TECHNICAL ANNEX
TO THE MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE PRESIDENT
TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS
ON A PROPOSED CREDIT OF SDR 13.8 MILLION
(US$20 MILLION EQUIVALENT)
TO THE REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL
FOR A CASAMANCE EMERGENCY RECONSTRUCTION SUPPORT PROJECT

August 13, 2004

Transport Sector
Country Department 14
Africa Region
**Currency Equivalents**

Currency unit  =  CFA Franc (CFAF)
US$1.00  =  CFAF 545 (as of July 31, 2004)

**Fiscal Year**
January 1  -  December 31

**ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BIS</td>
<td>Business Initiative Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>CERSP</td>
<td>Casamance Emergency Reconstruction Support Project</td>
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<td>CI</td>
<td>Community Infrastructure</td>
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<tr>
<td>CP-PRAESC</td>
<td><em>Comité de Pilotage du PRAESC</em> (PRAESC's Steering Committee)</td>
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<td>CRD</td>
<td><em>Conseil Régional de Développement</em> (Regional Development Council)</td>
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<td>CS-ANRAC</td>
<td>Conseil de Surveillance de l'ANRAC (ANRAC-Oversight Committee)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DG-ANRAC</td>
<td><em>Directeur Général de l'ANRAC</em> (ANRAC General Manager)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRR</td>
<td>Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration</td>
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<td>ERC</td>
<td>Emergency Recovery Credit</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>GoS</td>
<td>Government of Senegal</td>
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<td>GTC</td>
<td><em>Groupe de Travail sur la Casamance</em> (The Government’s Task Force on Casamance)</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<td>IRR</td>
<td>Infrastructure Reconstruction and Rehabilitation</td>
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<tr>
<td>LD</td>
<td>Local Development</td>
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<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<td>MC</td>
<td>Mine Clearance</td>
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<td>MEF</td>
<td>Ministry of Economy and Finance</td>
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<td>MET</td>
<td>Ministry of Equipment and Transport</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFDC</td>
<td><em>Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance</em> (Rebellion Movement in Casamance)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIM</td>
<td>Project Implementation Manual</td>
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<td>PRAESC</td>
<td><em>Programme de Relance des Activités Economiques et Sociales en Casamance</em> (Recovery Program of Social and Economic Activities in Casamance)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCIRR</td>
<td>Supra-Community Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Reconstruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commission for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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1. INTRODUCTION

After almost 20 years, the conflict in Casamance in Senegal is nearing a negotiated settlement that should end the violence that has inflicted hundreds of civilian deaths and injuries upon the Casamance population and generated large numbers of displaced persons and refugees. Although this conflict was of low intensity, thus allowing "business as usual" to go on in the rest of the country, the disruption of the economic and social life of the populace posed an unsustainable constraint on the region's potential. If unfettered, this potential could bring significant economic development to the Casamance region and, as a consequence, to Senegal as a whole.

In April 2000, a new president took office as the third President of the Republic of Senegal. As a result of his commitment to resolving the thorny Casamance issue, contacts for future peace negotiations started anew. Since then, the situation has improved significantly, culminating in the co-signing in 2001 of two peace agreements by representatives of the Movement (Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)) and the Government of Senegal (GoS). Those sketchy peace agreements briefly touched on such political questions as the billeting and disarmament of armed groups, prisoner liberation and freedom of movement, as well as economic and social recovery issues such as mine clearance, reinsertion programs and improved road access.

In the wake of those agreements, the GoS undertook the development of the Programme de Relance des Activités Economiques et Sociales en Casamance (PRAESC). The program had the financial and technical backing of all donors, led by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the European Union (EU) and the World Bank.

The World Bank's role will be pivotal during the post-conflict process. Like all of Senegal's partners, the World Bank is committed to promoting the peace process within the context of the PRAESC. This World Bank presence in Casamance will manifest itself in two ways: (i) a project specific to Casamance, i.e., the Casamance Emergency Reconstruction Support Project (CERSP), which will finance a portion of the activities described in the PRAESC; and (ii) some of its ongoing projects in Senegal, which will re-direct some of their resources to Casamance.

The CERSP will be the World Bank's primary vehicle in Casamance and is presented in this document.

2. SECTION A: BACKGROUND AND STRATEGY

2.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE CONFLICT

Casamance, a natural region situated along the Casamance River in southwestern Senegal consists of two administrative regions: Ziguinchor and Kolda, with respective areas of 7,339 km² and 21,011 km². Casamance is separated from the rest of Senegal by the enclaved Republic of The Gambia and the Gambia River.

Casamance has an estimated population of 1,341,000 inhabitants belonging to various ethnic groups - Diola, Fulbe (Peuls), Mandingue, Soninke, Sérère, Wolof, Toucouleur, Bambara, Manjaque, Mankagne, Pépel, Balantes and Bairnouk - all with distinct languages or dialects.¹ Separatist aspirations among the Casamançais date from the colonial period, during which the populace resisted French influence. The region's geographic and political separation, resulting from the presence of the Gambia River and the former British colony of The Gambia, has preserved its separate languages and cultures but has also

¹ This population figure is extrapolated from the 1988 Recensement Général de la Prévision et de la Statistique.
prevented real integration with the rest of Senegal, from which the Casamance population has remained somewhat aloof.

The Casamance region has always been known for its cosmopolitan character and ethnic diversity. The area known as Basse Casamance, i.e., the Ziguinchor region, and Moyenne Casamance, the Sédhiou department in the Kolda region, whose populations are predominantly Diola, have a relatively high economic potential, mainly due to agriculture and tourism. The social and economic life of the population revolves around the Casamance River. The population of Haute Casamance – the area comprised of the two other departments of the Kolda region, Kolda and Vélingara -- is predominantly Fulbe and Mandingue. Poorer and with less economic potential, its physical remoteness from Dakar limits its development prospects.

**Cause of the Casamance conflict**

“At root, MFDC (Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance) militancy is the outgrowth of economic grievances and, secondarily, cultural ones that compound Diola rejection of the impositions of an alien central government. Though the Casamance is Senegal’s main food-producing area, the Casamançais have felt themselves neglected in terms of investment from Dakar. They lack roads and transport to get food to market. Central government attempts to increase rice output by non-traditional methods gave rise to cultural resentment as well as labor shortages, particularly among the Diola. (Rice cultivation for the Diola combines deep religious significance with economic subsistence and is closely fitted to the local ecology.)

“The keenest grievance has been expropriation of land since independence by both the State and immigrants from northern Senegal. A significant migration of Muslim farmers and petty traders to the Casamance occurred in the 1980s, when they encroached on Diola land and destroyed forest cover in order to plant groundnuts. Though lands are nominally divided between Muslims and Catholics, a common Diola religious tradition unifying the Diola with the land, and with the forest in particular, continues to run strong. It unifies Muslim and Catholic alike against the heterodox Muslim settlers from the north. The latter stand accused by the Diola of pillaging the resources of the Casamance with the complicity of the authorities.”


The conflict aimed at independence for Casamance has been impeding this region’s development. The causes are complex and include historic, economic, and social factors (e.g., youth unemployment and land tenure problems) as well as cultural issues (e.g., the failure to acknowledge local specificities). Despite its apparent ethnic roots, the conflict is mainly economic and political, however. As with other recent regional conflicts, the main cause is the marginalization of the region within an overly centralized country.

The separatist insurrection is straining the government’s military and political capacities and paralyzing Senegal’s most fertile region. Until recently, this conflict was portrayed as solely a Senegalese problem. However, ethnic and economic factors have caused clashes between Senegalese security forces and the MFDC guerrillas to affect the stability of neighboring countries, and particularly that of Guinea-Bissau. Thus, the conflict has grown from a local one to a sub-regional one. Given the cultural and economic ties existing among The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Casamance, a peaceful resolution in Casamance would promote regional stability.

The conflict’s intensity has varied over time, with quiet (albeit tense) periods broken by sporadic outbreaks of violence.

Combat zones have shifted from one area to another within the region, causing population displacements usually of short duration. Until recently, Haute Casamance – i.e., the Kolda and Vélingara departments - were spared, but an increase in livestock rustling and vandalism by armed gangs that then fled to Guinea-Bissau led to the closing of the border with that country in September 2002. This border has since been re-opened.
Peace agreements between the Government of Senegal and the MFDC were signed on March 16 and 23, 2001. Those sketchy peace agreements briefly touched on such political questions as the billeting and disarmament of armed groups, prisoner liberation and freedom of movement, as well as economic and social recovery issues such as mine clearance, reinsertion programs, and improved road access.

2.2 CURRENT STATUS

Despite the progress made, low intensity violence, some criminal and some political in nature, has persisted in the area. Dissension within the MFDC has sometimes provoked violence. However, discussions within the Movement have gone on under pressure from a Casamance population exhausted by more than 20 years of fruitless conflict. After some changes at the top (including the death due to illness of a major past military leader), the MFDC now seems close to the unity necessary for a peace process.

Contacts between both parties resumed with a high-level meeting on May 4, 2003 between the President of Senegal and the political leader of the MFDC. The MFDC convened a conference of the Movement’s major leaders from October 6 to 8, 2003. The conclusions of this meeting were quite clear about the commitment of MFDC representatives to ending the violence and reaching a final peace agreement.

In January 2004, the Government announced significant progress towards peace. While no overall peace accord has been signed yet, negotiations with the three separate factions have begun. The most radical faction has just signed an agreement that ends combat, withdraws troops to their barracks, ends road blockades by ex-combatants and agrees to restore/rehabilitate basic social infrastructure in the area. There have been no significant attacks in several months; indeed, the army is feeding the rebels as an incentive to get them to lift roadblocks, and the Government feels that the conditions for security and peace are present. These initiatives intensified until the adoption of Amnesty Law No. 2004.20 on July 21, 2004. On the same occasion, the Government established the Agence Nationale de Relance des Activités Economiques et Sociales en Casamance (ANRAC, created by decree of No.2004.822 of July 2004) to implement, among other things, the PRAESC.

2.3 HUMAN AND SOCIAL IMPACT

The toll of the conflict is now fairly well documented: many thousands of lives lost, hundreds of people injured by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO), and tens of thousands displaced either internally or externally. According to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), which works in Casamance, the consequences include around 30,000 displaced persons, 231 villages deserted and 4,000 school students displaced and accommodated in temporary housing. Land mine victims from 1988 to 1999, as reported by the NGO Handicap International (HI), totaled 433, including 95 deaths. Most of these accidents occurred in the latter half of the 1990s. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that there are 13,000 refugees in Guinea-Bissau and The Gambia.

The area most affected lies south of Ziguinchor on the border with Guinea-Bissau. MFDC apparently had regrouped its forces and placed land mines in fields to protect them. The mines, combined with frequent fighting, pushed civilians out of the region toward inner Casamance and Ziguinchor city. Other parts of the Ziguinchor region, especially the north, have been less affected thanks to a separate peace agreement between the GoS and the so-called ‘northern wing’ of the rebellion. Violence, apparently more criminal than military in nature, has also been reported there, however. After the battles, armed gangs leave

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2 This estimate comes from the International Organization for Migrations (IOM) after a comprehensive field survey in 2001...
randomly placed antipersonnel mines to prevent effective pursuit. This atmosphere of lawlessness increases feelings of insecurity among the local population.

The Kolda region is markedly less afflicted. The impact of the conflict decreases as distance from the Ziguinchor region increases. Land mines have been detected only in the Sédhiou department, for example, while the Kolda and Vélingara departments are almost untouched.

The health system has also suffered: many health centers have shut down and the vaccination program (Programme élargi de vaccination, or PEV) was unable to reach its assigned objectives. Access to the health system is especially difficult in the many rural areas in which infrastructure has been destroyed and health care workers have often left. Infrastructure not destroyed has been neglected and left unattended, leading to theft of equipment.\(^3\) Unsafe conditions and the difficulty of free movement, especially during the rainy season, make access to health facilities even more problematic. Finally, displaced persons cannot always afford the required co-payment (tickets modérateurs) or drugs, even when health facilities are nearby.

The extent of the AIDS epidemic is not well known, for lack of reliable data. With few health facilities operating, exhaustive data collection has been impossible. In the Ziguinchor department, 3,300 AIDS-infected persons have been identified, for a prevalence rate of 0.90 percent. Of these, 1,500, or 45.45 percent, are females. In the Kolda department, 4,300 adults (i.e., individuals aged 15 and older) are infected, for a prevalence rate of 0.80 percent. Of these, 2,000, or 45.51 percent, are females. In dramatic contrast, the AIDS infection rate among sex-workers is estimated to be 20 percent.

Maternal mortality in this region is alarming: the figure in Kolda is 1,200 maternal deaths per 100,000 births vs. a national average of about 510 deaths per 100,000 births.

As for the education sector, the Ministry of Education estimates that the Ziguinchor region has a school deficit: 37 schools that have either closed or failed to open, for a deficit of 96 classrooms affecting approximately 3,840 students. As a result, most students have moved toward the city and department of Ziguinchor where they attend school in makeshift buildings. Paradoxically, the Ziguinchor region has the highest level of school enrollment in Senegal, reflecting the Casamançais’ strong belief in the benefits of education.

2.4 ECONOMIC IMPACT

The Casamance conflict has taken a toll on the southern part of Senegal, a region with great agricultural potential, abundant rain, and land suited to the cultivation of rice, fruits, and vegetables. Forestry resources are also plentiful and include many indigenous species. Important fish resources are provided by the 86-km-long coastline, the 300-km-long river and numerous ponds. In the mining sector, Casamance has oil, peat bogs, gnafouran, and shell sediments in the river’s islands. The land issue, which is central to Casamance economic life, is at the epicenter of the conflict and is therefore critical to its resolution.

(i) Major constraints on agricultural productivity are now emerging as a result of natural resource damage inflicted by salinization, erosion, and deforestation.

(ii) The regional directorate for agriculture in Ziguinchor announced a 19.7 percent drop in cereal production -- from 41,673 to 33,479 tons -- over the 1990-96 period. According to the regional inspectorate for Water and Forest Resources, revenues from public lands fell from CFAF 45

\(^3\) Of 81 health centers in the Ziguinchor region, 28 are closed: 5 for lack of staff or equipment and 23 due to unsafe conditions.
million in 1991 to CFAF 17 million in 1997. The fishing and livestock sectors have also been affected by the violence.

(iii) The public sector was affected when the MFDC declared a tax “strike” that limited the local capacity to invest in infrastructure.4

(iv) Finally, the formal private sector, particularly in the tourism area, is plagued by the lack of safety, and some companies have had to cease operation.

It is difficult to assess the overall impact of the Casamance conflict on the Senegalese economy. Impact on the government budget is limited in terms of expenditures. Top officers in the Senegalese army (Armée Nationale Sénégalaise, ANS) state that defense budget increases have been small since the army opted to transfer troops into Casamance to enforce law and order. The conflict is therefore not considered to have a significant impact on military resources.5

Beyond the capital destruction costs, most of the economic losses for Senegal are thus opportunity costs arising from the inability to exploit Casamance’s economic potential, which has in turn had an impact on the State’s fiscal revenues, poverty alleviation and GDP growth.

During the conflict, public investment in Casamance by the Government of Senegal remained constant or even increased. However, many projects were slowed or even stopped due to the lack of security.

It is difficult to estimate what the volume of private investments would have been under normal circumstances and what benefits it would have brought to both the local and national economies. Still, it seems that investments have not been commensurate with this region’s potential. Tourism has been negatively affected, with many investors shunning the region for fear of potential customer flight.

