Document of The World Bank Report No: ICR2807 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-H1200-DRC; IDA-H5520-DRC; IDA-H7200-DRC) ON A GRANT ORIGINAL GRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF 41.1 MILLION SDR US$60 MILLION EQUIVALENT FIRST ADDITIONAL FINANCING IN THE AMOUNT OF 22.6 MILLION SDR US$35 MILLION EQUIVALENT SECOND ADDITIONAL FINANCING IN THE AMOUNT OF 4.2 MILLION SDR US$6.8 MILLION EQUIVALENT TO THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO FOR AN EMERGENCY SOCIAL ACTION PROJECT December 27, 2013 AFTSW AFCC2 Africa Region CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective at Project Closing, June 30, 2013) Currency Unit = Congolese Franc CDF 100.00 = US$ 0.11 US$1.00 = .919 CDF GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR January 1 – December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AF Additional Financing ALE Agences Locales d’Exécution CAS Country Assistance Strategy CBO Community-Based Organizations CDD Community-Driven Development DAF Director of Administration and Finance DDR Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration ESMF Environmental and Social Management Framework FIB Force Intervention Brigade FM Financial Management FSRDC Social Fund of DRC GPRSP Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper ICR Implementation Completion Report IDA International Development Association IDP Internally Displaced Person IFR Interim Financial Report IMF International Monetary Fund INGO International Non-Governmental Organizations IPPF Indigenous People’s Planning Framework IPRSP Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper LIPW Labor Intensive Public Works M&E Monitoring and Evaluation M&O Maintenance and Operation MONUSCO UN Peacekeeping Mission NGO Non-Governmental Organization PASU Projet d’Action Sociale d’Urgence PDO Project Development Objective PPF Project Preparation Facility PROLEDA Projet de Lecture et Alphabétisation PSNP Productive Safety Net Program RPF Resettlement Policy Framework SPF State and Peace Building Fund TSS Transitional Support Strategy Vice President : Makhtar Diop Country Director : Eustache Ouayoro Sector Manager : Stefano Paternostro Project Team Leader : Maurizia Tovo ICR Team Leader : Fanta Touré DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO EMERGENCY SOCIAL ACTION PROJECT Table of Contents DATA SHEET .................................................................................................................. i A. Basic Information .......................................................................................................... i B. Key Dates ....................................................................................................................... i C. Ratings Summary........................................................................................................... i D. Sector and Theme Codes .............................................................................................. ii E. Bank Staff ..................................................................................................................... ii F. Results Framework Analysis ........................................................................................ iii G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs .................................................................... viii H. Restructuring (if any)................................................................................................. viii I. Disbursement Profile ..................................................................................................... x 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ............................................. 1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .......................................... 10 3. Assessment of Outcomes ........................................................................................... 18 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ........................................................ 27 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ................................................... 27 6. Lessons Learned ........................................................................................................ 30 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners ...... 31 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing ......................................................................... 32 Annex 2. Outputs by Component ................................................................................. 34 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ................................................................ 36 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ....... 39 Annex 5. Executive Summary of Borrower's ICR...................................................... 41 Annex 6. List of Supporting Documents ...................................................................... 43 IBRD MAP# 33391R2 ........................................................ DATA SHEET A. Basic Information Democratic Republic of Congo, Democratic Country: Project Name: Congo Emergency Republic of Social Action Project IDA-H1200, IDA- Project ID: P086874 L/C/TF Number(s): H5520, IDA-H7200 ICR Date: 12/24/2013 ICR Type: Core ICR Lending Instrument: ERL Borrower: GOVERNMENT Original Total XDR 41.10M Disbursed Amount: XDR 67.70M Commitment: Revised Amount: XDR 67.72M Environmental Category: B Implementing Agencies: Fonds Social de la RDC Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 12/22/2003 Effectiveness: 07/26/2005 07/26/2005 05/30/2008 07/30/2009 Appraisal: 04/18/2005 Restructuring(s): 10/29/2010 10/19/2011 12/30/2012 Approval: 08/26/2004 Mid-term Review: 10/30/2008 Closing: 03/31/2009 06/30/2013 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Substantial Bank Performance: Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Satisfactory i C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Quality at Entry: Satisfactory Government: Moderately Satisfactory Implementing Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Satisfactory Agency/Agencies: Overall Bank Overall Borrower Satisfactory Satisfactory Performance: Performance: C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments (if Indicators Rating Performance any) Potential Problem Project Quality at Entry Yes None at any time (Yes/No): (QEA): Problem Project at any Quality of Supervision Yes None time (Yes/No): (QSA): DO rating before Satisfactory Closing/Inactive status: D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) General education sector 9 Health 8 7 Other social services 20 25 Primary education 64 50 Rural and Inter-Urban Roads and Highways 8 9 Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Gender 11 5 Improving labor markets 22 10 Other social protection and risk management 23 5 Participation and civic engagement 22 12 Rural services and infrastructure 22 68 E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Makhtar Diop Callisto E. Madavo Country Director: Eustache Ouayoro Emmanuel Mbi Sector Manager: Stefano Paternostro Laura Frigenti Project Team Leader: Maurizia Tovo John Elder ii ICR Team Leader: Fanta Touré ICR Primary Author: Catherine A. Gibbons F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The objective of the project is to improve access of the poor to social and economic services and increase the availability and management of development resources at the community level. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) (a) PDO Indicator(s) Original Target Actual Value Formally Values (from Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value Revised approval Completion or Target Values documents) Target Years Indicator 1 : Average increase in enrollment in FSRDC-built/rehabilitated classrooms Value quantitative or 0 Not specified 35% 52% Qualitative) Date achieved 06/29/2004 07/25/2005 06/02/2011 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % Target surpassed achievement) Average increase in medical consultations in FSRDC-built/rehabilitated health Indicator 2 : centers Value quantitative or 0 Not specified 50% 64% Qualitative) Date achieved 06/29/2004 07/25/2005 06/02/2011 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % Target surpassed achievement) Indicator 3 : Reduction in average travel time of motorized vehicles on rehabilitated roads Value quantitative or 0 Not specified 30% 61% Qualitative) Date achieved 06/29/2004 07/25/2005 06/02/2011 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % Target surpassed achievement) Indicator 4 : People provided with access to improved water sources Value 0 Not specified 435,180 483,585 quantitative or iii Qualitative) Date achieved 06/29/2004 07/25/2005 06/02/2011 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % Target surpassed achievement) Indicator 5 : Traders with access to stalls and/or storage facilities rehabilitated by the project Value quantitative or 0 Not specified 27,762 43,759 Qualitative) Date achieved 06/29/2004 07/25/2005 06/02/2011 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % Target surpassed achievement) Indicator 6 : Direct beneficiaries (broken down by province, disaggregated by gender) Value quantitative or 0 Not specified 5,000 4,088,000 Qualitative) Date achieved 06/29/2004 07/25/2005 06/02/2011 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % Target surpassed achievement) Indicator 7 : Sub-projects operational and well maintained with a year of completion Value quantitative or 0 Not specified 90% 97.5% Qualitative) Date achieved 06/29/2004 07/25/2005 06/02/2011 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % Target surpassed achievement) Indicator 8 : Village committees operational after one year of project completion Value quantitative or 0 Not specified 90 74 Qualitative) Date achieved 06/29/2004 07/25/2005 06/02/2011 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % Target not met achievement) Indicator 9 : Person days provided in labor intensive public work Value quantitative or 0 N/A 290,000 259,969 Qualitative) Date achieved 06/29/2004 07/25/2005 03/05/2010 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % Target not met achievement) iv (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) Original Target Actual Value Formally Values (from Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value Revised approval Completion or Target Values documents) Target Years Indicator 1 : Classrooms built/rehabilitated Value (quantitative 0 Not specified 2,642 3,426 or Qualitative) Date achieved 06/29/2004 07/25/2005 06/02/2011 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % Target surpassed achievement) Indicator 2 : Health facilities built/rehabilitated Value (quantitative 0 Not specified 103 117 or Qualitative) Date achieved 06/29/2004 07/25/2005 06/02/2011 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % Target surpassed achievement) Indicator 3 : Community water points built/rehabilitated Value (quantitative 0 Not specified 154 129 or Qualitative) Date achieved 06/29/2004 07/25/2005 06/02/2011 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % Target not met achievement) Indicator 4 : Roads rehabilitated, rural Value (quantitative 0 Not specified 40 km 182 km or Qualitative) Date achieved 06/29/2004 07/25/2005 06/02/2011 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % Target surpassed achievement) Indicator 5 : Marketplaces constructed/rehabilitated Value (quantitative 0 Not specified 98 92 or Qualitative) Date achieved 06/29/2004 07/25/2005 06/02/2011 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % Target not met achievement) Indicator 6 : Environmental sub-projects implemented Value 0 Not specified 15 6 v (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 06/29/2004 07/25/2005 06/02/2011 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % Target not met achievement) Indicator 7 : Communities benefiting from at least one sub-project Value (quantitative 0 550 1,012 1,022 or Qualitative) Date achieved 06/29/2004 07/25/2005 06/02/2011 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % Target surpassed achievement) Indicator 8 : Beneficiaries of public works program Value (quantitative 0 1,333 3,865 3,385 or Qualitative) Date achieved 03/05/2011 03/05/2010 06/02/2011 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % Target not met achievement) Indicator 9 : Share of wage bill/total cost (%) Value (quantitative 0 > 35% > 35% 52% or Qualitative) Date achieved 03/05/2011 03/05/2010 06/02/2011 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % Target surpassed achievement) Indicator 10 : Population indicating satisfaction with their participation in sub-project planning Value (quantitative 0 Not specified 70% 81% or Qualitative) Date achieved 06/29/2004 07/25/2005 06/02/2011 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % Target surpassed achievement) Indicator 11 : Village committees established Value (quantitative 0 550 1,012 1,044 or Qualitative) Date achieved 06/29/2004 07/25/2005 06/02/2011 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % Target surpassed achievement) Communities and organizations trained in planning, implementing, and managing Indicator 12 : the construction/rehabilitation of economic and social infrastructures vi Value (quantitative 0 Not specified 1,096 1,381 or Qualitative) Date achieved 06/29/2004 07/25/2005 06/02/2011 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % Target surpassed achievement) Indicator 13 : Students receiving scholarships Value (quantitative 0 Not specified 7,392 7,645 or Qualitative) Date achieved 06/29/2004 07/25/2005 06/02/2011 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % Target surpassed achievement) Indicator 14 : Libraries established and maintained one year after completion Value (quantitative 0 Not specified 610 668 or Qualitative) Date achieved 06/29/2004 07/25/2005 06/02/2011 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % Target surpassed achievement) Indicator 15 : Baseline and surveys provide regular monitoring and evaluation of project impact Value (quantitative No Yes Yes Yes or Qualitative) Date achieved 06/29/2004 07/25/2005 06/02/2011 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % Target met achievement) Indicator 16 : Operating costs are at or below 20% of total project investments Value (quantitative No Yes Yes No or Qualitative) Date achieved 06/29/2004 07/25/2005 06/02/2011 06/30/2013 Comments Target not met. This represents one of the key lessons learned from the project (see (incl. % Section.6. Lessons Learned 31) achievement) Indicator 17 : FSRDC is represented and functions efficiently and autonomously in all provinces Value (quantitative No Yes Yes Yes or Qualitative) Date achieved 06/29/2004 07/25/2005 06/02/2011 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % Target met achievement) Indicator 18 : (i) Sub-projects; (ii) ALEs; and (iii) sub-contractors based in remote and vii impoverished areas Value (i) 840 (i) 841 (quantitative 0 Not specified (ii) 235 (ii) 157 or Qualitative) (iii 107 (iii) 176 Date achieved 06/29/2004 07/25/2005 06/02/2011 06/30/2013 Comments (i) Target met (incl. % (ii) Target not met achievement) (iii) Target surpassed G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs Actual Date ISR No. DO IP Disbursements Archived (USD millions) 1 11/16/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 03/02/2005 Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 0.00 3 06/07/2005 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 0.00 4 12/19/2005 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 4.14 5 03/13/2006 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 5.80 6 06/06/2006 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 6.34 7 02/20/2007 Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 9.50 8 06/13/2007 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 11.57 9 12/12/2007 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 18.47 10 06/27/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 25.96 11 08/25/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 28.24 12 12/23/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 32.26 13 06/25/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 42.65 14 12/29/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 52.66 15 06/30/2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 60.30 16 04/12/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 68.11 17 12/04/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 71.39 18 06/26/2012 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 80.87 19 01/21/2013 Satisfactory Satisfactory 97.69 H. Restructuring (if any) ISR Ratings at Amount Board Restructuring Restructuring Disbursed at Reason for Restructuring & Approved Date(s) Restructuring Key Changes Made PDO Change DO IP in USD millions Reallocation of proceeds due to of the following: (i) delays in 05/30/2008 N MS MS 25.96 effectiveness date; (ii) higher than expected costs for transportation, fuel, and viii ISR Ratings at Amount Board Restructuring Restructuring Disbursed at Reason for Restructuring & Approved Date(s) Restructuring Key Changes Made PDO Change DO IP in USD millions communications due to the challenging operational context; (iii) training costs for Social Fund staff charged to operating costs rather than Consultants' Services as originally planned; and (iv) very high banking and money transfer costs. This was being off-set by lower than anticipated expenditures for consultants partly due to the above mentioned charging of training costs to the operational cost category and partly due to the fact that the project needed fewer consultants than originally envisaged for information and outreach activities. Extension of closing date from March 31, 2009 to March 31, 07/30/2009 N S S 44.89 2010 and reallocation of proceeds due to start up delays. Additional financing and extension of closing date to 10/29/2010 N S S 63.26 March 31, 2013 to allocate sufficient time to implement the additional financing activities. Additional financing and reallocation of proceeds to allow 03/01/2011 N S S 67.56 readjustments between disbursement categories. Extension of closing date to June 13, 2013 to compensate for delays due to changes in the 12/30/2012 N S MS 97.40 World Bank’s disbursement policy and to allow the project to complete an additional 175 projects. ix I. Disbursement Profile x 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisal 1. