ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES GLOBAL PRACTICE POLICY NOTE 95557 ECONOMIC, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND SOCIAL EVALUATION OF AFRICA’S SMALL-SCALE FISHERIES APRIL 2015 WORLD BANK GROUP REPORT NUMBER 95557-GLB ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES GLOBAL PRACTICE COUNTRY POLICY NOTE Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries © 2015 World Bank Group 1818 H Street NW Washington, DC 20433 Telephone: 202-473-1000 Internet: www.worldbank.org Email: feedback@worldbank.org All rights reserved This volume is a product of the staff of the World Bank Group. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this volume do not necessarily reflect the views of the Executive Directors of World Bank Group or the governments they represent. The World Bank Group does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. 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Contents Acknowledgmentsv Abbreviations and Acronyms vii Executive Summary ix Methodology ix Key Findings x Recommendations xii Chapter One: Introduction1 Chapter Two: FPI Output Scores—Measuring Wealth 7 Ecology8 Economics9 Community10 Chapter Three: FPI Input Scores—Enabling Wealth Creation 13 Rights14 Community Comanagement 15 Gender16 Chapter Four: Hypothesis Test 17 Chapter Five: Highlights of Key Findings and Recommendations 21 References23 Appendix A: Output Indicators 25 Appendix B: Input Indicators 27 Appendix C: Case Study Summary 29 FIGURES Figure 2.1:  Average Scores for FPI Output Indicators 8 Figure 2.2:  Average Score for Ecology Outputs 8 Figure 2.3: Average for Postharvest Sector Economic Performance 9 Figure 2.4: Average Score for Community Outputs 10 Figure 3.1:  Average Scores for Inputs 14 Figure 3.2: Average Access Rights Inputs Scores 15 Figure 3.3: Average Leadership and Social Cohesion Scores 16 Figure 3.4: Role of Women in Fisheries 16 Figure 4.1: C  orrelation of Ecology, Economic, and Community Outputs Scores and Access Rights 18 Figure 4.2:  Correlation of Economic Outputs and Community Inputs (Leadership and Social Cohesion) 19 Figure C.1: Summary of Ghana Case Study Output and Input Scores 30 Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries iii Figure C.2: E  cology, Economics, and Community Sustainability for Ghana Artisanal Fishery 31 Figure C.3: Summary of Liberia Case Study Output and Input Scores 32 Figure C.4: E  cology, Economics, and Community Sustainability for Liberia Artisanal Fishery 33 Figure C.5:  Summary of Sierra Leone Case Study Output and Input Scores 34 Figure C.6: E  cology, Economics, and Community Sustainability for Sierra Leone Artisanal Fishery 35 Figure C.7: Summary of Senegal Case Study Output and Input Scores 36 Figure C.8:  Ecology, Economics, and Community Sustainability for Senegal Artisanal Fishery 36 Figure C.9: S  ummary of Malawi Case Study Output and Input Scores 38 Figure C.10:  Ecology, Economics, and Community Sustainability for Malawi Artisanal Fishery 38 TABLES Table 1.1: FPI Rankings 4 Table 2.1:  Fishery Performance Indicators (Output Sustainability Average) 8 Table A.1: Output Indicators, Dimensions, and Measures 25 Table B.1: Input Components, Dimensions, and Measures 27 Table C.1: Summary of Ghana Artisanal Fishery in Axim 30 Table C.2: S  ummary of Liberia Artisanal Fishery in Robertsport and Semi-industrial Fishery in Marshall 32 Table C.3: S  ummary of Sierra Leone Artisanal Fishery in Tombo and Sherbro River 34 Table C.4: Summary of Senegal Artisanal Fishery in Ngaparou 36 Table C.5: Summary of Malawi Artisanal Fishery in Lake Chiuta 38 iv Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This report is the culmination of a cross-African countries analytical and empirical study commissioned by the World Bank, which set out to improve the understand- ing of the characteristics and environmental, economic, and social performances of small-scale fisheries in Africa. It applies a common evaluation tool, called Fish- ery Performance Indicators (FPIs), which evaluates the ecological, social, and economic performances of a particular fishery (see details in Anderson et al., forthcoming). ­ Jingjie Chu (Natural Resource Economist, Environment and Natural Resources Global Practice, World Bank) and Jennifer Meredith (Graduate Student, University of Washington) are the primary authors of the report. Jingjie Chu is the study’s overall task team leader. She produced the FPIs survey design, provided overall guidance to the study team, and helped compile and edit the final synthesis report. Jennifer Meredith compiled all the case studies, conducted cross-country analysis, and drafted the synthesis report. Tim Bostock (former Senior Fishery Specialist, Environment and Natural Resources Global Practice, World Bank) helped develop the terms of