Land Rights in Côte d'Ivoire

Survey and Prospects for Project Intervention

John R. Heath
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John R. Heath

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FOREWORD

This is one of several country case studies that grew out of a body of work on Sub-Saharan Africa that has collectively come to be referred to as the "Population, Agriculture, Environment Nexus." That body of work hypothesized that, in Africa, the intensification of agriculture is not proceeding fast enough to accommodate the rapid growth of population and that one of the consequences of this is a degradation of the rural environment. The land rights regime is one facet of the "Nexus." How advanced is the breakdown of communal systems of tenure? Does this breakdown lead to an "open access" regime characterized by highly insecure property rights? To what extent is tenure insecurity responsible for the low rate of investment in agriculture and the failure to adopt sustainable land use strategies? What are the implications for the design of land use management strategies? These are some of the questions posed by the "Nexus" studies that the present case study seeks to address.

The study addresses the issue of the role of "external agents" or "managers" or "guides" in the process of the evolution of land rights. It also offers an analytic framework as a context for further project and policy-related investigation. The main conclusion of the study is that in an environment where state intervention has tended to weaken the traditional systems of land rights, the effort must be to emphasize and give support to village-based land management, rather than to individual land titling or to Government land ownership. This village based intervention should in effect protect traditional land owners against various forms of tenure insecurity. The recommendations are in consonance with the World Bank's emphasis on effective administrative decentralization in other related areas such as agricultural services and infrastructure provision.

Kevin Cleaver
Director
Technical Department
Africa Region

September 27, 1993
ABSTRACT

How secure are the rights to rural land in Cote d'Ivoire and what are the implications of tenure security for land use management? This is the central question posed by this study which draws on the results of a rapid survey of 250 household heads and finding in the rich anthropological literature. The study concludes that traditional village authorities continue to influence how land is allocated among households and that there are few instances of private land rights. In particular, land cannot usually be transferred from one generation to the next without the consent of customary authorities. However, the power of these authorities varies significantly between regions. This is important because it affects the terms on which land is conferred on "outsiders," who are very numerous in Cote d'Ivoire. Disputes over transfer and boundary rights were less acute than the "Nexus" study hypothesized. Outsiders have weaker transfer rights than indigenous farmers but, in other respects, enjoy a similar level of land tenure security. This suggests that the existing regime offers a relatively flexible means for resolving intra-community disputes, one with positive effects from both an equity and an efficiency standpoint. But, in certain areas, the state has undermined the traditional regime by seizing land. Policy and project interventions should reinforce the capacity of village communities to manage their resource base, by providing them with legal protection from external incursions and - where there is a real demand for it - by helping villagers to develop a monitorable data base on land rights and land use.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

John Heath (AF1AA, Occidental and Central African Department, Regional Mission) coordinated the survey research and wrote the report. The survey was sponsored by a Canadian Trust Fund Grant and the fieldwork was carried out by four faculty members from the Institute of Tropical Geography, University of Côte d'Ivoire: B. Koli (Soubre); A. Alla Della (Daloa); J. Tape Bidi (Niable); and S. Coulibaly (Korhogo and Komborodougou). Preparation of this draft was greatly facilitated by the detailed comments on earlier versions supplied by: Hans Binswanger, Jean-Paul Chausse, Kevin Cleaver, Luc De Wulf, Salah Darghouth, Christian Fauliau, Gershon Feder, John English, Shem Migot-Adholla, Simon Rietbergen, Abdoulaye Sawadogo, Paul Shaw and Guy Williams. Guidance was also provided by three external reviewers: Barbara Lewis (Rutgers University); Larry Stifel (Cornell University); and Michael Roth (Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin).
ACRONYMS

SATMACI : Société d'Assistance Technique pour la Modernisation Agricole
SODEFOR : Société de Développement des Plantations Forestières
RCF : Registre de la Conservation Foncière

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

Currency Units = CFA Francs (CFAF)
US$1 = CFAF 265 (February 1993)

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

Metric System

GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report aims to provide an analytic framework to help guide discussions about the design of projects and policy reforms bearing on the land rights regime in Côte d'Ivoire. Throughout Africa, land rights are evolving from a system of appropriation by lineage groups to appropriation by individual households: under the latter system, land is fully alienable and may be bought and sold by the household without the need for approval by a broader collectivity. Various studies have demonstrated that, in Africa, full individualization of land rights is a slow process; village communities continue to exercise broad discretionary powers in allocating land.

It is a plausible hypothesis that the evolution of land rights in Côte d'Ivoire will be critically affected by the pace of labor migration. Migration is driven by major differences in per capita incomes between the forest and the savanna zones. The effectiveness of the land tenure regime in accommodating the influx of migrants is of critical importance in terms of sustainable agricultural development and political stability.

Survey Results

A rapid survey, based on questionnaire interviews with rural household heads, was conducted in five zones of Côte d'Ivoire: two in the savanna region and three in the forest region. The zones were of roughly similar population density but varied significantly in terms of ethnic composition and settlement history. The survey addressed the following questions:

- To what extent have land rights been individualized?
- Are there significant differences between regions and between migrant and indigenous groups in terms of the security of land rights?
- What are the main sources of conflict over land rights?

The survey found that in none of the regions have land rights been fully individualized: village and lineage chiefs, rather than household heads, determine how land rights are allocated. In many cases, land reverts to the lineage on the death of the land user. "Sales" of land often do not amount to full alienation; the "seller" may reassert his customary claim to the land at a later date. There is considerable variation in the form of the contracts governing access to land; these contracts involve varying combinations of gifts, labor service, crop shares and cash payments.

"Security" of land rights is necessarily a subjective concept and is hard to define in any absolute sense. The survey used proxy variables for land tenure security. The results suggest that the differences between regions and between indigenous and migrants groups are of a relatively small order. A seven-variable index of land tenure security was constructed with household heads scored from 1 to 7 (7 denoting "most secure"). Irrespective of region, households scored from 3 to 5 on the scale. Peri-urban areas enjoyed slightly less security than rural areas. Overall, migrants and indigenous farmers scored respectively 4 and 5 on the scale. Security does not appear to increase in proportion to the length of stay. During their parents' lifetime, the sons of indigenous farmers (who, compared to sons of migrants, tend to have more schooling and urban experience and less farming experience) tend not to enjoy greater success in gaining access to their father's land than migrants' sons.

Conflicts over land rights can be grouped into three categories: (a) disputes over parcel boundaries; (b) attempts by young indigenous would-be farmers to claim land that their fathers
have ceded to migrants; (c) attempts by migrant sons, following their father’s death, to “inherit” land ceded to their father by an indigenous land user. The second and third categories may be grouped together as instances of conflict over transfer rights. In designing projects it will be important to assess the relative importance of boundary disputes and transfer disputes. In terms of transfer rights, migrants are somewhat worse off than indigenous farmers but with respect to other dimensions of land tenure security, there are no differences between the groups.

**Review of Key Issues**

On the basis of the survey results and a review of the (rich) anthropological literature it is possible to frame a number of hypotheses which should be tested through closer investigation. First, the contracts governing rights in land (and, equally important, rights to appropriate others’ labor) take a variety of surface forms but, in essence, they conform to a sharecropping paradigm: their function is to reduce supervision costs, spread risks and compensate for a lack of credit and crop insurance facilities. These contracts appear to be relatively favorable in terms of their impact on equity and efficiency—the impact on sustainability is harder to evaluate. Evidence from other countries (including those outside Africa) suggests that individualization is not a sufficient condition for investment in land or for the adoption of conservation measures—it is not intrinsically more likely to enhance sustainability than lineage-based systems of allocating land rights. It is therefore hard to make a case for programs (e.g. land titling) that seek to force the pace of individualization.

Second, the evolution of the land rights regime varies according to the level of political centralization and the effectiveness of tribute-exacting mechanisms. In this respect a broad distinction may be drawn between the eastern forest (which has a longer history of settlement) and the western forest (a “frontier” zone). In the east, tribute mechanisms have favored leveling between indigenous groups and migrants; in the west, allocation of land rights is less orderly and migrants have become significantly better off than indigenous farmers, partly through “land grabs.” The sharecropping paradigm of contract negotiation is more applicable to the eastern forest (and probably the savanna also) than it is to pioneer areas of the western forest. These differences point to significant regional variations in the effectiveness of communal mechanisms for resolving land rights disputes. This has implications for the design of projects that are intended to promote the capacity of villages to manage their own resource base.

Third, there is some indication that the present generation of young people enjoy less land tenure security than their predecessors, suggesting an intensification of conflicts in the future. Young sons of indigenous farmers leave the village to work in the towns and then have difficulty in negotiating access to village land. An important factor in this respect is the level of reverse migration from towns to countryside associated with economic recession and structural adjustment: there is no clear indication about the strength of this trend. A further consideration is the flow of migrants from savanna to forest areas: the rate of migration may have diminished since 1985 owing to the narrowing of regional income disparities associated with the severe economic recession. Lower migration into the rural forest region may soften adjustment pressures on the land rights regime, reducing the scope for conflicts.

**State and Project Interventions**

In both the colonial and the post-independence period, the state has generally failed to enhance land tenure security. Its actions have tended to undermine the capacity of the lineage-based systems to allocate land rights. Land statutes are contradictory—some endorse and others contest the legitimacy of customary rights to land. More important, land has been
impounded in gazetted forests and seized for reservoir construction without reference to the claims of local chiefs. Parastatal and private plantations have also been established without reference to the rights of neighboring communities.

Since 1989, innovative attempts have been made to enhance land tenure security by codifying the various rights to land. Working closely with village communities, survey and mapping teams have marked out the boundaries between parcels, lineage groups and villages and made a record of current land use. The purpose of this exercise is to provide communities with a data base which they may refer to when making decisions about land allocation and management of village resources (the "terroir" approach)

**Recommendations**

From a policy standpoint, a key question is whether the evolution of the land rights regime needs to be "managed" or "guided" by external agents (projects) or whether there will be a spontaneous and (from an equity and efficiency viewpoint) satisfactory adjustment without external intervention. This report does not seek to draw lasting conclusions in this respect; it aims to provide an analytic framework within which further project and policy-oriented investigations may be conducted. The report draws attention to the flexibility and scope for conflict limitation that characterizes the traditional land rights regime; but recognizes that there are important regional variations that project design will need to take account of—variations that are captured in the anthropological literature.

The report's main conclusion is that the effectiveness of the customary system for allocating land rights has been undermined in the past by the nature of state intervention. The government is now taking tentative steps to resolve this problem by helping to sponsor a demand-driven formalization of land rights contracts.

To enhance the capacity of villages to manage their resource base, it is important to legally protect the village land from external incursions. The village needs secure, well-defined boundaries and it needs to be constituted as a legal entity with internal fiscal and regulatory powers. This will presuppose boundary mapping—although it is not clear that mapping of individual parcels will be necessary—accompanied by legal reforms. The guiding principles should be to discourage any extension of the state domain, to remove any residual government claims to uncultivated land and to ensure that the government is committed to enforcing laws that protect the terroir.

This emphasis on village-based land management is fully consistent with the thrust of Bank-financed initiatives that favor administrative decentralization in other areas such as agricultural services and infrastructure provision. But if it is to work, the terroir approach will need to be backed up by other initiatives. To ease the strains associated with the land rights transition in Côte d'Ivoire, it will be important to reduce the flow of migrants from the savanna to the forest region by adopting a range of programs and policy measures intended to alleviate the relative poverty of the savanna. In terms of the broader objective of poverty alleviation, land tenure projects may be of lower priority than initiatives which seek to improve the operation of rural factor markets, extend social and physical infrastructure and improve agricultural research and extension.
1. THE LAND RIGHTS TRANSITION

Various authors have argued that, in Africa, there is a land rights continuum at the "traditional" end of which individual use rights are contingent on the consent of a collectivity; societies are moving toward the other ("modern") end of the continuum at which point the individual has the right to indefinite and unrestricted use of the land and is able to transmit that land to whichever party he or she chooses. This process— which may be described as the individualization of land rights— has been linked with rising population density and closeness to markets, factors which tend to increase the value of land, making it more likely that the current user will wish to have a long-term stake in it. It is sometimes asserted that individualization is a prerequisite for investments designed to conserve land or enhance its revenue-generating capacity. On the other hand, there is no shortage of evidence to demonstrate that, in Africa at least, rising population density and agricultural commercialization are not sufficient conditions to bring about individualization. Progress toward the "modern" end of the land rights continuum tends to be very slow, with village communities continuing to exercise broad discretionary powers in allocating land. Also, throughout the world, there are cases where individualization (e.g. via land titling programs) has not resulted in significant increase in investment in land, nor is the productivity of plots subject to individual rights noticeably higher than for those plots of comparable size and quality where such rights do not apply. These are important questions to resolve because they touch on the issue of whether or not states (and externally-financed projects) can usefully intervene to influence the nature of the land rights transition— will such interventions have a beneficial effect from the viewpoint of enhancing equity and efficiency and encouraging sustainable agricultural development?