The greatest economic impact has been on the poorest of the poor in Casamance, and especially its farmers. In particular, they have been unable to fully exploit the locally available agricultural potential. The sowing of landmines, which began in August 1997, led the NGO Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme (RADDHO) to assert at the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Summit in Ouagadougou in June 1998 that no rice had been cultivated in Casamance during the previous crop year and that none would likely be planted that year. Likewise, fruit and vegetable crops are also very probably affected by the presence of landmines.

2.5 RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS

There are many development projects in this region, of which some are described in the following paragraphs. Yet few so far have offered activities specifically aimed at post-conflict reconstruction.

(i) The only agencies active in mine clearance are the French NGO Handicap International (HI) and, to a lesser extent, UNICEF. HI offers social and medical assistance to land mine victims and has started mine hazard outreach and training campaigns. These activities are ongoing, and HI is seeking supplemental funding to continue its activities. HI also wishes to conduct a Level 1 Survey of mine-infested zones, subject to funding.6 UNICEF, whose 2001 program was financed by USAID, is collaborating with HI on outreach campaigns.

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4 It must be acknowledged, however, that the tax recovery rate has always been low, even in the absence of such a declaration.
5 This assertion is questionable since it assumes that troops stationed in Casamance do not cost more than in other places. No data is available to refute this, however.
6 "This [survey level I] is the investigation of suspected mined areas to collect information on the general location of mines. This information gathering process is intended to identify general details of where the mines may be located and which areas are safe. It will also establish high and low risk areas, in which case further planning can be
UNICEF has also been involved in aiding displaced persons, as has the World Food Program (WFP), which launched a Food for Work program in 2001 in support of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and other affected people. UNICEF's program “aims to support people negatively impacted by the crisis and to create a peace-enabling environment through better access to basic social services.”

Although there is no dedicated demobilization program, UNICEF is working on peace-building through its program, as is USAID, which finances similar small programs in both the Ziguinchor and Kolda regions.

Despite the sporadic violence in Casamance, none of the many other development programs is specifically aimed at conflict resolution. For instance, the multi-donor Transport Sector Program (Programme Sectoriel des Transports 2, PST2) is engaged in rehabilitating the Diouloulou-Bignona road and the port of Ziguinchor. Similarly, a few decentralization promotion projects, such as the EU’s PADEL (Projet d’appui à la décentralisation et au développement local) or the French Cooperation’s ADDEL (Projet d’appui au développement local en Casamance) or GTZ’s PAARZ (Projet d’appui à l’autopromotion de la Région de Ziguinchor) are ongoing. They are progressing, although sometimes very slowly. Since early 2004, many initiatives have emerged:

These include, among others, GTZ’s financial and technical support, amounting to CFAF 3.4 billion, for the Projet d’Appui au Développement Socio-économique pour la Paix en Casamance (PROCAS), an essential component of which is the improvement of basic service provision and infrastructures, primarily by rebuilding homes through the traditional solidarity system, and the rehabilitation or digging of modern wells to improve access to drinking water.

Canada recently formulated a program for the restoration of socio-economic activities in Casamance through the local development fund (Fonds Local de Développement – FLD) made available to the Government. This program, valued at CFAF 1.3 billion and defined as part of the PRAESC, revolves around support for the development of community infrastructures and the promotion of socio-economic activity.

USAID has launched a support program to re-establish viable communities by grouping persons who remained in villages during the conflict, IDPs, refugees, as well as ex-combatants of the MFDC. Financing totaling CFAF 635 million will boost water supply by improving wells or digging new ones and by rehabilitating health centers and classrooms.

The Islamic Development Bank and the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (Banque Arabe pour le Développement Economique de l’Afrique – BADEA) have resumed their financial support to the Programme de Lutte Anti-Sel (salt abatement program) in the Ziguinchor and Kolda regions for the construction of anti-salinization and/or water retention dikes.

Italy has initiated a new program named « Fonds Local de Développement de Sédhiou en Moyenne Casamance » (local development fund for Sédhiou in Moyenne Casamance) amounting to CFAF 2,500 million. This program is a follow-on of the PRIMOCA and has two areas of intervention:

- socio-economic development in rural areas aimed at generating incomes and better access to basic services and infrastructures;
- sustainable natural resource management and environmental regeneration.

The French Development Agency (Agence Francaise de Développement, AFD) is financing rehabilitation works in the port of Ziguinchor valued at CFAF 4 billion.

developed for the deployment of level 2.” Source: U. S. Army Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) website.
(vii) The European Union (EU) is financing, for CFAF 15 billion, the Cap Skirring-Ziguinchor and Ziguinchor-Mpack roads.

(viii) The World Food Program (WFP) has mobilized financing totaling CFAF 10 billion for food aid to the population of Casamance.

(ix) The GoS, using internal resources, is continuing its program to rebuild 754 houses, 258 of which have been rebuilt so far.

(x) Through its annual investment budget (Budget Consolidé d’Investissemen, BCI), the GoS will finance over the 2003-2005 period the water management infrastructure project for Basse Casamance (Projet d’Aménagement Hydro-Agricole de la Basse Casamance) for a total of CFAF 800 million, as well as the provision of public services in the Kolda region for a total of CFAF 2,200 million, which includes:

• integrated rural development management;
• construction oversight of agricultural and hydraulic infrastructures;
• maintenance of hydraulic infrastructures;
• water management;
• advisory/support services and training for producers.

Over the same period, the GoS will provide counterpart financing totaling CFAF 2,658 million for projects and programs specific to Casamance that are funded by its partners. GoS is also contributing counterpart funding for national projects and programs of which Casamance-related activities are a part.

Finally, a mine clearing unit from the Senegalese army has been assigned for the long term to the Ziguinchor region. This unit has been provided with up-to-date equipment (e.g., mine detectors) and has received support from national service volunteers to perform humanitarian mine clearing of villages and roads.

2.6 CROSS-SECTORAL NEEDS AND SECTORAL PRIORITIES

Current and planned activities in Casamance are in urgent need of coordination. Indeed, many activities, however limited, are being implemented in the absence of proactive and global dialogue, despite the Government’s official stand against piecemeal approaches. As a result, comprehensive and detailed knowledge of the issues at stake in Casamance is lacking and interventions occur on a case-by-case basis depending on the agenda, capacity, and available funding of the implementing agency. Problem-solving is thereby complicated, since few if any agencies can provide a comprehensive solution to any given problem. In addition, numerous and substantial sector needs must be addressed in order to lay a solid groundwork for economic and social recovery in Casamance.

2.6.1 Land mine clearance

The first land mines appeared in Casamance in 1991. Until 1997, their use was limited, improvised and sporadic, usually at the initiative of individual combatants. Since mines did not yet pose a significant hazard, an elaborate mine clearance policy was not justified. The existence of mine stockpiles had not yet been ascertained. Between 1991 and 1997, land mine incidents claimed only about a dozen victims. It was only in 1997, i.e., about fifteen years after the conflict had begun, that the use of land mines intensified in Casamance, a trend manifested in the large number of incidents noted. From 1997 onward, mines began to be deployed according to conventional military methods.

Land mines mainly affect local populations, claiming numerous victims and causing family upheaval through the loss of a parent or the infliction of a severe physical injury. Their economic impact is also substantial. Because many accidents occur as people are harvesting crops or collecting firewood, farmers avoid activities on portions of their village lands out of fear. It is the fear of a potentially mined area,
more than the actual number of mines placed, which influences the population's behavior and risk-
avoidance strategy. Different age groups exhibit different behaviors, and women and children often pay
the heaviest price. Behavioral changes caused by the actual or supposed presence of land mines have a
lasting impact on production potential.

2.6.2 Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration (DRR)

There are no reliable estimates of the number of combatants needing to be reinserted into civilian life.7
According to information gathered (based on sightings of combatants in the Bignona area during the
elections, reports by NGOs on recent MFDC activity, the existence of four fronts, etc.), there are probably
about 1,200-2,000 combatants8 who would be subject to eventual demobilization. It is also probable that a
number of young people are recruited for short-term actions, but do not actually leave their villages
and/or families to join "the underground".9

In addition to these active combatants, two specific groups have been directly affected by the combat:
namely, injured or chronically ill ex-combatants and the family members (i.e., widows and orphans) of
those killed in combat. There are also a number of women who may have been forcibly recruited by
combatants. These two groups are believed to total 2,300 persons.

These various groups are assumed to be accompanied by their immediate families. The exact whereabouts
of these families are obviously not known at present, but they are probably among the refugees in Guinea
Bissau and The Gambia. Therefore, if we assume an average of 7 additional persons for each person to
be demobilized, the total number of persons would be 18,400, a figure exceeding the currently estimated
total number of refugees.10

2.6.3 Local development

The effects of the crisis have been most severe in Basse Casamance (Ziguinchor region), the southern
part of the département of Sédiou (arrondissements of Tanaff and Diattacounda) and the southeastern
part of the département of Kolda, where observers note that many activities contributing to the region's
wealth have been abandoned due to the hazardous conditions. The conflict has therefore contributed to a
decline in cereals production (and thus to a deterioration in food security11), which went from 41,600 tons
in 1990 to 33,500 tons in 1996, a drop of 19.7 percent. The reappearance of mines in 1997 accentuated
the downward activity trend, despite rainfall that was once again "normal". Natural resource management
projects, many involving costly infrastructures, were scaled back or even stopped.

Important projects (such as the expansion of the Ziguinchor industrial zone that was to have included
the establishment of about fifteen SMISMEs by 2000) have been suspended or cancelled, and tourism has
been seriously disrupted for several years, although a modest recovery has been noted over the past few
years.

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7 This is true despite meetings with political and military leaders of the MFDC.
8 In November 2003, an authorized military spokesman estimated this number at 500 combatants at most.
9 According to some sources, a considerable number of women are active in the 'underground'. They are thought to
be involved in particular in weapons trafficking and distribution (e.g., munitions transport and placement of land
mines). Rumor has it that they are paid each time a land mine claims a victim, with the price depending on whether
the victim was a civilian or a soldier. MFDC authorities reject this claim, however, citing the Diola tradition that
bars women from combat. No mention is made of child soldiers.
10 This figure would be a maximum. Indeed, according to tradition, warriors (or combatants in this case) are young
unmarried men, and warrior/combatant status ends with marriage. It is therefore possible that the direct dependents
of combatants are few in number. The situation is obviously different in the case of leaders and commanders.
11 The special CRD report dated May 15, 1999 concerning the Prime Minister's visit at that time mentions a decline
in agricultural activity of over 50 percent, according to then-recent studies.
At the socio-economic level, many private and/or community-level infrastructures – mainly homes, wells, roads, community gardens, community centers, individual and community plantations – have been abandoned or even destroyed.

In addition, there has been a marked population movement (involving over 28,200 people) away from villages that have become unsafe. This has led to increased population density in various townships (communes)\textsuperscript{12} of both regions, and especially in the regional capitals. In the region of Ziguinchor, there are indications that over 231 villages have been abandoned. In the region of Kolda, according to a summary provided up by the prefect of the department of Sédhiou in June 2003, 69 villages in the two arrondissons of Diattacounda and Tanaff, which are the most affected by the conflict, with a total population of 21,780 inhabitants, have been abandoned.

According to government sources in Ziguinchor, over 37 schools (or 96 classrooms) there have sustained physical damage, and 31 of those have been completely abandoned. To deal with the classroom shortage in the region, local populations have constructed temporary shelters: 519 in the department of Bignona, 122 in Oussouye and 177 in Ziguinchor. In the department of Sédhiou, 75 temporary shelters have been built in Diattacounda and 22 in Tanaff, using out-of-pocket contributions of the local population.

In addition to the damage to schools' infrastructure, the region of Ziguinchor has sustained damage to 15 youth centers, 32 shops, 15 bridges and the customs checkpoint of Sély (on the Gambian border). In terms of medical and social welfare infrastructures, available information indicates that 28 health posts have been abandoned in the region of Ziguinchor. Those involved in community development and the decentralization process feel that the State has transferred skills without transferring the means, know-how and mechanisms needed to facilitate local development.

Livestock theft, especially in the Kolda region, was regularly reported in 2001 and 2003. Revenues derived from natural resource use by the Forestry Service have also declined by 62.2 percent, from CFAF 45 million in 1991 to CFAF 17 million in 1997.

2.6.4 Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Reconstruction

Some populations face enormous difficulties due to a lack of infrastructures or the non-functionality of those that do exist. Most problems are in the sectors of transportation, education, health, hydraulics, electricity, irrigation infrastructures, environment, fisheries, and tourism; to name only a few.

2.6.4.1 Transportation sector

If there is an issue directly relevant to the security situation in Casamance, it is that of the accessibility of the southern region vis-à-vis the rest of Senegal as the Gambia River is a natural barrier. Even though, the development partners of both countries have long stated their willingness to contribute to the building of a bridge over The Gambia River, there is still some political disagreement between the two governments on this issue.

Without a solution, the options for enhancing access to Casamance will mainly consist of road rehabilitation operations. Roads in Casamance are generally in very poor shape (as they are in Senegal generally), with 28.5 percent (1998 estimate) of paved roads and 82 percent (1994 estimate) of unpaved roads in poor condition.

Based on the general comparative situation as of November 2000, it appears that road networks in Casamance are in worse condition than the national average. The security situation cannot be blamed entirely for this difference, since the regions of Diourbel and Kaolack are also below average; the

\textsuperscript{12} According to government authorities in Ziguinchor, 15,000 people have taken refuge in the commune of Ziguinchor (as of May 5, 2003)
situation common to Casamance's two regions is exacerbated, however, by the physical inaccessibility specific to them.

As of late 2003, air transport was still the safest means of transportation despite its relatively high cost for most potential customers. Indeed, the capsizing on September 26, 2002 of the ferry the “M.S. Le Diola” significantly slowed the maritime connection between Ziguinchor and Dakar, which had been the most reliable and cheapest means of transporting people and goods between those two cities. That route is now served only by a military vessel and a small cargo ship. The Government is in the process of purchasing a new boat to serve the route and has indicated its intention to bring in private participation in the company’s management.

Since the option initially chosen by the Ministry of Transport and Equipment, i.e., to charter a vessel by the end of October 2003, has not materialized, financing was mobilized by the German Cooperation and the EBI to purchase a vessel. This process could take 10-12 months, however. The option of private management will be studied for that boat.

2.6.4.2 Education sector

With a gross enrollment rate of 93 percent in 1999, the region of Ziguinchor ranks second after Dakar. Its 87,739 students are distributed among 20 pre-schools, 292 primary schools, 28 middle schools, 5 secondary schools, and 16 technical and vocational schools.

The unsafe conditions have either closed or immobilized 37 schools in the region. They account for 96 classrooms that would serve about 3,840 students. Most (70 percent) of this displaced student population is concentrated in the department and commune of Ziguinchor, where they are accommodated in temporary shelters.

According to the Ziguinchor school inspectors, three schools (81 classrooms in Bignona) have reopened in the region of Ziguinchor with the assistance of UNICEF and so-called “pioneer” teachers. In 2002, there were 27 ‘pioneers’ in the field. Many classrooms in the region are still in temporary shelters: 519 in Bignona, 122 in Oussouye and 177 in Ziguinchor.

