Report No. 43194 Pakistan Infrastructure Implementation Capacity Assessment (PIICA) Discussion Paper Series: Technical Note 9 Authorized LOCAL CASE STUDIES Disclosure November 2007 Public Sohail Abidi, Aized H. Mir, Amer Z. Durrani Authorized osure Discl Public Authorized Disclosure South Asia Sustainable Development Unit Public (SASSD) Document of the World Bank LOCAL CASE STUDIES November 2007 South Asia Sustainable Development Unit (SASSD) Document of the World Bank Cover art credit: Aized H. Mir, images from Google Earth (Karachi Airport, Tarbela Dam, Karachi Port and M-2 Interchange) The discussion paper series were prepared as a part of the Pakistan Infrastructure Implementation Capacity Assessment (PIICA) study and comprise of the following technical notes. Technical Note 1: Development of Construction Industry ­A Literature Review Technical Note 2: Local Stakeholders' Perception Survey Technical Note 3: Foreign Stakeholders' Perception Survey Technical Note 4: Business Environment and Cost of Doing Business Technical Note 5: Purchase Price Review in the Infrastructure Industry Technical Note 6: A Review of Allocations and Expenditures in the Public Sector Technical Note 7: Demand ­ Supply Gap Analysis Technical Note 8: International Case Studies ­ UAE CHINA and MALAYSIA Technical Note 9: Local Case Studies Technical Note 10: Response to International and Local Bids Technical Note 11: Focus Group Discussions i Discussion Papers are published to communicate the results of the World Bank's work to the development community with the least possible delay. The typescript manuscript of this paper therefore has not been prepared in accordance with the procedures appropriate to formally edited texts. Some sources cited in the paper may be informal documents that are not readily available. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of The World Bank or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of the World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Acknowledgements are due to the World Bank core team comprising Amer Zafar Durrani (Task Team Leader), Aized H. Mir (Co Task Team Leader), Hasan Afzal Zaidi, Dr. Zafar Raja, Hiam Abbas, Huma Waheed, Ermeena Malik, Abid Abrar Hussain, Mehreen Tanvir, Nazifa Sheikh and Shaukat Javed. The WB Consultants: M/s Engineering Associates [Sohail Abidi and Ahsan Siddiqi] for their valuable inputs. Asif Faiz, Cesar Augusto Querio, Fabio Galli, Giovanni Casartelli, Fang Xu, John Carter Scales, Richard Scurfield, Shahzad Sharjeel, Usman Qamar and Uzma Sadaf, are thanked for their extensive review of the PIICA report which is based on the technical notes. Mazhar Malik's extensive inputs on tackling Human Resource issues along with a detailed review of the report are greatly appreciated. Unjela Siddiqi (M/s Media Solutions) and Huma Ajam for providing editorial support. iii GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR July 1 ­ June 30 CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit = Pakistan Rupee (PKR) US$ 1 = PKR60.70 (February 6, 2007) ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AASHTO American Association of State Highway GIKU Ghulam Ishaq Khan University of Science and Transportation Officials & Technology ACI Airports Council International GoP Government of Pakistan ADB Asian Development Bank GoS Government of Sindh ADP Annual Development Program GoB Government of Balochistan AIT Asian Institute of Technology (Bangkok, HR Human Resource Thailand) APCCA All Pakistan Construction & Contractors HRDF Human Resources Development Fund Association BCA Building and Construction Authority ICB International Competitive Bidding CAA Civil Aviation Authority ICT Information and Communications Technology CAK Contractors Association in Korea IFC International Finance Corporation CAPECO The Peruvian Chamber of Construction ILO International Labor Organization CBR Central Board of Revenue IPC Interim Payment Certificate CDA Capital Development Authority JXB Jebel Ali International Airport CICA Confederation of International Contractors' KPT Karachi Port Trust Association CIDB Construction Industry Development Board KWSB Karachi Water and Sewerage Board CIJC Construction Industry Joint Committee L/C Letter of Credit CITC Construction Industry Training Center LCB Local Competitive Bidding CITI Construction Industry Training Institute LUMS Lahore University of Management Sciences COTI Construction Official Training Institute MBA Master of Business Administration CRS Contractors' Registry System MCA Monopoly Control Authority CWTC Construction Workers Training Center MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology DBS Development Bank of Singapore MOC Ministry of Construction (Korea) DELFT Delft University of Technology, Holland MTDF Medium Term Development Framework DEWA Dubai Electricity and Water Authority NAB National Accountability Bureau DFCs Development Finance Companies NEPRA National Electric Power Regulatory Authority DIB Dubai Islamic Bank NESPAK National Engineering Services Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. DIFC Dubai International Financial Center NHA National Highway Authority DLC Dubai Logistics City NIT Notice Inviting Tender DURL Dubai Rail Link NLC National Logistic Cell EDR Engineering Development Board NPRP National Procurement Reforms Program ENR Engineering News Record NWFP North-West Frontier Province FBR Federal Board of Revenue OGRA Oil & Gas Regulatory Authority FBS Federal Bureau of Statistics P&D Planning and Development FIA