One school of thought— after Boserup— argues that as population density rises, and as there is a switch in the relative value of land and labor, technologies will change and there will be a spontaneous move toward individualized land rights. This transition will be efficiency-enhancing and will be conducive to higher agricultural productivity; the terms of the transition cannot meaningfully be adjusted by state intervention. An alternative view— proposed by Cleaver and Schreiber— argues that, in Africa at least, population growth is so rapid that, rather than driving technological change, it is outdistancing technological response capacity, undermining the sustainability of agricultural development. One part of the answer is to manage the land rights transition in such a way that people are encouraged to make yield-enhancing investments. To sum up, the first school is essentially "non-interventionist," while the second school favors of intervention (Box 1.1).

The purpose of this study is to consider where Côte d'Ivoire stands on the land rights continuum and to ask whether the present land rights regime is conducive to equity, efficiency and sustainability. It also considers whether project interventions are justified to influence the terms of changes in land rights. The analysis is based on the results of a survey of land rights in five zones of Côte d'Ivoire, together with a review of the relevant literature.

In Côte d'Ivoire, pressure on the land rights regime is building not only because the natural rate of increase of the population is very fast (probably about 3.2 percent per year); but also because there has been a large influx of migrants. Côte d'Ivoire stands out as one of the African countries where migration has played a key role in national development, in general, and the agricultural development of the forest
Box 1.1 The Nature of the African Land Rights Transition

Boserup has written that "Although subject to enormous regional variations, the transition to specific land rights has a common tendency. With general land rights, cultivators typically only have the right to cultivate in a particular region. A lineage head assigns the right to use a specific plot and to do so as long as the plot is actually being cultivated. When the current cultivator departs—usually to leave the plot fallow—the use right to the plot reverts to the lineage. With the development of specific land rights the cultivator can begin to assert certain rights over plots, beginning with the right to resume cultivation of the specific plot after a period of fallow. At a later stage the cultivator asserts—and receives—the right to assign the plot to an heir or to a tenant. Thus, the use right to the plot does not revert to the lineage anymore. With increasing population density, the rights assignable by the individual cultivator become more extensive. Eventually they include the right to refuse stubble grazing and, most important, become completely alienable. Thus, a cultivator can lease and sell plots to individuals from outside the lineage. This transition to secure, specific land rights provides incentives for investing in specific plots. Such investments are required for the intensification of production and the preservation of fertility" (Quoted by Binswanger and McIntire 1987:87).

Cleaver and Schreiber accept the start and the end points of the continuum described by Boserup and they agree that population growth is the main dynamic. But they question the smoothness of the change to individual rights. They propose that many parts of Africa are stuck in an awkward limbo where fallow periods have contracted to the point where yields are no longer sustainable, there has been no compensating improvement in technology and the social costs associated with soil degradation are not internalized by the land users. This limbo is associated with an "open access regime" of land rights, implying that political authorities or legal codes do not effectively regulate access to land. Delays in the adjustment of land rights will lead to a failure to conserve or invest in land, resulting in falling agricultural yields and environmental degradation. It will therefore be necessary to strengthen the various institutions regulating access to, and management of, the land. There is a strong presumption in favor of increasing the power of local people and communities to sustainably manage their land, since the state has proved to be a poor manager of natural resources. Cleaver and Schreiber conclude that "governments should divest themselves of most land, except parks, to individual or community owners;" also, "the appropriateness of vesting residual control over all land in the state should be re-examined" (Cleaver and Schreiber 1992:95-96).

zone, in particular. According to the most recent population census (1988), one-quarter of the population is composed of immigrants, the largest migrant group coming from Burkina Faso. Traditionally, the Ivoirian government has practiced an "open door" immigration policy, allowing immigrants free access to land and permitting them to vote in local and national elections. But recently, Côte d'Ivoire has become one of the twelve nations in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) to officially declare that the level of immigration is too high (Russell and others 1990:9). As population density rises and there is growing competition for land, conflicts between indigenous land holders and newcomers may increase. The immigration statistics understate the magnitude of the migration issue. Many of the migrants to a given area come from other regions of Côte d'Ivoire; yet in the eyes of the local indigenous groups these are as much "outsiders" as the non-Ivoirians.

Migration is mainly driven by the large disparities between regions in terms of income
Table 1.1: Regional Income Disparities: Export Crop Farmers

Average Household Expenditure Per Capita (1985 CFAF/year)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1988</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Forest</td>
<td>181,031</td>
<td>146,344</td>
<td>-19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Forest</td>
<td>239,000</td>
<td>158,550</td>
<td>-34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savanna</td>
<td>116,605</td>
<td>87,406</td>
<td>-25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: In Abidjan, average household expenditure per capita was CFAF 376,108 in 1985 falling by 23 percent to CFAF 288,708 in 1988.

Source: Grootaert (1993:45).

and living standards. In the savanna, farmers’ per capita annual expenditures (adjusted to account for variations in non-monetary expenditures) are roughly half those of farmers in the western forest, which is now the primary rural destination for migrants. Nevertheless, between 1985 and 1988, there was some narrowing of this income gap owing to the collapse in coffee and cocoa prices—a trend that has undoubtedly continued since 1988. It is not clear to what extent this has reduced the inflow of migrants from the north (Table 1.1). Recent fieldwork by Chauveau (1993) and Ruf (1992) suggests that there has been a reduction in the flow of migrants from the savanna and Sahel into the east and west forest regions of Côte d'Ivoire. In 1985, the savanna accommodated 19 percent of the Ivorian population but contained 57 percent of persons in the poorest decile (Glewwe 1988:38). Income differences between the two regions are accentuated by the pattern of implicit taxation on cash crops. In terms of the wedge between the actual producer price and the export parity price, cotton farmers (who account for about 40 percent of savanna households) are more heavily taxed than coffee and cocoa farmers (accounting for about two-thirds of forest households). In 1988, 40 percent of households in the savanna received funds from other regions (primarily urban and rural areas of the forest zone), compared to 20 percent of rural households in the forest. The mean annual value of remittances received was about CFA 12,000 in the forest zone and CFA 24,000 in the savanna. Comparing the highest educational attainment of household heads, in the rural savanna 94 percent reported having received no schooling compared to around 70 percent in the rural forest areas.

Apart from the southward shift of population into the forest zone, another key dimension of Ivorian development concerns the relative fortunes of the east and the west forest, with the
Bandama river serving as the dividing line between the two zones. The Bandama river marks a key divide for the whole of the West African coast zone, separating a yam-based culture to the east from a rice-based culture to the west. The conversion of forest to tree crop plantations took place earlier in the eastern forest than in the western forest. The population density of the eastern forest increased rapidly between 1945 and 1960. After 1960, the frontier of cultivation moved progressively westward and the rate of increase of population density was faster to the west of the Bandama than to the east of it. While cocoa is grown by two-thirds of rural households on each side of the Bandama, coffee cultivation is increasingly concentrated in the pioneer zone (71 percent of households cultivate coffee in the west compared to 40 percent in the east). Despite the influx of migrants from the Sahel and the high rate of natural population increase, overall, Côte d'Ivoire's population density remains low (22 rural inhabitants per square kilometer in 1990). Low density helps to account for the slow progress made toward agricultural intensification.
2. A RAPID SURVEY OF LAND RIGHTS IN FIVE AREAS OF COTE D'IVOIRE

The Survey Zones

In 1992, the World Bank conducted a survey of land rights, based on interviews with 250 household heads. The demographic characteristics of the five zones studied are summarized in Table 2.1. In selecting these zones, the aim was to capture the major regional and ethnic dimensions of the land rights question in Côte d'Ivoire. The Korhogo and Komborodougou zones, which are respectively periurban and rural, are located in contiguous sub-prefectures in the savanna Zone Dense. These are cotton-producing zones. Population density is similar to that in the forest zone. Roughly three-quarters of households operate farms of four hectares or less. Cattle are mainly confined to paddocks. Unlike in other, less densely settled, parts of the savanna, there are no conflicts over land access between farmers and transhumant grazers. The Voltaics (specifically, the Senoufo) are the dominant ethnic group in each of these zones, migrants make up under 15 percent of the population.

East of the Bandama, the zone of Niable falls in the original heartland of Côte d'Ivoire's cocoa producing region; most of the prime cocoa land has been worked out, the plantations are old and yields are low. The main ethnic group are the Akan (Agni). The zones of Soubré and Daloa are located west of the Bandama and fall in an area of more recent development. The Daloa zone is peri-urban, growing food crops for the town as well as coffee and cocoa; Soubré is a pioneer region, situated at the frontline of deforestation and coffee plantation in Côte d'Ivoire. In Soubré, between 1975 and 1988, the number of rural inhabitants per square kilometer more than doubled (from thirteen thirty-four). One indication of the extent to which Soubré is a pioneer zone is the mean age of household heads in the land rights survey; only one-third are over forty years old, compared to more than 70 percent in each of the other areas. Daloa and Soubré both form part of the Krou cultural sphere. In each of the three forest zones surveyed, migrants account for over 70 percent of the population. In the east forest, a large proportion of the migrants come from outside Côte d'Ivoire (primarily Burkina Faso); in the west forest, a significant number of them come from the north and east of Côte d'Ivoire.

Methodology

Since there was no readily available sampling frame based on the distribution of the population by ethnic groups, the households were not scientifically sampled—the approach employed was to interview at least thirty households in one or two communities falling within the five zones. There is no indication how representative the household heads are of the populations being studied. In these circumstances, statistical tests of significant difference between groups would be spurious; the analysis is therefore limited to a simple evaluation of frequency distributions. This is justified on the grounds that the purpose of the study was not to draw definite conclusions but to define a framework of analysis that will help to guide future project and policy-oriented work.

The survey data were gathered from questionnaire interviews with rural household heads. One limitation of this approach is that it sheds little light on the intra-household distribution of land rights. Also, although household heads were asked questions about the land rights status of their sons, this indirect approach can only be expected to yield limited insight about the possible emergence of inter-generational conflicts over access to land. The survey addressed the following questions:

- To what extent have land rights been individualized?
Table 2.1: Demographic Characteristics of Sous-Prefectures where Survey Areas were Located

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOUS-PREFECTURE</th>
<th>Komboro-Dougou</th>
<th>Korhogo</th>
<th>Niable</th>
<th>Soubre</th>
<th>Daloa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>region</td>
<td>Rural Savanna</td>
<td>Periurban Savanna</td>
<td>Rural Forest (East)</td>
<td>Rural Forest (West)</td>
<td>Periurban Forest (West)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Indigenous Group</td>
<td>Voltaic</td>
<td>Voltaic</td>
<td>Akan</td>
<td>Krou</td>
<td>Krou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural population</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>8,596</td>
<td>36,016</td>
<td>11,629</td>
<td>29,248</td>
<td>25,268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>11,473</td>
<td>61,230</td>
<td>18,456</td>
<td>78,361</td>
<td>27,308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(% change)</td>
<td>(33)</td>
<td>(70)</td>
<td>(59)</td>
<td>(168)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density (rural inhabitants/km²)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant Presence (1988)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of population that is non-Ivoirian</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of population not belonging to primary indigenous group</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of persons resident in 1988 who were born outside this sous-prefecture</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. According to the 1988 census, there were five primary groups: Akan, Krou, Northern Mande, Southern Mande and Voltaic; the Baule and Agni both form part of the Akan group; the Bété, Dida and Bakwe all form part of the Krou group; the Senoufo and Mossi are classed as Voltaics.


- Are there significant differences between regions and between migrant and indigenous groups in terms of the security of land rights?
- What are the main sources of conflict over land rights?
Survey Results

How Land Rights Are Acquired

The survey demonstrated that, in both savanna and forest regions, land rights continue, overwhelmingly, to be vested in lineage groups rather than individual households— that is, there is no automatic transfer of a given land holding between different branches or different generations of the same household, the land tending to revert to the custody of a local chief. Among the Voltaic peoples of the savanna, the overriding right to land is attributable to the chief (tarfolo), a descendant of the person who originally claimed possession of the land in the name of a particular family group. The tarfolo may simultaneously exercise rights to land in several villages. On the basis of this pre-eminent claim to land the tarfolo cedes user rights to each of the lineage segments in each village. Ultimate claim to the land remains vested in the lineage as a whole (which embraces all persons descended from a common mother). Land rights are inalienable and cannot be appropriated by individual households or lineage sub-groups. Between generations, land is transmitted matrilineally, from uncle to nephew. By tradition, outsiders have as much claim to usufruct rights over land as the indigenous population. Also, in the event of the death, departure or "delinquency" of the land user, the piece of land ceded to this person will revert to the chief.