reference, identify consultants, coordinate the case studies and work- shop, and contribute to the introduction. Steve Cunningham (Institut du Dével- oppement Durable et des Ressources Aquatiques [IDDRA]) developed the case study template and helped coordinate the case studies, along with drafting the syn- thesis report. The team wishes to thank and acknowledge the invaluable contribution of the fol- lowing case study authors: Robert Arthur (Marine Resources Assessment Group [MRAG], with Patrick Sayon, Glasgow Togba, and Alvin Jueseah) for Liberia; Max Schmid (Environmental Justice Foundation [EJF]) for Sierra Leone; Wisdom Akpalu (United Nations University) for Ghana; Lorna Slade (Mwambao Coastal Commu- nity Network) and Fred Nelson (Maliasili Initiatives) for Kenya; Friday Njaya for Malawi; and Lamine MBaye for Senegal. Each of these reports can function as a stand-alone publication. However, with time and budget constraints, they have been combined. The team acknowledges the participants at the Small-Scale Fisheries in Africa Work- shop (World Bank, October 2013) for their contribution and Iris de Graaf ’s logistical support. The team further acknowledges all peer reviewers for their insightful com- ments and suggestions, with particular thanks to Christohphe Crepin (Sector Leader, GENDR); Richard Damania (Lead Economist, GENDR); John Virdin (Senior Natu- ral Resource Management Specialist, GENDR); and David Tomberlin (Senior Econ- omist, NOAA). The team prepared this work under the guidance of Magda Lovei (Practice Manager, GENDR) and is grateful for her strong support during the whole process. Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries v Finally, the team appreciates the financial support from the World Bank Trust Funds BNPP-Sustainable Development & Climate Control: Strengthening Demand-Side Environmental Governance in Poor Coastal Communities in West Africa (TF097225) and Building Demand-Side Governance Capacity in Local Artisanal Fishing Com- munities (TF097288). vi Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries Abbreviations and Acronyms BVC Beach Village Committee MPA Marine Protected Area CMA Community Management Association MRAG Marine Resources Assessment Group EJF Environmental Justice Foundation NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development FAO Food and Agriculture Organization (of the RBM Rights-Based Management United Nations) SSFs Small-Scale Fisheries FPI Fisheries Performance Indicator TURF Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries vii Executive Summary Small-scale fisheries (SSFs) in developing countries are extremely impor- tant for local communities, as they are the main source of food, liveli- hood, and income. Small-scale fishing communities are vulnerable to overexploitation of fish stocks owing to insecure access and use rights to the fishery resources and limited alternative livelihood. This is most often the group in extreme poverty and also one that is frequently overlooked. To cast some light on the status of SSFs in Africa and their relationship with the existing institutional and governance arrangements, the World Bank (former Africa Region Environment and Natural Resources Management unit together with PROFISH) and the New Part- nership for Africa Development (NEPAD) commissioned a series of case studies across Africa in 2013. The fisheries case studies range from inland to marine, single to multi- species, East to West African, and from artisanal to semi-industrial fisheries. A template was developed to provide structure and guidance for these case studies. Each case study involved the following elements: (a) characterization of SSFs (at both the national and case-study levels); (b) legal and institutional framework for case-study countries and communities; and (c) social, economic, and environmen- tal performance of case-study fisheries. This synthesis report focuses on element (c) by using the standard Fishery Performance Indicators (FPIs) to do the comparison analysis. Methodology The FPIs are a new set of evaluation tools to measure the triple bottom line sustainability of a particular fishery recognizing that the sustainabil- ity of fish stocks, fishing industries, and fishing communities are interre- lated and that none can provide benefits without the others. The FPIs consist of two categories: output indicators that measure the wealth generation status of a fish- ery and input factors that enable or contribute to the success or failure of fishery wealth generation. All of the indicators are coded on a five-point scale, with the bins chosen to reflect the quintiles of performance on the global metric. FPIs are designed to be easy to collect. They are quantifiable, understandable, accurate, and feasible. Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries ix This evaluation tool strives to balance accuracy are the Liberian fisheries. This can be attributed to the with rapid assessment as no primary data col- success of a recently implemented trawler spotter pro- lection is required, which makes them very cost gram that has been effective at keeping illegal industrial effective, particularly for data-poor countries. trawlers out of inshore zones. It also has the potential to change how fishery manag- ers, stakeholders, and aid agencies measure progress, as Economically, as we would expect, the perfor- it focuses on three dimensions at the same time. So far, it mance of these fisheries is poor. In the absence of has been tested in more than 50 fisheries by researchers infrastructure, these fisheries lack the capacity for value- all over the world. added processing and are forced to smoke, dry, or ferment the harvest to prevent spoilage. The case-study fisheries have Another feature of this evaluation tool is the qual- a low percentage of landings going to fresh market or inter- ity score for each measure, which indicates how national market, very few processing facilities that are certi- confident the scorer is regarding the accuracy of fied to export, and a low proportion of harvest undergoing the chosen bin. Despite the ease of application, the product enhancement. This contributes to low postharvest quality of the data is high, yielding a good snapshot of wholesale prices relative to similar products and inhibits the biological, economic, and community conditions asso- the fisheries from extracting maximum economic rents ciated with the corresponding fishery. from their value chains. The only exception is the Kenyan octopus fishery in which processors from the coastal hub of This report uses the quantitative results from the Mombasa play a large role in targeting export markets. The FPIs to explore commonalities and differences postharvest sector of this octopus fishery performs particu- among and between the nine African fisheries in larly well with regard to ex-vessel to wholesale margins and six countries (Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, the facilitation of international trade. Senegal, and Sierra Leone) and to infer their relative strengths and weaknesses. Additionally, The case-study fisheries experience more annual fluctua- the existing FPI dataset (which includes 50 other fisheries) tion in total revenue, landings, and prices than the average allows the analysis to be expanded to include a compari- African fisheries or FPI database fisheries. The instabil- son with African fisheries in general and with fisheries in ity fostered by such fluctuations inhibits harvest developed and developing countries around the globe. sector investments and efficient exploitation of the resources in those SSFs. Key Findings Socially, the community performance of the Overall, there are large performance gaps in the recent African SSFs is much closer to the average recent African SSFs in terms of the output perfor- for all FPI databases. This can be attributed to com- mance. These fisheries have unhealthy fish stock, high- munity measures that are scored relative to local alterna- risk volatility, weak market performance, and postharvest tives and not entirely on a global scale. Additionally, the performance. Moreover, they also lag behind in harvest recent case studies all concerned fisheries in which the performance, harvest asset performance, and postharvest majority of harvesting and processing is undertaken by asset performance. They appear to slightly outperform locals, whereas many high-revenue fisheries attract par- the rest of the database in wealth accumulating to pro- ticipants from outside the community who may extract cessing workers. The following is a summary of these fish- resource wealth without contributing to local economies. eries’ performance with regard to the triple bottom line. Another community issue that the FPI scores allow us Ecologically, the environmental performance of to analyze is that of equity within the fishery. When the these case-study fisheries is very low relative to scores for income, education access, health care access, the rest of the database, especially relative to local residency, and social standing are averaged across fisheries with effective harvest rights. The only the four occupations in the fishery (boat owners/cap- exceptions to the norm of abysmal ecological indicators tains, harvesting crew, processing owners/managers, and x Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries processing workers), a picture of the wealth distribution data are collected irregularly, which prohibits proper within the fishery emerges. It appears that fisher- management. Even when data on landings exist, they are ies with strong tenure systems tend