Abstract

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Labor Markets in Low and Middle-Income Countries: Trends and Implications for Social Protection and Labor Policies


Yoon-young Cho, David N. Margolis, David Newhouse and David A. Robalino

March 2012

**Abstract**

This paper reviews labor market trends throughout the developing world, identifies issues and policy priorities across groups of countries, and derives implications for the World Bank’s new Social Protection and Labor Strategy. Five key issues are identified: a high and growing share of the labor force that is self-employed or working in household enterprises, exposure to income shocks with limited access to risk management systems, low female participation rates, high youth unemployment rates, and the need to manage migration flows and remittances. The paper then details a three-pronged agenda based on providing incentives and conditions for work, improving the efficiency of job creation, and managing risks / facilitating labor market transitions. This suggests that the Bank should emphasize self-employment and entrepreneurship promotion, provision of skills and development opportunities, and facilitation of labor market transitions into and between jobs, while protecting workers from shocks and paying particular attention to youth.

**JEL Codes:** O15, O19, J21

**Key Words:** labor markets, developing countries, cluster analysis, self-employment, entrepreneurship, skills, activation, labor market transitions, social protection, youth employment
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I. INTRODUCTION

The well-being of the majority of the world’s population depends critically on workers’ ability to earn a decent and reliable stream of income. Improving individuals’ livelihoods and earnings opportunities, to a large extent, is about improving their work opportunities – by helping them either to increase the returns from their current work or to move from inactivity or low return occupations into more productive occupations. At the same time, jobs that provide an adequate standard of living during good times are not enough. Any job is associated with risks: the risk of being dismissed, the risk of exploitation or abuse, the risk of work injury or disability, or the risk of a drop in the price of the goods or services sold by a self-employed person or a small family business. An agenda to promote good quality employment needs to consider policies, such as implementing labor regulations or providing insurance, that reduce or mitigate these risks.

This paper reviews labor market trends throughout the developing world, identifies specific problems and policy priorities across groups of countries, and derives implications for the Bank’s work on labor and the new Social Protection and Labor Strategy. The analysis is based on a sample of 133 middle and low income countries during the last two decades, complemented by desk reviews of relevant studies in labor economics, including economic sector work produced by the World Bank. It reviews the evolution of several standard labor market indicators such as participation, employment/unemployment, and labor productivity growth. For each country, we also track important determinants of these indicators, including the macroeconomic and business environment, the level of education of the labor force, and labor regulations and social insurance laws.

As countries recover from the financial crisis, it is increasingly important for policymakers to move beyond short term mitigation measures and tackle structural problems that limit workers’ access to productive jobs and formal risk management programs. The global challenge facing policymakers, particularly in low and middle income countries, is to create more high-quality jobs. A large share of the labor force remains employed in low productivity activities in the
urban informal sector or in agriculture. Many are self-employed, work in a household enterprise without outside workers, or in a family business without pay. Earnings are often insufficient to pull households out of poverty. Low labor participation rates and high unemployment are also issues of concern. Women, in particular, are less likely to enter the labor force, while in many countries a growing number of youth are filling the ranks of the unemployed. And with the exception of a minority of formal sector workers, most workers are vulnerable to abuse, poor working conditions, risk of exploitation, and lack of income protection.

The structural problems that hinder the creation of good jobs vary from country to country. Many countries are still affected by macroeconomic policies that create uncertainty and/or regulations that increase the costs of doing business, which reduce incentives to invest in job-creating enterprises. The lack of skilled workers, and inappropriate labor regulations and social insurance policies, are also part of the problem. The importance of each of these factors varies by country and is not necessarily the same within regions. In low income countries, for instance, imperfections in labor markets and inadequate labor regulations and social insurance laws tend to be less important because most workers are in the “unorganized” sector and well-functioning labor markets often do not exist. In these settings, the lack of a skilled labor force and weak basic infrastructure, both of which inhibit innovation and economic diversification, are more pressing constraints. In middle income countries, although macroeconomic stability and the skills of the workforce remain important, imperfections in the labor market and inappropriate regulations and social insurance systems can become binding.

In the context of the new Social Protection and Labor Strategy, the paper identifies three common objectives for labor policies in middle and low income countries. The first two, more directly related to the promotion function of the social protection system, focus on (i) providing incentives and conditions for individuals to work; and (ii) ensuring that enough high-quality jobs, both salaried and non-salaried, are created. These objectives can be promoted through policies that promote sound macroeconomic and business environments (including labor regulations), as well as programs that provide direct support to self-employed workers and
small entrepreneurs. The third objective, mainly related to the prevention function, concerns managing risks and facilitating labor market transitions. This entails reducing the routine risks that workers face, in part by ensuring that they can smooth consumption in the presence of income shocks through risk pooling or savings arrangements. There is also a key role for active labor market programs that facilitate the transition of youth from school to work, and help adults move from a state of disability, inactivity, or unemployment into productive jobs.

Improving labor market outcomes requires a cross-sectoral perspective that recognizes the complementarities and tensions that can exist between different types of policies. For instance, macroeconomic policies that provide incentives to invest and create jobs also can reduce the risk of unemployment and provide incentives to work. Similarly, insurance policies that protect incomes equally can encourage workers to invest in skills and engage in activities that are risky but offer high returns. Or, activation policies that help individuals transit from inactivity or unemployment into work can facilitate labor reallocations that help create good jobs in particular regions or sectors. At the same time, poorly designed policies aimed at reducing worker risks, such as overly stringent regulations on dismissal procedures, can backfire by reducing incentives to create quality jobs or incentives to work. Improving our understanding of how the interactions between different policy interventions affect the behavior of workers and employers is thus a necessary condition to design more effective social protection systems.¹

The paper is organized in four sections. The first describes the analysis of labor market trends across different types of countries. In the second, we analyze secondary data as well as country and regional studies to identify constraints that prevent entrepreneurs from starting or expanding businesses to create jobs, as well as those facing workers to obtain wage and salary jobs. This analysis is followed by a discussion of five areas where future research and policy analysis should focus to address major knowledge gaps. The last section concludes and discusses the operational implications for the Bank’s work on labor.

II. DEVELOPMENT PATTERNS AND LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES

Traditionally, cross-country analyses of labor market trends have grouped together countries by region or income level. This is a natural classification of countries and is appealing in part because it matches the way operations are organized within the Bank. These classifications can combine countries that, although geographically close or similar in terms of standards of living, have important structural differences. When countries’ macroeconomic and labor market dynamics are different, so too will be their key constraints and policy priorities. As a result, it can become difficult to diagnose and develop policy priorities that apply to all countries within a region or income group.

The analysis in this section takes a different approach, classifying countries by how similar they are according to broad demographic, macro, and labor market indicators. The indicators that determine the groupings were chosen to give a reasonably accurate picture of labor market activity while maximizing the number of countries for which analysis could be undertaken, given that missing data is a serious issue for many developing countries. Each group contains countries whose observed labor market changes indicated that they were on a similar development path, as distinct as possible from the development path of other groups. In this part of the analysis, we exclude factors that determine labor market outcomes such as the existence of infrastructure or labor regulations, which are discussed in the next section.

Four groups of countries can be identified, bringing together countries from different regions and, in some cases, different levels of income. The clusters are represented by different

---

2 Examples of neighboring countries with vastly different labor markets include India and Bangladesh, Brazil and Bolivia, Russia and Tajikistan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, South Africa and Mozambique, and China and Mongolia.

3 The indicators used are the following: log GNI per capita, percentage change in average years of schooling, percentage population growth, percentage working age population growth, percentage adult population growth, percentage youth population growth, percentage change in total employment, percentage change in adult working population, percentage change in youth working population, percentage change in male working population, percentage change in female working population, percentage change in agricultural employment, percentage change in industrial employment, and percentage change in service sector employment. The baseline period for the analysis was 1995-1999, and the comparison period was 2005-2008. The analysis was based on a statistical procedure known as cluster analysis (see Appendix 1 for details).

4 The data used for the cluster analysis are drawn from the ILO-KILM and WDI databases.
columns in Table 1 and different colors in Figure 1. The main characteristics can be summarized as follows:⁵

**Table 1: Main Macroeconomic and Labor Market Indicators across Clusters**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Type 1: Middle Income, Rapid Growth, Structural Change</th>
<th>Type 2: Upper Middle Income, Aging, Declining Informality</th>
<th>Type 3: Very Low Income, Young, Balanced Employment Growth</th>
<th>Type 4: Low Income, Young, Slow Productivity Growth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Initial level (1995-1999)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>1,224</td>
<td>3,406</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2/day poverty rate</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage growth</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor productivity</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total labor force</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth labor force</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>-3%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total employment</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth employment</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>-2%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Changes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2/day poverty rate</td>
<td>-8.58</td>
<td>-4.23</td>
<td>-6.63</td>
<td>-11.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self, unpaid family and household employment share</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>-1.33</td>
<td>15.56</td>
<td>-2.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture share</td>
<td>-5.51</td>
<td>-2.20</td>
<td>-4.08</td>
<td>-7.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry share</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>5.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Sector share</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
<td>-0.51</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recent level (2005-2008)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female labor force participation</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult employment to working age population ratio</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth unemployment rate</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pension coverage among working age population</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of countries available</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: WDI and ILO-KILM.

Notes: Initial level figures refer to the 5-year average of available data from the period 1995-1999, while change and growth figures compare initial level average to the 4-year average of available data from the period 2005-2008. Data available for all countries in groups 1-4 and all variables except (Initial poverty rate – Change in poverty rate - Self, unpaid family and household employment share – Public sector share countries available/total countries in group): 20-15-10-5/25 type 1 countries, 17-11-17-12/23 type 2 countries, 9-4-1-0/17 type 3 countries, and 11-7-1-2/13 type 4 countries.

⁵ The analysis compares average values of available data for the 1995-1999 period with average values over the 2005-2008 period. Income levels are based on WDI definitions for 2009: GNI per capita less than USD 995=low income, GNI per capital between USD 996 and USD 3945=lower middle income and GNI per capita between USD 3945 and USD 12195=upper middle income. Detailed statistics for each cluster are provided in Appendix 2.
Figure 1: Country Groupings by Development Path

- **Cluster 1: Middle Income, Rapid Growth, and Structural Change.** This cluster consists of countries where both income per capita and labor productivity have grown rapidly, moving most into the middle income category. Significant structural changes also have occurred, with a reallocation of labor away from agriculture and into the industrial sector. Furthermore, employment growth is in line with labor force growth. Examples of this cluster include rapidly growing countries like China, India, Armenia, and Kazakhstan, as well as many countries from the Middle East and North Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean.

- **Cluster 2: Upper Middle Income, Aging, and Declining Informality.** The second cluster includes higher income countries that, while not matching the first cluster, have also displayed high growth rates in income per capita and labor productivity. Structural changes from agriculture to industry or services have been less important in this cluster, but there has been a small shift away from informal employment. Employment growth is also in line with labor force growth, but the share of youth employed has been shrinking. These countries include Argentina, Brazil, South Africa and Russia.

- **Cluster 3: Very Low Income, Young, and Balanced Employment Growth.** Countries in the third cluster are the poorest in the sample. Growth in income per capita and labor productivity was solid, in line with a shift of employment out of agriculture into the service sector. There are no major imbalances between labor force and employment
growth despite a rapid increase in the number of youth in the labor market. At the same time, the share of self, unpaid family, and household employment has experienced a large increase, suggesting an insufficient number of good jobs. This cluster includes many African countries such as Burundi, Ghana, and Malawi, with some poorer countries from other regions such as Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Tajikistan.

- **Cluster 4: Low Income, Young, and Slow Productivity Growth.** This group of countries is characterized by slow growth in output and productivity, despite substantial employment growth and a rapid structural transformation out of agriculture into industry. These countries demonstrate that substantial employment shifts from agriculture to industry do not always translate into improved labor productivity. While the majority of these countries are located in Sub-Saharan Africa, the cluster also includes non-African countries like Nicaragua, Pakistan, and Mongolia.

- **Cluster 5: Residual Countries.** The final group of countries is heterogeneous and has only one common feature: a lack of available data. As a result, we cannot draw conclusions about any particular development path for these countries.

The rapid expansion of employment, however, masks five important challenges. The first is the high and growing share of the labor force that is self-employed or working in household enterprises, often without pay. These activities absorb over 55 percent of labor force in low income countries (cluster 4) and close to 85 percent in very low income countries (cluster 3). This problem is less severe in the case of upper middle income countries (cluster 2) where informality has been declining, but remains an issue in many middle income countries. Growth

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6 Of the 55 countries in this group, no single indicator was available for all of them: the country with the most available data was Georgia with 19 of the 20 variables used for the analysis (missing only the change in the average years of schooling). At the other extreme, Kosovo only had data for the change in the agricultural and industrial shares of employment, while only demographic information (percentage change in the total and youth population, and percentage change in the working age population) was obtainable for North Korea. In fact, much of the data that is available for these countries is drawn from sources in which imputed data is common. The variables that are the most highly represented in group 5 are those related to demographics (typically projections between censuses) and the share of employment in agriculture or industry (drawn from the ILO’s KILM database, which relies on well-documented imputation techniques (ILO Employment Trends Unit (2010) “Trends Econometric Models: A Review of the Methodology,” [http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_elm/---trends/documents/publication/wcms_120382.pdf](http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_elm/---trends/documents/publication/wcms_120382.pdf)) when original source data are unavailable). Margolis et al. (2010) demonstrates the importance of this problem and discusses alternative imputation mechanisms that can be used in the developing world in the absence of regularly reported labor market data.
in self-employment is matched by an increasing share of informal wage and salary employment.\textsuperscript{7} Although the share of informal employment generally decreases with income,\textsuperscript{8} it remains a cause for concern even in higher income countries.\textsuperscript{9} The majority of these self-employed jobs are not productive and generate low earnings, and as a result many of these workers and their families remain poor (poverty rates in the countries of clusters 3 and 4 are 85 and 56 percent respectively). Moreover, workers in these activities/jobs are typically not protected by labor regulations and social insurance systems, and therefore remain vulnerable to abuse and exploitation or fluctuations in incomes. Bringing more employment into the formal wage and salary sectors while improving the productivity of the self-employed continues to be a challenge for many of these governments\textsuperscript{10} (see Figure 2).

