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IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
(TF-53940)

ON A

GRANT
IN THE AMOUNT OF US\$13.0 MILLION

TO

THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN
FOR THE AFGHANISTAN CIVIL SERVICE CAPACITY BUILDING PROJECT

May 5, 2011

Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit
Afghanistan Country Management Unit
South Asia Region

AFGHANISTAN – GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR

21 March – 20 March

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective April 18, 2011)

Currency Unit = Afghani

AFN 1.00 = US\$ 0.02

US\$ 1.00 = AFN 45.38

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AEP	Afghan Expatriate Program	IOM	International Organization for Migration
AFMIS	Afghanistan Financial Management Information System	LEP	Lateral Entry Program
ANDS	Afghan National Development Strategy	M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation
ARS	Administrative Reform Secretariat	MAC	Ministerial Advisory Committee
ARTF	Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund	MAIL	Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock
CDS	Capacity Development Secretariat	MCP	Management Capacity Program
CTAP	Civilian Technical Assistance Program	MDG	Millennium Development Goals
FMR	Financial Management Report	OAA	Office of Administrative Affairs
GDPDM	General Directorate of Programs' Design & Management	PAR	Public Administration Reform
GoA	Government of Afghanistan	PDO	Project Development Objective
GoIRA	Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan	PRR	Priority Reform Restructuring
IAB	Independent Appointments Board	SDU	Special Disbursement Unit
IARCSC	Independent Administrative Reform & Civil Service Commission		
IDA	International Development Association		
IDLG	Independent Directorate for Local Governance		

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AFGHANISTAN
Afghanistan Civil Service Capacity Building

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MAP

A. Basic Information			
Country:	Afghanistan	Project Name:	ARTF-Civil Service Capacity Building
Project ID:	P086228	L/C/TF Number(s):	TF-53940
ICR Date:	05/05/2011	ICR Type:	Core ICR
Lending Instrument:	TAL	Grantee:	GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN
Original Total Commitment:	USD 13.0M	Disbursed Amount:	USD 13.0M
Revised Amount:	USD 13.0M		
Environmental Category: C			
Implementing Agencies: Independent Administrative Reform & Civil Service Commission IARCSC			
Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:			

B. Key Dates				
Process	Date	Process	Original Date	Revised / Actual Date(s)
Concept Review:	12/14/2004	Effectiveness:		06/05/2005
Appraisal:		Restructuring(s):		
Approval:	05/02/2005	Mid-term Review:		
		Closing:	02/28/2010	02/28/2010

C. Ratings Summary	
C.1 Performance Rating by ICR	
Outcomes:	Unsatisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome:	Substantial
Bank Performance:	Unsatisfactory
Grantee Performance:	Moderately Unsatisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)			
Bank	Ratings	Borrower	Ratings
Quality at Entry:	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Government:	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Quality of Supervision:	Unsatisfactory	Implementing Agency/Agencies:	Moderately Satisfactory
Overall Bank Performance:	Unsatisfactory	Overall Borrower Performance:	Moderately Unsatisfactory

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators			
Implementation Performance	Indicators	QAG Assessments (if any)	Rating
Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	No	Quality at Entry (QEA):	None
Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	Yes	Quality of Supervision (QSA):	None
DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:	Satisfactory		

D. Sector and Theme Codes		
	Original	Actual
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)		
Central government administration	50	50
General public administration sector	50	50
Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)		
Macroeconomic management	100	100

E. Bank Staff		
Positions	At ICR	At Approval
Vice President:	Isabel M. Guerrero	Praful C. Patel
Country Director:	Nicholas J. Krafft	Alastair J. McKechnie
Sector Manager:	Joel Hellman	Kapil Kapoor
Project Team Leader:	Satyendra Prasad	Anne Tully
ICR Team Leader:	Satyendra Prasad	
ICR Primary Author:	Satyendra Prasad	

F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)

Providing short to medium term capacity to ministries primarily in agencies where the PRR effort has been slow to take off.

Laying the foundation for the reform process in ministries and government agencies, which are currently not under the PRR process.

Training, mentoring and motivating regular post holders to work more efficiently and more effectively for the government, providing an alternative to the continued extensive use of technical assistance and consultants

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 :	Number of lateral entrants recruited i) women ii) men iii) ethnicities			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	0	150		142
Date achieved	07/04/2002	02/28/2010		02/28/2010
Comments (incl. % achievement)	The MCP program succeeded AEP-and LEP program and thus recruitment was stopped in 2008.			
Indicator 2 :	Pace of implementation of reforms in LEP vs. non # LEP departments			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	No baseline and no systematic efforts to assess. See ICR for observations which suggest LEP's did make positive impact under specific circumstances.	Departments with LEP's would have completed PRR process		20 departments with LEP's completed the PRR process.
Date achieved	07/04/2002	02/28/2010		02/28/2010
Comments (incl. % achievement)				

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 :	The capacity of existing civil servants to apply for PRR positions will be enhanced			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	At least 20 departments with LEP's went through the PRR process. Difficult to independently verify the extent of LEP involvement in these.	All Departments will have completed stage 1 of PRR process.		35 departments across 10 ministries completed stage 1 of PRR; of which 20 commenced implementation of the reforms.
Date achieved	07/04/2002	02/28/2010		02/28/2010
Comments				

(incl. % achievement)	
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
G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No.	Date ISR Archived	DO	IP	Actual Disbursements (USD millions)
1	06/26/2008	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	11.98
2	03/16/2009	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	12.69
3	03/01/2010	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	13.00

H. Restructuring (if any)

Not Applicable

I. Disbursement Profile



1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

In the wake of the international intervention of 2001, the fall of the Taliban regime, and the establishment of an Interim Administration by the Bonn Agreement, Afghanistan faced a reconstruction effort of immense proportions. The challenge of rebuilding the state's collapsed central and sub-national administrative apparatus was made all the more acute by severe capacity deficits in the civil service. After more than two decades of civil war, almost all of the educated Afghan elite had emigrated, a process that accelerated after the fall of the Najibullah regime, the war which disrupted organized life in Kabul in the early 1990s, and the arrival of the Taliban regime in 1996. As a result, a significant part of the country's highly educated population was living in North America, Europe, Pakistan and Iran by 2002. Of those who remained in Afghanistan, many skilled Afghans were working for international organizations, donor-funded projects or programs, non-governmental organizations or the private sector rather than government, which provided very little in the way of incentives to attract skilled personnel. As in many other post-conflict and developing country environments, donors and international agencies had created a highly distorted labor market that severely disadvantaged the government as an employer.

Expertise for the reconstruction effort was being introduced primarily through donor-funded purchase of foreign technical assistance and consulting services. Despite the high cost of such technical assistance in Afghanistan when compared to other countries, it was widely acknowledged to be very poor both in terms of quality of the services provided and knowledge transfer, an issue that had attracted the government's attention at the highest level. Beyond the standard criticisms addressed to foreign consulting services,¹ their quality/cost ratio seemed unfavorable compared to other countries.² At the same time, many Afghans living abroad had been considering returning to Afghanistan to contribute to the reconstruction effort, and had strong family and cultural ties in the country, but faced considerable financial and personal risks in returning. There was considerable pressure from a range of donors for a mechanism through which some of this existing Afghan expertise in the diaspora could be injected into the Afghanistan civil service early during the emergency phase of the reconstruction effort. This was seen as a more satisfactory means of injecting short-term ad hoc capacity than through foreign providers of technical assistance, who faced the inevitable challenges of language and culture quite aside from any other shortcomings. There was also an acknowledged need to draw from existing expertise in Afghanistan within donor agencies NGOs and the private sector.

Both the Afghan Expatriates Program (AEP) and the Lateral Entry Program (LEP), initiated in 2002 and 2004 respectively, were conceived during the emergency phase of reconstruction and were designed to inject a critical mass of capacity from two separate labor markets: (i) expatriate Afghan labor and (ii) international agencies, NGOs and the private sector within the local labor market and the immediate region (Iran and Pakistan). The programs aimed at enabling government to compete for scarce Afghan capacity by funding (at competitive rates of pay) and placing highly qualified Afghans in advisory positions (AEP) and civil service line positions (LEP) respectively. The aim was that those recruits would help plan and implement the development agenda, as well as contribute to the capacity development of existing civil servants

¹ Short term assignments and high turnover of staff, difficulty to work in the local environment, language and cultural barriers, lack of transfer of knowledge.

² Serge Michailof, Review of AEP, 2006.

and support basic institutional reform of the ministries and government departments in which they worked.

The AEP and LEP were not isolated efforts. They were innovative efforts to rebuild the civil service architecture commenced soon after the Bonn Conference in December 2001 and at a time of considerable uncertainty. The Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC) was established in 2003 with an expansive mandate, including an overall policy role, the development of a meritocratic recruitment process and coordinating a broader Public Administration Reform program.³ The Priority Reform and Restructuring (PRR) program was established in 2003 as a means of encouraging skilled staff to remain in the civil service in departments that had undergone initial administrative reform. It was implemented through the IARCSC and aimed at linking the civil service pay with a comprehensive restructuring of selected departments and units.⁴ The PRR “superscale” offered higher salaries to suitably qualified staff in strategically selected positions.⁵ Within the Bank’s program, there were also other efforts relating to civil service and public administration reform initiated in 2004 and 2005.⁶

The AEP program proposal was approved in 2002 by the Management Committee of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF). Administered by the World Bank, ARTF provided a coordinated financing mechanism for the Government of Afghanistan budget as well as priority sector and investment projects and programs; a large part of its recurrent window was used to support salaries for non-uniformed civil servants.⁷ Originally the AEP was introduced under the recurrent window of the ARTF and the ARTF Management Committee allocated US\$5 million to the program in 2003. This recurrent window finances recurrent expenditures such as salaries and operation and maintenance in the Government’s budget. (A further US\$5 million was allocated to AEP in 2006.) An initial recruitment of 60 expatriates into positions as senior advisers was anticipated, for contracts of between 6 months and 2 years, and compensation was to be in the range of US\$ 2500-7000.⁸ The advisers would hold short-term World Bank contracts. There were significant delays before the program began to be implemented, in part reflecting resistance amongst senior government figures about the prospect of returning Afghans being paid well in excess of mainstream civil servants.

The initial government counterpart for AEP was the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation, a keen interlocutor but one which did not have any capacity to manage the program. The Presidential Decree that eventually established the program was promulgated in March 2004, and designated the IARCSC as the implementing agency. As the IARCSC was a newly established institution with limited staff and capacity, it was decided that an Implementation Support Consultant would be contracted, with the role of providing logistical support in the recruitment process including advertising vacancies, preparing individual contracts and managing salary payments. The International Organization for Migration was subsequently contracted for this role in a single bid procurement process. The first AEP contract was not signed until September 2004.

3 The reform program was broad: establishing a civil service legal framework, personnel management, institutional and functional streamlining and development, financial management and accountability, policy management and machinery, administrative efficiency and physical infrastructure development.

4 The latter was to be underpinned by a transparent, competency-based recruitment and selection process for vital staff in both management and technical areas, aimed at attracting well-qualified and competent individuals. However, the decision in 2004 to broaden the PRR to cover not only the original strategically selected departments and units, but whole ministries, changed the nature of the PRR.

5 The main difference is that the PRR superscale does not target whole units or departments but individuals

6 P084188 and P096929.

7 It is a recipient-executed multi-donor trust fund and has made the largest contribution to the Afghan budget since 2002. Since early 2002, 30 donors have contributed over US\$3 billion as of April 20 2009

8 In theory, three inputs are supposed to be factored into the determination of compensation packages for the expatriates. These are : (i) educational qualification; (ii) previous position held, and (iii) previous salary.

During the delay of nearly two years, a number of highly qualified expatriates returned to the country under the auspices of other donor programs, including those of UNDP and USAID.

The LEP was prepared in parallel (during the period that AEP was facing the implementation delay), and was aimed at addressing the widespread shortage of competent and experienced civil servants in upper and middle management positions in key ministries and agencies. It aimed at providing a mechanism for lateral recruits to fill line positions in the civil service, through tapping into the reservoir of well-qualified, experienced and competent Afghans from NGOs, UN agencies, donor-funded programs, and the private sector and those working in the countries in the immediate region (Pakistan, Iran and India). The program was designed to cut the connection between the international funding and the selected candidate by offering contracts signed by Government for those line positions. It was anticipated that an initial 100 lateral entrants would be recruited in the first six month pilot phase, and an additional 1400 individuals would be recruited during the life of the project. The selected individuals were to be recruited at civil service grades 2-4 on two year contracts attracting an enhanced salary of up to US\$2000 a month. In late 2004, the ARTF Management Committee approved the Lateral Entry Program (LEP) and allocated US\$3 million as an immediate commitment to enable the IARCSC to recruit 100 lateral entrants in the first six months. The funding request for the overall program (1500 recruits) was for US\$64.7million.