to see more used only inconsistently or irregularly. Despite the prolif- wealth accumulating to the harvest and process- eration of cellular phones, price and quantity information ing capital owners but that wealth does not seem are often inaccurate, delayed, or available to only a few to come at the expense of the harvest crew and and very little historical data are recorded. processing workers. It is interesting that the average wealth distribution in the recent African SSFs is very close All of the case-study fisheries have limited basic to being equal. The outlier is the Kenya octopus fishery infrastructure. Many of the recent fisheries are in that relies on export processing and shows clear accumu- remote locations where ocean/air shipping from land- lation of wealth to boat captains and processing owners. ing site to port of export is unavailable or available only occasionally. The roads are most likely to be poorly main- When looking at input factors, the case-study fish- tained gravel or paved two-lane roads at best. Technology eries consistently score lower than the average FPI adoption is limited to cellular phones and there are no database in each input dimension except for the sophisticated fish finders or production technology as is comanagement dimensions of collective action, the norm in other fisheries. Where electricity is available, participation, community, and gender. Another supply chains often lose produce because of irregular fuel dimension in which the recent case studies score relatively supply or unreliable generators. Importantly, ice is avail- high is that of markets and market institutions, probably able but not in sufficient quantities to meet the demand. because these fisheries tend to have competitive landing It is often reused and is not applied to the entire catch pricing systems with many buyers and very few official throughout the supply chain, which explains why product tariff/nontariff barriers to international trade. There are improvement is often so low. large performance gaps in the recent African SSFs in terms of macroindicators such as general environmental perfor- All of the case-study fisheries can be classified mance, governance, and economic conditions. In addition, as regulated open access. There is a local author- they also lag behind in fishing access rights, harvest rights, ity who must be consulted before accessing the resource data management, and infrastructure. but these authorities have chosen not to limit the num- ber of harvesters, which undermines their ability to exer- The role of women was very similar across the cise control over the sustainability of the resource. There case-study fisheries. Women are dominant in the was some variation across the recent case studies owing postharvest sector (on average, from 60 to 80 percent to differences in the exclusivity (some had more intrusion of processors were female). The Ghanaian fishery dem- from industrial trawlers or aquarium fishers); in the flex- onstrated a high degree of female participation in busi- ibility (some were subject to very strict gear/area restric- nesses owing to the traditional role of the “Fish Mommy/ tions); and in the security/durability (certain fisheries had Monger/Queen,” who is the local authority on postharvest a very strong tradition of de facto open access whereas operations. This “Fish Queen” exercises a high degree of others were subject to arbitrary federal government deci- control over the local market by setting the prevailing price sions). Access rights in Malawi were the strongest because at the beginning of each trading day after examining the there was a higher degree of exclusivity than elsewhere first three landings and making a judgment on the price that with fewer incursions from outsiders owing to the remote day. This degree of influence by women in these nature of the lake fishery. Ghana also scored relatively African SSFs is far greater than that of most devel- ­ high because of the strong tradition of de facto rights that oped country fisheries, where both harvest and influenced participants’ perceptions of security and dura- postharvest sectors tend to be dominated by men. bility. Liberia scored slightly higher because of the recent trawler spotter efforts, but they still suffer from low secu- All of the case-study fisheries have very weak rity scores because of the unstable nature of the national data management. Small samples with lots of m ­ issing government. Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries xi The recent African SSF samples have shown »» FPI data should be collected regularly to stronger leadership and social cohesion. In the track progress and impact of interven- case of Ghana, the scores are exceptionally high because tions. This report demonstrates that collecting they have a century-old tradition of leadership from the data on the FPIs provides decision makers with Chief Fisherman and Fish Mommy, who govern the har- valuable baseline data on the ecological, social, and vest and postharvest sectors, respectively, with absolute economic performance of their fishery and also authority. Within the region, Ghanaians are renowned allows for informative comparisons across fisheries. as expert fishermen and their heritage of shared cultural The FPIs have the power to test hypotheses from a norms and centuries of fishing experience is demonstrated range of social science models and are constructed in their high social cohesion scores. to measure enabling factors alongside a multi- tude of outcomes. Even in the short term, cross- sectional analysis permits policy makers to draw Recommendations useful conclusions about the relative importance Preliminary analysis leads to the following recommendations: of factors, but a more rigorous test of hypotheses »» The FPIs are a useful tool for data-poor fish- from a range of social science models will only be eries because they provide cost-effective yet possible if FPI data are collected in the same fish- holistic estimates of the existing state of eries over time. In the long term, repeated collec- fisheries management by efficiently relying tion of FPI data within a given project is an impor- on the input of local experts. Fisheries can be tant component of evaluating and monitoring the scored using the FPI framework in only one to two Bank’s investments in fisheries management. Data weeks, yet the information gathered provides insight should be collected within these case-study fisheries into economic and social variables that are tradition- at regular intervals so that managers can map the ally ignored in fisheries management benchmarking. intermediate steps that accompany policy changes. The exercise demonstrates that even in such data- »» Comparison of the recent case studies poor fisheries, we can still obtain adequate quantita- leads to the recognition of two key outliers: tive scores that facilitate comparison and inference ecological outcomes in Liberia and eco- by collecting the FPI scores. nomic outcomes in Kenyan octopus. Trawler »» Ecological variables alone are not suitable spotter programs such as the one operating in Libe- proxies for economic welfare or commu- ria can be effective at generating short-term eco- nity well-being. The variability of fishery rank- logical gains and we recommend that such efforts ings when done according to either ecology, eco- be scaled up and accompanied by efforts to simul- nomics, or community FPI output scores lead us to taneously limit the activity of smaller vessels so conclude that economic and social variables can- that stock recovery is not temporary. The Kenyan not be omitted and replaced exclusively with stock octopus fishery suggests that a postharvest sector assessments. focused on value addition and export is capable »» Access and harvest rights appear to be posi- of generating large economic gains for boat own- tively correlated with ecological and eco- ers and processing managers that do not appear to nomic sustainability, whereas other inputs come at the expense of the local community. such as leadership and social cohesion do »» Improvements in infrastructure should not contribute to the same increase in scores. be coupled with strengthening tenure to Although some fisheries management experts have enhance the efficiency of the value chain. In predicted that the implementation of rights-based the absence of effective federal or local manage- management (RBM) will lead to higher levels of ment, processors have a vested interest in ensur- inequity within the fishery, the lack of declining com- ing the sustainability of the stock, especially if they munity scores with more exclusive rights arrange- have sunk capital investments in the form of facili- ments leads us to conclude that this is not true. ties and improved technology. xii Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries Chapter One Introduction Many of the world’s fishery resources—both in marine and inland waters—are in a precarious state despite the fact that the international fish trade broke records of more than US$136 billion in 2014 (FAO 2014). Fisheries generate livelihoods for more than 100 million people and represent a vital source of nutrition (FAO 2014); however, it is estimated that around 5.8 million fisher- man exist in poverty, often in rural coastal communities in Africa and Asia (FAO 2014). Overfishing and overcapacity characterize numerous fisheries around the world, resulting in lower potential for fisheries to contribute to sustainable economic, social, and environmental development in the way the sector could. Small-scale fisheries