FILE This report is restricted to use within the Bank. INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT ,LOAN ADNflNlSTRATION REPORT ON THE LOANS FOR 'l~HE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BELGIAN CONGO' December 23, 1954 • Department of Operatitons Europe, Africa and Austr~.1asia Department of Technical Operations Conversion Rates for Belgian and ... ____ !\~lgl~ ~_ql!l.q .Q.\ll:t:.ftIlU ___ _ 1 Belgian franc 1 Congo franc U.,S. $1 - 50 francs 1 franc - 2 U.8. cents 1,000,000 francs - U.8. $20,000 CONTENTS ~!~! . JlAPS - INTRODUGrION •••••••••••••••••••••• e ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1, CHAPI'ER I The Belgian Congo: Country and People HI • • • • • • • '• • 2 CHAPl'ER II The Ten Year Pla"'l: Execution and Financing •••••• 4 , ~ The Plan ••••••••••••••.••••.•••••••• !' • ., • • • • 4 The Condi.tions in ~Vhich the Plan Be·:~an II • • Investment Expenditure and Disbursement of the Bank's Loans •••••••••••• ~ •••••••••• 6 Financing of the Plan ••••••••••• !t • • • • • • O. 7 The Use of the Bank Loans • • • • II • • • • • • , •••• 8 CRAPI'ER III General Appraisal of the Program ••• e • • • • • • • • • ~ •• 8 Control and Execution •••••••••••••••••••• 8 The Test of Balanced Development ••••••••• 10 Financing Problems ••••••••••••••••••••••• 11 The Impact of the Plan on the Ordinary Budget ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 12 The Ultimate Burden •••••••••••••••••••••• 12 ANNEX ........ ................................ . ~ Transport ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 14 Power and Water Supply ••••••••• '.. ••• •• • •• • • • •••• 19 Agriculture ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 21 European Settlement ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 24 Research and SUl~eys ............................ . Housing ••••••••••••••••••••••• u • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .• • • 2, Native Education •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 27 Medical Facilities ... ~~ ......•.•...... •.......• ~ 28 Administration •••••• ~ ••••• It • ~... • •• • • •• • • • • • • • • • • 28 MAP i MISSION ITINERARY r."'-., ./". . ./0--.-.;-., r -...._.. /. . , . .r---........-'. . , .......,/.'\. .J '. • . (~ . ,.) ~ .J I PRO V INC E ( I 'I ~I > / 0 '-.~~ L. rJ-'" 0 R lEN TAL E J (palm plonbtp!,s I RUMU • t o o 17 oil renning) ELlSAB\ETHA (agriculturol research) YANGAMBI 1 0 ) A , '\ ,J (, '-..\ r-""\ ., r-"-.. I - -- -",", \, -' r \_J . . . . ) \- 'V I .. ~/""\ I \J , KINDUV _ _.:;,BY~A/~R_ _ _~~ I ," K ~ " 'V I I \ v u _.1 I <:) I 'K A SA', ___ _ • ,._ . A 0 MILES 0 100 200 300 400 ) ~!. . . . .~~~~~!. . . .--~;~~~I o 100 200 300 400 KM. ~I~~!~ ..~!~r~~. .~J ,_ _ _ _ _ _ MAP 2 RIVER AND RAIL SYSTEMS I (and new highway program) I I // " // I A N G o L A UKAM4 • I . WATERWAYS . I J RAILROADS l,r.. ..---'''' l~ADOTVILLE(. EXISTING UNDER CONSTRUCTION } • L • -< "'-. • .-J\,ELIS~THVIL.LE ARTERIAL ROADS a MAIN FEEDERS \ ~ '\ TO BE STARTED BEFORE 1960 AFTER 1960 r'-'- . ( • °-.s1 O ' • 100 200 300 400 KM. ' . .-. I , 1,0 2,0 3,0 4,0 MltESNO~HE R~ , ~HODESfll"A DECEMBER, 1954 MAP 3 BELGIAN CONGO r------------------------------------------------------ ~." .~~,.;- . .: ... . .: :. 1 CATTLE (Each dot .quall approximately 1,000 head) ) c;:~ COPPER CO COBALT • Zn ZINC Mn MANGANESE 0;0 DIAMONDS Au GOLD PROVINCE Sn TIN EQUATEU}•..•. U URANIUM· .... ' .. "'. " " ....... .................. .. ~~: ") ,/..J ,-""",, t~~ . , LEOPOLDVILLE 81~~'~-'-'1 ' ..... .. 7.2". \ • 1 •••••••••••• ..........-.-.-.,...,\ ...-.. .'- . PRINCIPAL )-~INING "GOTTON ,\\~\\\l\\\\~PALM OIL • COFFEE AREAS (COLUMNS INDICATE VALUE OF 1953 OUTPUT IN BILLIONS OF FRANCS) DECEMBER, 1954 o 100 200 300 400 KM. o 100 2M 300 400 MILES 1-- ! ! ! I ! ! ! I ,-1- Introduction 1. In September 1951 the Bank made two loans, tot,aling $70 million, to support the Ten Year Plan for the Econowic and Social Development of the Belgian Congo (Plan Decennal pour Ie Developpement Economique et Social du Congo BeIge). One loan, of $40 million, was to the Belgian Congo, guaranteed by Belgium, to assist in meeting th.e foreign exchange needs arising directly or indirectly fro:. -the execution of the Plan. The other, of $30 million, was to Belgium and was designed to meet the draul on Belgium's hard currency resources brought about by the greater production of goods for the Congo. Belgium was to make availablf to the Belgian Congo for the purposes of the Plan an amount of francs equivalen to the amount of the loan to Belgium, as and wh~.n the Congo Government required additional financing. The Bank's loans were intended to help finan.ce expendi- ture on the Plan in the two-year period from July 1, 1951 to June 30, 1953.This expenditure was estimated at 11 billion francs(~20 million). The franc equiva.... lent of the loans was to be applied to the investment in transport facilities made under the Plan by the Government-owned Office d'Exploitation des Transports Coloniaux (Otraco). In 1952" the Bank disbursed the loans on the basis of Otraco's actual investment e:Arpenditure between July 1, 1951 and June 30" 1952.In 1953/54J the rate of disbursement was determined by a special formula, which took into aCCOQut total e;qpenditure on the Plan, including otraco, and ensured that the full amount of the loans l'{auld be withdrawn when II billion francs had been spent. Each disbursement made b,y the Bank was divided between the borrowers, four-sevenths being disbursed to the Belgian Congo and three-sevenths to Belgium, in accordance with the respective amounts of the loans. 2. By June 1954 the disbursement of the loans was nearly completed and the Bank accordingly sent a wission to the Belgian Congo to appraise the progress of the program wit:1 which its loans were associated. The mission consisted of Alexande"t' stevensoil and Joseph Fajans of the Department of Operations - Europe, Africa and Australasia, and Bertil Walstedt of the Department of Technical Operations. After a week in Brussels for discussions mainly on financial aspects of the Plan, the mission spent the month of Ju~ in Africa, passing through Brussels on its return journey. The mission's itinerary in the Congo is shmvn on. map No.1. 3. The Ten Year Plan now involves expenditure at an annual rate of over $100 million equivalent on projects of various kinds scattered throughout the Colony. In the circumstances the mission's survey could only be impressionistic The mission discussed the progress of the Pl~n and related problems with those in charge in Leopoldville and the provincial capitals o .It visited as many of the most important projects as possible, paying special regard to the progress made by Otraco in expanding and modernizing its transport installations. Never- theless, there were many regions in the north" center and east of the countr,y which could not be included in its itinerary. And limitations of time" local experience and spel::ialized lmowledge sometimes made it impossible to form a considered judgmeni~ on particular projects. 4. The misston I s overaLl appraisal of the progress of the Ten Year Plan is contained in Chclpter III. Details on invest.mel:l,·t in the separate fields of transport, agriculture, housing, etc., are gt~en in the Annex. - 2 -' _ Chapter I wI,_ .......... The Belgian Congo: Country and ..People 5... The' Belgian Congo is eighty times as large as Belgium and one-third the size of t,he U.S. It lies within the Congo River system and its only access to the sea is by a narrow strip of land at the mouth of the river. Equatorial rain forest covers a vas'(j area in the center, giving place in the north and the south to ZOlles of subtropical grassland (savannah). Climatic and physical dif- ferences are wide between the hot humid area of the central Congo basin with its luxuriant vegetation and leisurely flowing rivers, the comparatively cool eastern regions of the Ki vu lvith its sparkling lakes, precipitous mountains and rushing torrents, and the dusty wastes of the upper Katanga il1 the south where, during the dry season,: only scrubby trees, towering termite hills, or the pillar of smoke f~om some distant brush fire break the monotony of the landscape. 6. The Congo River and its tributaries bind the country together with a vast network of largely navigable waterways. Yet, transportation difficulties have constantly hampered the country's development IIThe mountain ranges to the west and northeast and the equatorial forest in the center presented serious obstacles to penetration and not until the series of rapids on the lower Congo between what ·:!xe now Matadi and Leopoldville were circumvented by a railroad in 1898 could the inland waterways be adequately used to bring the countrY's produce to the Atlantic Ocean and the outside world. In the interior, railroad building by private interests and road building were in the past mainly motivated by the need to open up distant parts of tha country, rich in minerals and vege- table commodities, and link them ~th navigable rivers. The existing transport s,ystem is thus a combi:lation of water, rail and road transport oriented towards Matadi and cnara<.;teri'Zt!d by long distances, frequent transhipment and many delays, and, conseq-,].rsntly.) by high freight charges (see map No.2). 7. The development of the Congo has been further hampered by the fact that it is extremely thinly populated. There are only 12 million people in the whole country and their distribution is very uneven, as shown on map No o 3. Densities of over 100 per square mile exist, mostly in relatively inaccessible parts of the Kivu, while over much of the Congo basin and the Katanga the aver- age density is less than 5 per square mile. Despite the fairly strict control of migration, the proportion of Congolese living outside the tribal community has risen from one-twentieth to more than. one-fifth of the total in the past 20 years. This movement to the cities, particularly on the part of able-bodied men, is closely associated with the rapid industrialization, and has at times caused the authorities considerable concern lest it should affect agricultural produc- tion adversely and threaten balanced development. . 8. In the future, however, the problems brou5ht about by the growth of an urban proletariat are likely to be more serious than those arising from rural depopulation. r1igration has recently slawed down somewhat, and the cities, where the population is ~;roung and increasing rather rapidly, are becoming more able to satisfy the demand for :tndustrial labor from t,heir O'tffl natural increase. Nowhere is this more strikingly illustrated than in the Katanga. When Unio~ Minieredu - J. - Haut-Katanga began m1n1ng copper about 50 years ago, the Katanga was practically uninhabited and the majority of workers had to be recruited from other parts of the country. At present, apart from underground work which the local people will no longer do, the bulk of the Company's labor requirements can be met from the natural incrBase of the local population. 