In 2005, both programs were merged into a single project, Afghanistan Civil Service Capacity Building Project, as they were seen to play a complementary role in contributing to the capacity building framework for the civil service. AEP was taken out of the recurrent window of the ARTF and combined with the Lateral Entry Program (LEP) in its investment window. The trust fund grant agreement was signed in May 2005, with a financing amount of US\$13 million.

In the three and a half years that had lapsed between the Bonn Conference and the signing of the grant agreement, much had occurred in terms of re-establishing *de jure* central political and administrative authority in Afghanistan. In January 2004, Afghanistan's Loya Jirga adopted a new Constitution, and by the year's end, a presidential election had been held, resulting in the election of Hamid Karzai to the Presidency. Parliamentary and provincial elections were held in September 2005. By the time the Project was being implemented "in full swing", the emergency period of reconstruction was over.

As indicated, the two programs that comprise this project were funded by the ARTF, a recipient-executed trust fund administered by the World Bank. There were substantial changes to procedures related to the administration of trust funds during the life of the project. The old OP 14.40 and BP 14.40 governed the project prior to July 2008. Under those rules, each Vice Presidential Unit was accountable for the trust funds it administers, establishing both its internal control and monitoring and financial administration procedures to ensure the Bank fulfills its obligations. Since 1 July 2008, projects financed by recipient-executed trust-funds, with a financing amount over US\$5million, are subject to the same Bank operational policies that are applicable to IBRD loans and IDA credits.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators

Identifying the development outcomes and key indicators proved to be something of a challenge in the case of the AEP component of the program. There is virtually no supporting documentation filed in IRIS or the Bank's trust fund reporting site about the genesis of AEP, nor are such records available through the IARCSC or the ARTF Management Committee. Indeed, both the Michailof (2005, 2006) and Prashant (2006) reviews noted that a good part of the initial project documents

regarding AEP had disappeared, soon after it had commenced. The missing documentation includes the original project proposal to the ARTF. Because the initial project was developed through the recurrent ARTF window, the normal range of Bank documentation was not required. There was no breach of Bank procedures therefore.

Thus there is little clarity about initial development objectives. Those that are mentioned below have been identified (or “pieced together”) from secondary sources, often produced many years after the approval of the program. Some of these sources⁹ define AEP’s operational objectives intuitively and identify means rather than objectives as such: for instance, “to recruit around 60 highly qualified expatriate Afghans advisers for a period of six months to two years to work in government ministries and agencies”.¹⁰

A number of reviews undertaken of the programs in 2005 and 2006, the submission of the IARCSC (the implementing agency), and reports submitted to ARTF from 2008 onwards suggest AEP recruitment had a number of development objectives:

- i. enhancing strategic capacity within relevant line ministries and agencies;
- ii. building local capacity/ promoting human resource development;
- iii. promoting institutional reforms within relevant agencies to enhance organization efficiency;
- iv. acting as drivers for the implementation of public investment programs *viz* formulating and managing priority development programs.

One review of the program undertaken in 2006 by Serge Michailof includes an additional objective:

*“another objective which had not been clearly spelled out when the AEP project was designed has also progressively emerged: it is to facilitate the permanent return of members of the educated elite (i) by covering part of the financial risks and the transition costs supported by these professionals if they decide to move back and (ii) helping them identify structures and institutions where their skills might be efficiently employed.”*¹¹

While many reviews have indicated that neither LEP nor AEP should be viewed in isolation from the much broader public administration reform process, only LEP’s development objectives are situated within such a framework.

The LEP is a much better documented program, and identifies the underlying objectives of its recruitment process as follows:

- i. Providing short to medium term capacity to ministries primarily in agencies where the PRR effort has been slow to take off;
- ii. Laying the foundation for the reform process in ministries and government agencies, which are currently not under the PRR process;
- iii. Training, mentoring and motivating regular post holders to work more efficiently and more effectively for the government, providing an alternative to the continued extensive use of technical assistance and consultants.

None of the documentation identifies any key indicators apart from numbers of recruits anticipated to be targeted by the program. Nor were benchmarks developed during the life of the project relating to measurable improvements in outcomes.

⁹ Lateral Entry Program, Proposal to ARTF, 2004.

¹⁰ In a review conducted in 2006, Prashant mentions that the 60 experts were to be the first batch of the intake, which would go up to 200 in due course.

¹¹ Serge Michailof, 2006.

A Development Objective (DO) for the project as a whole, as opposed to its two components, is not mentioned in the documentation until the 2008 annual report to ARTF, where it is stated that the project aims “to meet the short-term capacity needs of the Afghan Civil Service through two inter-related programs: the Afghanistan Expatriate Program (AEP) and the Lateral Entry Program (LEP).”

It is important to note the disconnect between the DO ratings in the last Implementation Status Report (ISR) approved before closing of the project and in the Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR). This is explained in paragraph. 3.2.

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and Reasons/Justification

There were no revisions in the PDOs of ARTF – Civil Service Capacity Building.

1.4 Main Beneficiaries

The primary beneficiaries of the AEP and LEP were to be the Government ministries, agencies and departments whose capacity to plan, design, implement and monitor reconstruction efforts and deliver the development agenda were sought to be enhanced by the program through the injection of capacity. The individual AEP recruits who were effectively repatriated to Afghanistan through the program were secondary beneficiaries, as were the lateral recruits who were brought into government through LEP. Finally, donor agencies were also beneficiaries of this program to a greater extent than with most other development programs – their programming across all sectors depended on having skilled counterparts in various ministries, something which was virtually absent at the beginning of the reconstruction effort.

1.5 Original Components

This Project involves two components, one of which had previously existed as a program funded out of the recurrent window of ARTF. AEP was merged into this project under the investment window of ARTF in 2005:

- (i) *The Afghan Expatriates Program - US\$10 million (US\$5million allocated in 2003, another US\$5 million in February 2006).*

This component aimed at recruiting qualified expatriate Afghans into positions as senior advisers in various ministries and agencies. Placement of those advisors was determined through consultations with key ministries, government departments and donors.

- (ii) *Lateral Entry Program - US\$3 million:* This component aimed at recruiting qualified Afghans from the domestic and regional labor markets into senior and middle management line positions in Ministries and agencies.

1.6 Revised Components

The components were not revised during the implementation of the project.

1.7 Other significant changes

Following a number of reviews and an internal assessment, a decision was made in late 2006 not to seek further ARTF funding for AEP or any Phase II of the LEP, but rather utilize the lessons learned to formulate a new program intervention call the Management Capacity Program (MCP). At that point, 138 LEPs and 98 AEPs had been recruited and their contracts remained valid until their expiration.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry *(including whether lessons of earlier operations were taken into account, risks and their mitigations identified, and adequacy of participatory processes, as applicable)*

There is a considerable contrast between the preparation processes for the two components of the project. AEP was conceived early on in Afghanistan's reconstruction with considerable pressure from donor countries who wanted a mechanism to repatriate qualified Afghans to contribute to the reconstruction effort. As indicated above, there is virtually no available documentation about the genesis, formulation or design of the program. It appears from interviews that the specifics of the mechanism through which AEP repatriated expertise from the diaspora was secondary, and the program's nexus to a civil service or public administration rationale did not feature prominently in the process of its formulation.

While specific public sector management expertise does appear to have been brought to bear on the preparation and design of the project, the initial TTLs were mainly drawn from the Human Development Sector and the Country Management Unit. No peer review process was undertaken in the Bank as the procedures at the time required only that the proposal be assessed by the Management Committee of the ARTF. However, the lack of any clear statement of the development objectives attest to the absence of quality control mechanisms that a proper peer review process would have provided.

The design of AEP does not appear to have been revisited after the delay of almost two years. By that stage, the emergency period of reconstruction was almost over, and some of the expatriates initially targeted by the program had returned to Afghanistan under the auspices of other donor programs. Supporting expatriates to return to Afghanistan immediately after the end of the conflict may have been helpful when few other options were available, but when a larger pool of qualified expertise existed in Afghanistan and the region, retaining "country of origin" as a principle in recruitment and payment for expertise is more open to question.

The Presidential Decree establishing the program was issued in March 2004. It allowed for ministries and government agencies, based on their needs, to request the IARCSC to recruit expatriate Afghans. The final selection was to have been made by a Ministerial Advisory Committee for Administrative Reform (MAC), established under article 30(2) of the IARCSC regulations. However, by 2006, MAC had become dysfunctional for reasons not linked to this program but this meant that a broader ministerial oversight of AEP and LEP was replaced by a narrower IARCSC oversight. Program management was the responsibility of members of an Executive Committee who were mandated to be AEP recruits, generating concerns about a conflict of interest. Thus, although the risks of patronage and corruption were obvious at the outset, the governance structure itself did little to allay those risks (see further Implementation at 2.2 below). The focus appears to have been on controlling fiduciary risks through supervision in individual recruitments rather than addressing these issues in the process of design.

As the IARCSC was a newly established institution at the time that the program came into operation, with limited staff and capacity, the decision was made to contract an Implementation Support Consultant to provide logistical support in the recruitment process (including advertising vacancies, preparing individual contracts and managing salary payments).

LEP was prepared by a public sector specialist and was the subject of considerable consultation. The program was peer reviewed in December 2004, with the major issues of concern raised by review relating to the fiscal sustainability of the program. Its design appears to have taken into account the broader context: the LEP program was designed to complement other schemes to secure additional qualified capacity within government, especially the PRR. The design also appeared to recognize the need for a critical mass of capacity to be injected if there was to be meaningful improvement in development outcomes. The original proposal was to recruit 1500 qualified Afghan professionals under the program, with 500 in the first year, and 100 lateral entrants in the first six months.

2.2 Implementation *(including any project changes/restructuring, mid-term review, Project at Risk status, and actions taken, as applicable)*

As indicated above, there appears to have been an under-estimation of the sensitivity of paying international salaries to returning expatriates and the wage differential that was created – senior civil servants and Ministers expressed deep concerns, which delayed the political decision to move ahead with implementation by almost two years. This was especially controversial because the pay and grading reforms which would have placed civil servants on a more reasonable salary structure than the one that prevailed at the time was too slow off the drawing board. A greater focus on initiating the civil service wide pay and grading reforms would have gone far to allay such concerns and resentment.

AEP was implemented by the IARCSC's Administrative Reform Secretariat (ARS), which in turn was to oversee an Executive Committee of 5 persons, all of whom were mandated to be AEP consultants (as it transpired, three of the five members were AEP consultants for the IARCSC). The Executive Committee was supported by a managing firm, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which provided the program's administrative functions. The process of selection of Afghan expatriates commenced when a Ministry or agency requisitioned an expert from the ARS. The Executive Committee decided on admissibility and necessity, and prepared TOR and requisition forms for such an expert. IOM advertised the position and applications were received by the AEP Secretariat and reviewed by the Executive Committee. Short-listed candidates were interviewed by the Executive Committee and the selection sent to the Chairman of the IARCSC for approval. The dissolution of Ministerial Advisory Committee meant that there was no layer of accountability after the IARCSC. After approval, the expert was contacted by IOM and brought into the country. IOM arranged a meeting between the expert and the employing organization and was responsible for disbursement of emoluments, travel arrangements and the provision of equipment such as computers.

From an operational perspective, the mechanics of the recruitment process provided for in the program's guidelines were consistent with the World Bank's *Guidelines for the Selection and*

¹² In December 2004, the ARTF Management Committee was requested to approve US\$14.2 million to fund the first year's planned number of 500 lateral entrants.

¹³ It was anticipated that a specialist HR firm would assist with this expansion. The expansion also entailed submitting another proposal for the ARTF Management Committee to increase the funding to US\$ 64.7 million over 4 years to recruit 1,500 lateral entrants. However, due to delays in the recruitment of the initial 100 lateral entrants, and based upon the recommendations of several reviews, the expansion was not funded. Rather the program was reformulated as the subsequent Management Capacity Program (MCP).

Employment of Consultants. However, there is evidence of various attempts by Ministries and those at the highest levels of political office to influence the individual appointment processes.

Both the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GoIRA) and the Bank agreed that IOM's poor performance as supporting consultant partly accounted for delays in mobilization of AEP consultants. Its contract was not renewed when it expired in August 2006.¹⁴

Although the two programs were both under the supervision of IARCSC, the LEP had its own management structure and resources. LEP was originally aimed at recruiting 1500 individuals over a 2-3 year period, through the Independent Appointments Board (IAB)¹⁵ of the IARCSC. The needs assessment for a lateral entrant took place once a request was forwarded to the IARCSC by individual ministries. The IAB was in charge of advertising posts, liaising with ministries to draft terms of reference for lateral entrants and identifying potential candidates and hiring them. Detailed procedures to hire and manage lateral entrants were described in the Project Implementation Manual. It was intended that in the second phase of LEP, a firm would be recruited to manage the increased load of lateral entrants and increase the outreach of the project. MAC was to have provided ministerial oversight to the project, and final approval for commencement of recruitment based on the evaluation and technical assessment for each set of applications by the ARS.