Similar arrangements are found in the forest zone. In the Agni kingdom of the eastern forest, the village chief has ultimate right over the land. Land is ceded to families in return for a gift. Outsiders are expected to pay one-quarter to one-third of their crop as a form of tax on the land as well as participating in funeral ceremonies pertaining to the chief's family (at which time, gifts and sometimes sacrifices are in order). In addition, the outsider is expected to supply a few days labor service to the chief each crop year. In the western forest, access to land by migrants is based more on sale than on gift. This difference between the east and west forest is significant and its implications for the land rights question will be examined at greater length in Chapter 3.

The survey measured the relative importance of three broad categories of acquisition: by inheritance; by monetary transaction (purchase or cash rent); and by all other means (Table 2.2). The category "other means" covers a large range of options: gifts of land (usually in exchange for a bottle of gin or some other token item), labor service and crop shares. Because these options are often combined and because each option has a number of variants, it is, in practice, very difficult, in a rapid survey, to detect and to assign a weight to the various permutations. One of the striking findings is the extent to which there is an overlap between "other means" of acquisition on the one hand and sale or inheritance on the other (cash rentals proved to be of negligible importance in all regions).

It is important to clarify why the columns in Table 2.2 generally add up to more than 100 percent. First, farmers may have separate plots of land— they may have inherited one and bought another; if this is the case, the farmer would be counted twice— as an owner and as an inheritor. Second, the various forms of acquisition are not mutually exclusive— farmers may have bought a piece of land and yet, at the same time, they continue to owe gift, crop share or labor obligations to the previous "owner." It is these overlapping contracts that account for the complexity of the land tenure system.

Not surprisingly, indigenous farmers are more likely to inherit rights to land than migrants— the proportions are respectively 78 percent and 17 percent. More than 80 percent of indigenous household heads acquired land by inheritance in each of the areas except Niable; here land is primarily acquired by "other means." This suggests that, in the eastern forest, the lineage group still exercises considerable redistributive power. In Niable,
redistribution of land through pledging and crop sharing seems to apply as strongly to indigenous groups as it does to migrants. The higher frequency of inheritance (and sales) in the west forest suggests that here there has been more progress toward the individualization of land rights. On the other hand, the anthropological evidence appears to demonstrate that individualization is severely constrained even in this region (Box 2.1).

There was scarcely any purchase of land by indigenous household heads. For migrants, purchase was an important means of acquisition in the western forest—roughly 60 percent of households in Soubré and Daloa had come by land in this way. In Niable, only 23 percent of migrants had bought land (a smaller proportion than those who inherited).

The line by which land is transmitted may influence farm investment decisions. It has been suggested that farmers are more likely to invest in (or simply take good care of) land that will pass to their son (patrilineal transmission) rather than land that will be inherited by their nephew (matrilineal transmission). Table 2.3 indicates that indigenous household heads in savanna areas primarily inherit matrilineally—that is, from their mother’s brother. There is no indication that the matrilineal tradition is weaker in the periurban Korhogo than in rural Komborodougou. However, a larger proportion of household heads in Korhogo (40 percent against 7 percent in Komborodougou) said that they expected, eventually, to hand their land over to sons rather than nephews. The Akan of Niable have a tradition of matrilineal descent, but the survey indicates that in 90 percent of cases, indigenous farmers received land from their fathers. Also, the prevailing descent mode among the households surveyed at Daloa and Soubré is patrilineal.

In the case of the western forest, the results of the Bank survey receive independent confirmation from a study of land rights carried out by the coffee/cocoa extension agency, SATMACI, in Daloa, Gagnoa, Issia and Oume (cited in Coulibaly and others 1992). The combined data from these areas indicates that 48 percent of indigenous farmers inherited rights in land; none of the migrants did so. No less than 98 percent of the migrants interviewed had obtained their land through purchase, compared to 22 percent for indigenous farmers. The only farmers to hold formal title to the land were all of indigenous origin, accounting for a mere 5 percent of the household heads in this group. Most of the registered properties are located within a fifteen kilometer radius of Daloa town center. The SATMACI and Bank surveys also agree on one other point: there is no gradient in the frequency of land sales from rural to periurban areas. Land is sold just as frequently in rural areas of lower population density as in higher-density periurban areas.

Land Tenure Security

"Security" of land rights is necessarily a subjective concept and is hard to define in any absolute sense. The survey used proxy variables. A tenure security index was constructed, based on seven factors.

- Existence of some documented claim to land
- Parcel limits marked by fences or hedges
- No restrictions on land use
- No boundary conflicts
- No attempt by others to expropriate
- No redress for grievances sought from local authorities
- Part of land ceded to another.10

The presence of one or more of these factors is taken to indicate that some measure of tenure security exists—the larger the number of factors present, the greater the likelihood that the user of the land will enjoy security of tenure. Each household head was assigned a score on a scale of one to seven; although there may be grounds for doing so, no attempt was made to apply different weights to each of the constituent variables.
Table 2.2: Impact of Ethnic Origin on Mode of Acquisition of Land Rights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Komboko- dougou</th>
<th>Komboko- dougou</th>
<th>Korhogo</th>
<th>Korhogo</th>
<th>Niable</th>
<th>Niable</th>
<th>Soubré</th>
<th>Soubré</th>
<th>Daloa</th>
<th>Daloa</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IND</td>
<td>MIG</td>
<td>IND</td>
<td>MIG</td>
<td>IND</td>
<td>MIG</td>
<td>IND</td>
<td>MIG</td>
<td>IND</td>
<td>MIG</td>
<td>IND</td>
<td>MIG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentage

1. Inheritance  87  83  30  26  96  100  30  78  17
2. Purchase     3   -   -   23  -   57  -   60  1  48
3. Cash rent    -   -   -   7   -   2   -   3   1  4
4. Other        10  -   80  -   100 97  4   90  -   10  61  55

Note: "IND" refers to members of the ethnic group that is indigenous to the locality; "MIG" denotes those who have migrated to the locality from elsewhere.

Table 2.3: Breakdown of Indigenous Farmers who have Inherited Land by Person from whom They Inherited

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Komborodougou</th>
<th>Korhogo</th>
<th>Niable</th>
<th>Soubré</th>
<th>Daloa</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N of indigenous farmers who inherited</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Person from whom inherited (%)

1. Father          19 16 90 100 97 61  
2. Uncle           65 80 - - - 33  
3. Brother         12 - 10 - - 3   
4. Other person    4  4 - - - 3   


Box 2.1 The Qualified Nature of Land Rights Individualization

Robert Hecht (1981, 1985) conducted fieldwork on land rights in the western forest zone of Divo in the late 1970s. One of the purposes was to show how the transmission of land rights moves from being controlled by lineages to being controlled by households. He attributes this process of “individualization” to the commercialization of agriculture and increasing population pressure on the natural resource base, often accelerated by immigration (1985: 320). But to demonstrate that land rights have been truly individualized it is necessary to show that (a) land buyers are exempt from all further obligations to the seller and (b) that sellers can only repossess the land through repurchase. At the time Hecht carried out his work, neither of these circumstances were true for Divo. The data that Hecht presents make it clear that land sales do not entail alienation. Moreover, the motive for the sale is less to raise cash than to establish a continuing hold over the buyer. Having bought land, migrants in Divo continue to owe a series of obligations to the indigenous seller, involving annual gifts, crop shares or labor service (1985: 331). (This is precisely the situation of "overlapping contracts" that the World Bank survey identified in 1992). Also, Hecht suggests that migrants who purchase land are not necessarily able to transmit it to their sons— he cites cases where land that has been sold to migrants is successfully contested later by members of the indigenous lineage (1985:332). The site of Hecht’s work was resurveyed by Lewis in 1991. In the case of land purchased by migrants, she found that this reverts to the indigenous group if the purchaser has no heir, the lineage group has the right of first refusal if the migrant decides to sell and, after sale, the indigenous farmers continue to exact various forms of tribute from the migrants to whom the land was sold (Lewis, 1991:18). These findings appear to bear out the conclusions of the World Bank survey, suggesting that individualization of land rights is a long way from being realized.
The data may be used to answer three questions: (a) Do migrants enjoy less tenure security than indigenous farmers?; (b) Is length of occupancy a significant determinant of tenure security?; (c) Does tenure security vary significantly between rural and peri-urban areas?

Table 2.4 indicates that indigenous farmers and migrants both enjoy "moderate" tenure security, scoring respectively 5 and 4 on the scale— the land rights of migrants are only slightly less secure than those of indigenous household heads. There was no indication that tenure security was higher in the less ethnically-mixed savanna areas than in the ethnically-mixed forest areas. Population density was in the same range for the forest and savanna areas surveyed so in principle the overall competition for land was the same.

It is recognized that the aggregation of these variables may be arbitrary— each variable needs to be considered on its own merits. Breaking down tenure security by the seven factors, the results vary widely according to the area considered. None of the 250 household heads had formal title to their land. In Niable, when asked if they had a title, farmers produced a certificate from the extension agency, SATMACI testifying to the size and location of their tree crop plantations. Since possession of this certificate is perceived by the farmer himself as reinforcing his hold over the land, it is interpreted here as a "documented" claim. In Soubré, the document in question was a "bill of sale" witnessed by officials from the local offices of the Agricultural Ministry. In both Niable and Soubré, migrants were more likely than indigenous farmers to possess such titles, suggesting perhaps that they are seeking to compensate for their lack of a customary right to the land. The migrants were also somewhat more likely to place hedges and fences around their property, although this was a significant factor only in Niable; probably because Niable is an area of long-established settlement where agriculture is increasingly sedentarized.

Migrants are not more subject to land use restrictions than indigenous farmers. Limitations apply only in the two savanna areas— where, in order to discourage long-term claims to land, tree planting is highly restricted. But the restriction applies equally to all ethnic groups.

For each of the factors measuring the presence of conflict over land rights— boundary disputes, attempted expropriations, recourse to the authorities— there is every indication that relative peace prevails. In each case, more than three-quarters of household heads reported "no conflict," with migrants scoring as highly as indigenous farmers. The one big difference between the groups concerns the right to cession: indigenous farmers clearly have much more freedom to cede part of their land to another party, whether a kinsman or a tenant. If this evidence about cession rights is combined with the previously cited data on inheritance patterns, it seems that migrants have less opportunity than indigenous farmers for transferring land rights, suggesting that the indigenous groups have more tenure security.

It was hypothesized that long-stay farmers would have a more secure claim to the land than those who had only been in occupation for a short period, and that length of stay might outweigh ethnic origin as a determinant of land tenure security. The majority of the household heads interviewed were long-stay, only 30 percent of them had been working their land for ten years or less. Taking all households together, the data do not suggest that tenure security rises proportionate to the length of occupancy (Table 2.5). The pioneer zone of Soubré appears to be a special case. Here, a somewhat larger proportion of farmers (42 percent) are short-stay. While long-stay farmers had very little involvement in boundary disputes or expropriation attempts, the short-stay farmers reported higher exposure to these sources of insecurity. Both groups, however, had generally failed to seek redress from local authorities.
### Table 2.4: Impact of Ethnic Origin on Land Tenure Security of Household Head

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Komboro-</th>
<th>Komboro-</th>
<th>Korhogo</th>
<th>Korhogo</th>
<th>Niaabl</th>
<th>Niaabl</th>
<th>Soubl</th>
<th>Soubl</th>
<th>Daloa</th>
<th>Daloa</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dougou</td>
<td>dougou</td>
<td>IND</td>
<td>MIG</td>
<td>IND</td>
<td>MIG</td>
<td>IND</td>
<td>MIG</td>
<td>IND</td>
<td>MIG</td>
<td>IND</td>
<td>MIG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Percentages

1. Has some documented claim to land
2. Land boundaries are fenced or hedged
3. No restriction on use of land
4. No boundary conflicts
5. No attempt by others to expropriate
6. No redress sought from authorities
7. Has ceded part of land to another

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Komboro-</th>
<th>Komboro-</th>
<th>Korhogo</th>
<th>Korhogo</th>
<th>Niaabl</th>
<th>Niaabl</th>
<th>Soubl</th>
<th>Soubl</th>
<th>Daloa</th>
<th>Daloa</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dougou</td>
<td>dougou</td>
<td>IND</td>
<td>MIG</td>
<td>IND</td>
<td>MIG</td>
<td>IND</td>
<td>MIG</td>
<td>IND</td>
<td>MIG</td>
<td>IND</td>
<td>MIG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Score* (Out of 7)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Score*: Each of the indicators 1-7 is assigned a value of 1 if the percentage is over 50 percent and a value of 0 if the percentage is 50 percent or less; the "Score" is the sum of these values.

**Note**: "IND" refers to members of the ethnic group that is indigenous to the locality; "MIG" denotes those who have migrated to the locality from elsewhere.