9. The resources of the Congo are far from fully developed. Wbile indus- trial workers in the Katanga or in Leopoldville may earn as much as their counter- parts in southern Europe, and the number of native commercial establishments has greatly increased in recent years, very many Congolese still eke out a bare sub- sistence b3T primitive shifting hoe culture, and the average income per head is estimated at $40 per annum. Yet the Congo has one of the mOst varied patterns of agricultural and mineral resources in Africa. ~Iost of the people are engaged in agriculture, which accounts for 30% of gross national product, or 36% if the processing of agricultural commodities is included. Besides growing manioc, maize, rice, bananas, pulses and groundnuts for domestic consumption, the Congo accounts for more than one-quarter of the worldis exports of palm oil and pro- duces substantial quantities of cotton, coffee, rubber, cocoa and tropical hard- woods.. More than one-f':..fth of the gro ss national product is attributable to mn1ng. The Congo produces over 200,000 metric tons of copper, significant quantities of tin, zinc and manganese, and is responsible for 'veIl over half the world's supplies of cobalt, industrial diamonds and uranium. Manufacturing, mostly for domestic consumption, accounts for about 6% of gross national product, having risen spectacularly over the past five years. 10. The Congo has not become a country of white settlement on a large scale. Less than 90,000 Europeans live there at present, roughly half of them in the larger cities. Strict financial, professional and health require~ents limit immigration and independent European settlers, merchants, craftsm.~n, industrialists and farmers, excluding their families, number only about, 7,000. Most of the 30,000 European adult men are employees of the Government and large corporations, and missionaries. Thus one 5ignificant source of racial friction in Africa, the conflict of interests, real or apparent, between the white settlers and Africans living on the land, is, in general, not found in the Congo. 11. The population of the Belgian Congo, both Congolese and European, has no elected representation. Goverr~ment Councils, composed of Government officials and r,ppointed European and Congolese members, advise the Governor General, t'lho is tte chief administrative officer in the Colony, and the Governors of the six pro- vinces. Changes in the prerogatives and composition of the Councils are being considered at present and, if enacted, should give a larger voice to the local p~lpulation, particUlarly as regards the Govern."Tient budget. The administrators of the 128 territories, many of which are more than half the size of the mother country, form the backbone of the Congo administration. These territorial admin r • istrators keep in close touch with local Congolese chiefs who play an importrunt administrative and judicial role where tribal traditions and custom take preced- ence. 12. The close relati.onship between business and government is perhaps a unique feature of the economic and administrative organization of the Belgian Congo. To obtain the necess~ financial and human resources to pacify, organize -4- and administer the Congo Free state, King Leopold II granted vast concessions around the turn of the century to various private groups.· Such groups, for example, first explored. the Katanga and initiated the development of its mineral deposits, prospected and worked the diamond concessions in the Kasai, and obtained transportation, land and mining concess)...Jns over large parts of the country. SincE- Belgium took over the administratiuil of the Congo, the influence of government has asserted itself but its close relationship with business remains a striking feature of colonial affairs. The Government has acquired large holdings and interests in many leading companies and its security portfolio is nOtrJ valued a.t the equivalent of $440 million. 13. Because of the historical role of private enterprise in administration and development, it. is often difficult to distinguish clearly between the spheres of private and public investment in the Congo. Besides building plants and rail- roads, opening up mines and organizing plantations, large private companies com- monly provide housing, hospitals, schools and recreation grounds for European and Congolese workers and their families, and, indeed, often for all the inhabitants in the area. Thus, private enterprise shares with the Government the burden of providing investment in basic services. Furthe~more, religious missions continue to play an important role in financ . ing and running health and educational facil- ities. Chapter II The Ten Year Plan: ~ecution and Financing The Plan 11. The Ten Year Plan was conceived in the postwar years, drawn up in 1948/49 and launched i~ 1950. The Congo had emerged from the war both economi- cally stronger and more confident in that strengtil. Ali the same time investment in basic services had inevitably lagged behind the expansion of production. The chief limitations on further econolnic development were shortages of transport and power, and a lack of skilled labor. lrJhile the first could be dealt with directly by expanding capacity, the second was more complicated and had to be attacked on many fronts. It involved reorganizing native agriculture to raise productivity and thus release manpower. It involved further extending general and technical education, and improving living conditions both in the urban areas to which labor was being attracted and in the rural tribal societies from which it 1-ras drawn. Accordingly, the Plan provided for the following distribution of investment qy the Government and Government owned organizations: in million r-.i~ancs ...!... Transport and communications 12,962 51 Power and water supply 2,961 12 Agriculture 1,638 6 European settlement 586 2 Research and. surveys 165 I Housing 1,900 8 Native education 1,838 7 Medical facilities 1,978 8 Administration 1,200 5 Total 25,228 leo - 5- The Conditions in vfuichthe Plan Beg~ lS. Just as the Plan lI1as getting under way, the Korean war broke out. World demand for raw materials soared and commodity prices followed suit. In the Congo, the output of minerals, except tin, rose substantially and already in 1951 production of copper, cobalt, zinc and industrial diamonds exceeded the estimates for 1960 made when the Plan was drawn up. Production of palm oil and other vegetable proU11cts increased considerably. Exports nearly doubled between 1949 and 1951 and the surplus in current payments was supplemented by an inflow of long term capital. Employment and money incomes expanded, and private consump- tion and investment were stepped up sharply. However, the threat to financial stability from the export boom was moderated when imports also expanded fai.~ly quickly and the Government's ordinary budget continued to show substantiel sur- pluses. 16. The end of the commodity boom in 1951/52 brought a change in the situa- tion. A period of readjustment set in as the terms of trade \lorsened and local banks grew more wary of fir~ncing stocks. Wholesale and retail sales fell, mer- chants sometime found their resources strained, and the volume of residential construction declined sharply. Nevert-heless, the tide turned quickly and since the middle of 1953 conditions of prosperous stability have ruled in the country, with the exception perhaps of Kivu province which is affected by price changes in coffee, pyrethrum and cinchona, by tourist expenditures and the inflow of refugee capital. Production and employment have continued to expand and private investment has remained high, although dipping appreciably as expansion programs neared completion. Imports have remained large, with a sl.zitch within their total froril consumers goods to materials required for the Plan. Although the movements of prices of the individual commodities have not been uniform, the index of export prices has held at a level about 30% above 1948/49. In 1952 and 1953, the C:I:r.:.go had a deficit on current account which, however, was more than covered by dra~~ngs on the Bank's loan of $40 million and the MBA loans of 1951 and by new loans floated in Switzerland. The financial position of the Govern- ment has remained favorable. Ordinary revenue exceeded ordinary expenditure but the surplus was lower. 17. In the early years of its execution, therefore, the Plan had to COM- pete with strong private demand for goods, manpower and services!!l Shortages of labor made it difficult to recruit adequate numbers of mIen to w\.:,rk on public investment projects. Qualified European personnel were also hard to find in a world of full ernployment@ Delivery dates of equipment grew longer and supplies were delayed by transport bottlenecks. Indeed, in the fall of 1951 the port and railroad facilities at and between Matadi and Leopoldville became so congested that temporary import restrictions had to be imposed. Not until the spring of 1952, when additional handling and hauling aquipment had been delivered, were normal transport conditions reestablished. Another bottleneck appeared late in 1951 when the supply of cement and the capacity of the building trades proved insufficient to satisfy both private and public construction needs. 18. In these circumstances, the authorities proceeded cautiously with the execution of the Plan, and only in 1952 did it really gain momentum. Indeed, in the readjustment at the end of that year, the increased rate of investment - 6 - under the Plan helped to keep the economy on an even keel. The initial delay meant, however, that a much greater effort was now called for in the field of public utilities and social services to match the higher level of production and export capacity achieved and thus ensure the country's balanced. development. 19. Execution of the Plan was slow at first also for other reasons. Cost estimates had to be revised because of mounting prices, native workers had often to be trained in advance for specific jobs, and access roads had to be built to bring equipment and materials to construction sites. Terrain and weather condi- tions sometimes raised unexpected obstacles. Soils had to be analyzed in order to make proper plmls for agricultural development and river flows studied before work could start on irrigation and hydroelectric projects. Similarly, surveys had to be carried out to find the most appropriate routes for roads and railroads. Plans for new airports had to be revised because new types of aircraft needed longer runways. Investment Expenditure and Disbursement of the Bank's Loans 20. The total cost of the Plan for the ten years 1950-1959 had been esti- mated originally at 25 billion francs ($500 million). Mainly because of higher costs this had already been raised to 33 billion francs at the time of loan neg- otiations l.d th the Bank in the middle of 1951» The latest revision submitted by the Governor General to the Ninistry of Colonies in July 1954 incorporates sub- stantial physical changes, particularly in the road program, and puts the cost at 48 billion francs (~p960 million). \-Jhen the mission arrived in the Congo, 15 billion francs had been spent under the Plan. In the first two years, public investment was only about 3 hillion francs and the annual rate of expenditure of 5-6 billion francs envisaged at the time of the loan negotiations was not reached. unti.l 19530 21. Disbursement of the Bankls loans consequently took longer than had been anticipated. The closing date of September 30, 1953 \..ras postponed for a year and the last disbursement was made on August 5, 1954. The following table sho~s expenditure on the Plan and disbursements by the Bank by years. Expenditure in francs Equivalent Disbursement expressed in till June 30, 1954 in dollars dollars till August 5, 1954 ~Bel,ium To Congo (in millions 1950 655 13.1 1951 2,468 4901.J, 1952 3,876 7705 10.6 14.1 1953 5,346 106.9 13.5 18.0 1954 (1st half) 2,695 53a9 5~9 7.9 15,040 1/ 30D:S 30.,0 ~/ '40.0 1/ 1/ Excluding investment by the Fonds du Bien-Etre Indigene. 