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is potentially one of Africa's richest economies, with extensive forest, mineral, and energy resources. Its regional importance, with a large labor force and potential market size, extensive navigable inland waterways and land links to nine countries, could make the DRC a motor for regional growth as significant as Nigeria or South Africa. However, this promise has been repeatedly thwarted. Successive governments have neither been able to translate this potential into satisfactory living conditions for the Congolese people nor to effectively fight corruption. As the State slowly collapsed in the last decade of the regime of Mobuto Sese Seko (1965-97), much of the productive capital was abandoned or destroyed. 2. In 2001, the government launched a program of economic reforms aimed at restoring macro- economic stability and kick-starting economic activity, while tackling some governance issues. This program was implemented with the support of the World Bank (Bank) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and began to pay off with the economy reaching an annual growth rate of 7.8 percent by 2005. Nevertheless, the global recession resulted in a precipitous drop in the growth rate to 2.8 percent in 2009. After a brief slowdown, economic growth accelerated again and climbed back to 7 percent by 2011. 3. Infrastructure, which was deteriorating under the Mobutu regime, was largely destroyed during subsequent years of conflict, leaving few passable roads and only sporadic access to electricity and safe water for a large majority of the population. Social indicators, already low before the war, continued to drop until the year 2000, when the trend gradually reversed. Despite the improvements evident over the last 10 years, the DRC continues to rank at the bottom of UNDP’s 2013 Human Development Index, tied with Niger for last place at 186th. 4. Starting in 2002, the government began implementing an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP), premised on broad-based consultations with civil society and community groups. The I-PRSP rested upon three pillars: (i) restoration and consolidation of peace and sustainable good governance; (ii) macro-economic stabilization and pro-poor growth; and (iii) community dynamics (community-led development initiatives). In July 2007 a Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (GPRSP) was approved by the Bank and remained valid until December 2010. It included five pillars: (i) promoting good governance and consolidating peace; (ii) maintaining macro-economic stability and growth; (iii) improving access to social services and reducing vulnerability; (iv) combating HIV/AIDS; and (v) improving community dynamics. 5. The objective of the Bank's activities in DRC was to contribute to the transition to peace and stability in the country. The first phase of support was framed within the context of a Transitional Support Strategy (TSS, July 2001) and aimed to: (i) meet basic and urgent needs; (ii) rebuild effective public institutions and policies; (iii) revitalize economic activity; and (iv) rebuild implementation capacity. The second phase of support was based upon the Bank's 2004 TSS, which included community reintegration and social development as primary objectives – with a particular emphasis on education, health, and community self-help – and identified a social fund as a key mechanism to reach such objectives. 6. The Emergency Social Action Project (Projet d’action sociale d’urgence, PASU), in providing money to communities via a social fund mechanism, was clearly designed to align with the goals of the I-PRSP 2002, the GPRSP 2007-2010, and TSS 2001 and 2004 and coordinated donor priorities. 1 PASU also responded to the need to show rapid results on the ground, quickly delivering much needed basic services to communities all over the DRC in a very low capacity context. By building local and provincial capacity for planning and implementing sustainable economic and social activities, the project was expected to increase self-reliance and social capital, facilitating on-going decentralization efforts and strengthening civil society. 7. At appraisal in 2004, the project was seen as an important complement to the Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (EDRP), which was designed to support the reintegration of demobilized ex-combatants. There was concern that disaffected citizens, not benefiting from the demobilization process, would turn to violence if they did not see improvements in the quality of living in their communities. The Bank’s investment in PASU helped relieve pressure from the government and other donors to satisfy this need, without over-extending the scope of the EDRP to include general community development. 8. The project was implemented in a very challenging post-conflict operational environment. Social and institutional capital in DRC remained very weak throughout implementation, with the country’s overarching governance systems still recovering from years of political instability. In the eastern provinces of the country, active conflict persisted. At appraisal the fiduciary environment had few established control mechanisms and lacked modern payment systems in some areas. During implementation, human resources capacity met several constraints in terms of the availability of qualified staff and NGO partners, particularly in remote rural areas where access to basic social services remains scarce. Not only is the cost of operating in the DRC very high, it is further compounded by the poorly developed transport network, the dense geographical terrain, and the large land mass. 9. During its life, the project received the following grants: Grant Amount Effectiveness Grant Number Approval Date (US$) Date Parent Project IDA-H1200 60,000,000 08/26/2004 07/26/2005 First AF IDA-H5520 35,000,000 03/30/2010 10/29/2010 Second AF IDA-H7200 6,800,000 06/28/2011 10/19/2011 Total 101,800,000 10. Findings presented in this ICR are the conclusion of a data collection and analysis process that spanned over six months, and included: • Two field visits in Kinshasa, Bas-Congo, Province Orientale, Nord Kivu, and South Kivu • Interviews with key project stakeholders, including project staff, government representatives, staff from NGOs and local contracting agencies involved in implementation, and staff of non- benefiting NGOs operating in areas covered by the project • Group discussions with beneficiaries • Desk review of five independent technical audits financed by the project, project appraisal documents, project supervision reports, and external financial audits • Desk review of Bank aide memoires and interim supervision reports • Interviews with Bank task team leaders and technical specialists 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators 11. The original objective of the project was “to improve access of the poor to social and economic services and increase the availability and management of development resources at the community level.” 2 1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and Reasons/Justification 12. While the PDO was not changed during the life of the project, the key indicators were revised to better capture the outcomes associated with the range of sub-projects selected by communities and to make the indicators more specific (with a particular emphasis on capturing IDA core indicators) and/or easier to measure. The only significant change was the addition of indicators to track the progress of a labor intensive public works sub-component financed as part of the first additional financing (AF). Table 1 below tracks the evolution of the PDO and indicators over the life of the project. Table 1: Evolution of PDO and Project Indicators Original Project Changes Introduced with First Changes Introduced with Additional Financing Second Additional Financing PDO: The objective of the project No change No change is to improve access of the poor to social and economic services and increase the availability and management of development resources at the community level Increased enrollment in Social Average increase in enrollment in No change Fund built/rehabilitated Social Fund built/rehabilitated schools/classrooms classrooms (%) - % better captures impact of project over time, rather than number of enrollment Increased medical consultations in Average increase in medical No change Social Fund built/rehabilitated consultations in Social Fund health centers built/rehabilitated health centers (%) - % better captures impact of project over time, rather than number of consultations Increased number of motorized Reduction in average travel time of No change vehicles using rural roads motorized vehicles on rehabilitated rehabilitated by Social Fund roads (%) - Changed to be more specific and easy to measure 550 communities with improved Removed and added under Component capacity to plan, implement, and 1 manage their economic and social infrastructure People provided with access to No change in indicator “improved water sources” under the language; however, target project (number) CORE increased to reflect increased - This indicator was formulated resources. under the original project after the communities identified the sub- projects to be implemented Traders with access to stalls and/or No change in indicator storage facilities rehabilitated by the language; however, target project (number) increased to reflect increased - This indicator was formulated resources. under the original project after the communities identified the sub- 3 Original Project Changes Introduced with First Changes Introduced with Additional Financing Second Additional Financing PDO: The objective of the project No change No change is to improve access of the poor to social and economic services and increase the availability and management of development resources at the community level projects to be implemented Beneficiaries direct (broken down per No change in indicator province, disaggregated by gender language; however, target (number) CORE increased to reflect increased - Original indicators did not track resources. number of beneficiaries Sub-projects operational and well No change maintained within a year of completion (%) - Moved up from Component 2. Village committees operational after No change one year of completion of project (%) - Added to track sustainability of community organizations, particularly as they related to operations and maintenance Person days provided in labor intensive No change; however, second public works (number) CORE AF included no funding for - Used to track new project sub- this component. component Component 1: Social and Component One 1A: Social economic No change economic infrastructure infrastructure built and rehabilitated. built/rehabilitated by poor communities Number of completed/rehabilitated • Classrooms built and rehabilitated No change in wording of infrastructure projects (by (number) CORE indicators, but targets province, per type of sub-project) • Health facilities built/rehabilitated increased to reflect increased (number) CORE funding. • Community water points built/rehabilitated (number) CORE • Roads rehabilitated rural (km) CORE • Marketplaces constructed or rehabilitated (number) • Environment sub-projects implemented (number) - Indicators revised to be more specific to project type Number of communities benefiting Communities benefiting from at least No change in indicator from at least one sub-project one sub-project (number) language; however, target increased to reflect increased resources. Component 1B: Labor intensive No change; however, second infrastructure rehabilitation and AF did not include any maintenance in the Katanga province. funding for this component. - New indicators added to track new sub-component. Beneficiaries of public works program No change in indicator 4 Original Project Changes Introduced with First Changes Introduced with Additional Financing Second Additional Financing PDO: The objective of the project No change No change is to improve access of the poor to social and economic services and increase the availability and management of development resources at the community level (Number) CORE language; however, target increased to reflect increased resources. - Share of wage bill/total cost (%) No change in indicator language; however, target increased to reflect increased resources. Component 2: Communities are No change No Change able to develop and implement cost-effective sub-projects through a participatory process Percentage of population indicating Population indicating satisfaction with No change knowledge of/satisfaction with their participation in sub-project (%) their participation in sub-project - Made more specific to measure plans only one variable 90% of sub-projects operational This indicator became an outcome and maintained one year after indicator to track impact at the PDO completion Village committees established No change in the wording of (number) the indicators, but target increased by 65 to reflect increased funding. Communities trained in planning, No change in indicator implementing, and managing the language; however, target construction/rehabilitation of economic increased to reflect increased and social infrastructure (number) resources. - Separates the establishment of the village committees from the training they received Component 3: Communities have This component was not included in the This component was not increased access to educational first AF. included in the second AF. services Percentage increase in year Students receiving scholarship completion rates in supported (number) schools - This indicator more accurately reflects the activities financed under Component 3. Number of libraries established and Libraries established and maintained maintained one year after one year after completion (number) completion - No significant change in indicator Component 4: Project No change No change successfully and cost-efficiently implemented in decentralized manner Baseline and annual surveys No change No change provided regular monitoring and evaluation of project impact 5 Original Project Changes Introduced with First Changes Introduced with Additional Financing Second Additional Financing PDO: The objective of the project No change No change is to improve access of the poor to social and economic services and increase the availability and management of development resources at the community level Processing timelines for sub- Eliminated No change project activities successfully met Operating costs are at or below No change No change 20% of total project investments Social Fund is represented and No change No change functions efficiently and autonomously in all provinces Number of sub-projects, ALEs, and (i) Sub-projects; (ii) ALEs; and (iii) sub-contractors based in remote sub-contractors based in remote and and impoverished areas impoverished area (number) - Editorial changes 1.4 Main Beneficiaries 13. The main beneficiaries were identified in the original project document as “poor communities” in all 11 provinces of the DRC. Zones of intervention were selected taking into account accessibility and safety, constraints in management and supervision of operations, dynamism of communities, 1 and existence of local partners. Over the life of the project, the primary beneficiaries continued to be “poor communities.” However, some project components targeted specific sub-groups of beneficiaries in poor communities as discussed below. 