



1. Project Data:		Date Posted : 03/29/2004	
PROJ ID: P040649		Appraisal	Actual
Project Name: Community Reintegration & Rehabilitation	Project Costs (US\$M)	41.3	34.0
Country: Sierra Leone	Loan/Credit (US\$M)	25.0	23.6
Sector(s): Board: SP - Central government administration (30%), Other social services (25%), General agriculture fishing and forestry sector (15%), General education sector (15%), General water sanitation and flood protection sec (15%)	Cofinancing (US\$M)	12.2	9.7
L/C Number: C3312; CQ005			
	Board Approval (FY)		00
Partners involved : African Development Bank	Closing Date	06/30/2003	06/30/2003

Prepared by :	Reviewed by :	Group Manager :	Group:
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2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

The project objective (as set out in the DCA and MOP) was to reduce poverty and enhance social stability and economic growth by helping the population of war affected areas return to normal, productive lives .

b. Components

The project consisted of two main components *(final cost in parentheses)*:

(i) Emergency Recovery Support Fund (ERSF) and related institutional support to the National Committee for Reconstruction, Resettlement and Rehabilitation (NCRRR) and partners. The ERSF was intended to finance demand-driven, community-oriented projects in, for example, agricultural rehabilitation, reconstruction of community infrastructure and establishment of essential social services that target individuals, groups and communities affected by the conflict *(US\$26.9million)*.

(ii) Training and Employment Program (TEP) and related institutional support to the National Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR). The TEP was intended to support the social and economic reintegration of former combatants through targeted counselling, training and employment creation efforts *(US\$5.2m.)*.

In addition, two related PPF advances helped finance studies, prepare project manuals, assess the capacity of implementing agencies, initiate pilot activities and support Government capacity *(US\$1.8m)*.

c. Comments on Project Cost, Financing and Dates

Final project costs were 82% of those at appraisal and 94% of the credit was disbursed. Close to 80% of funds committed by co-financiers have also been disbursed. While only US\$0.7m. of expected US\$4.1m. counterpart funding was forthcoming in cash, the shortfall was reportedly made up by contributions in the form of labor and materials by communities and local authorities. There has been some reallocation among components and a higher proportion of project funds were spent on institutional support to NCRRR and NCDDR (44% compared to 28% projected at appraisal). The credit was approved on 12/21/1999 and closed as scheduled on 06/30/2003.

3. Achievement of Relevant Objectives:

The project has substantially achieved its objectives :

- The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program - supported by the project through institutional support to the NCDDR - has contributed to social stability by successfully completing the disarmament and demobilization of combatants. The TEP program has helped over 30% of ex-combatants to obtain employment or become self-employed. Since the Declaration of the End of War in January 2002, there have not been any significant outbreaks of violence and peace has held for over two years. Social reintegration

has taken place, with two-thirds of all ex-combatants residing in their community of choice .

- Community life and local services were jump-started through the ERSF which was the main mechanism for reconstructing community infrastructure and re-establishing critical services and income generating activities in war affected areas in Sierra Leone . Over 1,000,000 people (about 20% of the population) have benefited from this program, which has helped to induce 220,000 internally displaced people (IDP) to return to their areas of origin. All IDP camps have now been closed .
- Economic activity in Sierra Leone began to recover in 2000 (the year of project effectiveness) and has since accelerated. Annual real GDP growth accelerated from 3.8% in 2000 to 6.6% in 2002, with an even higher forecast for 2003. ERSF contribution to this outcome is mainly through support to the agricultural sector . ERSF sub-projects have directly rehabilitated almost 10,000 ha of various crops and contributed to increased production of another 1,000,000 ha. of land.

4. Significant Outcomes/Impacts:

- 269 community projects were supported under the ERSF which helped to get 84 schools and 28 health centers back in operation, 200,000 people access to potable water, 9,000 hectares of land back under cultivation and improve production of close to a million hectares .
- 397 projects, mainly vocational training programs, were supported under the TEP and about 24,000 ex-combatants were employed or self-employed one year after completing the program . Of the 72,490 combatants disarmed under the project program (well above the original target of 45,000), 81 percent registered with the NCDDR for reintegration training .
- By helping to strengthen NCDDR's capacity, the project was instrumental in attracting additional donor support through the Multi-donor Trust Fund (MDTF) which had signed commitments in excess of US\$35m. by 09/30/2003.
- By supporting the operations of NCRRR and the independent Financial Management and Procuring Unit, the project helped to attract additional donor funds which financed 458 community investment projects at a cost of US\$6.9m..
- Sub-projects financed by the ERSF enjoyed considerable community support . A pilot beneficiary assessment carried out in September 2003, surveyed 428 beneficiaries and found that 87% agreed that projects identified in their communities were priority investments and 60% were satisfied with project implementation .

5. Significant Shortcomings (including non-compliance with safeguard policies):

- Social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants remains a major challenge as a large number of ex-combatants are still unemployed and a significant minority has yet to return to their communities . This is a continuing threat to stability and peace in Sierra Leone .
- Trust in the transparency and equitability of the DDR program was undermined when TEP projects implemented in the Western region cost almost 10 times that spent per ex-combatant in other parts of the country .
- Project monitoring could have been more systematic with baselines and targets established at the outset . There is insufficient reliable data to objectively assess the full impact of the project .

6. Ratings :	ICR	OED Review	Reason for Disagreement /Comments
Outcome :	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	
Institutional Dev .:	Substantial	Substantial	
Sustainability :	Likely	Likely	
Bank Performance :	Highly Satisfactory	Highly Satisfactory	
Borrower Perf .:	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	
Quality of ICR :		Satisfactory	

NOTE: ICR rating values flagged with '*' don't comply with OP/BP 13.55, but are listed for completeness.

7. Lessons of Broad Applicability:

The project provides many lessons . The most important are:

- Reintegration (DDR) and rehabilitation (RRR) activities should be implemented separately but in parallel . These functions require different structures from a service delivery perspective because reintegration of ex -combatants requires a tightly controlled top-down, targeted approach whereas reconstruction, resettlement and rehabilitation requires a bottom-up approach focused on empowering communities .
- While it is important to strive for maximum community participation in reconstruction of communities destroyed by conflict, it is equally important to be realistic about the extent of participation feasible during early post -conflict conditions when many community residents are moving back from IDP camps .
- Independent and professionally managed financial management and procuring units can increase the effectiveness of post-conflict investments particularly by increasing donor confidence to invest in and help improve administration of the project .
- When using NGOs as implementing partners, it is important to conduct a capacity assessment of the sector and plan up-front capacity building during the project design phase .
- Under post-conflict conditions where information/data area scarce, a simple logframe - focusing on a few key

indicators, supported by base-line studies - should be used to monitor project progress .

8. Assessment Recommended? Yes No

Why? To widen Bank knowledge about helping post-conflict countries increase social stability and jump-start economic activities. In particular, the project can provide useful lessons about supporting DDR programs .

9. Comments on Quality of ICR:

Satisfactory. The ICR has gathered together an impressive amount of information, including results of beneficiary assessment surveys. Borrower comments are also exceptionally detailed . However, the report could have been improved with clear focus on achievement of project objectives, better organization of the information, less repetition--that contributes to making it unnecessarily lengthy --and more attention to providing accurate cost tables (which overstate total project costs by almost 200%).