2/ Dollars only" 11 $)2.8 million in dollars and $7.2 million in Swiss francs. - 7- ~inancihg of ~he P~an 22~ To date~ the financing of the Plan has not raised a~ problems. Because of the policy of the Congo TreasUl:".". to borrow in advance of needs and the favor- able ordinary budget results', ample means have always been available to meet the requirements of public investment. The Congo Treasury has even been able to make substantial amounts of Belgian francs and foreign currencies available to the Belgian Treasur,y, either directly or through the large balances which it maintained at the Central Bank of the Belgian Congo and Ruanda"'Urund1, and which the latter invest~d in Belgian Treasury paper. 23~ How the Plan was financed can best be seen from the following table show- ing the increase of the Belgian Congo debt between the end of 1949 and the middle of 1954, expressed in billion francs. Congo f~ Belgian francs U.S. dollars Swiss francs Total Short-term debt -0.5 5.2 Long-term debt 4.1 11.7 3.b 16.9 24. The increase was greatest in obligations: denominated in Congo francs, which had been very sITlall in 1949. Practically all the Congo tranc"debt is held by Congo commercial banks, leading corporations and public institutional investors like the Caisse Co1oniale des Pensions and the Cals'se <:l'.Epargne du Congo BeIge et du Ruanda-Urundi. Before the second World War th~se organizations, insofar as they were in existence during the thirties, used to t ra.ns.fer available funds to Brussels and invest them there either in metropolitan securities or in Congo bonds denominated in Belgian franc~. Cut off from the Belgian market during the 't'lar J and the:':-eafter mindful of the "geographical. risk" invalved in keeping funds in Belgi Uin, colonial organizations got into tht~ hahi t of holding substantial funds in Congo francs. Consequently, there has been in the Congo in the past five years a continuing demand for short, medium and, more recently, even long- term securities, which the Treasury was able to tap by selling Treasury bills and placing longer term bonds with institutional investors, and in December 1953 by offering to the public an issue of long-term bonds which brought in O·ler 2 billion francs. 25. New loans in Belgian francs consisted of two public issues in 1950, of five and ten year bonds respectively, which brought in 2.3' billion francs, and an issue of twenty year bonds in April 1954 which gave 2~2 billion francs. These loans all give the holder the option of receiving payment in Leopoldville. 26. Loans obtained in foreign currencies are at long-te~m only.. The Belgian Congo borrowed in the Swiss market 60 million Swiss francs each in 1950, 1952 and 1953; in addition, $7~2 million of the Bank's. $40 m.i.llion loan represents a Swiss franc obligation. The dollar debt con1sists of two U. S. Government (MSA) loans totaling $17.1 million, contracted i,i'l, 1950 and 1951 by Belgium and trans- ferred to the Congo which services them, and o~ t.he bulk of the Bank's $40 million loan of which $2.3 million is now ;~ld by pri'vate investors without - 8 - the Bank's guarantGe. The greater part of the foreign currency loans was drawn down in 1952 and 1953, and, in the latter ye~, the Congo Government was able to consolidate 25% of its domestic floating debt. 27. The position of the Congo Treasur,y has improved very considerably since the end of 1949. Through Jlme 1954, it borrowed about 11 billion francs, about 2 billion frrulcs more than it spent on the Plan. It accumulated additional funds since ordinary budget surplusl~s for 1950-1953 exceeded extraordinary budget ex- penditure other than that on the Plan. On June 30, 1954, the Treasury had balances amounting to 11.2 billion francs, of which 7.5 billion francs represented the Budget Equalization Fund earmarked to cover future deficits in the ordinary budget, The remainder, 3.7 billion francs, was freely available to the Government for making payments on the Plan or otherwise. The Use of the Bank Loans 28.. The Bank's participation in the financing of the Plan has so far been smaller than was envisaged when the loans were made. Although the full $70 million has been made available in foreign exchange to the Belgian monetar.y area, only the proceeds of the $40 million loan to the Belgian Congo, equivalent to 2 billion Congo fra"1.cs, ~--e accrued to the Colonial Treasury. The Belgian Congo has not yet used the 1.5 billion Belgian francs which represent the counterpart of the $30 million loan to Belgium. The Convention of December 2, 1951 between the Belgian ~unisters of Finru1ce and of Colonies governing the use of these funds provides that the Congo can draw on it.s claim against Belgium when it is short of Belgian francs to oover the needs of the Plan. So far the Congo has had ample franc reserves, which the Belgian Government allowed it to supplement with an issue of 2~2 billion francs in the Brussels market in April 1954. 29. The Congo Treasury does not earmark specific funds for particular uses. Receipts flow into one pool and payments are made from it without any differentia- tion as to the source of funds. It is thus im~ossible to say that the 2 billion francs which accrued to the Congo Government over the period of disbursement of the Bank's $40 million loan, was applied to investment by otraco. Nevertheless, Otracc has invested 4(" billion francs since July 1, 1951 and its management confirmed to the mission that their investment requirements have always been met promptly by the Congo Treasury. Chapter III ~eral Appraisal of the Program Control and Execution 30~ The work of supervising the execution of the Plan falls principally to the Ten Year Plan Office (Commissariat du Plan Decenna1) in Leopoldville, the Director of which reports to the Vice-Governor General. In each province there is an Inspector of the Plan, usually a former territorial administrator familiar with local conditions and problemsQ His office checks terms of contracts relat- ing to particular works, compares actual costs and rate of expenditure with ... 9 - estimates, and watches the progress of the different sectors of the Plan in the province. Close contact is maintained both in Leopoldville and in the provinces between the Plan office and other Government departments concerned (for example, those of Public Works and Agricult ure), the contractors, f:.'f.ld last but not least the local territorial administrators on whose shoulders falls much of the work, for example, of organizing a native agricultural settlement or directing the construction of a rural dispensary. 31. The Commissariat du Plan does not, however, supervise all investment under the Plan. The various autonomous organizations, otraco, Institut NationaJ pour l'Etude Agronomique du Congo BeIge (Ineac), Office des Cites Africaines (OCA), Regie de Distribution d'Eau et d'Electricite (Regideso) and the two Societes des Forces Hydroelectriques have full responsibility for planning and supervising work in their respective fields of operations. While these organ- izations appear entirely competent to carry out their allotted tasks, most of them have their headquarters in Brussels and it seemed to the mission that the planning authorities in Leopoldville did not always have as much information about their activities as would have been desirable. More recently, however, steps have been taken to secure better liaison. 32. With regard to organization, another point may be worth making. The Commissariat du Plan has also recently been charged with the important task of coordinating the revision of the Plan in the light of experience. The office is highly efficient and can draw on the services of the various Government departments. Nevertheless, its staff is small and the complicated task of revising the Plan, superimposed on the day-to-day job of supervising work in progress, placed a very heavy burden on it. 33. In principle, the Government tries to get pri'vate cont.ractors to undertake cO'·lstruct,ion. Sometimes, however, particularly in rural areas, this may be impossible, and sometimes the bids are too high. In such cases the pro- vincial services of the Public Works Department of the Government or the autono- mous organization involved carries out the work itself. 34. On one or two projects the mission visited, for example the Tshopo power station, it appeared that contracting firms had taken on jobs tl~t were larger than they were accustomed tOI and that some delay has resu1tei~ Occa- sionally, conditions of soil and climate have ',?,iven rise to uni'oreseen diffi- culties during construction. In the enlargement of the Stanleyville airport, for instance, the stone and gravel used had such a high affinity for moisture that the asphalt coating stripped off and the work has had to be redone at considerable added cost. Sometimes del~~s have occurred because of difficul- ties in obtaining replacement parts sp~edily. But these were isolated exan~les. 35. On the whole, the mission felt that the work was being carried Due efficiently and without more than the normal teething troubles to be expected in a program of this magnitude. Much of the credit for this appears to be attributable to the officials charged with supervising and executing the various parts of the program, both at headquarters and in the field. The mission was very favorably impressed with their 6fficiency and imagiilation, their knowledge of local conditions, and their up-to-date information on the .progress'of parti- cular projects. - 10 - The Test of Balanced Develop"2~ 36. The Ten Year Plan was intended to provide the added basic services re- quired to make possible a smooth and rapid expansion ot production, and at the same time to improve Ii ring standards of the Congolese. The rate of its execu- tion has so far clearly been dictated by pqysical and technical rather than b,y financial limits. It was slowed down when it appeared that to try to foree the pace at the height of the private investment boom during the Korean war would have had in.:.-fJ.ationary consequences. Sinct3 then it has been speeded up, and total C~vernment consumption and investment, including all expenditures on the Plan, are nO't-t equivalent to about one-third of the national income. At the pre- sent rate of spel,lding on the Plan w S-6 billion francs a ye(·ar - the productive apparatus appears to be running at full speed without being overloaded. The authorities have not yielded to the temptation of trying to go too fast bec~use finance was available and, with a few exceptions, expansion in the various fields of public investment has so far complemented the expansion in the private sector well. 37. By far the lar~est eA~enditures under the Plan have been on transporta- tion. Here, although the Matadi-LeopoldvUle railroad always tends to be a bottleneck, the expanded and improved facilities of otraco are already bandling with dispatch a load nearly twice as heavy as in 1948 and considerably heavier than had been anticipated five years ago. Efficiency should be increased further as more new rolling stock and river craft are added and b,y the recent relatively cheap installation of "Scotchlite n markings which make night navigation possible on the Congo and Kasai Rivers. As regards roads, the del~s in construction are explained by the fact that the earlier conceptions of the road program proved erroneous and had to be radically changed. Economic development has probably been hampered somewha.l~ by these delays, particularly in the east by the postpone .. ment of the co~utruction of roads such as that between Bukavu and Stanleyville. 