Several evaluations of AEP and LEP were undertaken during the implementation phase. Michailof reviewed AEP soon after it came into operation in 2005. At around the same time, NORAD financed a review of LEP by Thor Oftedal. In the first half of 2006, Prashant reviewed the program and emphasized that the implementation of the program deviated markedly from the *de jure* structures established by Article 3 of the IARCSC notification. He identified a number of significant weaknesses and recommended to halt the project. Michailof was brought back to undertake a review in light of Prashant's critique. While he shared several doubts and concerns with Prashant, he saw a number of positive elements and possibilities to easily correct many of the most obvious flaws in the project design and its implementation mechanisms. The reviews were considered by the ARTF management committee in November 2006.

The existence of two programs of a similar nature running in parallel created confusion, unnecessary costs and questions about the relevance of their original objectives. Other major issues from the reviews included the following design issues:

- i. The relevance of retaining "country of origin" as a principle in the recruitment and payment of expertise as the pool of qualified expertise had grown.
- ii. AEP advisors in practice tended to function in the same manner as LEP recruits, largely because their ministries required managers rather than advisors. As such, the two programs did not make significantly distinct contributions that justified their separation.
- iii. Considering that progress that had been made in implementing reforms under the PRR, which covered as many as 18 of 24 ministries by that stage, the rationale for limiting

¹⁴ The curious choice as support consultant of the International Agency of Migration, an international organization specializing in the organized transfer of migrants and refugees, can be explained if one sees the repatriation rationale of the project.

¹⁵ The IARCSC Decree (Number 33) of 2003 establishes the IAB as an independent agency responsible for appointments and promotions in the Afghan civil service, consisting of 5 full time commissioners and supported by its own secretariat.

the role of LEP recruits to ministries that had not undergone the “PRR process” became largely redundant.

- iv. The management and administrative requirements and procedures of both AEP and LEP were very similar but managed by two separate teams; one (LEP) was essentially national and the other (AEP) was based on a loosely structured Executive Committee of senior AEP recruits supported by a consultant.

Quite aside from structural issues, the reviews indicated problems in the implementation mechanisms. They noted with regards AEP that insufficient oversight of the project by the IARCSC was apparent, especially in the early period. A blurred organizational structure and critical lack of capacity were identified as the causes. The governance structure of AEP was also a cause of considerable concern, particularly the potential conflict of interest of members of the Executive Committee.¹⁶

Further, there were issues related to patronage and political influence in the recruitment processes. AEP secretariat staff interviewed confirmed that the AEP had apparently been able to resist routine pressures coming from officials in ministries for recruitment of AEP staff based on patronage, ethnic and political affiliation. However, in a few and highly visible cases instances they were clearly unable to do so. Prashant’s review indicated that “such imposed appointments and the inability of the EC to resist those pressures and to apply adequate selection processes had therefore tarnished the credibility of the project”.¹⁷

Due to the “accurate perception of the reputational risk for the Bank, lack of trust in the governance structure, constant politically driven requests coming from the President’s office and a lack of appropriate M&E mechanisms,” Michailof indicated that the Bank was “now largely involved in micromanaging this very small operation through a systematic no objections process.” He highlighted the consequences of such a time-intensive process, including the unreasonable administrative cost compared to the size of the project, the real burden to staff, and the transfer of *de facto* managerial responsibility to the Bank.

AEP also suffered from several other problems in implementation:

- i. It was under-funded, partly the result of constant uncertainty about the future of the project almost from the moment it began. In mid 2006, Michailof indicated that “out of the 9.4m which had been earmarked for its second phase (US\$7m from ARTF and US\$2.4m by USAID), only US\$1.2m has been released,” and there was too much uncertainty regarding the future funding arrangements for the project to attract high quality staff.¹⁸

¹⁶ There are differing views on the governance structure of AEP. Prashant took the view that it presented a substantial potential for conflict of interest, and that it was ineffective in the face of political interference. Michailof was skeptical about the structure on paper, but his fears were somewhat allayed by meeting the five members of its executive committee, and concluded “while highly unorthodox and presenting risks, the present governance structure of this very small project is not only acceptable but maybe a good approach in the specific Afghan context”. However, it transpired that regardless of the risks of patronage, the insufficient availability of its members to make it work in a satisfactory way – due to illness, absence from the country, departure of members. As a result, the Executive Committee’s control and monitoring of the project was inadequate.

¹⁷ Michailoff, 2006.

¹⁸ He indicated that project management lost time on renegotiating contracts on a 2 or 3 month basis, a poor use of its time and a cause of stress for the recruits. Michailof indicated “until a formal decision has been made to stop this project, AEP should be fully funded”.

- ii. Compensation was largely determined by intuitive and subjective assessment of the utility of expatriates although previous pay was somewhat kept in mind, but not in all cases. The Executive Committee did not employ objective criteria in the process.
- iii. Implementation often deviated from the de jure structure established in the Notification of the IARCSC, and the regulations were never amended to reflect this. The notification required that recruits act as advisors. The program was designed to provide for supervisory supplements to line administration and had an exceptional provision¹⁹ for ad hoc placement of expatriates in ‘line’ positions. However, this principle was frequently violated. The commissioned reviews reported that most of the ‘influential’ expatriates, while enjoying the designation of advisors on paper, were actually performing executive tasks in line positions as well.²⁰

On the World Bank side, there were frequent changes of the Task Team Leader during the life of the project. They were drawn from different sectors: Human Development, Country Management as well as from amongst public sector specialists within the PREM group. After the 2006 reviews had been finalized, a new Kabul-based public sector specialist was put in place as TTL and this brought far greater stability to the program.

The response to the major points made in these reviews was to focus on designing the successor project, the Management Capacity Program (MCP). The results of the two reviews and subsequent discussions with authorities (Ministry of Finance and IARCSC) suggested the need for a unified program that would follow a single set of criteria for identifying requirements, recruitment, remuneration and supervision. The grant funding for MCP was approved in February 2007 and the grant agreement signed in June of the same year. There was much greater efforts invested in designing the MCP to address the areas most wanting in AEP and LEP, including: articulation of expected results; a single management structure managing the program with a single set of standards; and “strategic targeting” of priority areas closely related to operating requirements.

Once MCP was approved, fiduciary monitoring continued for the remaining appointments made under the ARTF – Capacity Building, but no further efforts were made to adjust that project in light of the problems that the reviews identified. Indeed, the project effectively fell into a “holding pattern” in which the remaining hires continued to be paid, but all new appointments were made through the MCP.

No second phase of LEP was developed as initially anticipated. No revisions were made to the original project documents based on the experiences from the pilot phase. In retrospect, the combined AEP and LEP project should have been closed upon the approval of MCP and those staff appointed under the program should have been migrated to the new project.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization *(focusing on issues and their resolution, as applicable)*

When the combined Project was initiated in 2005, it was agreed that monitoring would be conducted using a mix of qualitative techniques. Regular case-studies were planned to capture the

¹⁹ “In exceptional circumstances, Ministries and Government Agencies may request EC to assign an expert as acting head of a department in a position relevant to his/her expertise and experience.”

²⁰ Prashant said that the performers are in critical and apical line positions (Deputy Ministers, Director Generals, Deputy Chief of Staff to President of Afghanistan, Presidents & CEOs of public sector companies).

qualitative benefits of the project. The performance of the recruits was to be regularly assessed by superiors in the ministries/agencies/departments where the expatriates and lateral entrants were placed. IARCSC was encouraged to undertake independent evaluations as well. The aim of such evaluations was to assess (i) the relative success of the overall Program and (ii) to determine the performance of the employees vis-a-vis the work assigned to them and their job descriptions. IARCSC conducted regular individual appraisals of recruits with some terminations based upon poor performance. However, implementation of monitoring mechanisms for the program as a whole was limited. Further, in relation to AEP, it was constrained by the involvement of an Executive Committee which comprised, in part, of expatriates themselves funded under the program.

Michailof made a number of salient points in his review about AEP:

- i. It was impossible to assess the project's impact and performance unless an in-depth assessment of the effective performance of experts was made. The small number AEP contracts made such an assessment feasible. However, this could be done through standard paperwork or internal monitoring. Michailof suggested it required a "highly experienced international consultant with HR managerial experience to visit Afghanistan twice a year to conduct individual interviews with 30 or 40 experts and their supervisors each time. Unless such close monitoring was undertaken, he argued that it would be impossible to properly assess the project's impact and performance.
- ii. In establishing an M&E system, Michailof recognized that success cannot only be related to the individual recruit's qualities but also to his working environment. Hence the need for a "strategic" allocation of experts where their skill would most likely be fully utilized and not necessarily to support the most vocal minister. Also, the project needed to be able to correct mistakes made in appointment or selection (ie its ability to shift experts from one entity to another where skills would be better utilized or to terminate a contract in case of unsatisfactory performance).
- iii. Judgment about the success of the approach should be determined by magnitude of impact of the individual success stories, rather than of the overall number of positions placed. Michailof cited a senior advisor who played a crucial role in designing and driving successful restructuring and overhaul of MRRD, which completely transformed that ministry. The economic and institutional impact of the expert's activity over a critical 2 year period was substantial.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

As with other emergency projects in Afghanistan, records were maintained manually at both the implementing agency (IARCSC) and the Special Disbursement Unit (SDU) from inception until March 2005, when the SDU started using the Afghanistan Financial Management Information System for all projects and line ministries'/agencies' financial transactions. Supporting documents were maintained satisfactorily for all payments. Fund flows to all implementing agencies were controlled centrally by the MOF's SDU, and were managed satisfactorily since the project began.

Financial reporting was initially poor but improved over time, as the financial management capacities in the MoF improved. The Financial Management Reports (FMRs) were prepared and submitted regularly since the 1st quarter of SY1386. Annual audited financial statements were submitted regularly, though later than the mandated submission deadline, except for SY 1388 which was submitted on August 31, 2010, before the due date of September 21, 2010.

The audit opinion of the Control and Audit Office of Afghanistan was qualified for SY1384 and 1385 and unqualified for SY1386, SY1387 and SY1388. The response on issues raised in the SY1387 audit report has yet to be provided by the client.

With regards to procurement, the project's focus was mainly in providing consulting inputs. The client lacked capacity to: (i) prepare and update procurement plans and (ii) undertake contract management actions, such as extensions, in a timely manner. International Development Association (IDA) had to agree on post facto clearances several times. There were no other major issues, although the practice of providing no objections to individual contracts was challenging and time-intensive for the Bank. The lessons were considered during the preparation of MCP. One complaint had been registered with the Bank (Kabul Office and INT) regarding credentials of a consultant.

A financial management review was done in September 2010, which included transaction review of the project's expenditures made up to February 28, 2010. There were no key issues from the review.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase *(including transition arrangement to post-completion operation of investments financed by present operation, Operation & Maintenance arrangements, sustaining reforms and institutional capacity, and next phase/follow-up operation, if applicable)*

The reviews of this Project, conducted in the early phase of implementation made a number of useful recommendations aimed at improving the implementation of both AEP and LEP. Yet, given that the reviews cast doubts about the viability of the existing programs, the focus quickly shifted to preparing a new project (MCP) as opposed to improving or otherwise restructuring AEP and LEP. Once MCP was approved, new activity on these projects ceased and supervision was limited to overseeing payments and contracts of the existing hires.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

(to current country and global priorities, and Bank assistance strategy)

It must again be noted that without primary documentation about AEP, it is difficult to measure or evaluate program design, outcomes and the attainment of objectives in this and succeeding sections. The following discussion assumes that the material contained in secondary sources is accurate.

The short term injection of capacity was relevant to the country context, characterized as it was by severe capacity constraints in the civil service and the severely limited ability of the government to compete with other donor agencies for qualified staff. There is much to be said for a project that successfully injected ad hoc capacity during the early emergency phase of the reconstruction effort. One senses when reading documentation prepared during that period that *any* expertise would be welcome. However, AEP did not start implementation until late 2004, more than two and a half years after the Bonn Conference, well after the establishment of the IARCSC and the PAR program. According to the Prashant review, a number of expatriates had already returned under the auspices of other donor-funded programs. By that stage, one must question the idea of repatriating "any" expertise that was willing to return. The needs of the

various ministries had become clearer and a more strategic approach to capacity could have been attempted at that point.

