Report Number : ICRR0021155

1. Project Data

Project ID P127200	**Project Name** TG Community Development and Safety Nets	
Country Togo	**Practice Area(Lead)** Social Protection & Labor	**Additional Financing** P146598,P146598
L/C/TF Number(s) IDA-53910,IDA-H7670	**Closing Date (Original)** 31-Jul-2015	**Total Project Cost (USD)** 24,805,876.24
Bank Approval Date 22-Mar-2012	**Closing Date (Actual)** 31-Jul-2017	

	IBRD/IDA (USD)	Grants (USD)
Original Commitment	14,000,000.00	0.00
Revised Commitment	26,100,000.00	0.00
Actual	24,808,033.13	0.00

Prepared by	Reviewed by	ICR Review Coordinator	Group
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2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

The Project Development Objective (PDO) was to provide poor communities in the Borrower's territory with greater access to basic socio-economic infrastructure and social safety nets (Financing Agreement, Schedule 1). The formulation of the PDO in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) was almost identical, only omitting "in the Borrower’s territory": "to provide poor communities with greater access to basic socio-economic infrastructures and social safety nets" (PAD page 4 para 11). This review is based on the formulation of the PDO in the Financing Agreement.

Some outcome targets were revised at a March 2014 restructuring, but since both the original and revised targets were met, this validation will not perform a split rating.

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?
Yes

Did the Board approve the revised objectives/key associated outcome targets?
Yes

Date of Board Approval
07-Mar-2014

c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?
No

d. Components
The project had three components:
Component 1: Community subprojects (Appraisal: US$7 million; Total Actual: US$13 million). This component was to promote community development with a Community-Driven Development (CDD) approach through two subcomponents:

- **Subcomponent 1.1:** Infrastructure construction and rehabilitation (Appraisal: US$6 million; Total Actual: US$12 million). This was to facilitate beneficiary access to improved health, education, water and sanitation, and other socio-economic infrastructure through approximately 170 subprojects costing no more than US$60,000 each.
- **Subcomponent 1.2:** Income generating activities (IGAs) (Appraisal: US$1 million; Total Actual: US$1 million). This was to finance approximately 150 IGAs costing no more than US$5,000 each, benefiting small groups within the targeted vulnerable communities and consisting primarily of small projects in fishing, arts and crafts, and the production, transportation, storage, and marketing of agricultural products.

Component 2: Social Safety Nets (Appraisal: US$ 4.2 million; Total Actual: US$5.2 million). This component had two subcomponents.

- **Subcomponent 2.1:** Labor Intensive Public Works (Appraisal: US$2.2 million; Total Actual: US$2.2 million). This was to provide temporary employment opportunities to about 10,000 poor individuals by financing works such as restoration of degraded lands, water and soil conservation, and feeder road maintenance. At least 60 percent of the total budget for activities was to go to labor costs, and youth were to represent at least 70 percent of the labor force.

- **Subcomponent 2.2:** Pilot Cash Transfers (Appraisal: US$2 million, Total Actual: US$3 million). This was to complement a UNICEF-financed Nutritional Care Project operating in 565 villages by piloting a cash transfer (CT) program targeting children at risk of malnutrition or already severely malnourished in the northern regions where malnutrition rates were the highest. Monthly CTs were to be provided to children's mothers/caretakers, together with growth monitoring and training sessions for caregivers on health, hygiene, and nutrition. The CT was to be approximately US$10 per child aged 6-24 months or severely malnourished, for a maximum of 18 months. Soft conditionalities were to include having a birth certificate for the child, attending training and growth monitoring sessions, and schooling older siblings. Strong compliance was to be rewarded with extra cash.
- **Subcomponent 2.3:** School feeding program (Restructuring: US$5 million; Total Actual: US$7.1 million). This subcomponent, added at the first restructuring in February 2014, was to provide continuous support to the school feeding model developed and financed under the previous Community Development Project (P110943, 2008-2013) and finance feeding programs for 35,000 students in targeted schools for the 2014-15 school year. Village women were to prepare and distribute meals through parent-teacher associations and with the support of local non-governmental organizations.

Component 3: Management and Operating Costs (Appraisal: US$2.8 million; Total Actual: US$4.4 million). This component was to finance salaries and operating costs of the five regional implementing agencies and of the Technical Secretariat. It also included monitoring and evaluation activities, information and communication campaigns, financial and technical audits, and consulting services.

e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates

Project Cost

The total project costs were originally estimated at US$14.35 million. At the restructuring and Additional Financing, estimated total costs increased to US$29.7 million. The ICR reported actual total project costs at US$24.81 million, but this accounted only for Bank costs and did not take counterpart financing or co-financing into consideration.

