PROJECT INFORMATION DOCUMENT (PID) CONCEPT STAGE Public Disclosure Copy Report No.: PIDC92 Project Name SOMALIA: Drought Management and Livelihood Protection (P128143) Region AFRICA Country Somalia Sector(s) General agriculture, fishing and forestry sector (50%), Crops (25%), Animal production (25%) Theme(s) Rural non-farm income generation (50%), Other rural development (50%) Lending Instrument Specific Investment Loan Project ID P128143 Borrower(s) Implementing Agency Environmental B-Partial Assessment Category Date PID Prepared/ 01-Nov-2011 Updated Estimated Date of Appraisal Completion Estimated Date of 22-Aug-2011 Board Approval Public Disclosure Copy Concept Review Decision I. Introduction and Context Country Context On July 20, 2011, the United Nations declared that people across the Bakool and Lower Shabelle regions in southern Somalia were experiencing famine. On August 3rd, new evidence indicated that the agropastoral areas of Balcad and Cadale districts of Middle Shabelle, the Afgoye corridor IDP settlement, and the Mogadishu IDP community had passed the famine threshold. On September 5, 2011 United Nations declared a famine in the Bay Region of Southern Somalia. The famine is expected to become more widespread throughout southern Somalia during the remainder of the dry season in August and September and into the crop production season from October through December. Across southern Somalia, farmers and herders have lost to the drought the crops and animals that are often their sole source of income and primary basis for household food security. Crop production in the August gu harvest is expected to reach no more than 50 percent of the five- year average, and pasture availability is already significantly below-average and expected to deteriorate further. Animal mortality is already 20% on average compared to 10% in #normal# dry seasons, and is reaching 40% in some areas. Page 1 of 6 As a consequence, many Somalis are struggling to cope with severely reduced access to food, acute malnutrition, and high morbidity and mortality, and many have already left their home areas seeking assistance elsewhere. Kenya➃❫¢➃❪➂❨➃❪➂ s Dadaab refugee camps, already hosting about Public Disclosure Copy 385,000 Somalis, are receiving an additional 1,300 refugees per day; and Ethiopia➃❫¢➃❪➂❨➃❪➂ s Dollo Ado camp, hosting 120,000, is receiving an additional 2,000 per day. Many refugees arrive in weakened condition, on the verge of starvation (Dadaab➃❫¢➃❪➂❨➃❪➂ s under-five mortality rate is three-to-six times the rate last year). Together with ongoing crises in the rest of Somalia, the number of Somalis needing humanitarian assistance has increased from 2.4 million to 3.7 million since January 2011 out of which 3.2 million people are in need of immediate lifesaving assistance. Assistance needs will remain extremely high at least until the next harvest, expected in December 2011. The current dry season will be especially difficult for pastoral households. Somalia has existed as a "failed state" for the past 20 years. During this time, it has suffered three civil wars, proxy wars, militia and clan-based fighting, armed criminality and a sustained Islamist insurgency that has introduced deadly tactics. The causes of the conflict are manifold, including conflicting claims to resources (especially land), distrust of the state, clan rivalry, weak and distrusted national leaders, "spoilers" with vested interests in the war economy, and radical ideologies-amplified by weapons proliferation, regional insecurity and rivalries, and external financing (through remittances, piracy, business investments and diverted humanitarian aid). The diaspora community currently dominates most Somali politics. Fifteen attempts since 1990 to bring peace and stability to Somalia have failed. The international community remains engaged, recognizing the significant social and economic impact of Somalia's fragility as well as its implications for international security. Today, there are basically three different operational environments in Somalia: (i) south-central Somalia, an area of prolonged crisis, with peace and relative order in areas controlled by the Islamist insurgent group Al-Shabaab but continuing armed conflict in and around Mogadishu, where internationally- recognized Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) defended by African Union forces have tried to Public Disclosure Copy establish authority; (ii) Puntland, in the northeast, a semi-autonomous administration and area of deterioration; (iii) and