1.5 Original Components 14. The original project had the following four components for a total initial project value of US$60 million. Component 1: Infrastructure (US$35.04 million) 15. This component included three main sub-components. Sub-component 1A targeted poor communities for the rehabilitation and construction of community-based socio-economic infrastructure for a value of up to US$50,000; community contributions of 10 percent in cash and/or in kind were required. Sub-component 1B financed medium to large socio-economic infrastructure projects costing up to US$850,000. These projects were to benefit larger communities, including urban neighborhoods and clusters of communities. Very few sub-projects of this scale were implemented, and this sub-component was formally dropped with the first AF, when the limit on small infrastructure projects was raised from US$50,000 to US$100,000 to address increase in the sub-project costs 2. Finally, Sub-component 1C supported pilot income-generating sub-projects to be 1 As measured by the ability to provide a 10 percent community contribution (in kind or in cash). The vast majority of contributions received were in kind. 2 There were two factors affecting construction costs in the DRC at the time, high inflation rates and the added cost of building in remote communities where materials often had to be airlifted to the building site. 6 implemented through local micro-enterprise organizations. This was also dropped with the first AF to allow the project to focus on Sub-component 1A where demand was very high. Component 2: Capacity building (US$1.97 million) 16. The primary beneficiaries of the capacity building efforts were (i) the local executing agencies (ALEs for Agences locales d’exécution), that is, local non-government organizations (NGOs) that were selected by the communities (and certified by the Social Fund as needed) to provide them with technical support in the identification and implementation of the sub-projects; (ii) the community management committees composed of 3-7 members who were elected by the community during the project preparation phase based on criteria identified in the project implementation manual to lead project design and supervise implementation; (iii) the village maintenance committees, which were established by the communities in each village to ensure the sustainability of the infrastructures rehabilitated 3; (iv) the local contractors who were small and medium enterprises recruited by the ALEs or the community management committees to construct/rehabilitate the infrastructures identified; and (v) the firms contracted by the Social Fund to conduct the feasibility study of relatively complex sub-projects, or supervise project implementation. The community management committees and village maintenance committees received limited training in committee organization and sub-project management, with a focus on mobilizing community contributions and infrastructure maintenance. The ALEs learned how to operate under strict Bank procurement, sub-project identification, preparation, and management rules. This included identifying, contracting, and managing local contractors, who received technical trainings to improve the quality of their works, as well as trainings on procurement and labor intensive public works methods (for those involved in the THIMO sub-components). Component 3: Education (US$3.14 million) 17. This component financed two sub-components, with different target beneficiaries. The scholarship program targeted top-performing university-level students based upon their state exam scores. Students from across the country benefited, regardless of income level, receiving US$400 each to finance tuition, lodging, and library fees. Awards were made on an annual basis and renewed when students passed their year with distinction. Schools that consistently produced winning students also received cash awards. This sub-component was only supposed to operate during the first two years of the project, but based on demand, was extended for a third year. The second component financed a Literacy Program, referred to as PROLEDA (Projet de lecture et alphabétisation), which was designed to establish community and classroom libraries, promote low-cost literacy activities for children and adults, and train teachers and librarians. Priority was given to communities and primary and secondary schools in disadvantaged areas that lacked library resources. These two activities were included in the project upon request of the GoDRC. They were a continuation of a government program already underway. 3 The village maintenance committees comprised at least 3 members. They included representatives of the community management committees, and were set up during the project preparation phase according to criteria defined in the project implementation manual. 7 Component 4: Project coordination, management, and outreach (US$19.85 million) 18. The project was implemented by the Social Fund of the Democratic Republic of Congo (Fonds Social de la République Démocratique du Congo), a public legal entity created in 2002 by Presidential Decree No. 009/2002 under the tutelage of the President’s Office to contribute to reconstruction efforts and rapidly increase access to basic social infrastructure and income-generating opportunities. Component 4 covered staffing and administrative costs of the Social Fund at its headquarters office in Kinshasa and in all 11 provinces where the Social Fund had small regional offices. 1.6 Revised Components 19. Component 1: Community-based socio-economic infrastructure and labor intensive public works (US$32.3 million, including US$27 million under the first AF and US$5.3 million under the second AF). The first AF added US$22.5 million to benefit an additional 300 communities, with a greater focus on economic infrastructure sub-projects. In addition, the ceiling for community sub- projects was raised to US$100,000 in consideration of higher commodity prices and the high cost of infrastructure investments in the most remote areas. The first AF did not finance medium- to large- scale infrastructure rehabilitation or the income-generating activity sub-component of the parent project. However, US$4.5 million was included for labor intensive public works (LIPW) targeting miners in the Katanga Province, many of whom had been affected by the decrease in global demand for minerals caused by the world-wide recession. The investment in this sub-component was expected to generate 290,000 person days of employment for this target group. LIPW sub-projects had a ceiling of US$200,000 each. The State and Peace-building Fund (SPF) provided an additional US$5 million to the LIPW sub-component. The second AF exclusively targeted communities in the Seke Banza territory of the Bas-Congo Province for infrastructure construction/rehabilitation, many of which had been affected by the construction of the Inga dam, financed by another Bank project. 20. Component 2: Capacity building of beneficiary communities and local executing agencies involved in project implementation (US$1.0 million under the first AF and US$.2 under the second AF). Additional funds continued to target community organizations and NGOs serving the beneficiary communities. 21. Component 3: Education grants and community libraries. This component was concluded successfully during the life of the original project and was not renewed in order to enable the Social Fund to focus on Component 1 where demand far exceeded project resources. 22. Component 4: Project coordination and management (US$7 million from the first AF and US$1.3 million from the second AF). The first AF provided US$7 million to finance on-going project coordination and management costs. Some of these incremental funds financed increased financial accounting oversight, particularly to support the labor-intensive projects in Katanga, and an internal audit function was created to strengthen financial management at the provincial level. The subsequent AF contributed US$1.3 million to finance an increase in administrative costs related to the scale-up in Bas-Congo. 23. Annex 1 provides a revised estimate of project costs per component, reflecting total contributions from the first and second additional financing. 1.7 Other Significant Changes 24. The project was restructured several times (three reallocations of proceeds and three extensions of closing dates) to take into account delays experienced at start-up (see section on Quality at Entry, paragraph 29), provision of additional financing, and issues related to unexpectedly high 8 and fluctuating operational costs given high inflation rates that affected costs of supervision, among others. Table 2 describes the type of restructuring carried out during the life of the project, while Table 3 provides details on the reallocation of proceeds. Table 2: Summary of Project Restructuring Type of Rationale Approval Effective Restructuring Date Reallocation of (i) Delays in effectiveness date; (ii) higher than 12/2007 05/30/2008 proceeds expected costs for transportation, fuel, and communications due to the challenging operational context; (iii) training costs for Social Fund staff charged to operating costs rather than Consultants’ Services as originally planned; and (iv) very high banking and money transfer costs. This was being off- set by lower than anticipated expenditures for consultants partly due to the above-mentioned charging of training costs to the operational cost category and partly due to the fact that the project needed fewer consultants than originally envisaged for information and outreach activities. Extension of Start-up delays 11/2008 07/30/2009 closing date from March 31, 2009 to March 31, 2010 and reallocation of proceeds Additional To allocate sufficient time to implement AF activities 03/30/2010 10/29/2010 Financing and extension of closing date to March 31, 3013 Additional To allow readjustments between disbursement 06/28/2011 10/19/2011 financing and categories during the final project when all activities reallocation of have been completed proceeds Extension of To compensate for delays due to changes in the World 12/30/2012 12/30/2012 closing date to Bank’s disbursement policy and to allow the project to June 13, 2013 complete an additional 175 projects 9 Table 3: Overview of Reallocation of Proceeds Categories Original Credit December 2007 November 2008 February 2011 Allocations Reallocation Reallocation Reallocation Amounts in SDR Works 410,000 520,000 470,000 479,000 Goods 1,090,000 1,040,000 920,000 926,000 Consultants’ Services 6,970,000 6,220,000 6,150,000 5,754,000 Trainings 850,000 850,000 1,350,000 639,000 Scholarships 2,500,000 2,500,000 2,150,000 2,045,000 Microgrants 25,300,000 25,300,000 24,000,000 25,031,000 Operating Costs 2,800,000 4,260,000 5,650,000 5,817,000 Refund of Project 410,000 410,000 410,000 409,000 Preparation Advance Unallocated 770,000 0 0 0 Total Credit 41,100,000 41,100,000 41,100,000 41,100,000 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design, and Quality at Entry 25. This project was prepared under the Bank’s emergency procedures (OP 8.50) in the challenging post-conflict context described in the Introduction Section (see paragraph 8). The risk rating was High at appraisal in recognition of the weak fiduciary and administrative capacity of the Social Fund at the time of appraisal and the volatility of the overall political context. The risk level was downgraded to Medium under both additional financings (AF), given the experience acquired by the Social Fund, its good fiduciary performance, and the country’s progress towards political stability. 26. Overall and given the circumstances under which the project was prepared, the project design was solid and it continued to be revised for improvements during implementation as discussed below. The project was aligned with the Bank’s country assistance strategies (TSS 2001 and 2004 and the Country Assistance Strategy), the government’s Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (I-PRSP) in effect at the time of project preparation, and later the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2007-2010 (GPRSP) at the time the AFs were prepared. Project design incorporated best practices in Bank-funded Community Driven Development (CDD) projects in comparable countries and situations, as follows: • Used a Project Preparation Facility (PPF) to promote readiness after approval. An advance in the maximum amount allowed of US$600,000 was provided to the Social Fund six months before Board approval of the parent project. • Was responsive to the fragile context by using a bottom-up participatory process to build community infrastructure so that communities began to take ownership of the development process. • Required community contribution (10 percent of the project costs, in kind and/or in cash) as a way to promote ownership. • Helped form community management committees that were elected by the beneficiaries and responsible for the design and implementation of the prioritized community sub-projects; village maintenance committees were also established by the community, and were responsible for the maintenance and sustainability of the sub-projects. • Envisioned working with and strengthening local NGOs (ALEs) and construction contractors to collaborate with the communities in getting their prioritized infrastructure built. By engaging civil society and private sector partners, the project helped demonstrate the value of 10 multi-stakeholder collaborations for rapidly achieving results across the entire country at a reasonable cost, in a context of social instability, post-conflict violence, and minimal State capacity. • Built the project on an existing government-operated social fund. Prior to receiving the Bank’s support, the Social Fund was already legally mandated and had some (minimal) experience managing a community infrastructure portfolio. This reduced the potential delays associated with creating a new government institution from scratch. • Envisioned a decentralized model, where each provincial office operated in a semi- autonomous fashion with its own staff. This not only led to rapid implementation in all 11 provinces but also created an institution in each province with the potential to serve as a government vehicle to make impactful community investments. • Ensured effective linkages with the wider health and education systems through the role played by the provincial committees. These committees included representatives from key sector ministries at the provincial level who worked effectively to review and approve sub- projects, while ensuring that the infrastructure was consistent with sector plans and could be staffed and supplied by government. • Built rigorous checks and balances into the system to help minimize corruption. These included sufficient funding for regular internal and external financial and technical audits, enforcing a zero tolerance for corruption, prosecuting those found guilty of corruption, and vetting NGOs involved in implementation to eliminate those that were underperforming. This helped maximize the volume of funds reaching the community level and helped spread a culture of transparency among the actors directly involved with the project. • Benefited from continuous learning. The design of the project was continuously strengthened during the implementation period to incorporate lessons learned and accelerate disbursements (see sub section on M&E Utilization in paragraph 39). 27. The project envisioned that its management and oversight would be governed at the national level by two main structures within the Social Fund: (i) a board of directors responsible for providing oversight of the coordination unit, approving project manuals, annual project activities and work plans, ensuring the recruitment of external auditors, and reviewing activities and project reports; and (ii) a coordination unit responsible for the day-to-day management and implementation of the project, and for ensuring compliance with Bank guidelines and requirements. The board of directors, which comprised representatives from key line ministries, donors, and civil society, was only formed in 2010 despite recurrent reminders from the Bank and the Social Fund. Once established, the Board held a total number of nine meetings (three in 2010, three in 2011, two in 2012, and one in 2013). During the absence of an active board of directors prior to 2010, the Social Fund’s management team, composed by its the general coordinator, the financial management director, the technical director, the director of programs, and the internal auditor, ensured oversight responsibilities in terms of recruiting the external auditors on an annual basis, and worked closely with the Bank to approve planning documents and ensure compliance with fiduciary requirements. 28. No quality at entry review was conducted by the Quality Assurance Group. 11 2.2 Implementation Quality of Implementation 29. The project became effective 11 months after approval, after receiving two extensions. Implementation progress was characterized by a slow start associated with non-compliance with Bank fiduciary requirements and slow disbursement rates during its first two years. This was primarily justified by a combination of factors related to the post-conflict context, including: (i) difficulties in recruiting and retaining qualified staff; (ii) delays in securing office space (which was supposed to be a government contribution); and (iii) challenges in identifying partners with strong capacity (communities and ALEs). In addition, the first general coordinator fell short of the Bank’s expectations. The Social Fund completion report identifies additional project-specific challenges that contributed to the slow start, including difficulties in: (i) securing community contributions for Component 1 sub-projects; (ii) finding construction materials; and (iii) motivating communities to participate in the project (see executive summary of the borrower’s completion report in Annex 5. Executive Summary of Borrower's ICR). 