38. Forecasting the demand for power in a country like the Congo is extremel:, difficult and expert estimates often differ widely. The completion of the Zonga station near Leopoldville will come nc~ too soon, for o~ the availability of excess energy across the Congo River at a new station in French Equatorial Africa saved the capital from an acute power shortage before Zongo was ~ompleted. In the east, on the other hand, a ~~jor question, to which the mission could not form a firm opinion, is whether the scheduling of the projected qydro-stations at Stanleyville and :i.~l the Ruzizi. Valley may not have been based on. rather optimistic estimates of expected demand. 39. In agriculture the research and development work of Ineac, particularly in improving plant strains (notably coffee and oil palm) are impressive and pro- bably well worth their comparatively high cost. The main aim of the agricultural program proper is to transform the primitive shifting subsistence agriculture of the Congolese into permanent settlements called "paysannats", pra~cticing a rational system of tillage and crop rotation, and producing a substantial surplus for the market. The p3.ysannat program was naturally slow to get under way but, once started, the results look extremely encouraging. However, largely because costs o·! organizing and settling farmers are higher than had been ant,icipated and more .. 11 - qualif'ied peraormel are required, the Government has cut the ten-year target from 450,000 to 300,000 farms. This cut is probably inevitable, but the fact that 200,000 new farmers will have been added in the same period means that the tra.nsformation of Congolese agriculture will still be very slow. 40. In housing, though the need for improved housing for the Congolese will, of; course, remain very great, the public programs, supplemented b.r those of the :private sector, are making possible a radical improvement in living con- ditions for Congolese in most of the major towns. Only in Leopoldville does th!Z! continued inn ux 0 f people and the large backlog of substandard housing make the pro'blem rather intractable. As regards medical facilities, schools and other administrative buildings, the same generally favorable conclusions apply. 41. The Government is now undertaking a thorough-going review of invest- ments to be carried out in the next five years. Many important decisions have not yet been finally taken. The mission was, however, impressed with the care and thoroughness with which particular problems were being attacked, and is confident that the ultimate result will correspond closely both to the exist- ing needs and to the available resources. Financing Problems 42. So far the development of the Belgian Congo has not been hindered b.Y any shortage of funds for public investment. Financing the Plan has brought the Colonial debt up to about one-half the national income, still a fairly modest burden. Yet when the au!.irun'ities salol that the completion of the Plan would cost .far more than had originally been estimated, they undertook a thorough-going examination and revision of the Plan in order to see more clear~ what it would. cost and what its physical and financial implications might be. The revised :21an is nOt-T estimated to cost about 48 billion francs in all. It has still not, -:'-,een decided whether thi s should be spent in the ten-year period 1950-1959 or lvhether expenditure on some of the works included should be extended into the early sixties. 43. It is not, of course, possible to say in any detail how the remaining expenditurE:S, estimated at about 30 billion francs, will be financed. The 1954 ordinary budget sl~plus will probably again be large enough to cover extraordin- ar,y budget expenditure not related to the Plan and leave something over to finance Plan expenditure. The balances of the Colonial Treasury could provide, say, about 3 billion francs more. Nevertheless, at the present rate of expendi- ture, particularly for purchases in Belgiura, this would not last long and it would not be wise to let Treasury balances fall too low. In the circumstances, it would not be surprising if the Congo were soon to turn again to the Brussels capital market or to calIon the counterpart of the Bank's $30 million loan to Belgium. 44. Beyond this, the Congo Treasury will have to borrow 5 to 6 billion francs per annum to meet the cost of the Plan. Host of the capital should con- tinue to come from the Congo and from Belgium in the form of public issues, loans by institutional investors such as Government pension funds, and the sale of Treasury bills. The rest, probably at least one billton francs per annum, will - 12 - have to be found ab~oad. In view of the structure of the Congo balance of pay- ments, the proceeds of Congo is sues in Brussels and also a part of the proceeds of external loans would be used to cover Congo deficits with Belgium on current account. The Impact of the Plan on the Ordinary Budget 45. Though there are technical and economic reasons for many of the changes being made in the Plan, the decision to hold total expenditures to 48 billion francs and to trim investment accordingly ca~e largelY from a scrutiny of the costs of operating and maintaining the larger facilities built, and from a real- ization of the effects of these costs on the ordinary budget. 46. The heavy investment in hospitals, schools, agriculture and transport facilities will also lead to a rise in current expenditure on personnel, materials and maintenance. Salaries of Government personnel, for instance, absorb over 40% of ordinary budget expenditure and it now appears that rather more personnel than originally envisaged may be required to staff the new installatioIls. For instance, whereas one agricultural agent was previously provided for each 10,000 Congolese cultivators, one such agent can supervise adequately only 3,000 natives in a newly organized paysannat. Again, the contracting inflow of members of religious orders will necessitate staffing hospitals and schools with la,y Europ- ean medical and teaching personnel whose cost to the Government is far higher than that of missionaries. It is the Government's policy to employ more Congo- lese workers in more and more responsible administrative positions and thereby reduce the burden on the ordina~ budget. However, this can be done only very gradually as the required level of professional aptitude is aChieved. (.t 41. Ordina~ budget expenditures on health may reach about 1.5 billion francs' in 1959 comparei with about 500 million francs in 1950 and 900 million francs in 1953, while the cost of maintaining and staffing the schools may be over 1.3 billion francs in 1959 compared with 300 million in 1950 and 720 million in 1953. Ordinary expenditures on agriculture, transport and communications will also increase sUbstantially. The borrowing of an additional 30 billion francs in the next five years (or eight years if the Plan is stretched out until 1962) will increase the annual debt service to about 2.5 billion francs in 1959 compared with about 200 million francs in 1950 and 500 million francs in 1953. As a result, total ordinary budget expenditure may reach 12-13 billion fr~'cs by the end of the decade, and 14-1, billion in the early sixtie·s, compared with only 4.3 billion in 1950 and 6.1 billion in 1953. The Ultimate Burden 48. The significance of these figures depends on the rate of growth of the economy. At the present time, Government expenditures, recurrent and capital, are equivalent to about one-third of the national income. By the end of the decade they will have risen by about one-third. Thus, if they 1rlere to continue to bear the same proportion to national income, the latter wouli have to grow at a rate of about 6% per annum. Though this is by no means improbable if world economic conditions remain favorable, it would nevertheless require a ve~ con- siderable effort, particularly since the labor force in the Congo is expected to grow by only 20-25% over the same period. On balance it would appear likely - 13 - that, at least for a time around 1960 when capital expenditure is still high, consumption and investment by the Government will take a somewhat larger share of available resources than they now do. 49. The Congo, of course, remains a raw material producing country subject to the vicissitudes of the ~]orld marke't. Provided, however, that the long-run expansion in world demand for its products continues, the burden of Government expendi ture should not place an undue strain on the economy. In view of the Congo's strong reserve position, its ability to borrow abroad, and also the present structure and incidence of taxation, there is no reason to expect that what additional real burden might ensue should have untoward consequences. -14 ... ANNEX TRANSPORT General 1. The backbone of the transport system of the Belgian Congo is the railroad from the ocean port of Matadi to Ieopoldvil1e and the river links to the:northeast with the Congo River port of stan1eyville and to the south- east With Port Francqui on the Kasai River. These facilities are operated b~' Otraco. The interior is served by three private railroads connecting with Otraco (see map Nq. 2)'" In the south, the Compagnie du Chemin de Fer du Bas- Congo au Katatlga (B. C.K.) connects the Upper Katanga minL"lg region with Port Francqui. Further north, the Compagnie 'des Chemins de Fer du Congo-Superieur aux Grands Lacs Africains (C.F.L.) provides a rail-river connection between Lake Tanganyika and Stanleyville'. Finally" the Societe des Chemins de Fer Vicinaux du Congo (Vicicongo) connects the north-eastem agricultural and mining region with the Otraco RiYer system west of Stanleyville. A substantial number of roads and navigable rivers feed into the above main traffic arteries. 20 About one-fourth of Congo foreign trade is carried on foreign rail- roads" primarily through Angola to Lobito on the Atlantic Ocean, but also through British Central and East Africa to Beira, Dar-es-Salaam and Mombasa on the Indian Ocean. Because of shorter distances and fewer trans-shipments" these are natural outlets for the Katanga and Kivu provinces. Nevertheless, 'tiO secure a higher degree of utilization of the Congo transport 'System, the Government seeks b,y means of special tariffs and agreements to g~ar<ee that a substantial proportion of the Kivu and Katanga traffic moves via Matadi. 3. TC\ ensura cheap and rapid transport over this ItVoie Nationale" is of vital Drportance to the Congo and at the same time ver,y difficult. Distances are enonnous. It is 1,75f lane from Leopo1dville to Stanleyville and a further 1,OO~ km.by poor road to Bukavuj 2,)00 km. by river-rail from Leopoldville to Elisabethville. Frequent trans-shipments are necessar.l~ and traffic densities in the interior (except for the Upper Katanga) are low. Only about 300,000 tons per year move through Stanleyville and Port Francqui" only ab~ut 200,600 tons over most portions of -the C.F. L. network, and only about 100,06'0 tons over the Vicicongo railroad. 