Somaliland, in the northwest, an area of gradual improvement led by a democratically-elected government that has claimed independence. Successful interventions over the short-run are therefore dependent on a strategy that recognizes the peculiar situation and very substantial risks. The World Bank support is characterized by an approach that includes: (i) focus on a small number of carefully selected activities; (ii) support that builds on on-going activities; and (iii) implementation through collaborative arrangements that engage reliable and reputable intermediaries such as UN agencies and international NGOs with historic presence on the ground. Sectoral and Institutional Context In July 2011, USAID➃❫¢➃❪➂❨➃❪➂ s Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWSNet) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) for Somalia conducted 17 representative nutrition and mortality surveys across southern Somalia. Results from the 11 available surveys indicate that famine exists in several regions and will soon exist in most other regions in southern Sudan. (Based on the Integrated Phase Classification (IPC) scale, famine exists when at least 20 percent of the population has extremely limited access to basic food requirements, global acute malnutrition exceeds 30 percent, and the death rate exceeds 2/10,000/day for the entire population.) Across all livelihoods in Page 2 of 6 southern Somalia, poor households (about 30 percent of the population) are unable to meet basic food needs and have limited ability to cope with these food deficits. Acute malnutrition exceeds 20 percent in all surveyed areas and is higher than 38 percent (with severe acute malnutrition higher Public Disclosure Copy than 14 percent) in nine of the 11 areas, with the highest levels in Bay, Bakool, and Gedo (agropastoral), where it exceeds 50 percent. Population#wide death rates are above the famine threshold (2/10,000/day) in two areas (Bakool agro-pastoral, and Lower Shabelle) and are elevated across the south. The death rate of children under five exceeds 4/10,000/day in all areas of the south where data are available, peaking at 13 to 20/10,000/day in riverine and agropastoral areas of Lower Shabelle. While the situation is not as dire in central and northern Somalia, these regions are also facing serious food insecurity, with nearly half a million people needing livelihood and lifesaving humanitarian assistance. According to the FSNAU, the rural population of southern Somalia can be divided into two groups according to their source of food and income: (i) the agropastoral livelihood group, relying on self- employment and sale of crops and livestock for income, and on own production and purchase for food security, and (ii) the pastoral livelihood group, relying only on livestock and livestock-products sale for income, and purchase for food security. As such agriculture and livestock play a crucial role in the Somali economy and food security. In particular, the livestock value chain is estimated to create about 60% of Somalia#s job opportunities and generate about 40 percent of Somalia➃❫¢ ➃❪➂❨➃❪➂ s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The crisis in southern Somalia is driven by several factors working in combination. The total failure of the October to December 2010 deyr rains (secondary season) and the poor performance of the April to June 2011 gu rains (primary season), resulting in crop failure, reduced labor demand, poor livestock body conditions, and excessive animal mortality (20% average compared to 10% in (normal to dry seasons, and reaching 40% in some areas) due to water scarcity, deteriorating pasture and increased sensitivity to animal diseases. In addition, local cereal prices across southern Somalia are more than two or three times 2010 prices in some areas, and continue to rise, when prices for livestock are dropping due to the high number of animals in the market and the average poor body Public Disclosure Copy condition, with the result that both livestock-to-cereal and wage-to-cereal terms of trade have deteriorated substantially. It is currently estimated that the sale of one goat allows a household to buy 50kg of cereals currently, against 220kg one year ago at the same period. Large scale displacement and significant limitations on humanitarian access, imposed by al-Shabaab, have further exacerbated the situation. Further deterioration is considered likely, given the very high levels of severe acute malnutrition and child mortality, an expectation of worsening pastoral conditions, a