30. In August 2006, the recruitment of a new general coordinator prompted gradual and steady improvements in project performance and compliance with the Bank fiduciary requirements. The Social Fund started adjusting operational procedures in late 2006 to address bottlenecks to rapid disbursements on its largest component (Component 1), including: (i) conducting extensive sensitization campaigns to secure community contributions; (ii) making community contributions a pre-condition to starting project activities; and (iii) systematically involving ALEs in project management. Staffing positions were progressively filled. Throughout the implementation period, the Social Fund made continuous improvements to its processes and procedures to ensure effective and efficient project implementation. In particular, the mid-term evaluation, conducted from October to November 2008, and the periodic technical audits provided useful recommendations that were promptly adopted and reflected in the two requests for additional financing. These included the decision by Kinshasa headquarters to: • Disburse the full value of a sub-project to the provincial office as soon as the sub-project was approved, thus eliminating the risk of losing a qualified contractor due to transfer delays – and having to start the bidding process all over again • Raise the budgetary ceiling for sub-projects from US$50,000 to US$100,000 in light of the significant increases in construction costs, particularly in conflict-affected eastern DRC, where the risks and challenges of moving materials contributed to escalating costs • Intermediary NGOs should only get involved in sub-project construction if no local private sector contractors were available. 31. The 2010 and 2012 technical audits assessed the quality of project implementation during the period 2010 and 2011 as Satisfactory. The reports found that the infrastructure built was generally of good quality, fully furnished and equipped, and responded to the needs of the beneficiary communities. The report also noted that the Social Fund had been effective in engaging provincial government officials through the provincial committees. This helped ensure that the selected sub- projects were included in the local sector plans, thus increasing the likelihood that the personnel required to operate/maintain the expanded/improved infrastructure would be made available. At closing, the project was rated Satisfactory and exceeded seven out of nine of its programmatic targets (see paragraph 52 on Achievements of Project Development Objectives). 12 Capacity Building for Implementation 32. The quality of implementation benefitted from investments in capacity building for community organizations, intermediary NGOs, consulting firms, and local contractors. Supervision documents and the counterpart’s completion reports indicate that trainings in procurement, financial management, technical supervision of sub-projects, and other administrative procedures required for working effectively with Bank funds were regularly delivered and crucial for achieving good results and building local partners who can serve as effective implementers for other donors in the future. Trainings on project implementation processes were delivered before the sub-projects were implemented. The majority of NGOs interviewed during ICR preparation commented that the regular follow-up and implementation support they received from the provincial-level office was particularly useful in building their capacity to manage the quality of the construction work. Some NGOs also indicated that the trainings in procurement and financial management helped them strengthen their internal control processes, making them more competitive to receive other donor funding. 33. The assessment of the intermediary NGOs, carried out in 2007 to diagnose their capacity and develop a capacity building plan, was successful in weeding out ALEs that did not have the capacity or the level of transparency required by the project. A total of 91 NGOs (out of 171), 45 engineering firms (out of 75), and 61 contractors (out of 95) qualified to continue working with the Social Fund. The NGOs were organized into three categories according to their capacity, with the most capable being allowed to work on multiple sub-projects at once and the least experienced on one small sub- project at a time. Based on findings from the above assessment, the project opted to build the capacity of local community-based organizations (CBOs) in remote areas, including helping them become legally registered as opposed to bringing NGOs from larger cities to operate in these regions. This increased effectiveness and further strengthened community participation. 34. A small number of Social Fund staff also benefited from trainings in procurement, monitoring and evaluation (M&E), and exchange visits in Madagascar and the Republic of Congo. Kinshasa- based staff experts on M&E and safeguards were responsible for training project officers in the provinces. Implementation Capacity 35. At project start-up, implementation capacity was hampered by instability at the top of the Social Fund. The initial general coordinator fell short of satisfying Bank expectations and left in July 2006. She was replaced by the director of administration and finance (DAF), who had worked for many years as an auditor for one of the main international auditing firms, proved to have the right set of skills to get the project moving at a rapid pace, and enforced a culture of zero tolerance for corruption. Under his leadership, 37 percent of the staff members who left the Social Fund during the project were terminated for lack of integrity. The transparent culture that the second general coordinator promoted was critical within the context of the DRC, where the risk of corruption is very high; it is also a contributing factor to the positive results that the project achieved under his leadership. NGOs consulted for the preparation of the ICR were unanimous in praising the good governance of the Social Fund and appreciated the fact that they were held accountable for a transparent management of funds. 36. Rapid staff turnover, particularly at the level of the provincial offices, was identified as an issue in implementation. Over the life of the project, 77 staff left. This was due, in large part, to the fact that the Social Fund contracted its field staff on annual consulting contracts, which were renewed after an evaluation of each staff member’s performance. While this enabled the Social Fund to weed out poor performers annually, the lack of job security led many staff to go to their field post without their family, which increased the likelihood of staff turnover. The mid-term evaluation team also 13 found that salary levels were not competitive and became less so over time, especially as inflation increased. The problem was such that, the Social Fund tried to maintain salaries that were more in line with local employers to promote sustainability but this made it increasingly difficult to compete with international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and other donor and Bank-funded projects that offered higher salaries. The director of M&E, a position difficult to fill in most contexts, changed more than seven times during the first two years of the project, likely due to better financial opportunities offered by other employers. 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation, and Utilization Design- Rating: Substantial 37. The design of the project approach to monitoring and evaluation (M&E) was not very strong at approval, but gradually improved to satisfactory levels after being adjusted to incorporate lessons learned during the implementation period. At project effectiveness, the M&E indicators were not defined precisely, and field staff did not receive training on the results frameworks, leaving some of the indicators open to interpretation. This issue was compounded by the reliance of the project on the ALEs (whose capacities varied significantly) for data collection. Due to budget constraints, only one staff based in Kinshasa was responsible for coordinating input from all the 11 provinces, and this person had a limited supervision budget and was seldom able to get to the field to verify data supplied by local partners. Turnover at this post also affected the timeliness of reporting. Despite these weaknesses, the initial design of the M&E system featured several strong points: (i) it provided for five technical audits reports and a thorough mid-term review4 that provided reliable data on project performance until the M&E system became operational; and (ii) it relied on a decentralized system for routine supervision, whereby heads of provincial offices and their technical staff (including an engineer and a chief of provincial officer with an expertise in rural development or social mobilization) conducted regular field visits to identify implementation issues and provide support as needed. Implementation- Rating: Substantial 38. The above-mentioned initial weaknesses in the M&E design led to further delays in establishing and operationalizing the system. The M&E manual was finalized in March 2006, a year after effectiveness. The first M&E manager was recruited a month later. In 2007, a consultant was recruited to provide technical assistance to roll out the M&E system. Software was acquired to manage M&E data; training was provided to key stakeholders; and M&E tools were developed. In 2008, the results framework was updated to ensure a common understanding of the indicators, and a baseline data collection exercise was conducted, marking the official launch of the M&E system. As of this point, the project conducted annual evaluations and technical assessments, which looked at randomly selected samples of sub-projects to confirm the validity of data reported by the provincial offices. These external assessments were complemented by a rigorous financial audit. A random sample of sub-projects was selected for a site visit by the technical audit teams, which helped serve as a means of verifying the accuracy of data submitted by the provincial teams. The Social Fund estimates in its completion report that it conducted on average 13 monthly supervision missions of NGOs and local contractors during project implementation. In addition, the coordination unit conducted regular supervision of the provincial offices, estimated at 49 per year. Timeliness of 4 The technical audits and mid-term review were conducted by some independent firms who were recruited competitively based on the World Bank procurement procedures. 14 reporting to the Bank remained an issue until project closing, but did not seem to impact data utilization as findings and lessons learned were regularly incorporated in project implementation and design. Utilization- Rating: High 39. Data provided through the M&E system – particularly internal supervision missions, the mid- term review, the various technical audits – and the external audits, were used to strengthen project design and implementation performance as follows: • Addressing implementation issues: At its onset, the Social Fund met some challenges in obtaining a large number of proposals for sub-projects, and in securing the 10 percent community contributions. The quality of sub-project proposals received was also problematic. The Social Fund’s completion report indicates that in 2006, less than 60 percent of the requests received were of an adequate quality. Information obtained during supervision missions pointed to the need to conduct more thorough sensitization campaigns to address communities’ concerns about the contributions. After implementing this recommendation, the project experienced a high success rate in obtaining community contributions and the number of proposals surged from 1,825 in 2006 to 3,479 in 2007. The percentage of high quality proposals exceeded 85 percent in 2007. • Contributing to good governance: The financial audits led to corrective measures against mismanagement, as they helped the Social Fund identify instances of corruption or financial mismanagement at the project level. The government is expected to reimburse US$93,313 in ineligible expenses resulting from the project accountant in North Kivu and the manager of a financial cooperative 5 misappropriating project funds. Likewise, findings from the NGO capacity assessment conducted was instrumental in weeding out the local implementing partners (NGOs and local contractors) that could not be trusted to deliver effectively on project objectives as discussed above. • Ensuring the delivery of good quality operations: Regular supervision missions undertaken by the Social Fund staff were key in ensuring the good technical quality of infrastructure rehabilitated. Indeed, the project engineers in the provinces conducted follow-up site visits based on supervision reports from the ALE or the communities, pointing to potential issues in the rehabilitation/construction activities underway. These site visits were an opportunity to provide technical support to the local contractors. 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance 40. Social and environmental safeguards: Project performance on safeguards compliance was also characterized by a slow start during the first two years after effectiveness. The project was classified as environmental category B, as the sub-projects (including the construction and rehabilitation of community-based infrastructure) could potentially have localized negative environmental and social impacts. The prescribed instruments (an Environmental and Social Assessment Framework (ESMF), a Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF), and an Indigenous People’s Planning Framework (IPPF) were prepared and disclosed between one to two years after their scheduled due date (six months after effectiveness). Performance improved to a Moderately Satisfactory rating in 2007 after the Social Fund recruited an environmental specialist whose responsibilities included training the ALE and the 5 In the absence of banks in remote areas, the project partnered with community based banking institutions such as credit institutions, and financial cooperatives. 15 entrepreneurs on Bank safeguards requirements and ensuring safeguards compliance. This specialist, based in Kinshasa, worked closely with the provincial staff for supervision. Yet, effective supervision and capacity transfer to key stakeholders (ALE and enterprises) was affected by a low budget for supervision activities, a high turnover rate of the provincial staff that the Kinshasa-based specialist trained, and limited capacity of the stakeholders who required more in-depth training. 41. Despite these constraints, as indicated by the Social Fund during the ICR process, environmental impact assessments were conducted and risk management plans elaborated for medium-size projects and projects requiring population displacements. The potential impact of non- compliance was reduced during the first additional financing, when the Social Fund required the use of a negative list for micro-projects selection. The 2012 technical audit reviewed 22 requests for financing and concluded that overall social and environmental risks were adequately addressed. 42. Financial management (FM) performance: The project appraisal identified a high fiduciary risk and proposed appropriate mitigation measures that were satisfactorily implemented during the project implementation period. The recruitment of the fiduciary management team, the systematic implementation of biannual financial management supervision missions, the elaboration of detailed procedural manuals, and the hiring of external auditors (for the technical and financial aspects) helped somewhat in reducing these risks. With the exception of the first two years of implementation characterized by instability at the level of top-management as described above, FM performance was consistently rated as Moderately Satisfactory or Satisfactory and the related FM risk was rated Moderate during the implementation of the project. This achievement is notable in a country context that is characterized by weak governance systems and can partly be attributed to the zero tolerance policy enforced by the second general coordinator when he took office. Strong control and oversight systems were established. The final financial supervision visit found that the project complied with the obligations of financial reporting and auditing. Throughout the life of project, all the IFRs were submitted on time and all audit reports submitted in the last four years of the project were unqualified. All audit reports and IFRs were reviewed by the Bank and comments provided to the government. All FM issues that had justified the project financial management Moderately Satisfactory rating were addressed before the project closing date, except for the refund of US$91,313 diverted by the project accountant in North Kivu and by the manager of a financial cooperative. The project pursued legal action against both the ALE manager and the North Kivu accountant. A repeated claim letter was sent to the Ministry of Finance on November 18, 2013 for action. 43. Procurement performance: Procurement occurred at two levels through the life of this project: (i) purchase by the ALEs of small inputs for sub-projects; and (ii) purchase of larger goods and recruitment of consultants by the Social Fund. Performance was rated Unsatisfactory during the first two years of implementation, when the Social Fund’s experience with Bank procurement guidelines and its capacity to implement the sub-projects proposed under Component 1 was limited. As the Social Fund’s capacity improved, its performance rating alternated between Satisfactory and Moderately Satisfactory until closure, except in 2011 when it was rated Moderately Unsatisfactory due to delays in replacing the procurement manager who had left the project. The latest post procurement review conducted in 2011 concluded that overall, procurement performance was consistent with the provisions of the Bank’s procurement guidelines and the financing agreement. The document noted room for improvement in the following aspects of the procurement system: (i) the filing system should be strengthened to ensure traceability of the entire procurement process; (ii) all contracts should be included in the procurement plan agreed with the Bank; (iii) full transparency should be required in the selection procedures of individual consultants; (iv) all contract awards should be published; and (v) delays in the procurement process should be reduced. During ICR preparation, the intermediary NGOs commended the Social Fund for transferring capacity in procurement management. 