Box 2.2 Recent Survey Evidence from Ghana

Ghana is ethnically and agroclimatically contiguous with Cote d'Ivoire. Land rights in Ghana are therefore likely to be similar to those in the neighboring country. Place and Hazell (1993) have presented data showing the extent of land rights individualization and the difficulty of establishing a simple correlation between individualization and the factors--high population density and closeness to urban markets--that are commonly thought to cause it. The authors studied 100-150 households in each of three regions, grouping land parcels according to the degree of transfer rights enjoyed by the household (1993:12):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Anloga</th>
<th>Ejura</th>
<th>Wassa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crop</td>
<td>Scarce</td>
<td>Abundant</td>
<td>Abundant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons/Km²</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>20-30</td>
<td>20-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer Rights (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Limited</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Preferential</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Complete</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>72.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Parcels over which households have no individual transfer rights.
b. Parcels which cannot be sold but may be given or bequeathed, usually to members of the same family or lineage.
c. Parcels which can be sold.

The above shows although there has been much progress toward individualization of land rights in two areas, the third area--which has a very high population density and is close to the urban market--has made much less progress in this direction.

Consistent with expectations, longer-stay farmers are more likely to have ceded land to other parties and to have acquired some written claim to the land. In Niable, long-stay farmers scored 5 out of 7 on the tenure security index, higher than any other group: this probably reflects the closure of the extensive land frontier in the eastern forest and the switch to a more sedentary pattern of agricultural development. However, security does not amount to individualization--transfer rights in Niable remain very limited.

Table 2.6 shows that tenure is somewhat less secure in peri-urban areas than in rural areas. This may be explained by the greater competition for land that is to be found on the urban fringe. Significantly, these peri-urban conflicts do not diminish with length of occupancy: 10 percent of short-stay farmers had suffered boundary conflicts compared with almost one-quarter of long-stay farmers; 14 percent of short-stayers had been threatened with expropriation compared to nearly 30 percent of long-stay farmers. In the rural areas, on each of
### Table 2.5: Impact of Length of Occupancy on Land Tenure Security of Household Head

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Komboro-dougou</th>
<th>Komboro-dougou</th>
<th>Korhogo</th>
<th>Korhogo</th>
<th>Niablé</th>
<th>Niablé</th>
<th>Soubre</th>
<th>Soubre</th>
<th>Daloa</th>
<th>Daloa</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SHORT</td>
<td>LONG</td>
<td>SHORT</td>
<td>LONG</td>
<td>SHORT</td>
<td>LONG</td>
<td>SHORT</td>
<td>LONG</td>
<td>SHORT</td>
<td>LONG</td>
<td>SHORT</td>
<td>LONG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N=</strong></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(percent of N that are migrants)</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>(29)</td>
<td>(57)</td>
<td>(86)</td>
<td>(47)</td>
<td>(60)</td>
<td>(47)</td>
<td>(49)</td>
<td>(38)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Percentages

1. Has some documented claim to land: 3 8 5 9 23 5 7 16 5 2 8 27
2. Land boundaries are fenced or hedged: 8 6 - 14 36 33 14 5 - 2 13 13
3. No restriction on use of land: 17 22 33 41 100 98 93 100 100 100 79 83
4. No boundary conflicts: 100 100 100 73 86 74 54 79 87 73 77 78
5. No attempt by others to expropriate: 92 100 83 36 100 96 68 87 89 89 83 85
6. No redress sought from authorities: 92 100 100 91 100 98 96 95 27 27 83 78
7. Has ceded part of land to another: 67 56 50 91 21 20 14 32 7 27 25 37

#### Score* (Out of 7)

|                  | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 |

*Score: Each of the indicators 1-7 is assigned a value of 1 if the percentage is over 50 percent and a value of 0 if the percentage is 50 percent or less; the "Score" is the sum of these values.

**Note:** "Short" denotes occupancy for ten years or less; "long" denotes occupancy for over ten years.

Table 2.6: Impact of Closeness to Town and Length of Occupancy on Land Tenure Security of Household Head

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Peri-urban SHORT</th>
<th>Peri-urban LONG</th>
<th>Rural SHORT</th>
<th>Rural LONG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N= 21</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentages</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Has some documented claim to land</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Land boundaries are fenced or hedged</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. No restrictions on use of land</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. No boundary conflicts</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. No attempt by others to expropriate</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. No redress sought from authorities</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Has ceded part of land to another</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em><em>Score</em> (Out of 7)</em>*</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Score:* Each of the indicators 1-7 is assigned a value of 1 if the percentage is more than 50 percent and a value of 0 if the percentage is 50 percent or less; the "score" is the sum of these values.

Note:  "Peri-urban" refers to household heads from Korhogo and Daloa;  "Rural" refers to household heads from Komorodougou, Niablé and Soubré;  "Short" denotes occupancy for ten years or less;  "Long" denotes occupancy for over ten years.


The seven variables, long-stay farmers show more tenure security than short stay to have attended secondary school or to have obtained urban work experience; migrants are more likely to work alongside their father on the land. This may be because migrants try to increase their hold over land by clearing as much ground as possible, using their sons' labor to help them. This clearly raises the sons' expectations about eventually acceding to some of the land that they have helped to develop, expectations that are often frustrated by the rival claims of indigenous sons. But the indigenous sons are manifestly less equipped to assume the role of farmers. Almost half of them now live in the town and only 31 percent of them help their father with farmwork.

The Position of Sons

Given that patrilineal transmission of land rights is increasingly important, it was deemed valid to study the nature of the association between fathers and sons, considering its implications for the evolution of the tenure regime. The survey revealed some differences in the orientation of migrant and indigenous sons of fifteen years or over (Table 2.7). To begin with, migrants' sons are more likely to live with the household head; the migrants are less likely.
Table 2.7: Selected Characteristics of Sons of Household Heads Aged Over Fifteen Years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Komboro-dougou</th>
<th>Korhogo</th>
<th>Niable</th>
<th>Soubré</th>
<th>Daloa</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SONS OF INDIGENOUS FARMERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentages</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Live with household head</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Have secondary education</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Have urban work experience</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Live in town now</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Help household head with farmwork</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SONS OF MIGRANT FARMERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentages</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Live with household head</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Have secondary education</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Have urban work experience</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Live in town now</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Help household head with farmwork</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The survey results can be used to frame the following propositions.

- In terms of transfer rights, migrants are worse off than indigenous farmers—for example, they are less likely to inherit land.
- With respect to other dimensions of land tenure security (boundary conflicts, threats of expropriation, etc) there are no differences between migrant and indigenous farmers.
- Land that is obtained through inheritance or sale remains encumbered with a variety of other obligations (involving exchange of gifts, labor service and crop shares). Land remains less than fully alienable and land rights have not yet been individualized.
- Patrilinearity is becoming more prevalent; this trend is stronger in the forest than the savanna.
- In areas of comparable population density, tenure
security is no higher in ethnically homogeneous (savanna) areas than ethnically diverse (forest) areas.

- Length of occupancy does not greatly enhance security of tenure.
- Land tenure is less secure in peri-urban than in rural areas, even for long-stay occupants.
- The sons of indigenous farmers who leave the village to pursue education or jobs in the towns are likely to have difficulty in negotiating access to village land. Although, by customary law, they have a stronger claim to land than the sons of migrants, in practice, they may have difficulty in realizing this claim.

Although the results of this survey—or any other survey for that matter—make it impossible to define the absolute level of tenure security or insecurity, they show that, in terms of certain variables which serve as good proxy measures of security, there are relatively few differences between indigenous and migrant groups regarding the strength of their claim to land. Although, in absolute terms, the tenure security of all may be limited, migrants are not significantly worse off than indigenous groups. This is a significant finding, particularly because assimilation through intermarriage remains relatively rare. In many parts of the world, migrants have a very precarious tenure and limited control over resources. In Côte d'Ivoire—as in several other African countries—the framework of customary land rights has proved sufficiently flexible to accommodate a large number of “strangers.” This is not to say that there are no conflicts over access to land; rather, under customary law, there are effective mechanisms for conflict resolution.

The remaining chapters seek to explore the terms of negotiation over land rights, hypothesizing about the dynamics of this bargaining process and considering whether the actions of the state tend to reinforce or undermine the traditional mechanisms for conflict resolution.
3. INTERPRETING THE LAND RIGHTS REGIME IN COTE D’IVOIRE

In Côte d’Ivoire, the rural households involved in land rights disputes are fairly evenly balanced in terms of resource power. There is little scope for one set of households (e.g. indigenous farmers) to unilaterally impose conditions on another set of households (e.g. migrants). This is partly because, unlike in other parts of the world, there are no distinct classes of landowners and landless. The parties to contracts are involved in permanent renegotiation. Each party’s leverage over the terms of the contract varies inversely with local population density: the higher the density (the larger the number of migrants competing for land), the lower the bargaining power of the tenant. The state presently stands very much on the sidelines of this negotiating process—its initiatives are ineffectual, all the weaker because they are often mutually self-contradictory. Each of these issues will be examined separately—the way in which households negotiate access to land; and the government’s ineffective role as mediator.

A Sharecropping Paradigm

The issue of rights to land cannot be separated from the question of labor contracts and the production relations between members of the same household and between members of different households. As the survey indicated, gaining access to land brings with it a series of obligations; these amount to contracts which bind households together. The parties to inter- and intra-household contracts are generally remunerated not in the form of wages but in the form of labor service, gifts or crop shares. Although, on the surface, these contracts have numerous permutations, in essence, the rationale they reflect approximates closely to that of sharecropping. Given the existing constraints, this system of allocating land rights appears to be fairly optimal from an efficiency and equity point of view.

Sharecropping is well adapted to situations where credit and crop insurance is limited (Box 3.2). There are two other factors that are conducive for sharecropping to flourish. First, there must be a flourishing external market for a cash crop, with market access controlled or closely supervised by the landowner. Sharecropping does not lend itself to the production of food crops: if the tenant can eat the crop he is likely to pilfer (i.e. he takes 100 percent of some portion of output whereas he would receive only half or less of that portion if he had declared it to the farmer). In the eastern forest, even if the tenant has independent access to cash crop traders, the social (and information) network between migrants and their indigenous hosts is sufficiently tight to make it difficult for the tenant to sell some part of his crop on the side without the indigenous farmer finding out about it. A second requirement for sharecropping to thrive is the existence of a centralized and potentially coercive political structure that enables land users to prevent sharecroppers from simply appropriating land (or output) in their own right; this situation is more characteristic of the eastern than the western forest.

Wage contracts are not attractive for a number of reasons. First, landowners face liquidity constraints that make them reluctant to enter into wage contracts; for example, if the crop fails they may be unable to meet their wage bill. Sharecropping enables the producer to share his risks: in the event of a poor harvest, the farmer and his tenant absorb the loss between them. Second, sharecropping entails low supervision costs: the tenant has an incentive to produce as much as possible because
Box 3.1 Anthropological Sources

There is a rich anthropological literature which captures the diversity of land rights in Cote d'Ivoire and the significant variations between different ethnic groups. Research has focused heavily on the forest zone of Cote d'Ivoire and (ethnically contiguous) Ghana. In the context of a decentralized approach to resolving land rights problems—examining the case of each village on its merits—project design could be greatly enhanced if reference was made to the relevant ethnographic literature; unfortunately, most project designers are not anthropologists and such sources tend to be overlooked.

For the forest zone, studies have been made for most of the major ethnic groups. For the Abe and Agni, see Dupire (1961); for the Adioukrou, Memel-Fote (1980); for the Bete, Kobben (1956); for the Dida, Terray (1969); for the Gorou, Meillasoux (1964); and for the Wobe, Schwartz (1970). Important overviews of the land rights issue have been provided by Chaveau and Richard (1976), Chaveau (1993), Hecht (1981, 1983, 1985), Lena (1979), Lewis (1991), Raulin (1957) Stavenhagen (1975) and Weiskel (1979). For a detailed study of the importance of sharecropping, see Robertson (1982, 1987); although he refers to the abusa system of Ghana, Robertson's comments are equally pertinent to the forest zone of Cote d'Ivoire.

his income is contingent on the level of output (Stiglitz 1974). The tenant's incentive would be even higher under a system of fixed cash rental but, given credit and insurance constraints, such contracts are not attractive either to tenants or landlords. (Table 2.2 shows that in the survey zones cash renting accounts for under five percent of cases of land acquisition). Wage labor requires close supervision if employers are to ensure that laborers work as hard as they can. Third, by reducing supervision requirements, sharecropping potentially frees the landowner to pursue off-farm activities which is a way to minimize risks (since it permits income diversification) or to increase leisure—many are absentee landowners preferring to live in the town rather than on the land. The gains from low supervision costs may continue to make sharecropping attractive to the landowner even when labor becomes so abundant that the wage rate is pushed down beneath the value of the crop share.

Following the terms of this analysis, a series of propositions may be advanced about differences between labor contracts and land rights in the east and west forest. These propositions concern: how political centralization influences the relative importance of wage and share contracts; the circumstances in which household heads are likely to use their sons' labor for farm work; and the point at which household heads are likely to cede land to their sons.

