capacity of Yemen’s key ports further un- dermines the flow of key commodities - Recent developments YEMEN including food, fuel, and medical supplies - to parts of the country. These hurdles are Since the escalation of violent conflict in particularly challenging given that Yemen March 2015, Yemen’s economy has deteri- had previously imported approximately orated sharply. Although official statistics 90 percent of its food. are no longer available, evidence suggests While it is reported that food is available Table 1 2017 that Yemen’s GDP contracted by more in markets, many Yemenis do not have P o pulatio n, millio n 28.3 than 50 percent cumulatively since 2015 the purchasing power to buy the required while employment opportunities in the quantities. UN-OCHA estimates that 22 GDP , current US$ billio n 16.5 private sector have significantly dimin- million Yemenis are in need of humanitar- GDP per capita, current US$ 583 a ished. Economic activity in agriculture ian assistance, of which about 9 million Internatio nal po verty rate ($ 1.9) 82.9 services, and oil and gas production—the are in acute need of assistance to sustain a Lo wer middle-inco me po verty rate ($ 3.2) 94.7 largest components of GDP, remains lim- their lives and avoid famine. The advent a Natio nal po verty line ited due to the ongoing conflict. Further- of cholera, diphtheria, and other infectious a Gini co efficient more, the commensurate dramatic de- diseases in a context of prevailing poor b crease in government revenues, especially health and malnutrition, has further di- Life expectancy at birth, years Source: WDI, M acro Poverty Outlook, and official data. due to the much-reduced oil and gas pro- minished peoples’ welfare and eroded Notes: duction, have contributed to the implo- their ability to lead productive lives. The (a) M ost recent value (2014), 2011 PPPs. sion of the formal social safety net and ability of many households to cope is at a (b) M ost recent WDI value (2015) infrequent payment of public salaries. In breaking point. addition, the conflict has led to increasing The dramatic worsening of conditions has The violent conflict has caused a dramatic inflation and pressure on the exchange translated into a significant worsening of deterioration of the economic and social rate, which further undermined house- the incidence of poverty. The poverty rate conditions in the country. Output has hold income at a time when approximate- (with the poverty line at a US$3.20 PPP) is ly 40 percent of households reported to estimated to have increased since 2014 by contracted sharply, household incomes are have lost their primary income source nearly 30 percentage points to approxi- declining, and poverty has dramatically (according to the 2016 Gallup World Poll). mately 80 percent today. Poverty was al- increased with nearly four-fifths of the For many, joining a militia or other con- ready on the rise in Yemen prior to the population living below US$3.20 a day flict related economic activities remain the recent conflict, rising nearly 14 percent only gainful opportunities. between 2005 and 2014. PPP. Even beyond the increase in pov- Imports have greatly contracted given the However, the deteriorating socio- erty, UNOCHA estimates that almost 9 dwindled foreign reserves available to the economic conditions and worsening pov- million Yemenis are facing various forms Central Bank system of Yemen (CBY). erty rate do not fully describe the suffer- of food insecurity at level 3 or 4 of the Critical food and energy imports are facili- ing of the Yemeni population. Significant internationally agreed standard for meas- tated exclusively through private channels damage to vital infrastructure and private without support from financial trade ser- residences has contributed to a decline in uring food security. Cholera, diphtheria, vices offered earlier by the CBY. In addi- access to basic services (like water), crip- and other communicable diseases have tion, limited access to and the turnover pled civilian health and education facili- been ravaging the country. FIGURE 1 Yemen / Republic of Yemen / Public Finances FIGURE 2 Yemen / People in need of humanitarian assis- tance (in million) In % of GDP In % of GDP People in need of humaniatarian assistance (in million) 35 0 3.0 2.7 -2 2.6 30 2.4 -4 2.5 25 2.0 -6 1.9 2.0 20 -8 1.4 1.5 15 -10 1.1 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 -12 1.0 10 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 -14 0.4 0.5 0.3 5 0.1 0.0 -16 0.0 0 -18 Am. Al-Asimah Al-Dhale Raymah Al-Bayda Dhamar Sana'a Al-Hudaydah Taiz Al-Jawf Lahj Hajja Al-Mahwit Abyan Al-Maharah Saadah Aden Ibb Socatra Amran Hadramout Marib Shabwah 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total domestic revenues Grants Current expenditure Capital expenditure Fiscal deficit excl. grants (Right Axis) Sources: Yemen Ministry of Finance, Yemen Statistical Office; staff of the IMF Sources: 2018 United Nations Humanitarian