4. In the last five years, goods traffic has grown by roughly 50%, but local traffic on the Matadi-Leopoldville railroad has increased more rapidly and inbound traffic has grown much faster than outbound. This put a heavy strain on the ports and on the Otraco river fleet, ship requirements being largely determined by the upstream movementG Although the worst congestion '. in the ports of Matadi and Leopoldville was remedied in 1952, the Matadi- Leopoldville railroad, beset by occasional derailments in the rainy season, still tends to be a bottleneck. In the east., lew water disrupted traffic on the Lualaba river in 1953, but the arrival of new dredges and the regulation resultj~g from the new dam at the Delcommune power station should bring some improvem.ent. -15 -- 5. Against, the above background, it is easily'understandable that one- half of the original cost of the Plan was to be spent on transport. The objectives were to equip the transport system to handle' a two-fold increase in traffic over 1948/49 level~ and to provide in certain regions new transport facilities, mainly r~.,ads. In general,the Government was to carry out pennanerl civil engineering works for ports, waterways~ railroads~ roads and airports, while the government-ovmed and private carriers Vfould finance buildings and equipment. Owing, to the rise in prices and the inclusion in the Plah of certail additional facilities for Otraco, the est:iJnated expenditure on transport was raised to 22.5 billi,on francs. To the time of- the mission's visit 8.6 billion fran ce had been spent. Investment by the Government in Water and Rail Transpo~ 6. The Plan included the extension of the quays at Matadi from 1,050 to 1,750 meters and a-t Leopoldville from 390 to 1,600 meters. At Matadi, work on the neVi 560 meters quay has progressed slow-ly because of much earth ~in;g and excavatt.g, but completion is now confidently expected for the end of 1955.' Work is also far advanced on a wide rail outlet through the rocks belund the port, replacing the ttUUlel envisaged in the Plan. At Leopoldville, a 270 meter extension to the old quay was completed in 1951" while bids have been invited for a 313 meter extension scheduled for completion by the end of 1956. s~ar improvements at other river and lake ports are well advanced. 7. The use of liS cotch-lite" marldngs has made possible night navigation on the rivers at a lower cost than originally estimated. Night traffic between Leopoldville and Stanleyville was opened in October 1953. The marking of the Kasai River has been completed. It was in progress along the estuar,y of the Congo River when the mission visited l1atadi. 8. The 450 km. long rail connection between B.G.K. at Kamina and C.F.L. at Kabalo will probably be opened by the end of 1956. Although this link is prLma~ily of strategic importance, it lvill also open up new tracts of land for agricultural development. The Government finances the eastern half of it, work on the western half being carried out by B.C.K. itself. Th.e Kamina-Kaba10 railroad may be the first step towards a continuous trans-African railroad on Belgian and British territor,y, inteJ~upted on~ by a ferr,y across Lake Tanganyika. The second step would be a 850km. connection linking Port Francq~ the northernmost point on the B. C. K.• , railroad, with the Leopoldville-Mc:ttadi railroad, a project which is nov; under study. Investment by otraco in its Installiations 9. By the middle of 1954, otraco had invested 5.6 billion francs under the Plan. Investment reached a. peak of 1.8 billion francs in 1953; only 1.3 billion was to be spent in 1954, and a £urther slight reduction was predicted for 1955. Roughly, 30% of the total had been spent on the river fleet and 10% on port equipment, while 20% paid for rolling stock for the Matadi-Leopoldville railroad. Housing for employees accounted for another 20%. Smaller amounts were used to improve the track between Matadi and Leopoldville, for railroad repair shops, and for equipment for the smallY~vu and Mayumbe railroads which will probably be dismantled after the completion of parallel highways. -16 ... 10. The ports are rapidly being converted from their previous congested and outmoded layout to modern loading and unload.i.ng plants. The wC';rehouse area at the Otraco port in Leopoldville vvill have more than doubled by early 1955. At Matadi the number of electric cranes has been trip1ed l and warehouse space moderately expanded. It appears that, due to rationalization measures, both Leopoldville and Matadi will be able to handle on a given quay frontage a larger volume of traffic with less equipment than originally foreseen. Be-' caUSEl of the rise in prices of building materials and the insufficient capacity of the local construction industr.y, some of the warehouses built in the early 1950 l s were very expensive. Thus, a ?yarehouse which. cost 4,000 francs per square meter in 1952/53 can now be built at 2,800 francs per square meter. 11. The capacity of otraco river tugs was 60% higher and the loading capacity cf Otraco barges 85% higher at the end of 1953 than at the end of 1949c. Present plans envisage further increases to respectively III and 125% above the 1949 level b.Y the end of 1958. A large part of the new tugs and barges are designed for push-towing which will permit barges to average about eight round trips per year between Leopoldville and Stanle~-ville as compared with 4.3 trips under the old system. The first "integrated tug-.boat", carrying both passengers and cargo, was put into traffic last year. Several similar vessels have been ordered, although there may be some question as to their economy of operation. However, there are savings in time and labor. 12. Since 1950, the conversion of the u~tadi-Leopoldville railroad to diesel traction has been proceeding steadily. At the end of 1953, the rail- road had at its disposal about 3,400 wagons as compared with 2,300 at the end of 1949, and anot,her 400 were bsing assembled. Addi tional investment will probably be entailed in replacing 1,200 small cars dating fram 1911-1925. Expenditure on track improvement and on new sidings has thus far been moderate. The capacity of the heavily traveled first 100 kIn. from Leopoldville will be doubled through the instailation of a central traffic control system in the next three years. In addition, Otraco has asked the Government to finance substantial improvements in the present roadbed (curves, grades, ballasting) with a view to reducing maintenance cost and improving safety and speed. 13. Repair and construction of small river craft have in the past been done for Otraco by a private shipyard. Their agreement expires in 1956. Otraco now intends to do much of this work itself and is consequently building a shipr3ard at Leopoldville. Substantial investment in railroad maintenance shops and in marshalling yards, both at Matadi and Leopo1dville, will also be made over the next. two to three years. Major repairs will remain centralized at Thysville, half-way between the tvfO cities, where a new workshop for diesel locomotives has been installed. 14. Investment in housing, hospitals and welfare facilities has been heavy, particularly in 1953. The housing program for European personnel, partly aimed at imprOving present standards, may soon taper off. Family cbJ'ellings for Congolese workers, however, are to be built at the rate of 1,500 per annum for some years to come" since otraco aims at lodging the majori:ty of its 33,000 Congolese workers in its own~:attlements. -17 - 15. In the light of the preceding information, it seems doubtful whether otraco will in fact be able to reduce its present rate of investment, or whether, on the contrar,y, some increases will not prove necessar.y. 16. The cost per ton-kIn. of traffic (including depreciation but not interest) has increased by about 25% in the past four years, both OIl the riverE. and on the Matadi-Leopoldville railroad. Vlhile this v.ras largely the result of a rise in wages and fuel prices~ the 40% expansion in traffic has not btaen accompanied by any reduction in the number of personnel per unit of transport. On the other hand, depreciation aJ~owances which are based on replacement values have increased roughly in proportion to the increased traffic: and interest charges have more than doubled. Primarily because of automatic slidin, scale adjustments of tariffs on export products, otraco's receipts in 1953 did not quite suffice to cover operating expenditures, including interest. Because of the Government's polic,y to keep transport costs at the lowest possible leve1 1 otraco has not insisted on a rate increase. Nominally, since 1952, Otraco has Ufinancial autonomy". In practice this means little, as long as its tariffs are set by the Government, the bulk of its investment is financed by the Govern- ment, and borrcwving requires Government approval and guarantee. Roads 17. In 1949, there were almost 100,000 kme of public roads in the Congo, of which about one-fourth were classified as national and provincial, and the rest as local. In addition, there were about 13,000 km() of private roads. Even the national roads were narrow and winding, and generally incapable of support- ing anything heavier than 4-ton trucks. (n many routes, bridges were lacking and ferries had to be used. Depreciation of motor vehicles was excessive. There were only about 10,000 trucks and an equal number of passenger vehicles, but their nu.rnbers have nOW' doubled. 18. The Plan called for the construction of five trunk-roads, totaling 9,000 km. TtNO of these would span the Colony from east to west and two from north to south, while the fift,h would provide the important Bukavu-Stanleyville .- ···conne"Ction. In addition, there would be 11 main feeder roads exceeding in length 3,000 km. The total cost was put at over 6 billion fra:acs. The highest possible degree of mechanization was to be introduced, both in construction and maintenance. 19. These plans have not proved appropriate. The benefits of trunk road~ spanning the whole countr,y - and often duplicating rail-river connections ~had been exaggerated, particularly in view of the light traffic, while the immediate and urgent need for improving the existing road network and building new access roads had not been fully rea.lized. Secondly, road building costs had been greatJ.y unde~estimated and the actual cost of the origLlal road program would now appear to be three times th(-!~, . --",+,~ and quite out of proportj_c~l to the financial possibilities. Thirdly, tIle idea of having the trunk roads follow existll1g road$ as far as possible was challenged in favor of building nav and more direct roads. Finally, execution was limited by the lack of trained persorh~el and the capacity of the construction industr.y. -18 - 20. At the end of 19$3, only about 250 km. of trunk roads and feeder roads were approaching completion, while work on another 200 km. was in progresse The Boma-Tshela feeder roa.d, paralleling the :Mayumbe railroad, should be ready about the end of 1954, and the Bukavu-Uvira road, paralleling the Kivu rail- road, is expected to be completed in mid-1956. Total expenditure had reached 1 billion francs. 21. A new road program bas now been worked out. It envisages cutting the trunk and feeder road program from 12,000 km. to less than 5,000 km., and extending its completion to 1962. About 4.5 billion francs would~ span-t on trunk and feeder roads and 3.0 billion francs on secondary roads _ and bridges during the period 1954-59 and another 4 billion francs on trunk roads in 1960-1962. 22. The Bukavu-Stanleyville trunk road v.rl.~th a feeder road from Goma and the Bukavu-Kindu se ction of the east-west road to Matadi will, when complete,d in 1959-62, greatly improve the transport situation of the easter.n Congo. At the present moment, the coordination of the new public highway network with the established private railroads in this area raises a number of diffioult and delicate problems. One of them, for instance, is the feeder-road program for North-eastem Congo (Mambasa-Mungbere and Aketi-Bumba) which is essentially geared to the Vicicongo railroad. This railroad, however, is already operating close to capacity, and would have to be expanded to handle additional traffic. Hence, there may be an ar~ent for an alternative new direct highway from Bunia to Mambasa and Stanleyville, w~ich would provide an efficient outlet for Lake Albert fish, Ituri cattle and other products of the region. 