Federal Investigation Agency PC-1 Planning Commission's Performa 1 FIDIC International Federation of Consulting PEC Pakistan Engineering Council Engineers FWO Frontier Works Organization PERT/CPM Project Evaluation Review Technique/Critical Path Method PIDs Provincial Irrigation Departments SOP Security of Payment PKR Pakistan Rupee SPO Special Purpose Organization PPP Purchase Power Parity SSGC Sui Southern Gas Company iv PPRA Public Procurement Regulatory Authority TEVTA Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority PSDP Public Sector Development Program ToR Terms of Reference PTA Pakistan Telecommunication Authority UAE United Arab Emirates RFP Request for Proposal USAID United States Agency for International Development RTA Road & Transport Authority (Dubai) WAPDA Water and Power Development Authority SECP Security and Exchange Commission of WB World Bank Pakistan SNGPL Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited Vice President: Praful C. Patel Country Director: Yusupha B. Crookes Sector Director: Constance A. Bernard Sector Manager: Guang Z. Chen Task Team Leader: Amer Z. Durrani v Technical Note 9 LOCAL CASE STUDIES Table of Contents OBJECTIVES............................................................................................................................................... 1 METHODOLOGY....................................................................................................................................... 1 CASE STUDIES ........................................................................................................................................... 1 A MOUNTAIN ROAD PROJECT .................................................................................................................... 1 A BYPASS ROAD PROJECT.......................................................................................................................... 2 AN AIRPORT PROJECT ................................................................................................................................ 3 A PORT DREDGING PROJECT ...................................................................................................................... 5 A MOTORWAY PROJECT............................................................................................................................. 6 AN IRRIGATION PROJECT............................................................................................................................ 7 LESSONS LEARNT .................................................................................................................................... 8 vi OBJECTIVES As a part of the Pakistan Infrastructure Implementation Capacity Assessment (PIICA), several past infrastructure projects were reviewed. The objectives of preparing local case studies for projects in different sectors were to document the bottlenecks which occurred during the various processes involved in the life cycle of infrastructure projects. Identifying such processes allows a better understanding of the capacity constraints in planning, designing, programming, procurement, contract administration, financing and budgeting, execution and other stages in a project cycle. The case studies would also help validate the feedback regarding capacity constraints obtained from the Stakeholders' Perception Surveys (see Technical Notes 2 and 3) and Focus Group Discussions (see Technical Note 11). METHODOLOGY Several projects were identified for review at the first focus group meeting1 held with stakeholders. The final selection was made based on the different lessons to be learnt from each case study. The issues faced by the stakeholders in these projects can be termed to be typical and representative of the projects' planning, design and implementation experience in Pakistan. The documentation related to each project was obtained from the concerned implementing agencies and it included project background information, history, current progress reports, reasons for delays, time extensions and other issues. CASE STUDIES A Mountain Road Project In March 1993, a project executing agency invited tenders for a road project located in the mountains of Balochistan. The tender was for one of four packages of an alignment which was planned to be later upgraded to a motorway status, however, the other packages were not offered in the tender. Although, there was no provision for the project in the annual budget for that year, the project was launched by the executing agency on a special "Deferred Payment Model" on the insistence of the provincial government. Under the terms of the tender, the first bill of the contractor was to be cleared in two installments after the work was half finished. Eleven bidders collected the bid documents and six submitted responsive bids in May 1993. Bids ranged in value from approximately 32 percent below to 32 percent above the engineers' estimates. Recommendations were made for award of work to the lowest bidder but with the condition that the lowest bidder must agree to rate revision of one pay item related to excavation of unsuitable material (a rate which the employer had deemed exceptionally high) if quantity for that pay item was to increase more than 15 percent during execution. Negotiations with the lowest bidder failed and eventually the executing authority dismissed the tenders. Tenders were re-invited in October 2003, but not on "Deferred Payment Model" as fund allocation had been made for the