\textbf{Figure 2: Labor Force and Employment Growth (1990-1995 to 2005-2008)}

![Graph showing labor force and employment growth]

Source: Cho et al., (2011)
Note: blue=East Asia and Pacific, green=Europe and Central Asia, red=Latin America and the Carribean, yellow=Middle East and North Africa, orange=South Asia, and gray=Sub-Saharan Africa.

\textsuperscript{7} Informality is defined as lack of access to social insurance and/or the failure to pay social security taxes. See Perry et al. (2007), World Bank (forthcoming-a), World Bank (forthcoming-b).
\textsuperscript{8} See Loayza and Rigolini (2006).
\textsuperscript{9} See Ribe et al. (2010).
\textsuperscript{10} Flagship reports in the LAC, MENA, and ECA regions investigate the issues related to informality and discuss policy options ranging from institutional reforms to skills development for marginalized workers. See Perry et al. (2007) for LAC, World Bank (forthcoming-a) for MENA, and World Bank (forthcoming-b) for ECA.
High rates of self-employment are explained in part by the important role that agriculture still plays as a source of jobs, particularly in low income countries. The share of agricultural employment has been declining across the board, but in some cases only slowly. In very low income countries, 38 percent of workers are employed in agriculture. In countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, or the Central African Republic, over 50 percent of all employment is in agriculture. Countries in cluster 4, which tend to be slightly wealthier than those in cluster 3, experienced significantly faster shifts out of agricultural employment. Even in this cluster, however, agriculture still accounts for 22 percent of all jobs.

While higher labor productivity and earnings will require a reallocation of jobs out of agriculture and the unorganized sector, the type of reallocation matters. Indeed, the relationship between productivity growth and changes in the sectoral allocation of employment varies across clusters. In the second cluster, for example, higher productivity growth is strongly associated with a reduction in both the shares of agricultural and self-employment (see Figure 3), which suggests that the structural transformations taking place in these countries are leading to productivity gains and higher quality jobs. In cluster 1, however, increased productivity growth is strongly associated with an increase in self- and family employment, despite a similar negative relationship between productivity growth and agricultural employment. Meanwhile, in clusters 3 and 4, the association between productivity growth and shifts out of agricultural employment is weaker, again implying that movement out of agriculture alone in these lower income countries is not sufficient to raise productivity. In brief, the right type of structural transformation is not easy to achieve and will not happen overnight. Interventions that increase productivity and access to social protection for workers in the agricultural and “unorganized sector” are therefore key priorities for countries with large numbers of workers in these sectors.\[1\]

\[1\] See Fox and Gaal (2010); World Bank (2010g).
The high share of employment outside the formal sector is also correlated with **high exposure to income shocks and limited access to risk management systems**. It is estimated that less than 20 percent of the world’s labor force has access to social security. Even in cluster 1 countries, only 30 percent of the labor force is covered. The situation is even more dramatic in clusters 3 and 4, where less than 10 percent of labor force is covered by public pensions – mainly civil servants and a small contingent of formal workers in the private sector. Not surprisingly, coverage rates across countries are strongly correlated with income and region. Low income workers and the poor, especially those living in rural areas, are much less likely to be covered.\(^\text{12}\) But even those who are covered are not covered all the time. Data for some countries in cluster 2, for instance, show that there are frequent movements in and out of the social security – these reflect transitions between formal and informal employment, and employment and unemployment. On average, workers only contribute during half of their active life; low income workers have lower contribution densities.\(^\text{13}\)

**Low female participation rates**, which drive adult employment rates down and keep an important source of human capital idle, are another major issue facing the majority of low and middle income countries. The participation of women in the labor market is particularly low in

\(^\text{12}\) See Ribe et. al. (2010); Holzmann et al. (2009).
\(^\text{13}\) See Levy (2008); Forteza (2010).
middle income countries (45% in cluster 1 and 49% in cluster 2). The lowest rates are observed in the Middle East and North Africa, which averaged 26.8 percent over the 2005-2008 period. Participation rates tend to be higher in low income countries in part because minimal household earnings force more women to work. In fact, close to 70 percent of women are active in very low income countries, even though they often work in household enterprises without pay. In Tanzania, for instance, 70 percent of women work in agriculture and among those in non-agricultural activities, 43 percent work in household enterprises without outside workers and 30 percent as unpaid family workers.

High youth unemployment rates also pose a severe challenge in many countries. As in the case of low female participation rates, youth unemployment tends to be higher in middle income countries, but there is considerable heterogeneity and only weak linkages to the growth rate of the youth labor force (see Figure 4).\(^4\) Youth unemployment is particularly high in the Middle East and North Africa region where it averages 26.5 percent. It ranges from 17.0 percent in Morocco to 37.5 percent in Iraq. In other regions, countries with high youth unemployment rates include Indonesia (28 percent youth unemployment rate) and South Africa (40 percent). The latter is a legacy of apartheid that calls for serious attention, as it is unusually high and long term, with a large number of discouraged nonparticipants.\(^5\) More recently, the great recession highlighted the vulnerability of youth employment in many cluster 2 countries.\(^6\)

In low income countries, youth employment rates tend to be lower but remain a serious concern. While the youth unemployment rate is low in the very low income cluster 3, the youth labor force has been growing very rapidly (32 percent on average). Although youth may be finding work in these countries, they are often forced to take low-quality and low-productivity jobs. In cluster 4 countries, the youth unemployment rate is considerably higher (18 percent), close to the level observed in middle income countries. As the share of youth in the labor force continues to increase in both sets of low income countries, the problem of youth

\(^4\) Serbia, for example, saw its youth labor force shrink by 16 percent, while youth unemployment grew by 12 percentage points.

\(^5\) See Lam (2008); Levinsohn and Pugatch (2011).

\(^6\) See Cho and Newhouse (2011). Their analysis covers many of type 2 countries such as South Africa, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Turkey, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, and Mexico.
unemployment may intensify. The fact that youth are less experienced than adults and have more limited social networks means that finding jobs can be more challenging. More importantly, a prolonged school-to-work transition may have long-lasting consequences for youth.\textsuperscript{17}

\textbf{Figure 4: Youth Unemployment vs Youth Labor Force Growth}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure4.png}
\caption{Youth Unemployment vs Youth Labor Force Growth}
\end{figure}

A final challenge for middle and low income countries is better managing migration flows and remittances. Except for upper middle income countries, the average share of workers’ remittances is above 6 percent of GDP. All countries have sizeable diasporas, particularly the very low income countries where over 16 percent of the native born population lives oversees. Moreover, a growing share of current migration flows is taking place between developing countries. Hence, countries like Bangladesh or Pakistan have become an important source of cheap labor for higher income countries in Asia (e.g., Malaysia), the Middle East (e.g., Jordan and Lebanon), and the Gulf (e.g., Saudi Arabia and the Emirates). The issue here is not migration itself – migration is a choice that workers and their families make, presumably to obtain better jobs and improve their standards of living. The problem is that migration can have unintended consequences. First, migration divides families, with potential repercussions on children’s education and the resilience of informal safety nets.\textsuperscript{18} Second, migrants can be

\textsuperscript{17} See Margolis et al. (2001), World Bank (2006); Kahn (2010); Oreopolous et al. (2011).

\textsuperscript{18} See Holzmann and Jorgenson (2002).
exposed to abuse and exploitation in receiving countries. Migration management that benefits both sending and receiving countries is a policy problem that is only now beginning to receive the serious attention it deserves.

III. WHAT ARE THE CONSTRAINTS TO THE CREATION OF GOOD JOBS?

Ultimately the labor market outcomes discussed in the previous section – the lack of sufficient formal wage employment and the large share of workers involved in low productivity activities, vulnerability to income shocks, high youth unemployment rates, low female participation rates, and important migration flows – depend on decisions by entrepreneurs to create, expand, downsize, or close business or establishments; occupational choices made by workers; and the efficiency of the job-matching process. Several formal and informal institutions affect these decisions and labor market dynamics. Much attention, for instance, has been given to the role of macroeconomic stability, the rule of law, infrastructure, and business regulations in influencing investment and hiring decisions. Decisions about the creation and expansion of businesses also depend on the cost of recruiting and paying workers with given skills. Regions with few skilled workers, where workers do not hold trusted diplomas certifying their skills, or where labor regulations increase the cost of hiring and dismissing workers will be less likely to attract investors, particularly those involved in high value added activities. Occupational choices also play a role at different levels, including the types of skills in which individuals invest and decisions about accepting formal or informal job offers or moving into self-employment. These decisions can be affected by both labor regulations and the design of mandatory insurance programs.

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19 See Holzmann et al. (2011).
20 These decisions reflect individual preferences and the constraints they face. Many individuals, for instance, might choose to become self-employed not because it is their vocation but because the number of salaried jobs is small relative to the number of jobseekers. Expectations about the types of jobs and earnings that are available can also affect decisions to invest in education and training. Individuals are less likely to invest in high end skills if they know that the number of jobs available is rationed and the probability of getting one is low – in this case, the expected return to investment in education can be low even if the wage premium itself is very high.
In this section we discuss some of the main factors that can contribute to explain current labor market outcomes in middle and low income countries. We focus on five sets of indicators: (i) macroeconomic; (ii) the investment climate; (iii) labor market regulations; (iv) skills; and (v) social insurance policies.\(^{21}\)

### 3.1 Macroeconomic Policy

A stable macroeconomy, balanced budgets, and competitive exchange rates are some of the key ingredients to promote investments and employment creation. Countries with high inflation, which creates uncertainty about the real rate of return of different projects, are less likely to attract investments. Large deficits and high public debt can lead to high interest rates, the crowding-out of private investments, and less employment creation. And, an appreciation of the real exchange rate can affect the competitiveness of export-oriented sectors and also reduce investments and employment there.

Comparing macroeconomic indicators suggests qualitative differences across clusters (see Table 2). Type 1 and 2 countries, which are the highest income and among the most productive countries, have low inflation, succeed in attracting foreign direct investment, and have relatively high gross capital formation, but on average they are running budget and current account deficits. Type 4 countries, although facing slightly higher inflation and carrying slightly more public debt, are running budget surpluses, on average. They are also experiencing a high level of gross capital formation, albeit primarily of domestic origin as seen by the low level of foreign direct investment.

Type 3 countries are in a more delicate situation, despite running budget surpluses on average. These countries have the lowest rate of gross capital formation and are running high current account deficits. Moreover, their very low levels of foreign direct investment suggest that access to new innovations/technologies will be limited. This is a risky prospect given that this cluster contains, on average, the poorest countries. Thus far, relatively low capital formation and FDI have not appeared to constrain labor productivity growth, which was high in the past.

\(^{21}\) The World Bank refers to these five dimensions as the MILES framework (see Banerji et al. 2008).
In the future, however, increases in the capital stock may be needed to enable these countries to absorb a rapidly growing labor force while maintaining labor productivity growth.

Table 2: Challenges – Basic Macroeconomic Indicators

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GNI per capita</td>
<td>5099</td>
<td>10483</td>
<td>936</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average USD 2/day poverty rate</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>1679</td>
<td>4305</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor productivity</td>
<td>5064</td>
<td>11929</td>
<td>719</td>
<td>1681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign direct investment/GDP</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: WDI.
Notes: Figures refer to the 4-year average of available data from the period 2005-2008. Data available for all countries in groups 1-4 and all variables.
red=serious, yellow=moderate and green=mild

3.2 Investment Climate Institutions and Infrastructure

*The creation of new jobs depends ultimately on the ability of entrepreneurs to expand existing businesses or start new ventures.* The evidence available today shows that although large firms tend to account for the majority of jobs in the developed world, this may not be the case in the developing world. Furthermore, new establishments of existing firms and small new firms (including non-employers) are responsible for most of the new jobs created. Not all of the newly created firms survive; in fact most do not. Yet, those that do succeed, the “gazelles,” ultimately become the engines of employment and productivity growth. It is this process of firms’ entry and exit, of job creation and destruction that keeps economies healthy. A business environment that shortcuts this process by precluding innovation and the creation of new firms

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22 See Haltiwanger et al. (2010).
23 See Ayyagari et al. (2011).
24 See Haltiwanger et al. (2010) and Ayyagari et al. (2011).
25 See Haltiwanger et al. (2010).
or by making exit and job destruction costly will most likely lead to an inefficient allocation of resources, stagnant productivity, and slow employment growth.26

Although the relationship between a business friendly environment and job creation is complex, the empirical evidence typically points to a positive link. For example, a high tax rate can reduce firms’ profitability and thus discourage entry and future investments.27 The importance of infrastructure for job creation has been highlighted in numerous BEEPS28 and ICA29 studies. Other studies shed light on the importance of access to finance,30 deregulation of entry,31 and governance and corruption32 for job creation.

Among the countries in our sample, those in cluster 2 have the most accommodating business environments, while those in cluster 3 have the worst, particularly when it comes to access to credit (see Table 3).33 Developing countries in general are very underserved by credit bureaus and public registries, which provide information on the creditworthiness of borrowers to lenders and thus facilitate access to credit. These problems are especially relevant in type 3 countries, where on average only 1 in 10,000 people is covered by a private credit bureau and 5.6 out of every 1,000 are covered by a public credit registry. These obstacles to accessing capital can be a serious constraint to job creation and productive investment.