The Role of Political Centralization

In general terms, the sharecropping paradigm seems more applicable to the east forest than to the west forest of Cote d'Ivoire. Land rights appear to be evolving differently on both sides of the Bandama, reflecting differences in the original political situation. Table 2.4 suggests that tenure security is somewhat higher in the eastern forest than in the western forest. It is possible that conflicts will intensify in the future and that the traditional institutions will make conflicts easier to manage in the east than the west.

The sharecropping paradigm is more likely to be valid where power is relatively centralized,
Box 3.2 The Efficiency Implications of Land Contracts

The following propositions may be derived from a recent comprehensive study of different regimes of land rights (Binswanger and others, In Press):

- Faced with imperfections in the market for management skills and "lumpy" inputs (e.g. oxen), households enter the land tenancy market in order to achieve the optimal operational holding size given their non-tradeable factor endowments: this underlying motive applies to all forms of tenancy.

- There is no difference in efficiency between owner-operated and fixed cash rental systems.

- Fixed cash rental is more efficient than sharecropping because of the incentive question: the sharecropper typically keeps one-third to one-half of every unit of output he produces; the fixed rental tenant is better off because for each incremental unit of output beyond the threshold needed to cover the rent, the tenant keeps 100 percent of what he produces. Nevertheless, recent research has demonstrated that the efficiency losses attributable to sharecropping are not as large as previously thought (Otsuka and Hayami 1988: 49).

- Where there are credit and insurance constraints, sharecropping will prevail and there will be little or no fixed cash renting. In these circumstances, wage contracts will also be rare. Sharecropping is more efficient than wage contracts because the latter entail heavy supervision costs (particularly where farms are large) and payment of a fixed wage entails a risk for the operator (if his crops fail he may be hard pressed to pay the wage). Because of the lesser need for supervision, sharecropping is also more attractive than wage contracts when the operator wants to develop off-farm enterprise; this form of diversification may also serve to reduce the risks incurred by the entrepreneur.

- Sharecropping tenants are more likely to accumulate capital where land is abundant relative to labor and landlord’s shares are low; capital accumulation may enable sharecroppers ultimately to become owner operators. In these circumstances, sharecropping may potentially serve as a leveling device, tending to reduce income inequalities between different farm operators.

For additional discussion of these issues, see Otsuka, Chuma and Hayami (In Press).

with the original claimants to land having the means to exclude outsiders and exact tribute. These circumstances have long been more characteristic of the eastern forest than the west.

In general, the Akan peoples have a tradition of co-optation and assimilation of outsiders. In the first instance, this was based on military force: the Akan of Côte d’Ivoire represent a breakaway group from the warlike Ashanti of Ghana and, like the Ashanti, they preserved the tradition of exacting tribute from other ethnic groups moving into the vicinity. Essentially, the Akan got the outsiders to work for them and then divided the fruit of their labor, taking half or more for themselves and leaving the rest for the migrants. To this day, migrants are expected to live in the same villages as their indigenous hosts and are fairly well integrated in the life of the community. For example, they have the same
level of participation in village cooperatives as the indigenous group. Nevertheless, marriages between migrants and their indigenous hosts remain relatively rare and the rights of the former are closely circumscribed.

In the west, no warrior aristocracy ever emerged and consequently there was no basis for the formation of tributary states in which outsiders would become tightly integrated with the indigenous group. For a long time, southwest Côte d'Ivoire remained more isolated from the outside world than either the savanna to the north or the area to the east of the Bandama. Communities had no tradition of political centralization or long-distance trade, only a relay trade passing goods between contiguous peoples. Person (1989:652) has observed that the history of the Krou region is "one of small groups continuously splitting up."

In this context, migrants were relatively free to move in and appropriate what they could. As in the east, they tended to be more industrious than their indigenous hosts but, unlike in the east, the hosts appear to have been less successful at taking a cut of the wealth generated by outsiders; the sharecropping paradigm is less applicable. Since, until recently, population density was relatively light in the west, there was more space here than in the east for migrants to set up by themselves. They lived, and continue to live, in camps, located at a distance from the indigenous villages and intermarriage between the two groups is rare.

These political differences are reflected in the income gap between migrants and indigenous farmers. Income inequalities are sharper in the west because migrants have appropriated more land and are better off than the indigenous population. In 1985, in the rural west, the indigenous Krou accounted for 45 percent of the population, but 60 percent of western households fall in the poorest decile. In the rural east, the proportion of indigenous Akan in the total population was the same as their share of the poorest decile of households (68 percent). Although migrants in the west tend to be better off than indigenous farmers, this is not the case for Burkinabe migrants who-- throughout Côte d'Ivoire-- are the poorest migrants. In the west, the Burkinabe account for 1 percent of the population but 4 percent of the poorest decile of households; in the east, their share in the poorest decile was roughly the same as their share in the population as a whole (around 1 percent)(Glewwe 1988:56). However, the Burkinabe form a much smaller proportion of the migrant population in the east than they do in the west. Overall, there are fewer income disparities (and a greater propensity for "leveling") in the east than in the west.

How do living standards compare in the east and west? Table 1.1 has already shown that per capita incomes of export farmers are higher in the west. In 1985, mean per capita expenditures were 20 percent higher in rural forest west than in rural forest east. A much larger share of the poorest quintile of households was located in the east (35 percent) compared to the west (9 percent). But by some measures the east seems better off than the west. The total income of farm households is higher in the east reflecting the larger mean size of farms and lesser dependence on coffee/cocoa incomes (Grootaert 1993:45). Roads and communal infrastructure are better developed in the eastern forest: in 1985, 21 percent of households had electric light (compared to only 1 percent in the west) (Glewwe 1988). It is plausible to hypothesize that the more tightly-knit communities of the east with their leveling mechanisms and their better-developed infrastructure will be more conducive to easier resolution of land rights conflicts than the more loosely-textured, fissile communities of the west. The same circumstances will possibly make it easier to mobilize villagers for communal investment projects in the east. This has implications for the design of projects that are intended to promote the capacity of villages to manage their own resource base.
The Continuum Between Wage Labor and Share Contracts

In the forest zone, indigenous farmers use migrant laborers less as a supplement to family labor power, than as a substitute for it. Migrants are initially hired as short-contract wage workers during the period when plantations are established. This suggests that migrant labor is sufficiently abundant for newcomers to have limited bargaining powers—otherwise they would demand and be given land from the outset. The indigenous farmer is willing to use a wage contract for plantation establishment for two reasons. First, since food crops can be interplanted with tree crops in the first four years, the wage paid does not have to cover the full subsistence costs of the worker. Second, there is a built-in incentive for the worker to perform well, helping to minimize the supervision cost associated with wage labor. If his husbandry is good the worker may expect to move up the hierarchy from hired hand to sharecropper. The wage contract therefore amounts to a probationary period which is associated with new plantation development. It is for this reason that the proportion of wage workers is now higher in the western forest (where most new plantations are located) than it is in the eastern forest (where, fifty years ago, coffee and cocoa cultivation first took off, and where plantations are older).

Once the indigenous farmer has satisfied himself that the migrant laborer is competent and reliable and once tree crops come into production, the worker will be upgraded to a sharecropper (abusun) receiving a one-third share of the crop. The productive life of coffee and cocoa trees is around thirty years. Therefore, once established, the abusun effectively has a contract for life. As yields from the trees taper off, the contract is commuted to half shares (abunu) or a three-quarter share for the sharecropper (abunan), thus compensating him for the declining income from the plantation. These arrangements vary locally according to the relative availability of migrant labor— the less abundant the supply of this labor, the greater the power of the migrants to bargain over shares and terms. For the migrant and the indigenous farmer, the relative attractiveness of the share contract varies with the price of coffee and cocoa. When the price is low, the worker makes very little from the system and would perhaps prefer to be hired as a wage laborer; when the price is high, it is the owner who prefers to hire wage labor, rather than divide his profits with a sharecropper (Stavenhagen 1975:142).

Access to land for food crops is invariably a source of conflict between farmer and tenant. Once the plantations are established, interplanting with coffee and cocoa is ruled out by overshading. The tenant may prefer to have use rights to land to grow his own food crops but the farmer may wish to have the whole of his land in cash crops with the tenant buying food in local markets. The deal that is struck will depend on the quality of land available (is there some that is appropriate for food crops but not for cash crops?); and the bargaining strength of the tenant (are workers so scarce that it is worth the farmers’ while to hand over land for food crops to help secure his labor supply?). A major consideration is the land-extensive nature of food crop cultivation: sharecroppers usually shift the site of cultivation to maintain yields, presupposing that they must continually renegotiate access to land with the indigenous group. This need for renegotiation may have the effect of increasing the migrant tenant’s dependence on his indigenous hosts, making it easier for the latter to enforce tribute obligations. As the availability of migrant labor increases, there will be less forest land available for conversion to crops and, since the bargaining power of the migrants is diminished, less incentive for the indigenous group to offer access to food crop land as an inducement. There are signs that in higher-density areas indigenous farmers are now unwilling to let migrants establish sedentary food crop cultivation. This is one way of reminding migrants that they are still outsiders; its
incidental effect is to inhibit food crop intensification.\textsuperscript{14}

The Transfer Of Land Rights

As the results of the survey indicate, in the forest region, even in areas that are traditionally matrilineal, land is increasingly passed down from father to son. As long ago as the 1940s, Fortes (1970:206) found that among the Akan (Agni), in about one-third of all cases, land was transmitted from father to son rather than from a man to his sister’s son. This is primarily because residence is patrilocal-- the father lives with his son and shapes his mind, character and skills; close ties develop between them. In these circumstances it is hardly surprising that many farmers prefer to transmit land to sons rather than to nephews.

Stavenhagen (1975:133) concludes:

"The Agni agriculturist finds it difficult to respect a tradition that dictates that his farm, which is in such a large part the product of the labor of his own sons, be passed on not to those same sons, but rather to a nephew, to whom the father feels less attached. On the other hand, the young men who have participated in the creation of a farm have no way of knowing if the farm they will inherit from their uncle will be equal to the one on which they have labored throughout their youth. As a result it is increasingly common that the farmer gives a piece of his own farm to his sons during his lifetime, subtracting this land from the legacy he is obliged by tradition to leave to his nephew."

However, contrary to this observation, the survey found that in many cases, the farm of the indigenous household head is not "the product of the labor of his own sons;" nor is it clear that farmers are willing to cede land during their lifetime. In principle, if the father wanted to retain some claim to the income from the land, he could recruit his son as a sharecropper. This rarely happens, for three reasons. First, the father has limited suasion over his son’s labor; sons may prefer not to work on the land.

Second, because indigenous sons tend to have relatively little farming experience--as the survey demonstrated--their fathers may prefer to continue relying on the proven services of their abusan. Third, provided there is an abundant supply of outsider labor, it may be a better strategy for the household head to encourage his sons to seek education and urban employment, assuming, that is, that sons can be relied on to generate remittances and to provide for their parents’ old age.

There is every indication that, during the lifetime of the household head, until he has acquired some capital or income source of his own, the indigenous youth is no closer to acquiring land rights than the son of the migrant sharecropper. If he is not prepared to work on his father’s land, the indigenous son must at least demonstrate to his father that he is capable of providing assistance in the form of gifts or cash remittances. However, up to and during his retirement, the father can get these same services from his tried and tested tenants, continuing to live off their crop shares.

This tends to reduce the son’s bargaining strength as a source of support to his parents in their old age. With the economic downturn of the 1980s and the contraction of urban employment opportunities, sons arguably have less opportunity to generate remittances and therefore less power to persuade the father to hand over land before his death. Theoretically, the value of remittances must be at least as high as the value of the crop share from the land that the farmer must give up in order to accommodate his son. In 1988, the value of remittances received by rural households in the forest zone was only about CFAF 12,000 per year, less than 2 percent of mean annual farm
Box 3.3 How Significant Is The Return To The Land In Cote d'Ivoire?

There are plausible grounds for assuming that with the economic recession of the 1980s and the consequent shrinking of urban incomes (informal sector incomes included), the young who had previously left the rural sector in search of urban employment might return to the villages to take up farming. This assumption was sufficiently strong to lead to the tentative preparation of a "Young Farmers" project, one of whose aims was to help would-be farmers negotiate access to land in the villages they had originally left. Recent research by the French sociologists, Claudine Vidal and Marc LePape casts some doubts on the size of this reverse migration. Vidal and LePape* have surveyed a panel of 200 low-income households in Abidjan, focusing on neighborhoods with a large number of migrants from rural areas. The panel was interviewed on three occasions (1979, 1985 and 1992), shedding valuable light on changes in the living standards and life strategies of the urban poor. Throughout these years of economic crisis, Vidal and LePape found strong elements of continuity: 60 percent of the households first interviewed in 1979 were still in place in 1992; people in the five communities from which the households were drawn show a strong identification with Abidjan and, specifically, there is little sign of a reverse migration.