Amongst the key priorities identified in the Government's *National Development Framework (2002)* and the *Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (2006)* (I-ANDS) were strengthening core government agencies, public administration and the civil service. Yet, while AEP's objectives were couched in a rationale around increasing civil service capacity, it appears to have had confused development objectives, partly a mechanism for assisting repatriation and partly a mechanism for autochthonous capacity development. Further, the scale of the operation remained too small to make a major impact in any particular ministry or department, much less across the whole of government.

AEP was supposed to inject short-term Afghan expertise; however, the nature of this expertise and of the needs that it was supposed to meet was never specified. What were the critical needs in Afghanistan in terms of the high level expertise? It was unclear whether these needs were essentially of a managerial nature to run existing institutions or rather highly technical specialized skills. As a result, expatriate expertise was mobilized in many cases on the basis of uncertain terms of reference and blurred needs assessments. The precise roles of advisors remained ambiguous. If it was managerial expertise that was needed, then AEP's design was wrong (since it brought in staff in advisory positions, not line positions) and it was unlikely that the program could attract such skills in any event. In fact, while AEP was supposed to only fill advisory positions, a number of its experts were brought in to meet managerial needs.

With initial targets of recruits on the order of 60 (rising to 200), excessive faith was placed in the capacity of the AEP advisors to initiate change processes and to themselves engage in capacity building, when they were situated in an uncoordinated fashion in a range of highly dysfunctional and low capacity entities. As Michailof suggests, AEP expertise could have been utilized more effectively if used in a strategic way, and targeted towards entities that would undertake a reform process and had both the requisite leadership and a minimum of human capacity to undertake the reform. Individual advisors can only provide impetus to reform if there is clear leadership in the given institution and if a critical mass of qualified professionals can press for and implement change. This transpired to be the case in MRRD and in the Ministry of Public Health, but not in many other agencies. Both these ministries received several AEP's each. These AEP's did play important roles in promoting the PRR efforts as well as in strengthening the management of large investment programs. If the aim was to increase institutional change and implement the development agenda, then thinly dispersing them across numerous ministries was highly unlikely to have a substantive impact on culture change and on reform efforts. It may have been possible to cluster AEPs (and LEPs) around fewer ministries and agencies and their efforts aligned to support clearer and specific ministry-agency level objectives.

The idea of hiring an implementation support consultant was justified in 2002, especially in light of the fact that the government counterpart at that stage was the Ministry for Refugees with minimal capacity of its own. Similarly, in 2004, the IARCSC was in its infancy and the appeal of an implementation consultant was understandable. The choice of IOM transpired to be a poor one. With a background in repatriation and resettlement, IOM was seen as fast-tracking the project at the beginning, but added no value at all in the end, when it was performing general administrative and oversight duties pertaining to recruitment. While IOM was contracted to provide implementation support, it was not located within IARCSC. In light of the consensus about IOM's poor performance, insufficient action was taken to either improve their performance or terminate the contract prior to its end date in August 2006. All who were interviewed indicated that the IARCSC performed better than IOM with regards to these tasks.

The AEP governance structure opened the project up to claims of a conflict of interest, and recruitment based on patronage. Several allegedly politically imposed appointments undermined the credibility of the whole project.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives

(including brief discussion of causal linkages between outputs and outcomes)

The Development Objective (DO) rating in the data sheet of this Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) (which is drawn automatically from the last Implementation Status Report (ISR) approved before closing) is Satisfactory. However this does not reflect the conclusions from this ICR as described below. The correct DO rating is Moderately Unsatisfactory. We are unable to reflect this correctly in the data sheet.

As there is no formal appraisal document for AEP, it is difficult to “measure or evaluate program outcomes and the attainment of objectives”. Because of the considerable delay in the implementation of AEP for two years, it did not function as an emergency mechanism through which Afghan expertise in the diaspora could be repatriated. “If the program was intended to build capacity in the civil service rather than provide short term consultants to make things happen, then it has clearly underachieved.”²¹ There is no evidence that AEPs made a measurable contribution to capacity development of civil servants in the ministries to which they were assigned. The PDO was therefore extraordinarily ambitious. Given the low capacity base, it was unreasonable to expect small numbers of AEPs to bring about significant improvements in capacity of the underlying civil service units in which they were employed.

Though there is no evidence to document the collective impact of AEPs and LEPs on capacity development in Afghanistan, this does not mean that the individuals recruited through these programs did not have an individual impact. In all, 95 AEPs and 138 LEPs were recruited through the Project. Of these, it is very encouraging that only 2 have left Afghanistan by the time of this review. In addition, many of the individual LEPs have gone on to play very prominent roles in the Afghan Government as well as in other important Afghan institutions, as demonstrated below.

²¹ Prashant, 2006.

Table 1: Comparison of LEP and post-LEP careers of a sample of LEP employees

LEP					
No	Name	Before LEP	Designation under LEP	Ministry/Agency	Now
1	Ajmal Ayan	Advisor, International Relations Planning Depart of MoICT	External Relations Manager	Communication and IT	Director General Policy and External Relations (under MCP), Ministry of Information & Technology
2	Aimal Marjan	National ICT Advisor, MoICT	Director of IT	Communication and IT	Director General Information Technology (under MCP), Ministry of Information & Technology
3	Dr. Jalil Shams	Businessman, University lecturer	Deputy Minister Administration	Energy and Water	CEO Brishna Power Company
4	Zia Gul Saljuki	Head of WAPECA	Director of Engineering and Consulting Service	Energy and Water	Director General Donors Relations and Coordination (under MCP), Ministry of Energy & Water
5	Mirwais Ahmadzai	HR Manager (Bering Point), USAID	Reform and Evaluation Consultant	Finance	Acting HR support Director, IARCSC
6	Eshaq Aloko	Advisor of Criminal Law/Ministry of Justice	Deputy Attorney General	Office of Attorney General	Attorney General
7	Arian Sharifi	Private Sector, Singapore	Director of Communication	Finance	Overseas for Education
8	Sayed Zabihullah Sawayz	Senior Program Coordinator, UN Habitat	Director General ARS	IARCSC	Director General Administrative Reform Secretariat (under MCP), IARCSC
9	Yalda Natiq	Communication Officer/IHRC	Head of Foreign Relation Department	Transport and Civil Aviation	Director Foreign Relations (under MCP), Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation
10	Nadir Wahab	Commerical Atesha, UAE	Administrative Reform Specialist	Office Senior minister to the President	Capacity Building Officer (under NIBP), IARCSC
11	Hamidullah Amin	Lecture, Kabul University/International NGO	Assessment and Evaluation Advisor	Higher Education	Chancellor Kabul University, Ministry of Higher Education
12	Mohammad Farid Hekmat	Consultant, OAA	Deputy General Director Administration	Office of Administrative Affairs	Consultant, OAA
13	Mohammad Asif Nang	Project Coordinator/Pak-Afghan Cross Border Training	Spokesperson	Office of Administrative Affairs	Spokesperson, Ministry of Education
14	Abdul Ghafoor Liwal	Director of Cultural and Social Affairs Department/President's Office	Media consultant	Office of Administrative Affairs	Director Regional Studies Center
15	Dr. Amanullah Hamidzai	Chief of Field Surveillance/Maryland State Health Dept, USA	Chancellor of Nangarhar University	Higher Education	Chancellor of Academy of Science
16	Gul Maqsood Sabit	Business manager/La Honda-Pescadero, California, USA	Internal Audit Director	Finance	CEO Pashtany Bank
17	Hazrat Meer Totakhail	Academic Deputy, Khost University	Chancellor of Kandahar University	Higher Education	Chancellor Kandahar University, MoHE
18	Abdul Rahman Rasikh	Deputy of Protocol, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Director of Provincial Affairs	IARCSC	Director Provincial Affairs (under MCP), IARCSC
19	Mohammad Yousuf Niazi	Advisor to the Ministry of Education	ACE Member	Education	Minister of Religious Affairs
20	Noorul Haque Faqiyar	Advisor, Documents and Relations, Ministry of Civil Aviation and Toursim	Chief of staff	Energy and Water	Deputy Minister

Indeed, some of the Government's most well-known reformers were recruited into service through AEP or LEP and have been sustained through MCP (see some examples in Box 1). As a result, though it would be difficult to ascribe a collective impact to AEP and LEP hires as a group or to make any claims about their contribution to the capacity of the state, many of the individuals recruited through the program have made a significant contribution in their own areas. This suggests that the objectives of the program can be seen less in terms of capacity development and more in terms of key individual recruitments and the contribution that individuals made to support specific reform efforts during the term of their appointments and their broader contributions to Afghanistan's development in their post AEP careers. The AEP's rapidly moved

into important managerial and political positions across Government at the end of their contracts for example.

Table 2: Post AEP Careers of a Sample of AEP consultants

AEP					
No	Name	Before AEP	Designation under AEP	Ministry/Agency	Now
1	Ahmad Javid Jalali	Chief operating officer /Afghanistan Finance Company	Head of Revenue	Finance	Director General Budget (under MCP), Ministry of Finance
2	Wahidullah Shahrani	Lecturer in economics, finance and business faculty of Business, Richmond Upon Thames College Kingston University	Economic Advisor to the President and Deputy minister	Finance	Minister of Mines
3	Davood Moradian	Lecturership in International Relations, Scotland	Senior Policy Advisor	Foreign Affairs	Director Strategic Studies Center(under MCP), Ministry of Foreign Affairs
4	Rahela Hashim Siddiqi	Planning and Management consultant CESVI	Senior Advisor to the Chairman of IARCSC	IARCSC	Senior Advisor to the Chairman of IARCSC
5	Homayoon Rasaw	Project Coordinator, Manager UNDP/ICT Project	Head of Secretariat	IARCSC	Deputy Chief of staff for the President
6	Ahmad Eklil Hakimi	Private Sector, USA	Advisor to IARCSC	IARCSC	Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
7	Omar Zakhailwal	Senior Policy Advisor/CIDA Secantment MRRD	Senior advisor to the minister	MRRD	Finance Minister
8	Rangin Dadfar Spanta	Lecturer at University in Germany	Advisor International Affairs	President's Office	National Security Advisor to President
9	Mohammad Yasin Osmani	Advisor, Private Sector, Canada	Advisor Financial Affairs	President's Office	Director General, High Office of Oversight, Advisor to the President
10	Barna Karimi	President of ALMA OSA Enterprise, INC.	Deputy Chief of staff	President's Office	Deputy Minsiter IDLG
11	Prof. Abdul Salam Azimi	Chief of Party/University of Nebraska at Omaha IARRENA, Kabul	Legal Advisor	President's Office	Advisor to the President, Head of Supreme Court, Chief Justice
12	Shojauddin Ziaie	Manager/Kings Burry, London	Technical Advisor	Energy and Water	Deputy Minister
13	Omar Sultan	Special Consultant to National Geographic Society	Advisor to the minister	Information and Culture	Deputy Minister

On the whole therefore, the program can point to some significant success.

3.3 Efficiency

(Net present value/Economic rate of return, cost effectiveness and Financial Rate of Return)

The project was a capacity building project from a trust fund grant, so no calculations of rates of return were undertaken.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

Rating: Unsatisfactory.

The strongest positive impact of this project was largely unintended – it proved to be a recruiting ground for key reformist members of the Government's technocratic leadership and other public sector institutions today. This was said by several interviewees to be a relatively efficacious use of US\$13 million in a context such as Afghanistan, with its enormous aid flows. However, assessed against it stated development objectives as a capacity-building project, the project clearly fell short. The AEP and LEP recruits do not appear to have made a systematic contribution to building overall capacity in the civil service or increasing strategic capacity.

The absence of any primary documentation on file about the AEP makes the most basic effort to undertake such an assessment of this component difficult, though the simple fact that it took two years for this emergency project to get off the ground, suggests that it was an unsatisfactory response to the urgent capacity gaps. LEP is more thoroughly documented, and was a peer reviewed product. It had ambitious target of 1,500 lateral recruits into the civil service, but a phase II of the project was abandoned (having shifted instead to the preparation of a new project – MCP), and it in the end only brought in 138 recruits.

Apart from financial management reporting, supervision of both components of the program was marked by extremely poor reporting. Since July 2008, project reporting for recipient-executed trust-fund financed projects with a financing amount above US\$ 5 million follows the Bank's operational policies applicable to IBRD loans and IDA credits/grants. Before that, the Vice Presidential Unit's internal control and monitoring procedures were applicable.²² These new standards were only inconsistently applied to this project as the task team with frequent leadership changes was not fully clear on the applicability of the new guidelines to this project. Again, beyond financial reporting, due to the absence of documentation on file, this ICR cannot determine whether the VPU's procedures for supervision were followed.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

None of the project objectives directly dealt with poverty reduction or social development, although it could possibly be argued that the capacity brought in by Afghan expatriates and lateral entrants indirectly improved the capacity of Government institutions to implement its overall development agenda and thus deliver any poverty reduction.