26 See Haltiwanger et al. (2008).
27 Kolko et al. (2011).
28 The Bank’s Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS) list several key indicators of constraints to doing business including tax rates and administration, corruption and crimes, business licensing, labor regulation, skills of work force, infrastructure such as transportation, water, and electricity, and access to finance and land.
29 Investment Climate Assessments run by the World Bank have tended to focus in the past on administrative conditions for business and infrastructure, as well as issues of access to credit. Examples of this approach are the Investment Climate Assessments in Mongolia, Mozambique, and Ethiopia (types 3, 4, and 5). More recently, however, Investment Climate Assessments in Turkey, Mauritius, Albania, and South Africa (types 1 and 2) move beyond the simple business environment and have begun integrating features discussed in previous sections, such as policies to promote skills development, adoption of new technology, and productivity of microenterprises.
30 Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998); Galindo and Micco (2005); Ayyagari et al. (2006).
31 Klapper et al. (2004); Branstetter et al. (2010).
33 For this analysis, the Bank’s investment climate assessments have been used to characterize the business environment based on 8 categories of indicators: macroeconomic stability and trade policy; infrastructure such as transportation, electricity, and communication; access to land and finance; market structure and entry barriers; regulations and licensing; property rights and contract enforcement; security and crime; and local governance and corruption.
Table 3: Challenges – Business Environment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Days to start a business</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting credit: share covered by public registry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting credit: share covered by private bureau</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of tax payments per year</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years to close business</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice and accountability indicator</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political stability and absence of violence indicator</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Doing Business.

Notes: Figures refer to most recent year data. Data available for all countries in groups 1-4 and all variables except getting credit: public registry (missing for type 2 country Malaysia), getting credit: private bureau (missing for type 1 country Egypt and type 2 country Mauritius) and years to close business (missing for type 1 country Albania and type 3 countries Burundi, Cambodia, and Rwanda).

Administrative failures associated with long delays in opening or closing a business, or excessive tax reporting requirements, can also increase transaction costs and reduce incentives to invest. Often these administrative obstacles appear in the same countries that impose stringent labor market regulations, further reducing the incentives of firms to create jobs. Procedures for creating a business and cumbersome tax regulations tend to be particularly problematic in cluster 4 countries. Procedures to close a business, on the other hand, are a problem across the board, although cluster 2 countries are relatively less affected.

Weak infrastructure can be an even more serious hurdle to attracting investment and innovation and inducing employment creation. For example, a lack of readily available electricity or water can make additional investment much more costly if the new facilities need to include off-grid electricity generation. Likewise, an absence of paved roads, railways, or maintained waterways can make the transportation of goods to market more costly and reduce the incentive to invest in poorly served areas. Table 4 shows that, again, countries in clusters 3
and 4 face particular challenges in improving infrastructure to encourage productive investments. Although it is an imperfect measure of electrification, electricity consumption in these types of countries was roughly one fifth of the level found in cluster 2 countries. In addition, and despite very limited data on the subject, it also appears that the road networks in cluster 4, and especially cluster 3, countries may be severely underdeveloped. This can reduce the incentives for new entrepreneurs to start firms and create jobs in poorly equipped areas, and can keep existing firms from expanding their operations due to the cost of transporting their production out of their local market along poorly maintained roads. As a general rule, infrastructure problems in all clusters tend to be more common in rural areas, where economic activity, productivity, and employment creation are often less dynamic than in urban areas.

### Table 4: Challenges – Infrastructure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electricity consumption (kWh per capita)</td>
<td>1255</td>
<td>2532</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of roads paved</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: WDI.
Notes: Figures refer to the 4-year average of available data from the period 2005-2008. Data availability by variable and country type for countries in groups 1-4 are as follows (Electricity consumption – Paved roads/total countries in group): 22/9/25 type 1 countries, 21/9/23 type 2 countries, 8/2/17 type 3 countries, and 10/3/13 type 4 countries.

### 3.3 Labor Market Regulations and Institutions

In most countries, labor laws (generally through the national labor code) provide legislative requirements with which employers and employees must comply for hiring and employing workers, as well as terminating employment. Labor laws are, inter alia, designed to equalize the bargaining power between employers and employees, but they also establish rules to prevent practices that society considers abusive and unacceptable. For example, they may prohibit employers and unions from engaging in specified "unfair labor practices" and establish obligations for both parties to engage in good faith collective bargaining. Labor laws can also aim to protect workers from arbitrary, unfair, or discriminatory actions by their employers, while protecting employers against arbitrary industrial action by workers and their unions.
The main aspects of labor law include: (i) entry into an employment contract (mandatory provisions of employment contracts, probation period); (ii) term of employment contract, including fixed-term contracts, part-time employment, and working hours; (iii) paid and unpaid leave, maternity leave, and family leave; (iv) wages and benefits including minimum wages; and (v) contract termination, including notification and approval by a third party, advance notice, mandatory (re)training, and severance payments.

The most frequent issues surrounding labor regulations concern hiring and dismissal procedures and minimum wage policies. Regarding the former, one problem is restrictions on contractual diversity. Legislation often imposes constraints on the use of fixed-term contracts, part-time contracts, on-call contracts, zero-hour contracts, contracts for workers hired through temporary employment agencies, and freelance contracts, even if these are established features of modern labor markets in developed countries. In terms of the minimum wage, most of the problems relate to high levels of discretion in minimum wage setting and adjustment, which leads to excessive uncertainty, and systems where levels are set without consideration of worker productivity.

Across clusters the rigidity of labor regulations is a concern. Despite low coverage due to a large informal sector (particularly in clusters 3 and 4), some aspects of the legislation can be quite restrictive. Although the poorest countries (cluster 3) have the weakest social protection coverage (see Section 3.5), they, along with cluster 1 countries, also tend to have the most rigid labor markets (see Table 5). For example, cluster 3 countries have, on average, a minimum wage that is more than 50 percent of value added per worker; they provide for severance pay equal to almost 19 weeks of earnings and 88 percent of the countries require administrative notification in advance of layoffs of at least 9 workers. Furthermore, in nearly half of the cluster 1 countries, administrative approval is required before groups of workers can be dismissed. When contrasted with type 2 countries, type 1 and 3 countries have more “rigid” labor markets along almost all dimensions.

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34 See Kudo (2009).
35 See Cho et al. (2010).
### Table 5: Challenges – Labor Market Regulations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of minimum wage to value added per worker</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severance pay for redundancy dismissal (in salary weeks)</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notice period for redundancy dismissal (in salary weeks)</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paid annual leave (in working days)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notification of a third party required if 9 workers are dismissed</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approval of a third party required if 9 workers are dismissed</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed-term contract prohibited for permanent tasks</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Doing Business (Employing Workers Indicators).
Notes: Figures refer to most recent year data. Severance pay, notice period, and paid annual leave figures represent averages for workers with 1, 5, and 10 years of job seniority. Data available for all countries in groups 1-4 and all variables except the notification and approval variables, for which one country in group 1 (Bolivia) is missing data.

Even though the evidence from the literature is mixed, it usually shows that laws aimed at providing job security reduce turnover, lead to the creation of fewer jobs, and possibly slow productivity growth.³⁶ For example, evidence from Latin America shows job protection is correlated with lower turnover in Colombia, Brazil, and Peru,³⁷ and longer job tenure more generally. In principle, this could increase employment and provide incentives to increase investment in human capital within the firm, since workers with strong job protection resemble a fixed asset for the firm.³⁸ However, evidence suggests that lower job turnover can also lead to lower job creation,³⁹ less demand for unskilled workers,⁴⁰ and higher average unemployment rates.⁴¹ Finally, there is growing evidence that tighter labor regulations can negatively affect

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³⁶ See Kuddo (2009) for a review of the literature.
³⁷ Kugler (1999); Gonzaga (2003); Saavedra and Torero (2000).
³⁹ See Kugler (1999) for the case of Colombia.
⁴⁰ See Montenegro and Pages (2003) for the case of Chile.
⁴¹ Elmeskov et al. (1998); Lazear (1990); Addison and Grosso (1996).
productivity growth by increasing the cost of labor adjustments and reducing the incentives for firms to innovate and adopt new, especially labor-saving, technologies.\textsuperscript{42}

The literature on the impact of minimum wages is also mixed, being sensitive to the actual wage level and the type of labor market where it is implemented. A minimum wage can be an efficient policy response to increase wages and even employment in imperfectly competitive labor markets, like those found in most countries.\textsuperscript{43} In practice, a minimum wage that is low enough relative to economy-wide average earnings is not likely to have major impacts on employment. A minimum wage that is too high, however, can reduce incentives to create jobs in the formal sector, particularly for youth. Moreover, there is no evidence that a minimum wage is a good instrument to reduce poverty or inequality.\textsuperscript{44}

Issues related to labor regulations are less important for labor markets in clusters 3 and 4 despite their rigidity because such a large share of employment is outside of wage and salary work; they need to receive attention, however, in the other clusters. A particular challenge for countries in clusters 1 and 2 is rethinking the tradeoff between the advantages to incumbents provided by labor market regulations and the benefits of flexible labor markets that can generate additional employment, especially in the formal sector. Higher minimum wages, higher severance pay, longer paid vacations, and longer advance notice are intended to improve the quality of jobs for those who occupy them. However, if these regulations reduce the incentives to hire new workers or lead employers to exit the formal sector, significant negative effects can impinge on “outsiders”, namely workers who do not manage to get or keep one of the protected jobs.

3.4 Education and Skills

The accumulation of human capital through the acquisition of knowledge and skills is recognized as central for economic development. More educated workers not only have better

\textsuperscript{42} See Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) for an analysis using a general equilibrium model of job search; Cappelli (2000) and Hobijn and Jovanovic (2001) for analyses of the impact on the cost of labor adjustments; and Scarpetta and Tressel (2004) for direct effects on productivity growth.

\textsuperscript{43} Card and Krueger (1997); Manning (2003).

\textsuperscript{44} See Kuddo (2009) and Cho et al. (2010) for a review.
job opportunities, earn more, and have more stable and rewarding jobs, they also are more adaptable and mobile.\textsuperscript{45} Workers who acquire more skills also make other workers and capital more productive and, within the firm, they facilitate the adaptation, adoption, and ultimately invention of new technologies. This is crucial to enable technological change and economic diversification. Through all these channels, a more educated and more skilled labor force is likely to contribute to faster employment and economic growth.\textsuperscript{46}

\textit{In the developing world, unfortunately, the majority of the labor force has very low levels of education (see Table 6).} Countries in cluster 2 have the best indicators, yet the average number of years of schooling is only 8.5 (primary plus a couple of years of secondary). For comparison, this same average in OECD countries is 11.9 years. Moreover, only 30 percent of the working age population in cluster 2 countries has successfully finished high school and less than 7 percent has a university degree. Again, in advanced economies these shares are 56 and 14 percent respectively.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\hline
Average years of schooling & 7.5 & 8.5 & 4.3 & 5.3 \\
\hline
Literacy rate & 95.76 & 93.87 & 56.18 & 65.68 \\
\hline
Share of working age population completed secondary school & 27.79 & 30.92 & 9.93 & 14.69 \\
Share of working age population having completed tertiary education & 6.44 & 7.45 & 1.35 & 3.09 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Challenges – Skills}
\end{table}

Source: WDI, Barro and Lee (2010).

Notes: Figures refer to the 4-year average of available data from the period 2005-2008. Data available for all countries in groups 1-4 for average years of schooling but data on the literacy rate are limited (countries available/total countries in group): 24/25 type 1 countries, 20/23 type 2 countries, 15/17 type 3 countries, and 12/13 type 4 countries.

\textsuperscript{45} There is a vast literature empirically supporting the value of investing in education to develop human capital and on the contribution of education to growth and development (see, for example, Vandenbussche et al. 2004; Aghion et al. 2008; Helpman 1992; Hanushek and Kimko 2000; Krueger and Lindahl 2001; Hanushek and Woessmann 2007).

\textsuperscript{46} See Helpman (2010).
There is, of course, a clear divide between the middle and upper middle income countries of clusters 1 and 2 and those in the other clusters, where providing even basic skills to the population remains a challenge. Countries in clusters 1 and 2 already have literacy rates over 90 percent. For these countries, the issue of access to primary education is more or less resolved, and the challenge is to further lift the skill level of the population into the secondary and tertiary levels. In the other countries, illiteracy can touch up to 73 percent of the population (Niger) and average years of education can be as low as 1.2 (Mozambique). In some cluster 3 and 4 countries like Kenya, Mongolia, Tajikistan, or the Kyrgyz Republic, literacy rates and average education have reached levels comparable to type 1 and 2 countries. Nevertheless, a priority for the countries in clusters 3 and 4 continues to be expanding educational opportunities and ensuring the presence of teachers and the availability of textbooks.47

Still, these basic indicators of educational achievement hide fundamental issues regarding the relevance of skills acquired in education and training systems for labor markets. Indeed, ensuring that children enroll in schools and ultimately graduate from college does not guarantee that, while in the system, they are acquiring skills that will improve their labor market opportunities.48 For many developing countries, particularly in low income settings, assessments of education quality are disappointing.49,50

The diversity of skills that matter for the labor market, and the ways in which the skills required by employers change as economies develop, make providing skills relevant to the labor market a challenge. For example, recent empirical analyses show that success in the labor market does not only depend on the acquisition of technical skills. Cognitive and non-cognitive skills, in part

48 See the Skills toward Employability and Productivity (StEP) framework publication “Stepping Up Skills for More Jobs and Higher Productivity” (World Bank, 2010).
49 See Glewwe and Kremer (2006); World Bank (2008); Robalino et al. (2011); Boissiere (2004).
50 Internationally comparable data measuring the quality of education such as TIMSS (Third International Mathematics and Science Study), PIRLS (Progress in International Reading Literacy Study), and PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment), collect information primarily from developed countries and a few middle income developing countries. Internationally comparable data are not available for very low income countries. The performance of students on achievement tests administered within many of the low income countries, however, suggests that academic achievement is often very low. See Glewwe and Kremer (2006) and Boissiere (2004) for more information on the quality of education in developing countries, World Bank (2008) for a country-specific assessment of academic achievement in LAC, and Robalino et al. (2011) for South Asia.
acquired in early childhood and during basic and secondary schooling, are also important determinants of employment dynamics and earnings later in life\(^5\) and facilitate the acquisition of technical skills and education more generally.\(^5\) The literature has also found that the demand for higher level cognitive skills, relative to demands for manual job-specific skills, tends to increase with technological progress, development, and diversification of the economy.\(^5\)

As the level of education increases, skills mismatch becomes an increasingly important issue and a major cause of high unemployment, especially among youth with higher education. In India, for instance, 50 percent of university graduates obtain a diploma in the arts, far exceeding employer demands.\(^5\) In Tunisia, the share of higher educated youth among unemployed youth has been rising and currently is the largest among all education levels. Graduate curricula are often criticized as the source of high unemployment among tertiary educated youth, and more than 50% of university graduates are in jobs that do not use the skills they acquired in the university.\(^5\) In Macedonia, where youth unemployment (particularly long term unemployment) is prevalent, skills mismatch is pervasive. Employer surveys show that soft skills such as responsibility and team work are more appreciated than job-specific skills such as foreign languages or technical skills.