are particularly vulnerable because of insecure access and use rights with respect to the resources upon which communi- ties depend for income, livelihoods, and food. In many developing countries, legitimizing and bolstering traditional rights over SSFs could be part of the formula for improving the governance of fisheries (World Bank and FAO 2009). Custom- ary practices for resource allocation and benefit sharing within coastal communities engaged in fishing have been frequently undermined by weak access rights leading to destructive competition with fellow fisherman and with other higher-profile economic sector developments such as tourism, aquaculture, energy, mining, industry, and infra- structure. Improving governance of tenure, taking these aspects and underlying causes into consideration, is therefore a matter of urgency for fisheries to continue providing contributions to growth, nutrition, and livelihoods in developing countries. To address this issue, during 2013 the World Bank (for- merly Africa Region Environment and Natural Resource Management unit together with PROFISH) and the NEPAD commissioned a series of case studies throughout Africa. The studies set out to identify the relationship between the performance of SSF and the existing institutional and governance arrangements that underpin these. Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries 1 In support of this objective, the Fisheries Performance data collection is required, FPIs are a very cost-­ Indicators were used to provide a quantitative perspective effective tool with the potential to change how of fisheries performance at all of the case study locations. fishery managers, stakeholders, and aid agen- The FPIs are a rapid assessment instrument for cies measure progress. The tool has been tested in measuring the level of success that the manage- more than 50 fisheries by researchers all over the world. ment systems are having in generating benefits for the environment, community, and economy Each measure is also given a quality score to (Chu, Anderson, and Anderson 2012). The guiding prin- indicate how confident the scorer is regarding ciple is that a successful fishery management system is one the accuracy of the chosen bin. Although individual that is ecologically sustainable and socially acceptable, and metrics may be imprecise, using multiple metrics for each generates sustainable resource rents or profits. The FPIs performance dimension leads to an accurate impression fall into two categories: (a) output indicators that identify of what is and is not working. In this manner, the FPIs and measure key factors that reflect success or failure in are robust and can be employed in data-poor fisheries and the attainment of the “triple bottom line” of environmen- sectors. Analysis across the dataset reveals that despite the tal, social, and economic sustainability, including 3 com- ease of application, the quality of the data is high, yielding ponents, 11 dimensions, and 68 indicators (see appendix a good snapshot of the biological, economic, and commu- A for details) and (b) input factors that enable or contribute nity conditions associated with the corresponding fishery. to the process of meeting the “triple bottom line,” includ- ing 5 components, 15 dimensions, and 54 indicators (see The FPIs are designed not only as a tool for appendix B for details). All of the indicators are coded on identifying fisheries that are underperform- a five-point scale, with the bins chosen to reflect the quin- ing in meeting the triple bottom line but also tiles of performance on the global metric. as a framework for pinpointing what policies and interventions are likely to have the greatest For the output indicators, there are two ways to impact and for research that supports evidence- group them. One is the triple bottom line way (social, based policy making. By analyzing relationships economic, and ecological sustainability) and one is based among the wealth creation and input measures, the FPI on the sector (stock performance, harvest sector perfor- dataset can be used to understand the causes, correla- mance, and postharvest sector performance). The latter tions, and paths toward successful industry development is useful for describing distributional outcomes and for that can arise from investment in, and changes to, fishery potential investors in different segments of fishery (Ander- policy and practice. It is worth mentioning that sophis- son et al., forthcoming). The braiding shows how each ticated econometric analysis regarding the output and individual metric can be regrouped into different dimen- input relationship has not been included in this report sions and indicators that emphasize different aspects of because of the limited sample. Other analysis meth- sustainability (see appendix A). ods such as Data Development Analysis and Stochastic Frontier Analysis can be explored when more samples ­ FPIs are designed to be easy to collect and do have been collected. not require detailed data. They are quantifi- able, understandable, accurate, and feasible. A The goal of this report is to demonstrate that col- local expert who understands the fishery well is the key. lecting data on the FPIs provides decision ­ makers A detailed manual to explain each indicator and a user- with valuable baseline data on the ecological, friendly MS Excel spreadsheet have been developed that social, and economic performance of their fish- local experts can fill out easily with summarized results ery and also allows for informative comparisons and graphs. FPI scores are assigned after consultation across fisheries. In the long term, repeated collection and in-person interviews with key stakeholders, manag- of FPI data within a given project is an important compo- ing officials, and important industry leaders. It strives to nent of evaluating and monitoring the investments in fish- balance accuracy with rapid assessment. As no primary eries management. Even in the short term, cross-sectional 2 Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries analysis permits policy makers to draw useful conclusions the score equally, then the rankings are altered as in the about the relative importance of factors such as property second column. Column 3 demonstrates how the rank- rights, infrastructure, enforcement, and other manage- ings change if economic outputs are allowed to contribute ment inputs. 50 percent of the score, whereas ecology and community make up 25 percent each, and column 4 does the same The focus of this report is to explore common- for a 50 percent contribution of community. These last alities and differences between the nine African columns show how flexible the FPI ranking system can SSFs surveyed in 2013 and then to expand the analy- be. If policy makers are more concerned with community sis (using the entire FPI database) to include a compari- strength, then they should use rankings similar to those in son with African fisheries in general and with fisheries in the fourth column. If they are more concerned with eco- developed and developing countries around the globe. logical health or economic growth, then there are many The final sets of FPI scores examined in this report are alternate weighting schemes that could be employed. from fisheries located in six different countries: Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. In This table demonstrates that the relative ranking the case of Kenya, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, the case- of fisheries is very sensitive to the way we define study data were broken into two different sets of FPI success, particularly when considering fisheries scores for a total of nine fisheries. This synthesis report located in developing countries—there is much uses the quantitative data from the FPIs to infer the rela- more movement in the rankings for fisheries tive strengths and weaknesses for each of the nine fisher- in these countries. Note that out of the nine recent ies. In addition, a summary of the management structure African SSFs, the Liberian fisheries score highest when in each fishery is found in appendix C. For more detailed ecology alone is the metric, but once economic measures qualitative insights into the nature of rights in Liberia and are incorporated, their rankings fall and they are outper- Sierra Leone, the reader should refer to the individual formed by the Kenyan octopus fishery that scored very case-study reports for these countries, which will be pub- low in ecology but high in economics. The fisheries in lished separately. The set of case-study fisheries and their Ghana and Sierra Leone (Tombo) also move up in the authors are the following: rankings once community concerns are weighted more »» Ghana (Axim)—Wisdom Akpalu heavily. »» Kenya (Shimoni: Artisanal and Octopus)—Lorna Slade The report is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents »» Liberia (Robertsport and Marshall: Artisanal and the results for FPIs that measure the success (Outputs) in Semi-Industrial)—Robert Arthur/MRAG achieving the triple bottom line of environmental, social, »» Malawi (Lake Chiuta)—Friday Njaya and economic sustainability. Chapter 3 presents the »» Senegal (Ngaparou)—Lamine MBaye results for FPIs that measure factors (Inputs) that enable »» Sierra Leone (Sherbro Estuary and Tombo)—Max (or undermine) the likelihood that the triple bottom line Schmid will be achieved. Chapter 4 presents the simple graphic correlation between FPI inputs and outputs. Chapter 5 Too often, the success of a fishery is narrowly summarizes the lessons to be inferred