However, the village remains an important adjunct of the Abidjan household economy. Many of those now living in Abidjan are absentee landlords who derive an income from rural property (often left in the hands of sharecroppers). Abidjan householders often run small businesses (e.g. pharmacies) in their village. Children may be educated in the village rather than in Abidjan because it is cheaper to raise them in the countryside. Village ceremonies continue to make a significant demand on the resources of Abidjan households: between 1979 and 1992 there was no decline, in real terms, in funeral expenditures. Women in poor Abidjan households mobilize the labor of young nieces from the villages, training them as apprentices for the food and textile trade and for craftwork. In the age range fifteen to twenty-five there are significantly more females in the household than males, owing to the large number of girls imported from the villages.

While the design of this panel study makes it impossible to verify what proportion of the households that dropped out returned to the land, there are strong indications that the poor urban economy has generally retained the labor of those who migrated to the cities. Rather than return to the land it is plausible to hypothesize that young men- partly because they have no farming skills and because they have developed "urban values"- are more likely to stay on in the towns, perhaps gravitating from steady to casual employment or crime. Vidal and LePape argue that the main effect of the recession has been to increase the dependence of poor urban men on rents and on the trade and business incomes generated by women; access to this income may reduce pressure on young men to return to the village for employment. This suggests that the move by indigenous sons to reclaim land given to migrants may be less strong than is commonly assumed.


income (Glewwe 1988; Grootaert 1993). Among other things, this low level of remittances may mean that indigenous sons have a low motivation (or limited means) to press their claim for land during their father's lifetime.
Once the indigenous farmer dies, there will be an adjustment in the relative strength of land claims advanced by the deceased man's son and the migrants currently occupying his land. With the death of the indigenous farmer, a share of the income generated by migrants is no longer needed by him as a welfare guarantee. Judgments about the relative utility of contracts with sons or migrants are of less importance than the collectivity's goal of ensuring that land is not permanently alienated from the lineage. Therefore, the dead man's land is more likely to pass to his son than to the migrant, irrespective of how long the latter has been in occupation. However, it remains unclear what proportion of indigenous sons leaving for the town eventually return to stake a claim to land in their village (Box 3.3).

The interventions of local political authorities in land transmission disputes tend to reinforce this two-phase aspect of indigenous sons’ land rights. In the first phase, while the father is alive, government officials will defend the right of tenants against expropriation threats (usually instigated by the indigenous farmer's son). In the second phase, following the death of the indigenous farmer, the local political authorities reassert the claim of the lineage group to the dead man's land: while the tenant may be able to continue working the land for the rest of his own life, he will not be able to transmit it to his son.\(^\text{15}\)

For migrant tenants, the transmission of land rights from father to son is more likely to occur where the migrants have intermarried with their indigenous hosts. However, intermarriage remains rare. When migrants marry indigenous women, reports one anthropologist, it is considered "a notable strategic coup;" such alliances, which convey economic and political rights to the offspring, continue to be regarded with suspicion by the Akan (Okali 1976:98; Radcliffe-Brown and Ford 1950:279).
4. THE ROLE OF THE STATE

The position of the state concerning land rights has entailed, on the one hand, the promulgation of a series of mutually contradictory statutes and, on the other hand, the turning of a blind eye to the covert colonization of land formally in the state domain (Akomian 1991; Reed 1992:55-57; Coulibaly and Sawadogo 1991).

Colonial Period

During the early period of colonial rule, French authorities laid claim to all vacant and unoccupied land under the Decree of 20 July 1900. This act denied all traditional claims to land not then under cultivation. The motive was to establish a legal foundation for distributing unoccupied land to French colonists. This end was furthered by the Decree of 25 July 1932 defining the legal procedure for obtaining individual freehold title to land. According to this, private claims and the acquisition of title could be based simply on evidence of active land use. A subsequent decree, dated 15 November 1935, reaffirmed the principle that all unoccupied land belonged to the state. The legislation also ordained the state’s right to seize any lands within five kilometers of human settlement if they had been abandoned for more than ten years—this was intended to allow public authorities to promote the growth of urban areas. Moreover, the 1935 decree stipulated that even land under customary law which was currently in use could be expropriated by the state if there was an economic justification for doing so. On the basis of this legislation, the colonial administration installed migrants (mainly Baule and Dyula) in central Côte d’Ivoire, without seeking the permission of the local inhabitants; this was in an attempt to spur development of coffee and cocoa which the indigenous population was proving slow to take up.16

But this position was largely reversed by the Decree of 17 May, 1955 which renounced public claims to vacant, unoccupied or unexploited land. Moreover, for anyone to stake a claim to land it was necessary to demonstrate, either that this land was not subject to customary law, or that the customary claimants had waived their right to the land. This 1955 policy reversal may have been reflective of a general trend toward liberalization by colonial authorities; or a specific attempt to placate the nationalist African unions who were pressing their claims for land. One effect of this reversal was to encourage a rapid acceleration of rural land transactions in areas that had previously, in principle at least, been part of the public domain. One aspect of this was the creation of private plantations and timber concessions, operated by absentee landlords (both European and Ivoirian) employing mostly migrant labor. Changes to land statutes tended to encourage “privatization,” rather than reinforcing traditional land rights. This helps to explain why, from an early date, there was a high incidence of land sales in the western forest.

Post-Independence Period

With independence and the promulgation of the new constitution of 7 August, 1960, the state implicitly reaffirmed the land tenure laws inherited from France, complete with their contradictions. There remained a fundamental conflict between indigenous customs, which hold that land ownership (as opposed to usufruct) is inalienable, and the emphasis on private freehold maintained by European legal traditions.

Intermittently, and without serious attempts at enforcement, the government has sought to establish the primacy of state rights and modern tenure procedures over customary law. A 1963 bill declaring that all land that was unused or
unregistered was henceforth the property of the state was never formally promulgated. The most significant government initiative remains the Decree of March 20, 1967, declaring that "land belongs to the person who brings it into production, providing that exploitation rights have been formally registered." As Coulibali and Sawadogo (1991:49) have noted, the second clause of this decree tends to be overlooked: the 1967 edict (reaffirmed in the President's celebrated Daloa address of 1968) has been used by indigenous and migrant interests alike to legitimate the clearing of unoccupied land; the rider concerning the need for a formal registration of claims has remained unobserved and unenforced. The government further sought to assert its claim to land in an Interior Ministry circular of December 17, 1968, according to which "the state is the owner of all unregistered land," "customary rights to land are abolished" and "no compensation will be paid to so-called customary owners" (Coulibaly and Sawadogo 1991:50).

Despite early support for registration, the government took few steps to ease the stringent requirements for acquiring land title that were inherited from the French. Full title is obtained only after survey and registration work (immatriculation) costing CFAF 85,000 per hectare. Less than 1 percent of the rural areas of Côte d'Ivoire have been thus registered. Recognizing that the costliness of the process was a real barrier to obtaining full title, the government introduced a separate certificate in 1971: the "authorization d'occupation" costs CFAF 40,000 per hectare and is granted by the Agriculture Ministry's Service du Domaine Rural. Although this agency has local offices in each of the administrative regions, its activities have not resulted in any significant increase in the issue of certificates. For a more modest fee, the agents will simply witness a payment made for land. But although witnessing gives the buyer (particularly the migrant) a limited protection against current counterclaims, it does not confer transfer rights: the Ministry's officials acknowledge that formal claim is annulled at death, with the land reverting to the lineage.17

Thus, in practice, almost all land remains subject to customary law and any attempt to exploit or develop land must take place with the explicit cognizance of the traditional authorities; matriculation or land registration carries little conviction with these traditional authorities and is regarded as an illegitimate imposition by the state. This impasse has as one of its consequences the covert occupation of gazetted forest and national parkland. These "protected" areas cover 2 million hectares (6 percent of the national territory), with about one-third of this area corresponding to gazetted forest. Such public domain lands have never been effectively policed by the government, and traditional chiefs have remained the effective arbiters of access. Land claimed by the state is subject to private appropriation from two sides: it is appropriated by politicians and leaders who use their positions to become owners of land; and it is appropriated by migrants who acquire use rights from local chiefs in exchange for gifts. In many cases, the politicians end up acting as patrons and protectors of the peasants who have moved onto state land.18 The contradictions in the state's position have given the "clandestins" a certain leverage. This was well illustrated in the 1970s in the Marahoue Park: one arm of government (SODEFOR) evicted the peasants who had settled in the park and were destroying the wildlife; the clandestins were mainly Baule and shortly after their eviction were able to reoccupy the land after a successful appeal to the President.

Whatever measures are taken to mark and patrol boundaries, attempts by the government to protect public domain land will lack all credibility in the eyes of local chiefs as long as the government itself continues to covertly hand over tracts of these very same lands to political clients. The local chiefs may be expected to resist now that, under the auspices of the Commissions Paysans-Foret, the government is
asking them to accommodate in their villages the migrants they, the chiefs, directed toward the gazetted areas, with the complaisant acceptance of a government committed to rapid expansion of the agricultural frontier. Some of the lands on which these migrants would be resettled are being contested with increasing vigor by indigenous sons returning from the cities.
5. THE PROSPECTS FOR INTERVENTION

Outlook

Conflicts between the traditional land rights system and the regime imposed by the state probably outweigh in significance the conflicts—within village communities—between indigenous farmers and migrants. However, migrant/indigenous conflicts seem more likely to intensify in the western forest than in the east and local structures of mediation seem better equipped to deal with these disputes in the east compared to the west.

Raulin’s observation in 1957 probably remains true for much of the forest zone: “We can conclude that tensions are not carried to the extreme, and the equilibrium between the native population and the immigrants is not broken except in those regions where competition for the land has become very sharp.”19 The rural population density of the forest zone is still far from heavy: the maximum density is perhaps represented by peri-urban Daloa (78 rural inhabitants per square kilometer), while in Niable and Soubré, the densities are, respectively, only 22 and 34 persons per square kilometer (Table 2.1). Attempts to establish a critical population level or a threshold carrying capacity beyond which land rights conflicts and environmental degradation are likely to accelerate sharply are hedged about with complications. First, population densities calculated at the level of the sub-prefecture may conceal more than they reveal; the mean gives no indication of how densities range across the various localities within this large administrative district— it is the village-specific density that is critical. Second, there is no real consensus about just how much population land can support without a sharp deterioration of the natural resource base (Box 5.1).

What is the environmental impact of land rights systems in Côte d’Ivoire? In terms of the sustainability of agricultural development, does it make any difference whether land rights are lineage based or individualized? How do sharecropping and other inter-household contracts affect sustainability? There is no hard data with which to answer these questions. First, land rights probably have less impact on agricultural practices than the overall framework of incentives (prices, interest rates etc.) within which farmers operate. Evidence from several countries indicates that small farmers with secure individual title to land are no more likely to make yield-enhancing investments than other farmers with farms of the same size and land quality, enjoying a lesser degree of tenure security (Heath 1992). Rather than the system of land rights, it is probably the price of land in relation to other factors which determines whether or not the farmer has an incentive to protect his resource base; the price of land is a function of population pressure and access to markets. A plausible hypothesis would be that tenure security is a necessary but not sufficient condition for adoption of ecologically-sound practices, the best measure of tenure security is probably the possession of transfer rights. In Côte d’Ivoire, transfer rights are poorly developed and therefore there is probably little incentive for farmers to make fixed investments in their land. Within this context of generalized insecurity, it probably makes little difference—in environmental terms—whether the land contract involves sharecropping, labor service, owner-operation or any other system. If it is accepted that the security of transfer is not a sufficient condition for adoption of ecologically-sound practices, there is no reason for project or policy-based interventions to seek to “force the pace” of land
Box 5.1 Interpreting Carrying Capacity

The carrying capacity of a given area is the maximum number of people that can be sustained by the resources on that land. For example, the carrying capacity of a piece of land could be defined as $Q/M$, where $Q$ represents the number of calories of food output that may be produced on that surface and $M$ is equal to the minimum number of calories required for human survival of one individual (Pearce, 1991: 115).

Initial assessments about carrying capacity tended to be excessively pessimistic. Blaikie has noted that "There are many examples of colonial officers writing in dismay in the 1930s and 1940s about the cultivation of steep slopes, land slips and impending catastrophe due to rapid population growth. Yet population densities two or three times those of half a century ago exist today in the same areas. Much of these colonial views can be laid at the feet of prejudice and a Eurocentric technical model of "good farming", but also it seems that many African environments are more resilient than Europeans thought" (1989:21).

A colonial geographer estimated a maximum carrying capacity of 56 persons/km² in the forest zone of Nigeria (Stamp, 1939: 32-45). By the late 1960s, this estimate had been revised upwards to 77 persons/km² (Morgan and Pugh, 1969: 127). A World Bank study found that, with the exception of Liberia and Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire was better off than all other West African countries in terms of having space to absorb future population growth. The study suggested that at low input levels, the country has the capacity to absorb between 50 to 100 persons per square kilometer, with the potential of the forest zone approximating the higher of these two figures (Acsadi and others 1990).

rights individualization. There are other areas (e.g. development of low-input technologies) which should probably command higher priority.