Compounding the problems of low educational attainment, quality, and potential skill mismatches is the phenomenon of low or declining rates of return to education. Recent evidence for very diverse countries, from Latin America to South Asia, shows that investments in different levels of education are not always worth their cost. In Latin America, rates of return on education are generally positive but have been falling over the last decade in the case of secondary and higher education. Within South Asia, rates of return to certain levels of

---

\(^5\) Heckman et al. (2006) show that cognitive skills and non-cognitive skills are important in explaining a diverse array of labor market outcomes. Although there are important gender differences in the effects of these skills, for most behaviors, both factors play an important role for men and women. Carneiro and Heckman (2003), Heckman and Masterov (2007), Cunha et al. (2006), and numerous other papers establish that parents play an important role in producing both the cognitive and non-cognitive skills of their children.

\(^5\) See Bowles and Gintis (1976); Heckman et al. (2006).


\(^5\) See Robalino et al. (2011).

\(^5\) See the Skills toward Employability and Productivity (StEP) framework publication “Stepping Up Skills for More Jobs and Higher Productivity” (World Bank 2010).
education can be negative. Low or falling rates of return ultimately reflect a mismatch between supply and demand; if the demand for a given skill set grows less rapidly than the supply, wages are expected to fall and push down the return to the investment. The factors behind these dynamics are complex, but they deserve careful attention if incentives to investment in education and training are to be preserved and enhanced.

3.5 Social Protection

Social insurance policies are important determinants of labor market dynamics and the quality of jobs. If well-designed, social insurance programs not only can protect workers’ consumption against various shocks but also facilitate labor mobility and improve their bargaining power. This can reduce failures in labor markets, allow better matches between skills and jobs, and provide incentives to engage in higher risk/higher return activities – which can in turn contribute to productivity growth and employment creation. On the other hand, badly designed social insurance policies often have adverse impacts on labor markets by restricting labor mobility, reducing labor demand, and providing incentives for informality or labor force withdrawal. This happens, for instance, when social insurance benefits are not portable, when the tax-wedge that finances the contributory programs is too high, when out-of-work benefit levels are too high or last too long, and/or when the design of non-contributory programs to expand coverage induces implicit taxes on formal work.

Social insurance programs cover considerably different sets of risks across countries (see Table 7). Among the countries for which data exists, old age, disability and survivor benefits are the most common – only Malawi does not offer them. Unemployment benefits, however, are not part of the social insurance system in the majority of cases. Only 35 percent of countries in the sample have them (mostly in cluster 2), while the others rely on severance pay regulated through the labor code (see next section). Severance pay is riskier (since the systems are not funded) and usually associated with long legal and administrative processes. Outside of clusters 1 and 2, only a minority of countries offers contributory health insurance. In the others, all

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56 The rationale for having these programs is that many individuals may not have the ability to self-insure against risks such as disease, longevity, or unemployment due to “myopia,” liquidity constraints, and capital and insurance market imperfections (see Barr 2004; Kuddo et al. 2011).
workers (and their families) supposedly are covered through national health services, but these systems can suffer from issues of access and quality.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7: Challenges – Social Protection</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Availability of social protection (Number of different risks covered)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Share of working age population contributing to pensions</td>
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Notes: Figures refer to most recent year data. Types of risks potentially covered by the social protection indicator include old age, disability and survivor, sickness and maternity (cash benefits, medical care, or both), workplace injury, unemployment, and family allowances. Data availability by variable and country type for countries in groups 1-4 are as follows (SP countries available – Pensions countries available/total countries in group): 23-22/25 type 1 countries, 23-19/23 type 2 countries, 14-12/17 type 3 countries, and 11-11/13 type 4 countries.

There are many reasons for the observed low levels of coverage, two of the most important being low productivity and earnings, and a weak capacity to enforce regulations. Low productivity firms, usually small or micro-firms, typically self-select into the informal sector: they cannot afford the minimum costs of labor imposed by social security, which can be high. Moreover, social security laws in many countries apply primarily to medium and large firms and organizations in the public sector. In theory, workers who are not in formal wage employment could be allowed to enroll voluntarily, but “myopia”, lack of trust in the public systems, and short term liquidity constraints can keep uncovered individuals, particularly the unskilled and those with low income, from enrolling. The incentive and non compliance issues that reduce coverage are further aggravated by low enforcement capacity. When comparing the benefits and the expected costs of non-compliance, poor enforcement can reduce the expected costs and some employers can choose to evade – studies have found underreporting to the pension

57 See Wagstaff (2007) for general discussion on social health insurance; Thornton et al. (2010) for Nicaragua’s randomized experiment on the design of social insurance program; World Bank (2007) for implementation of social health insurance program for various countries including Kenya, Ghana, Philippines, and Thailand; and Wagstaff et al. (2009) for integration of segmented programs in China.

58 See World Bank (2005).
system can be as high as 30% of the covered wage bill in formal firms. There are also employees who prefer higher take-home pay to the benefits offered by social security, particularly when non-contributory arrangements are in place or the perceived value of the benefits is low.

More generally, social insurance programs can affect labor market outcomes through implicit and explicit taxes and subsidies within the various insurance programs, particularly in cluster 1 and 2 countries. These distortions can affect behavior on the supply side of the labor market in several ways. First, incentives to search for and keep jobs may be affected by the presence of unemployment insurance systems that are not actuarially fair, as is the case in most countries with such systems. Second, a lack of portability of benefits can restrict labor mobility. This is quite common in countries with fragmented social insurance systems. Finally, decisions to participate in the labor force, and in particular to retire early, can be affected by the design of the pension system. In particular, system parameters such as high minimum pensions can push individuals to delay entry into the labor market or retire earlier in order to receive higher rates of return on their contributions.

From the demand side, social insurance programs can affect firm behavior when funded through payroll taxes with a high tax wedge (the difference between the cost of labor and take-home pay) and when regulations impose dismissal taxes (or severance pay). Both payroll taxes and severance benefits in countries around the world can be quite high (see Figure 5). In particular, type 2 countries such as Colombia, Mexico, Lithuania, and Turkey present a larger tax wedge than the world average. Type 1 countries including Algeria, Tunisia, Peru, and Morocco follow. There is evidence that the level of formal employment declines as the tax

59 Ibid.
60 See Perry et al. (2007); Ribe et al. (2010).
61 See Robalino et al. (forthcoming).
62 See Robalino et al. (2009) for a review; Tatsiramos (2010) and Vodopivec (2009) for a discussion. One alternative, individual unemployment savings accounts, can also distort behavior if the mandated precautionary savings rate is too high and/or the interest paid on the accounts is too low. In this case, workers may have incentives to collude with employers and simulate dismissals, thereby allowing the individual to withdraw his or her forced savings. See Chapter 5 in Ribe et al. (2010) for details.
63 See Forteza (2010).
64 In poorly designed defined-benefit pension systems, the rates of return that individuals receive on their contributions depend on when they join, how often they contribute, and when they retire (Robalino et al. 2005).
There is also evidence that mandatory severance pay reduces turnover and incentives to create jobs. The net effect is likely to be a reduction in formal employment among existing firms. Moreover, high labor costs also can deter the entry of new firms. As these firms are often precisely the innovators, a poorly designed social insurance system can, indirectly, slow labor productivity growth.

Figure 5: Tax-Wedges around the World

Source: Ribe et al. (2010).

IV. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH AND POLICY ANALYSIS

The discussion in the previous section identifies common challenges across countries in terms of increasing participation rates, reducing unemployment rates (particularly among youth), creating higher productivity and better quality jobs, and protecting workers. This opens a three pronged agenda that focuses on: (i) providing incentives and conditions for work; (ii) improving the efficiency of the job creation process; and (iii) managing risks and facilitating labor market transitions. And, from this arise four areas of concentrated work:

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65 See Ribe et al. (2010).
66 Ibid.
67 See Haltiwanger et al. (2010).
First, the process of job creation and destruction: what are the constraints that need to be removed and how can the self-employed and small entrepreneurs be supported?

Second, skills: how can the level and relevance of skills of the new entrants to the labor market be improved, and what can be done with the large stock of unskilled workers?

Third, labor market dynamics: how can transitions from school-to-work, out of unemployment, or inactivity, and between jobs be facilitated?

Finally, worker protection: how can regulations and laws protect workers from loss of income and exploitation or abuse without creating labor market distortions that reduce employment levels or encourage informality?

4.1 Businesses and Jobs: From Self-employment to Entrepreneurship

As noted in Section II, wage and salary employment make up the minority of jobs in the developing world, suggesting two interrelated policy agendas through which the Bank can support countries to increase the number of good quality jobs. The first agenda involves ensuring that the process of businesses and job creation (and destruction) can take place efficiently. Good ideas or projects should be able to be funded and implemented, and entrepreneurs should have the incentives to grow and create jobs; bad ideas should be filtered out and discarded so that human and physical resources can be put to better use. Clearly, not all good ideas need to be transformed into large corporations. Many businesses can remain small but productivity should be high enough to allow entrepreneurs to operate “formally” and pay wages (or generate earnings) that ensure a decent standard of living for all workers.

The second agenda involves improving the quality of the jobs that already exist. Some low skilled, self-employed or small entrepreneurs running low productivity, small scale businesses have economic potential if well managed, while others do not. There is also variability in the potential of self-employed individuals to become successful business owners. The goal of public policy in this case is to help promising businesses realize their potential, while assisting those individuals involved in non-economically viable activities to exit and transition to a more productive occupation. The relative importance of each of these agendas will depend on
countries’ economic circumstances; the second agenda would probably need to receive priority in clusters 3 and 4 but in most cases both will coexist.

Policies to promote macroeconomic stability and a business environment that encourages investments and innovation are relevant mainly to the first agenda and the high end jobs. The focus here should continue to be on understanding how different parts of the regulatory framework affect the creation of firms and jobs in different sectors, regions, and at various levels of productivity. Evidence highlights the importance of competition in facilitating firm entry, innovation, and productivity growth.\(^68\) Research also shows that significant reductions in regulations can increase the number of business and wage employment.\(^69\) Even so, important questions remain in terms of how different regulations and policy interventions affect competition (e.g., competition councils, anti-trust law) and ultimately jobs. How to enforce these regulations in developing countries also remains an open policy question.\(^70\)

The first agenda could also involve more direct policy interventions to stimulate investments in specific sectors. Even in a perfect business environment with low macroeconomic and microeconomic risks, investments and new business will not simply follow, due to other market features such as coordination failures, and information spillovers.\(^71\) In the case of coordination failures, the return to one investment depends on whether another investment is also made, such as when the profitability of export activities depends on port investments. Information spillovers can occur when first movers in new activities pay the cost of experimenting, allowing new entrants to learn from the experience. In this case, governments may be called upon to temporarily subsidize investments, guarantee loans to firms, facilitate the creation of necessary infrastructure, and mobilize skilled workers. How these policies should be implemented – starting with how to “target industries” – will need to be addressed.\(^72\)

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68 See, for example Aghion et al. (2005) and Hallward-Driemeier and Thompson (2009).
69 See Bruhn (2011) and Klapper and Love (2010).
70 See Hallward-Driemeier and Pritchett (2010).
72 Lin and Monga (2010) present evidence that governments implementing successful industrial policies targeted industries that (i) were consistent with the country’s latest comparative advantage determined by endowment structure and, (ii) were mature in countries whose per capita income was, on average, around double their own.
Relatively little is known about the effectiveness of interventions that support self-employment and entrepreneurship (the second agenda). These policies attempt to influence: motivation and risk tolerance (via cultural and social norms); technical and non-cognitive skills; information about production technologies, best management practices, and prices; access to value chains and markets; and liquidity constraints. Interventions of this sort include business and life skills training, advisory services, networking, improving access to finance, and micro-franchising.

It is difficult to extract reproducible lessons from the evidence given the large heterogeneity of programs and the fact that they are typically comprised of a package of interventions. Randomized control trials carried out on a sample of microfinance clients in Peru, Tanzania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dominican Republic, and Pakistan found that business training improved business knowledge and business practices, but there is little evidence of an impact on sales, profits, or survival rates. Moreover, introducing microfinance in new areas affects the creation and ownership of new businesses but not employment among current businesses. Evaluations of youth programs that provide entrepreneurial skills show that much depends on curriculum, pedagogical approach, and whether participants have to actually start a business or not. For example, an evaluation of Argentina’s Microemprendimientos Productivos, which targeted welfare beneficiaries from a large safety nets intervention, reports that the intervention failed to increase income for the average participant in the short run.

Evaluations of matching grants for SMEs in Argentina and Tunisia show positive results on employment creation, with less straightforward results in Mauritius. Mentoring for SMEs in Mexico led to large, though imprecisely measured, increases in profits and sales but no increase in

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73 See Karlan and Valdivia (2011).
74 See Bjorvatn and Tungodden (2010).
75 See Bruhn and Zia (2011).
77 See Mansuri and Gine (2011).
78 See Banerjee et al. (2009).
80 See Almeida and Galasso (2009).
81 See Castillo et al. (2010).
82 See Biggs (1999).
employment over one year.\textsuperscript{83} Provision of business consultants to improve management practices in India increased productivity by 11 percent and annual profits by over USD 200,000 per firm, but induced no significant change in employment in the first year.\textsuperscript{84} In general, most results measure impacts over the short run; little is known about the medium term impact of these programs.