The implementation of the AEP and LEP introduced several women into senior civil service posts, although their numbers are too small to form any critical mass which would facilitate any cultural change to a male-dominated civil service or make it more a attractive environment for women to work in. At the time of the NORAD review, only 9 of 76 AEP recruits and 1 of 93 LEP recruits were women. When IARCSC and LEP staff was questioned by the NORAD review of LEP about the extremely low percentage of women, they cited the more conducive work environment for women in NGOs and international organizations discouraged them from leaving. They also cited issues related to security, transportation and office infrastructure as not being helpful.²³ AEP expatriate recruits interviewed by the Prashant review indicated systemic resistance to women in high positions. The AEP program appeared to itself disadvantage its female recruits in terms of compensation, with average remuneration lower than for male recruits: only one woman had a salary of US\$5000, while the remainder had salaries of between US\$2500 and US\$4000.

²² The now superseded OP 14.40 and BP 14.40 applied. The SAR VPU supervises TF activities to ensure that the funds are used in a timely manner for the agreed purposes. Each VPU is accountable for TFs it administers; therefore, it establishes internal control and monitoring procedures to ensure that the Bank fulfills its obligations in accordance with the terms and conditions of each TF Administration Agreement. Financial administration of a TF is the responsibility of the VPU. That is to say, it appears that SAR would have had its own policy for supervision of the project.

²³ The woman recruited by LEP indicated to Oftedal that this was not the case and cited a number of senior women working in her ministry.

There were no programs to nurture female talent and leadership once recruited into the system, nor realistic targets for female recruitment into the program. The absence of an emphasis on proactive gender policy, especially in relation to recruits from the diaspora is at odds with the professed goal in many policy documents.

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

Both AEPs and LEPs appear to have been too thinly dispersed to have substantive impact on cultural change or capacity of specific Government entities, although a few have proven to play an important role in developing and implementing a reform agenda in their specific areas. Clustering of AEPs and LEPs around fewer ministries and agencies, in order to support clearer and specific ministry-agency level objectives, may have made a greater contribution to institutional change and strengthening.

The major achievement of this program from the perspective of overall institutional strengthening was to introduce the ideas of (i) merit-based recruitment and (ii) lateral/external recruitment to the senior cadre of the civil service in Afghanistan, the first in South Asia. While far from institutionalized, this is an achievement, as is the introduction of a performance appraisal system for those individuals hired through the system.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)

The strongest unintended outcome of the AEP and LEP was that it helped expand the professional pool from which future ministers, deputy ministers and heads of agencies would be drawn. The present Minister of Finance, the Chief Justice, Minister of Mines, Chief of Security Counsel, the ex Minister of Foreign Affairs, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Deputy Minister of Independent Directorate of Local Government, Attorney General, Minister of Haj and Religious Affairs, Director General of High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption, were recruited through LEP and/or AEP.

Box 1: AEP/LEP introduced Public Sector Reform and Private Sector Leaders

Many consultants recruited through the Program have stayed on, after the completion of the Program in various senior positions within the Government.

Ministers and deputy ministers such as Wahidullah Sharani (Minister of Mines), Omar Zakhiwal (Minister of Finance), Barna Karimi (Deputy Head of IDLG), Eklil Hakimi (Ambassador to USA) and Farooq Wardak (Minister of Education) were hired through the Program initially. They have contributed substantially to improving Ministry level performance of Mines, Finance, IARCSC and Foreign Affairs, IDLG and OAA and Education. These ministers have been able to set the pace of comprehensive reforms, while simultaneously increasing ownership of these reforms within the Government. A number of recruits hired through the Program currently work as directors within different ministries. Ajmal Ayan, Aimal Marjan, Zia Gul Saljuki, Sayed Zabiullah Sawayz, Yalda Natiq and Abdul Rahman Rasikh have contributed to legal reform, institutional strengthening and capacity building in significant ways in finance, information and technology, energy and water, transport and civil aviation and the IARCSC. These former LEP's all presently hold Director General level posts in different ministries.

LEPs have also directly contributed towards the implementation of PRR process. Mirwais Ahmedzai, Zia Gul Saljuki were directly involved in implementing the PRR process in the ministries of finance, information and technology, energy and water.

LEPs who were hired through the Program have contributed strongly to the development of

higher education. 4 LEPs, Habidullah Amin, Amanullah Hamidzai and Hazrat Meer Totakhail, are currently working as the chancellors of Kabul and other universities.

Some LEPs moved to work in the private sector in Afghanistan upon completion of the Program and are making their presence felt. Jalil Shams is currently working as the CEO of Brishna Power Company and the Pashtani Bank.

Further, these projects enabled external capacity injection possible in an otherwise closed recruitment system, thus opening up the Afghan civil service to external recruitment. To accommodate LEP in line posts, civil service recruitment had to be made open. Through subsequent changes to civil service regulations and laws, the element was retained making the Afghan civil service one of the most open across the South Asia region.

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

In order to assess the impact of the Program on beneficiaries, a stakeholder workshop was conducted with key informants on December 11th, 2011, and interviews were conducted with eight LEPs (for more details, see Annex 6).

In summary, the LEPs appear to have been involved mainly in the implementation of strategic and administrative reform within ministries, including the development of strategic plans for reform, establishment of 5-year plans for newly created ministries, building transparency within ministries and legislative reform, facilitating the creation of databases and websites to simplify business procedures and improve day-to-day management. The LEPs also contributed towards administrative reform geared towards the privatization of state owned enterprises such as Afghan Telecom. The eight interviewed LEPs highlighted the following:

- i. **Main challenges faced by LEPs:** All the LEPs interviewed highlighted the fact that they operated in a highly political environment which hindered their performance. Also, the LEPs did not receive recognition for their achievements nor saw any prospects for career growth. LEPs also felt that leadership within the ministries was largely weak. This is relevant because all the LEPs interviewed stated that the tasks assigned to them were daunting. Finally, the interviewees highlighted the fact that the facilities and support within the ministries were wholly inadequate to operate effectively.
- ii. **Recruitment process:** Interviews with LEPs revealed that the recruitment process was time-consuming and cumbersome. There were significant delays in the disbursement of salaries. Nevertheless, the respondents pointed out that the salaries were competitive.
- iii. **Recommendations:** The respondents made a number of recommendations to improve the program and make it more attractive for Afghans willing and interested to work in the civil service. They are:
 - a. Regular coordination mechanisms should be established amongst LEPs enabling them to share their ideas and experiences.
 - b. During the recruitment process, the interview panels should consist of related technical experts in addition to normal management staff.
 - c. There was a need to recognize and reward good performance to build morale and motivation.
 - d. Regular monitoring mechanisms should be established to assess the contributions made by the LEPs.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome

Rating: *Substantial*. A primary development outcome was to increase the quality and pace of implementation of development programs. The capacity brought into line ministries through the AEP and LEP was insufficient to have observable impacts on this developmental outcome. The injection of capacity, however small, needed to, in any case be, supported by improvements in public financial management, procurement and related systems that would have enabled ministries to achieve this outcome. Progress in these areas was equally slow.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry

Rating: *Moderately Unsatisfactory*

While it should be noted that AEP was initiated at a time when the current operational guidelines for trust funds did not apply, interviews and previous reviews suggest little evidence that the proposal was subject to any peer review process in the Bank, tested against Bank operating policies, or whether cognizance was taken of lessons from emergency staffing measures in other post-conflict situations. It appears unclear whether public sector expertise was harnessed in its design or indeed whether AEP was initially primarily even seen through the lens of a civil service or public administration intervention. The emphasis of some donors supporting the project was said to be on the repatriation of skilled Afghans from the diaspora – this meant that the initial government counterpart was the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation rather than an agency which was responsible for the civil service or public administration. This also explains the curious involvement of the International Agency of Migration as a supporting consultant, once it was decided that the implementing agency would be the IARCSC. IOM is an international organization specializing in the organized transfer of migrants and refugees; by all accounts did a poor job in the context of this project.

AEP design reflected confused, and potentially conflicting, objectives, as described above. The overriding objectives of injecting skilled Afghans into the civil service and increasing overall civil service capacity in some instances clashed with the interest of key donor agencies to provide an opportunity for Afghan refugees to return to Afghanistan.

The general assessment of interviewees on the Bank side was that LEP was significantly better designed than AEP. A public sector specialist was involved in its design, documentation was systematically filed, and it was subject to the full peer review process. While the end product was not without its flaws, and it could certainly have been streamlined better with the management structure of AEP, its quality at entry was substantially better than AEP.

(b) Quality of Supervision

Rating: *Unsatisfactory*

Apart from financial management reporting (procurement and audit reports), poor reporting and document management in IRIS means that there is little evidence of supervision. One of the past TTLs for this project indicated that a lot of time was spent on supervising or monitoring the work

of various project entities (and on working with procurement colleagues on issuing “no objections”) but that this was not reported or meaningfully captured in the system.

Three sets of ratings for ISRs were entered into the system, but the justification for these ratings and the process of arriving at them is unknown. Presumably the ratings were entered at the discretion of the TTL at the time, and cleared by sector management. While there is little documentary evidence that is available, the previous reviews that were undertaken of AEP and LEP would suggest that the predominantly “satisfactory” ratings in the first two ISRs would appear to be inflated. The lax attitude to supervision and records management appears to have been due partly to the assumption that, because the project was funded by ARTF -- a recipient-executed trust fund that until July 2008 was not subject to regular Bank supervision procedures -- there was no need to keep IRIS updated with appropriate information. As a result, data about the project are woefully inadequate.

Bank supervision appears to have been heavily focused on procurement and fiduciary risks -- trying to limit patronage and cronyism in the recruitment process. Due to the low procurement thresholds in Afghanistan, the context of a heavily patronage-based society with no history of merit-based recruitment in the civil service, and the political pressures that came to bear in relation to certain recruitments, this approach is understandable. TTLs invested considerable time working with procurement colleagues on issuing “no-objections” in relation to individual procurements, as well as on the individual performance appraisal process of recruits. Yet this appears to be at the expense of evaluating overall development efficacy of the project. The focus does not appear to have been on monitoring or collecting data to measure outcomes, or on whether the placement of the recruits was helpful. The “clean” recruitment of individual AEPs and LEPs, and monitoring of each individual’s performance through an appraisal process was seen as the end in itself and the development effectiveness of the overall project and whether it was meeting its strategic goals and aims appears to have been left to the various reviews of the project that were undertaken in 2005 and 2006. There does not appear to be any evidence of changes to AEP after the Michailof review of May 2005. Soon after the NORAD review of LEP in May 2006 and the Prashant review of June 2006, the decision was made to develop the successor project MCP.

When one TTL was asked about whether he felt that the overall development effectiveness of the project and the more strategic issues had been compromised due to the time-intensive nature of the fiduciary safeguards, he said that strategic thinking was focused on the broader civil service reform policy engagement outside the Project under review.

The quality of the supervision was likely to have been affected by the constant change in task team leaders. A project like this requires extensive and continuous communication between TTLs and project counterparts and a relationship of comfort and trust. Five names were mentioned by interviewees, mapped to different sectors -- Human Development, Country Management Unit and the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management).

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance

Rating: *Unsatisfactory*

Preceding paragraphs have documented the lax attitude towards procedural issues, and many basic principles of project management, in light of the fact that this was an ARTF project. There were constant changes of Task Team Leader during the life of the AEP and LEP. During 2004, when the LEP was being designed, a public sector specialist was brought in to lead project

preparation and the project subsequently came to the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Group. While the TTLs after this appear to have had specific public sector expertise, there was regular turnover of TTLs. There appears to have been weak oversight at the sector management level.

5.2 Borrower Performance

(a) Government Performance

Rating: *Moderately Unsatisfactory*

The two year delay in the implementation of the AEP meant that it did not perform as an emergency plan to inject ad hoc staffing capacity. During the delay, a number of highly qualified Afghans returned to the country under the auspices of other donor programs. The Government cannot be faulted for this however and as other avenues opened up, ministries began to lose interest in the AEP.

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance

Rating: *Moderately Satisfactory*

A small, largely part time secretariat within the IARCSC managed both these components. With IOM's assistance, the secretariat established clear recruitment procedures, records were properly maintained, employee performance was monitored and grievances were resolved. A number of interlocutors commented that the IARCSC's performance was much better than either the Bank's performance or the Government's as a whole. The Ofdetal review (for NORAD) commented that the Commission and the management of LEP should be given "full credit" for the work done so far.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance

Rating: *Moderately Unsatisfactory*

The program outcomes were affected by lack of clarity at the start on the functions of IARCSC and the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation. This took more than 12 months to resolve and involved sensitive inter-ministry and internal government discussions that affected the start of the program. The borrower had identified rightly the need to inject capacity in advisory and managerial posts. However, once the program was operational, it made no efforts to restrain the use of direct donor top-ups and other incentives which meant that ministerial interest in these windows inevitably waned.