23. Progress on mechanized road maintenance has been slow. Often machiner,y could not be used until certain bridges had been built. Now the whole ma~1t·6,J.ance problem is being reappraised. Although the Government has accumulated a sizeable fleet of road maintenance equipment, this fleet is dis- persed and lacks homogeneity~ What is required, according to some experts, is, first, to create several new "road laboratories" to establish the best con- struction and maintonance techniques for eaCh region, and, secondly, to screen existing equipment and concentrate the best types in a limited number of regional pools where they could be used to maximum effect. Airports 24. Air transport in the Congo has become the chief means of medium and long distance travel for Europeans. Since 1949 the number of passenger-trips in internal traffic has almost tripled to 63,000 in 1953. In international air traffic 40,000 passengers were carri(~do The 4.7 lone long landing strip for the n~T international airport near Leopoldville was inaugurated while the mission was in Leopoldville~ The new airport at Elisabethv111e, capable of acco~nodating nc-6 planes, should be ready by early 1955, and a similar one at 1/ This classification includes 15,000 km. of national and .provincial roads - not designated as trunk roads or feeder roads. -19 - Stanleyville is nearing completion. Progress in improving four provincial airports (Do-4 traffic) and 20 local air fields (DC-) traffic) is slower. Partly because of considerable technical difficulties in constructing satis- factory l~"1ding strips tmder Congo soil conditions, expenditure on ail:ports is now eArpected to run at about twice the or:i,ginal estimate. This does not include any marglll for improvements which would be necessar,y if DC-3 planes had to be displaced as standard carriers in local traffic. Telecommunications 2$. The Plan provided for 9)..'PCU1ding and modernizing urban telephone net- works, and for developing radio services, both to facilitate communication between the widely scattered European population and as an important element in safe and efficient airline operations. Thus far, work has progressed roughly according to plans. It now appears, however, that all facilities will have to be expanded beyond initial plans and that the cost will exceed the original estimate by about 140%. PO/fER AND WATER SUPPLY 26. The Belgian Congo has vast tmdeveloped water power resources in several regions. Early in 1949 installed i\vdroelectric capacity totalled about ~OO"IJOO RVlI, which was only slightly more than the 96,OOOKW available in 1939. HO'Never, the existing plants were fully utilized in 1949 and delivered 55' million ~rrI, compared with only 400 million Kkm before the war. Both in 1939 and 1949! the Union Miniere stat,ions concentrated in the upper Katanga ftt1:'nished about three-quarters of the total hydroelectric power, mainly for use by the CompanYe J.!:4 addition to hydroelectric installations" there were a number of local diesel units, including public utility capacity in major centers outside the upper Katanga and Leopoldvillee 27. There was a marked power shortage in early 1949. By the end of 1953, however, power capacity had been increased to 310,000 m'v, producing over 1,100 million ~{H. Out of these totals, Union Miniere was responsible for 2l0"dOO m'f and about 800 million K'NH; its production potential will be more than doublec when the new Le Marinel stati~n is ready about the end of 19$6. This 220,000 Ktro installation will supply 1 1 400 million mm in a normal year, of which $00 million ~fH have been earmarked for Northern Rhodesia under a five-year contrac~ 28~ In order to promote industrialization and to take advantage of the unexploited water power resources, the Plan envisaged four new public hydro- electric stations, with a capacity of 68,000 IDV and an annual production of some 350 million KWH" serving the Leopoldville" Stanleyville, AlbertVille and Ruzizi Valley regions. The total cost was estimated at 1,150 ~il1ion francs. III addition the Regie de Distribution dlEau et dlEl.ectricite (Regideso)" a govemment-o.\'Iled organization charged with water distribution and provision of thermal power to urban areas, would spend 1.6 billion francs to furnish ten large and twenty-sGven smaller towns ?lith water and therma~ povrer. .. :2C,- 29. Two of the hydroelectric projects are now under construction for two government-controlled corporations - the Societe des Forces HYdro-electriques du Bas-Congo and the Societe des Forces Hydro-electriques de 1 tEst. The Zongo station (initial capacity 21,,000 KW, ultimate capacity 42,,000 KW) 9. lan west of Leopo1dville is expected to supply power by the middle of 1955." The Tshopo station at StanleyvUle (initial capacity 12,000 I1v, ultimate capacity 18,,000K. will probabl¥ be rear~ about the middle of 1957. The A1ber1iville and Ruzizi Valley stations (each planned for about 16,000 KW) have not been started. At Albertville, an a,lternative thermal power project has come up in connection with a proposal to produce ~~thetic gasoline from the substantial low-grade coa1 deposits neatbYG In the Ruzizi Valley, construction was postpc.ned becausE of soil conditio}'1s on the site first s~lected. A new site for a 23,,000 KW station was chosell, but now a proposal has been ·put forward for a multipurpose project to harness, in stages" the water of the western tributaries of the Ruziz1 to_wodu(!e ultimately 50,,000 KW of power and irrigate 25,GOO hectares of land. Y 3D. Throu.gh June 19,4, 1.1 billion francs has been spent on the hydro- electric projects. Higher prices and increases in plan..lled capacity are now likely to require an investment of 3 billion francs in the four stations. The cost will be about $$00 per installed KW for Zongo and about $600" for Tshopo, roughly comparable to the cost of some new stations in France and Switzerland. The 23,000 FJIv station in the Ruzizi Valley, howev'er, would be considerably more expensive. 31. The Zongo station" now well advanced, will come on the line none too soone Power was short in Leopoldville in 1952; only the transfer of power from the new Djoue plant across the Congo River in French Equatorial Africa prevented a serious crisis. The opposite situation exists at Stanleyville. There the Tshopo station will provide 12,000 Wi b,y 1951, whereas present peak demand is put at about 3,000 KW. 32. Indeed, the hydroelectric progrcu:n illustrates some of the thomiest problems of balanced development. In a countr,y like the Congo, estimates of future demand for power are often bound to be highly conjectural. Local inter- ests are, of course, always in favor of expanding hydroelectric power. But even experts differ widely. In the Ruzizi area, for instance, forecasts range between a doubling and a tripling of power demand over a ten-year period. There is also a general and probably reasonable tendenc,y to build power plants some- what ahead of demand. This tendency is influenced by technical considerations of minimum size and by the assumption that it would be worse to err on the side of caution than to over-estimate future requirements. In the Ruzizi area the prob1em is particu.l~rly complex. To build a 23,000 J(ff plant in the Ruzizi Valley now may be too ambitious, even though the mines of Ruanda-Urtmdi are expected to absorb a substantial part of its output. On the other hand, it would be inopportune to delay all const~~ction until a complete investigation had been made of the feasibility of the multipurpose project. At first sight the latter would have a high benefit-cost ratio and a greater effect upon the development of the area. Whether part of it cou~d be engineered and constructed 11 Methane has recently been discovered in considerable quantities in Lake Kivu, but studies have not progressed enough to judge how this might affect the energy p:tcture of the area. - 21- fairly soon and whether the installation of additional thermal capacity should be sought in these circumstances as a transitional solution the mission was not in a position to determine. 33.., The Regideso program" on which 170 million francs was spent at the end of June 1954, appears to be going forward smoothly. In the large towns, the first stage of the power program, including over 3,,000 EW in n~v capacity and substantial strengthening of the network~, is nearly" completed. Similarly, water distribution systems are nearly completed, though it is not clear whether the capacity of the water works has been brought up to that envisaged for 1959. The program for the 27 smaller towns has advanced more slowly" mainly because priority was given to the larger centers. Regideso is now installing electricity in four and water in ten of these towns. In the future, Regideso plans to equip five centers a year with power and water. AGRICULTURE General 34. The hot, humid climate of the equatorial forest of the Congo is particularly ~uited to tropical cultures (see map No.3) like the oil palm, Robusta coffee, rubber and coooa. These export crops are mainly cultivated Gn European plantations, which cover an area of 330,000 hectares. In the savannah, the principal crop is cotton in rotation ~Ji th groundnuts and maize. These are almost exclusively native crops. In the mountain areas of the Kivu, European plantations of Arabica coffee, tea and various medicinal herbs have been successful. Cattle raising by Congolese is widespread in the north-eastern highlands" and European settlers have established cattle ranches in the high plateaus of the Katanga. 35. Native agriculture covers an area of 2.4 m11li::)r\ hectares with an output valued in 1952 at 11.4 billion francs or about 51 000 francs per hectare. Most of it is subsistence agriculture, although the part reaching commercial channels, valued at 3.5 billion francs~, is roughly equal to the European out- put. In recent years there has been a substantial expansion in cotton which is now responsible for about one-third of the cash income of Congolese farmers; and competes with palm oil as the major t'xport crop. But othervdse there is no marked tendenc,y towards greater diversification or increased yields in native agriculture. 360 A generation ago there was enough land to allcwl nomadic hoe culture without exhausting the soil. The native village farmed a certain tract of land fer two or three years; when the yields began to fall the tribe moved on t.o a new tract" returning to the old sites only aft.er the land had been regenerated through a long fall0\"1 period. In the last thilty years, however" the tribal population has grown from 7.5 to 9.5 million, and has become increasingly concentrated along major transport routes. In these circumstances, the primi- tive rotation tends to break down and the soil becomes exhausted. 37. It was therefore necessar.,v to organize Congolese agriculture along new linbS, and to establish permanent agricultural settlements ("paysannats H ) ... In these paysannats a scientific system of crop rota-cion is organized as a - 22 - primary defense against soil exhaustion. But the paysanna.ts are also becoming a vehicle through which many other agricultural and social improvements can be introduced and rural Congo transformed from sUbsistence agriculture to agriculture producing large supplies for the market. 