Financing

The project was originally to be financed by a US$14 million Grant from the International Development Association (IDA). A US$12.1 million Credit was added as Additional Financing at the March 2014 restructuring. Actual disbursements were US$13.76 million from the Grant, and US$11.05 million from the Credit. The pilot cash transfer program was co-financed by the Japanese Social Development Fund (JSDF) with a Grant amount of US$2.55 million (ICR, para 37). According to the Government of Togo (comments received by email on September 11th, 2018), the total project cost was US$28.65 million (comprising of the initial IDA grant of US$14 million, a second Japanese grant of US$2.55 million and a third IDA credit financing of US$12.1 million).

Borrower contribution

The government contribution was originally estimated at US$0.35 million, comprised of community contributions to subprojects. At the Additional Financing, with the scaling up of activities, it was estimated that the government would contribute an additional US$3.6 million: US$1.5 million for cash transfers and

US$2.6 million to support the school feeding program. The main text of the ICR did not report on the actual government contribution, but in the summary of the Government's ICR (page 53 of the ICR), it is stated that over the five years of the project, the Togolese Government allocated 5.4 billion CFA francs and that 77.5% of that amount was disbursed.

Dates
The project was approved on March 22, 2012 and became effective on July 10, 2012. The project went through one level-1 restructuring (March 2014), and two level-2 restructurings on February 1, 2017 and May 2, 2017. The first restructuring in March 2014 provided Additional Financing and extended the project's closing date by 14 months from July 31, 2015 to September 30, 2016. This was to allow sufficient time for the implementation of additional activities and scaling up of the project; outcome targets were revised upward. The second restructuring in June 2015 extended the closing date of the original Grant by 14 months to (i) provide additional time to make use of a local currency surplus due to currency fluctuations in the Euro relative to Special Drawing Rights; and (ii) to allow additional time for the implementation of the pilot cash transfer program under Component 2. A third restructuring in May 2016 extended the closing date of both the Grant and the Credit by 10 months to July 31, 2017 to align the closing date with the closing of the JSDF Grant, which was financing the pilot cash transfer.

The mid-term review was submitted on March 9, 2015. The project's original closing date was July 31, 2015, and the actual closing date was July 31, 2017, with a total extension of 24 months.

3. Relevance of Objectives

Rationale

The PDO was relevant to country context both at approval and at closure. Poverty and extreme poverty levels remain high in Togo. The PDO is in line with Togo's National Development Plan for 2018-2022, in which improved access to and quality of basic social and infrastructure service delivery at the local level is a top priority. It was also well aligned with the Government's "Strategy for Boosting Growth and Promoting Employment 2013-2017" (SCAPE). Furthermore, the PDO was well aligned to the World Bank's Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for the Republic of Togo for FY17-FY20, as the CPF proposes IDA support for the Government's efforts in scaling up social services, strengthening health systems, and empowering local governments and communities. The CPF emphasizes scaling up of existing support for CDD approaches and social protection programs, as these have demonstrated that empowering local communities and decentralizing decision making with sustained support may have an impact on poverty in Togo.

However, while there is clear alignment between the project's development objectives and the country and WB strategies, the relevance of the objectives is pitched at a level that does not adequately reflect a potential solution to a development problem. While acknowledging the difficulty of the operational environment, a shortcoming here was that the objective was not defined such that its achievement would be plausibly traceable to improvements envisioned to arise from increased access to basic socio-economic infrastructure and social safety nets, whether those improvements were improved health and educational outcomes, improved production and income, or other factors affecting community livelihoods. These may be longer-term targets but tracking them and identifying them is an important aspect of a successful development operation. Furthermore, since this was the latest in a long line of CDD projects in Togo, the project would be expected to aim higher than previous projects. The IEG/OPCS guidelines for Relevance of Objectives say: "The expectation is that a project occurring later in the Bank's engagement with the sector in that country would set relatively more challenging objectives than a project early in the engagement. This means that second, third, fourth, fifth, etc., projects within a sector in a country should include outcomes consistent with progress over time as compared with earlier projects."

The project's objectives are clearly relevant to both national priorities and Bank strategies, however, for the reasons outlined in the preceding two paragraphs, Relevance of Objectives is considered weakly Substantial, bordering on Modest.