Promising interventions nonetheless do exist. Micro-franchising programs remove the difficult step of business design by replication of a successful existing business in sectors from pharmaceutical drugs, to ice cream, to solid waste collection, to domestic or phone services, to the provision of water. In addition, the risk of failure is lower than that of a standard firm start-up, which increases the attractiveness of this type of program in places where the stigma associated with failure is high. Interventions that focus on increasing the productivity, integration, resistance to shocks, and competitiveness in the agricultural sector also merit more attention, particularly for countries in the low income clusters. Some of the interventions targeting this sector include policies that promote access to finance, facilitate the adoption of new technologies, help upward movement in the value chain, improve the use of fertilizers and seeds, provide information about prices and quality standards, ease access to insurance to manage risk, provide assistance for the formation of producer networks, and promote skill development.\textsuperscript{85}

Looking forward, the agenda to support self-employment and entrepreneurship should be an important component of the work on social protection and labor markets, in partnership with the IFC, DEC/FPD, and other sectors within the Bank. The following questions will need to receive attention:

- Designing instruments and targeting methods to identify different groups of potential beneficiaries and assess the constraints they face. Examples of targeted groups include subsistence farmers, women, youth, and low productivity firms, among others. Interventions can take place at the individual, firm, or community level.

\textsuperscript{83} See Bruhn, Karlan, and Schoar (2011).
\textsuperscript{84} See Bloom et al. (2011).
\textsuperscript{85} See World Bank (2007c).
• **Better understanding what types of entrepreneurship programs are effective for specific groups.** This is essential to design programs tailored to different population subgroups and go beyond the “one-size fits all” approach.

• **Identifying the benefits of mitigating risk for entrepreneurs.** The presence of uninsured risk may deter potentially successful entrepreneurs either from establishing businesses or from engaging in high risk / high reward activities. Still, entrepreneurs should bear some risk so as to reduce moral hazard and give them a vested interest in the success of their enterprise.

• **Identifying implementation issues that are crucial for a program to succeed and be scaled up.** Evaluations that show muted results do not necessarily imply that the corresponding programs are always ineffective; they can reflect problems with design and/or implementation.

• **Identifying what skills are related to successful entrepreneurship and learning about their malleability over the lifecycle.** This can help understand whether interventions need to be introduced early in an individual’s education or if they can be taught after the individual enters the labor market.

• **Developing a dialogue with international agencies, NGOs, and other stakeholders that have experience in the design and implementation of entrepreneurship interventions.** This dialogue is essential to develop partnerships at different levels (e.g., funding, technical assistance, and capacity-building).

4.2 Developing Skills

_The area of skills development also has a two pronged agenda: improving the skills of the large stock of unskilled workers and, over the medium term, improving the skills of new labor market entrants._ Both are complicated by the multiplicity of channels through which skills are acquired – from parents and families in the early years of life, later through schools, universities, and vocational centers, and ultimately via on–the-job training and work experience. In addition,

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whether the right set of skills translates into higher employment and productivity depends on how well labor markets function. Labor markets where information is lacking or mobility is limited may fail to match jobseekers with the right jobs, reducing the returns on investments in additional skills.

The StEP framework highlights the importance and complementarity of these different dimensions. The framework emphasizes that in order to improve employability and productivity, countries need to coordinate policies at five levels: (i) creating the conditions for adequate early childhood development; (ii) laying a strong foundation in basic and secondary schooling; (iii) building and upgrading job skills in response to labor market signals; (iv) promoting technological change by enhancing the human dimension of innovation; and (v) enabling labor mobility and improving the matching of skills to jobs through appropriate labor market regulation, social protection, and intermediation programs.

The focus of the work on skills for the Social Protection and Labor sector is step 3. Specifically, SP&L’s work concentrates on three types of training programs for individuals who are leaving the formal general schooling system or are already in the labor market: pre-employment technical and vocational education and training (TVET); on-the-job training (OJT); and training-related active labor market programs (ALMP) targeted to individuals without access to the first two. In this way, the skills agenda is intimately related to the work on entrepreneurship and labor market transitions.

Although current skills development initiatives have increased investments in training at various levels, the effectiveness and relevance of the skills individuals acquire remain a concern. A common problem for most programs is the lack of monitoring and evaluation systems. Worse still, policymakers lack information about the distribution of skills on the supply and demand sides of the labor market; they are not able to measure what they are trying to influence via policy. As a result, supply-driven TVET systems struggle to remain relevant, training funds

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87 See Skills toward Employability and Productivity (StEP) framework publication “Stepping Up Skills for More Jobs and Higher Productivity” (World Bank 2010).
88 Labor policies are also concerned with Steps 4 and 5 which are covered in Sections 3.4 and 3.5 respectively.
89 For a recent report taking stock of skills development strategies see Almeida et al. (forthcoming).
financed through payroll taxes increase the cost of labor without necessarily providing incentives to firms to invest in productive training, and fragmented ALMPs have unclear mandates and face design, governance, and accountability issues.

The challenge is to improve the design of current programs, taking into account the market failures they are trying to address as well as the limitations of government interventions.\(^9\) Key considerations affecting the success of programs include poaching and matching externalities; capital markets that preclude investments in training; coordination failures that lead workers to underinvest in training (due to lack of high productivity jobs) while limiting the incentives for employers to create these jobs (because of a lack of skilled workers); and limited information and individual “myopia” that lead to insufficient investments in training or inappropriate career choices. Governments, too, are prone to failure and many programs currently operating are part of the problem, not the solution.

The Human Development Network already works extensively on skills; in this context, the Social Protection and Labor sector’s contributions should focus on the following priority areas:

- **Measuring skills.** An important question is how to define and measure the set of skills that determine labor market outcomes in developing countries. Sound country-level, regularly-administered surveys of workers and firms that measure the supply and demand of technical, cognitive, and non-cognitive skills relevant for the developing world need to be devised.\(^9\)

- **Assessing failures in the market for skill acquisition.** There is an urgent need for a much better assessment of the main market and governmental failures affecting the provision of training as well as evaluations of the impact of alternative corrective policy interventions. A first step would be to improve current data collection and ongoing monitoring and evaluation systems (M&E) across all programs. Another issue is to define a more systematic approach to identify constraints facing individuals looking to acquire skills or firms seeking to provide them. This could involve evaluating information

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\(^9\) See Almeida et al. (forthcoming).

\(^9\) The Bank has already pioneered this type of survey in Lebanon and Peru, and is exploring the possibilities for expanding to more countries.
problems and myopia among different groups of workers and assessing the likelihood that more information and/or incentives possibly could affect skill acquisition.

- **Improving knowledge about program design and implementation.** Some of the most important decisions when designing a new program relate to governance, management structures, public vs. private provision, financing mechanisms, payment systems to providers, decentralization and autonomy, regulations to control quality, and how to target and deliver subsidies (to individuals or firms). Efforts should be undertaken to fill these knowledge gaps.

4.3 **Activating Individuals and Facilitating Labor Market Transitions**

*Labor market transitions are crucial determinants of labor market outcomes.* High unemployment rates today can reflect inefficient transitions from school to work, from welfare to work, or between jobs. Low participation rates also raise the question of how to help individuals transit from inactivity into a job. Because of failures in labor markets, government interventions can be designed to help ease these transitions by helping individuals better signal their skills to employers, find or relocate for the right jobs, identify training needs and/or the right training providers, or finance this training. Insufficient labor demand and low expected returns to investments in training or job-search are also issues that may require government intervention.

Supporting countries in the design and implementation of programs that activate individuals and facilitate labor market transitions should be an important part of the Bank’s work on labor. The relevant programs fall into two categories: (i) programs to stimulate labor demand and (ii) programs to support job search and improve employability. The first set of programs mainly includes public works and wage subsidies, while the second brings together interventions such as intermediation, counseling, job-search assistance, training, skills certification, and social services that facilitate mobility (e.g., child care). The entrepreneurship promotion programs of Section 4.1 can also become part of the portfolio when wage and salary jobs are lacking.

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92 Some of these, as well as other, programs (such as work-sharing) have also been used to protect jobs during a recession. Their use, however, is more controversial. More effective interventions to temporarily help firms in distress include credit and access to public tenders.
Evaluations of have given mixed results, but this may partly reflect design problems in the programs being evaluated. As with entrepreneurship promotion programs, negative evaluations should not be interpreted as suggesting that the active labor market programs as a whole are not needed or are not useful.\(^9\) The market failures that these programs try to address are real, and successful programs linking individuals to jobs that integrate various interventions and have a strong involvement of the private sector do exist. For example, “Training Plus” programs, which consist of technical and/or life skills training followed by work experience through private sector internships and job placement assistance, have been found to be quite successful at activating individuals. Interventions such the Jovenes programs in Latin America (mainly targeted to unskilled youth)\(^9\) and Probecat in Mexico\(^9\) fit in this category.

These interventions are relevant for all four clusters of countries, even though the composition of the portfolio will vary according to country circumstances and target population. Programs linking individuals to formal wage employment (e.g., intermediation and job-search assistance) will be less relevant in clusters 3 and 4 given the small size of the formal sector. In clusters 3 and 4, these components of the package of services could be replaced with programs that support self-employment and entrepreneurship.

The challenge is to better understand how to design and implement integrated interventions that respond to the needs of different workers in different country settings.\(^9\) Specific issues include:

- **Understanding employability constraints.** Specific instruments and analytical products could be developed, including a stock-taking of the most successful profiling methodologies in high income countries, a statistical toolkit to analyze the main

\(^9\) See Cunningham et al. (2010).

\(^9\) Jovenes programs have a strong emphasis on demand-driven skills training, ensured by ex ante agreements with the private sector to provide internships to their graduates. Wages during the internship are financed by the program.

\(^9\) The program, which is not specifically targeted to a disadvantaged population, provides a stipend equivalent to the minimum wage to beneficiaries while the private sector businesses provide the training and the internship (for a minimum of three months), and cover the training costs. Most importantly, private firms have to agree to retain at least 70 percent of the trainees for a year each in order to participate in the program (Ibarra and Rosas 2009).

\(^9\) For a detailed review of programs and a more in depth discussion of the various issues, see Almeida et al. (2011). For a recent discussion about how wage subsidies are used in Tunisia, see Robalino et al. (2011).
constraints to employability across different groups based on varying data sources, and an exploration of techniques used for providing profiling and counseling services across different programs and settings.

- **Understanding incentive-compatible designs of income support schemes.** The effectiveness of activation policies addressed to income support recipients will depend, in part, on the incentives these beneficiaries have to search for jobs or enter programs that improve their employability, earnings potential, or businesses. The evidence linking transfers and other interventions to incentives, behaviors, and take-up rates, however, is still unclear.

- **Investigating the appropriate contracting, auditing, and payment systems for the outsourcing of service delivery to the private sector.** Private sector involvement has typically been associated with greater cost-effectiveness, lower pressure on public budgets, and a wider array of services proposed to an increasingly diverse clientele. Despite the importance, there is still little understanding of how to best create and operate these markets.

4.4 Protecting Workers

Although not all reforms of labor regulations and social insurance systems\(^97\) have achieved their goals, past experiences have improved our understanding of the pre-conditions for success. Four general principles must be considered when reforming worker protection: (i) taking a more integrated approach to worker protection systems; (ii) delinking access to public insurance programs from the existence of a labor contract; (iii) moving to explicit forms of redistribution to cover those with either no or limited savings capacity and reducing distortions where compatible with societal objectives;\(^98\) and (iv) integrating, simplifying, and refocusing labor regulations.

*Taking an integrated approach to the reform of worker protection systems could improve their success for a number of reasons.* First, labor laws and social insurance are intimately linked. It is

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\(^97\) See World Bank (2010); Holzmann et al. (2009); World Bank (2005); Ferreira and Robalino (2010).

\(^98\) Implicit redistribution is currently a part of many systems, but these implicit subsidies are often regressive, benefiting more high than low income workers. See Ribe et al. (2010); Skoufias et al. (2009); Forteza et al. (2010).
risky, for instance, to have more flexible labor regulations if the right insurance programs are not in place. Second, there are important interactions between social insurance programs, so reforming one program without looking at the effects on another can be counterproductive. As an example, changes in a public health insurance plan can affect the amount (and frequency) that workers contribute to social security and, through this channel, the savings workers accumulate in their pension accounts. Similarly, changes in unemployment benefit systems can affect retirement ages and the sustainability of pension systems. Third, it is difficult to justify having fundamentally different strategies to expand the coverage of the various programs when the problems that need to be addressed are essentially the same. Finally, there are gains to be made, through cost reductions and more effective service delivery, if programs are better coordinated and share administrative and information systems.

*Expanding access to social insurance would require opening systems to all workers regardless of occupation and most likely on a voluntary basis, given the difficulty of enforcing compliance.* This raises several technical challenges: (i) defining the set and level of benefits that are provided to attract workers – and their employers (when available) – from outside the formal sector; (ii) structuring incentives to encourage enrollment and take-up; (iii) mobilizing subsidies for individuals with low or limited savings capacity; (iv) financing the system so as to minimize incentives to evade while allowing workers to enroll (regardless of income and their contribution capacity) and avoiding the creation of unfunded liabilities; (v) collecting contributions from workers without stable and measurable earnings who often lack access to the financial sector; and (v) paying benefits.

*Beyond flexibility, labor regulations need to be integrated, simplified, and better enforced.* In most developing countries, inspection offices do not have the capacity to enforce the many regulations found in different pieces of legislation. Societies thus need to prioritize the areas where labor markets need to be regulated and try to extend these basic rights to informal sector wage earners. These priorities would include, for instance, the enforcement of core labor standards (freedom of association, no forced labor, no child labor, and no discrimination) and

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99 See Robalino et al. (2009).
regulations on minimum wages and working conditions (work schedules, health, and safety). Lower priority areas might be regulating contracts or dismissal procedures beyond requiring appropriate advance notice.

To be able to address the four general principles described above, the work on social protection and labor at the Bank would need to focus on the following areas and activities:

- **Designing guidelines to account for individual heterogeneity when setting the mandate of social insurance programs.** Individuals have different preferences and needs, yet most systems impose a universal mandate. This can create implicit cross-subsidization, provide incentives for informality, and increase the tax-wedge. Alternative schemes need to be considered where individuals are more involved in the choice of the benefits they receive.

