



1. Project Data:		Date Posted : 08/14/2000	
PROJ ID: P044424		Appraisal	Actual
Project Name: War Victims Project	Project Costs (US\$M)	28.9	17.6
Country: Bosnia-Herzegovina	Loan/Credit (US\$M)	10	9.6
Sector(s): Other Population Health & Nutrition	Cofinancing (US\$M)	17	8.05
L/C Number: C2896			
	Board Approval (FY)		96
Partners involved :	Closing Date	12/31/1998	12/31/1999

Prepared by :	Reviewed by :	Group Manager :	Group:

2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

- to help reintegrate people with war-related disabilities into productive life;
- to introduce a more cost-effective approach for dealing with disabilities;
 - to support the development of local and regional capacity to manage and deliver rehabilitation services .

b. Components

(a) **Community-Based Rehabilitation (CBR) - US\$5.5 m.** establishment of 76 locally based physical and psycho-social rehabilitation centers within or appended to existing health centers ; (b) **Prostheses and Orthoses Production - US\$4.4m.** three main production units and five maintenance/service units, plus training to 75 technicians in prosthetic manufacture; (c) **Orthopedic and Reconstructive Surgery - US\$6.7m.** through limited civil works and provision of surgical instruments, supplies and pharmaceuticals upgrade orthopedic and reconstructive surgical services in three clinical centers (in Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Mostar) and in four cantonal hospitals (in Zenica, Travnik, Livno, and Bihac), plus training abroad to approximately 50 professionals involved in orthopedic and reconstructive surgery; (d) **Project Implementation - US\$1.0m.** establishment of a project implementation unit (PIU) and salaries and operations expenses, and the provision of a full -time implementation advisor for two years to the Ministry of Health.

c. Comments on Project Cost, Financing and Dates

Final cost of US\$17.6m. was only 61% of total estimated at appraisal; only 40% of expected co-financing materialized. At completion, Bank loan disbursements of US\$ 9.6m. financed 55% of the project. The remainder was co-financed by other donors, including the Canadian CIDA and European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO). The project was approved on 06/28/96 and its closing date was extended for one year .

3. Achievement of Relevant Objectives:

- 1. (reintegration) was achieved satisfactorily. Although conclusive quantitative estimates are not available, service quality improved and surgical capacity was enhanced in the CBR centers established . To date, 400,000 therapeutic procedures have been provided through the CBR system, but this figure could not be broken down by type of treatment, nor is the proportion due to war injuries known .
- 2. (cost-effective approach) To date, there is no evidence to indicate whether this objective was achieved or not . No explicit performance targets were set at appraisal, nor were unit costs of services monitored during implementation, precluding an assessment of the achievement of this objective .
- 3 (increased local capacity) Satisfactorily achieved through the increased local and regional provision particularly of physical rehabilitation. With respect to local mental health care, however, there has been under -achievement since only 70% of mental health CBRs are currently operating as intended .

4. Significant Outcomes/Impacts:

- The successful establishment of a network of production and treatment centers through the Federation entity in the face of on-going ethnic tensions and very weak governance .
- Re-laying the groundwork for applying a consistent methodology for tracking patients and patient services, that had been disrupted by the war .
- Introduction of good practice of procurement through competitive bidding, which accounted for 95% of project expenditures. By completion ICB alone accounted for 65% of all expenditures, even though no ICB was

foreseen at appraisal.

5. Significant Shortcomings (including non-compliance with safeguard policies):

- The project did not benefit war victims in the Republika Srpska entity of the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina .
- Project preparation mobilized only 40% of donor cofinancing foreseen, proportionately undercutting the physical outputs of the project.
- Lack of explicit performance targets in project design and inadequate monitoring of project implementation and results achieved. Among other things, this led to a shortage of performance -related unit cost data which would have permitted an assessment of objective 2 (more cost-effectiveness). A simple monitoring system focused upon a few key variables relating project outputs to intended outcomes would have sufficed .

6. Ratings :	ICR	OED Review	Reason for Disagreement /Comments
Outcome :	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Some achievements but smaller coverage than intended and inadequate attention to both physical outputs and final outcomes in design and implementation.
Institutional Dev .:		Modest	
Sustainability :	Likely	Likely	
Bank Performance :	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Through neglect of performance indicators in design and during supervision, the Bank failed to ensure that outcomes, or even all outputs, would be fully achieved. Vigorous pursuit of just a few, but key output/outcome indicators would have sufficed.
Borrower Perf .:	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Failure to track the outcomes, or even outputs, of project investments. As in the case of the Bank, a deliberate focus upon a few simple output/outcome indicators might have helped steer this project toward greater success.
Quality of ICR :		Satisfactory	

NOTE: ICR rating values flagged with '*' don't comply with OP/BP 13.55, but are listed for completeness.

7. Lessons of Broad Applicability:

The ICR highlights the following three lessons :

- Sufficient staff must be deployed for implementation (procurement, disbursement and supervision tasks and--even in a difficult post-conflict situation--for monitoring and evaluation (inc. a patient and service tracking system).
- Strengthening procurement capacity in the immediate post conflict situation --where a borrower typically has insufficient skills in this area--is essential to overcome delays in implementation .
- It is necessary to match post-conflict objectives to long-term objectives. This project took the opportunity of the post-conflict situation to meet immediate needs and to introduce a new model of care that, while now widely accepted as standard in OECD and some developing countries, was a radical shift for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The introduction of this new paradigm may not have been possible in Bosnia and Herzegovina under any other circumstances .

Two more lessons derive from the experience :

- Even in a disruptive post-conflict situation of physical and institutional devastation, project design should incorporate explicit performance targets and arrangements to monitor and evaluate their achievement . These need be only a few and simple, but which directly relate project outputs to the intended development outcomes. A sophisticated multi-variate monitoring system is not necessary to effectively track outcomes that reveal the efficacy and efficiency of project performance .
- Some proportion of Bank project preparation and supervision effort should be focused upon securing the ownership of co-financing donors and keeping them on board .

8. Assessment Recommended? Yes No

9. Comments on Quality of ICR:

This is a good ICR that provides the reader with a clear account of the project achievement, is candid about project shortcomings and provides meaningful lessons that can be usefully applied to future operations . The ICR's repeated emphasis upon the project's main objective provides a clear focus for an evaluation which demonstrates a clear understanding of the differences between project outputs and results as far as this operation is concerned . This ICR would have been rated exemplary had there been a more thorough treatment of the limited information available on

performance indicators (Annex 1) which, among other things, could have reported quantified results in terms of number of people treated, number of surgeries performed etc . expressing these as a percentage of the total need/demand, for instance. Also the ICR could have reported more on the important experience of partnership with co-financing donors, indicating among other things, amounts financed by whom and why there was such a shortfall in relation to the co-financing expected.