For the rural communes (communes rurales, CRs) affected by the conflict in the arrondissements of Diattacounda (CRs of Diattacounda, Samine, Djibanar) and Tanaff (CRs of Tanaff Niagha, Simbanding Brassou) in the department of Sédhiou (Kolda region), there are 35 and 22 temporary shelters, respectively. These two arrondissements have, respectively, 15 and 23 classrooms that lack teachers. According to available statistics, the gross enrollment rate in the Kolda region was 70 percent in 1999.

2.6.4.3 Health sector

The health care situation is critical in Casamance, especially in the region of Kolda, with insecurity an aggravating factor. Populations on the move often leave everything behind in their fear of the fighting and are forced to move in with relatives. This leads to overcrowding and fosters the spread of disease.

In sum, the health care infrastructures and equipment in the region face the following constraints: (i) poor spatial distribution, inadequate number of health posts and scarcity of drugs; (ii) inadequate size of many current public health posts; (iii) inadequate, absent or outdated equipment; (iv) absence of fencing, lodging and running water in certain posts; (v) shortage, or even absence, of staff in health care centers and health posts; (vi) shortage of hospital beds relative to demand; (vii) shortage or absence of logistical means; (viii) scarcity of funds for the purchase of drugs and fuel; (ix) dilapidated buildings and/or unsanitary conditions in some public health facilities; and (x) the poor condition of roads, which makes the evacuation of patients difficult.

13 These “pioneers”, who are village residents, are unpaid volunteers.
In the region of Ziguinchor the health service is poor: 28 health posts (HPs) out of 81 are closed (5 for lack of staff and/or equipment and 23 due to unsafe conditions, of which 11 have been destroyed); 3 HPs are operating with moderate technical facilities and reduced staff; the regional hospital is overburdened, and the mental health center at Kënia barely functional (due to a lack of staff and dilapidated facilities). The region of Kolda has one of the weakest levels of coverage in the country in terms of health care infrastructures and staff. The average radius of a health post service area exceeds 15 km.

2.6.4.4 Hydraulics sector

Despite its abundant rainfall, Casamance has significant problems with safe water supply. The rate of coverage of the population is 38 percent in Ziguinchor and 26 percent in Kolda, which is far below the national average of 54 percent.

Despite the difficulties, facilities (boreholes, tubewells or wells) have been built but not in sufficient numbers. Throughout Senegal, the State (with the help of its development partners) and NGOs have installed 927 motorized boreholes; 74 equipped boreholes or wells; 1,028 boreholes, tubewells or wells equipped with manual pumps; and 2,100 wells or tubewells using traditional water-extraction systems.

2.6.4.5 Hydro-agricultural installations sector

Casamance possesses good potential for irrigated agriculture (through controlled flooding). About 9,000 ha of irrigated perimeters are being worked in Basse Casamance and Moyenne Casamance. On the other hand, salt encroachment may seriously compromise this potential if the phenomenon is not addressed. This requires substantial investment, however, in the area of hydro-agricultural installations.

A number of primary works have been built under large programs, but practically no secondary works. Secondary infrastructures should therefore be built over the short-term wherever they are feasible and of immediate utility to the population.

Over the longer term, the large-scale primary infrastructure programs should be re-launched after an in-depth study of surface water trends in recent years. It should be noted that no hydraulic facility has suffered any damage because of the conflict.

2.6.4.6 Environmental sector

With regard to the environment, the plundering of forest species is striking in Casamance. Hazardous conditions prevent Water and Forestry Service agents from venturing into the bush. Wood-cutting is therefore occurring in an anarchic fashion, leading to substantial deforestation.

In the very short term, one can hope that improved security conditions will enable Water and Forestry Service agents to resume their surveillance and maintenance of wooded areas. This should stop, or at least slow, the current deforestation. However, the long-term mode of conservation and exploitation of these natural resources will need to be re-defined.

3. SECTION B: GOVERNMENT RESPONSE AND STRATEGY FOR RECOVERY

THE PROGRAMME DE RELANCE DES ACTIVITÉS ECONOMIQUES ET SOCIALES EN CASAMANCE (PRAESC)

In November 2000, the Ministry of Economy and Finance contacted the main donors interested in the Casamance issue to request their participation in recovery activities in Casamance under the coordination of the European Commission (EC) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). This collaboration led to the Programme de Relance des Activités Economiques et Sociales en Casamance

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14 The district of Ziguinchor is the most affected by these closures (11 posts).
(PRAESC). PRAESC is a comprehensive and evolving document that defines a framework and activities aimed at Casamance’s recovery. The document was drawn up under the leadership of the World Bank, with a Japanese Government grant from the Special Fund for Policy and Human Resources Development (PHRD). It is based on high-level discussions with many individuals and organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, who had solid knowledge of field conditions.

The PRAESC was designed with the goal of coordinating all activities in Casamance in order to avoid redundancies and inefficiencies resulting from a disorderly approach by multiple donors and programs, and of ensuring that Casamance’s fundamental, initial reconstruction needs are properly met. The PRAESC will be implemented by the ANRAC.

**Priority Interventions**

The top priority is the re-establishment of safe conditions and basic social and infrastructure services in the two administrative regions that make up Casamance. Once peace agreements are signed by all parties, the following tasks are urgent:

- demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants so that they can return to socially and economically stable civilian lives;
- restoration of public safety through quick and precise location of minefields, and commencement of the mine clearance process as soon as possible;
- restoration of effective primary and secondary economic and social infrastructure, and especially transport infrastructures, the lack of which is currently hindering Casamance’s economic development;
- support for communities’ efforts to jumpstart their local social infrastructure, as well as support for individuals and groups of persons willing to initiate small business activities and thus revive local economies.

Preparatory studies must also be made to assess the root causes of the conflict and to lay the groundwork for Casamance’s future development prospects, by means of data-gathering studies needed to generate information on regional strengths and weaknesses.

**3.1 PRAESC’S GENERAL OBJECTIVES**

PRAESC’s general objectives are to (1) facilitate the quick restoration of a beneficial economic and social environment in Casamance, similar to that existing in the rest of Senegal; and (2) lay the groundwork for sustainable long-term development in the region, while fully respecting its specificities.

**3.2 SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES**

The *Mine Clearance* (MC) program aims at minimizing as much as possible the risks linked to the presence of mines in some areas, to permit economic recovery and a return to normal life for refugees. This program is a prerequisite to all other interventions, and involves at the very least the immediate identification and marking of potentially mine-infested areas. However, it is estimated that complete mine clearing of the region may take up to five years. The program, through other donors, will launch immediate activities to reach, as quickly as possible, a level of security high enough to allow economic and social recovery in high-priority, heavily populated areas.

The *Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration* (DRR) program aims to enable ex-combatants and groups directly affected by the conflict make the transition to a stable civilian life. This program will support those men and women and their families until they return to socially and economically stable civilian positions.
The Local Development (LD) program complements the DRR program. The Business Initiative Support (BIS) subprogram aims at facilitating individual or group for-profit activities. Although this subprogram will be open to everyone in Casamance, ex-combatants are expected to be its first beneficiaries. The Community Infrastructure (CI) subprogram will re-start community investment in local social infrastructure, thus increasing community access to social services, as well as access to water through the construction or rehabilitation of village water points.

The Supra-Community Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (SCIRR) program will allow the resumption of full operations of primary and secondary infrastructure that sustained direct or indirect damage from the conflict. The objective is the resumption of sustainable operation, which implies that permanent budgetary and administrative resources for the maintenance and operation of the infrastructures to be rebuilt will be a prerequisite for investments.

While the aforementioned activities address urgent, short-term needs, they do not deal with the root causes of the conflict. To prepare more ambitious future development activities, the PRAESC will launch studies and consultations with the actors involved for the preparation of a long-term development project. The PRAESC has identified the following issues as critical in terms of addressing the causes of the conflict:

- **Transport link between Casamance and Dakar**, Senegal's political and economic capital. Difficulties in reaching Dakar from the Casamance heartland are a major hindrance to Casamance's development, preventing this region from sending its products to Dakar's markets and from getting the political and economic attention it deserves. Since bypassing The Gambia by means of inland road transport is both time-consuming and costly, two other alternatives have to be developed and improved: the sea link from Ziguinchor to Dakar and land transport through The Gambia.

- **Improved access to specific zones in the Casamance River delta**, where much of the population suffers from physical isolation from the rest of the region.

- **The development of tourism**. Casamance is famous for its scenic beauty, which has always drawn many tourists. The future of tourism needs to be carefully studied to maximize its benefits for Casamance's population.

- **Water resources**. Despite a heavy rainy season, access to potable water is a problem for several reasons. In the Ziguinchor region, sea water has infiltrated ground water supplies and ground water levels have fallen due to insufficient rains over the past 30 years. The Kolda region lacks adequate water supply facilities. Despite its definite potential, irrigated agriculture is also in poor condition due to mismanagement.

- **Natural resources** are also jeopardized by the conflict. Forests, including those that are classified, have been under intense pressure. Mangroves are also under attack and must be properly managed if they are to be preserved. According to some estimates, fishing resources are being over-exploited and the fisheries sector is in need of a general reorganization. Similarly, the forestry and arboriculture sector must be revitalized so that it can achieve its full potential.

- Finally, the land tenure issue requires in-depth study. This question is central, and many assert that it is largely responsible for the eruption of violence. Although it took a dramatic turn in Casamance, the land issue is not specific to Casamance, however, and must be studied comprehensively and nationally if a solution satisfactory to all parties is to be found.

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15 *Classé* means that no one may alter the object – be it a forest, monument or house -- without prior governmental consent. The concept is similar to that of official preservation, patrimony, or heritage status in other venues.
3.3 PRAESC PRINCIPLES AND IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS

The design of the PRAESC is based on the fundamental principle of avoiding duplication of effort. The PRAESC’s design favors the use of existing or upcoming operational projects to implement certain parts of the program, rather than the creation of new projects. In addition to avoiding duplication of effort, this principle will permit speedy implementation, since the project’s structures are already operational.

However, the weakness of this strategy is that it may hamper ongoing activities. For example, many pre-existing projects were not designed with post-conflict recovery in mind, and they may require some modification in order to be able to carry out activities corresponding to the PRAESC’s objectives and methodologies. In addition, the implementation of a given activity using different approaches can create divergences among the various regions, which can in turn cause problems. This potential source of difficulty can be avoided through effective coordination in the field.

In response to the urgent need, identified during preparation of the PRAESC, for a focal point for coordination, the Government has created ANRAC, an administrative entity under the authority of the Prime Minister, which will implement the PRAESC.

The Oversight Council, chaired by a representative of the President of the Republic and composed of representatives of the various ministerial departments involved in economic and social recovery activities in Casamance, guides ANRAC activities and approves documents submitted to it for approval (e.g., activity programs, budgets, financial accounts, procedures manuals, etc.). It generates synergy and promotes coordination between the State, local collectivities, NGOs, local populations, development partners and other technical and financial partners.
ANRAC is managed by a General Director who is appointed by decree on the basis of a proposal from the Prime Minister. The General Director has the following structures at his disposal for the execution of his mandate:

- The Directorate for Landmine Clearance (*Direction de la Dépollution*, DD);
- The Directorate for Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration (DDRR);
- The Directorate for Infrastructure Rehabilitation (*Direction de la Réhabilitation des Infrastructures*, DRI);
- The Directorate for Support to Local Development (*Direction d’appui au développement local*, DADL).

The Director General is also assisted by other departments, including in particular:

- The Information, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (*Cellule Information, Suivi et Evaluation*, CISE);
- The Conflict Early Warning and Prevention Unit (*Cellule Alerte et Prévention des Conflits*, CAPC);
- The Environmental and Social Impact Unit (*Cellule Impact Environnemental et Social*, CIES);
- The Procurement Unit (*Cellule Passation des Marchés*, CPM);
- The Long-Term Development Studies Unit (*Cellule Etudes Développement Long Terme*, CEDLT);
- The Administration, Personnel and Finance Department (*Service Administration, Personnel et Finances*, SAPF).

Details on the organization of ANRAC’s General Directorate, as well as on the mandates of its various structures, are set out in decrees emanating from the Prime Minister.

### 3.4 PRAESC COST ESTIMATE

The estimated cost of the PRAESC as of March 2003 was CFAF 58.0 billion, to be spent over 5 years. Costs break down as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Cost (CFAF)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Program Management and Support Units</td>
<td>4 323 805 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Components</td>
<td>53 708 237 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Clearance (MC)</td>
<td>26 059 740 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration (DRR)</td>
<td>10 942 300 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local development (LD)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (IRR)</td>
<td>13 840 010 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Almost half of the program’s costs are related to mine clearance (MC). This figure is approximate since there is no reliable estimate of the extent of land mines in Casamance.

### 3.5 INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE AND COORDINATION MECHANISMS IN PLACE

The Casamance conflict has been low in intensity and the Casamance region has received donor attention and many projects are ongoing, albeit with some difficulties. Moreover, some donors have been directly involved in peace-building efforts. For instance, following the 1991 and 1993 peace agreements with the MFDC’s *Front Nord* (Northern wing), then the movement’s most important faction, a demobilization program for young *Front Nord* combatants was launched in 1992 with EU funding. This program was quite innovative in terms of its methodology of reinserting ex-combatants either into their original
villages or at least into their ethnic groups. Other donors such as USAID or UNICEF are involved in similar peace-building and tension-abating efforts.

Given these ongoing activities and new developments in the negotiation process, the GoS has emphasized the need for all donors to work in a collaborative, integrated fashion. The donors have readily adopted this recommendation, and been supportive of the approach. The EU and UNDP have been assigned the role of coordinating the activities of the government’s development partners.

This coordination has led to numerous joint meetings between all donors and GoS representatives, with a view to harmonizing activities, clarifying themes and defining the intervention process. In 2000, a core group of donors including the EU, the UNDP, the World Bank, and USAID worked closely with the Ministry of Finance to draw up terms of reference that described the framework and implementation details to revive development activities in Casamance. This core group of donors joined the GoS’ Groupe de Travail sur la Casamance to supervise preparation of the PRAESC. The donors share a willingness to avoid duplication and maximize their outputs to support the peace process. The active support of most of them during the PRAESC preparation, and their mobilization of resources and time to ensure its success, demonstrate their commitment to full participation in peaceful long-term solutions to Casamance’s issues.

Moreover, the PRAESC document was the basis for a United Nations (UN) document drawn up in preparation for a roundtable that was scheduled for mid-2001 but was cancelled due to the negotiation stalemate. As of March 2004, donor commitment to the PRAESC is strong, and many are willing to share its cost. We are confident that the Program will be fully funded.

4. SECTION C: BANK’S RESPONSE AND STRATEGY

4.1 OBJECTIVES, RATIONALE AND STRATEGY

4.1.1 Current World Bank Involvement in Senegal

The project was prepared in the context of the CAS presented to the Board in April 2003. Of the 18 credits in the portfolio in various sectors, the rural infrastructures and social development fund APLs would be particularly used in Bank’s response to the Casamance’s conflict.

4.1.2 Rationale for World Bank involvement in Casamance

Although the political situation in Casamance is not completely stabilized, since the different factions of the MFDC are giving contradictory signals, peace is now regarded as inevitable. Violence has virtually ceased and the rare incidents are of a criminal nature. There is sufficient progress towards peace.

The Casamance population now wants to reap the benefits of this restoration of peace. The GoS intends to meet this demand and encourage all its partners to quickly increase their involvement in Casamance, in order to support the population in persuading the few last holdouts to resume a peaceful civilian life.