Rating

Substantial

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

Objective 1

Objective

Provide poor communities with greater access to basic socio-economic infrastructure

Rationale

The project's theory of change is solid, with the planned activities logically and plausibly connected to their expected outputs and outcomes: for example, funding for income generating activities (activities) was expected to lead to an increased number of firms and local production (outputs), which in turn were expected to lead to increased productivity and income (outcomes). Likewise, cash transfers and school feeding (activities) were to lead to an increased number of children benefiting from school feeding and an increased number of beneficiaries benefiting from cash transfers (outputs), in turn leading to improved child health and nutrition (outcomes).

There was a weakness in the Results Framework in that the indicators identified were appropriate but not sufficient to measure the outcomes of the project. For example, the outcome indicators covered only number of beneficiaries (number of students enrolled, number of people with access to improved water source, number of community IGA projects operational after one year, number of beneficiaries receiving assistance from IGAs, from CTs, and from Labor Intensive Public Works) in addition to percentage of households receiving cash transfers on time. These indicators could not capture the intended outcomes of the project as defined in the PDO, which were, among other things, increased productivity and better opportunities for private sector development, improved child health and children's rights, and improved educational and nutritional outcomes. These outcomes were identified in the project's theory of change as presented in a diagram on the ICR's page 8. Additional studies and an impact evaluation were conducted to measure and document the higher-level outcomes of the project, and these studies documented achievements such as reduced stunting and increased economic activity, i.e. outcomes at a higher level in the project's theory of change than what could have been captured by the indicators defined in the PAD. This discrepancy was also visible in the ICR's theory of change diagram, where outcomes such as increased productivity and improved child health were correctly listed as expected outcomes, but where the project's PDO ("to provide access") is at a lower level in the logical chain than what the stated expected outcomes were.

Targeting was done by identification and selection of the poorest communities in the project area.

Outputs

The project exceeded all of its output targets.

Direct project beneficiaries were 315,246, substantially exceeding both the original target of 70,250 and the revised target of 125,250, and also reaching the target of 50% female beneficiaries.

The project financed 355 socio-economic infrastructure projects, exceeding both the original target of 170 and the revised target of 320. 577 extra classrooms were built under the project, exceeding the target of 500. The subprojects included the construction or rehabilitation of 196 primary schools (benefiting nearly 40,000 students), 110 water wells (benefitting more than 50,000 beneficiaries), and 24 health centers. The project team informed IEG that the relevant table in the ICR contained factual errors as monitoring data from November 16, 2016, had been used rather than monitoring data from July 31, 2017 (email of August 19, 2018). In that email, the project team provided IEG with the correct data (from July 31, 2017), which are reflected here.

Outcomes

The project reached most of its outcome targets and exceeded some.

39,831 students were enrolled in rehabilitated and newly constructed schools, exceeding both the original target of 20,000 and the revised target of 30,000 students. According to comments received from the Government of Togo (email September 11, 2018), 85,768 beneficiaries had access to an improved water source at the end of the project (at the end of July 2017), far exceeding and more than doubling both the original target of 30,000 and the revised target of 40,000 beneficiaries.

According to the ICR (page 13), a technical audit of the community infrastructure sub-projects indicated that the overall quality of the infrastructure was strong and that it was built and fit for purpose. 100 percent of the community subprojects were operating one year after project closure, comfortably exceeding the target of 80 percent. An audit report showed that the profitability of the activities financed was mixed, as internal rates of return varied between 3% and 9% (ICR, page 50). The margins obtained in terms of the number of members show that these IGAs alone would not be able to feed the members, at least not yet.

These shortcomings are considered to be minor only; achievement of the first objective is therefore rated Substantial.

Rating
Substantial

Objective 2

Objective
Provide poor communities with greater access to social safety nets

Rationale
Outputs

The project achieved or exceeded most of its output targets also under Objective 2.

The total number of beneficiaries for all the social safety net programs was 78,574 at project closure (email from project team September 20, 2018), exceeding the target of 53,000 beneficiaries. They received benefits under three different social safety net programs: the unconditional cash transfer program had 18,270 beneficiaries, exceeding the original and revised target of 8,000; the cash-for-work, food-for-work, and public works programs had 12,754 beneficiaries, exceeding the target of 10,000; and the school feeding programs had 47,550 beneficiaries, exceeding the target of 35,000.