6. Lessons Learned

When analyzing the lessons, it is necessary to consider the context in which the Program was implemented. The Program was initiated less than two years after the Bonn Agreement. The needs for capacity building were poorly defined at the time. Ministries/agencies/departments were understaffed, under-budgeted with unclear mandates. In this context the AEP and the LEP were a significant and highly innovative approach to redressing generic, rather than specific capacity constraints.

Two elements of this innovation stand out. First, contingent changes to civil service regulations opened up the civil service to external recruitment. The LEP was the means through which the Afghan civil service was opened and therefore become capable of directly receiving civil servants at middle and senior levels from external labor markets. Had this not been the case, capacity development would have been even slower as the civil service system would have relied on new recruits, with fresh university degrees to move into middle and senior ranks after the requisite period of 5 or more years of employment. Second, incentive pay for LEPs in line posts was introduced without adding upward pressure on the overall civil service pay structure as they were essentially civil servants ‘on contract’. Both these lessons are relevant for post conflict institutional environments characterized by collapsed administrations and severe fiscal constraints.

Third, using the Diaspora to attract ‘high performers’ – though not unique was innovative nevertheless. There was a strong emphasis on ‘management expertise’ in AEP. Though these were essentially advisory posts, new management experiences were brought into the civil service management. AEPs in many instances introduced some basic modern practices into management such as electronic filing, making decisions through open deliberations, challenging archaic administrative rules and practices, introducing discipline in work places and reducing informality. AEPs often worked close to Ministers and professionalized offices of the Ministers enabling them to better focus on decision making and separate their ministerial functions from their ‘political roles’.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Grantee/Implementing Agencies/Donors

(a) Grantee/Implementing agencies

The implementing agency was positive in its response about the outcomes of the two programs. Nevertheless, it proposes a number of recommendations that would be instrumental in improving the success of such endeavors in the future. These are outlined below.

- i. **Establishment of a Monitoring and Evaluation Unit** in the initial phase of program inception to identify capacity gaps, more systematically monitor the performance of recruits during their employment.
- ii. **Prioritize gender mainstreaming** first, by making a concerted effort to recruit more women in the civil service; and, second, by emphasizing those areas of service delivery in the reconstruction process where gender concerns are not effectively addressed.
- iii. **Re-assess the scope and scale of the Program** since public sector reform is a dynamic process and immediate positive results are not always forthcoming. Both government and donors need to be more patient in expecting major results.
- iv. **Delegate more authority to local ministries/agencies/departments** to recruit expatriates and lateral entrants; and assess their performance thereby increasing ownership by the Afghan Government.
- v. **Streamline implementation**, specifically by improving the quality of recruits, improve the process by which potential candidates are recruited (hiring procedures); and by ensuring there is capacity transfer to line staff.

(b) Cofinanciers/Donors

The Program was entirely funded by the ARTF, of which the World Bank acts as administrator. The ARTF has received contributions from more than 30 donors since 2002. The lessons learned

from this program were shared with DFID, USAID and other donors with a keen interest in this program.

(c) Other partners and stakeholders

At the time when IARCSC was in its infancy, it was decided that a support consultant would be hired to help implement the AEP. The Government sub-contracted IOM to identify qualified Afghans living abroad and to perform the necessary recruitment and hiring functions. Subsequent to a comprehensive review of the Program conducted in 2006, the IOM contract was amended for an additional 2 months. It was not renewed after August 2006. Since then, he IARCSC managed LEP on its own, including the recruitment and hiring functions.

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)

Components	Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)	Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)	Percentage of Appraisal
AEP	10.00	9,726,724.47	
LEP	3.00	3,224,6660.07	
Total Baseline Cost	13.00	12,951434.77	
Physical Contingencies	0.00	0.00	0.00
Price Contingencies	0.00	0.00	0.00
Total Project Costs	0.00	13.00	
Project Preparation Costs	0.00	0.00	.00
	0.00	0.00	.00
Total Financing Required	0.00	13.00	

(b) Financing

Source of Funds	Type of Cofinancing	Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)	Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)	Percentage of Appraisal
Trust Funds		0.00	0.00	
Afghanistan Reconstruction Fund	Trust	13.00	0.00	.00

Annex 2. Grant Preparation and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members

Names	Title	Unit	Responsibility/ Specialty
Lending/Grant Preparation			
Nicholas Paul Manning	Lead Public Sector Management Specialist	SASPR	
Rahimullah Wardak	Procurement Analyst	SARPS	
Deepal Fernando	Senior Procurement Specialist	SARPS	
Anne Tully	Senior Country Officer	SAC	
Ranjana Mukherjee	Sr. Public Sector Specialist	SASPR	
Supervision/ICR			
Deepal Fernando	Senior Procurement Specialist	SARPS	
Kenneth O. Okpara	Sr. Financial Management Specialist	SARFM	
Satyendra Prasad	Senior Governance Specialist	SASGP	
Nigel Peter Coulson	Senior Public Sector Specialist	SASPR	
Anne Tully	Senior Operations Officer	OPCFC	
Ranjana Mukherjee	Sr. Public Sector Specialist	SASGP	
Monali Aziz Choudhury	Sr Public Sector Specialist	MNA	
Vidya Kamath	Program Assistant	SASGP	
Hossai Mahak Aliffi	Team Assistant	SACAF	

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)	
	No. of staff weeks	USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)
Lending		
FY05	4.83	36589.00
FY06	22	89953.00
Total:	26.83	126542.00
Supervision/ICR		
FY07	20.31	82612.00
FY08	5.94	24294.00
FY09	0.5	2063.00
Total:	26.75	108969.00

Annex 3: Monitoring Indicators for LEP

Objective	Indicator	Monitoring Mechanism	Reporting Frequency
Providing short to medium term capacity to ministries primarily in agencies where the PRR effort has been slow to take off	Number of lateral entrants recruited i) women ii) men iii) ethnicities	Through monitoring Ministry's records, ARS FM consultant.	Monthly for the initial phase and six monthly thereafter
Laying the foundation for the reform process in ministries and government agencies, which are currently not under the PRR process	Pace of implementation of reforms in LEP vs. non – LEP departments (would include an element of evaluating performance against TORs, which will be conducted by ministries employing the LEPs but with assistance from the ARS and IAB)	<p>Submission of stage 1 and/or 2 applications for PRR.</p> <p>Progress on PRR in PRR ministries can be compared to progress of reforms in LEP departments/agencies.</p> <p>TORs will be evaluated by line agencies and then cleared by the ARS.</p> <p>The IARCSC is mindful of the problems of TA performance monitoring but a probationary period provides the government with the opportunity to terminate LEP contracts early.</p> <p>Performance evaluation is working reasonably well for AEP.</p> <p>Performance measurement tools are being developed and piloted for PRR and AEP, which can be used as a starting point for the LEP.</p>	At the end of 6 months
Training, mentoring and motivating regular post holders to work more efficiently and more effectively for the government, providing an alternative to the continued extensive use of technical assistance and consultants	The capacity of existing civil servants to apply for PRR positions will be enhanced.	Independent and competitive appointments procedures of the IARCSC through which these civil servants will apply for new PRR positions.	12 months.

1.

Annex 4: Beneficiary Survey Results

Report of Focus Group Interviews with AEPs/LEPs that moved on to MCP

Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission *General Directorate of Programs' Design and Management*

AEP/LEP MCP Brainstorming Workshop/Session Report (11th December, 2011 – IARCSC)

(Report prepared by the IARCSC and edited by Satyendra Prasad)

The Brainstorming Workshop/Session was conducted on May 29, 2010 at General Directorate of Programs Design and Management (GDPDM) of the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC). The session aimed to review the Management Capacity Program (MCP), share lessons learned from its predecessor AEP and LEP programs and brainstorm for future direction of the program.

General Director of Program design and management, heads of each department of the IARCSC, heads of key international donors, Deputy chief of staff to the president of Afghanistan, representatives from the ministries of Economy, foreign Affairs, Education and Agriculture, Irrigation and livestock were present and actively participated. Most participants were recruited initially through the AEP or the LEP program.

The meeting was called to (i) share lessons from AEP, LEP and MCP, (ii) and to explore possibility of scaling-up the MCP program. Particularly in consideration of the upcoming Kabul Conference and the expected announcement to roll out national projects, a scaled-up MCP could be used to facilitate the roll out of capacity building in Tashkeel positions.


All participants in the meeting actively contributed to the brainstorming discussion, providing important feedback on and pointed out the following comments and suggestions during the session.

- Develop MCP and Civilian Technical Assistance Program (CTAP) into a more strategic and cooperative system of support services
 - Build a roadmap for MCP that would include an exit strategy
 - Consider close coordination with Superscale
 - Approach MCP as part of a larger government structure and consider the lessons learned from AEP and LEP
 - Address sustainability of MCP through
 - ③ Approaching Pay & Grading (P&G), MCP, and CTAP as one package
 - ③ Build a middle-level de-politicized civil service
- Develop a Capacity Development Framework that would provide a big picture approach to CD through programs like MCP and CTAP
- Further develop data collection mechanisms for MCP
 - Re-visit goals for data collection
 - Consider difference in data collection outcomes at a departmental level vs. a Ministerial level
- Re-visit setting the critical mass for determining proof of success
 - Consider whether current methods still apply result-based management
 - What have we learned from MCP

- Prioritize resources by considering what reforms areas to focus
- Consider re-evaluation breakdown of MCP Appointee appraisal, such as 50% on Capacity Development and 50% on service delivery
- Build capacity within each ministry to handle
 - data collection
 - translations
- Expand effect of appraisal process
 - Provide rewards for success stories
 - Use outcomes to suggest constructive change
 - Evaluate deliverables
 - Identify needs in Ministries and gaps in service
- Ministry of Education requests appointment of MCPs for all provincial level directors
- Address evaluation of impact of Advisors from different donors assigned to same function or problem
- Clarify distinction between CTAP (a TA program) and MCP (a line management support program)
- Consider role of ARTF in implementation of MCP as a development program and whether MCP should be rolled into GoIRA payroll
- Address MCP management problems, such as NOL
 - Simplify/reduce bureaucracy
 - Increase HR, finance, and M&E capacity/simplify recruitment process within MCP
- Address the Beckham Factor – Hiring one star vs. a star team
 - In both AEP and LEP there was a ‘peppering of capacity’ and this meant that ministries depended on a few individuals. MCP seemed to be repeating this approach.
 - The Kabul Conference will be a good entry point for MCP packaging approach (shifting to a function-based provision of MCP packaged support vs. a problem-based approach wherein a single senior level appointee is provided.)
- Focus more on quality of baseline assessments and performance appraisals
- Explore the example of MCP support to Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL) where CTAP and MCP cooperation is happening
- Consider whether MCP support to Ministries should be premised on a Ministry-presented proposal delineating functions and deliverables
- Develop advanced methods to determine MCP contributions and share MCP experiences so that MCP appointees can draw on each other for lessons learned from common experiences
 - MCP support network
 - MCP newsletter highlighting achievements
 - Dealing with resentment from standard pay civil servants who may undermine MCP appointee efforts
- Developing a quick support system for MCP appointees from home office to manage tasks, such as
 - Quick translations
 - Program review
 - Technical assistance
- Consider providing MCP appointees a pre-joining boot camp to prepare them for the specific context and tasks for which they have been recruited
- Clarify MCP appointees’ service delivery

- Look to Ministry of Education (MoEd) for examples of MCP appointees providing a clear and definable service
- Create a focused approach to MCP support to better define expected outcomes and create a realistic environment of positive change
 - Consider whether providing support through single MCP appointees is effective
 - Consider whether to measure individual MCP appointees differently than a team of MCP appointees
- Continue to focus providing MCP support to advance PAR
 - Create a professional, capable, de-politicized civil service
- Focus more on Gender
 - Challenges to hiring and retaining female AEP, LEP and MCP appointees were similar
 - ③ Government office environment
 - ③ Job security
 - ③ Tailoring TORs to attract qualified candidates, regardless of gender
 - Ask whether current MCP appointee gender breakdown is an accurate reflection of Afghan society?
 - What is the solution to bringing gender balance to the MCP program?
 - ③ Providing incentives?
 - ③ Establishing quotas?
- Consider MCP expansion at the sub national level
 - Should sub national MCP be approached from cluster, provincial, or district view?
 - Open floor for ideas on sub national MCP

Annex 5: Institutional Mechanism for Recruitment of AEP/LEP



Annex 6: Assessment of LEPs and AEPs

Interviews were conducted with 8 LEPs, all still employed in various capacities by the Government. Key conclusions are summarized.