A significant presence of the World Bank, a major partner of the GoS, will send a strong signal to the Casamance population that Senegal’s partners are willing to support this region’s development. Indeed, the Bank’s absence could be perceived as lack of confidence or, worse, indifference to the fate of Casamance. Such a signal could retard the restoration of peace and provoke frustrations that could lead to renewed violence.

As noted above, the World Bank will not be alone in this approach. Many partners have already increased their presence in the field. This presence lacks overall coordination, however, and certain needs are either

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16 In the absence of available documentation, the PRAESC intends to learn about this operation from its former staff currently involved in various projects in Casamance.
not being met or are being only partially met. Quick implementation of a programmatic approach, such as the PRAESC, is therefore required. Through the launch of the PRAESC, the World Bank will strongly signal to Senegal’s other partners its support for field-level cooperation and coordination, thus encouraging operational dialogue among them, and will help leverage other resources.

4.1.3 World Bank Objectives in Casamance

The World Bank will support the PRAESC, a program designed by the GoS for the economic recovery of Casamance. It will finance parts of the identified activities as well as coordination activities through ANRAC. Thus, the World Bank supports the PRAESC’s general objectives.

4.1.4 World Bank Strategy in Casamance

4.1.4.1 Implementation of a Casamance Emergency Reconstruction Support Project (CERSP)

The CERSP will be the World Bank’s primary vehicle in Casamance. As an emergency project, it will follow the World Bank’s special procedures. By definition, it only includes short-term activities. This project is expected to be implemented over a period of three (3) years.

The purpose of this project is to fund activities not covered by the current portfolio in Senegal. As detailed in Section D on page 18, in addition to the participation in the establishment of ANRAC, the CERSP will also finance the DRR, a portion of reconstruction and rehabilitation investments, as well as other activities such as long-term development studies, conflict early warning and prevention, information, monitoring and evaluation, environmental activities, etc.

4.1.4.2 Other donors’ involvement in the PRAESC

The PRAESC is ambitious and costly and the involvement of all Senegal’s partners is required to implement it fully. As described in paragraph 2.5 on page 5, many donors are willing to commit themselves and some have already begun their activities. Therefore, PRAESC financing is, it is hoped, largely in place.

Nevertheless, the mine clearance issue is critical. UNDP has asserted its leadership in this area and the European Union is expected to commit a substantial amount to this component, with support from some other bi-lateral donors. However, it is not clear that the mine clearing needs identified by the PRAESC will be covered. Still, this should not compromise World Bank activities in Casamance, because only 5 percent of areas will be affected.

The various PRAESC missions have clearly identified five mined zones in which the accident risk is insignificant, although limited, owing to the low density of the mines observed so far. Although mine clearing is needed in these zones prior to any development activities, they are small relative to Casamance as a whole (3.8 percent of the total area). Moreover, the estimate of the potentially mined area should decrease significantly once the quick light surveys have been carried out.

4.2 LESSONS LEARNED FROM PAST EXPERIENCES

After the 1991 and 1993 peace accords, a program to demobilize young resistance fighters was carried out beginning in 1992 with EU financing, and involved in particular the MFDC’s Northern Front, which was at the time its largest contingent. The program, under the neutral and fairly modest label of “micro-projects”, incorporated some innovative methodologies for the reinsertion of ex-combatants (not necessarily into their home villages but within their ethnic group.)

Lessons learned from experiences in other regions are the following:

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17 USA, Canada, and Belgium have expressed their interest.
18 potentially divided by a factor 10.
It is important to eliminate — or at least limit — the danger posed by landmines and to conduct rapid mine clearance to humanitarian standards so that local populations may return promptly to their usual place of residence.

There is a need for rapid creation of a database of combatants to be demobilized, so that they can be monitored over the months/years following their reintegration. These people, who have lived with violence for prolonged periods, expect the reintegration program to help them handle their day-to-day problems. It is important to teach them to live as civilians again. This re-learning process is impossible unless their identities and whereabouts are precisely known. The ideal is to register them upon their first contact with the demobilization program, i.e., when they are disarmed.

It is important to limit as much as possible the duration of the affected people’s stay in temporary encampments. Apart from health and logistical issues, prolonged stays bring about behavioral changes in beneficiaries, including anger and passivity, making their economic and social reintegration and the relearning of autonomy all the more difficult.

Support for ex-combatants must be geared to their specific needs, and must at the same time avoid generating a feeling of unfairness on the part of non-combatants. It is important that the benefits of peace be perceived as being equitably bestowed upon all. Differential treatment must be limited and great efforts must be made to support the receiving communities, in terms of both local infrastructures and income-generating activities.

Quick restoration of infrastructures is vital to the resumption of economic activity and increased employment in the region.

Since 1999, the OIM has, with World Bank financing, been operating a demobilization program in Guinea-Bissau (including the Senegalese military intervention dubbed “Operation Gabou”) in the wake of that country’s civil war. The interconnections between events occurring in Guinea-Bissau and the situation in Casamance will require close coordination of post-conflict activities carried out on both sides of the border. For example, if the re-insertion and reintegration of those demobilized is done poorly, demobilization in Casamance could spur a re-mobilization of ex-combatants in the ranks of resistance fighters on the Guinea-Bissau side, assuming that the precarious political and military situation in the border region persists.

5. SECTION D: DETAILED CERSP DESCRIPTION

5.1 PROJECT OBJECTIVES

The objective of the PRAESC is the rapid reintegration of the entire population of Casamance into a favorable economic and social environment and the establishment of a foundation for long-term sustainable development that takes the region’s specificities into account.

The overall objectives of the CERSP are to enable the PRAESC to be implemented through its coordination and supervisory functions and to help the Government of Senegal to:

1. demobilize and reinsert 2,300 combatants and other direct victims of the conflict as well as their families;

2. ensure the social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants, their families and other persons directly affected by the conflict;

3. rebuild or rehabilitate major social and economic public infrastructures in Casamance in three major sectors: transport, health and education;
4. prepare a long-term development program aimed at bringing the level of development in Casamance up to the average level of other regions in Senegal, while addressing the original causes of the conflict.

5.2 PROJECT SCOPE AND IMPLEMENTATION PERIOD

The CERSP will be the World Bank’s primary vehicle in Casamance. This is an emergency project that will therefore follow the Bank’s special procedures. By definition, it may contain only short-term activities. The project will be implemented over a period of three (3) years.

5.3 PROJECT COSTS AND FINANCING

The total cost of the CERSP should not exceed US$20 million for the entire period under consideration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMPLEMENTATION STRUCTURE OF THE CERSP</th>
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<td>of which Ziguinchor Central Structure (w/o technical cells)</td>
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<td>of which IT and M&amp;E Officer (RGISE – Responsable Gestion de l’Information et Suivi-Evaluation)</td>
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<td>Long term development studies</td>
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<td>Environmental activities</td>
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<td>Activities</td>
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<td>IRR</td>
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<td>Structure (incl. Local branches)</td>
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<td>Activities</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>$19,890,000</td>
</tr>
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</table>

5.4 RATIONALE FOR THE CERSP

An Emergency Recovery Credit under the Bank’s OP/BP 8.50 guidelines is considered the most appropriate instrument to support the critical transition process in Casamance because it enables the Bank to quickly respond to the GoS request for support. The CERSP’s objectives are to quickly restore economic activities and social services in key sectors, with targeted spending priorities drawn up by central and regional Senegalese authorities. The credit would total US$20 million equivalent.
The proposed project will have a high economic and humanitarian impact since its objectives are to (i) quickly restore normal social and economic activities to areas devastated by war; and (ii) prepare for future regular development activities in Casamance. Indeed, the project will support the demobilization and reintegration of a few thousand ex-combatants and direct victims of the conflict and their families, and restoration of important local social and economic infrastructures. These emergency actions should therefore contribute to a more sustainable environment in the region by reducing the scope for conflict generated by economic and social disparities.

5.5 OVERALL INSTITUTIONAL AND PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS

Structure of the CERSP

The CERSP will be implemented by ANRAC, a Senegalese administrative structure created by the Government to ensure smooth execution of the PRAESC.

In order to satisfy the World Bank's fiduciary requirements for implementation, however, the following changes will need to be made to the structure of ANRAC.

Organizational set-up of ANRAC

ANRAC will have a Program Coordinator who will be based in Ziguinchor and will be responsible for implementing operational activities at the field level. In accordance with the decree creating ANRAC, the Directeur Général of ANRAC will delegate the necessary powers to the Program Coordinator. Like all ANRAC personnel, the Program Coordinator is under the direct authority of the DG-ANRAC and is bound by the terms of a contract signed with the DG-ANRAC acting on behalf of the Government.

Oversight Council

An Oversight Council will handle strategic coordination at the national level of all interventions associated with the economic and social recovery of Casamance.

Steering Committee

A PRAESC Steering Committee will be established by decree of the Prime Minister to translate themes defined by the Oversight Council into programs, and particularly to supervise the implementation of the PRAESC. This committee, which will be headed by a representative of the Prime Minister, will be composed of representatives of the relevant administrations, parties to the reconciliation process, civil society, the private sector and local elected officials. The DG-ANRAC, or his representative, will serve as the Secretary of this Committee.

The Steering Committee will examine and approve annual work programs and budgets as well as the activity and financial reports of the PRAESC. It will convene meetings at least twice yearly, alternating between Ziguinchor and Kolda. The secretariat of the PRAESC Steering Committee will be carried out by the DG-ANRAC or his representative.

The World Bank will help finance the revised structure so that it can carry out the CERSP. In addition, the CERSP will finance:

- most of the activities included under the Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration (DRR) Component;
- a large portion of the Infrastructure Reconstruction/Rehabilitation (IRR) Component;
- preparation of a long-term development program for Casamance;
- activities associated with conflict early warning, conflict prevention, and social mobilization.

Finally, a budget line will be earmarked under the CERSP to finance certain activities resulting from the implementation of environmental protection and social policies.
5.5.1 Operational activities for the implementation of the PRAESC

The primary role of the ANRAC is to harmonize all reconstruction and development activities initiated by all partners in Casamance. This function will be supported by cross-sectoral activities implemented by specialized staff.

5.5.1.1 Monitoring and Evaluation

Monitoring of field activities (CERSP’s as well as others’) will be the responsibility of the Cellule Information, Suivi et Evaluation (CISE).

Standard monitoring modalities will be integrated into the CERSP’s Procedures Manual in order to facilitate the monitoring and analysis of the situation. These modalities will also incorporate objectively verifiable indicators on the CERSP’s performance so as to facilitate comparison. The CISE Officer will prepare a monthly implementation monitoring report. This report will be incorporated by the Program Coordinator (PC) into the monthly Implementation Technical Monitoring and Financial report which is also transmitted to the Director General (DG) on a monthly basis. Each quarter, the DG will prepare an in-depth analysis of the situation, which will be submitted to the ANRAC Oversight Committee (ANRAC-OC), to the PRAESC Steering Committee and to the relevant donors.

These M&E activities will be based on a comprehensive and nimble IT system of field data collection, local inputting and centralization at the ANRAC level, allowing nearly real-time analysis of activities and identification of needs and of beneficiaries (especially those from the DRR component who will receive ID cards in the interest of preventing gaps in coverage of the DRR process.) This IT system will include a Geographic Information System (GIS) that will, for example, quickly identify gaps in PRAESC implementation.

An evaluation of program implementation will be undertaken one to three months after completion of each phase of each component. Each evaluation, conducted by an independent consultant or NGO, will address: (i) the results of program implementation; (ii) the impact on those demobilized, their families, displaced persons, refugees and their receiving communities; and (iii) the adequacy of institutional and administrative mechanisms.

All the evaluations shall be based on: (i) the IT system and the financial monitoring reports; and (ii) a survey of beneficiaries’ and communities’ reactions in order to gauge the impact in the field by means of direct observation and interviews (e.g., with key informants, ex-combatants, community leaders and members of the community).

5.5.1.2 Conflict early warning and prevention and activities

Activities implemented by the Cellule d'Alerte et de Prévention des Conflits (CAPC) will aim to mitigate and prevent the triggering of social conflicts in Casamance, and to lay the groundwork for sustainable regional development at the community and regional levels.

The more specific objectives are: (i) to make the population aware of PRAESC activities in order to create a consensus around its objectives and approaches; (ii) to monitor current or potential conflict triggers and mobilize the population and stakeholders around conflict early warning, mitigation, and resolution instruments; (iii) to support advocacy on the part of local actors (e.g., civil society, community radio stations, etc.) for peace and reconstruction initiatives; (iv) to promote participatory formulation of a sustainable development program that will take into account potential conflict triggers and related mitigation activities.

The CAPC will implement a conflict early warning and mitigation system based on prior analysis, with the relevant actors, of current and potential conflict triggers, as well as information gathering and periodic updating of this analysis. Data will be collected by stakeholders belonging to the support network as well as by AD representatives.
When (current or potential) conflicts are identified at or above the community level, stakeholders will be assigned to find appropriate solutions or to dispatch representatives of the parties involved to the appropriate institutions. Mobilization campaigns will be launched, in a preventive as well as reactive manner, on sensitive issues (conflict triggers) or activities proposed under the PR4ESC. An action plan for social mobilization activities will be updated on a regular basis.

Studies and other analytical activities aimed at formulating a long term sustainable development plan for Casamance will be documented on the basis of the conflict early warning and prevention system and social mobilization activities.

5.5.1.3 Environmental and Social activities

5.5.1.3.1 Social and Environmental Impact

By restoring a stable and productive economic and social life, for a direct impact on 30,000-to 40,000 people and an indirect impact on all 1.2 million inhabitants of Casamance, the PRAESC will have a social impact at the regional, national, and international levels. Restoration of Casamance’s optimal economic growth potential will have very strong social repercussions on the immediate environment, including all of The Gambia and the northern part of Guinea-Bissau.

The component involving Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of Non-Community Infrastructures should also have minimal negative impacts since it will confine itself to the restoration of existing infrastructures. On the contrary: if this work is done properly, it will correct previously existing defects in those infrastructures. For each of these major infrastructures, the Procedures Manual will determine the environmental studies to be carried out prior to any intervention.

A Regional Environmental Assessment (REA) covering all of Casamance was carried out before the start of the program in order to point up potential problems. The topics covered are the following:

- Management of natural resources, and particularly ground and surface water resources;
- The problem of inland infiltration of salt water;
- Protection of mangroves;
- Exploitation and conservation of fisheries resources;
- Exploitation and conservation of forests (whether classified or not) and of other protected areas.

The main conclusions of the REA are the following:

(i) Both environmentally and socially, the Mine Clearance component will have a major positive impact as it will allow for better management of natural resources and prevent further accidents.

(ii) The social impact of the Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration component, if well managed, is self-evident and may well transcend the regional context. The Community Development component is expected to have limited negative impacts because of the small size of the infrastructures involved. The component will have a definite positive impact in cases where the interventions have a clear environmental protection objective, such as anti-salinization dams and measures against soil degradation. The component dealing with the Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of Non-Community Infrastructures may have major negative impacts, even if these are limited to existing structures. On the other hand, this component could have a distinct positive impact in cases where it corrects existing infrastructure problems.