38. In the original Plan estimates, investment in the paysannat and related programs accounted for over ,'00 million francs. (In addition: an estL"llated 1.4 billion Was. to be spent in planning and installing the paysannat~ expenses which, although financed from the ordinar.y budget, would also represen' an investment in a wider sense) D Irn:~estments :tn agricultural research and development were put at 300 million francs, as were improvements in meat and fish production, and expenditures on silos, warehouses and refrigeration facilities~ So far investment in storage and refrigeration facilities has been very small Through June, 1954 about 600 million francs had been spent on Go agriculture, no less than one half on agricultural research and the rest mainly for the paysannats and soil conservation. Paysannats 39. Before a paysann,!lt is established, the available land is carefully studied as to its p~sical characteristics and tribal rights to it~ Where new territory is to be put under the plough, land has often to be cleared, drained" sometimes even irrigated, and access roads have to be built. Finally" the land is divided into sections to be cultivated one after the other, according to a predetermined system of crop rotation, including the necessar.y fallow period. 40. Because of the time involved in planning and in carrying through these prel~inar.y steps, the paysannat program got under way relatively slmvly. At the eno of 1953, about 125,000 farmers had been installed as compared with a target for the decadE:~ of 450,000.., Although the rate of installation could now be stepped up" experience has shovm that supervision of a paysannat in the ini tial years will require more trained men (Europeans and Congolese) t,han ori~nally expected. For this reason, the Government has cut the target for the ten-year period from 450,000 to 300,000 farms. The total cost, however, will be well above the original estimates in view of price increases, higher costs of supervision and the inclusion of several items at first expected to be financed through the ordinary budget. lil. It remains to be seen whether the Government ,viII really be able to stabilize the pays annat program at the present level. A cut-back in areas where the program is well under way will probably be strongly resisted. In other areas, notably in the Kivu and Leopoldville provinces, experiments have been conducted regarding the economics of more intensive agriculture and the stage is set for action on a ~dder front. Since the pressure of population upon limited soil resources is particularly serious in these areas, they can put in a strong claim for additional funds. N~r must the overall aspects be forgotten. The present rate of installation of about 30,000 farmers per year compares with a total rural population of about 2 million families and an annual net increase of 2J,OOO new farmers. - 23- The Y:J ork of Ineac 42. Progress has been particularly rapid in research and development carried out by the Institut National pour l'Etude Agronomique du Congo Belge (Ineac). Among its projects are several new research buildings at the main station at Yangambi, and continuing experiments in plant and animal selectionl in new methods of cultivation including mechanization and use of fertilizer, and in forest planting and management. In some thirty regional stations, Ineac selections are tested under local conditions and the best varieties multiplied. Thus far, the most important benefits have probably been obtained from plant selection. Yields from plantations of nevi hybrid oil palms average about 3 tons of oil per hectare as compared with about 1.5 ton from previous selectionse The latest Ineac variety of Robusta coffee has given yields of r/0ughly 2 tellS per hectare as compared with the present Congo average of 0.75 ton. Similar results have been obtained for several other crops. 43. Although much remains to be done, both in",plant selection and dissemination of the results among the Congolese, the emphasis is now shifting towards improved methods of culti'vation. The recent doubling of cotton yields ~n certain territories of the Kasai is attrit~ted primarily to better cultiva- tion. Mechanization and the use of fertilizer have so far played only a minor role in Congo agriculture, but this situation may gradually change. Mechaniza- tion is potentially important in clearing the tropical forest and the savannah, and in tilling the hard tropical soils. Both are extreme~ arduous operationsJ and explain partly w~, even in the paysannat, the annual area cultivated by each family is set as low as 0,,6 to l.~ he~tare. According to experiments at the Ineac station at Gandajika" tillage to a depth of 25 em. by the aid of disc cultivators would cost about 1,000 francs per hectare, but would raise cotton yields by 20%, an increment worth about 1,200 francs. The fact that mechanized cultivatio~1. v;ould make it possible for a farmer to cultivate three or four times as much land as he now does adds greatly to the attraction of higher yields. The use of ft~rtilizer may also be a paying proposition.. Experiments suggest tr~t a modest dose of mixed fertilizer, applied before each crop rota- tion, would raise yields substantially_ Mechanized tillage in conjunction vvith the use of fertilizer might also enable the fa!'mer to use his land morel intensively by reducing the fallow' period. C:b~riously, such changes take a long time to be worked out in detail and generally applied. They can hardly be expected to have much effect on Congo agriculture under the present Plan. Forestry, ... Cattle Raising and Fisheries 44. The equatorial forest is a valuable natural resource. Besides provid- ing the countr,y with fuel and meeting most of its lumber requirements, it also furnishes valuable hardwoods for export. Recently four plywood and veneer mills have been built and the establishment of a puJ.p and paper industry is being studied. The Plan target was to plant annually 5,000 hectares of forest for industrial uses, of which 1,500 hectares were required to maintain the existing cut. So far achievements have lagged behind this goal. H~~ever" lneac is developing promising new techniques for the conversion of the existing lOVI value forest to high value forest, which should permit to step up this program con- siderably. -2h- 45. In the savannah, forest corridors of fast-growing and relative~ fire resistant species, such as eucalyptus and bamboo" are planted around the paysannats. The primary purpose is fire protection. According to one expert" the suppression of bush fires for three years would double agricultural output. At the same time these forest bands would also provide the farmer 'with wood f01" fuel and building. About 5,000 hectares of protective forest were to be plante· under the Pl:an. 'l'he program has, however, run into difficulties. In certain areas the seedlings can be successfully planted only during a short period of the year and maintenance of young trees requires much labor. Also, questions have been raised as to the real effl.cacy of these forest bands for fire pro- tection. Thus, until more experience is gained" the Government will probably proceed slowly in this field. 46. Expansion of meat and fish production is important in the Congo because the native diet is deficient in animal proteins and because one half of the meat and one-tlti.. rd of the fish supplies come from abroad" notwithstand- ing low cons~~ption levels. There are ~ obstacles, however. The tsetse ~ is widespI~ad and in the tropical climate cattle have low weight and low resistance to disease. Clii11ate and long distances make meat distribution costly and cause sanitary problems. Moreover" mal\.v tribes have llttle experience in" and somet.imes no inclination for, animal husbandry. 47. Thus far expenditure on the livestock program has been on slaughter houses and local breeding stations, on imported cattle for the new paysannats and Ineae, and on selective breeding and improved feeding practices. Plans are under way to introduce cattle-raising on the arid RWangoplateau in the Leopold- ville province. In the east the pastoral tribesmen are slowly being induced to raise cattle for productiv\9 purposes rather than for prestige reasons. The Government now intends to expand the livestock program by including grass land improvement, strengt.hening the veterinar,y service and constructing more dipping tanks and slaughter houses. 48. construction of fish ponds and the parallel expansion of fish hatcheries is also being promoted on the assumption that one hectare of land under a fish pond would provide as many proteins as 160 hectares under cattle. A dozen hatcheries are ll1 operation, but only 3,400 hectares of ponds have been constructed by the Congolese as compared with 30,000 hectares required to meet the ten-year target of 60,000 tons of fish per annum. Although the pond program is not yet safely under way, another program for intensified exploita- tion of the Great Lakes on the eastern border of the Congo has already been initiated. EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT 49. To help independent European settlers to go into business in cities or to establish themselves as fanners, the Government has been providing them with credit through the Societe de Credit au Colonat et a 1 'Industri.e. Early in 1951, the capital of this organisation was raised by 200 million francs to make it compatible with new tasks under the Plan. In addition, facilities for the processing of agricultural products have been promoted, particularly in the -2$ - Kivu. Plants for grading and pacld.ng of tea, for extraction of soya oil and processing of fish are in various stages of study or construction. Further" three schools and several reception centers have been built in rural areas to provide training in practical agricllJ.ture and temporary accoIIDIlodation for European immigrants. Altogether over 300 million francs has been spent on European settlement. RESEARCH AND SURVE'IS SOa Khmvledge of natural resources, topography and weather conditions is a prerequisite to economic development. Geological surveys are essential to mining development, while nlaps have to be made and soils surveyed before roads, railroads" hydroelectric projects or irrigation schemes can be set in motion. In a vast tropical country like the Congo all of this requires an enormous effort which has, been undertaken by numerous public and private organizatioils, ranging fl."om Jheac in the field of agriculture to the Geographic Institute of the BelgiafL Congo responsible for cartograp1\v. 51. To date about 100 million francs has been spent and work appears to be going forward smoothly. Indeed, new methods of, for instance, aerial photo- graphy have made it possible to push ahead more rapidly in mapo-mald.ng than was expected. However, the expansion or research p)rograms, and the general rise in prices have made it necessary to almost doubt. the original estimate of the cost of work in cartography, geology and meteorology. HOUSmG General 52. The task of housing the detribalized population is among the most challenging in the Cor..go. About 2.6 million Congolese now live and work out- side the tribal organization, and the number is growing steadily. As is indicated by the following table" the groV'lth of urban agglomerations during the past 15 years has been spectacular. Ieoooldville Elisabethville Jado"i:.ville Matadi stanleyville Bukavu T940 1954 r94t1 ]9:sTi ~40 1954 I941 19$ 1940 1954 1940 1954 41 21 , (thousands of Congolese inhabitants) liS 19 54 11 50 2 2$ This growth necessitated t,he erection of' entire urban connnunities. Land had to be cleared, leveled and drained, streets and sewers l..aid out and electricity supplied, and schools, hospitals, market places and playgrou..l'lds built.. These works are costly. Expenditure on infrastructure is equal to 60% and that on communal buildings to 40% of expenditure on house construction itself. ... 