The Labor Intensive Public Works (LIPW) program completed a total of 154 projects, of which 115 were for rural roads and 39 for water wells and other agricultural works, against a target of 125. The LIPW benefitted 12,754 individuals against a target of 10,000 and created 510,160 labor days against a target of 400,000, exceeding both targets. The project essentially met its target for gender participation, as women's participation in LIPW was 39% while the target was 40%, but fell short on its target for youth participation (defined as participation by individuals aged 18 to 35) , reaching 58% participation by youth while the target was 70%. The project team stated (email of April 27, 2018) that the reasons for the lower-than-expected youth participation were varied; self-targeting was used (by setting wages to attract only those who did not have other alternatives) within the poorest communities. In these communities, many of the young people had left to pursue employment opportunities elsewhere. Participation in LIPW was also seasonal for young people; many would not participate during agricultural labor-intensive periods or during the school year, as many youths were doing agricultural work or going to school during these times.

The pilot cash transfer program exceeded expectations, despite initial delays. A total of 29,600 mothers and caregivers received monthly cash transfers amounting to approximately US$9 per month. The transfers were targeted to 217 villages where malnutrition rates were the highest. Transfers were provided to pregnant women mothers/caregivers of children up to 24 months (or up to 60 months for severely malnourished children). The percentage of households receiving cash transfers on time was 94.15 at project closure, exceeding the target of 70 percent. Trainings in nutrition, health and hygiene were provided for cash transfer beneficiaries.

The IGAs also followed a CDD approach. 208 IGAs were approved, exceeding the target of 150. These IGAs provided financing to 3,530 beneficiaries. The projects financed vegetable production, production of cereals, purchase and sale of cereals, cattle breeding, transportation of local products, mills, and other enterprises.

With 5,098 beneficiaries, the labor market program also reached more people than anticipated, nearly doubling the target of 2,250.

The school feeding program benefited schools in the poorest cantons and covered 161 schools, exceeding the target of 150. An additional 144 schools were reached through Government of Togo counterpart funds. Together, these schools provided 29 million meals to 88,927 students, of whom 46.9 percent were girls. According to the Government of Togo (email received September 11, 2018), referring to the study titled "Cost-advantage Study of School Meals in Togo", the school feeding initiative in Togo was richer in energy intake than comparable programs (1,200Kcal, compared to between 320Kcal and 720Kcal for other countries).

Outcomes

The project achieved or exceeded most of its Outcome targets under Objective 2.

The technical audit confirmed that IGA projects were allocated to groups in the 200 poorest cantons, that the groups were in existence for between four to ten years, and that 70 percent of the groups consisted of only female members. Only six percent of the IGA projects had been abandoned at the time of the technical audit.

For the LIPW, the target was that at least 60% of project costs would finance labor, and the project also exceeded this target with 65% of costs financing labor payments to beneficiaries. An independent technical audit found that the technical quality of water wells and other projects was high (80 percent), while the technical quality for rural roads was relatively low (52 percent), mainly due to shortcomings in maintenance. The project team (email of April 27, 2018) provided two reasons that the maintenance of roads was a challenge: The first reason was that roads were considered common goods (as opposed to private property), and in the absence of a local government to take responsibility for their maintenance, almost none of the roads were maintained. By contrast, the water reservoirs were managed by community groups who had a direct interest in using them for agricultural activities. The second reason was that neither the available technology nor the labor-intensive approach allowed for high quality works for the road projects, and most of the roads were damaged during heavy rainfalls and left in need of maintenance. To mitigate this situation, the project team has recommended that Road Maintenance Committees be set up in each community where such projects are undertaken, and that future project funds be allocated for road maintenance.

An impact evaluation of the CT program was undertaken. The evaluation covered 162 villages (80 in the control group and 82 randomly selected from the 217 treatment villages), and it followed a difference-in-difference methodology to establish to what degree the results of the final survey (2016) revealed significant difference both from the baseline survey (2014) and between the control and treatment groups. Findings from the impact evaluation that suggested achievement of outcomes were:

• The cash transfer amount was mainly spent on expenses for children. Households spent the transfers on: children's nutrition (91 percent of households), health (68 percent), soap and laundry detergent (64 percent), shoes and clothing (59 percent), and nutrition of other household members (55 percent).
• The percentage of mothers/caregivers declaring their children sick in the 15 days preceding the two surveys fell from 32 percent at baseline to 13 percent at completion. The decrease was more notable among beneficiaries than in the control group.
• The percentage of children with low birth weight fell from 13 to 7 percent among beneficiaries, while it remained stable in the control group.
• The transfers had a marked positive impact on the registration of children for birth certificates and on improvement in women's knowledge about children's growth monitoring, health, hygiene, and children's rights.
• The percentage of mothers giving birth in health facilities as opposed to at home increased from 39 to 50 percent among the beneficiaries, while there was no improvement in the control group.
• Nutritional diversity improved from 14 to 19 percent and school attendance of siblings increased from 88 to 95 percent for beneficiaries, compared to smaller improvements in the control group.

