



1. Project Data:		Date Posted : 04/29/2002	
PROJ ID: P035996		Appraisal	Actual
Project Name: Education And Health Rehabilitation Project	Project Costs (US\$M)	49.04	49.04
Country: West Bank & Gaza	Loan/Credit (US\$M)	20	20
Sector(s): Board: ED - Health (33%), Primary education (28%), Secondary education (28%), Central government administration (11%)	Cofinancing (US\$M)	29.04	29.04
L/C Number:			
	Board Approval (FY)		95
Partners involved :	Closing Date	06/30/1999	06/30/2001
Prepared by :	Reviewed by :	Group Manager :	Group:
Ronald G. Ridker	Timothy A. Johnston	Alain A. Barbu	OEDST
2. Project Objectives and Components			
a. Objectives			
To assist the Ministries of Education and of Health to develop sustainable sector strategies and establish themselves as effective institutions by providing support in three areas: (1) rehabilitation and essential expansion of selected education and health facilities; (2) improvement in service provision; and (3) capacity building and institutional development of both ministries.			
b. Components			
Project components included (appraisal estimate/final cost): (1) Upgrade physical infrastructure (\$94.58/\$43.11), (2) Improve quality of service (\$25.75/\$2.55) and (3) Develop institutional capacity (\$5.97/\$2.11)			
c. Comments on Project Cost, Financing and Dates			
The appraisal identified substantially greater needs than could be funded at the time. Accordingly, the Bank agreed with the government on a set of core activities funded by the Trust Fund for Gaza and encouraged other donors to provide co-financing for other pieces. In the end, the Bank contributed \$20 million and co-financiers (notably Saudi Arabia, Italy and Australia) \$29.04 million to this project. The project required five years and nine months to complete, two years longer than originally estimated.			
3. Achievement of Relevant Objectives:			
The project met or exceeded all its physical targets. For example, 30 school buildings, rather than the originally planned 24, were replace or rehabilitated and 10 health centers, as originally planned, were replaced or expanded. Service quality improvement activities included the establishment of an interdisciplinary Quality Improvement team to continuously identify and promote health improvements, and the establishment of health education program, as planned in the SAR. Efforts to develop the two ministries' institutional capacity had mixed results, on balance considered marginally satisfactory.			
4. Significant Outcomes/Impacts:			
Significant achievements included the upgrading or construction of schools serving a total of 22,000 students with a special emphasis on girls (13,950 of the 22,000), the successful establishment of the Quality Improvement Program, and health education programs in both ministries, and the establishment of two effective Project Coordination Units integrated into their respective ministries.			
5. Significant Shortcomings (including non-compliance with safeguard policies):			
The Quality Improvement Program, while generally successful, tended to try implementing QI actions itself rather than facilitating the relevant management units to do so, thereby threatening to create a parallel management structure and raising questions about ownership and sustainability of its actions. The quality of technical assistance provided to the MOH to prepare a five year Plan for Health was inadequate and a study designed to address MOH's			

need to expand the use of information technology failed to provide the desired outputs.

6. Ratings:	ICR	OED Review	Reason for Disagreement /Comments
Outcome:	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Rehabilitation component was satisfactory; data on improvement in service delivery is inadequate; physical capacity of ministries was satisfactory but other aspects of capacity building were modest.
Institutional Dev .:	Substantial	Modest	Implementing agencies' capacity was substantially improved, but other dimensions of ID failed to produce much and little or no effort was made to develop MIS capacity.
Sustainability:	Likely	Non-evaluable	ICR ignores the intifada, Israeli army actions, deteriorating economy and cessation of most foreign aid programs . But things could change dramatically in the next 6-12 months.
Bank Performance:	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	
Borrower Perf .:	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	
Quality of ICR:		Satisfactory	

NOTE: ICR rating values flagged with '*' don't comply with OP/BP 13.55, but are listed for completeness.

7. Lessons of Broad Applicability:

- The key to a successful project in a post-conflict context, with newly formed and inexperienced government agencies is to establish a simple project with modest goals and spell out staffing requirements, responsibilities and implementation steps in considerable detail.
- For technical assistance to be available when and as needed, agencies must be very clear about their needs and absorptive capacity. Also, the parameters for TA must be clearly spelled out, to avoid the creation of parallel management structures and to ensure that the beneficiary develops its own implementation capacity.
- Integration of implementing units into ministries regular activities and continuity of staff are essential for sustaining capacities created by a project after the project has closed.

8. Assessment Recommended? Yes No

9. Comments on Quality of ICR:

While the overall rating of the ICR is satisfactory, there are some disturbing omissions. There is no satisfactory explanation for why the project closed two years later than planned; no satisfactory plan is included for covering recurrent costs of the additional student and health system loads; and, most serious, there is no mention (apart from saying that border closing resulted in some delays) in the ICR, which is dated 12/17/01, of the effects on implementation and sustainability of the intifada, Israeli army actions, the deteriorating economy and capacity to provide public services, and cessation of most aid programs.