- 1. Main Contribution of LEPs:** The LEPs were mainly involved in the implementation of strategic and administrative reform within ministries, including the development of strategic plans for reform, establishment of 5-year plans for newly created ministries, building transparency within ministries and legislative reform. The LEPs also assisted in the creation of databases and websites for ministries to simplify procedures and day-to-day management. The LEPs also contributed towards administrative reform geared towards the privatization of state owned enterprises such as Afghan Telecom. Such reform primarily included initiatives that made these companies more profitable and competitive.
- 2. Main Challenges faced by LEPs:** All the LEPs interviewed highlighted the fact that their achievements/contributions were manipulated by the political ambitions of immediate seniors who were part of the regular civil service. This pressured hindered job performance. Also, the LEPs did not receive recognition for their achievements nor saw any prospects for career growth within the ministries they were working for, which is related to the fact that the sustainability of the program was not effectively considered. There was insufficient coordination across other ministries, which becomes problematic when implementing initiatives planned through the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS). LEPs also felt that leadership within the ministries was weak, which resulted in insufficient guidance from senior ministry staff. This is relevant because all the LEPs interviewed stated that the tasks assigned to them were daunting. Related to this is the fact that a number of LEPs were not taken seriously by their senior counterparts because they were younger, or in the case of one respondent, female. Finally, the interviewees highlighted the fact that the facilities within the ministries are inadequate to successfully implement reform initiatives.
- 3. Recruitment process:** Interviews with LEPs revealed that the recruitment process was time-consuming and cumbersome and there were significant delays in the disbursement of salaries. Nevertheless, the respondents point out that the salaries were competitive and adequate to encourage a good work ethic. Moreover, the interviews reveal that these concerns were addressed through the MCP. Not only was the recruitment process simplified, it was transparent, making it more merit based. Nevertheless, despite these initiatives, the LEPs argued that there is still room for improving the recruitment process by streamlining it.
- 4. Recommendations:** The respondents made a number of recommendations to improve the program and make it more attractive for young Afghans willing and interested to work in the civil service. These are as follows:
 - a. Regular coordination mechanisms should be established amongst LEPs enabling them to share their ideas and experiences; perhaps through web-based forums or meetings.
 - b. During the recruitment process, the interview panels should consist of more qualified staff especially where the recruitment is for a technical expert.

- c. The focus so far has been on recruitment of a *specific number* of LEPs not necessarily on qualified staff. The emphasis should be on the quality of staff hired through the Program.
- d. Reform efforts should be more comprehensive, targeting all levels of the ministries especially senior and middle-level management, to ensure their sustainability.
- e. There is a need to recognize and reward good performance to build morale and motivation.
- f. Regular monitoring mechanisms should be established to assess the contribution made by the LEPs.

Annex 7. Summary of Grantee's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan



Independent Administration Reform and Civil Service Commission General Directorate of Program Design and Management

Implementation Completion Report

Afghan Expatriate Program (AEP) and Lateral Entry Program (LEP) August 2010

Compiled and prepared by: Program Department

Background and Context

Ravaged by more than two decades of successive wars, civil, ethnic and political conflicts and the concomitant collapse of the public sector, the Afghan government and international community were faced with the fundamental challenge of the reconstruction and redevelopment of the country's infrastructure. The restoration of a central administrative apparatus was deemed crucial in order both to prevent Afghanistan from sliding back to renewed strife and to provide basic social and political stability for long term development.

In 2002, a proposal was approved by leading international organizations and donor countries for the establishment of an Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF). Managed by the World Bank, ARTF is a multi-donor trust fund supporting the reconstruction needs and efforts of the GoA. A major focus of the ARTF was to secure and support the salaries of non-uniformed civil servants and to ensure that those salaries were paid in a timely fashion.

To address the non-functional public administration and the inadequate public sector salary levels, a wide-ranging Public Administration Reform (PAR) program was initiated with donor support. One of major feature of this program was the setting up of an Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC). The IARCSC was established with the mandate of defining over-arching civil service policies and also with development of a meritocratic civil service staffed through a transparent, objective and equitable recruitment and selection system. In addition, the IARCSC was mandated with the complex and ambitious task of leading and coordinating the PAR from within its limited resources.

A key element of the PAR process was the setting up of Priority Reform and Reconstruction (PRR) program. The PRR's major role was, as a matter of urgency, to link a much needed pay scale reform process with a comprehensive restructuring of key ministries and institutions. The latter was to be underpinned by an open, fair, and transparent recruitment and selection process for vital staff in the management and technical areas which was competency based and which aimed to attract well qualified, competent and experienced individuals.

In order to meet these requirements, the government developed a capacity development framework which would enable the Afghan Civil Service to:

- compete fairly for skilled professional staff;
- strengthen critical departments;
- reduce the needs for external technical assistance;
- and limit the need for donor staffing top-ups which have the inevitable potential for undermining loyalty to government institutions.

At the core of the government capacity development framework was the development of mechanisms to attract competent, skilled and experienced Afghan professionals from both the private sector in the region and the wider international community, including the staff of NGOs and UN agencies. This aim was supported by enhanced salaries available under the PRR superscale.

Project Development Objectives and Design

Thus, two specific initiatives, the Afghan Expatriates Program (AEP) and the Lateral Entry Program (LEP), were instigated as part of a capacity building framework instituted by the IARCSC to make the Afghan Civil Service (ACS) more attractive as an employer to high quality individuals. The ultimate aim was to significantly improve the strategic and operational outputs of the ACS.

Afghan Expatriate Program (AEP)

Both the government and the international community were cognizant of the considerable challenges to be faced when trying to restore the institutional and human capacity for planning and managing the country reconstruction efforts. Recognizing these immense gaps in capacity development needs, ARTF provided US\$10 million in two installments (in 2003 and 2006) for the AEP.

The AEP's main aim was to recruit 60 exceptionally well-qualified Afghan expatriates to serve for a limited period (six months to two years) as senior advisors in certain essential line ministries. The salaries for the advisor posts attracted ranged from US\$500 to US\$7,000, which presented a rate significantly higher than normal civil service rates which averaged up to US\$300. In essence the AEP was a temporary solution to kick-start priority development programmes.

The placement of those advisors was focused on those ministries identified through consultation with key ministries, government departments and donors. The advisors' main duties would be three-fold:

- to enhance strategic capacity within the line ministries.

- to promote institutional reform to enhance organizational efficiency and managerial transparency and rigor.
- to act as drivers for the implementation of public investment programs.

Lateral Entry Program (LEP)

Whilst the AEP was designed to attract exceptionally well-qualified expatriate Afghans to serve as senior advisors to various ministries, the widespread shortage of competent and experienced civil servants for upper and middle management positions in key ministries had been identified. This capability shortage posed a significant constraint adversely affecting the delivery of the country's reconstruction agenda. To address this major challenge, and in advance of the civil service grade/pay scale reform initiative, the IARCSC launched the LEP. The proposal submitted to ARTF requesting a funding of US\$64.7 million assuming average contract duration of two years. From this total, a minimum of US\$14.2 million was required to secure the funding of 500 entrants who were to be recruited in the first year. Of this request, an immediate advance/commitment \$3 million was called for to enable the CSC to meet its plan of recruiting 100 lateral entrants in the first six months.

The LEP was a unique program which recruited Afghan professionals to senior and middle management line positions within ministries and government departments to meet urgent needs at the national, provincial and district levels. The LEP's target was to tap into the reservoir of well-qualified, experienced and competent Afghans from the NGO, UN Agencies and donor-funded program communities. It was anticipated that an initial 100 individuals would be recruited during the project's 6 month pilot phase with an additional 1,400 staff engaged over the life of the project.

The selected individuals were to be recruited at Afghan Civil Service Grades 2 to 4 on two year contracts attracting an enhanced salary of up to US\$2,000 per month. The key duties of these posts included:

- Providing short to medium term enhanced professional capacity to ministries - primarily where the PRR process has been slow to take off.
- Laying the foundation for the reform process in ministries and government agencies which were not currently under the PRR process.
- Training, mentoring and motivating regular post holders to work more effectively and more efficiently for the government, thus providing an alternative to the continued extensive use of technical assistance and consultants.

An additional benefit of the LEP was that it would normalize the terms and conditions of employment for a large number of Afghan professionals who were on the payrolls of bilateral donors or who were donor-funded consultants and contractors but who were, in fact, working as *de facto* civil servants in various line ministries.

Along with the submission of LEP initiative the IARCSC proposed that AEP and LEP be combined into a single project given the complementary nature of the respective roles. The rationale behind the proposed merger was that both interventions were designed to bring critically needed public administration capacity to manage the country reconstruction efforts for better results on the ground. Both AEP and LEP were initiated and implemented by IARCSC and

engaged Afghan professionals to be a part of integral and important part of overall capacity building. It was also envisaged that lateral entrants would be absorbed by the civil service following the completion of pay and grade reform.

Implementation and Operational Experience for AEP and LEP

Under the supervision of ARTF Executive Committee, after considerable delay, the first phase of AEP commenced in July 2004 as an urgent response to low capacity of the ministries. The delay in project initiation stemmed from debate over the sensitivity surrounding the appropriateness of the program's approach in that Afghan experts recruited through the program would be paid salaries considerably higher than those paid to their routinely-recruited colleagues.

As IARSCS was a newly-established institution with limited staff and capacity to manage this new initiative, International Organization for Migration (IOM) was contracted as the Implementation Support Consultant. With a budget of US\$ 500,000, IOM was expected for provision of logistical support in the recruitment process including advertising vacancies, preparation of individual contracts and managing salary payments. The IOM services did not continue with the same quality during implementation process and the IOM contract was discontinued with establishment of a special department called Capacity Development Secretariat (CDS) under IARCSC, with the mandate for coordinating and implementing AEP, LEP and government-initiated capacity development programs.

Once the AEP was initiated, the qualified experts were contracted for a period of two years with terms of reference specifically written to emphasize their advisory functions (including a training component for counterpart capacity building and with emphasis on the importance of not undertaking line position core functions).

One particular strength of the AEP was the emphasis on transparent and objective recruitment and selection procedures which required the involvement of, and input from, numerous ACS bodies. A project implementation manual was developed to provide guideline and detailed procedure in recruitment and selection process. This approach went a good way to countering the potential for allegations of corruption and nepotism in the recruitment and selection of advisors. Additionally, the process allowed for the establishment of a database of suitable candidates who were screened against objective experiential and educational eligibility criteria. This is considered a significant step forward as it is a wealth of data which could be utilized for future programming. Paradoxically, however, ultimately the multi-agency approach led on occasion to significant delays in the recruitment process and the loss of high quality candidates.

In common with the AEP, the LEP was implemented in two phases. In the pilot phase the aim was to recruit 100 lateral entrants. Subsequently, a further 1,400 individuals were to be recruited to produce a grand total of 1,500 seasoned mid to senior manager level entrants.

The LEP's Recruitment and Selection process mirrored that of the AEP and therefore shared its strengths and weaknesses outlined above.

It was agreed at the onset of LEP that Phase I was to serve as a pilot to lay the groundwork for possible extension and expansion into Phase II. At the end of the pilot phase, there was a plan of

an assessment and in-depth discussion to review the key achievements of LEP prior to the commencement of Phase II.

The internal assessment among stakeholders in 2007 resulted in a decision to continue the injection of experts utilizing the lessons learned into a new program intervention called Management Capacity Program (MCP) with the ARTF funding for the purpose of change and management capacity development. At that point, there were 138 LEPs and 98 AEPs on board and their contracts remained valid until their expiration.

Assessment of Project Outcomes and Effectiveness


The first Afghan advisor contracted under the AEP entered service on 1 September 2004. From the target of 60 technical experts, a total of 98 advisors were placed within key ministries, including 13 experts (13.3%) in the President’s Office. By the end of the AEP, a total of 19 ministries had benefited from the presence of AEP-funded advisors.

At the core essence, the experts worked along the key ministries to resolve bureaucratic system and speed up improvement of effective delivery of services. With concentrated efforts in organizational and capacity building, the AEP experts supported the establishment and promotion of coordination and communication frameworks, the development of ministries strategies, as well as national and regional program plans, and facilitated the acceleration of the PRR process. The experts also involved in providing advice in major significant decision making within the ministries. The Afghan-origin professionals’ involvement in the country public restructuring process was a major attraction to the donor community and in turn it provides a significant pulling factor for more funding for similar initiative.

More generally, the advisors significant contribution in the following management areas has been widely recognized:

- Working with Ministries to reduce bureaucracy and speed up delivery and output.
- Developing capacity through the provision of professional seminars, workshops and on-the-job training.
- Active participation in the drafting and production of numerous ministerial policies, strategies, development plans and regional plans.
- Promoting increased liaison and consultation between ministries, departments and other governmental and non-governmental entities.