(iii) The REA includes a Environmental and Social Management Framework of PRAESC. This plan (PCGES) identifies the Casamance context in terms of regional priorities for environmental and social management, specifically for the two regions of Ziguinchor and Kolda, and in terms of the options allowed under the Safeguard Policies. The PRAESC triggers
five safeguard policies, as indicated in the table below. In response to the requirements of Safeguard Policy OP 4.12 - Involuntary Resettlement, a special Resettlement Policy Framework was prepared for PRAESC and issued as a separate document. In view of the several international waterways in the Casamance region, and the possible use of these waters under the PRAESC program, Safeguard policy OP 7.50 requires that neighboring states and/or OMVG be informed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Safeguard policy of PRAESC</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.01 - Environmental Assessment</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.04 - Natural Habitats</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.09 - Pest Management</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.11 - Cultural Property</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.12 - Involuntary Resettlement</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.20 - Indigenous Peoples</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.36 - Forests</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.37 - Safety of dams</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.50 - Projects on international waterways</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.60 - Projects in disputed areas</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the basis of regional priorities and taking into consideration the requirements of the Safeguard Policies, the Framework provides overall guidelines for environmental and social management of the PRAESC project. The guidelines concern:

- Environmental assessment procedures of each of the micro-projects of PRAESC;
- Environmental and social management instructions for the four PRAESC project components;
- and
- Investment measures, particularly for existing environmental problems.

A consultation plan, a monitoring program, and detailed recommendations for institutional measures and capacity building, designed to ensure optimal management of the environmental and social aspects of PRAESC, round out the Framework.

A study for the Social and Poverty Analysis under the PRAESC has also been performed. This study stressed the importance of local participation in the reconstruction process, of being attentive to needs expressed in the field, and of maximizing coordination between all PRAESC activities. The CERSP will support these objectives through the PRAESC’s central structures.

5.5.1.3.2 Environmental and social activities

The DRR component, as described in paragraph 5.6.1 below, is fully geared to social activities, as these will support the reintegration into civilian life of combatants and victims of the conflict.

Regarding the environment, the CERSP will include forestry activities as a complement to similar activities performed through the local development component of the PRAESC (not financed by the CERSP).

The Cellule Impact Environnemental et Sociale (CIES) will supervise these activities and monitor the environmental and social impacts of all activities performed under the PRAESC.

5.5.2 CERSP administrative management

Beyond these operational functions, the DG-ANRAC will also be in charge of the fiduciary and administrative aspects of the CERSP.

5.5.2.1 Safeguards to Ensure Proper Use of Funds

The CERSP will contribute to the funding of the Procurement Unit (Cellule de Passation des Marchés, CPM) as well as the Department of Administration, Personnel and Finance) Service Administration,
Personnel et Finance, SAPF). In this context, the staff of these two units will be recruited through procedures acceptable to the World Bank.

5.5.2.2 Accounting, Audit and Reporting Arrangements and the Flow of Funds

A manual of administrative, accounting and financial procedures for the CERSP will be produced at the beginning of the project in order to ensure that funds are managed according to Bank requirements. This document will subsequently be incorporated into the ANRAC manual of procedures approved by the ANRAC-OC.

The ANRAC will be audited on an annual basis. This audit will include the activities executed by the CERSP as well.

Section G – Financial Management Arrangements – on page 50 describes in detail the financial management procedures to be used under the CERSP.

5.5.2.3 Procurement Arrangements

Procurement for all Bank-financed activities will be handled by the Procurement Officer who will use Bank-approved procedures as set out in an administrative, accounting and financial procedures manual.

Section F – Procurement Arrangements - describes in detail the procurement procedures to be used in the CERSP.

5.6 COMPONENT DESCRIPTION

5.6.1 Program of Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration (PDRR)

5.6.1.1 Objectives

The objective of the PDRR is to meet the most acute needs of groups directly affected by the conflict in Casamance and to help them resume a stable and sustainable economic and social life. The DRR component will be divided into two sub-components, each having specific objectives.

© Sub-component 1: Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration (DRR) of Ex-Combatants

The objective of this sub-component is to support the demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration of ex-combatants of various groups (i.e., irregular forces) involved in the Casamance conflict in order to allow them to attain a socio-economic level comparable to that of the majority of the rural population of the region. This will consolidate the end of the Casamance conflict, thus reducing insecurity in the region and allowing economic and social development to resume.

© Sub-Component 2: Support for Reintegration of Groups directly affected by the Conflict (Appui à la Réintégration des Groupes directement Affectés par le Conflit – ARGA)

The main objective of this sub-component is to provide ad hoc support for the reintegration of groups directly affected by the conflict (e.g., widows of combatants, orphans, disabled ex-combatants, women recruited forcibly) into a stable economic and social life, as an accompaniment to initiatives already proposed by other parties active in the field.
5.6.1.2 Description

© Preliminary identification work

(i) Identification of target groups

Sub-component 1: Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration (DRR) of Ex-Combatants

- Demobilized persons

The target groups must include all active combatants irrespective of their affiliation with the various military fronts or factions. Every demobilized person must be defined as a “vulnerable ex-combatant”. The beneficiary is to choose the assistance he/she needs. In order to bring this about, the Program of Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration (PDRR) must offer a wide range of benefits. The details of these benefits remain to be specified.

Regarding combatants to be demobilized, the PDRR of the PRAESC concerns active military forces consisting of some 2,000 combatants. To the extent that each family includes about 8 individuals, this sub-component, the PDRR, would directly affect nearly 16,000 people.

The criteria for selecting persons eligible to benefit from the demobilization and reinsertion program must be transparent, so as to prevent any discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, region or gender. However, the identification of combatants to be demobilized may pose problems. In the likely event that the MFDC does not have any troop rosters, the receipts issued to ex-combatants at the time they turn in their weapons will serve as a baseline reference. Finally, the ex-combatants may be grouped into billets for purposes of determining their numbers and characteristics.

The characteristics of every ex-combatant must be recorded with precision. Combatants will receive assurances that, in allowing themselves to be counted, they will not be risking any reprisals or legal proceedings.

The liberation of ex-combatants has important consequences for their families and communities. If the spouses and children are to enjoy beneficiary status, ex-combatants must declare them prior to their liberation, at the time when data needed for monitoring is being collected. They must also declare the specific location of re-settlement, so that collectivities that might need specific support under the program can be identified. Thus, complementarity between Community Development activities and activities associated with the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants is a fundamental aspect of the CERSP.

Sub-Component 2: Support for the Reintegration of Groups Directly Affected by the Conflict (ARGA)

- Groups directly affected by the conflict

This sub-component will benefit groups directly affected by the conflict, i.e., the widows of ex-combatants, women who were forcibly pressed into service, handicapped ex-combatants and orphans. Estimated numbers of people to benefit from the activities proposed under this component are roughly 300 persons.

If the ex-combatants include child soldiers (irregular forces) and if there are no specialized agencies in the field to handle their reinsertion, they will be covered by this sub-component.

19 All figures provided in this paragraph are preliminary and are to be refined at a later date by MFDC authorities.
(ii) Identification of needs and opportunities

If the PDRR is to be adapted to needs, those needs must be identified. Information to be gathered will be of three types:

- Beneficiaries’ characteristics, needs and aspirations;
- Opportunities and constraints that will emerge when beneficiaries enter the labor market as salaried workers or self-employed persons; and
- The civilian context in which the beneficiaries will be living.

It is therefore crucial to carry out preliminary studies. These must cover the beneficiaries’ socio-economic profile, opportunity structure, the social patrimony of the community and the institutional and organizational structures needed to implement the PDRR program.

Essential data includes demographic and health data, level of education, access to resources (e.g., land, capital and other means of production), work experience, place of origin, desired resettlement locale and type of work envisaged after the demobilization. On the basis of the data gathered, a socio-economic profile of the beneficiaries will be drawn up.

The profile obtained will be used to classify ex-combatants into the following categories: rural and urban mode of subsistence, female ex-combatants, child soldiers, disabled ex-combatants, ex-combatants with many years of service, retirees and particularly vulnerable ex-combatants (e.g., those belonging to ethnic minorities). Those who joined up or who served only for short periods may not require any particular assistance to re-integrate themselves, but will still need some help with the transition.

Large-scale studies will take time. It will therefore be useful: (i) to establish a preliminary profile based on information obtained in the context of a billeting operation, through interviews with discussion groups, cross-referenced with general information on the economic development of the region; and (ii) to perform a summary qualitative evaluation of collectivities and organizational structures. The latter is best done with the collaboration of projects and organizations that have been in Casamance for a long time and that possess a large amount of valuable baseline data.

(iii) Development of an effective targeting mechanism

Once identified, ex-combatants will need valid, non-transferable and un-falsifiable identity documents. A certificate of liberation providing personal information (including a photo and signature or fingerprint) and a section detailing the benefits entitlement may be the best way for ex-combatants to exercise their rights. If the benefits are transferable, e.g., in the event of the bearer’s death, the document must also include a section pertaining to reversion, including the entitlements of close relatives. This certificate shall be designed to be durable and portable. Documents concerning particular target sub-groups may also be issued: e.g., identity cards for disabled ex-combatants (cartes d’invalidité) and (for family members) certificates of community residence (attestations de la collectivité).

These identity documents fulfill two functions: (i) they enable every qualified ex-combatant to exercise his rights; and (ii) they exclude those who are not ex-combatants (except spouses and children), i.e., they prevent fraud. For this purpose, a clear procedure must also be established for the re-issuance of documents in the event of loss or theft. The issuance of these documents will be computerized and each individual affected will thus be entered into the SGI’s database.

It will be crucial that such a system be developed in harmony with the systems and techniques used in Guinea-Bissau for counting demobilized persons under its demobilization program.

(iv) Reintegration needs

Casamance is still a rural society, with over 75 percent of its population in rural areas. Most ex-combatants are from agricultural milieux and will need access to land to undertake agricultural activity in...
the event of their demobilization. Overall, however, the main requirement of combatants’ families during the critical transition period will probably be money, since basic needs (i.e., food, housing, clothing) are not being met. Poor households are also characterized by the absence of basic social services. Finally, the beneficiaries, and particularly former combatants, will need help finding employment.

Economic and social reintegration may pose a great challenge for ex-combatants. The PDRR can hope that many ex-combatants will be perceived by the receiving communities as community members. This will be reinforced if socio-cultural reinsertion measures (especially including traditional rituals often performed by female shamans) are well organized.

Phases of the PDRR

The PDRR of the PRAESC will be drawn up on the basis of the results of the socio-economic profile of MFDC combatants and other beneficiaries, other preparatory work done during the demobilization, and the prior analysis of opportunities for economic reinsertion. It is also critical to address the need for a reliable mechanism for identifying beneficiaries in order to ensure the program’s efficacy.

The PDRR therefore includes four phases needed for a global and complete approach, namely: (i) headcount (military identity); (ii) demobilization (civilian identity); (iii) reinsertion (safety net); and (iv) reintegration (sustainable livelihood) as shown in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phases of Demobilization and Reinsertion Program for ex-combatants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phase 1</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Census and disarmament</td>
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<td>&quot;Military&quot; identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Identification and disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Data gathering*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Photograph*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Issuance of identify papers*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Data processing*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Personnel database*</td>
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The CERSP will only finance reintegration activities and those selected by the individual from among those indicated with an asterisk (*). Other actors are expected to participate in the program in the form of logistical support (e.g., transportation supplied by the Senegalese Armed Forces), assistance in kind (e.g., food aid for ex-combatants) and complementary activities essential to the smooth implementation of the program (e.g., support for housing construction for ex-combatants).

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20 In the context of projects aimed at education for peace and peace promotion, some international projects (e.g., GTZ-PAARZ, CRS, WFD), with their local partners (e.g., NGOs) have already developed such strategies and approaches. A program involving a group of traditional female shamans seems particularly noteworthy.
Phase 1: Headcount and disarmament

An adequate system of identification is necessary to avoid delays in implementation of the PDRR. The Direction de la Démobilisation, la Réinsertion et la Réintégration (DDRR), will begin a process of identification and counting of all MFDC combatants in order to computerize them. Demobilization criteria must be defined clearly and precisely by the MFDC. Vulnerability criteria must also be defined without ambiguity by civil authorities after consultation with civil society. An exhaustive headcount of the target group will allow the PDRR to direct resources to persons who were actually combatants.

All combatants will be identified, registered and issued secure identity papers prior to the first phase of demobilization. Data will be processed and entered into a database that will be the basis for the organization of the demobilization process.

This headcount phase is expected to occur during the disarmament process. Combatants will appear before a Disarmament Committee composed of high-ranking representatives of the MFDC and Senegalese Army, and by a neutral (non-Senegalese) third party. The combatant will be identified as subject to demobilization and entered into the database. The individual will then trade his weapon for an identity document. Arms will be collected by the weapons-disposal team, which will tally the weapons in the database before destroying them on a daily basis. It has been decided that the disarmament team(s) will be mobile so as to limit the need for groups of armed men to move about.

The DDRR will be charged with the operational implementation of this phase, with support and advice from the Office of Demobilization.

Phase 2: Demobilization

The DDRR will participate in the organization of start-up procedures and will coordinate them with the Office of Demobilization. These procedures will integrate planning (including schedules, locations, number of persons involved, etc.), administration (e.g., validation of combatants’ identities, documentation, departure certificates and databases) and transportation logistics (including security measures). The first of three disbursements from the amount provisionally earmarked for safety net allowances will also occur during this period and will be organized and managed by the DDRR.

From a practical standpoint, a database on individual combatants to be demobilized will need to be developed by the DDRR, with the help of the CGI, on the basis of lists supplied by the MFDC and survey forms. An identification (ID) system with a code to be used for the database will also need to be developed and implemented, along with accompanying files containing basic information about the demobilized individual and the composition of his family, his profession and/or training, final destination, and demobilization benefits to which he is entitled. This general data file of the PDRR will be used for the subsequent stages (i.e., reinsertion and reintegration) and updated on an ongoing basis with the needed information.

The DDRR, on the basis of information from the MFDC, will need to develop the demobilization plan and calendar. In theory, several options may be examined.

The assumption used in the present document is, a priori, that demobilization will occur in “waves”, with the most vulnerable groups having priority. This option would allow for demobilization by locality and by group. It is theoretically recommended, once the combatants to be demobilized have been

21 Made up of ANS personnel.
22 The method of weapons disposal (via explosives or other means) needs to be chosen so as to ensure daily destruction without any stockpiling. Senegalese laws pertaining to the transportation of explosives and weapons must also be respected.
23 To the extent that events permit this.
identified, that the receiving zones (i.e., the camps) be emptied as quickly as possible so as to avoid the burden of managing these groups (housing, food, medical assistance, etc.) and possible trouble that could emerge over time due to uncertainties about their future.

The demobilization plan and calendar must also be analyzed in relation to the subsequent stages and especially in relation to the schedule for preparation of the PRAESC structures.

During the period in which candidates for demobilization are being assembled, specific food aid programs, as well as medical assistance and prescreening, will need to be provided. A campaign of civic education and introduction to the PDRR and to the sequential steps in the process of reinsertion (benefits and safety net services; eligibility criteria) and reintegration (economic reintegration services and opportunities; eligibility criteria by category) will need to be implemented. The DDRR will be responsible for developing all the documents and procedures manuals relative to the above-mentioned points and for training the staff of the implementing agencies responsible for the activities.