FY04. Eleven prospective bidders collected the tenders and 1Refer Technical Note 11: Focus Group Discussions 1 only four submitted responsive bids. The project was priced on scheduled rates for 2000, less 25 percent overheads and profit. The bids were received on the cost plus mode. Bids ranged in value from 9.1 percent below to 58.2 percent above the direct cost. Work was finally awarded to the lowest bidder during 2004. The PC-I and feasibility reports recommended that, contracts adjacent to the inaccessible middle section be taken up and completed first in order to provide access to this mountainous region. This advice was not followed. Furthermore, due to inaccessible remote areas, the construction documents indicated a reach of approximately 5 kilometers where the alignment was subject to verification and change. Early in to the execution of works, problems were discovered with this proposed alignment, which ranged broadly from in-accurate assumptions regarding terrain to steep (unacceptable to the client) gradients. The design consultant was instructed to finalize the alignment to suit ground conditions and to also improve the road gradient in indicated stretches as mentioned in the contract drawings. Revising or correcting the alignment was an extremely tedious and slow process given the difficult terrain. Because of the mountainous nature of the alignment, changes in the alignment caused variations in the cut and fill quantities. These variations forced the contractor to re-organize and again re-source the work, and ultimately, asked for re-rating of his tender. Exhaustive material investigation to determine nature and hardness of material to be cut in the original alignment could not be carried out at the time of design due to the inaccessible and remote terrain and the deep cuts involved. This created an added complication. Though volumes of cut and fill had been ascertained to a reasonable degree of concurrence by the parties involved, but their nature and therefore, cost for doing work could only be known when the actual cut is executed. The situation was compounded by the remote and harsh terrain of the project, where movement of material, equipment and man-power was difficult. Indeed even worse conditions had existed at the time of designing of the project which had to be negotiated by the designers likewise in an unrealistic 90-day time period. Due to the changes in design, lower than estimated rates and remote terrain, the contract has lagged behind and contractual complications have emerged. A Bypass Road Project Seven international contracting firms were short-listed for a major bypass project in Pakistan. The short-listed contractors were from Italy, Germany, Cyprus, Turkey and Argentina. Of the seven, five responded and finally, four submitted bids to the executing agency. The bids varied in cost from 31.7 percent to 57.8 percent, higher than the engineers' estimate. Two of the bids were found to be conditional. The work was awarded to the lowest bidder at a negotiated price of approximately US$62 million (1US$=60PKR) with 25 percent mobilization advance and a 40 percent foreign exchange component. The construction period was agreed upon at 22 months for the main carriageway and four additional months for ancillary works. The work comprised construction of approximately 17kms of a 6 lane carriageway, a bridge on the River Ravi, 3 complete interchanges with affiliated ramps up to 17m high and ancillary works. 2 Following the award of work, concerns were raised in various quarters, other than those of the executing agency, regarding the high cost of the project. Subsequently, so as to reduce the project cost, those components which mostly related to ancillary works were taken out of the contractor's scope. In addition, limited design changes were also incorporated at the time. The contract value was reduced to US$43 million. These changes were carried out with the contractor's consent. The work was started in all earnest and by the end of the first year in to the contract, the progress was slightly ahead of schedule. About this time, problems arose in payment of the contractor's Interim Payment Certificates (IPCs), which up to that time were cleared promptly. The problems were particular to payment of the foreign exchange component of the IPCs which could not be cleared for extended periods. The PKR component was also delayed during this time. This situation persisted for about a year. During this period, the project did not progress as originally scheduled and was delayed by about 9 months. The IPC payment situation improved considerably during the extended period and so did the progress of work. Approximately 50 percent of the contractor's work was executed in the extended period. The ancillary work which was removed from the contractor's scope was eventually carried out by local contractors appointed directly by the executing agency and external to the main contract. There were some problems with land acquisition, but these do not appear to have contributed significantly towards delay in completion as interruptions in payments had already slowed down the pace of work. Land acquisition problems were resolved within this period of apparent lethargic activity. The contractor's work plan envisaged acquisition through hiring of limited but specific plant and equipment from the local industry. Initially, the contractor faced difficulty in this regard, but eventually was able to hire from the local industry, albeit after delay and not to the