- **Providing guidance to move towards efficient and equitable redistributive arrangements.** A priority is to develop best practices for gradually moving to contributory social insurance programs that are based on *actuarially fair risk pooling* and/or *savings*. Explicit redistributive arrangements can then be added as complements to these basic arrangements. Questions to address include: (i) whether to use ex ante or ex post transfers; (ii) how to design a targeted mechanism that goes beyond the poor; and (iii) how to finance the programs.

- **Supporting the development of voluntary savings schemes for informal sector workers.** Informal workers are disproportionately excluded from the financial sector and thus may not have sufficient access to (or knowledge of) private savings instruments. How to best design public voluntary contribution systems is unclear, and it is difficult to evaluate alternative arrangements in the field. Pilot experiments should be launched to understand the constraints affecting willingness to save (e.g., information, skills, access, liquidity constraints, trust, and social norms) and the interventions/incentives susceptible to influence savings.

- **Improving administrative systems.** More efficient and universal social insurance programs will require better administrative systems to manage their various business
processes: identification; registration; targeting; collection of contributions; calculation of benefits; and benefit payment. The Bank should therefore: (i) take stock of best practices and promising technologies; (ii) develop a toolkit to benchmark administrative systems; (iii) develop operational manuals to guide the design and implementation of various programs; and (iv) support efforts to refine targeting methodologies that attempt to reach the informal sector.

- **Assessing the impact of labor regulations and improving enforcement.** Considerations that should be addressed include: (i) the efficient level of discretion; (ii) how to combine controls and penalties; (iii) how not to discourage small entrepreneurs; (iv) how to limit the opportunities for harassment and corruption associated with increased enforcement; and (v) how to involve civil society in the process to expand labor regulations to informal sector workers.

### 4.5 Special Issues Regarding Youth

*The analysis of demographics and youth labor market outcomes showed that youth labor market issues are relevant for all clusters.* The growing share of young workers in the labor force in many countries, especially in clusters 3 and 4, has the potential to contribute to unemployment growth. The lack of experience among young workers not only compounds the problem but more importantly could have long lasting consequences. The social benefit of any policy intervention that helps young people durably transition into the world of work, other things being equal, can be inferred to be higher than for adults.

*Because of these reasons, the work on social protection and labor, therefore, should pay special consideration to youth issues when designing and implementing any of the interventions discussed in this section.*

- **Skills development programs should consider that many personality traits, non-cognitive skills, and attitudes are malleable through young adulthood.** The

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psychological literature indicates that personality traits stabilize by roughly age 30.\textsuperscript{101} Personality characteristics and non-cognitive skills influence occupational choice.\textsuperscript{102} These elements should be considered when designing the curriculum and pedagogical approaches and selecting trainers for skills development programs for youth.

- **Skills development programs for youth should foster the development of self-regulation, a positive identity, and “productive” preferences.** Recent research has found that a young person’s susceptibility to deviant or risky behavior, academic failure, or low performance in the job market is less a function of vulnerability to adverse circumstances and more a heightened sensitivity to external factors, including positive ones.\textsuperscript{103}

- **Familiarity with the internet and mobile communications among youth creates opportunities for innovation in the delivery of training, labor intermediation, and entrepreneurship programs.** One example of a business training program relying fundamentally on web-based content is the IFC’s *SME Toolkit: Build Your Business* program. It includes material on creating a business plan, starting a business, and financial literacy, among other subjects. Elsewhere, cell phones have been used by programs like *SoukTel* to connect employers and job-seekers via text messages in Somalia and Palestine.

- **Alternative or complementary arrangements for youth need to be incorporated into social insurance programs.** For example, young people may be disproportionately reluctant to contribute voluntarily to pensions, because they either are myopic or lack faith in the pension system. Unemployment insurance systems can also present problems, particularly if countries move to programs based on savings. Finally, alternative avenues for financing health insurance for youth may need to be explored.

\textsuperscript{101} Longitudinal studies that track college students have shown that personality traits show certain persistence during this period of life, although some changes still occur (Robins et al. 2001). Roberts et al. (2003) found that work experiences were related to changes in personality from age 18 to 26 using a panel of individuals in New Zealand. They also found that personality traits at age 18 predicted work experiences at age 26, suggesting the presence of unobserved common factors that influence both personality and work experiences.

\textsuperscript{102} Empirical evidence shows that the decision to start-up a business and entrepreneurial performance are affected by a series of cognitive and non-cognitive skills. See Heckman et al. (2008) and Ciavarella et al. (2004).

\textsuperscript{103} See Belsky and Pluess (2009); Belsky et al. (2007).
Current systems based on payroll taxes penalize youth, who are less likely to have dependents and incur lower average health costs. Moving to systems based on premiums, for instance, could make social insurance less expensive, more competitive, and more desirable for youth.

- **Entrepreneurship programs also need to take into account the extra intensity with which certain constraints affect youth.** Most youth lack the social networks, business skills, and money to establish a business because they do not have labor market experience or assets that might serve as collateral. These issues suggest a shift in emphasis for some of the program components (i.e., mentoring, access to capital) when designing entrepreneurship programs for youth.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BANK’S WORK ON LABOR

This paper has reviewed some of the main trends in labor markets around the world, identified some of the key challenges that countries face to improve them using the MILES framework, and discussed implications in terms of research and policy analysis. The agenda that emerges for the Bank’s work on labor is ambitious and its implementation will require a coordinated effort between the regions and networks, with major contributions from the Human Development, Finance and Private Sector Development, Poverty Reduction, and Development Economics Networks. It will also require rethinking current institutional arrangements and knowledge management tools with the aim to increase their operational impact. We propose actions at five levels:

1. Leveraging internal resources and partnerships to implement the knowledge agenda, in particular through development of a knowledge platform on labor.
2. Moving towards the second generation of impact evaluations of labor market programs.
3. Improving the capacity to monitor, benchmark, and analyze labor markets.
4. Improving the capacity to track and develop operational guidelines for promising or successful labor market interventions.
5. Rethinking partnerships and training.
5.1 Knowledge Platform

The jobs agenda suffers from lack of coordination, data, and institutional knowledge. Part of the problem is content-related: the agenda is inherently multi-sectoral and, as suggested by the MILES framework, requires coordination of policy interventions at various levels. In addition, the data and instruments needed to assess market failures are often not available, and there is often insufficient knowledge about how best to design and implement particular policies (e.g., employment services or support to small entrepreneurs). Institutional constraints comprise another facet of the problem: the organization of knowledge production and management on the subject of jobs is hampered by: (i) the lack of a systematic process to digest current cross-sectoral research into forms that can most usefully inform policy; (ii) the mismatch between some of the research in the academic community and the demands from policymakers; and (iii) the disconnect between research findings and policy recommendations on the one hand, and local political and institutional constraints on the other.

The Jobs Knowledge Platform (JKP) aims to address these constraints. The JKP, which is jointly managed by the Social Protection anchor and three other networks, is an international network of researchers, policy analysts, and policymakers. This network links the Bank with universities, think tanks, academic associations, other international organizations, donors, and elements of civil society such as labor unions and chambers of commerce. The network aims to identify knowledge gaps in the jobs agenda in developing countries, foster relevant research, link research to policy, and disseminate best practices and innovations.

The JKP has three core objectives:

- **Making knowledge accessible**: The JKP will mobilize leading academics and policy analysts to build a virtual encyclopedia of issues related to job creation. This will take the form of a Wiki bringing together insights from labor, finance, macro, industrial organization, and trade economics as they pertain to firm growth, job creation, and labor market outcomes. Beyond direct virtual access, the dissemination of best practices will be supported by policy and technical notes, newsletters, and virtual lectures by internationally renowned academics and policymakers.
• **Filling knowledge gaps by matching research to policy interests and developing innovative, cross-sectoral approaches.** During an initial stage, the JKP will be used to identify knowledge gaps. In a second stage, the JKP will mobilize resources for research that can fill the knowledge gaps. This will be done by: (i) facilitating access and/or supporting the collection of relevant data, such as panel surveys on labor market outcomes; (ii) linking researchers and analysts, particularly between northern and southern institutions; (iii) having prestigious scientific journals dedicate special issues to specific research questions; (iv) creating fellowships and research grants; and (v) organizing high level dissemination activities.

• **Enhancing the impact of knowledge on policy.** Information and knowledge are necessary but not sufficient to achieve successful reforms; more is needed to help policymakers transform ideas and policy recommendations into new laws and programs. Despite constraints related to the political economy of reform, the outcomes of a given policy debate often depend on how issues are framed. Exposing stakeholders to the experiences of other countries that have considered similar reforms can improve the policy debate. The main contributions of the JKP to this process are to: (i) coordinate discussion platforms where ongoing reforms are followed continuously, with commentary from experts and stakeholders; (ii) facilitate South-South partnerships where experiences in the implementation of successful reforms can be shared; (iii) disseminate knowledge about the experiences of successful reformers and reforms; and (iv) use various international forums to bring together all the relevant actors for a given theme.

5.2 Impact Evaluations

*Policy interventions and programs that the Bank supports are increasingly subject to rigorous evaluation.* In the area of labor markets there have been important recent initiatives to evaluate programs such as the **Dominican Republic** Youth Development Program; **India**’s National Rural Employment Guarantee; **Liberia**’s Economic Empowerment of Adolescent Girls; **Malawi**’s Apprenticeship Program and Entrepreneurial Support for Vulnerable Youth; **South**

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104 Many of these impact evaluations were financed by the Spanish Impact Evaluation Fund.
Africa’s Wage Subsidy for Youth; Tunisia’s Turning Theses into Enterprises; Turkey’s ISKUR Training Program; and Uganda’s Social Action Fund.

The goal moving forward is to mobilize resources to fund evaluations that provide information not only about whether a given program makes a difference but also why and whether it is cost-effective. Key questions to be addressed are: how governance arrangements, delivery systems, and choices about content affect the impact of a given program; how these effects change with the target group and economic environment; and whether the time of exposure to the interventions makes a difference. More attention will also be given to the value of the economic costs and benefits of the various interventions.

Beyond the evaluation of government pilots or programs, resources should also be mobilized to fund field experiments that can improve our knowledge of specific interventions. Experiments can help understand, for example, how different incentives, targeted to different population groups in different settings, can affect savings behaviors (see Section 4.4) or how changes in the components of an entrepreneurship promotion program can affect entrepreneurial success (see Section 4.1).

5.3 Data, Indicators, and Modeling Tools

Beyond program evaluation, good labor policy needs to start with a good assessment of labor markets, a task constrained, in part, by limited data. For many countries, surveys that provide labor market data (mainly household, labor force, and enterprise surveys) are either not available or infrequently updated. Even among the countries that have surveys, individuals or firms are usually not followed over time, making it impossible to observe labor market transitions. Data about earnings, a primary indicator of the quality of a job, are also seldom available for self-employed workers. Looking forward, a three pillar strategy is proposed:

- **Improving labor market assessments and benchmarking.** The proposal is to partner with ongoing efforts to standardize and track the production of relevant labor market data, and collaborate with the regions in the analysis of specific issues. While several regions within the Bank are actively engaged in standardizing household survey data,
the most comprehensive collection of labor market data is the International Income Distribution Database. This archive, which is maintained by the Development Research Group, covers 251 surveys in 126 countries (Montenegro and Hiri 2009). The Labor Team would complement these efforts by first creating and maintaining a small, complementary database of standardized panel surveys that could be used to track labor market transitions. The second step would be to establish, in consultation with labor markets experts, the set of indicators that should be tracked and benchmarked at both the macro and micro levels, beyond what is available in current databases such as WBI and KLM. The various surveys in the databases could also be used to better understand how observed policies and institutions are related to labor market outcomes.

- **Upgrading estimates of recent labor market developments.** Given frequent gaps in labor market data within and across countries, it is important to improve the methods used to impute missing data. Imputation techniques are widely used today by the institutions managing databases on labor indicators. There are, however, concerns regarding their reliability. The proposal is to launch a concerted effort with key internal and external partners to further develop these techniques, building on recent innovations.

- **Strengthening countries’ LM information systems and survey instruments.** Beyond helping to mobilize resources to improve countries labor market information systems, there is room to work on the improvement of current instruments. In particular, most surveys do not collect information on the extent to which firms or workers comply with labor market regulations (such as minimum wages, minimum labor standards, social security contributions, and severance pay); individual job satisfaction and preferences towards social security benefits; or sources of labor market information and job search behavior. Although ad-hoc initiatives have expanded and improved current instruments, more systematic and coordinated efforts are needed.

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105 This database on panel surveys of workers can be used to obtain a better understanding of labor market transitions and patterns of job creation and destruction.

106 See Margolis et al. (2010).
5.4 Operationalization of Key Labor Market Interventions

Ultimately, the impact that the Bank has in countries results from the quality of the operations it supports and helps design; therefore, it is necessary to have more a systematic process to disseminate and apply best practices. Even today, task team leaders rely mainly on their own initiative and informal arrangements to learn about the design and implementation of operations in other countries that are similar to the ones they are preparing (e.g., a training project for vulnerable youth). The proposal looking forward is to (i) dedicate resources to create an inventory of labor market interventions; and (ii) develop toolkits (i.e., operational manuals and technical notes) to guide the design and implementation of the most promising operations.

5.5 Rethinking Training Activities

Training activities have been developed to inform interested parties about the many dimensions of the jobs agenda, but these often sacrifice depth in exchange for breadth; going forward the balance needs to change. The proposal is to complement the Labor Markets Core Course (LMCC) with targeted, intensive training on the design and implementation of specific interventions. The LMCC provided by the Social Protection Anchor could be shortened to give a general perspective on labor market issues and policies. Other one or two week courses would be provided on topics such as youth employment, design of unemployment benefits systems, or the organization of employment services. These could be offered regionally, depending on the policy priorities for given groups of countries, or could take the form of online courses – which would expand their reach considerably. Additional resources would also need to be allocated to assess the impact of these courses through more detailed surveys, evaluations, and the tracing of participants.
APPENDIX 1: CLUSTER ANALYSIS

Cluster analysis is a statistical technique to reveal subgroups based on similarity without imposing an a priori structure on the raw data. Groupings through cluster analysis are done in such a way that observations in a cluster are similar to each other while those across different clusters are dissimilar. By grouping the similar observations together and separating the dissimilar ones, each group provides a concise description of similarities and differences in the data.