16 2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase 44. Sustainability of Infrastructure Financed: A review of the independent technical audits conducted, as well as discussions held with project counterparts and field visits conducted as part of the ICR mission, point to the good quality and durability of the infrastructure constructed/rehabilitated. As stated above, an engineer was based in each provincial office and worked closely with the ALEs, communities, and local contractors to ensure that the sub-projects were technically sound. Financial sustainability was promoted on several fronts: (i) promoting ownership of the infrastructure; (ii) ensuring alignment with government sector plans; and (iii) building community capacity to manage the infrastructure. 45. By actively involving the community in prioritizing projects to be financed and by requiring the community to form a community management committee, and raise match funding equivalent to 10 percent of the sub-project value (in kind or in cash)this project laid the groundwork for active community participation in the operation of the community infrastructure financed. The management committees were required to report regularly to the community on implementation progress. These design features were critical in contributing to the communities’ sense of ownership; indeed, most beneficiary communities contacted for the ICR preparation referred to their completed sub-project as “our school,” “our health clinic,” and “our market.” . 46. Further, the sub-projects identified by the communities were first vetted by the Social Fund, which conducted field visits to confirm communities’ needs, and then submitted to the provincial committees for approval. This linkage helped ensure an alignment between the communities’ priority projects and the sector ministries’ plans for expanding services; thus, the overwhelming majority of funded projects have the additional teachers, nurses, and doctors, paid by the government, required to operate effectively. 47. Finally, the project laid the foundation for community-based maintenance of constructed/rehabilitated infrastructures through the creation of village maintenance committees. These committees (including representatives from the community management committee) were established by the communities during sub-project preparation. Members were trained in project maintenance and were responsible for (i) making sure that the infrastructures rehabilitated/constructed were used no later than a month after project end; (ii) developing a project maintenance plan to be included in sub-project proposals 6 ; and (iii) maintaining the infrastructures. A manual for the operation and maintenance of rehabilitated/constructed infrastructures was provided to the committees. Unfortunately, the trainings were only delivered in April 2013, long after the majority of sub-projects had been completed. According to the project staff, this resulted from a lack of consensus within the Social Fund itself and between the Bank and the Social Fund as to the content of the modules. Despite these delays, the communities and NGOs interviewed in the preparation of this ICR reported that village maintenance committees established by the project are functioning well, and are able to manage the rehabilitated infrastructures. These affirmations corroborate the outcome indicator target of 97.5 percent of sub-projects being operational and functioning one year after completion. 6 The village maintenance committee was required to sign a “maintenance contract” with the Social Fund before receiving sub-project funds. 17 48. Sustainability of the Social Fund: The Social Fund is a legal public entity with financial autonomy; therefore, its sustainability as a national institution is firmly established. However, the government has allocated minimal funding to both its running costs and its portfolio of activities are minimal. Efforts by the Bank team to link the Social Fund to multilateral and bilateral donors – despite being beyond the scope of this project – have so far been unsuccessful. Future Bank-funded projects implemented by the Social Fund should include a provision to help this institution diversify its donor base. An active board of directors could play an important role in achieving this objective. 3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation Relevance of Objective- Rating: High 49. The project objectives are still relevant today, and will remain relevant into the foreseeable future as the demand for access to basic social and economic infrastructure and services continues to outstrip supply. The Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for FY2013-2016 approved in April 2013 reflects this continued demand and includes “improving social service delivery to raise human development indicators” as one of its objectives. The project’s objective contributes to the actual World Bank objective of eradicating poverty and contributing to shared prosperity. The PDO is also aligned with government policy priorities highlighted in the 2011-2015 DRC Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (GPRSP 2), which lists increased access to basic social services and strengthening human capital as one of its four pillars with a focus on education, health, and social protection. Relevance of Design and Implementation- Ratings: High 50. The original causal model around which the project was designed was solid. Component 1 directly contributed to “improve access of the poor to basic social and economic services” by constructing or rehabilitating 1,022 basic social infrastructure (including 3,426 classrooms, 117 health centers, 92 markets, 182 km of road, and 103 water points). For the labor intensive public works, an estimated 3,385 people, of which 745 were women, received increased revenues. Component 2 contributed to “increase the availability and management of development resources at the community level” by building the capacity of 1,381 village committees to manage development resources at the community level. Component 4 also contributed to 157 ALEs and 176 local contractors operating in remote and impoverished areas of the country. 51. Component 3 under the parent operation, which included the university scholarship program and the community libraries, may be slightly less aligned with the PDOs. This sub-component, which from a budget perspective was not significant representing only 5 percent of the original budget and 3 percent of the final budget, was introduced in the project upon specific request from the government, and dropped after the activities were successfully implemented before the first additional financing. A focus on only targeting poor students who had demonstrated outstanding performance could have further strengthened its relevancy. The community-based model to increase the supply of the goods provided continues to be appropriate in a context as fragile as the DRC given limited government capacity to effectively address the needs, as also mentioned in the FY2013-2016 CAS. 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives Rating: Substantial 18 52. The Social Fund’s performance at closing indicates that it overcame significant implementation challenges and surpassed six out of nine of its outcome indicators (see Table 4 on achievements of key outcome indicators below), while fully achieving a seventh. Improving access of the poor to social and economic services 53. According to the three technical audit reports reviewed and 10 field discussions conducted through this ICR process, the social and economic infrastructure produced were of high quality. The impact of these infrastructure improvements on the beneficiary populations exceeded expectations, with school enrollment increasing by 52 percent, exceeding its target by almost 50 percent, clinic consultations increasing by 64 percent, almost 30 percent above target, and close to half a million people getting access to potable water for the first time as stated in the completion report of the Social Fund. According to the Social Fund’s data, the total number of people who benefited from at least one of these projects was over 4 million, almost 700 percent greater than anticipated. This assumed an average household size of eight and 500 households benefiting from each project. As highlighted in the CAS, GPRSP2, and government completion report, accurate data on household size is very difficult to find in the DRC where the last census was conducted in 1984. Since then, population estimates have been based on growth assumptions and projections. Even if we use more conservative assumptions of five people per household and 200 households benefiting from each sub-project, over 1 million people would have benefited from at least one sub-project, twice the number anticipated. 54. The project also created an estimated 34,000 temporary jobs through the sub-projects under Component 1, which were not formally tracked by the project, and over 260,000 person days of work through the LIPW, putting over US$7 million into the hands of people who would be otherwise unemployed. Increasing the availability and management of development resources at the community level 55. The project could not have successfully built 1,022 infrastructure projects at the community level without capable partners on the ground, including 157 local NGO partners (ALE), who, in turn, recruited 176 local contractors (private sector construction contractors) to build high quality infrastructure in the remote communities. Local NGO partners were identified by the communities, vetted by the Social Fund, received support to become accredited according to relevant national/relevant laws when needed, and trained to strengthen their procurement and financial management skills. During the life of the project, the Social Fund conducted an assessment of its partners, which led to a narrowing of the pool of qualified NGOs, contractors, and technical assistance providers to those that demonstrated the highest level of capacity. Through its NGO partners, the project also created 1,381 village committees that contributed to the design of the sub- projects’ infrastructure and worked hand-in-hand with the intermediary NGO and construction contractors, ensuring that community contributions were on-site when required and assisting with the recruitment of local labor. This experience has left communities better prepared to implement similar projects in the future. The intermediary NGOs also helped organize and train village maintenance committees; however, as noted above, the Social Fund was late in developing the training curriculum, which meant many committees were not trained in M&O until the last year of the project. This may explain why the project under-performed its target of 90 percent of village maintenance committees being fully operational one year after sub-project completion. 56. Overall, the project, by only a small margin, fell short of two of its nine PDO indicators: 19 • 74 7 percent of village maintenance committees were fully operational one year after the project rather than the target 90 percent. This shortcoming does not appear to have had an impact on service delivery and maintenance. Indeed, nearly 98 percent of sub-projects were operational and in good repair one year after completion according to the 2012 M&E report. • The number of person-days of work provided by LIPW was 10 percent less than targeted. .. 7 This indicator was measured before the M&O training, which is expected to have led to an increase in the percentage of operational village maintenance committees in the project area. 20 Table 4: Achievements of Key Outcome Indicators Project Development Objective Indica- Results as Exceeds Difference (as revised) tor of June 30, or between Target 2013 (Below) Results as of Target Achieved AF2 and Target Improve access of the poor to social and economic services and increase the availability and management of development resources at the community level PDO Indicators: Average increase in enrollment in FSRDC 35% 52% 8 17% 49% built/rehabilitated classrooms (%) Average increase in medical consultations in FSRDC 50% 64% 9 14% 28% built/rehabilitated health centers (%) Reduction in average travel time of motorized vehicles on 30% 61% 10 31% 103% rehabilitated roads (%) People provided with access to “improved water sources” 435,180 483,585 11 48,405 11% under the project (number) CORE Traders with access to stalls and/or storage facilities 27,762 43,759 12 15,997 58% rehabilitated by the project (number) Beneficiaries direct (broken down per province, 525,000 4,088,000 13 3,563,000 679% disaggregated by gender (number) CORE Sub-projects that are operational and Well maintained 90% 97.5% 14 7.5% 8% within a year of completion Village committees 15 operational after one year of 90% 74% (16%) (18%) completion of project (%) Person days provided in labor intensive public works 290,000 259,969 (30,031) (10%) (number) CORE 8 This data is based upon an annual survey of completed schools. A total of 189 or 34 percent of the 561 completed schools provided enrollment data, which generated this result in increased enrollment. 9 A randomly selected sample representing 37 percent of the completed health centers generated this data on increased health consultations. 10 A randomly selected sample representing 22 percent of the 99 roads projects generated the result that the completed roads reduce travel time by 61 percent. 11 A randomly selected sample of 49 percent of the 103 water points built resulted in an average of 4,695 people per water point having new access to improved water sources per source, which allowed the project to extrapolate that a total of 483,585 people now have improved access from the 103 water projects built. 12 This data is based upon 40 market and/or warehouse projects representing 45 percent of the total built each of which was found to benefit an average of 457 merchants. This data was extrapolated to the 89 projects and adjusted for one large marketplace that is no longer operational. 13 The project used the following assumptions for this indicator. Every project reaches an average of 500 households, each of which has eight household members; therefore each project benefits 4,000 people. This multiplied by the 1,022 projects results in over 4 million beneficiaries. Even if we use more conservative assumptions of five people per household and 200 households benefiting from each sub-project, over 1 million people have benefited from at least one sub-project, twice the number anticipated. 14 All projects built in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 were evaluated one year after completion to verify if they were operational and well maintained. This assessment found that 97 percent, 95.6 percent, 100 percent, and 100 percent of the projects for each of the respective years were operating and well maintained. This data generated the overall average of 97.5 percent. 15 This refers to the village maintenance committees here. 21 3.3 Efficiency Rating- Substantial 57. Although the budget ceiling on sub-projects had to be raised from US$50,000 to US$100,000 with the first AF to accommodate increase in the price of construction materials (which averaged close to 20 percent per year and was further elevated in conflict zones where the cost of moving materials increased with the level of insecurity), the average cost for implementing a sub-project remained US$60,000. All of the beneficiaries, implementing NGOs, and local government officials visited as part of the ICR process expressed the opinion that the infrastructure project costs were reasonable compared to other projects being implemented in the area. To verify the cost-effectiveness of its investments, the Social Fund staff collected data on schools and health clinics (which represented 66 percent of their investment in infrastructure) built by other implementers, including UNICEF and UNOPS, in four of the provinces targeted by the project. On average, the Social Fund’s schools cost only 77 percent of similar schools built by other implementers and health clinics only 70 percent (see table below). Table 5: Implementation Cost Comparisons Province/Territory Structure Cost of a Cost of a School Health Center (US$) (US$) Social Fund 69,338 31,537 Kinshasa UNICEF (w/o equipment) 70,000 55,000 Difference -662 -23,463 Social Fund 89,081 51,715 Kasai Occidental UNICEF 100,000 60,000 Difference -10,919 -8,285 Social Fund 85,080 41,821 Province Orientale UNOPS 125,000 IRS 80,000 Difference -39,920 -38,179 Social Fund 70,269 60,914 Kasai-Oriental UNICEF 110,000 70,000 Difference -39.731 -9.086 58. According to the third party technical auditors, the Social Fund’s projects did not sacrifice infrastructure quality to lower its costs. This was confirmed during site visits for the ICR preparation and in interviews with local government officials; moreover, it is supported by the fact that 97.5 percent of the sub-projects were still fully operational when assessed at least one year after completion. The emphasis put on anti-corruption by the Social Fund likely helped keep the costs of sub-projects more in line with what they should be, including construction materials, labor, profit margin, and oversight, with no increment for paying off bribes. 