initial expectation in numbers and capacity. Towards the end, the contractor had to subcontract asphalt work to expedite work. It would appear that delayed payments were the primary reason for delayed execution of the work. The progress of work appears to have varied directly with the IPC payments. The situation was further compounded due to the required brisk pace of work given the quantum of work and the short contract period. The contractor was eventually awarded claims on account of delayed IPC payments. An Airport Project In 1994, a client invited international bids for construction of a major airport. Only two bids were received in response. Scope of work included design of some components of the proposed facility in addition to construction of all works. The bidder was also responsible for arranging financing for the project. There was considerable difference between the two bid amounts which were US$ 420 million and US$ 390 million. Negotiations continued for 2 years and eventually in 1996, the work was awarded to the lowest bidder for US$ 220 million. The client had acquired design and management services from a joint venture of two consulting firms, of which one was local and the other from a European country. The project appears to have suffered due to an extended period of political instability in 3 the country during that time. After two years of extended negotiations the order to proceed was eventually given in 1998. This was, however, not before another round of negotiations (post award of work) in which the contractor agreed to limit escalation in material costs to US$8.3 million. Soon after the commencement of work, the client relieved the foreign consultant of his services and the entire work was entrusted to a local consultant. The contractor had arranged financing for the project from a consortium of countries, including UK, Netherlands, Germany, Japan and others. The Government of Pakistan (GoP) provided sovereign guarantees for the loan amount. As per the conditions of the donors for the project, equipment purchase had to be made from the donor countries. Another condition under the loan agreement was that if any one of the donors withdrew from the consortium, the remaining would follow suit. Due to the political situation, the project suffered even beyond 1998, when there were defined periods when payments could not be made. The donor consortium eventually pulled out under international sanctions imposed after the country's nuclear blast in 1999. Financing for the project was then transferred to local banks in the country but even then there was a period of about 6 months when no payments could be made to the contractor. All in all, there was a period of 14 months during which no payments were made to the contractor. International sanctions and the local conditions also had an adverse effect on the contractor's expatriate staff, where many expatriate specialists were unable to continue their stay in the country and had to be replaced with staff from other nationalities. This considerable replacement of specialist staff already in to the work further retarded the contactor's progress. The project completion schedule which was already affected by delayed payments and international environment, suffered further postponements due to difficulties in import of equipment to be installed at the new airport. Import from some sources could not be arranged, in other cases production specifications had changed and contractual specifications stood outdated. The consultants on their part insisted that equipment which meets the contractual specifications only, could be installed and were unwilling to revise or update the specifications to equivalent or better, considering the difficult circumstances during that time. In an attempt to contain the project costs within the project's planned budget, towards the end of the project some peripheral work was removed from the international contractor's scope by the client and was executed through local contractors. The work was ultimately completed during 2003, 18 months behind schedule on a 36 month contractual completion time period. A delay of 4 years, from time of bidding to release of "Order to Proceed," has not been counted in the completion time. The contractor submitted various claims amounting to approximately US$70 million. The client challenged these claims and the matter was put to the "Claims Review Board" as per the contract, which ruled for payments to the contractor for approximately US$30 million and rejected the remaining amount. The contractor has refused to accept this decision and has approached the courts for redress. The matter remains unresolved to date. 4 A Port Dredging Project The capital dredging of approaches for a port in Karachi was last carried out during 1980 by a European contractor enabling handling of cellular container vessels of up to 10m draft. At present, most container ships operating in the region are Post-Panamax size with a 11m to 13m draft. According to some estimates this limitation in handling capacity at the port is costing about US$1.5 billion annually to the country's economy. Following repeated demands from industry stakeholders, the port authorities approved a program to deepen the approach channels in August 2001, as recommended by a European consultant appointed for carrying out the necessary studies for deepening & widening of the port's navigational channel. After almost one year of prequalification and tender process, the port authorities received bids