26- The Fonds dfAvances 53. Quite apart from its responsibility as a large employer to provide housing for the 76,000 Congolese in its service, the Government also helps to house people who come to cities without employment contracts ensuring living quarters. Already before the war the Congolese willing to build houses them- selves and deemed able to carry the financial burden could obtain the required materials from the municipalities on credit generally repayable over five to six years. Funds for this activity came from the Fonds d'AvancesJ an appropria tion in the extraordinary budget, and are lent to municipali'ties. Since the householder often repays the municipality more rapidly than the latter is bound to repay the Government, the municipality·is in a position to step up the rate of operations by means of a revolving fund. In ElisabethviIle, where the Fonds d'Avances method has been outstandingly successful, about 65,000 CongolesE not housed by thei-r employers, live in 8,000 durable houses vrhich they own. Of· these, 6,000 were built between 1950 and 1954 with the help of advances averag- i..'lg some 25,,000 francs. Half of the houses have water and there are sewers and electricity in ~y streets. The Work of the D. Cc:A. 54. The Fonds dlAvances method ·w·as too slovl[ to cope with the housing problem in certain cities. Consequent.ly, the Plan provided for the creation in the Congo of several Offices des Cites Indigenes to organize and direct rapid mass construction of 20,000 durable houses in Leopoldville and 20,,000 in other large cities. In 1952 the work of the Offices was taken over by the Office des Cites Africaines (O.C.A.) estahlished in Brussels. The mission observed the work of O.C,A. in Leopoldville, Stanleyville and Bukavu. As may be seen below, the rate of operations has increased spectacularly in the last two years: Total Jan.-April . Aprfi Dece 1954 1951-1952 1953 1954 - 1954 e st. 1954 est. Houses started 3624 4887 3546 12957 Houses completed 2383 4~j66 1561 7500 8010 14000 55. Conditions in which D.C.A. operates '~re different in the three cities. In LeopoldviUe, where 10,000 houses are expected to be completed by the end of 1954., and in Stanleyville, infrastructure is lagging. The sandy soil on the flat outskirts of Leopoldville required deep drainage works, and at Stanley-- ville land clearing was difficultJ particularly during the rains" streets and -the electricjy distribution network have been completed in only one of the Leopoldvill£ de11elorments, whereas in Stanleyville the question of water supply was only recently studied. In Bukavu, on the other hand, despi te great diffi- culties in terracing roc~ hillsides" progress on streets, sewers, water mains and communal buildings has been impressive. In order to reduce the cost of infrastructure per dvlelling, and sometimes also for reasons of topography" - 27 - settlement in O.C.A. developments is fairly dense. Two to six dwellings are usually grouped under one roof. Two-story houses are being tried' in Leopold- ville and are a regular feature at Bukavu - an innovation for people used to living at ground level. 56. The organi:~ation of 0. C.A. work depends on the availability of contractors and manpower. In Leopoldville, O.C.A.either constructs whole developments for its m~ account or lets large contracts to private enterprise. In Bukavu work on infrastructure is done by contractors, while O.C.A. builds' all the houses itself 'with its own equipment and labor; bids for house con- struction were invited in 1952 but the lowest was 50% above the estimated cost to O.C.A. In stanleyville shortage of local enterprise compelled the Office des Cites Indigenes, and subsequently O.C.A., to undertake most of the con- struction work. The recruitment and training of manpower took a long time ~~d even now the shortage of labor hampers the smooth progress of operation. 57. The mission could not make any adequate judgment of housing costs. These are substantial~ lower than for comparable imported prefabricated houses5 Moreover, it is clear that D.C.A. is making great efforts to keep construction costs low. In Leopoldville, a square meter of floor space costs betYfeen 1,100 and 1,350 francs and in certain instances as little as 1,008 francs. Costs are roughly the same in Stanleyville, after having been reduced in the past three years by more than one-thi·rd. In Bukavu" construction cost per square meter is abo~~ 20% over the Leopoldville level because building materials are much more expensive due to high incidence of transport charges. 58. The accomplishments of O.C.A. are impressiye. At the Bagira develop- ment near Bukavu, for instance, where the first foundations were laid in Januar,r 1954~ long rows of houses were nearing completion at '~he time of the mission's visit. D.C.A. should be able to fulfill or even to exceed the original goals of the Plan. Its expenditure is now running at the rate of 1.1 billion francs per annum, including expenditure on infrastructure for which funds are a)propriated under the heading of "Administration". Its sphere of activity is expanding: Elisabethville will be included in its program in 1955. 59. This does not mean that the Fonds d'Avances method has failed. Indeed, it appears to have many advantages. It encourages permanent settlement and gives the owner, to whom the concepts of credit and private property are both new, a more personal interest in his home. At the same time it is less of a financial drain on the Treasuryo But in the largest, most rapidly grCPJlIing urban areas, where unsanitar.y and unsightly shanty-towns are still in evidence, it was insufficient and a mass construction program such as that. of o. C.A. was imperative. NATIVE EDUCATION 60. As in all African territOries, the need for more education is only too obvious in the Belgian Congo. Probably between one half and twiO··thirds of the children of school age do not go to school, those who go now numbering over 1 million. Less th&l 50,000 are in vocational or secondar.y schools and almost none have passed through a university. Since far more boys than girls have in the past been sent to school, the cultural gap between the educated men and ti"..e - 28 - women rooted in tribal tradition is now a striking and unfclrtunate feature of urban society in the Congo. The implications of this situation are recognized by the Government but it can be eliminated only gradually. Schools for Europeans are open to t,he Congolese provided the latter come from similar back-. grounds; but for the time being very few Congolese children attend them. This is not merely a matter of learning French - the adaptation of a western educa- tion to a prllnitive society raises difficulties not yet fully understood, far less solved. Although the Government's financial responsibility for the capital and recurrent costs of education is stead~ grcwdng, teaching itself is still primarily in the hands of religious missions, often subsidized by the Government 0 61. Within the framework of the Plan, a very considerable effort is being made to expand and improve educational facilities in which, according to present estimates, 2.1 billion francs is to be invested during the current decade. Te June 30, i954, 100 million francs has been spent. The greatest emphasis is being placed on primar,y education for both sexes, but vocational training for' boys and home economics for girls are being more widely taught. MEDI CAL FA CILIT I:ES 62. The need for improved medical facilities in tropical Africa is no less than that for more education. In the Congo one child out of ten dies in infancy and the average life expectancy of a Congolese at birth is still UIJder 40 years. This does not detract from the great and, in SOQe cases, spectacular progress which has been made. Regular spra~~ng of insecticides, for L~stance, has in recent years greatly reduced the danger of malaria. About half the expectant ma~jhers are nOVI estimated to benefit from prenatal care, and in some of the advanced urban centers four children out of five are born in hospitals. From 28.8 per l,~oe inhabitants in 1930, the death rate has fallen to 21.5 per 1,000 in 1953. 63. Many organizations have contributed to this result. The missions have long been active in the bUilding and operating of hospitals, and large private companies and para statal organizations typically have their cwrnmedical facilities. Over the past six years the Fonds du Bien-Etre Indigene (FEEr), financed by Gover.nment grant and by the proceeds of the Colonial LottelJ(, has spent about 1 billion francs on medical and sanitation facilities in rural areas. A large part of the campaign for improved health falls within the framework of the Plan. To June 30, 1954, 600 million francs have been spent on medical facilities and total expenditure planned for the decade has ncwu been raised ,to about 2.8 billion francs, mainly because of the rise in prices. ADr/ITNISTRAT ION 640 The Belgj.an colonial adnri.nistration now' employs 1,300 Europeans in thE~ Congo, compared with 4,800 in 19490 The great majority of these officials are in Africa with their families, a marked contrast with the years before the vtar. Work in an underdeveloped country in the tropics is exacting and adequate - 29- living conditions, educational facilities and office accommodation must be available if the Congo is to attract qualified and efficient staff. The emplqyment of a European in the Congo costs the Government 45°100. francs a year against 37,,000 francs in 1949. This includes housingl travel within " the count171 salar,y, which is roughly twice as high as that for comparable positions in Belgium, a share ot capital invested in health and educational installations, and, every three years, home leave for the whole r~mily. 6$. The Plan foresaw investment in administrative buildings and in housing for 3,000 European officials and 10,000 Congolese Government workers. At the time of the mission's visit, 11 ,00 European homes had been complet~d and about 500 were in the course of construction. Although detached one- family houses are the rule, some large apartment buildings have recently been erected in Leopoldville. Several thousand houses for Congolese Government workers have also been built. Further sUbstantial amounts have been 'spent on asphalted streets, the benefits of which no one who has not experienced the dust of the dry season in Africa can fully appreciate. ~ 66. To June 30, 1954, 2.4 billion francs have been spent throughout the country on office buildings, court houses, custonis depots, schools for European children and houses. for C~vernment personnel. That aotual expendi- ture on administration in 4i years was twice as large as the original. ten- year es,timate can be ascribed to the general rise in prices and to the expan- sion in the colonial service which in 1954 includes 400 Europeans more than the number foreseen for 1959. Moreover, costly European schools and work on infrastructure carried out in native cities by the O.C.A., which do not seem to have been originally included under this heading, were actua~ financed from the appropriation for administration. Investment in admini- stration is nmv put at 1.5 billion francs for the ten years of the Plan. Con- sequently, about 5 billion francs are to be spent between now and 1960. The larger part of this expenditure will be in housing for Government personnel and in urban infrastructure, as the need for office buildings and European schools should be largely met by the end of 1955• •