59. The overall administrative cost as a percentage of the total project budget was 28 percent, compared to the targeted 20 percent. Each time funds were added to the project, the relative 22 proportion of project management increased as a percent of the overall budget. There were a number of reasons for these higher than expected operating costs. For one, the country is very large and has a very poorly developed road network, so most supervision travel had to be done by air, along routes that had very little competition; travel for supervision and on-going internal auditing, thus, was very expensive. The heavy emphasis put on project supervision and auditing was necessary in the highly corrupt context of the DRC and helped keep sub-project costs in check by minimizing opportunities for fraud. 60. While staff salaries were low relative to other projects, staffing costs were still higher than expected given the challenge of finding qualified staff in the provinces, so many of the provincial satellite offices were staffed with professionals recruited from Kinshasa who had higher salary expectations and required relocation expenditures. By working through local NGOs as intermediaries, the Social Fund was able to reach many more communities with relatively small field teams. 61. The delays in implementation experienced during the early years of this emergency project contributed to higher than expected administrative costs: Administrative costs were incurred over a number of months while little progress was made in implementing sub-projects. That being said, once the new general coordinator was in place, this situation was gradually corrected and the Social Fund became increasingly efficient in its operations. For example, prior to 2009 the proposal review process took an average of seven months from the moment the staff received a proposal from the community until the project was approved for financing. By 2013, this process was down to five months. Likewise, the number of months required to construct a project dropped significantly over the life of the project, from an average of 13 months prior to 2010 to an average of four months from 2010 onwards. This effectively lowered the cost of administering each sub-project. 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Satisfactory 62. Despite the challenging operating environment and difficulties experienced at project launch, the project successfully incorporated lessons learned and exceeded most of its outcome indicators and results targets as discussed in previous sections. 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development Poverty Impacts: Overall, as per the PDO, the project was effective in targeting poor communities in all 11 provinces of the DRC. In a context where over 70 percent of the population is poor, with an estimated 89 percent of the rural population being poor 16 the risks of exclusion were small. For the first Sub-component 1A, which represented 68 percent of project investments, the majority of the beneficiaries lived in rural areas. Poor communities were identified using poverty indicators such as limited or lack of access to basic social infrastructures in health, education, roads, and markets. Of the 1,022 sub-projects implemented under this subcomponent, 841 sub-projects or 82 percent were implemented in “remote and impoverished rural communities” according to the counterpart’s report 17. 16 World Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy for DRC (FY2013-2016). 17 The number of sub-projects implemented in remote and impoverished areas is an intermediate outcome indicator of the project. The Social Fund indicated that this figure would increase if sub-projects implemented in poor neighborhoods in urban centers were taken into account in the definition of this indicator. 23 The need to target very poor communities was balanced with the importance of promoting sub-project ownership and sustainability by requiring community contributions of 10 percent (in cash or in kind). Communities that came up with their contribution first had their sub-project financed first. A thorough community sensitization process was key to securing the community contributions in a timely fashion. The labor intensive public works activities specifically targeted communities in Katanga that had been affected by a series of layoffs in the mining sector. In this sub-component, self- targeting, through the setting of a daily wage that was slightly below market rate, ensured that the 3,483 beneficiaries were among vulnerable populations. Component 3 on education, which represented 3.7 percent of total project investments, targeted students for scholarships primarily based on merits and academic performance, not on poverty status. Table 6: Number and Value of Sub-Projects Completed (US$) Province Number of Projects Total Value of Sub-projects Completed Completed (US$) Bandundu 75 $5,157,902 Bas-Congo 148 $10,534,817 Equateur 71 $4,273,333 Kasai Occidental 79 $4,905,319 Kasai Oriental 65 $4,358,162 Katanga 89 $9,929,822 Kinshasa 161 $9,721,072 Maniema 92 $5,898,962 Nord Kivu 74 $4,794,297 Province Orientale 95 $4,449,028 Sud Kivu 73 $4,645,730 Total 1,022 $68,668,444 63. Beyond the poverty impacts captured through the project indicator data – improved access to health and educational services, potable water, and markets – the project created over 34,000 temporary jobs through the sub-projects and over 260,000 days of work person days of work through the LIPW, putting over US$7 million into the hands of people who would be otherwise unemployed. Likewise, the project helped poor communities realize that they had the power to contribute to improving the quality of their lives by working hand-in-hand with this government program, even in communities located in conflict zones. 64. Gender Aspects: For Component 1, the project indicators did not break the data down by sex, so it is difficult to assess the degree to which women and girls benefited from the sub-project investments. Nonetheless, expanded school capacity and single-sex bathrooms may have contributed to an increase in the number of girls attending school; potable water projects likely decreased the time it took for girls and women to collect water; and closer health care services with birthing facilities benefited women more than men. Both the scholarship program and the labor intensive public works program tracked beneficiaries by gender and sought to achieve a minimal degree of gender balance. Findings indicate that 25 percent of scholarships went to women and 22 percent of the beneficiaries of the labor intensive public works program were women. 65. The Social Fund staff was male dominated, particularly at the highest levels (although the first general coordinator was a woman), with all of the directors and all but one of the provincial managers being men. Gender equity was slightly more evident among the intermediary NGOs. The community management committees tended to be male-dominated; however, women seemed to be more visible 24 than men on the village maintenance committees, especially those that collected and managed user fees. (b) Institutional Change 66. With Bank funding and guidance, the project helped transform the DRC Social Fund from a fledgling agency into a decentralized institution operating in all 11 provinces – arguably the only government presence in many remote areas. The Social Fund effectively transferred resources to 171 NGO partners and 289 construction contractors to build high quality social and economic infrastructure in poor communities all across the country at lower average costs than others, while strengthening the capacity of their local partners. Partner NGOs and contractors had the opportunity to learn about transparent procurement processes and infrastructure project management, which positions them well for future opportunities. 67. The community management committees also learned to mobilize community residents around a common cause and to hold contractors and their NGO partners accountable for results. This may eventually affect the way in which communities engage with government at the local level, as they now see that the government and communities can work together to achieve results. The community also sees the infrastructure that it has built as a community asset, not as a government asset. This change of attitude stimulated by the requirement that the community finance up to 10 percent of the cost may help ensure that the community infrastructure is maintained and remains operational over the long-term, even though delays occurred in training the village maintenance committees responsible for M&O. 68. According to discussions held during field visits conducted as part of the ICR process, the project helped build trust between targeted communities and the government, as the Social Fund delivered on its promise to provide its 90 percent contribution towards the rehabilitation of socio- economic infrastructures identified. The 10 percent community contribution, on the other hand, helped foster pride from the communities in their accomplishments, breeding self-confidence and self-reliance. The positive experience the community had in participating in the identification and construction of their sub-projects may also have given them a sense of empowerment, which could translate into increased initiative and self-help in the future. (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) 69. Promoting demand for good governance at the community level: The community empowerment methodology used by the project helped create microcosms of democracy in each of the beneficiary communities. The communities had to elect their management committees’ membership, and they had to learn how to write and abide by their by-laws and be accountable to the citizens that elected them. This experience in good governance may create more demand from these community citizens for accountability from their elected government officials. Based on anecdotal evidence collected in South Kivu, some communities situated nearby an intervention area required the government to finish constructing schools for which rehabilitation works were underway before the Social Funds started its operations. Likewise, the emphasis placed by the project on community empowerment, good governance, and the transparent management of funds also gave government at the provincial and municipal levels an opportunity to see how accountable systems result in visible results on the ground. 70. Creating a transparent, effective, and efficient decentralized public sector delivery system: The Social Fund created a nationwide delivery system functioning in all 11 provinces for the construction and rehabilitation of community infrastructure. While this was not an end in itself, it was an organizational precondition for achieving the stated results. The investment required to getting this 25 highly effective and transparent delivery system fully operational was high. Ideally, this system could be repurposed to channel government, private sector, and/or donor funds to the provinces, most of which continue to have many unsatisfied basic needs. 71. Promoting social cohesion in conflict zones: In eastern DRC, the project is credited with contributing to social cohesion by bringing together members of groups traditionally in conflict based on anecdotal evidence. For instance, the Lenge Primary School in Ituri and the Boule Primary School in Fataki brought together Hema and Lendu communities for a school rehabilitation project. Parents from both sides had to collaborate to collect the required community contribution, and their children now attend the same schools. This experience is informing the design of a follow-on project that is being developed to target the provinces in eastern DRC that have been most affected by ethnic conflict. 72. Economic ripple effect: Based upon anecdotal evidence, some of the sub-projects created other income-generating opportunities for targeted populations. In South Kivu and Bas-Congo, for example, the installation of electricity in poor communities improved living conditions and laid the groundwork for businesses reliant on electricity to operate. Merchants could extend their store hours into the evening; local entrepreneurs could start-up grain mills, hair salons, and cold storage units; and mechanics and carpenters could increase the scale of their operation through the use of power tools. The increased demand for school furnishing created by the high investment made by the Social Fund in schools also generated work for local carpenters. New roads cut the travel time of getting agricultural products to market; it also led farmers in Bas-Congo and other provinces to expand the area they cultivated, because they had the means to transport their crops in trucks instead of on their backs. This expansion, in turn, created demand for more seasonal labor during the planting and harvesting periods. 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops 73. The project undertook a beneficiary assessment from April to May 2013 to evaluate the level of beneficiary satisfaction with the project. Thirty percent of sub-projects completed were randomly selected to be the focus of this exercise. Given budgetary constraints, only projects within 50 km of the provincial capital in seven provinces were selected. Interviews with 1,048 people were facilitated by the project staff. The populations surveyed included local authorities, beneficiaries, and community leaders living in the intervention area. The findings are as follows: • 83 percent of community members know of the sub-projects rehabilitated/constructed through the project • 81 percent are satisfied with the final output • 58 percent of people interviewed claimed to have been involved in the supervision of the sub- projects • 68 percent of people interviewed confirmed the existence of a village maintenance committee. 74. These statistics show a high level of satisfaction and are generally consistent with project outcome indicators and qualitative discussions held with the ICR preparation team during field visits. 26 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Significant 75. The overall risk to the project achieving its development outcome is rated Significant, due to a combination of factors including the overall operating environment (which remains characteristic of most low-capacity post-conflict contexts), political volatility, and government commitment to provide financial support to the Social Fund. 76. The main risk to the long-term development outcome would be the communities’ ability to maintain the rehabilitated infrastructure. In the short term, as the Social Fund effectively mitigated the risk of occurrence by transferring knowledge to the communities and ALEs on effective maintenance of rehabilitated/constructed infrastructure, despite the training being delivered in the final year of the project. In addition, the project trained the village maintenance committees in setting up basic cost- recovery schemes to generate funds for the maintenance of these structures. This risk is further mitigated by the heavy emphasis on community ownership at every phase of the sub-project cycle. Future Bank-funded CDD trainings should consider providing refresher training to ALEs and village committees that have participated in sub-projects. 77. A possible second risk relates to the inability of civil servants to deliver basic social services using the rehabilitated/constructed infrastructure if, for instance, the government fails to pay their salaries. The likelihood of this occurring was reduced as the project set up provincial committees which included representatives from all key technical ministries to approve sub-projects before implementation. Their decisions were based on the availability of government resources to ensure that the proposed sub-projects remained functional over the long term. Any potential impact could be mitigated by the fact that in the education sector (which represents the majority of the investments), community mechanisms (e.g., the strong mobilization of parent–teacher associations) generally exist to ensure that schools remain functional even when the government is not able to pay teachers’ salaries. 78. Finally, political instability and conflicts in eastern DRC may reduce the access of the communities to rehabilitated/constructed infrastructure. However, the Social Fund’s experience indicates that community-rehabilitated infrastructure has not been destroyed by warring factions, perhaps because of strong community ownership. In addition, the government, working in collaboration with the UN Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), has made recent progress in militarily defeating the M23, one of the most powerful armed groups operating in the East. A follow-up project is being designed to target eastern DRC in the hope of contributing to stability in this area. 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Satisfactory 79. Overall, the project design was solid, especially given the challenging operational environment and conditions in which this emergency intervention was prepared. The design was responsive to the country context during preparation; it used a demand-driven approach and valuable inputs, such as the recruitment of an engineer in each province to oversee the technical quality of the work undertaken by contractors, which increased the chances that the community infrastructure built would be sustainable over the long-term; it built the project on a structure that already existed; and it drew from international best practices of other Social Funds using the CDD approach. The PPF was approved six 27 months before project submission to the board, for the maximum amount allowed of US$600,000, to help the project elaborate its implementation manuals and recruit key staff. 