in September 2002. The lowest bid was of US$33.3 million for dredging approximately 8.5 million cubic meters. The bid was too high (about US$4 per cubic meter at current exchange rates) according to international standards, apparently due to additional work scope introduced into the contract. For example: · The contractor was required to construct/reclaim an island to dispose of the dredging material. · The contractor was to hand over all dredging equipment (dredgers and barges) to the port authorities free of cost at the end of the work. Moreover, the tender introduced numerous conditions and while quoting rates altered the Bills of Quantities (BoQs), which made the tenders non-responsive. The tender documents drawn by the client put the onus of risk on bidders as regards to sub-soil data in areas to be dredged. The situation was further compounded in the absence of definitive geotechnical investigation of the area to be dredged. Since the final cost of dredging would have been based on actual quantities of hard and soft material to be dredged (hard material being costlier to dredge), and since quantities given in the bid documents were deemed arbitrary, there were serious concerns regarding increase in cost during execution. The tender cost, therefore, was virtually unknown. After protracted negotiations and discussions with the lowest bidder, and amid concerns of enquiries and investigations by various local authorities, the port authorities termed the bids as non-responsive, did not agree to the conditions put forth by the lowest bidder and discharged the bids in August 2003. Bids were re-invited from the same set of pre-qualified bidders during December 2003. The lowest bidder was the same as in the previous round; however, the bid price this time round was higher at approximately US$46.7 million. The port authorities entered into negotiations with the lowest bidder who eventually agreed to a reduced bid price of US$31.2 million. Agreement however, could not be reached on contract conditions regarding methods of measurement proposed by the port authorities. The new bids were eventually discharged also. The port authorities have since then decided to procure dredgers and carry out the necessary dredging operations themselves. They also placed purchase orders for two dredgers from a European company. The dredgers are under construction and scheduled to be operational by 2007. According to estimates, a minimum of three seasons shall be required to dredge the 5 required material. The deeper draft vessels, therefore, are not likely to be able to use the port until 2010. It appeared that the tender document which was prepared by the client introduced methods of measurements of hard/soft soils which put the risk on to the bidders. This was especially true in the absence of sound geotechnical investigation of the area. It is interesting to note that there is a stay order for the harbor mouth (Sector 2) by the Sindh High Court on request from a local firm. Despite all efforts, the port authorities have been unable to get it vacated to date. A Motorway Project The National Highway Council, in principle, approved a motorway project in March 1992, as a six lane, controlled accesses facility. Bids were invited in December 1992, from 31 pre-qualified international contractors of whom only 10 collected the tender documents. Bids required the bidder to arrange 40 percent of the project cost as Buyers Credit on soft terms. Remaining 60 percent of the project cost was to be arranged by the GoP. Only 2 contractors submitted responsive bids on the extended due date in February 1993. Eventually, work was awarded to the lowest bidder on negotiated terms and the project completion time was set as 2 years. Negotiated bid price was approximately US$280 million. After the award of the contract, concerns were raised in various quarters regarding the high cost of the project during the tenure of the then caretaker government. Accordingly, in an effort to reduce cost, the length of the motorway was reduced and number of lanes curtailed to four, bringing the cost down to US$203 million. The donor agency at the time had shown strong reservation against the motorway project as it felt that this project affected the GoP's ability to make adequate allocations for social sector programs and the project was also not justified by the expected traffic volumes. As a result of negotiations that the caretaker government had with the donor agency for a Structural Adjustment Loan, this project was not included in the core development program of the GoP. Despite this commitment, the caretaker government decided to proceed with the project. The donor agency protested strongly against the decision and termed it a breach of covenant which could jeopardize the US$1.5 billion Structural Adjustment Loan. Subsequently, due to lack of effective demand, serious financial crunch and opposition from the donor agency, the GoP decided to cancel the project. According to the conditions of the contract, under clauses related to "Convenience of the Employer" the contract was terminated in 1994. The contractor objected, leading to arbitration and eventually won an award of US$10 million. After inception of a new political government during 1996, the contract was revived in 1997. The same contractor was reinstated on the project on improved terms. The work however could only proceed at a very slow pace. Only 29 percent of the work could be completed up to April 2001, as the contractor could not raise IPCs for the first 4 months. In the later period, IPC's ranged from US$0.8 to 1.0 million per month. This value was about 10 percent of the expected value if work was proceeding at anticipated speed. Due to low value of the IPCs, the employer could not recover his mobilization advance according to the schedule. During this period, international reaction to the country's nuclear explosion had caused severe fluctuation in the foreign exchange rates in the county. Also, as a result of international sanctions, the contractor could only manage to arrange buyer's credit worth US$100 million as against a commitment of US$300 million. 