There are several different methods to generate clusters from data, each depending on a different measure of “distance” between data points within the cluster. The analysis undertaken here uses the Euclidean distance as a measure of distance, and the Ward clustering method to assign countries with similar experiences. The Euclidean distance between the data from two countries X and Y is defined as \( d(X,Y) = \sqrt{\sum (x_j - y_j)^2} \). Assuming that there are \( i = 1,2, \ldots, n_m \) countries with \( j = 1,2, \ldots, J \) variables for each country \( i \) in cluster \( m \), and letting the total number of clusters be \( M \), the Ward method assigns countries in each cluster by minimizing the within cluster variance

\[
W = \sum_{m=1}^{M} \sum_{j=1}^{J} \sum_{i=1}^{n_m} (x_{ijm} - \bar{x}_{j|m})^2,
\]

where \( \bar{x}_{j|m} \) is within cluster mean of variable \( j \) over all countries in the cluster \( m \).

Since the cluster analysis as used here aims to identify the countries that followed a similar development path, focusing on labor market evolutions over time, variables that are thought to affect the main labor market indicators are used for the purposes of clustering the countries. In order to capture the differential growth rates of the size of labor force by gender and age group, the percentage change in the population of each gender and age group (youth and adults) was selected. Likewise, to capture the differential growth rates of employment by gender and age,

\[\text{See Everitt et al. (2001) for a detailed explanation on cluster analysis, including different distance measures and methods.}\]
the percentage changes of the size of the employed population are added. The analysis includes the percentage growth in the number of people working in each sector (agriculture, industry, and service) to reflect the structural transformation in the labor market, and the percentage change in average years of schooling to consider the skills level of the workforce. Finally, to capture the initial state of each country, average GDP per capita during the period of 1995-1999 was also included.

The results of the cluster analysis identify four different development paths, as described in the text. The extent of population aging or the size of the youth bulge, shifts from agriculture to industry and to services, employment growth by gender and age, and progress in education, as well as the initial GDP level are the determining features of each cluster. As the results show, countries from different regions and income levels fall into the same cluster, meaning that they share common patterns of labor market evolution. This suggests that simple grouping by the region and income levels, although a natural first step, masks important heterogeneity within regions or income levels, and commonality across regions and income levels, in the development paths taken by each country.

While cluster analysis provides useful information on different development paths for countries across different regions and income groups, there remain several caveats to this approach. First, the results from cluster analysis can vary widely depending on the methods used, and the scale and type of variables included. The analysis undertaken here is constrained in particular by the availability of data, with the variables used being chosen so as to give as accurate a picture of labor market changes as possible and balance orders of magnitude as much as possible while limiting the number of countries eliminated due to missing data. Thus the grouping from this exercise is not definitive, and a different set of variables could potentially lead to a different set of development paths.

Also, the cluster analysis only groups countries by similarity of observed variables, and in no way implies a causal relation between inputs and outcomes. Once the clusters have been determined, descriptive statistics for other variables that were not used to establish

108 Detailed tables providing descriptive statistics for each cluster are presented in Appendix 2.
membership in the cluster, such as productivity growth, GDP, or National Income growth, or poverty reduction, can be calculated. The discussion does not imply causality, but rather considers how sets of variables move together on average for particular groups of countries. It is important to remember that the stock-taking and grouping of countries into development paths is a descriptive exercise, and more detailed econometric analysis would be required to determine a causal link between the inputs and outcomes as described in this paper.
APPENDIX 2: DETAILED STATISTICS FOR EACH CLUSTER

Table A2.1: Cluster 1 - Middle Income, Rapid Growth, and Structural Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Number of countries</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Number of countries</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent GDP per capita growth</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Percent Labor productivity Growth</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent GNI per capita growth</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Change in $2/day poverty rate</td>
<td>-8.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline average GDP per capita</td>
<td>1224</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Baseline average $2/day poverty rate</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Inputs**

**Labor Force**

- Percent population growth: 12% 25
- Percent working-age population growth: 19% 25
- Percent youth population growth: 15% 25
- Change in female labor force participation: 2.32 25
- Change in youth labor force participation: -1.77 25

**Unemployment**

- Change in adult employment to working age population ratio: 1.38 25
- Change in youth employment to working age population ratio: -0.95 25
- Change in youth unemployment rate: -1.13 25

**Employment**

- Percent employment growth: 21% 25
- Change in agricultural employment share: -5.51 25
- Change in public sector employment share: -0.46 5
- Change in self, unpaid family and household employment share: 0.37 10

**Skills**

- Change in average years of schooling: 0.92 25
- Change in percent literate: 11.96 20

**Countries**

- East Asia & Pacific: China, Indonesia, Philippines
- Europe & Central Asia: Albania, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine
- Latin America & Caribbean: Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Paraguay, Peru
- Middle East & North Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia
- South Asia: India, Maldives, Sri Lanka
- Sub-Saharan Africa: Swaziland, Namibia

Sources: WDI, ILO-KILM.

Notes: "Percentage growth" figures refer to percentage increase in 4-year average value of the period 2005-2008 relative to the 5-year average of values for the baseline period 1995-1999. "Change" figures refer to percentage point change between comparison and baseline intervals. Color code for countries based on income level in 2009: **red**=low income, **blue**=lower middle income and **green**=upper middle income.
### Table A2.2: Cluster 2 - Upper Middle Income, Aging, and Declining Informality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Number of countries</th>
<th>Inputs</th>
<th>Number of countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcomes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent GDP per capita growth</td>
<td>26% 23</td>
<td>Percent Labor productivity Growth</td>
<td>19% 23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent GNI per capita growth</td>
<td>50% 23</td>
<td>Change in $2/day poverty rate</td>
<td>-4.23 11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inputs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline average GDP per capita</td>
<td>3406 23</td>
<td>Baseline average $2/day poverty rate</td>
<td>15% 17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent population growth</td>
<td>9% 23</td>
<td>Change in adult employment to working age population ratio</td>
<td>1.98 23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent working-age population growth</td>
<td>14% 23</td>
<td>Change in youth employment to working age population ratio</td>
<td>-2.86 23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent youth population growth</td>
<td>7% 23</td>
<td>Change in youth unemployment rate</td>
<td>-1.46 23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in female labor force participation</td>
<td>2.40 22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in youth labor force participation</td>
<td>-4.40 23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Labor Force</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Unemployment</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent population growth</td>
<td>9% 23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent working-age population growth</td>
<td>14% 23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent youth population growth</td>
<td>7% 23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in female labor force participation</td>
<td>2.40 22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in youth labor force participation</td>
<td>-4.40 23</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Skills</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in average years of schooling</td>
<td>0.92 23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in percent literate</td>
<td>6.02 16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employment</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent employment growth</td>
<td>16% 23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in agricultural employment share</td>
<td>-2.20 23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in public sector employment share</td>
<td>-0.51 12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in self, unpaid family and household employment share</td>
<td>-1.33 17</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Countries</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia &amp; Pacific</td>
<td>Fiji, Malaysia, Thailand</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe &amp; Central Asia</td>
<td>Bulgaria, Lithuania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Turkey</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latin America &amp; Caribbean</td>
<td>Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay</td>
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<tr>
<td>Middle East &amp; North Africa</td>
<td>South Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>Botswana, Gabon, Mauritius, South Africa</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: WDI, ILO-KILM.
Notes: “Percentage growth” figures refer to percentage increase in 4-year average value of the period 2005-2008 relative to the 5-year average of values for the baseline period 1995-1999. “Change” figures refer to percentage point change between comparison and baseline intervals. Color code for countries based on income level in 2009: red=low income, blue=lower middle income and green=upper middle income.
### Table A2.3: Cluster 3 - Very Low Income, Young, Balanced Employment Growth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Number of countries</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Number of countries</th>
<th>Mean</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent GDP per capita growth</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Percent Labor productivity Growth</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent GNI per capita growth</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Change in $2/day poverty rate</td>
<td>-6.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inputs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline average GDP per capita</td>
<td>208.7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Baseline average $2/day poverty rate</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Labor Force</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent population growth</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Change in adult employment to working age population ratio</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent working-age population growth</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Change in youth employment to working age population ratio</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent youth population growth</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Change in youth unemployment rate</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in female labor force participation</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in youth labor force participation</td>
<td>0.04</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Unemployment</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent employment growth</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Change in agricultural employment share</td>
<td>-4.08</td>
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<tr>
<td>Change in public sector employment share</td>
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<td>Change in self, unpaid family and household employment share</td>
<td>15.56</td>
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<td><strong>Skills</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Change in average years of schooling</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Change in percent literate</td>
<td>15.57</td>
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<td><strong>Employment</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Bangladesh, Nepal</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Burundi, Central African Republic, Ghana, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Togo, Uganada, Zambia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: WDI, ILO-KILM.

Notes: “Percentage growth” figures refer to percentage increase in 4-year average value of the period 2005-2008 relative to the 5-year average of values for the baseline period 1995-1999. “Change” figures refer to percentage point change between comparison and baseline intervals. Color code for countries based on income level in 2009: red=low income, blue=lower middle income and green=upper middle income.
### Table A2.4: Cluster 4 - Low Income, Slow Productivity Growth, Structural Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Mean Number of Countries</th>
<th>Mean Number of Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent GDP per capita growth</td>
<td>18% 13</td>
<td>Percent Labor productivity growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent GNI per capita growth</td>
<td>40% 13</td>
<td>Change in $2/day poverty rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inputs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline average GDP per capita</td>
<td>463.7 13</td>
<td>Baseline average $2/day poverty rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Force</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent population growth</td>
<td>21% 13</td>
<td>Change in adult employment to working age population ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent working-age population growth</td>
<td>27% 13</td>
<td>Change in youth employment to working age population ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent youth population growth</td>
<td>26% 13</td>
<td>Change in youth unemployment rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in female labor force participation</td>
<td>2.74 13</td>
<td>Employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in youth labor force participation</td>
<td>-1.67 13</td>
<td>Percent employment growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td></td>
<td>Change in agricultural employment share</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skills</td>
<td></td>
<td>Change in public sector employment share</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in average years of schooling</td>
<td>0.86 13</td>
<td>Change in self, unpaid family and household employment share</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in percent literate</td>
<td>11.66 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Countries                                    |                           |
| East Asia & Pacific                          | Mongolia, Papua New Guinea |
| Europe & Central Asia                        | Kyrgyz Republic           |
| Latin America & Caribbean                   | Nicaragua                 |
| Middle East & North Africa                  | Yemen                     |
| South Asia                                  | Pakistan                  |
| Sub-Saharan Africa                           | Benin, Cameroon, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritania, Senegal, Sudan |

Sources: WDI, ILO-KILM.

Notes: "Percentage growth" figures refer to percentage increase in 4-year average value of the period 2005-2008 relative to the 5-year average of values for the baseline period 1995-1999. "Change" figures refer to percentage point change between comparison and baseline intervals. Color code for countries based on income level in 2009: red=low income, blue=lower middle income and green=upper middle income.
Table A2.5: Cluster 5 - Residual Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Number of countries</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Number of countries</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent GDP per capita growth</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Percent Labor productivity Growth</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent GNI per capita growth</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Change in $2/day poverty rate</td>
<td>-11.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inputs</td>
<td>Baseline average GDP per capita</td>
<td>1434</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>Baseline average $2/day poverty rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>Change in adult employment to working age population ratio</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Change in youth employment to working age population ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>Percent employment growth</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Change in agricultural employment share</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in youth unemployment rate</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Change in self, unpaid family and household employment share</td>
<td>-0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skills</td>
<td>Change in average years of schooling</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Change in public sector employment share</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Change in percent literate</td>
<td>13.09</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Change in self, unpaid family and household employment share</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Source: WDI, ILO-KILM. Notes: “Percentage growth” figures refer to percentage increase in 4-year average value of the period 2005-2008 relative to the 5-year average of values for the baseline period 1995-1999. “Change” figures refer to percentage point change between comparison and baseline intervals. Color code for countries based on income level in 2009: red=low income, blue=lower middle income and green=upper middle income.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Asia &amp; Pacific</td>
<td>Kiribati, DR (North) Korea, Lao PDR, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Myanmar, Palau, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe &amp; Central Asia</td>
<td>Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America &amp; Caribbean</td>
<td>Cuba, Grenada, Haiti, Suriname, Venezuela</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East &amp; North Africa</td>
<td>Djibouti, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, West Bank and Gaza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Bhutan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>Angola, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, Comoros, DR Congo, Rep of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Nigeria, São Tomé and Príncipe, Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# APPENDIX 3: REGIONAL PRIORITIES CONCERNING LABOR MARKETS