80. The Bank had little control over issues that primarily affected readiness to implement during the first two years of the project, as those were primarily linked to the challenging operational context (see paragraph 8) or required government intervention, which was not always forthcoming. The fact that this was an emergency project meant that the Bank could not make government action a condition for disbursement; thus when government failed to fulfill its commitments, the Bank’s ability to negotiate was limited. These issues were progressively addressed throughout project implementation, particularly after the replacement of the first general coordinator as discussed above, and they had a marginal impact on the project’s ability to meet its development objectives. (b) Quality of Supervision (including of fiduciary and safeguards policies) Rating: Satisfactory 81. The Social Fund generally had praise for the support it received from the Bank project team, particularly its ability to get quick decisions from different departments within the Bank. A total number of three task team leaders (TTLs) were involved in the supervision of the project at different times. One of the TTLs who had less experience received mentorship to ensure the quality of implementation support. 82. A review of ISRs produced during implementation indicates the following performance on the part of the Bank team: • Strong focus on development impact: The team conducted regular field visits (more than twice a year for Washington-based staff) and provided constant reminders of progress towards achieving outcome indicators, which were adjusted and updated as needed to adequately capture impact on targeted communities. • Adequate supervision inputs and processes, which was rated satisfactory by the borrower in its completion report. The Bank’s recommendations that the project recruit international consultants to assist with the M&E system, for instance, had a positive impact on overall project performance in that regards. It should be noted however that the Social Fund received minimal supervision on safeguards, with input only provided at critical times (during the preparation of additional financings). • Overall candor and quality of performance reporting: ISR ratings were globally consistent with the narrative of project performance documented in the aide memoires and the ISRs themselves. M&E ratings, which were upgraded to Satisfactory from 2008 to 2011, should have remained Moderately Satisfactory until project end. Likewise, counterpart funding was rated satisfactory from 2010 to 2013 to reflect the successes in mobilizing community contributions and positive collaboration with the government at the local level. A moderately satisfactory rating would have better captured the challenges associated with involving the government in addressing implementation issues. 83. Lessons learned during the implementation of the parent operation were successfully incorporated in the restructuring and the additional financings, such that the project exceeded most of its expected results by closing. 28 (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Satisfactory 84. The project was prepared in eight months as an emergency operation to be implemented in a highly political and fragile post-conflict context. Despite these challenges, the Bank successfully assisted the Social Fund in delivering a Satisfactory project. The project presented some weaknesses on monitoring and evaluation design and operation costs that were higher than expected. Ultimately, these did not affect performance ratings at closing. 5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance Rating: Government of DRC: Moderately Satisfactory 85. At the provincial and local levels, representatives of relevant sector ministries were actively involved in the provincial committees . This helped ensure a rational allocation of limited sub-project resources and avoid the building of a school or health clinic in a community not contemplated in the government’s sector plans. As a result, most of the public schools and clinics that were built received the government-paid staff and supplies required to be fully operational. 86. The government at the national level, however, was slow to respond to repeated requests to address implementation issues, including delays in establishing a board. Further, Sub-component 1B of the parent operation was dropped primarily because of the inability of the government to contribute its funds for the larger-scale projects. Finally, the start-up delays were also linked with government delays in providing office space to the Social Fund at the local level. (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: The Social Fund: Satisfactory 87. The Social Fund team achieved good results, despite a slow start and a difficult operating context. Under the leadership of the second general coordinator, the Social Fund established rigorous policies and procedures as well as checks and balances that enabled effective mitigation of key project risks, in particular, identifying and eliminating corrupt staff and intermediary NGOs. The Social Fund staff worked to continuously improve their procedures and, in turn, their results. The communities and implementing agencies visited during the ICR process were all complimentary of the support they received from the Social Fund. They noted that funds were always sent on time, which allowed them to implement the sub-project quickly. Community representatives reported that they felt comfortable visiting the Social Fund offices and expressed gratitude for the technical support and advices they received. The project staff established an effective partnership with the UN Peacekeeping Mission (MONUSCO) to reach communities in conflict areas. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Satisfactory 88. While the national government has yet to take the necessary leadership required to transform the Social Fund into a fully autonomous institution, including allocation of financial resources, the potential is still there. There is still time for the government to recognize the importance of the Social Fund and use it as one of its primary vehicles for operationalizing the transfer of resources from the national to the provincial and community levels. The local and provincial government representatives 29 played a key role in aligning the sub-projects financed with their regional investment plans and could continue to play this role should the national level government decide to channel resources through the Fund. 6. Lessons Learned • Transparency is possible even in highly corrupt contexts: The Democratic Republic of Congo Social Fund has demonstrated how a highly decentralized grant-making mechanism can be effective and transparent in a context that ranks high on international corruption indexes, as long as: (i) local staff and partners receive sufficient training on what is expected of them in terms of transparent procurement and resource management, and on what they stand to lose if they violate the rules; (ii) a strong internal and external audit financial and technical audit function is in place and regularly conducts random audits; and (iii) staff and partners who are found to have undermined the procurement and resource management rules are removed and held accountable for their behavior. • In countries where a decentralization process is underway and there is an active and diverse donor community, consider making the sustainability of the Social Fund, itself, a project objective: In such complex environments as the DRC, a transparent, well-run Social Fund mechanism able to reach all provinces is a real asset, particularly for donors seeking to channel funds down to the local level. An active networking and communications campaign is required to build the awareness of other donors of the Social Fund’s work and dispel assumptions that its investments are politically motivated. While, in the case of the DRC, the absence of an active board of directors does not appear to have had a negative effect on project outcomes, it may have reduced the visibility of the Social Fund’s work within the donor community. This, while not an objective of the project, could have contributed to a more diversified funding base for a highly effective government project that would ensure its longevity beyond the Bank funding period. • Engaging with government increases project sustainability: Actively engaging provincial and local government in the sub-project selection process at the provincial level is a good way to ensure that the sub-projects funded are considered priorities by both the beneficiary community and the relevant sector ministries and local government. This in turn helps to ensure that completed sub-projects are staffed and equipped by complementary government financing. Likewise, the national government must be required to make a match investment in the Social Fund, either by contributing public sector resources or by engaging with other donor or private sector companies to raise additional Social Fund capital. The lack of national government contributions undermines the long-term sustainability of the social fund, increasing the likelihood that it will cease to exist once World Bank funding ends. • Invest adequately in project management: The DRC context requires investments in project management costs that exceed the Bank’s standard ceiling of 20 percent of total budget costs. This will help project implementation units be better equipped to effectively support operations over a vast territory, where transport facilities are often expensive and precarious. Adequate funding needs to be allocated to monitoring and evaluation (M&E). Project indicators need to be very clearly defined, and project staff and partners need to be trained in a common methodology for gathering, recording, and documenting indicator data. To do this effectively, provincial offices need to have M&E specialists on staff. Data audits, carried out by an internal or third party auditor, are as important as financial audits in verifying that a project is on track in achieving project results transparently. 30 • Allow some flexibility in sub-project budget levels for remote locations: Construction costs vary within different parts of a country based on a number of factors, including distance from main markets, security, road quality, cost of labor, and supply of skilled labor. For this reason, budget envelopes may need to be adjusted by province to reflect these variations; otherwise, sub-projects may need to be scaled down to fit within the budget in remote, underserved areas that may have the greatest need. 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/Implementing Agencies 89. The Social Fund wrote an in-depth completion report that provides a wealth of project data, some of which is presented above. The report is highly analytical and overall very constructive in identifying improvements made in its operations over the life of the project to ensure that all project results would be achieved. The key points made in the report are in line with the analysis presented above. The executive summary of the Borrower’s report is presented in Annex 5. Executive Summary of Borrower's ICR 90. The Borrower report should provide additional information on safeguards compliance. The report also underplays the role played by the government in contributing to start-up delays. (b) Cofinanciers N/A (c) Other Partners and Stakeholders • Many of the communities and ALEs interviewed through this ICR preparation process complained about the challenge of raising the 10 percent counterpart; nonetheless, they succeeded in doing so and acknowledged that it fostered community ownership of the sub- projects. Communities in the eastern part of the country, where the need was greatest and the poverty most intense, were least likely to see the community counterpart as a barrier to implementing the project. It is not recommended that this requirement be decreased, especially when it helps ensure that the Social Fund’s resources are invested in communities with the highest level of motivation for self-improvement. However, more flexibility can be built into the process of defining what constitutes the community contribution, and at which point in project implementation it should be provided. • Despite its extremely significant accomplishments, very few other donors, NGOs, or other actors were familiar with the Social Fund’s work. Many made erroneous assumptions about its capacity to deliver transparently on its promises. 31 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing (a)Revised Estimates of Project Costs Financed by IDA (amounts in '000 US$) Component Activity Original First Second Revised Costs Budget Additional Additional Financing Financing 1 Infrastructure 35.04 27.00 5.30 67.34 Community sub-projects 34.04 22.50 5.300 61.84 Income-generating activity 1.00 4.50 0.00 5.50 sub-projects3 2 Capacity Building 1.97 1.00 0.200 3.17 3 Education 3.14 0.00 0.00 3.14 4 Coordination and 19.85 7.00 1.300 28.15 Management Total 60.00 35.00 6.8 101.8 (b) Financing Undisbursed Loan Original Original Amount Approval Effectiveness Balance (in no Amount(SDR) (US$) Date Date SDR) IDA H1200 41,100,000 60,000,000 8/26/2004 7/26/2005 19,427.21 IDA H5520 22,600,000 35,000,000 40,267 10/29/2010 0 IDA H7200 4,200,000 6,800,000 6/28/2011 10/19/2011 0 IDA Q4270 600,000 600,000 4/12/2004 4/16/2004 0 Total 67,900,000 101,800,000 119,214 119,874 19,427 32 (c) Commitments against actual disbursements by Component (in USD equivalent) Percent of Components Original Project AF1 AF2 Total Actual/Appraisal Appraisal Actual Appraisal Actual Appraisal Actual Appraisal Actual Estimate Disbursement Estimate Disbursement Estimate Disbursement Estimate Disbursement Component 1: Infrastructure 35,040,000 38,580,000 27,000,000 25,910,000 5,300,000 4,950,000 67,340,000 69,440,000 103 Component 2: Capacity 1,970,000 1,030,000 1,000,000 330,000 200,000 130,000 3,170,000 1,490,000 47 Building Component 3: Education 3,140,000 3,420,000 0 0 3,140,000 3,420,000 109 Component 4: Coordination 19,850,000 19,600,000 7,000,000 8,120,000 1,300,000 1,080,000 28,150,000 28,800,000 102 and Management PPF (project advance) 600,000 600,000 600,000 600,000 100 18 Total Financing 60,000,000 62,630,000 35,000,000 34,360,000 6,800,000 6,160,000 101,800,000 103,750,000 102 18 Total actual disbursement amount exceeds total estimate at appraisal because of currency exchange fluctuations during the life of the project. 33 Annex 2. Outputs by Component Results Indicator Indicator Results as of Exceeds or Difference Target June 30, 2013 (below) between Results Target Achieved and Target (%) Component One A: Social economic infrastructure built and rehabilitated Classrooms built and rehabilitated 2,642 3,426 784 30% (number) CORE Health facilities built/rehabilitated 103 117 14 14% (number) CORE Community water points 129, of which 103 built/rehabilitated (number) CORE 154 are water points; (25) (16%) 26 public latrines Roads rehabilitated rural (KM) 40 182 142 355% CORE Marketplaces constructed or 98 92 (6) (6%) rehabilitated (number) Environment sub-projects implemented (number) 15 6 (9) (60%) Communities benefiting from at least one sub-project (number) 1,012 1,022 10 1% Component One B: Labor intensive infrastructure rehabilitation and maintenance in the Katanga province Beneficiaries of public works 3,385 3,385 0 0% program (number) CORE 22% Female Share of wage bill/total cost (%) 35% 52% 17% 49% Component Two: Communities able to develop and implement cost-effective sub-projects through a participatory process Population indicating satisfaction with their participation in the 70% 58% 19 (12%) (17%) planning of the sub-project (%) Village committees established 1,012 1,044 32 3% Communities trained in planning, implementing, and managing the construction/rehabilitation of 1,096 1,381 285 26% economic and social infrastructure (number) Component Three: Communities with increased access to educational services Students receiving scholarship (number) 7,392 7,645 253 3% Libraries established and maintained one year after 610 668 58 10% completion (number) 19 The relative low score on this indicator likely reflects project delays in delivering comprehensive training to its intermediary NGO partners on how to engage in a truly participatory project identification and planning process. 