6 In view of the sustained slow progress of work throughout the project limits, including the two priority sections, which were scheduled for completion by April 2001, the employer terminated the contractor on basis of overall poor performance and non-completion of the priority sections, following due contractual procedures. The contractor objected to this termination and cited slow progress to reasons beyond his control. At the time of termination, the contractor's request for time extension was pending with the engineer. The contractor has challenged this termination and the case is being processed in an international court. Upon appointment, the contractor had submitted bank guarantees from his country of origin. These had not been endorsed by any of the banks operating in Pakistan. The employer has since then been unable to realize the contractor's bank guarantees. At the time of termination, an amount of US$280 million remained outstanding to suppliers and subcontractors from the contractor. Two IPC's which were under process at that time, were blocked by the employer pending resolution of the dispute. These IPCs amount to only US$3 to 5 million each. The work has since been awarded to a consortium of local contractors and is expected to be completed towards the end of 2007. As per conditions of the contractor's agreement with the employer, work is proceeding at the contractor's risk and cost. The prolonged litigation may have effected business relations of other international firms also. An Irrigation Project In the case of this mega irrigation project, significant cost overruns were experienced. The project was initially started during 1991, with the approval of a loan from one of the international development banks. The planned closing date was September 30, 2000. However, supplementary financing had to be provided in 1999, to cover a financing gap of US$50.5 million. By June 1999, 83 percent of the original implementation period had elapsed while only 40 percent of the overall physical project was completed. Hence, the main reason for the cost overrun was the interplaying of delay in the initiation, progress and completion of the project. The reasons for delays at all stages of the project have been identified as: a) Late compliance with the effectiveness of loan covenants b) Late recruitment of project consultants c) Late completion of ortho-photo mapping d) Delays in resolving issues related to the grant of construction awards e) Insufficient counterpart financing Differences between the donor agency and the implementing agency for the loan on the selection of the main civil works contractor, delayed the assignment of the contract for construction of the main canal, flood carrier channels and related civil works till late 1997. Specific reasons that have contributed to the cost overruns include: a) 57 percent of the additional project costs were due to escalation of prices of the main civil works due to the delay. Roughly about US$28 million were added to cost estimates. b) 27 percent or roughly US$13 million of the overrun was due to an increase in the foreign exchange component. 7 c) Increase in quantities due to design changes, insufficient mobilization costs in appraisal estimates and differences in unit rates, exceeding the effects of price escalation were responsible for an additional 16 per cent of the costs overruns (approximately US$8 million). According to the GoP, its financing ability was further limited by serious financial crises during the late 1990s, and the subsequent shortage of foreign exchange and domestic resources. LESSONS LEARNT The case studies clearly demonstrate the presence of deep rooted systematic problems related to: i) Inadequate client capacity to plan, procure, program, administer and manage projects ii) Imbalanced conditions of contracts iii) Flawed procurement procedures (pre-qualification, bid evaluation, negotiations and re-negotiations with the lowest bidder) causing significant delays iv) Mismatched project funding needs and actual availability of funds v) Commencement of projects without ensuring that required funds are in place vi) Delay in making running payments vii) Insufficient time given for detailed design and variations in contract due to inadequacies in design viii) Poor and inefficient dispute resolution mechanisms ix) Problems in land acquisition x) Limitations in available local resources (equipment) xi) Limited capacity of local contractors xii) Poor international bid response in mega projects related to credibility issues The case studies re-confirm the problems identified in the stakeholders' perception surveys and the focus group discussions. 8 Amer Zafar Durrani, Aized H. Mir, Hasan Afzal Zaidi, Dr. Zafar Raja, Hiam Abbas, Huma Waheed, Ermeena Malik, Abid Abrar Hussain, Mehreen Tanvir, Nazifa Sheikh, Shaukat Javed, Sohail Abidi, Ahsan Siddiqi, Unjela Siddiqi and Huma Ajam