However, this is no reason for complacency. Development initiatives that are launched today may be advised to work on the assumption that, at present rates of population growth, Côte d'Ivoire will reach its maximum capacity for population absorption by the year 2021 (Acsadi and others 1990). The challenge therefore is to develop projects that anticipate the likely rise in land rights conflicts that will occur as the Côte d'Ivoire reaches the approximate limits of its population carrying capacity.

The following is the "worst case" scenario that may be imagined for the next decade. Assuming that migrant labor still streams into the forest zone and that structural adjustment programs push the terms of trade in favor of agriculture (against the urban economy), there will be increasing demand for land in the forest zone. As labor becomes more abundant, the wages and the crop shares offered to migrant workers will contract. Migrants may have fewer opportunities to have farms in their own right: rising population will reduce land availability and force down the wage rate. However, with the continuing weakness of prices for coffee and cocoa and the absence of effective price stabilization mechanisms, indigenous farmers may prefer—given their cash constraints and the risks implicit in tree crops—to stick to share contracts; also, they will probably continue to appreciate the low supervision costs associated with the abusa contract, which gives them the freedom to develop other (mainly off-farm) income sources. In other words, the migrants will continue to operate as tenant farmers rather than landless laborers; but their incomes will be squeezed, leading, by extension, to a decline in the welfare of the savanna households dependent on their remittances.
Indigenous sons will step up their claims for land and it will be increasingly difficult for local authorities to effectively ensure a balance between the interests of migrant sharecroppers and indigenous farmers. This shift in the balance of power is already implicit in the challenge posed by the opposition parties at a national political level; at one level, the opposition seeks to reclaim the rights of indigenous groups, reversing what they perceive as the dominant party’s excessive pandering to migrant interests. If present trends are allowed to escalate, inter-ethnic conflict will lead to violence, compromising both political stability and rural welfare.

Whether or not this scenario comes to pass will depend on migration trends. Further investigation is required to determine how much the economic recession has led, first, to a downturn in migration from the savanna (consistent with the shrinking gap in mean regional farm incomes that was indicated in Table 1.1); and, second, to what extent recession has encouraged a retreat to the villages by indigenous sons no longer able to support themselves in the towns.

**Project Initiatives**

Cognizant of these challenges, the Government has taken tentative steps toward recording the various rights to land in Côte d’Ivoire. This process has been supported since 1989 by a Pilot Land Tenure Project, co-financed by the World Bank and French bilateral assistance. A follow-up project, involving extension of the pilot operation over a broader area, is currently (1993) under preparation.

The initial aim is to record the various—and sometimes overlapping—claims to land, rather than promoting one set of claims over another. Thus, no attempt has been made to force the pace of transition from "customary" to "modern" rights, nor has an attempt been made to impose a system of land titling. Through the medium of negotiation between villagers themselves and between villagers and political authorities, an attempt is being made to reconcile the multiple claims to land, encouraging some convergence of the diverse perceptions about who has a right to what. It is accepted that the codification of land rights will be a very gradual process entailing a long-term commitment by the government.

The pilot operation covered five zones broadly representative of the diversity of land use and land rights scenarios in Côte d’Ivoire. Between them, these zones accounted for about 200,000 hectares. The follow-up project would extend outward from the nuclei formed by the pilot zones, covering a total area of about 2 million hectares. The approach entails taking aerial photographs of each zone, these being used to produce outline maps. A survey team, working in collaboration with villagers, marks on the map the village, lineage and parcel boundaries, incidentally recording the current use to which the various parcels were put. The same degree of precision concerning boundary location and land use could not be achieved using (cheaper) remote-sensing techniques.

Before survey teams arrive at the villages, sensitization campaigns are conducted in order to brief the villagers about the purpose of the exercise. The villagers then participate in tracing the various boundaries on the ground. The survey teams play a neutral role in this process: refusing to take sides in disputes between rich and poor and between migrants and indigenous groups. Once the work is complete, the survey team will deposit in the headquarters of each Prefecture (and in the Agricultural Ministry in Abidjan), a land use plan and land rights register, indicating village, lineage and parcel boundaries and recording the various claims to these lands. This will serve as a point of reference for resolving future disputes. The success of the exercise will ultimately depend on the commitment of villagers and government representatives to a regular updating of the land rights record. Updating will be necessary because, while it may be expected that the boundaries of village land (terroir) will remain
more or less fixed, within those boundaries there will be changes in the distribution of land between different lineage groups and between different households.

It is anticipated that, with appropriate training of villagers and political authorities, the updating of land rights will become a demand-driven process: specialized teams based in the regional offices of the Agriculture Ministry will respond to requests made by the villagers themselves for modification of the existing record. The work on boundary definition will be complemented by a review and reform of the laws bearing on transfer rights to land.

Although the prime objective of this approach is to clarify land rights, in the course of project implementation it will be possible—at no extra cost—to simultaneously chart land use, thereby enriching the nationwide agricultural data base that the government uses for planning purposes. At present, this is envisaged as a "one-shot" exercise in the sense that the record of land use—unlike the land rights record—would not be regularly updated by the Agriculture Ministry’s regional survey teams. The information about land potential will serve as a tool to facilitate planning by the villagers themselves—the maps being used to guide decisions about the location of access roads, transhumance corridors, small irrigation works and other physical infrastructure.

The pilot project has generally met with an enthusiastic reception from the villagers involved; this would seem to suggest that there is a strong latent demand for clarification of land rights. Village chiefs and lineage heads participated fully in the survey work entailed by mapping the various land boundaries. However, the pilot operation is not yet concluded. The data generated by this exercise and the lessons learned have yet to be formally analyzed.

**Recommendations**

The purpose of this report is not to arrive at set conclusions about land rights or the need for intervention but to establish an analytic framework that may help to guide follow-up studies and (ultimately) contribute to refining project design. The survey suggested that land rights conflicts are not of major significance; but early farmer response to the pilot land tenure project suggests that there is a strong demand for a clarification of land rights. The anthropological literature tends to reinforce the findings of the survey, generally emphasizing the strength and flexibility of traditional bargaining mechanisms and land rights systems. There are no grounds to suppose that a regime of individualized land rights would necessarily have a more positive impact in terms of economic efficiency and, from an equity viewpoint, traditional systems are potentially superior. One firm conclusion is that the state has generally failed to enhance land tenure security. On balance, there seems to be a strong case for reinforcing traditional land rights systems as against the regime imposed by the state. This suggests that support for village-based land management initiatives (the terroir approach) may be appropriate.

As conceived here, this approach is broadly consistent with the thrust of Bank-financed initiatives that favor administrative decentralization in other areas such as agricultural services and infrastructure provision. On the other hand, it must be recognized that land rights questions are almost certainly not the most pressing development issue in Côte d'Ivoire. Also, one of the biggest sources of pressure on the land rights regime—migration—can be resolved indirectly by projects designed to redress regional wealth disparities; alleviating poverty in the savanna should probably be the prime rural development objective. In terms of
poverty alleviation, land tenure projects are probably of a lower priority than initiatives which seek to improve the operation of rural factor markets, extend social and physical infrastructure and improve agricultural research and extension.

If these provisos are accepted, the following recommendations can be made about ways to proceed with terroir initiatives. First, in designing a project it will be important to pinpoint the main source of farmers’ tenure insecurity. Broadly speaking, insecurity arises as a consequence of boundary conflicts and as a result of conflicts over transfer rights. Although the conflicts are interrelated and mapping has a role to play in the resolution of each problem, the tracing of boundaries will not be sufficient to settle transfer disputes. This has implications for the relative weight of the different project components; mapping will need to be backed up by legal and institutional reform designed to make land transfers less problematic.

Careful consideration must be given to ways of enhancing the village’s capacity to resolve disputes between indigenous and migrant farmers and between indigenous fathers and their sons concerning the transmission of use rights; both within and between generations. Thus, for example, it seems possible that the tenure security of migrants is stronger for intra-generational rather than inter-generational transactions. As long as the indigenous landholder is alive, the migrants who have been installed on his land may be largely secure against rival claims (including claims from the landholder’s own sons); but once the indigenous landholder dies, the other members of his lineage group may successfully reassert their claim to the land. Similarly, once the migrant land-user dies, it is not clear that the lineage will permit transfer of the land to his children. To be successful, any land tenure project will need to address the transfer issue in all its sociological complexity, taking account of regional variations.

Second, while boundary demarcation is important, not all boundaries carry the same significance. It may be argued that the boundaries enclosing the territory of the village (terroir) and, within this area, the boundaries between different lineage groups, are more durable than the boundaries between the parcels of the various households. It is possible that in areas of low population density with systems of extensive land use (including slash and burn cultivation), individual parcel boundaries may not have much long-term significance. Since the location of each parcel will change over the life of the household, this would imply that regular updating of the map will entail more time and cost than in areas where agriculture is sedentarized. It will be important to consider whether the expenditure is justified in terms of the incremental gain to the farmer in terms of tenure security and breadth of use rights.

This point is less valid in areas where cultivation and stock rearing has been sedentarized: in peri-urban areas of Côte d’Ivoire and in the savanna zone dense there is much greater scope for conflicts over parcel boundary rights; in these areas there is probably greater need (and possibly greater farmer support) for the mapping of parcel boundaries. The evidence suggests that throughout Côte d’Ivoire, there is much to be gained from mapping exercises which clarify the boundaries of the village terroir as a whole: such an exercise should precede—and will greatly reinforce—attempts to strengthen the legal status of the terroir, this being indispensable if the community is to be protected against incursions from the state or external private interests. There is already an ample history of such incursions in Côte d’Ivoire, involving the establishment of gazetted forests, private plantations and displacement of the population by the Kossou reservoir—all these initiatives having been launched without reference to the traditional land rights of local communities. If the capacity of the village community to manage its own resource base is to be successfully
enhanced, it will be essential to provide legal protection against these incursions; mapping will be an important component of this approach. Since the boundaries of village lands remain fixed over time, mapping would be a once-and-for-all exercise, avoiding the problems likely to be associated with regular updating.

Third, the land use data that will (incidentally) be generated from the boundary survey should be fully exploited and used to enhance planning capabilities at the national and at the local level. In Côte d'Ivoire, the land use data base is very poor—remarkably poor for a middle-income country with a sizeable elite of university-trained personnel. The weakness derives from the lack of regular censuses—there has been no agricultural census since 1975—and from the filière-specific nature of information gathering. Consequently, data on natural resource capabilities and the agrarian structure is unsystematic and fragmented. This is partly because the political will for more detailed investigations has been lacking, perhaps because the government has preferred to draw a veil over such delicate issues as the distribution of landownership, wishing to reduce the scope for inter-ethnic conflict. It will be important to ensure that there is full government commitment to a transparent process of data collection, accompanied by various measures to ensure maximum diffusion and utilization of the results.

In the past, certain agencies—particularly the civil engineering agency, Département de Control des Grands Travaux (DCGTX)—have made very little attempt to share information with other branches of the government. A first step will be to analyze and synthesize the rich socioeconomic data compiled in the five zones covered by the pilot operation; the results of this operation have yet to be made available.

Fourth, steps must be taken to ensure adequate coordination between the various development agencies intervening at the village level. The objectives of village land management initiatives should reinforce the objectives identified by agricultural service agencies (research, extension, cooperative development). One aspect to address jointly with the extension service is the question of farmer incentives: attempts to improve land use management should complement the search for technologies that enhance farm incomes— if farmers are unable to perceive any link between the village management plan and prospects for increasing their incomes, they are unlikely to devote to the mapping and planning exercise the effort that it requires. It is unlikely that the terroir approach will work unless it is inserted into a context where agricultural services are already operating smoothly; this has implications for the sequencing of terroir projects.

Fifth, to avoid problems arising from the creation of overlapping or parallel jurisdictions, it will be important to ensure that the village boundaries defined by tenure-management projects do not cut across existing administrative boundaries (Sub-Prefectures, Departments and Regions). In this sense, there may be a conflict between the geographical rationality of the terroir approach—which often treats the watershed as the primary entity for land management purposes—and the administrative rationality of the government. It will be important to iron out these problems in the design phase of the project.