continued increase in local cereal prices, and a below average gu season harvest. Current mortality rates a nd malnutrition levels are comparable to or exceed those reported during crises in Niger (2005), Ethiopia (2001), Sudan (1998), and Somalia (1992). Given the numbers of people affected geographic scope, and difficulty reaching them, this is the most severe food-security crisis in Africa since the 1991/92 Somalia famine. Relationship to CAS The World Bank Board of Executive Directors last discussed an Interim Strategy Note (ISN) for Somalia, which covered 2008-2009, in July 2007. A new ISN is currently under preparation. Even though one of the objectives of the 2007 ISN was strengthening service delivery through community-driven interventions, and the DMLP Project falls under this objective, the ISN did not explicitly envisage this emergency project. As mentioned above, the DMLP Project does not deviate from the 2007 ISN in substantive respects. Page 3 of 6 Given though that there is no current ISN, the Board of Executive Directors was informed of this operation. Any failure to respond to this emergency would have a detrimental impact on the future progress of Public Disclosure Copy the Bank➃❫¢➃❪➂❨➃❪➂ s overall country strategy. For example, further spreading of the famine to the northern parts of Somalia, (which provide a more stable environment for the Bank➃❫¢ ➃❪➂❨➃❪➂ s medium- to long-term development engagement) would seriously jeopardize any progress so far achieved under the Bank➃❫¢➃❪➂❨➃❪➂ s strategy with respect to service delivery and state building objectives. A new ISN is currently being developed and expected to be discussed by the Board in 2012. The new ISN will plan more explicitly for World Bank engagement in a crisis situation and provide the needed flexibility to engage quickly. II. Proposed Development Objective(s) Proposed Development Objective(s) (From PCN) The project development objective (PDO) is to provide targeted emergency support to drought affected populations in Somalia including cash for work to preserve their livelihoods and the distribution of agricultural inputs, livestock feed or veterinary services in order to support the recovery of agriculture and livestock productive capacity. Key Results (From PCN) This is an emergency operation of 12 months duration, and as a result the outcomes are focused on short term delivery of emergency livelihood support including i) providing cash-for-work to about 15,000 beneficiaries, thus preserving livelihoods during the drought; and providing crop or livestock inputs to about 35,000 beneficiaries, thus facilitating a rapid recovery immediately after the drought. PDO level results indicators are: (a) Person days of cash-for-work provided, disaggregated by gender. (b) Households provided with drought recovery crop input packages, disaggregated by gender Public Disclosure Copy of head of household. (c) Households provided with drought recovery livestock packages, disaggregated by gender of head of household. Detailed Monitoring indicators are provided in Annex 2. III. Preliminary Description Concept Description The Bank will use an Emergency Response Loan (ERL) instrument financed by donor grants from GFDRR (USD 5 million) and SPF (USD 4 million). This is the Bank's only operation operating inside Somalia. IV. Safeguard Policies that might apply Safeguard Policies Triggered by the Project Yes No TBD Environmental Assessment OP/BP 4.01 Natural Habitats OP/BP 4.04 Forests OP/BP 4.36 Pest Management OP 4.09 Page 4 of 6 Physical Cultural Resources OP/BP 4.11 Indigenous Peoples OP/BP 4.10 Public Disclosure Copy Involuntary Resettlement OP/BP 4.12 Safety of Dams OP/BP 4.37 Projects on International Waterways OP/BP 7.50 Projects in Disputed Areas OP/BP 7.60 V. Financing (in USD Million) Total Project Cost: 9.00 Total Bank Financing: 0.00 Financing Gap: 0.00 Financing Source Amount Borrower 0.00 Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery 5.00 State and Peace Building Fund 4.00 Total 9.00 VI. Contact point World Bank Contact: Stephane Forman Title: Senior Livestock Specialist Tel: 473-4839 Email: sforman@worldbank.org Borrower/Client/Recipient Public Disclosure Copy Name: Contact: Title: Tel: Email: Implementing Agencies Name: Contact: Title: Tel: Email: VII. For more information contact: The InfoShop The World Bank 1818 H Street, NW Washington, D.C. 20433 Telephone: (202) 458-4500 Page 5 of 6 Fax: (202) 522-1500 Web: http://www.worldbank.org/infoshop Public Disclosure Copy Public Disclosure Copy Page 6 of 6