**Medical examination**

Medical exams will be an important part of the departure process. Their objective will be to identify serious ailments or disabilities that could affect ex-combatants’ future ability to achieve economic and social reinsertion. They will also make it possible to identify specific needs in terms of various kinds of rehabilitation. Medical examinations will be conducted using the technical resources available on-site. Financial concerns preclude more sophisticated procedures such as blood tests or x-rays.

The questionnaire will include questions on the patient’s socio-economic characteristics, general health, injuries and main traumatic experiences, previous operations and hospitalizations, as well as known ailments. The list of symptoms will include, among others: cough, chronic diarrhea, fever, symptoms of venereal disease, alcohol consumption, psychiatric symptoms associated with previous traumas, and symptoms of epilepsy. The examination will also include visible injuries, missing limbs, seriously diminished sight or hearing, paralysis and signs indicative of substance abuse.

The local team in charge of medical examinations will receive a brief preparatory training. The data obtained will be processed and computerized in the context of the PRAESC’s monitoring system. Relevant results of these examinations will be noted on the departure certificates in order to entitle the bearer to specific services. These results will be conveyed quickly to the medical authorities and NGOs active in this area.

**Pre-departure orientation**

The responsibility of the DDRR, supported by the Conflict Early Warning (CAPC) Unit, in terms of advising combatants, takes effect from the time the combatants are at the Demobilization Center. Information will be supplied on the PRAESC’s PDRR, indemnities, rights and obligations of combatants as well as on the role and functions of the Decentralized Branches of the PRAESC and the authorities. Advice concerning the proper utilization of the help provided and codes of civilian conduct will be an integral part of the pre-departure orientation.

The orientation program will be implemented in modules, each dealing with one of the aforementioned themes. Methods will be developed to encourage demobilized persons (as well as their spouses, if they were present at the demobilization center) to participate actively in the PDRR program, and joint participation of men and women will be encouraged wherever possible. A consultant and an NGO will be recruited to develop and implement the pre-departure orientation program. Total cost of the pre-departure orientation program is estimated at CFAF 16.8 million, or CFAF 5,600 per demobilized individual.
Transportation

Physical settlement will be handled by the centralized organization responsible for transporting demobilized combatants and their families\(^{24}\) from the Demobilization Center to the chosen destination.

Two guiding principles underlie the centralization of the provision of means of transportation. One is the large number and concentration of persons needing transportation as well as security considerations. The other is that, if transport is facilitated, people are more likely to actually arrive where they say they want to go, instead of remaining in the vicinity of the departure centers. Transport will not be funded by the CERSP. It is expected that the Senegalese army will provide the required means of transport.

Counseling upon arrival

Local authorities and communities will be made aware of the needs of combatants’ families prior to the implementation of the PDRR of the PRAESC. In addition, local administrative structures will be charged with receiving and counseling demobilized combatants and their families if necessary. Counseling will be organized shortly after the ex-combatants have arrived in their respective communes or villages, and will deal with most of the issues already touched upon in the pre-departure orientation program. This work will be performed by the Reintegration Counselors of the AD.

Phase 3: Reinsertion

Any delay in the demobilization process makes the reinsertion assistance to demobilized persons all the more crucial.

The period between the demobilization and the start of the economic reintegration process must be the focus of particular attention on the part of the DG-ANRAC. In planning its programs, it will aim to develop an approach adapted to the social, economic and cultural context. The duration of this stage, as well as the benefits (which may be differentiated by category of demobilized person), the modalities and schedule of their distribution must also be the subject of an in-depth analysis.

The primary target of the reintegration assistance is not only the ex-combatant himself, but his household as well. During the first few months, the household of the ex-combatant is very vulnerable: basic needs such as shelter and a minimum of food security must be met immediately upon arrival in the receiving community. Shelter and food are not enough, however, to allow the demobilized combatant and his family to establish themselves as a viable economic and social unit. Additional support is needed to ensure that the family’s health expenditures for non-chronic illnesses are covered at a level similar to that of the neighbors. In addition, support is needed to pay the urgent costs of resettlement until the ex-combatant’s household begins to produce its own revenues.

Calculation of basic needs

The regions of Casamance (i.e., Kolda and Ziguinchor), which are among the most disadvantaged, have the largest number of households living below the poverty level: 69 and 51 percent, respectively, according to poverty indicators (UNDP Human Development Report, 1998) calculated on the basis of health, education and access to basic services.

The PDRR of the PRAESC will provide families of ex-combatants with temporary relocation funds intended to facilitate the most difficult phase of reintegration into civilian life. This fund allocation will be divided into two parts intended to: (i) cover the food needs of an entire family for one year\(^{25}\); and (ii) a direct financial allowance for investment in housing (lodging and furnishings) and the non-food

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\(^{24}\) If they are living with the combatants.
\(^{25}\) i.e., one metric ton for an 8-person household.
consumption (e.g., clothing, health care, education and local transportation). The CERSP will only finance the second part of the resettlement allowance, for a total of CFAF 192,500 per household.

Since the safety nets are calculated on the basis of the needs of ex-combatants’ households, their rationale and utilization should be explained during the pre-departure orientation. Ongoing counseling in the receiving communities should help ensure proper use of these funds.

- Modalities of payment

The relocation expenses will be paid in cash in order to allow ex-combatants to exercise some options. This mechanism also responds to the need, generally expressed by ex-combatants, for cash at the time of their departure. Paying a monetary equivalent of essential goods also reduces transaction costs that could be generated by the provision, transportation, storage and preservation of goods. This also has the advantage of introducing purchasing power into the bottom of the system, i.e., the village, thereby stimulating the production of local providers of goods and services, and energizing the local economy.

The temporary relocation allowance will be paid in three equal installments: the first upon departure, the second about 3 or 4 months later and the third about 6 to 8 months after departure.

The first payment will be administered by the DDRR upon the combatants’ departure from the Demobilization Center, as will the second and third payments.

- Phase 4: Reintegration

In order to respond to needs expressed by the target groups (i.e., ex-combatants, their dependants as well as other beneficiaries), the PDRR of the PRAESC includes support to allow the most rapid possible resumption of stable and sustainable economic activity.

In the interest of both efficiency and social justice, there will be no funds, apart from the safety net funds, specifically provided for the financing of economic or social activities undertaken by the beneficiaries. Beneficiaries will therefore be encouraged to avail themselves of opportunities offered under the other PRAESC components, and particularly the Local Development (LD) component, the purpose of which is to support all communities and individuals in Casamance wishing to invest in their own initiatives.

However, since vulnerability is the main characteristic of the target groups, certain specific support activities will be undertaken.

- Individualized monitoring of each beneficiary by Reintegration Counselors

The program provides for enough reintegration counselors so that each beneficiary can meet with one on a regular basis (e.g., monthly), at home if possible. The counselors will inform beneficiaries of their rights, point out local activities likely to be of interest to them and relevant to their personal aspirations, and direct them to locally available jobs and training that might prepare them for a stable and adequately remunerated job. They will also listen to their grievances and, if necessary, serve as mediators vis-à-vis groups or agencies that pose problems. Finally, they will help beneficiaries to assemble the dossiers required by the development and financing agencies to which they may wish to submit applications.

This latter work is identical to that which is to be done by the economic promotion agents (Agents de Coordination pour la Promotion des Activités Economiques, AC-PAE). In the interest of coherence and continuity, it is thus proposed that these two positions be merged. The function of supporting returnees’ reintegration is impermanent by nature and PAE activities should move to the forefront within a few months.

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26 It should be noted that the Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Reconstruction component will encourage labor-intensive construction methods, thereby fostering local job creation.
This work of informing, counseling and orientation will be supported by communication and information plans established by the CAPC (Cellule Alerte et Prévention des Conflits) at the central level. The CAPC will develop communication and information tools in its work with beneficiaries.

- **Specific training geared to resumption of work**

Following the preliminary study on the opportunity structure, a number of economic opportunities that may lead to beneficiary employment will be identified.

The DDRR will facilitate training adapted both to beneficiaries' current capacities and to the economic opportunities that may be open to them. This training will, to the extent possible, be dispensed by agencies already present in Casamance (e.g., projects, NGOs or others). The goal is still the same: i.e., avoiding redundancy and maximizing the use of locally available expertise.

The CERSP will finance such activities to an amount of CFAF 137,500 per beneficiary.

- **Specific target groups**

Apart from the support detailed above, specific target groups will benefit from targeted support measures. Disabled ex-combatants, victims of combat and land mines, female soldiers and child soldiers will be offered appropriate counseling, medical rehabilitation and support for reintegration through specialized NGOs.

Those medical costs will not be financed by the CERSP.

Widows of ex-combatants, orphans, and forcibly recruited women will also receive appropriate counseling. The CESRP will finance job training similar to those given to ex-combatants at CFAF 137,500 per beneficiary. These groups will also have privileged access to community reinsertion funds.

The ANRAC will collaborate closely with the ministries relevant to disabled ex-combatants, widows, the chronically ill and victims of war.

### 5.6.1.3 Institutional and Implementation Arrangements

A Joint Commission for the Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants, made up of parties to the conflict (i.e., the GoS and the various factions of the MFDC), will be formed for purposes of discussing the content of the DDR program, the criteria for beneficiary identification and all preparatory action needed to establish the program.

The Direction de la Démobilisation, Réinsertion et Réintégration (DDRR) is the technical agency of the ANRAC charged with setting up the PDRR. The DDRR has the following responsibilities:

- Demobilize and reinsert all persons eligible for this program;
- Ensure the return of demobilized combatants, displaced persons and refugees to their homes;
- Facilitate the reinsertion of vulnerable groups through personalized monitoring of eligible individuals and families.

Within each Local Branch, the DDRR will be represented by Reintegration Counselors in direct contact with beneficiaries.

A Demobilization Bureau will be established to manage the military aspects of the PDRR of the PRAESC.

An implementation manual will be prepared for the PDRR prior its execution.

### 5.6.1.4 Implementation Risks

Risks, and their corresponding mitigation strategies, are the following:
Misidentification of beneficiaries – clear criteria for identification of ex-combatants; participation of the various parties involved in the conflict; development of criteria; process of joint verification;

Incomplete disarmament – active participation of the DDRR and presence of independent parties; outreach to ex-combatants, their families and communities; possible additional intervention by agencies belonging to the early warning and conflict prevention system (CAPC);

Tensions within the ex-combatants’ receiving communities – outreach/information campaigns; prior intervention by the Reintegration Counselors; system of accompaniment of local actors within the framework of the CAPC;

Inadequate job reinsertion – individualized support; individual job plans evaluated jointly with specialized actors; inclusion of ex-combatants in income-generating activities after the DRR program;

Continued violence/security – discussion with local actors about additional activities required; analysis of new (or old) factors contributing to the violence, with support of the CAPC; and preparation of a short- and medium-term action plan.

5.6.1.5 Action Plan

The PDRR of the PRAESC must meet its objectives in four phases implemented over a period of three years.

♦ Phase I

The identification and headcount process will be undertaken by the MFDC. Program preparation will also continue in 2004, including:
- Development of sub-components for specific target groups;
- Development of the pre-departure orientation program;
- Development and implementation of the staff training program;
- Preliminary studies before start-up of the PRAESC, etc.

♦ Phase II

The demobilization will affect 2,000 combatants.

The relocation expense allowance will be paid to the families of demobilized persons within the first 8 months following their departure to their home destination.

♦ Phase III

Information, counseling and employment services will be supplied to ex-combatants and their families throughout all three years of implementation of the PDRR of the PRAESC.

5.6.2 Infrastructure rehabilitation and reconstruction

5.6.2.1 Objectives

♣ Transportation sector

Regarding roads, the PRAESC aims to address the specific accessibility issues of CasamANCE vis-à-vis the rest of Senegal. Casamance’s longer rainy season, the greater degree of danger for the populace, its geographic location on a national border and the imperatives of re-starting economic and social activity could not be addressed under the PAST or the PST2.
In terms of internal and border access improvement, the program therefore aims to enhance access for as many rural communities as possible. As for external access improvement, including the option of going eastward around The Gambia, the program is engaged in rehabilitating all national and regional roads serving the main towns of departments, and is therefore in harmony with the objectives of the PST2.

Education and health sectors

In order to encourage the return of displaced populations and retain those that have remained, the PRRI will aim, in the sectors of education and health, to rehabilitate staff to existing school and healthcare infrastructures rehabilitated by local communities, thereby putting them back into operation.

5.6.2.2 Description

The program concerns the rehabilitation or reconstruction of infrastructures damaged in the conflict. It covers healthcare, educational and transport infrastructures. The electricity sector is addressed by the rural electrification component of the ASER, particularly in the departments of Kolda and Velingara.

5.6.2.2.1 Needs identified by the PRAESC

The PRAESC document lists a set of infrastructures in the areas of transportation, health and education that require refurbishment so that economic and social activity can resume. These infrastructures have been ranked, according to a methodology specific to each sector, in order of the urgency of their repair.

Transportation sector

In the area of transportation, the PRAESC has identified works valued at CFAF 11,063 million, directly relating to periodic maintenance, rehabilitation or reconstruction of roads in Casamance and some bridges and works, including two access bridges in the town of Kolda.

(i) External access improvement

Regarding external access, i.e., the linkage between Casamance and the rest of Senegal, including the option of going eastward around The Gambia, the rehabilitation of all national roads is required, as is that of the regional roads serving the main towns of departments.

In the area of maritime transport, the rehabilitation of the piers at the port of Ziguinchor may be deemed sufficient for the short-term, pending the reconstruction of the port with AFD financing, with the goal of attracting private investment for the acquisition of additional vessels and the privatization of the management of the vessel that is to replace the capsized ferry ‘Diola’. These investments are essentially covered by ongoing national, bilateral or multilateral financing operations.

(ii) Internal access improvement

Improved internal access is a matter of connections between and within communities. In terms of roads, the main towns of rural communities need to be made accessible; the program also involves the rehabilitation of feeder roads in certain pilot villages.

(iii) Enhanced accessibility of isolated areas

Roads serving rural border areas are to be rehabilitated in order to prevent these areas from being exclusively geared to the production and consumption of goods and services from neighboring countries, and also to promote community transportation services using traditional pirogues and to foster improved organization and safety of services providing access to the islands of Basse Casamance.

In this connection, 6 wooden pontoon bridges are to be built in 6 island villages of Basse Casamance (4 in the Carones islands and 2 in the Bandial area). The construction costs of these basic infrastructures are
covered under the PRAESC with a view to attracting private sector interest in the acquisition of one or several river ferries.

**Education sector**

In the education sector, 138 classrooms have been identified as needing reconstruction. These classrooms are to be rebuilt over a three-year period. A margin of 12 classrooms to be built was added to accommodate eventual changes in population density resulting from migrations due to the conflict. The estimated total cost is CFAF 750 million for the entire PRAESC, or CFAF 250 million each year for years 1 through 3.

**Health sector**

Total investment under the PRAESC in the area of health in Casamance totals CFAF 1,126 million, distributed equally over years 1 through 3 of the PRAESC program. This sum corresponds to about 50 health posts, 3 maternity clinics and the rehabilitation of the psychiatric center in Kénia.

### 5.6.2.3 Institutional and Implementation Arrangements

#### 5.6.2.3.1 Implementation strategy of the Infrastructure Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Program (Programme de Reconstruction et de Réhabilitation des Infrastructures, PRRI)

The PRAESC will not be directly involved in carrying out investment programs. On the contrary, it will rely on the whole array of programs supporting infrastructure investment that are already active in the area, or even on delegated implementing agencies that are already operational.