Response Plan. and the World Bank. MPO 1 Apr 18 ties, and has led to an internal displace- period. In particular, foreign assistance ment of over 10 percent of the population. The humanitarian response in Yemen con- Outlook would be needed to help restore basic services and rebuild confidence in Yem- tinues to support the basic needs of a sig- en’s institutions. nificant share of the population in difficult Economic prospects in 2018 and beyond circumstances. There are approximately will critically depend on rapid improve- 153 humanitarian partners on the ground- 109 national non-government organiza- ments of the political and security situa- tion, and ultimately whether an end to the Risks and challenges tion (NGOs), 36 international NGOs, and on-going conflict will allow for rebuilding 8 UN agencies. The World Bank supports the economy and Yemen’s social fabric. The estimated massive increase in abso- the most vulnerable groups with approxi- Macroeconomic stabilization is impossible lute poverty in Yemen since 2014 poses a mately US$1.2 billion through five large in the current context of fragmented con- tremendous challenge for peace building. emergency operations providing critical trol of key economic institutions between Making peace sustainable in Yemen will health and other services, complementary the recognized government in Aden and require diversifying the economy, making income opportunities and cash transfers. the de facto authority in Sanaa. If violence employment more productive, designing These programs serve to combat famine can be contained by mid-2018, with ac- fiscal and other policies, which will sup- and impoverishment while maintaining companying improvements in functioning port investment to create jobs and income critical institutional capacity. of budgetary and monetary institutions, for the large share of Yemenis who were However, coverage by humanitarian part- GDP is projected to begin to recover in unemployed and excluded even before ners is not uniform across the country, 2019, with a projected double-digit GDP the conflict. The war has severely aggra- where only 200 out of 322 districts in the recovery growth rate. Restoration of more vated centrifugal forces in Yemen, and an country are classified as “relatively acces- peaceful conditions will likely allow for inclusive governance model will be essen- sible” by the humanitarian response. Ap- resumption of hydrocarbon production, tial to mitigate these forces. Leveraging proximately 51 districts are classified as which will help restore government reve- support for recovery and reconstruction to having “high or extremely high access nues. However, even in this scenario, little improve economic and social inclusive- constraints.” Thus, there are pockets of this projected growth is to translate into ness could help with the prevention of where people in need cannot be reached. a substantial poverty reduction. Rather, relapse after a period of reduced conflict. Out of the 22 million Yemeni targeted by poverty is projected to remain high at the humanitarian response, 1.5 million approximately 75 percent in 2018 and 73 live in districts with high access con- percent in 2019. Given the bleak outlook straints. in Yemen, massive foreign assistance would continue to be required for recov- ery and reconstruction in a post-conflict TABLE 2 Yemen / Macro poverty outlook indicators (annual percent change unless indicated otherwise) 2015 2016 2017 e 2018 f 2019 f 2020 f Real GDP growth, at constant market prices -37.1 -34.3 -13.8 -0.5 17.9 16.3 Private Consumption -29.3 -27.5 -8.9 -0.8 6.6 3.4 Government Consumption -26.0 -23.0 -37.1 26.1 0.7 12.7 Gross Fixed Capital Investment -85.2 -39.6 9.3 220.2 33.8 15.2 Exports, Goods and Services -68.1 -78.5 43.2 196.8 81.4 55.4 Imports, Goods and Services -45.1 -20.5 -1.1 55.9 12.1 10.1 Real GDP growth, at constant factor prices -37.6 -35.0 -13.6 0.5 19.4 17.8 Agriculture -34.9 -31.4 -15.0 -5.0 11.0 9.0 Industry -43.1 -43.4 -9.6 1.0 22.1 25.8 Services -34.9 -31.4 -15.0 3.3 22.2 17.3 Inflation (Consumer Price Index) 61.4 -20.3 4.9 23.0 20.0 7.5 Current Account Balance (% of GDP) -6.5 -5.2 -1.0 -6.5 -3.8 0.3 Fiscal Balance (% of GDP) -11.5 -16.5 -7.6 -14.0 -8.6 -2.7 Debt (% of GDP) 72.7 128.0 141.8 130.9 98.5 84.7 Primary Balance (% of GDP) -3.4 -7.3 -7.2 -7.7 -1.9 1.7 a,b International poverty rate ($1.9 in 2011 PPP) 50.0 76.3 82.9 83.9 78.9 73.6 Lower middle-income poverty rate ($3.2 in 2011 PPP) a,b 79.7 92.2 94.7 95.1 92.9 90.5 Upper middle-income poverty rate ($5.5 in 2011 PPP) a,b 93.5 98.2 99.0 99.1 98.4 97.8 So urce: Wo rld B ank, P o verty & Equity and M acro eco no mics, Trade & Investment Glo bal P ractices. No tes: e = estimate, f = fo recast. (a) Calculatio ns based o n 201 4-HB S. No wcast: 201 5 - 2017. Fo recast are fro m 2018 to 2020. (b) P ro jectio n using neutral distributio n (2014) with pass-thro ugh = 1 based o n GDP per capita in co nstant LCU. MPO 2 Apr 18 MPO 3 Apr 18