## Table A3.1: Key Issues in Employment by Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Income Level</th>
<th>Type (# of countries)</th>
<th>Key Issues</th>
<th>Main Messages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| SSA    | LIC - LMIC   | 1 (2) 2 (4) 3 (13) 4 (7) 5 (20) | * Informal/agriculture sector productivity  
  * Youth skills and employment  
  * Business environment (e.g. infrastructure, transaction costs associated with government) | * Improve basic education and ensure learning (World Bank, 2008)  
  * Broaden employment/business opportunities and provide second chance learning (World Bank, 2008)  
  * Invest in infrastructure and business environment (Fox and Gaal, 2009) |
| SA     | LMIC-UIC     | 1 (3) 2 (0) 3 (2) 4 (1) 5 (2) | * More and better jobs: infrastructure and labor regulation  
  * Informal sector productivity and protection  
  * Skills of workforce (particularly women) | * Address constraints to business including infrastructure, labor regulation, conflicts (World Bank, 2011)  
  * Improve the effectiveness of labor market institutions in protection  
  * Provide basic skills (literacy/numeracy) training |
| EAP    | LMIC-UMIC    | 1 (3) 2 (3) 3 (1) 4 (2) 5 (10) | * Informal sector's productivity and protection  
  * Social insurance system with wider coverage  
  * Skills development | * Provide protection to the uncovered population (Wagstaff et al., 2009)  
  * Improve both vocational and academic education (Jimenez, 2011) |
| MENA   | LMIC-UMIC    | 1 (6) 2 (0) 3 (0) 4 (1) 5 (5) | * Youth and female employment (unemployment)  
  * Labor regulation  
  * Informality/public sector employment | * Provide work opportunities particularly for youth and women, and improve job matching (Briefs, 2011)  
  * Ensure labor market flexibility and incentive compatible tax system (Angel Urdinola and Kudo, 2010)  
  * Reduce public sector dominance in formal employment, and improve productivity and protection for informal sector (Gatti et al. forthcoming; Dhillon and Yousef, 2010) |
| ECA    | UMIC-LMIC    | 1 (4) 2 (5) 3 (1) 4 (1) 5 (10) | * Population ageing and sustainability of social insurance  
  * Youth unemployment  
  * Investment climate including labor regulation | * Reform social insurance for incentive compatible and sustainable design (Holzman et al, 2009; Mukesh et al. 2007)  
  * Provide the second chance learning, encourage entrepreneurship, and get the private sector involved (World Bank, 2007)  
  * Ensure investment climate conducive to job creation and reduce rigidity of labor regulation (Kudo, 2009) |
| LAC    | UMIC-LMIC    | 1 (7) 2 (11) 3 (0) 4 (1) 5 (4) | * Informal sector protection without labor market distortion  
  * Labor regulation  
  * Quality education and skills for the future | * Establish an incentive compatible social insurance and labor institutions (Ribe et al. 2010)  
  * Reduce labor market regulation and entry barrier (Kaplan, 2009)  
## APPENDIX 4: SUMMARY OF THE WORLD BANK’S RECENT STUDIES BY TOPIC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study/Report</th>
<th>Region/Country</th>
<th>Main Question</th>
<th>Main Messages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Informality</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loayza and Rigolini</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Cyclicality of informal sector.</td>
<td>Informal employment is in general counter-cyclical, and the extent of counter-cyclicality is lower with larger informal sector and better police and judicial services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2006)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perry et al. (2007)</td>
<td>LAC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not only from exclusion, but also an existing incentive is an important source of the expansion of informality. Policy suggestions include the following areas: (i) productivity for both formal and informal; (ii) social protection for all; (iii) formalization; (iv) enforcement; (v) legitimacy of the state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank (forthcoming-a)</td>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Informality: definition, motivation, dynamics, earnings, productivity, social protection, and institutions.</td>
<td>Informality is examined in the context of the region’s labor market, where the segmentation between the public and private sector, employment gap in gender, and youth bulge exist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank (forthcoming-b)</td>
<td>ECA</td>
<td></td>
<td>Institutions related to tax policy and administration, social insurance, and education may encourage workers to enter and stay in the informal sector, and the role of institutions will be examined.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levy (2008)</td>
<td>LAC</td>
<td>The effect of providing benefits to the informal sector.</td>
<td>Adding a separate social policy for the informal sector is believed to unduly encourage a low productivity informal sector, intensify the segmentation of labor market, hamper economic growth, and do little to help reduce poverty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sakhthivel and Joddar (2006)</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Social security coverage for the unorganized workforce in India.</td>
<td>The majority of the workforce in India works in unorganized sector and is not covered by social security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Insurance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holzman et al. (2009)</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Expanding social pension to those not covered.</td>
<td>Voluntary social insurance system, universal and delinked from work status, with financial incentives to increase the take up would be useful to reduce the coverage gap.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsiao, Shaw and Fraker (2007)</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>SHI in various developing countries.</td>
<td>Each country case shows policy considerations for each step of SHI from design, to implementation, to expansion, and to ultimately universal coverage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vodopivec (2009)</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Unemployment insurance</td>
<td>Given large informal sector, weak administrative capacity, large political risks, and corruption in developing countries, this study suggests 5 adaptations from the standard UI system: (i) self-insurance; (ii) simplified monitoring of job-search</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ribe et al. (2010) LAC Social insurance including pension, unemployment, and health insurance as well as other protection measures. Framework for social insurance for all (universal coverage), with adequate mandate system (well-defined contribution and payment) and subsidy (redistribution) is suggested.

Rafael et al. (2008) LAC Coverage of pension programs in 18 countries in LAC. The coverage of employed workers increases with income quintile and firm size; little progress was made from 1990s to 2000s.

World Bank (2003). ECA Old age pension. Pension expenditures, socioeconomic and demographic structure change, and EU integration require reform in pensions: parametric change diversifying the source of funding and paradigm change overhauling the system.

World Bank (2009) ECA Impacts of the great recession on pension system in ECA. Given a larger challenge of demographic structure, the government is advised not to make any long term policy changes to address the short term fiscal concerns due to the great recession.

Mukesh et al. (2007) ECA Population aging and its implications on LM, financial market, pension system, public expenditure, and education. In order to prevent old age poverty and facilitate consumption smoothing in the face of population aging, not only parametric reform but also substantial design change of pension systems should be considered.

World Bank, (2010a) China Social Health Insurance (SHI). Integrating segmented medical insurance systems and setting up a monitoring framework is critical.

Wagstaff et al. (2009) China SHI. The impact evaluation of Chinese voluntary health insurance system shows that it has increased outpatient and inpatient utilization, and has reduced the cost of deliveries. But it has not reduced out-of-pocket expenses per outpatient visit or inpatient spell.

Thorton et al. (2010) Nicaragua Randomized experiments: Social health insurance. The impact evaluation of voluntary social health insurance in Nicaragua shows that designing benefits and premiums conducive to take-up is important.


**ALMPS**

Angel-Urdinola and Kuddo (2010) MENA Review of ALMPs for youth in MENA. There are issues to be addressed in coordination, the type and objectives, targeting, accreditation, and monitoring and evaluation of the programs.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Card et al. (2011)</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>Impact of classroom and private internship training on employability of low income, unskilled youth.</td>
<td>Negligible impacts on employment and positive effects on earnings (10%), but not significant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attanasio et al. (2008)</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>3 months in class + 3 months on-the-job training (OJT).</td>
<td>Significantly positive effects on employment and earnings for both males (8%) and females (18%), with larger impacts on females. Impacts from in class training but not from OJT.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Education**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WDR (2007)</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Policies for youth with focus on school to work transition (education and labor market policy).</td>
<td>Great progress toward completion of primary schooling, but large dropout at secondary level and lack of basic skills even after completion of primary school poses new challenges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank (2010b)</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Early Childhood Development (ECD).</td>
<td>Guide provides: (i) existing information on the usefulness of ECD; (ii) practical information on recently relevant ECD topics, such as measuring child development outcomes and policy instruments; and (iii) latest evidence on intervention and major knowledge gaps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank (2010c)</td>
<td>LAC</td>
<td>Early Childhood Development (ECD)</td>
<td>Important to intervene during the window of opportunity from conception to 24 months.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank (2008)</td>
<td>Ghana and Pakistan</td>
<td>Education policy relevant for LM returns.</td>
<td>High returns to basic cognitive skills exist, especially in lower income countries. Not only increasing completion rate of primary schools (quantity) but also quality improvement to ensure skills development in primary school is also critical.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank (2010d)</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Education policy for transition to work and quality jobs.</td>
<td>Ensure basic quality and generic skills development in schools, rather than increasing the number of vocational schools.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Labor Market Regulation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freeman (2009)</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Relationship between labor market institutions and economic performance.</td>
<td>It is not clear that the labor market institutions strongly affect economic performance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boeri et al. (2008)</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>LM institutions and regulations, and functioning of LM (Minimum Wage (MW), Minimum Benefits(MB), Employment Protection Legislation (EPL), Unemployment Insurance Benefits(UIB)).</td>
<td>Theoretical background and international evidence of the effects of each institution and regulations on economic performance, to shed light on policies in developing countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fox and Oviedo (2008)</td>
<td>AFR</td>
<td>LM institutions and outcomes.</td>
<td>Labor institutions are not a main barrier to labor market outcomes. Used legal origin (former British colony or not) and Doing Business indicators to proxy for strict legal regulation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Key Policies</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angel-Urdinola and Kudo (2010)</td>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>LM regulations.</td>
<td>EPL in MENA is rigid by international standards, as other labor institutions such as collective bargaining are not in effect. It works as a barrier to employment with large heterogeneity across countries, and needs to be modernized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuddo (2009)</td>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>Labor code reform.</td>
<td>There is large heterogeneity; there have been reforms across many ECA countries; reform of the national employment protection legislation has focused on easing existing regulation to facilitate more contractual diversity; labor law still plays an important role in protecting workers as collective bargaining is not widespread in ECA countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank (2005)</td>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>LM institutions.</td>
<td>Strong institutions, enforcement capacity, and employment protection work as a barrier to job creation and need to be addressed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garcia and Fares (2008)</td>
<td>AFR</td>
<td>Policies for youth.</td>
<td>De-regulation to remove market segmentation, investment in human capital, and ALMPS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Besley and Burgess (2004)</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>LM regulations and labor productivity.</td>
<td>Not only being a barrier to job creation, labor regulation could also be an impediment to productivity by preventing mobility and productivity enhancing labor reallocations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharma (2009)</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>LM regulations and labor productivity.</td>
<td>Deregulation and flexible labor law can facilitate labor mobility moves from informal to formal sector.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Job creation, Productivity, and Growth**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Key Policies</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ayyagari et al. (2011)</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Contribution of SMEs in employment, job creation, and growth.</td>
<td>Small and young firms have higher job creation rates than large and mature firms, in developing countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank, (forthcoming-c)</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Constraints to better jobs: low productivity despite progress in education, and business environment (infrastructure, conflicts, and institutions).</td>
<td>Labor market institutions need reform; raising agriculture productivity is important; differentiating policy for conflict affected areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fox and Gaal, (2010)</td>
<td>AFR</td>
<td>In non-oil exporting but fast growing countries, why job growth is so small? Economic environment for job creation: demographics, wage and salaried employment, economic growth and structural change in wage employment changes between 1995-2005.</td>
<td>Argues that labor market is relatively flexible and labor regulation is not the main issue, but business costs captured in doing business including transaction costs with government and infrastructure should be addressed to increase quality employment (measured as wage employment).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author (Year)</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Focus</td>
<td>Summary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank (2005)</td>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>Productivity, investment climate, and labor market institutions and job creation.</td>
<td>Increasing pace of job creation and facilitating the reallocation of jobs and workers to more productive sector is needed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IADB(2009)</td>
<td>LAC</td>
<td>Long term dynamics of employment, jobless growth, low productivity growth, regulation for worker protection, social security, main barriers to firms' growth (constraints in investment climate), and role of regulation.</td>
<td>Creation of good jobs: business environment, protection against unemployment, ALMPs, and improving quality of jobs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaplan (2009)</td>
<td>LAC</td>
<td>Effects of labor regulation reform on job creation.</td>
<td>Labor regulation reform increased overall employment, and in particular, small firms benefited more.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank (2007b)</td>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Job creation.</td>
<td>With continued economic growth, employment increased with a large increase in working age population. It is important to create jobs in more productive areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank (2010e)</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Low productivity informal, dual formal, regional differences, labor regulations, and ALMP.</td>
<td>Regulatory reforms and active labor market policies are particularly important for job creation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank (2010f)</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Labor market regulation, skills development, safety net.</td>
<td>More unemployment benefits and lower severance payments; quality improvement in vocational schools and additional training facilities for a second chance; more inclusive social protection rather than focusing on formal sectors.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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REFERENCES


—. 2010c. The Promise of Early Child Development in Latin America and the Caribbean. Washington DC.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Publication Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1210</td>
<td>Climate-Responsive Social Protection</td>
<td>Anne T. Kuriakose, Rasmus Heltberg, William Wiseman, Cecilia Costella, Rachel Cipryk, Sabine Cornelius</td>
<td>March 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1209</td>
<td>Social Protection in Low Income Countries and Fragile Situations: Challenges and Future Directions</td>
<td>Colin Andrews, Maitreyi Das, John Elder, Mirey Ovadiya, Giuseppe Zampaglione</td>
<td>March 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1207</td>
<td>Labor Markets in Middle and Low Income Countries: Trends and Implications for Social Protection and Labor Policies</td>
<td>Yoonyoung Cho, David Margolis, David Newhouse, David Robalino</td>
<td>March 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1206</td>
<td>Rules, Roles and Controls: Governance in Social Protection with an Application to Social Assistance</td>
<td>Lucy Bassett, Sara Giannozzi, Lucian Pop, Dena Ringold</td>
<td>March 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1205</td>
<td>Crisis Response in Social Protection</td>
<td>Federica Marzo, Hideki Mori</td>
<td>March 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1204</td>
<td>Improving Access to Jobs and Earnings Opportunities: The Role of Activation and Graduation Policies In Developing Countries</td>
<td>Rita Almeida, Juliana Arbelaez, Maddalena Honorati, Arvo Kuddo, Tanja Lohmann, Mirey Ovadiya, Lucian Pop, Maria Laura Sanchez Puerta, Michael Weber</td>
<td>March 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1203</td>
<td>Productive Role of Safety Nets</td>
<td>Harold Alderman, Ruslan Yemtsov</td>
<td>March 2012</td>
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Abstract

The paper develops an operational definition of governance that can be applied to social protection. The 2004 WDR accountability framework acts as a starting point, defining accountability in terms of a set of principal-agent relationships between policymakers, providers, and citizens. Applying this framework to social protection, the paper looks at three broad areas where the Bank is involved in governance in social protection: rules of the game, including clear criteria for entry and exit of programs; roles and responsibilities, including defining accountability relationships and incentive frameworks across levels of government and institutions involved in social protection; and controls and accountability measures, including the broad set of implementation mechanisms and procedures for ensuring that “the right benefit gets to the right person at the right time”. The paper applies this framework to social assistance policies and programs, reviews what is currently being done across the Bank in this area, and identifies future opportunities for clients and Bank engagement.

Rules, Roles and Controls

Governance in Social Protection with an Application to Social Assistance

Lucy Bassett, Sara Giannozzi, Lucian Pop and Dena Ringold


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