**Transport sector**

The program should be implemented within the framework of convention between the Road Agency (AATR) and the Ministries of Highways and Finance. For investment expenditures, including the CERSP roads component, the agreement to be signed will either be for delegated works oversight or an implementing agency contract, both of which are provided for in the future procedures manual.

**Health and education sector**

The CERSP will establish conventions or memoranda of understanding with the Ministries of Health and Education, to which they will hand over the reconstructed or rehabilitated works. CERSP will delegate works oversight to AGETIP which has an office in Ziguinchor.

These reconstructions and rehabilitations will be contingent upon the actual availability of teaching or health staff for each of them. The works will be requested jointly by the health or education services and beneficiary representatives. Contract management will then be contracted out to the regional office of AGETIP.

Contracting for works oversight will be done locally. Labor-intensive techniques will be favored to maximize positive impact on local populations.

#### 5.6.2.3.2 Implementation structure of the PRRI

The Direction de la Réhabilitation des infrastructures (DRI)) will be responsible for developing investment plans, establishing contracts for delegated implementing agencies and then for ensuring their smooth implementation. In addition, the DRI will rely on the joint services of ANRAC, particularly for procurement.

#### 5.6.2.4 Implementation Risks

Risks are of three types:

- Renewed insecurity in the affected rural communities;
- Land tenure problems provoked by land development and associated with a failure to manage land resources;
- Premature deterioration of road infrastructures due to flooding, submersion or acidification of land resulting from inadequate technical studies or improper construction;

Measures to be envisaged:
- Prevention and early warning mechanism;
- Establishment of resource planning and management tools and training of the local population’s representatives in their use;
- Thorough technical studies and rigorous works oversight;

5.6.3 Preparation of the Long-Term Regional Development Program

5.6.3.1 Objectives

The objectives of these activities are to identify, and then to study in depth, the future sustainable development themes specific to Casamance. This work should result in concrete proposals for the government of Senegal and its development partners regarding interventions to be carried out.

5.6.3.2 Description

The selected areas of investigation meet two simple criteria:
- They are crucial to sustainable development in Casamance;
- They are not an outgrowth of national sectoral policies and can be resolved by interventions at the level of the natural region.

This latter point is important since Casamance suffers from problems common to all of Senegal. These must be resolved at the countrywide level. The function of the PRAESC is not to address these national problems, much less to launch activities aimed at resolving them in Casamance.

The specific areas are the following:
- enhancing accessibility of Casamance;
- tourism;
- private sector promotion;
- environment and natural resource management;
- hydraulics;
- land tenure.

5.6.3.3 Institutional and Implementation Arrangements

The start-up of studies and other analytical activities for the formulation of a sustainable development program in Casamance must be supported by useful information gathered in connection with the system of early warning, and conflict-prevention. Activities will be carried out by the CEDLT under the supervision of the Program Coordinator.

5.6.3.4 Procurement Arrangements and Action Plan

Procurement will be handled by the CPM of the ANRAC according to the manual of administrative procedure. Studies will be launched during the first year of the CERSP so that they can be presented by the DG-ANRAC to Senegal’s development partners, who may then put together the recommended programs at the end of the third year of the CERSP.
<table>
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<th>Studies</th>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
<th>Conditions</th>
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| **Land-based Dakar–Ziguinchor connection via The Gambia**               | • Desk study of studies already done on the land connection through The Gambia by means of a bridge over the Gambia River;  
• Updating of economic, social and technical data;  
• Proposal regarding institutional set-up allowing rapid transit through Gambian territory for transporters, while at the same time providing revenue incentives for the various Gambian parties. | • International consultant  
• Two months  
• Requirement of a formal agreement between both governments on this issue. |
| **Local river transport**                                              | • In-depth study of the milieu:  
  • People and their way of life;  
  • Navigability of the various river routes;  
  • Nature and flow of goods traded;  
  • Parties involved in river transport sector and their capacities;  
  • Etc.  
• Definition of a strategy of serving inaccessible areas via the river, particularly the Carone islands, including a sustainable institutions schema, a description of the necessary investments and their construction and maintenance modalities; support, if needed, for pirogue builders, etc.; | • One (1) international consultant and one (1) local consultant  
• Two months |
| **Tourism**                                                            | • The strategy that the PRAESC will help develop will be based on an exhaustive inventory of all the tourist possibilities of both regions, an analysis of constraints hampering their exploitation and a medium-term action plan to maximize local gains from tourism on a human scale. | • International consultant  
• Two months |
| **Secondary and tertiary private sector**                              | • For each of the previously identified sub-sectors, the study will define the economic potential and local constraints preventing their development. Particular attention will be paid to:  
  • Scope for credit access for entrepreneurs at each level (from the informal sector to SMEs in the formal sector), with an exhaustive description of credit agencies existing in Casamance;  
  • Available professional training to improve entrepreneurs’ ability to survive and adapt, and possible improvements;  
  • Private sector outreach agencies in Casamance, their ability to support entrepreneurs and their constraints.  
• At the conclusion of its analysis, this study will present an action for the private sector in Casamance. | • Two (2) local consultants  
• Three months |
### Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
<th>Conditions</th>
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| Hydraulics | - Baseline studies to determine hydrodynamic characteristics, potential and dynamics of groundwater resources of the shallow aquifers;  
- Definition of a strategy of rational and efficient management of hydraulic resources in Casamance;  
- Description of actions aimed at strengthening institutions responsible for natural resource management (e.g., mechanisms for resource supervision and oversight, training of staff, dissemination of information to users, etc.);  
- Description of a program of rehabilitation and consolidation of existing works already built in small valleys in *Basse Casamance* and *Moyenne Casamance* and the construction of small dikes upstream of these anti-salinization works to regulate water volumes in rice paddies;  
- Description of a priority program for protecting and preserving lands threatened by salinization through the construction of protective anti-salinization dikes and of an upstream dike system to better manage water volumes upstream from the works;  
- Identification of a certain number of sites, among the 200 small valleys identified in the region of Kolda, for the construction of small rainwater retention structures and the development of small irrigated perimeters to encourage off-season activities. | - Local consultant  
- Three months |
| Exploitation of perennial vegetation resources | - The study will aim to define a natural resource management strategy meeting the needs of the population of Casamance for forest and tree products and the protection of the natural wooded areas of Casamance.  
- Two themes will be studied:  
  - Sustainable management of forested areas for the benefit of the local population; and  
  - Development of commercially-oriented forest and tree plantations (species to be produced, potential markets, modes of exploitation adapted to the socio-cultural context of Casamance, etc.). | - International consultant  
- Two months |
| Exploitation of fisheries resources | - The study will evaluate precisely the qualitative and quantitative scope of fisheries resources in Casamance and will propose a program aimed at exploiting them sustainably for the benefit of the people of Casamance. | - International consultant  
- Two months |
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<tr>
<th>Studies</th>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
<th>Conditions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land tenure</td>
<td>The study will define, within the framework of existing and future national land tenure law, land tenure management tools to be put in place at the various administrative and territorial levels of Casamance so as to permit land tenure management for the benefit of the people of Casamance; The tools may in particular be rural and urban cadastral plans and Land Occupation and Use Plans (plans d’occupation et d’affectation des sols, POAS). A tool for managing livestock paths also seems to be needed to resolve the too-frequent disputes between farmers and herdsmen. • Actions to promote debate on land tenure reform and its application; • Training of Rural Councils in land tenure management, which is now one of their prerogatives; • Dissemination of current legal texts on national lands to producers in order to spur cooperation; • Dissemination of strategies currently under discussion on land tenure reform.</td>
<td>• Consultant national • Consultant national • Consultant national • Consultant national • Consultant national • Consultant national</td>
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These studies will be scheduled by the CAPC, which controls the relevant funds.

6. SECTION E: STUDIES AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

The structure of the ANRAC is predicated on a strong technical assistance base with the hiring of international experts to implement post-conflict activities. Those experts will remain in post for the entire duration of the activities they supervise. The Terms of Reference for each activity will be finalized by the ANRAC, once it is operational. Studies required to implement the activities are described under each component description. ToRs for these studies will be finalized by the managers of the relevant components, once they are operational.

7. SECTION F: PROCUREMENT ARRANGEMENTS

7.1 GENERAL

Procurement for the proposed project would be carried out in accordance with the World Bank’s “Guidelines for Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits” dated May 2004; and “Guidelines for the Selection and Employment of Consultants by World Bank Borrowers” dated May 2004, and the provisions stipulated in the Legal Agreement. A general description of the various procurements is provided below under their respective expenditure categories. For each contract to be financed by the Credit, the different procurement methods or consultant selection methods, the need for pre-qualification, estimated costs, prior review requirements, and time frame are agreed between the Borrower and the Bank project team in the Procurement Plan. The Procurement Plan will be updated at least annually or as required to reflect the actual project implementation needs and improvements in institutional capacity.

Procurement of Works: Works procured under this project would include: construction/rehabilitation of roads and bridges, classrooms, health posts and maternity clinics, and a psychiatric center. The
procurement will be done using the Bank’s Standard Bidding Documents (SBD) for all ICB and National SBD agreed with (or satisfactory to) the Bank.

**Procurement of Goods:** Goods procured under this project would include: Vehicles, motorcycles, office equipment, and computers. Procurement will be conducted using the Bank’s SBD for all ICB and National SBD as agreed with the Bank.

**Selection of Consultants:** Consultant services under the project would include preparatory studies for the long-term development program for Casamance, DRR and conflict early warning, environmental management, works preparatory studies and audits. Short lists of consultants for services estimated to cost less than US$100,000 equivalent per contract may be composed entirely of national consultants in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2.7 of the Consultant Guidelines.

**Operational Costs:** operating costs covered under the Project would be financed in accordance with the procedures of ANRAC, which are satisfactory to the Bank.

### 7.2 ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTING AGENCY’S CAPACITY TO CONDUCT PROCUREMENT

**7.2.1 Procurement arrangements**

Procurement activities would be handled by the Program Coordinator under the supervision of a Procurement specialist (SPM), including: (i) preparation of the General Procurement Notice and its annual update; (ii) preparation of the specific procurement notices; (iii) preparation and update of the half-yearly procurement plans; (iv) drafting bidding documents and requests for proposals; (v) awarding of contracts and requests for IDA’s non-objection when required; and (vi) drafting of contracts and ensuring that contracts are implemented properly.

Since ANRAC has no experience with World Bank procurement procedures, the project is considered high risk. Consequently, agreement was reached on the following measures prior to Credit Effectiveness: (i) recruitment of a consultant to prepare the Project’s administrative, accounting and financial procedures; and (ii) recruitment of the procurement specialist. These activities would be financed under the Project Preparation Facility (PPF). The adoption of a procedures manual satisfactory to IDA would be a condition of Credit effectiveness.

**7.2.2 Assessment of the procurement unit**

Because ANRAC staff has not yet been recruited, it was not possible to fully assess their capacities.

As soon as all the staff have been recruited, ANRAC will be evaluated to determine whether all conditions are in place to carry out procurement in accordance with World Bank procedures. The staff at the ANRAC would include a Procurement Specialist familiar with World Bank procurement procedures who would: (a) prepare and update the procurement plan for the project; (b) monitor the progress of procurement; (c) assist the implementing agencies in the preparation of bidding documents and bidding announcements for goods and works contracts and requests for consultants’ services; and (d) be responsible for bid opening and evaluation. The Procurement Specialist will also advise the implementing agencies on procedural matters. These conditions will be an important part of the specialist’s TOR and contract, which is to be drawn up with the assistance of the World Bank’s procurement team in Washington and Dakar.

The overall project risk for procurement is rated high until there is sufficient evidence that procurement has been handled satisfactorily.
7.3 PROCUREMENT PLAN

A Procurement Plan setting out the basics of the procurement methods has been provided to IDA. It will be available in the Project’s database and on the Bank’s external website. It will be updated in agreement with the World Bank annually or as required to reflect actual project implementation needs and improvements in institutional capacity.

7.4 FREQUENCY OF PROCUREMENT SUPERVISION

In addition to the prior review supervision to be carried out from Bank offices, the capacity assessment of the Implementing Agency has recommended twice-yearly field supervision missions to carry out post-review of procurement actions.

8. SECTION G: FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

8.1 GENERAL REMARKS

The project’s financial management arrangements are based on World Bank guidelines in this area, and particularly on “Guidelines: Financial Reporting and Auditing of Projects Financed by the World Bank” and “Guidelines for Simplified Procurement and Disbursement for Community-Based Investments”. They also take into account the fiduciary arrangements of World Bank projects in Senegal.

Financial management of the Project will be handled by the Director General of ANRAC, who will delegate expenditure authorization functions to the Program Coordinator (Coordonnateur des programmes, CP) based in Ziguinchor. Accounting functions under the Project will be performed by the Administration, Personnel and Finance Department (Service Administration, Personnel et Finances, SAPF).

Since this team is not yet operational, the assessment of financial management capacities consisted of defining the logistics of implementing the financial management plan. This assessment therefore covered: (i) human resources; (ii) accounting and financial procedures and periodic reporting; (iii) audits; (iv) disbursements; and (v) other specific arrangements given the nature of the project.

8.2 ARRANGEMENTS FOR FINANCIAL AND ACCOUNTS MANAGEMENT

8.2.1 Human resources

In terms of human resources, management of project accounts and finances will rely primarily on the Administration, Personnel and Finance Department (SAPF). Terms of reference for the head of the SAPF have been drawn up and recruitment of this administrative and financial officer is in progress. This individual will, like the team, be based in Ziguinchor. He will be assisted by an accountant. One year after project effectiveness, the work load will be evaluated in order to determine what reinforcement is needed at the central accounting and regional office levels.

Possible financing needs for activities in Dakar will be handled by the Directorate for Debt and Investment (DDI) of the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), which will be responsible for managing the Special Account (see paragraph 8.2.4.1 on disbursement arrangements).

8.2.2 Accounting and financial management procedures and computerized management information system

A procedures manual now being developed will provide all the required details on accounting and financial procedures. It will set out in particular the flow of accounting and financial information between
the General Directorate of ANRAC and project beneficiaries, as well as the modalities and formats of periodic reports. An overview of funding flows and cash management mechanisms is provided in the paragraph on disbursements.

In terms of budgets, each year the CP will, after consultation with the other operational directors, draw up a detailed budget for activities to be carried out under the CERSP. This budget, after its validation by the DG-ANRAC in a meeting of the management committee, will be submitted to the World Bank for analysis and then to the CP-PRAESC for approval. It will then be incorporated into the general State budget submitted to the National Assembly for approval.

The budget will be executed by the CP under the supervision of the DG-ANRAC. Thus, with regard to activities under the CERSP, the DG-ANRAC will delegate the relevant powers to the CP for the execution of all activities approved by the CP-ANRAC. A monthly activity report will be produced by the CP and conveyed to the DG-ANRAC. This report will in particular summarize the status of financial and technical execution and the volume of procurement for the month ended, and will also contain forecasts.

Every quarter, a Financial Monitoring Report (FMR) will be produced by the CP, validated by the DG-ANRAC, and conveyed to the World Bank.

In the area of reporting, the CP will also be required to produce, no later than March 31 of the following fiscal year, annual statements of accounting and financial execution. These financial statements will be subject to periodic audits (see paragraph on audits). Formats for the FMRs and financial statements will be defined in the procedures manual.