The impact evaluation of the CT program further found that, compared to the control group, the CT program led to a:

- 12.3 percent decrease in stunting;
- 12 percent increase in children's health visits;
- 25 percent increase in registration of newborns in the civil registry; and
- 15 percent increase in children's regular health monitoring.

Rating
Substantial

Rationale
Overall Efficacy is rated Substantial. The project exceeded almost all output and outcome targets, some by quite an impressive margin. However, there were some minor shortcomings such as lack of road maintenance, some

targets not being fully met (such as percentage of youth participation), and communal IGAs not being sustainable. Due to these minor shortcomings, Efficacy is rated Substantial.

Overall Efficacy Rating

Substantial

5. Efficiency

Economic Efficiency

A cost-benefit analysis was not conducted at appraisal because the community-driven subprojects were not pre-identified. No economic analysis was presented in the PAD or in the ICR. The project's efficiency was, however, assessed in the ICR (pp 19-23) through a comparison of infrastructure costs and an ex-post efficiency assessment of the IGAs.

The cost of infrastructure construction under the community subprojects was below the cost of similar projects.

The audit reports found that unit costs for constructed schools were on average 25 percent lower than those built by the Education and Institutional Strengthening Project (US$45 million, P116384, 2011-2015) for similar schools. Similar levels of cost effectiveness were also found in the provision of school furniture like desks and benches. Lower price might indicate lower quality; however, the technical audit on the schools' building quality found that 94 percent of the constructed schools had good technical quality.

The project's IGAs were less efficient. The average rates of returns of IGA micro projects were positive but low, between 4 and 20 percent. The collective IGAs had on average lower rates of return (between 3 and 9 percent) than the individual IGAs (between 12 and 20 percent). The financial audit concluded that no collective project would have been profitable with a five percent average rate of return, as the interest rates for microfinance institutions fluctuated between 16 and 28 percent per annum. Had these grants been given as loans, the ICR presumed that no IGA subproject would have been able to repay the loans and make a profit. The project team informed IEG (email of April 27, 2018) that this was partly due to management issues, in that the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) and the local agencies did not have management capacity to provide the necessary technical assistance and training. In addition, the Ministry of Agriculture did not provide sufficient monitoring of some of the livestock activities, and some beneficiaries lost their livestock to illnesses such as bird flu and swine fever. Finally, there were also some weaknesses in some of the associations because the members did not know each other prior to joining.

The cost-transfer ratio of the CTs and the behavior change communication activities fell from initially costing US$3.50 for each US$1 transferred to US$0.35/US$1 by completion. The ICR did not provide any information as to how the cost-transfer ratio compares with the cost-transfer ratio for other social protection functions in similar countries. This large drop in the cost-transfer ratio was explained by the high initial fixed costs of the program (for e.g. vehicles and furniture), and a cost analysis showed that a continuation of the program could further reduce the ratio to 0.28.

The school feeding program had a positive impact on enrollment in general and significant impact on enrollment for girls, and the cost of the school feedings was in line with those found in other countries and in the previous Bank-financed project, according to the ICR. The Government of Togo informed IEG (email received September 11, 2018), that on a standardized costs basis, the Togo school feeding program was less costly than programs in Lesotho, Malawi and the Gambia, but comparable to that of Kenya.

Implementation Efficiency

According to the ICR, the project was implemented efficiently with a total of 24 months extension (and only 10 of those after the Additional Financing) despite initial delays in the implementation of the CT and school feeding programs. Resources were used efficiently, according to the ICR (page 23), with cost savings for most activities that in turn permitted expanded outputs for nearly all programs. For example, the project team noted (email of April 27, 2018) that the average cost for an infrastructure sub-project such as a school was US$30,000, compared to the provisional US$40,000 per project, due to competitive bidding at the community level. The cost savings were used to cover a higher than anticipated demand for water points, latrines, and the like.