34 Results Indicator Indicator Results as of Exceeds or Difference Target June 30, 2013 (below) between Results Target Achieved and Target (%) Component Four: Project successfully and cost-efficiently implemented in decentralized manner Baseline and annual surveys provided regular monitoring and Yes Yes evaluation of project impact Operating costs at or below 20% Yes No – 28% of total project investments Social Fund is represented and functions efficiently and Yes Yes autonomously in all provinces (i) Sub-projects; (ii) ALEs; and (i) 840 (i) 841 (i) 1 (i) 0.12% (iii) sub-contractors based in (ii) 235 (ii) 157 (ii) (78) (ii) (50%) remote and impoverished areas (number) (iii) 107 (iii) 176 (iii) 69 (iii) 39% Sector Number of Total Invested Average Cost Projects in Sector per Project Education and Training 561 55% $38,346,693 56% $68,354 Health and Nutrition 117 11% $6,874,982 10% $58,761 Potable Water and Sanitation 129 13% $5,207,607 8% $40,369 Warehouses, Markets, and 92 9% $7,803,039 11% $84,816 Slaughterhouses Rural Transport 99 10% $8,873,376 13% $89,630 Electric Energy 17 2% $813,909 1% $47,877 Environment 6 1% $716,828 1% $119,471 Micro-Irrigation Systems 1 0.05% $32,010 0.1% $32,010 Total 1,022 $68,668,444 $67,190 35 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis 1. The economic impact of the project was assessed in terms of: (i) success in targeting poor communities; (ii) impact on households; and (iii) cost comparison with similar interventions implemented by other organizations. Success in Targeting Poor Communities 2. Overall, as per the PDO, the project was effective in targeting poor communities in the 11 provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In a context where 70 percent of the population is poor, the risks of exclusion were small. For Component 1A, which represented 68 percent of project investments, poor communities were identified using poverty indicators such as limited or lack of access to basic social infrastructures in health, education, roads, and markets. Of the 1,022 sub-projects implemented under this subcomponent, 841 or 82 percent were implemented in remote and impoverished rural communities according to the counterpart’s report. Direct beneficiaries are estimated to be 4,088,000 people. The need to target very poor communities was balanced with the importance of promoting sub-project ownership and sustainability by requiring community contributions of 10 percent (in cash or in kind). According to lessons learned from the project, a thorough community sensitization was key in securing the community contributions. Modifying the requirements of the community contributions so that it did not become a pre-requisite for disbursement to the enterprises was also important to avoid delays in implementation. The labor intensive public works activities specifically targeted the communities in Katanga that had been affected by a series of layoffs in the mining sector. In this sub-component, self-targeting through the setting of a daily wage that was slightly above market rate ensured that the 3,483 beneficiaries were among vulnerable populations. 3. Component 3 on education, which represented 3.7 percent of total project investments, targeted students for scholarships primarily based on merits and academic performance. Specific poverty targeting could have maximized its relevancy with the PDO. 4. Impact on Household: This impact was assessed in terms of (i) increased access to basic social services; and (ii) job creation and increased revenue. 5. Increased in access to basic social services: No research has been conducted to quantify the impact of increased access to basic social services on targeted households. Nevertheless, outcome performance gives a strong indication of overall improvements in living standards as a result of this project, as follows: • 52 percent increase in school inscription • 64 percent increase in medical consultations, with women giving birth in safer conditions • 61 percent reduction in the time spent by vehicles on rehabilitated roads • 169 percent increase in the number of people with access to clean water • 80.4 percent increase in the number of traders with access to stalls at the market and/or storage facilities • 7,645 people gained access to higher education; • Increase in the number of operational village committees, with 1,044 committees established through this project. 36 6. These changes can expect to have a direct short-term and long-term impact on the goods, services, and income of the communities targeted in the short and long term. 7. Job creation and increase in revenue: For the infrastructure sub-project, an estimated 34,000 temporary jobs for an average duration of four to six months were created, injecting roughly US$7 million in direct transfers to workers, but these investments were not formally tracked by the project. This calculation does not take into account indirect benefits to the communities, such as training skilled and unskilled labor involved in sub-project construction, the local purchase of building supplies and school furniture, and increased sales of prepared foods for the construction crews. 8. For the LIPW sub-component, labor intensity (the share of all wages paid in total public works costs) is estimated at 52 percent. This is consistent with (but on the lower end of) international standards. Other public works programs show rates of around 60 percent in India (National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme), 70 percent in Korea’s public works program, 85 percent in the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) in Ethiopia, 40-50 percent in Argentina’s Trabajar Program, and 60-70 percent in Bangladesh’s Food for Work Program. It is important to note, however, that these programs are of a significantly larger scale than the program in DRC. Cost Comparison 9. The Social Fund compared the costs of the infrastructures it rehabilitated to the costs paid by other institutions (see table below). This exercise met several constraints, such as: (i) the variability of costs in different provinces; (ii) the challenges associated with obtaining sensitive information, such as management costs from other institutions; and (iii) the fact that different institutions use different technical standards to construct/rehabilitate infrastructure. Thus, the cost comparison focuses on costs of constructing school and education sub-projects as part of Component 1. It should be noted that construction represented 87 percent of the sub-projects and that 66 percent of the built infrastructure was in the health and education sectors. The findings are summarized in the table. 10. The Social Fund was not able to obtain information relative to the management costs of the agencies mentioned above. However, it estimated at 0.38 per US$1 its own management cost for constructing an infrastructure sub-project. All stakeholders consulted during the preparation of this report confirmed the excellent technical quality of the infrastructures constructed/rehabilitated by the Social Fund, which conformed to technical norms and standards established by the technical ministries. The stakeholders interviewed (beneficiary communities and ALEs) mentioned the critical role played by the engineer of the Social Fund in ensuring the high technical quality of the work. The counterpart completion report indicates that 97.5 percent of infrastructures rehabilitated/constructed are still fully operational. 37 Table 1: Cost comparison with other implementers Province/Territory Structure Cost of a Cost of a School Health Center (US$) (US$) Social Fund 69,338 31,537 Kinshasa UNICEF (w/o equipment) 70,000 55,000 Difference -662 -23,463 Social Fund 89,081 51,715 Kasai Occidental UNICEF 100,000 60,000 Difference -10,919 -8,285 Social Fund 85,080 41,821 Province Orientale UNOPS 125,000 IRS 80,000 Difference -39,920 -38,179 Social Fund 70,269 60,914 Kasai-Oriental UNICEF 110,000 70,000 Difference -39.731 -9.086 38 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team members Responsibility/ Names Title Unit Specialty Lending Paul Geli Consultant MNSHD Astania Kamau Temporary MNSHD Jean Charles Amon Kra Sr Financial Management Specialist AFTME Thomas Mbonye Procurement Specialist AFTPE Pierre Morin Sr Procurement Specialist AFTPE Gabrielle M. Rooz Consultant AFTG1 Gilles Marie Veuillot Consultant SASDE Supervision/ICR Lucie Lufiauluisu Bobola Program Assistant AFCC2 Bourama Diaite Sr Procurement Specialist AFTPW Andre Lohayo Djamba ET Consultant AFTME John A. Elder Operations Adviser AFTDE Shungu Ivette Kandi Program Assistant AFCC2 Astania Kamau Temporary MNSHD Jean Charles Amon Kra Sr Financial Management Specialist AFTME Samuelson Lukimuena Kuba Consultant AFTME AFMCD Rebecca Kumuamba Team Assistant - HIS AFTH3 - Nathalie J. Lopez-Diouf Language Program Assistant HIS Philippe Mahele Liwoke Sr Procurement Specialist AFTPW Paul Jonathan Martin Sector Leader AFTSN Thomas Mbonye Procurement Specialist AFTPE Anne Mossige Sr Social Protection Specialist AFTSW Celeste Mukuna Team Assistant AFCC2 Etienne NKoa Sr Financial Management Specialist AFTME Nadege K. Nouviale Program Assistant HDNSP Christophe Rockmore Economist AFTHD AFTH3- Souleymane Sow Consultant HIS Fanta Toure Operations Officer AFTSW Maurizia Tovo Lead Social Development Specialist ECSSO 39 (b) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle Number of Staff Weeks US$ Thousands (Including Travel & Consultant Costs) Lending FY04 11 161.28 FY05 6 36.25 FY06 0.00 FY07 0.00 FY08 0.00 Total 17 197.53 Supervision/ICR FY04 0.00 FY05 15 74.94 FY06 25 150.23 FY07 21 148.94 FY08 12 77.02 FY09 7 0.00 Total 80 451.13 40 Annex 5. Executive Summary of Borrower's ICR 1. In 2004, the World Bank provided a US$60,000,000 grant to the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo to implement the Emergency Social Action Project (PASU). This project was framed within the context of the 2002 Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper of the DRC, and the July 2001 Transitional Support Strategy of the World Bank. 2. PASU was designed to increase poor people’s access to basic social services in a sustainable way and improve the management of resources allocated to community development. The project was approved on July 26, 2004 and became effective on July 25, 2005 on the eve of the 2006 elections, in a very difficult socio-economic and political context. Indeed, at the time of project appraisal, the DRC was emerging from several decades of dictatorial rule and a series of civil wars that destroyed the social and economic fabric of the society. An estimated 80 percent of the population lived in extreme poverty, and basic social infrastructures had been largely destroyed. 3. PASU met several constraints at its launch and throughout implementation. These challenges led to a slow start of the project and included: (i) delays in recruiting qualified staff and opening up offices in the province; (ii) difficulties in retaining qualified staff; (iii) high operational costs (and particularly transport costs); (iv) limited capacity of communities and implementing partners; and (v) challenges in securing community contributions at the beginning of the project. However, despite the difficult operational environment, the project achieved its development objective and nearly all of its outcomes and results indicators. Two additional financings of US$35 million and US$6.8 million IDA grants were approved in March 2009 and June 2011, respectively, and helped scale up project impact on vulnerable communities. Key project achievements are summarized as follows: • 1,022 community-based infrastructure sub-projects were implemented in all 11 provinces of the country in the health, water sanitation, education, rural transport, and energy and trade sectors. A total of 561 schools, 129 water points, 117 health centers, 99 small bridges and rural roads, 92 markets, and 17 electrical installations were constructed, rehabilitated, or equipped. • 1,381 communities benefited from capacity building through trainings that targeted at least 2,303 participants. • 7,645 students in the higher education system received scholarships of US$400, and more than 40,000 books were distributed to 327primary schools. 4. These achievements had a positive impact on beneficiary populations estimated at more than 4 million people, translating into an improvement in the living conditions of these populations. Outcomes noted are as follows: • A 52 percent increase in primary school enrollment in the schools rehabilitated/constructed by the project. Nearly all the schools rehabilitated have set up a double shift system to cater to the very high demand for education. • A 64 percent increase in medical consultations in the health centers rehabilitated/constructed by the project. Women are now giving birth in a safer environment. • 483,585 people gained increased access to improved water sources as a result of the project. • 43,759 traders gained access to stalls and/or storage facilities rehabilitated/constructed by the project. 41 • A 61 percent reduction in travel time on rehabilitated roads, with significant gains for users in terms of people’s mobility and the price of agricultural commodities. • 4,088,000 people benefited from the project. • 97.5 percent of sub-projects were operational and well maintained within a year of completion. • 74 percent of village committees were operational after one year of completion of project. • 259,969 person days of work were provided through the labor intensive public works. 5. This completion report provides a detailed account and analysis of project achievements, outcomes, and impact. It also reviews and analyses project performance, challenges met, and key lessons learned. 42 Annex 6. List of Supporting Documents Cabinet Africain de Gestion Informatique et Comptable (CGIC) – Afrique International (2006). Technical Audit Reports. Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. —— (2007). Technical Audit Reports. —— (2008), Technical Audit Reports. —— (2009), Technical Audit Reports. —— (2010, 2011), Technical Audit Reports. —— (2012), Technical Audit Reports. Fonds Social de la République Démocratique du Congo (2013). Beneficiary Assessment Survey, April 2013. Kinshasa: Democratic Republic of Congo. —— (2013). Completion Report of the Emergency Social Action Project, August 2013. Kinshasa: Democratic Republic of Congo. Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo (2002). Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. Kinshasa: Democratic Republic of Congo. —— (2006). Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper – June 2006. —— (2011). Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2 – 2011. World Bank (2004). Project Paper for the Emergency Social Action Project Democratic Republic of Congo, Technical Annex. Washington DC. Washington DC. —— (2004-2013). Internal Documents: Aide Memoires, Supervision Reports, Back to Office Reports, Financial Management Assessment Reports, Procurement Review Reports. Washington DC. —— (2005-2013). Democratic Republic of Congo: Implementation Supervision Reports Nos. 1 - 19. Washington DC. —— (2007). Bank Country Assistance Strategy (2008-2010) for the Democratic Republic of Congo. Washington DC. —— (2009). Supervision report with key recommendations of the Mid-Term Review of the Emergency Social Action Project for the Democratic Republic of Congo. Washington DC. —— (2010). Project Paper of the First Additional Financing for the Emergency Social Action Project for the Democratic Republic of Congo:. Washington DC. —— (2011). Project Paper for the Second Additional Financing for the Emergency Social Action Project for the Democratic Republic of Congo. Washington DC. —— (2013). Bank Country Assistance Strategy (2011-2015) for the Democratic Republic of Congo. Washington DC. 43 10°E 15°E 25°E 30°E CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC SOUTH SUDAN To 5°N Ubang To Bangasso 5°N To i Kembe Bangui To Zongo Gbadolite BAS-UELE Juba Bondo Faradje NORD-UBANGI Uele Libenge Gemena Businga HAUT-UELE Titule DEM. REP. Buta Isiro Watsa Kiba li OF CONGO SUD- Aketi To Imese UBANGI Akula Lisala Pakwach Bumba ORIENTALE Wamba MONGALA C Mongbwalu Bunia UGANDA angui Aruwimi ITURI on Banalia g nga Lake o . Lulo Bongandanga Oub Mts Basankusu TSHOPO Bafwasende Albert EQUATEUR Yangambi Beni ba É Q U AT E U R Kisangani Butembo Margherita Peak tum Wanie Rakula (5,110 m) 0° Mbandaka Boende 0° Mi CONGO Tshu a pa NORD Lake G ABON Lubutu KIVU Edward Lake Lo m Lua Bikoro T S H U A PAL Ikela mi a l NORD- aba om uil ak ela Victoria L a Lowa KIVU Goma Ul To Ruhengeri Inongo i Lake Kivu nd Betamba Congo Yumbi i To MAI-NDOMBE Kalima Bukavu Kibuye RWANDA Kutu Kindu SUD Buna KIVU KINSHASA Bandundu Lukenie Lodja Uvira To KINSHASA CITY Kasa i MANIEMA SUD- Bujumbura uru SANKURU Kama BURUNDI BANDUNDU Mangai Sank MANIEMA KIVU Ilebo KINSHASA Bulungu KASAI Malela Lusambo Kasongo Kenge KWILU K A S AÏ Lulimba 5°S CABINDA BAS-CONGO ORIENTAL 5°S Kikwit Idiofa (ANGOLA) To KONGO CENTRAL Mbanza-Ngungu Luebo LOMAMI Kongolo TA N Z A N I A Pointe- Boma KASAI Kananga ga Kalemie Kw Noire Mbuji- Luku Lake ATLANTIC KASAÏ- Mayi ilu Matadi To Feshi OCCIDENTAL Tanganyika Kabinda Kabalo OCEAN Damba Tshikapa Ka sa ORIENTAL TANGANYIKA KWANGO LULUA Kw i Moba ang Mwene-Ditu Manono i DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC am o Lom KATANGA Luv OF CONGO ua H A U T- L O M A M I Kapanga s. Pweto Kamina t Lueo M SELECTED CITIES AND TOWNS ba Lulua Lu PROVINCE CAPITALS* ANGOLA L Kilwa Lake m Mweru itu uf ira l ua NATIONAL CAPITAL Sandoa M Lubudi HAUT- 10°S RIVERS LUALABA KATANGA MAIN ROADS Kolwezi To 0 100 200 300 400 Kilometers Dilolo Likasi Luwingu ZAMBIA RAILROADS To Lu Lake lab Lucano Malawi a a PROVINCE BOUNDARIES** 0 100 200 Miles Lubumbashi I IBRD 33391R2 M A L AW INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. *The creation of 26 new Provinces was approved by the ratification of the 2005 Constitution, to take effect by February, The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information ZAMB I A Sakania JULY 2011 shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank To 2009. The existing 11 Province Capitals, shown with green circles, will retain their status, with the exception of Bandundu. Kitwe Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any Future Province Capitals are shown with white circles. endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. **The existing 11 Province boundaries and names are shown in dark green; future in light green. 25°E 30°E