The computerized information system will be set up in such a way as to furnish all of the above data, in addition to providing analytical accounting for purposes of monitoring beneficiaries, and particularly ex-combatants and target groups.

8.2.3 Audits

An annual audit of ANRAC, including activities under the CERSP, and particularly those carried out by the CP, will be conducted.

This audit will, on the one hand, be of normal scope in terms of providing an opinion on annual financial statements, and its scope will also be broadened to cover the specific risks enumerated below:

(i) the activity described under Phase 3 (i.e., reinsertion) concerning the payment of a temporary safety net allowance. The auditor will be required to ensure that the payment procedures described in the procedures manual have been observed and that the duly identified beneficiaries have received the funds to which they are entitled. The auditor will express a special opinion on this point;

(ii) the activity described under Phase 4 (i.e., reintegration) concerning specific training for re-entry into the workforce. The auditor will be required to express a special opinion on the training dispensed by the selected entities (NGOs or others), so that its effectiveness may be assessed.

Finally, it should be noted that the auditor will furnish, as an annex to ANRAC's financial statements, a report on the implementation status of activities under the CERSP that will in particular detail, by category, funds received as well as executed and verified expenditures.

The audit report for the fiscal year ended must be submitted no later than June 30 following the end of that fiscal year.
8.2.4 Proposed disbursement arrangements

8.2.4.1 Disbursement method and Special Accounts

The project will use the traditional disbursement method based on Statements of Expenditures (SOEs). This method will be used for an 18-month period, during which time the project will produce quarterly FMRs. After 18 months, capacities will be assessed in order to determine whether disbursements can be based upon FMRs.

© Special Account:

A Special Account will be opened and management primarily by the Borrowers' designated representative, who is the main authorizer (ordonnateur) of capital expenditures in Senegal.

The total allocation of this Special Account will be US$2 million equivalent and will cover approximately four months of expenditures. Upon credit effectiveness, the World Bank will deposit in this account an advance representing 50 percent of the initial allocation, or US$1 million equivalent. The balance of the advance will be deposited when total expenditures plus special commitments are equal to SDR 3,000,000. The Special Account will be used for all expenditures equivalent to less than 20 percent of the authorized allocation, and requests for reimbursement will be submitted monthly. Reimbursements deposited by the Bank into this Special Account will be made against these requests supported by appropriate documentation.

© 90-day advance account:

Out of this account, a documented 90-day advance not to exceed CFAF 50,000,000 will be deposited in an account held by the CP of the CERSP in Ziguinchor. This 90-day advance account will be managed by the CP, who will be the primary authorizer of expenditures from it, and by the CSAPF, its accountant.

The CSAPF and CP will be the joint signers on this account. The 90-day advance account will be reconciled on a monthly basis.

© Use of Statements of Expenditures (SOEs):

Disbursements for all expenditures will be made by the Bank against full documentation, with the following exceptions: (a) contracts for works in an amount not exceeding US$500,000; (b) contracts for goods in an amount not exceeding US$150,000; (c) consulting contracts in an amount not exceeding US$100,000; (d) contracts for individual consultants in an amount not exceeding US$50,000; and (e) cash payments, training and operating costs, which will be reimbursed on the basis of SOEs.

All supporting documentation for SOEs will be retained at ANRAC and must be made available for review by periodic World Bank review missions and external auditors.

The schema of funding flows will be described in the procedures manual and appended to the MOP as an annex; it will also specify the various modes of disbursement.

© Disbursements by category:

The table below sets out the expenditure categories to be financed out of the Credit proceeds. The allocations for each expenditure category are the following:
8.2.4.2 Counterpart funds

The Government must make all arrangements necessary to ensure the timely mobilization of the counterpart funds needed for project implementation, and particularly for the operating and equipment expenditures of the DG-ANRAC. An account will be opened in the books of the General Directorate for Public Accounts and Treasury to receive the counterpart funds. The DG-ANRAC will administer the Government’s counterpart funds.

The DG-ANRAC will open a regional account in Ziguinchor to cover petty expenditures associated with Program Coordination.

8.2.4.3 Other disbursement arrangements

The new Country Financing Parameters for Senegal (OP 600) adopted in July 30, 2004 allows the funding of:

- the relocation expenses to the ex-combatants,
- the increase of the disbursement percentage for the Operating Cost Category.

Regarding the second point, it has been stated that Counterpart Funds are not an issue in Senegal for Bank funded operation. However, the mobilization of counterpart funds for small expenditures and at the decentralized level is constraining. Thus the Bank agreed to increase the disbursement percentage for this category up to 100%. Furthermore, the Counterpart Funds was increased accordingly to match the 10%.

8.2.5 Other financial management arrangements

8.2.5.1 Relocation expense allowance for ex-combatants

A relocation expenses allowance is to be paid to ex-combatants (see description of Phase 3 in paragraph 5.6.1.2), of which CFAF 192,500 is to be borne by the project. This amount will be paid out in three equal installments: the first at the time of departure from the Demobilization Center, the second 3 to 4 months later and the last 6 to 8 months after the departure.

Regarding the financial management arrangements, the CSAPF will, after identification of ex-combatants, establish for each one a file, both electronic and physical, for payment and monitoring purposes. These files must in particular contain the relevant identification papers and all documentary evidence of payments. Payments will be made through a commercial bank or through any other acceptable financial intermediary (e.g., a funds transfer company or a micro-financing institution such as a cooperative, savings bank or credit union.)
The CSAPF, in agreement with the CP, will identify the financial intermediaries closest to the project areas and will proceed to assign ex-combatants to them for direct payment of this expense allowance. An agreement will be signed with these financial intermediaries specifying: (i) the list of beneficiaries as well as the required identity documents; (ii) the modalities of payment; (iii) the modalities and deadlines for reporting on the execution of payments.

The CSAPF will check the list of ex-combatants on a regular basis against the payment receipts. A report will be prepared on this basis after each tranche and submitted to the World Bank. The validation of this report by the Project Officer will trigger the disbursement of future tranches.

The Credit Agreement will include a ‘Grant’ category to cover these payments. Expenditures under this category will be reimbursed on a 100 percent basis.

8.2.5.2 Support for reintegration

Support for reintegration will be provided during project implementation (see description of Phase 4 in paragraph 5.6.1.2). This support will be provided in accordance with the “Guidelines for Simplified Procurement and Disbursement for Community-Based Investments”. This support will be provided through subprojects and will include training and capacity-building activities for reinsertion. It will include the occasional purchase of small equipment.

A detailed description will be provided in the administrative, accounting and financial procedures manual.

8.2.5.3 Accounting and financial conditions and action plan

- **Conditions of Project effectiveness:**
  - The Borrower has (i) established, in accordance with Section 4.01 of the DCA, of a financial management and accounting system for the Project satisfactory to the Association and (ii) appointed external auditors with qualifications and experience satisfactory to IDA who are employed in accordance with the provisions of Section II of Schedule 4 of the DCA;
  - The Borrower has opened the Project Account pursuant to Section 3.04 (a) of the DCA and has deposited therein the initial deposit referred to in Section 3.04 (b) of said DCA;
  - The Borrower has adopted the PIM and the PIP for the Project, in form and substance satisfactory to the Association;
  - The Borrower has completed the work program for the first eighteen months of Project implementation, including the budget and the procurement plan, satisfactory in form and substance to IDA; and
  - The Borrower has appointed to ANRAC: (i) a project coordinator, (ii) a financial management specialist, and (iii) a procurement specialist, all having qualifications and experience satisfactory to the Association, and has employed them in accordance with the provisions of Section II of Schedule 3 to the DCA.

- **Disbursement conditions for the Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration component:**
  Grants for sub-projects (Category 4):

  No withdrawals shall be made in respect of:

  (a) Payments made for expenditures prior to the date of the DCA;

  (b) Expenditures under Category 4 until and unless:

     (i) the Joint Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration has been established satisfactory to the Association; and

     (ii) the Grants have been made in accordance with the procedures, terms and conditions referred to in the PIM and outlined in Schedule 4 of the DCA, as shall be evidenced by the first such 5 Grant Agreements furnished to the Association for its prior approval;
No withdrawals shall be made in respect of:

(c) expenditures under category 5 (Relocation Expenses) until and unless:
   (i) the Joint Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration has been
       established satisfactory to IDA;
   (ii) contracts for the management and payment of relocation expenses to ex-combatants
        have been entered into between the Borrower and financial institutions acceptable to
        IDA;
   (iii) a list of ex-combatants has been established and certified by the JCDDR; and
   (iv) the information referred to in paragraph 5 of Schedule 4 to the DCA has been
        furnished to IDA, in form and substance satisfactory to the Association.
9. SECTION H: FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION

In the absence of reliable data on the impact of the conflict on the economies of Senegal and Casamance, it is currently impossible to calculate any economic rate of return for the PRAESC. It is obvious, however, that the development of Casamance would be seriously compromised without such a program.

The lack of aid for the demobilization of MFDC combatants would, in the best case, cause some of them to resort to banditry and civil violence, and at worst could re-ignite aspirations to achieve independence by violent means.

Similarly, failure to conduct mine clearance activities would amount to allowing a large part of the land area of Casamance's two regions to remain devoid of human presence, whereas these areas were an important source of revenue for the population prior to the conflict.

Finally, a minimum of upgrading of essential infrastructures, at the community level as well as at the higher levels, is essential for economy recovery.

In order to have an exact idea of these opportunity costs, an in-depth study would be required.

It is also important to point out that unless this local conflict is resolved, the neighboring countries of The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau could become even more unstable than they already are.

10. SECTION I: ACTION PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Tasks</th>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Target Completion Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human Resources</td>
<td>Recruitment of the RAFL and the accountant satisfactory to IDA</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance DG-ANRAC</td>
<td>September 15, 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedures</td>
<td>Preparation of the procedures manual</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance DG-ANRAC</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Selection of a consultant acceptable to IDA</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Draft Manual</td>
<td></td>
<td>• August 15, 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Final Manual including IDA's comments</td>
<td></td>
<td>• September 20, 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounting system</td>
<td>Establishment of a computerized accounting system acceptable to IDA</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance DG-ANRAC</td>
<td>September 30, 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Audit</td>
<td>Recruitment of an external auditor acceptable to IDA</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance DG-ANRAC</td>
<td>September 15, 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterpart funds</td>
<td>Availability of counterpart funds for the first fiscal year</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance DG-ANRAC</td>
<td>Prior to effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Annual needs of counterpart funds included in the general budget of the State</td>
<td></td>
<td>• During budget preparation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Model agreement between the Project and the financial intermediaries</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance DG-ANRAC</td>
<td>September 15, 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model agreements between the project and NGOs (or others)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# 11. RESULTS FRAMEWORK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project’s development objectives</th>
<th>Results indicators</th>
<th>Utilization of results of monitoring</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Facilitate speedy restoration in Casamance of a favorable economic and social environment similar to that existing in the rest of Senegal, and 2) Lay the groundwork for the region’s sustainable long-term development, while respecting its specificities.</td>
<td>100% of identified beneficiaries engaged in legitimate economic activity. 325,000 inhabitants benefiting from improved accessibility. Restoration of access to basic social services to all villages affected by the conflict.</td>
<td>Failure to reach objectives may be due to failure to finance PRAESC in its entirety.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intermediate results, by component</th>
<th>Results indicators for each component</th>
<th>Utilization of results of monitoring</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Component 1. Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration (DRR)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Sub-component 11. Demobilization, Reinsertion and integration of ex-combatants</strong> Support the demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration of all identified ex-combatants of various groups (i.e., irregular forces) involved in the Casamance conflict.</td>
<td><strong>Sub-component 11.</strong> 100% of identified ex-combatants reintegrated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-component 12. Support for reintegration of groups directly affected by the conflict</strong> Ad hoc support for reintegration of persons identified as being directly affected by the conflict.</td>
<td><strong>Sub-component 12.</strong> 100% of persons identified as directly affected by the conflict have received support for reintegration.</td>
<td>Permits evaluation of relevance of the approach to identifying beneficiaries and of the efficacy of reinsertion and reintegration.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Component 2. Infrastructure Reconstruction and Rehabilitation (IRR)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Component 2.</strong></th>
<th><strong>Component 2.</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-component 21 Transport</strong> Rehabilitation of road network and river transport infrastructures in Casamance</td>
<td><strong>Sub-component 21</strong> 50 km of paved roads reinforced. 8 bridges rehabilitated or rebuilt. 6 pontoon bridges built.</td>
<td>Measures the restoration of security and the efficacy of implementation of procurement procedures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-component 22. Education</strong> Restore functionality of existing school infrastructures rehabilitated by local collectivities, by assigning personnel to them.</td>
<td><strong>Sub-component 22</strong> 120 classroom rehabilitated and re-opened.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-component 23. Health</strong> Restore functionality of existing health infrastructures rehabilitated by local collectivities, by assigning personnel to them.</td>
<td><strong>Sub-component 23</strong> 50 health posts, 3 maternity clinics and the psychiatric clinic at Kénia rehabilitated.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
12. MAP

SITUATION OF PRAESC INTERVENTION IN THE ZONE
13. APPENDIX

DETAILS OF PROCUREMENT ARRANGEMENTS INVOLVING INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVE BIDDING (ICB)

A. Goods, works and non-consulting services.

(a) List of contract packages to be procured following ICB and direct contracting:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contract (Description)</th>
<th>Estimated Cost</th>
<th>Procurement Method</th>
<th>P-Q</th>
<th>Domestic Preference (yes/no)</th>
<th>Review by Bank (Prior / Post)</th>
<th>Expected Bid-Opening Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4x4 Vehicles</td>
<td>$730,000</td>
<td>ICB</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>Prior</td>
<td>March 2005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) ICB: Contracts with an estimated value exceeding US$1,000,000 equivalent for works and US$150,000 for goods. All Direct contracting will be subject to prior review by the Bank.

B. Consulting Services.

(a) List of Consultant Contracts to be awarded on the basis of a short-list of international firms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ref. No.</th>
<th>Description of Assignment</th>
<th>Estimated Cost in USS</th>
<th>Selection Method</th>
<th>Review by Bank (Prior / Post)</th>
<th>Expected Proposals Submission Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Land Connection Dakar-Ziguinchor via The Gambia</td>
<td>117,000</td>
<td>QCBS</td>
<td>Prior</td>
<td>Dec. 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Local river transportation</td>
<td>162,000</td>
<td>QCBS</td>
<td>Prior</td>
<td>Jan. 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Tourism</td>
<td>117,000</td>
<td>QCBS</td>
<td>Prior</td>
<td>March 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Secondary and tertiary private sector</td>
<td>135,000</td>
<td>QCBS</td>
<td>Prior</td>
<td>Feb. 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Exploitation of perennial plant resources</td>
<td>117,000</td>
<td>QCBS</td>
<td>Prior</td>
<td>June 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Exploitation of fisheries resources</td>
<td>117,000</td>
<td>QCBS</td>
<td>Prior</td>
<td>June 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Environmental management studies</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>QCBS</td>
<td>Prior</td>
<td>June 2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Consultants’ services with an estimated value exceeding US$100,000 equivalent per contract for firms and US$50,000 for individual consultants and Single Source selection of consultants will be subject to prior review by the Bank.

(c) Short lists composed entirely of national consultants: Short lists of consultants for services with an estimated value not exceeding US$100,000 equivalent per contract may be composed entirely of national consultants in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2.7 of the Consultant Guidelines.