Efficiency Rating

Substantial

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

	Rate Available?	Point value (%)	*Coverage/Scope (%)
Appraisal		0	0 ☐Not Applicable
ICR Estimate		0	0 ☐Not Applicable

* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

6. Outcome

Relevance of Objectives is rated Substantial, with strong relevance to country conditions and to government and Bank strategy, but with limited ambition given that the project was one in a long line of CDD projects. Achievement of both objectives was Substantial, and Efficacy was Substantial. On this basis (Substantial Relevance, Substantial Efficacy and Substantial Efficiency), the overall Outcome rating is Satisfactory.

a. Outcome Rating

Satisfactory

7. Risk to Development Outcome

The ICR provided information related to two relevant risks to the project's development outcome:

Risk of insufficient government ownership or commitment is considered to be very low. The ICR (page 31) stated that the project's PDO and its activities were fully aligned with the Government's National Development Plan and were designed to meet the country's needs. The government demonstrated its commitment by contributing US$3.5 million in counterpart funds to the cash transfer and school feeding programs under the project. This commitment is likely to continue. Later, the Government of Togo informed IEG (email received September 11, 2018) that their contribution to the project has been approximately US$10.8 million.

The sustainability risk is considered to be substantial; i.e. the risk that investments supported by the project may not be maintained and may not continue generating income and services to the project's beneficiaries, especially regarding community infrastructure and the LIPW and IGA subprojects. The technical audit found that 33 percent of investments financed under the community infrastructure subprojects lacked maintenance and that only 14 percent of rural roads and 40 percent of small dams under the LIPW were adequately maintained. Furthermore, many of the IGAs failed or ceased operation within their first years of operation.

8. Assessment of Bank Performance

a. Quality-at-Entry

The project's design incorporated important lessons from previous experience indicating that projects identified by communities using participatory mechanisms tended to reflect priority needs. Previous experience showed that communities were generally capable of realizing their village development plans with a basic level of support, and when they managed the procurement of small-scale contracts directly, local competition increased, and costs were lowered. This approach was therefore continued and expanded, while lessons pointing to the need for improvement also were addressed. The project's risks were correctly identified, and appropriate mitigation actions were included in the design. Project preparation efforts included clear targeting criteria in the Project Implementation Manual, and alternative transfer payment methods were assessed to select those that would provide the best mix of cost-effectiveness, efficiency, and safety. The project design also included a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) specialist to be supported by an external consultant to strengthen the M&E system. The PDO was at a low level of the results chain (access to services), and the Results Framework was weak in that the indicators defined as outcome indicators were not appropriate to properly measure the project's expected final outcomes (increased productivity, improved child health, improved educational and nutritional outcomes, etc.). In the context of this project, these issues are considered minor shortcomings in quality at entry.

Quality-at-Entry Rating
Satisfactory

b. Quality of supervision

Ten supervision missions were undertaken during the five years of project operation. The project benefitted from having one task team leader (TTL) throughout the project period, and a co-TTL based in Benin, whose proximity to the project facilitated dialogue and the sharing of experiences. The ICR stated (page 31) that the supervision team made more than 40 technical assistance missions. The Bank team showed flexibility and responded quickly to the country's request for Additional Financing to provide continuation to the school feeding program and for setting up the CT program. A minor shortcoming was that even though the Additional Financing would have provided an opportunity to revise the outcome indicators in the Results Framework, this was not done.

Quality of Supervision Rating
Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating
Satisfactory

9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization

a. M&E Design

The Results Framework identified relevant indicators to measure project outputs, but it lacked adequate indicators at the outcome level to measure achievement beyond the number of beneficiaries and number of subprojects, etc., such as improved health, improved learning, and increased income. M&E activities were designed to be carried out by the Technical Secretariat and supported by an M&E specialist, with information provided by regional agencies. Baseline, mid-term, and end-of-project evaluations were part of M&E design.

b. M&E Implementation

The project team indicated (email of April 27, 2018) that there was an M&E specialist in place during the whole course of the project. The project developed a computerized M&E system that recorded information on the progress of each of the activities. The system worked better for infrastructure projects than for other activities. Responsibility for inputting the data in the database was not clearly established in the regions, resulting in occasional delays in centralizing the information at the national (PIU) level. The system also helped generate information on the average cost of infrastructure of different types.