The distribution of AEP experts in various government agencies and ministries is shown in the graphic below.



Viewing from perspective of complex context of Afghanistan reconstruction and development, which fell short in human capacity, both in terms of number and qualifications, the capacity building projects was put on higher risk platform, in comparison to normal long-term development programs. As a short-term measure, it was apparent that LEP brought positive impacts in bringing well-qualified experts in key line positions. Though there were areas of improvement, like any program of similar nature, the IARCSC and LEP management strived to go beyond achieving the strategic objectives set out in the proposal. The LEP provided a window to support PAR process by using an open and competence-based selection for vital staff in the management and technical positions within the government agencies and ministries

From a review of previous relevant reports and documentation, from interviews with several key senior individuals in the Afghan government and from internal assessment, it is undeniably apparent that there have been numerous key successes. The project has delivered significant benefits across a whole range of key ministries. Below are merely a few examples of specific achievements, in which AEP advisors have been pivotal, among others, include:

- The establishment of diagnostic centres in 8 regions including the provision of essential medical equipment and laboratories for the Ministry of Public Health.
- The production of a 5 year investment plan for the Irrigation Sector in the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation.
- The capacity development of the technical staff of Agriculture Research Institute to be able to develop policies and strategies for research activities, and preparation of proposals and concept papers.
- The development of 5-year master plan, which includes national and regional plans, for the Ministry of Agriculture.
- The establishment of a computerized system of documentation management in the Ministry of Higher Education and the computerization of the entry examination for graduate and postgraduate programs.
- The training of 34 doctors and 102 inoculators across 31 provinces for the Ministry of Public Health.
- The establishment of a comprehensive Publication Strategy for the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology.
- The drafting of a new Education Law for the Ministry of Education.
- The development of 10-year strategic plan for Community College.


On the LEP side, the initial pilot phase was extremely successful with a total of 138 new recruits engaged – an over-achievement of 38% against the initial target. An analysis of this total shows positions filled in 24 ministries and the Office of the President within the approved budget allocation. At the end of the phase there was a joint executive decision to concentrate on honoring

the ongoing advisors' contracts but to discontinue new recruitments. From LEP experience, an ARTF funded new intervention named Management Capacity Program (MCP) emerged.

As with the AEP, professionals recruited under the LEP made a significant contribution to the output of the ministries and departments to which they were assigned. By virtue of their grade level and associated duties, their focus was, by necessity, more on operational issues. The significant achievements of LEP include:

- The support to the ministries/agencies in developing long-term and short-term strategies in accordance to the objectives of ANDS, Afghanistan Compact and MDGs.
- The promotion of better management mechanism and systems by supporting the implementation of administrative reform and restructuring and PRR, and particularly in the human resources, financial management, administrative and project management functions.
- Finalization of plan for the second phase of PRR implementation in the Ministry of Commerce and Industries.
- The implementation of an anti-corruption program at the Ministry of Finance in which over 1400 ministry staff were trained.
- The establishment of a Monitoring and Evaluation framework for the office of Administrative Affairs.
- The development of a new technology and information system within the Ministry of Transport.
- The identification of challenges concerning the implementation of PRR for IARCSC and the provision of associated recommendations.
- The provision of training regarding plant protection to research and technical staff of the Ministry of Agriculture.
- The implementation of credit system and change of curriculum in the Ministry of Higher Education.
- The signing of MoU with eleven international universities to facilitate capacity building and exchange programs for teachers and students.

The chart below reflects the wide-spread allocation of LEP experts.



Furthermore, it has been unanimous in agreed that the efforts of the LEP recruited staff have contributed greatly to the implementation of administrative reform, PRR and ongoing organizational re-structuring. In particular, their efforts in the fields of human resource, financial, administrative and project management have been instrumental in moving forward the work of their ministries.

It has been well acknowledged that in comparing with the proposed targets, the achievements of AEP and LEP were well above the objectives as shown below:

	Proposed Target	Achievements	Percentage of Achievements
AEP	60 Expert Advisors	98 Expert Advisors	163% Achievement
LEP	100 Experts	138 Experts	138% Achievement

Lessons Learned

The major achievement of both LEP and AEP, which underlines the importance and success of the initiative was the kick-starting of the process of bringing Afghan professionals and associated expertise into the ACS to increase capacity , be it in advisory or line management positions. Several individuals remained in service with the ACS and are currently working in very senior positions including ministerial appointments such as Minister of Finance, Chief Justice of Afghanistan, Minister of Mines, current Chief of Security Counsel and ex Minister of Foreign Affairs, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Deputy Minister IDLG, Attorney General, Minister of Hajj and Religious Affairs, Director General, High Office of Oversight on Anti-corruption. The continued employment of these high quality individuals is a prime indicator of the significant contribution to sustainability that has been at the core of the AEP and LEP programs. Equally important is the impact the programs made in terms of laying down the groundwork in preparation for the Management Capacity Program (MCP) which represented the next evolutionary step in the AEP/LEP process and which encompassed a more clearly-defined administrative approach and enhanced managerial rigor; for example, in terms of performance metrics which were more relevant and more closely monitored.

Unsurprisingly, the elements of the LEP that could have been improved are identical to the structural and administrative issues outlined above with reference to the AEP. In neither case should these concerns detract from the overall success of the project.

Along with major achievements, there were areas where the projects lacked rigor in terms of design and implementation:

- Needs Assessment.
There is no evidence that an in-depth needs assessment took place prior to design of both projects. There was undeniably requirement for immense needs capacity building of the public administrative sector. However, it seems that the Terms of Reference

developed for advisors were developed based on the perceived rather than actual needs.

- **Monitoring and Evaluation.**
Neither project design included Monitoring and Evaluation strategies and mechanisms, (including the detailing of expected results) to measure performance in achieving project objectives. A Project Implementing Manual (PIM) was developed, albeit in a very limited capacity with an apparent aim of primarily measuring process and procedure particularly in terms of recruitment and selection processes; it was inadequate in terms of monitoring the overall project performance and associated milestones. According to the PIM, the initial step in the AEP process is to identify critical gaps in a ministry's capacity needs. The implementation of this step seems, at best, patchy. Similarly, there is no evidence of any independent performance audit being undertaken of either the AEP generally or individual advisors' activities and outputs specific.
- **Gender Inclusion.**
The projects did not specifically promote gender mainstreaming. Thus, there was no measure in place to monitor the achievement in this area as the number of female applicants and successful candidates remained low.
- **Performance Management of Individual Advisors.**
It is apparent that the performance of many of the individual advisers was not actively monitored or managed centrally. There was no mechanism in place to assess the performance of individual advisers. The advisers reported solely to their host ministry and there was no reporting relationship back to the project management team. As a result, there is much anecdotal evidence of advisers deviating from their original terms of reference and working on non-AEP related projects at the instruction of senior ministry staff.
- **Conversely, it was reported that advisers found it difficult in that there was no system for central project management, feedback and support in place.** When advisers encountered challenges in performing their tasks, or faced with communication problems with their supervisors, they could neither channel it upwards to project management nor receive support formally from the project as an operational reporting mechanism was non-existence.
- **The Recruitment and Selection Policy.**
The recruitment and selection policy, whilst praiseworthy in its commitment to transparency, objectivity and fairness, became overly complicated and bureaucratic. The prior review process by the World Bank added into delays which inevitably led to delays in recruitment and it possibly resulted in the loss of high quality potential recruits. The extant AEP recruitment' flowchart is shown in the PIM.
- **Building partnerships, networking, sharing ideas and knowledge platform was lacking.** There was limited synergy with other existing capacity building intervention.

Though AEP and LEP produced significant achievements the critical context of the Afghanistan that period of time, considerable lesson learned from AEP and LEP laid the foundation to the birth of a more solid and well defined project of Management Capacity Program (MCP). Among

other key features of MCP, the positions are categorized to fit into specific criteria, the functions of the appointee will support particular organizational common functions, the posts are not advisors, but in line position functions which reflect more weight in hierarchical authority for implementation, as supposed only give advice.

Recommendations and Conclusion

In the event of a similar project being considered in the future, there are 5 recommendations that it is believed would increase significantly the effectiveness of the program. Unsurprisingly, these recommendations center on the weaknesses identified above in relation to the administration of the projects:

- A Monitoring and Evaluation Unit be established in the early stages of the project to advise and train counterparts on the methods used to assess expeditiously, objectively and effectively the comparative capacity gaps and requirements of individual ministries and other government organizations. Subsequently, the unit should review, monitor and audit the progress made by both ministries and individual advisors throughout the project cycle to ensure the capacity is transferred to team members as well as institution capacity is enhanced by establishing systems and developing sound procedures.
- Gender mainstreaming should be given a higher priority in relation to advisor recruitment.
- Capacity development is a long term process with required long-term intervention. In the future, consideration should be given to the extension of contract length, depending on the specific needs which could be defined from need assessment. The scope and scale of the challenges facing the advisors are such that a two year contract period is potentially too short a time frame to effect real, lasting strategic development and capacity transfer.
- With the support of technical assistance, it is necessary to establish systems and tools to conduct standardized, effective performance appraisals of appointees which include the setting of performance goals and objectives which should flow directly from the relevant, published job description.
- Consideration should be given to re-designing the recruitment and selection model with the aim of retaining those elements which ensure equity of treatment for all candidates and transparency of process whilst reducing the capacity for delays and the potential loss of high quality candidates. Specialist HR support should be sought in this regard.
- The level of Afghan ownership should be increased by delegating the process review to the implementing agency which also reduces the delays, and will help to meet the needs of Ministries in an efficient and on a timely manner.
- Consolidation of program in critical ministries with enhanced focus on with enhanced focus on creating permanent improvements within the organization, alignment with the development priorities and synchronizing with public sector reforms
- The CB programs need an efficient, responsive support structure/procedures (like newly established GDPDM) that coordinate, communicate and cooperate with all

stake-holders especially with the donors and visibly incorporate the best of their suggestions

- Any future program needs to initiate a continuing proactive talent search and create a segregated data base of skilled people
- There should consider the continuing-education aspects of capacity building through open website with short para training background, online learning, or fellowships or internships or graduate-study abroad programs etc. In other words, creating a knowledge platform more broadly available to civil servants

Overall, the AEP has proved to be a resounding success. The program was expected to recruit only 60 advisors under its auspices. The fact that some professionals were actually recruited (an increase of G% on the initial target) is a significant achievement.

The LEP had proved to be similarly productive and it has produced many highly skilled and motivated individuals whose contribution to reconstruction and capacity building is praiseworthy. Furthermore, there is no doubt that the output of this cadre of highly motivated, high quality AEP and LEP individuals has contributed greatly to the ongoing professional development - and allied capacity-building - of the ACS and to the reconstruction of the country's public infrastructure. Though AEP and LEP were completed, a number of those experts remain within the government structure and undertaking line functions to provide contribution to the greater development effort of GoA

Within the timeframe of the start of AEP and LEP, the context of reconstruction and reform efforts consisted of many components ranging from institutional development, operational effectiveness, project planning and design, as well as filling in the gaps of the non-existence or limited functions capabilities. Like in any other institutional strengthening, capacity building and capacity transfer program and training, it requires detailed and long process of planning, and complex intervention with long term horizon. AEP and LEP were merely short interim measures to address capacity inadequacy in the reform process. As such, considering the urgency and temporary nature of the project initiatives, within the framework of government framework to provide a window to generate critical professional resource pool to fill the gap of functional capabilities within public administration, AEP and LEP significantly achieved beyond the scope of the project objectives.

Furthermore, the foundations laid by, and the lessons learnt from, the AEP and the LEP contributed directly and significantly to the inception and growth of the General Directorate of Programs' Design and Management (GDPDM). The establishment of GDPDM is considered to be one element of sustainability, from which the future government-initiated capacity building program are designed, planned and implemented. In turn, the GDPDM has proved to be pivotal to the ongoing successes in the area of Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and Afghan-managed developmental initiatives.

In summation, there is great value in continuing with a similar capacity building initiatives along the lines of the AEP and the LEP. The Afghan government, its ministries and its staff all benefited hugely both in terms of organizational productivity and individual effectiveness. As shown below, AEP and LEP provided the genesis for the MCP, which in turn is the foundation for a permanent senior civil service group. The problem was that the short term aims were not

sufficiently mapped against possible longer term trajectory/ies along which the Afghan civil service could have evolved.

MAP

I N S E R T

M A P

H E R E

AFTER APPROVAL BY COUNTRY DIRECTOR

AN ORIGINAL MAP OBTAINED FROM GSD MAP DESIGN UNIT

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