Sixth, this participatory approach to codifying land rights should acquire full legal significance. Although in the first instance it may be valid to simply record the diverse claims to land, in the final analysis, competing claims have to be resolved by reference to laws enforced by the state. The government needs to review the existing land tenure legislation, aiming to simplify and clarify; statutes that are not in accordance with a clearly defined set of principles should be amended or repealed. As a guiding rule, the government should not seek to extend the area in the state domain and should eliminate any residual claims by the state to uncultivated land. Although it is not yet clear that farmers have expressed a strong demand for formal titles, the procedures for obtaining titles
should be simplified. In this respect, it will be necessary to build a bridge between the activities of the Agriculture Ministry's regional survey teams and the process of land registration that is handled by the Registre de la Conservation Foncière (RCF). At present, less than 1 percent of the rural surface of Côte d'Ivoire has been registered, partly because the costs of registration are prohibitive; partly because the RCF registers "modern" rather than "customary" rights--it has nothing to offer communities wishing to reassert their traditional rights to a given area. If the work of the survey teams is to have real impact, it will have to be tied in to a legal process of granting secure rights in land; whether these rights would be geared to protecting the integrity of the village the terroir as a whole or the right of families to individual parcels should depend on the demand expressed by the rural people themselves.
ANNEX: SETTLEMENT HISTORY OF SURVEY ZONES

Korhogo and Komborodougou

In the northern savanna of Côte d’Ivoire, Voltaic peoples (including Senoufo) predominate. These people remained outside the sphere of influence of the Empire of Mali, comprising "a loose fabric of peasantry whose economic life was articulated by a long-distance trade network which conveyed the kola nuts of the southern forest towards the line of the Niger" (Person 1989:655). This culture was oriented towards the north rather than the south and Islamic influences were strong. There was no direct outlet to the sea by the Bandama; the only possible access was westward toward Futa Jallon or eastward via the Comoe and Kumasi.

Korhogo and Komborodougou both fall within the Senoufo cultural sphere and are located on the upper reaches of the Bandama river. Both areas occur within the Zone Dense, a part of the savanna where the population density is atypically high. High density appears to be the result of a defensive imperative (a response to military threats); in agroclimatic terms there is little to distinguish this zone from surrounding more lightly-populated areas.

Korhogo and Komborodougou are populated by two sub-branches of the Senoufo ethnic group, respectively, the Kiembara and the Nafara. At the end of the 17th century, both groups occupied the left bank of the Upper Bandama, taking Dabakala as their capital. From 1700 onwards, the two groups suffered military persecution by the Islamicized Mandinka, who had infiltrated southward from the vicinity of present-day Burkina Faso. In response to these threats, the Kiembara and the Nafara moved northwards, switching from the left to the right bank of the Bandama. The Kiembara founded the settlement of Korhogo and the Nafara settled in the area of what is today the sub-prefecture of Komborodougou. For most of the 18th and 19th centuries the two groups lived in relative peace. However, after 1870 they faced a further threat from militant Islam, this time in the shape of the Samory empire, which was expanding from its original base in what is today Mali. The Kiembara chief adroitly negotiated an armistice, both for his own people and the Nafara. Henceforth, the area centered on Korhogo became a safe haven, free from the depredations of the Samory empire and relatively resistant to Islamicization. For this reason it attracted a large number of refugees from Islam, which accounts for the relatively high population density that today characterizes this area on the right bank of the Upper Bandama. For sanitary reasons, the population settled originally on the relatively infertile interfluves but, owing to the build-up of people, was eventually forced to occupy the floodplains, which they used for planting wet-season rice.

Roughly three-quarters of the parcels of land are less than four hectares in size. The area cultivated per rural inhabitant varies from 0.2 hectares in the heart of the Zone Dense to 0.6 hectares in the more lightly-populated peripheral areas. Agriculture is quasi-sedentarized with minimal opportunities for fallowing. The landscape is characterized by a multitude of small fields with relatively fixed boundaries, some being subject to short fallow; the fields are interrupted occasionally by islands of "sacred forest," the clearing of which is taboo. Cattle are reared in paddocks and the absence of open grazing means that the zone largely escapes penetration by transhumant pastoralists: compared with other zones of the savanna, there are few conflicts over land rights between farmers and nomadic herds (Coulibaly et al. 1992).
Niable

Niable forms part of the Akan cultural sphere which is bounded by the Volta river on the east and the Bandama on the west. For much of their history the Akan were essentially a tributary state of the Ashanti empire which centered on Kumasi in present-day Ghana. Today, Niable is peopled primarily by two sub-branches of the Akan, the Agni and the Baoule, both of whom broke away from the Ashanti empire, leaving Kumasi in the middle of the 18th century. In fleeing Ashanti domination, the Agni remained in the forest region, migrating in waves to an area on the left bank of the Comoe, close to what now corresponds to the frontier between Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana; the Baoule pushed further westward, toward the savanna margin, in the vicinity of present-day Bouake. For the Agni at least, the flight from Ashanti was only partially successful since, once having reached their new site of settlement, they continued to pay tribute to the Ashanti kings.

Atmore (1985:56) notes that "the tiny trading settlements at Grand Bassam and Assinie, which the French had occupied in 1842, formed a westward extension of the Akan/Gold Coast economic region." The Akan in this eastern region set themselves up as brokers for the palm-oil producers of the interior, maintaining regular links with the Liverpool ships that traveled along the coast. The French withdrew from Grand Bassam and Assinie in 1871. At this time there was much greater river traffic down the Comoe (dominated by the Dyula of Kong) than down the Bandama (blocked by the Baoule). Person (1985:228) describes the Baoule as "remarkably prolific and good at assimilating other peoples;" at this time they were beginning to fully populate the mid-savanna region that they had first occupied in the 18th century.

Throughout the 20th century (particularly since 1945), there has been considerable migration from the savanna and the Sahel into the forest region; the eastern forest was the original locus of in-migration since it was here that coffee and cocoa plantations were first established in the colonial period. According to the 1988 population census, persons of Ivoirian nationality account for only one-third of the total populations; among the Ivoirians the pre-eminent ethnic group are the Agni, followed by their ethnic neighbors, the Baoule. The "outsiders" come mainly from Burkina and Mali. Although coming originally as laborers or sharecroppers and working on the lands of the indigenous population, many are now established in their own right and, in any event, the oldest settlers are fully integrated into the community and (unlike in Soubre) do not live in separate encampments. The population of the sub-prefecture increased by 135 percent between 1965 and 1975 but only by 47 percent between 1975 and 1988: by the second of these periods the coffee/cocoa frontier had shifted further west and the bulk of the Sahelian migrants were moving to new pioneer zones such as Soubre (Coulibaly et al., 1992).

Daloa and Soubre

These areas form part of the Krou cultural sphere which extends west of the Bandama river, covering all the western forest of Côte d'Ivoire and extending into Liberia and Guinea. The Krou culture centered on fishing, hunting and gathering in south-west Côte d'Ivoire, a corner that was effectively cut off from the Sudanic empires and the penetration of Islam. The Krou are distinguished by their physical anthropology (absence of sickle-cells) and the tone languages they speak which are so singular that they cannot be classified with any known group (Person 1989:652). The Krou may be divided into two sub-groups: the Bete on the eastern banks of the Sassandra and the Bakwe on the western side.

The ethnic sub-group corresponding to the Daloa/Soubre region are the Bete whose geographic origin is unclear. In the 15th century, the Bete moved down the Bandama to the coast, proceeded westward along the littoral and then, on reaching the Sassandra river, went
up the river to the vicinity of Soubré where they settled. Between the 17th and 19th centuries, for reasons that are poorly understood (war or natural disaster?), some of these settlements were abandoned and the population dispersed. Henceforth, the population remained divided between small, widely-separated villages. The various lineage groups underwent a continuous process of fission and disintegration; the imperative for political centralization (defensive or otherwise) was evidently lacking. Migrants often live apart from the indigenous group, in separate camps.

Y. Person (1989:652) notes that, throughout the 19th century, "No communication was possible between the savanna and the sea west of the Bandama, whose valley had in any case been closed by the Baoule at the beginning of the eighteenth century. The rivers were hardly navigable. In this overgrown country, communities had no tradition of political centralization or long-distance trade, only a relay trade passing goods between contiguous peoples. Hence, this country's history is one of small groups continually splitting up...." According to Atmore (1985:56), during the late nineteenth century, "the coast of the Krou country attracted very little long-distance or overseas trade."

The opening up of the region was first related to trade with the savanna; kola nuts and slaves from the forest margin were traded for cotton and millet from the north. Between 1905 and 1920 there was an influx of merchants (Dyula, Lebanese and others), dealing in kola nuts, rubber and palm oil, acting as brokers between the Bete and the European trading houses on the coast. In the colonial period, first, rubber was planted and then this was followed by cocoa (introduced in 1921) and coffee (1922). The setting-up of plantations went hand-in-hand with attempts to press outsiders into forced labor. Coercion was not, by and large, very successful and it was only after the elimination of forced labor in 1946 that the region began to attract significant numbers of in-migrants, a process that was fuelled by the coffee boom of 1949-54.

By 1960, the westward march of the plantation frontier had reached Daloa and over the next fifteen years or so the clearing of the forest proceeded apace, strongly promoted by the government's willingness to support migrant over indigenous rights to land. The government turned large tracts into forestry concessions, stimulating the construction of logging routes which in turn facilitated access to the forest, drawing a growing number of migrant farmers into the area. By 1975, there was little forest left to remove around Daloa and settlers began to move south-westward; the coffee-cocoa frontier marched on toward Soubré, Sassandra and San Pedro.

Before 1970 most of the in-migrants were Mossi or Senoufo, moving southward from the vicinity of present-day Burkina Faso and northern Côte d'Ivoire. After 1970, immigration accelerated rapidly and there was a significant influx of Baoule from the east. The opening up of the logging port at San Pedro accentuated the shift of population into south-western Côte d'Ivoire. By 1988, in both Daloa and Soubré, the Bete accounted for just under half the total population, with the Baoule and the Mossi forming the largest group of in-migrants.
NOTES

1. The original exponent of this idea was Boserup (1965). Her ideas have been elaborated in various papers by Binswanger (notably Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986 and Binswanger and McIntire, 1987). The issues have also been reviewed Ault and Rutman (1979), Cohen (1980), Feder and Noronha (1987), Okoth-Ogendo (1989) and Johnson (1972). The authors of a recent Bank study have concurred with the Boserup hypothesis, observing that "there is a spontaneous individualization of land rights over time, whereby farm households acquire a broader and more powerful set of transfer and exclusion rights over their land as population pressure and agricultural commercialization proceed" (Migot-Adholla and others, 1991:155). Cleaver and Schreiber (1992) present a modified version of the Boserup thesis, accepting the overall trend toward individualization, but suggesting that this is not necessarily a spontaneous process (see Box 1.1).

2. See Box 2.2

3. Atwood (1990); Barrows and Roth (1990); Migot-Adholla and others, (1991); Place and Hazell (1993); for the case of Mexico, see Heath (1992).

4. The analysis of the economics of the migrant labor system made by Berg (1965) remains essentially valid; see also Skinner (1965).


6. According to the 1988 Living Standards Measurement Survey, 79 percent of households in the western forest grew rice, while 77 percent of the households in the eastern forest grew yam.


8. See map at end of study indicating location of zones and for background on their settlement history.

9. Settlement is denser in this corner of the savanna not because the region has more rainfall and better soils; but because the Senoufo crowded together for defensive reasons (see Annex).

10. On the grounds that if a land user is able to cede land to another person, he must have some enforceable claim to this land to begin with.

11. One aspect of this is the relative unimportance of the large plantation enterprise; in the whole of West Africa (with the exception of Liberia), such enterprises failed to take root. Accumulation of capital by the indigenous elite was based less on the concentration of land holding and the centralization of farm enterprise that it was on the mobilization of tribute-paying labor. Stavenhagen (1975:127) has observed that "the reputation and the power of the Agni kingdoms depended on the number of people over whom their authority extended, and granting possession of the land to immigrants was a means to this end."


13. The transition from wage worker to sharecropper is described by P. Hill (1956:43), Chaveau and Richard (1976:124) and Robertson (1987:70). Also, Stavenhagen (1975:142) notes that the worker often
sees the wage contract as "a stepping stone to obtaining his own farm" and Dupire (1961:224) writes about the "large" number of workers in the eastern forest who have "progressively acquired the status of sharecroppers and, later, farmers." Also, see Box 3.2.

14. This is the case among the Dida in rural Divo (Lewis 1991).


16. For Divo, see Hecht (1981); for Gagnoa, see Raulin (1957).

17. In Divo, payments witnessed by government officials do not expand the migrants' ("strangers") rights to land: "(1) the land still reverts to the [indigenous] Dida if the strangers has no heir; (2) the Dida had the fight of first refusal should the stranger seek to sell, and (3) the Dida continues to deserve respect and gifts from the stranger" (Lewis, 1991:18).


19. This was based on observations in Gagnoa in the center-west region (Raulin, 1957).

20. This is contrary to Stavenhagen's prediction that the migrants will be increasingly proletarianized (1975:144-145).

21. Barbara Lewis (1991) has drawn attention to the broader political implications of land disputes between migrants and indigenous groups in the center-west region. The ruling PDCI party has tended to back the claims of migrants— both to win votes and to promote agricultural growth— while the opposition parties that have emerged since 1990 tend to support a reassertion of indigenous rights over migrant right to land.

22. Including two of the zones surveyed in this report: Daloa and Soubré.


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