In addition to regular project monitoring, several studies, audits, and evaluations (including an impact evaluation) were undertaken during and after the project period, which enhanced credible results reporting.

c. M&E Utilization

The project team indicated (email of April 27, 2018) that data was efficiently used to track progress on infrastructure projects. This tracking helped to identify and address delays. Furthermore, the upward revision in targets was made based on the M&E data when additional financing became available.

M&E Quality Rating

Substantial

10. Other Issues

a. Safeguards

The project was a Category B project and triggered the Bank's OP/BP 4.01 Environmental Assessment and OP/BP 4.12 Involuntary Resettlement. The environmental audit showed that the implementation of environmental and social safeguard measures was satisfactory. There was no concrete information regarding resettlements in the ICR.

b. Fiduciary Compliance

Financial Management

The Financial Management of the project followed all procedures defined in the project's administrative, financial, and accounting manuals, according to the ICR (page 30). All unaudited quarterly Financial Monitoring Reports and all audited annual reports were submitted to the Bank in a timely manner. The audits were conducted in accordance with the standards of the International Federation of Chartered Accountants and World Bank guidelines. All statements were unreservedly certified by the auditors and found satisfactory by the Bank.

Procurement

Procurement was conducted in accordance with World Bank guidelines, according to the ICR (page 30). Procurement activities at the level of all stakeholders were coordinated by the Technical Secretariat under the supervision of a procurement specialist. Procurement activities were regularly included in a Procurement

Plan that was validated by the World Bank. The general organization of procurement was decentralized to the Agency to Support Community Development (AGAIB).

c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)

The impact evaluation of the CT program found that it had had an unintended perverse impact: 70 percent of cash transfer beneficiaries reported that they intended to have additional children, compared to only 58 percent in the control group.

d. Other

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11. Ratings

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Highly Satisfactory	Satisfactory	To be assign a Highly Satisfactory rating, there are to be no shortcomings in the operation’s achievement of its objectives, in its efficiency or in its relevance. Although the project did achieve most of its targets, there were minor shortcomings in relevance, efficacy and efficiency.
Bank Performance	Highly Satisfactory	Satisfactory	To be assigned a Highly Satisfactory rating, there are to be no shortcomings in identification, preparation or appraisal, or in the proactive identification of opportunities and resolution of threats. Although it is recognized that Bank Performance was very good for this project, there were minor shortcomings, particularly in its quality at entry.
Quality of M&E	Substantial	Substantial	---
Quality of ICR		Modest	---

12. Lessons

The following lessons are taken from the ICR (page 32-33 and previous pages), with some modification of language:

A combination of financing infrastructure and a community-driven development approach that bolsters local coordination can contribute to re-building social fabric after a conflict. A community-driven development approach in tandem with financing for infrastructure can provide access to services and buildings, create a sense of ownership, and spur engaged and accountable local governments.

Small-scale community-driven approaches can be an effective tool in fragile contexts and in conflict-affected poor countries, particularly when dedicated, professional, highly competent staff and support are deployed. The reasons why a very complex project such as this one worked well in this poor, fragile, and conflict-affected context may be manifold, and the project team highlighted a few potentially crucial elements in emails to IEG dated May 2, 2018. The TTL who initiated the project was experienced and dedicated and set up a professional Bank team from the outset. The PIU also had competent and dedicated staff from the start. Furthermore, this was not a new approach in Togo; the country had already been implementing CDD projects for three decades prior to this project. Finally, implementation was mainly done through AGAIBs, which are non-governmental entities placed very close to the field and communities. Those organizations were also capacitated with competent and dedicated staff who had the right specialties to carry out implementation at the community level. The stability of AGAIB staff also permitted capitalization on lessons learned from one project to the other.

Individual income-generating activities (IGAs) may have a better rate of return than collective IGAs. Experiences from this project suggests that individual IGAs, although their returns were low, had an overall higher rate of return than the collective IGAs. The reasons behind these lower returns for associative entrepreneurship may merit further study.

13. Assessment Recommended?

No

14. Comments on Quality of ICR

The quality of evidence and analysis presented in the ICR was good. It was results-oriented and presented a clear and convincing theory of change. However, there were important shortcomings. It lacked sections on M&E Implementation and M&E Utilization. The lessons learned were formulated as a mix of lessons, descriptions, and recommendations, and they were not clearly based on previously presented evidence and analysis. Annex 3 on project costs was not complete.

a. Quality of ICR Rating

Modest