about effective man- defined as ecological sustainability, but the agement strategies from this study. social and economic dimensions are overlooked. Table 1.1 demonstrates that if only ecological sustain- Comparisons were constructed across several subgroups: ability is evaluated, it will generate different results from »» All Recent Africa: Average for the nine African those measured based on the triple bottom line evalua- SSF FPI case studies done in June/July 2013. tion tool. For example, the first column in table 1.1 shows »» All Harvest rights-based management: how the 48 fisheries currently in the FPI database are Average for the 16 fisheries in the database that ranked when ecology alone is considered. If instead, all score a 4 or 5 in the measure “Proportion of Har- of the FPI output measures are allowed to contribute to vest Managed with RBM.” These are fisheries in Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries 3 Table 1.1. FPI Rankings Outputs Performance Equally Comm. Fishery Ecology Only Weighted Eco. Weighted Weighted Lobster - Iceland 1 1 1 1 AK Halibut - United States 2 6 5 8 AK Pollock - United States 2 2 2 2 AK Salmon - United States 2 14 21 19 Cod - Norway 5 5 7 6 Purse Seiners - Norway 5 4 6 5 OR Dungeness Crab - United States 7 13 14 18 Hoki - New Zealand 8 3 3 4 Gulf Prawn - Australia 9 7 8 3 Suruga Pink Shrimp - Japan 9 9 9 9 AK Crab - United States 11 8 4 7 Lake Victoria Dagaa - Uganda 11 27 28 34 Lake Victoria Tilapia - Uganda 11 26 26 28 Louisiana Shrimp - United States 14 15 15 16 Baltic Cod - Sweden 15 11 11 11 Beel Chatra - Bangladesh 15 21 22 22 Artisanal - Liberia 17 25 27 24 CA Urchin - United States 17 17 12 20 Kailin Nadi - Bangladesh 17 31 36 35 Nearshore Artisanal - Seychelles 17 12 13 12 Semi-Industrial - Liberia 17 28 32 30 Anchovy - Peru 22 19 18 17 Artisanal Sole - Gambia 22 24 24 25 C (Southern Zone) - Morocco 22 18 17 14 FL Spiny Lobster - United States 22 16 16 13 Semi-Industrial - Seychelles 22 10 10 10 Pabna - Bangladesh 27 39 39 40 A+B (Central Zone) - Morocco 28 23 25 21 Artisanal Snapper - Indonesia 28 30 31 33 Pacific Groundfish - United States 28 22 20 23 Sea Cucumber - Seychelles 31 20 19 15 TRY Oysters - Gambia 31 48 48 48 Lake Chiuta - Malawi 33 40 40 43 Artisanal Axim - Ghana 34 35 37 29 Blue Crab - Philippines 34 37 34 39 Nile Perch - Uganda 34 33 30 36 Artisanal Shimoni - Kenya 37 42 41 44 Artisanal Demersal - Liberia 37 45 45 45 Aristanal Demersal - Senegal 37 43 43 41 Demersal 2010 - Senegal 37 34 33 31 Sherbro - Sierra Leone 37 44 44 42 NE Groundfish - United States 42 36 35 37 Shrimp Industrial - Colombia 42 32 29 26 Tombo - Sierra Leone 42 41 42 38 Artisanal Demersal - Ghana 45 47 47 46 Octopus - Kenya 45 29 23 27 Shrimp Artisanal - Colombia 45 38 38 32 Tangh Hua - Vietnam 48 46 46 47 Source: Collected by authors and Anderson et al., forthcoming. Note: The most recent African SSF case studies’ names are shaded in pink and the fisheries shaded in blue are located in developed nations. Key: Eco. = Economically; Comm. = Community; AK = Alaska; OR = Oregon; CA = California; FL = Florida; TRY = TRY Oyster Women’s Association; NE = New England. 4 Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries which individual or community quotas that allo- to permits will also be included in this category— cate the right to a given number of fish are the pre- there is overlap between All Harvest RBM and All dominant form of management. Limited Access. »» All Limited Access: Average for the 27 fisher- »» All FPI: Average for all 48 fisheries currently in ies that score a 4 or 5 in the measure “Propor- the FPI database. tion of Harvest Managed under Limited Access.” »» All Located in Developing Countries (LDC): These are fisheries in which permits are allocated Average for the 31 fisheries that are located in and there is a limit on the number of vessels/indi- developing countries. viduals who are given access to the resource. Note »» All Africa: Average for the 22 fisheries that are that fisheries that also allocate quotas in addition located in Africa. Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries 5 CHAPTER TWO FPI OUTPUT SCORES—MEASURING WEALTH The main output components of the FPIs include stock performance, harvest sector performance, and postharvest sector performance. Each output component is bro- ken into several key dimensions, each of which is a composite of several individual measures (see appendix A for details). This chapter demonstrates the results as FPI output scores between the African SSFs and the other comparison groups. Figure 2.1 compares the average score on each output dimension across the recent African SSFs, the entire FPI database, and the subset of FPI fisheries that are managed using harvest rights (quotas). It shows clearly that there are large performance gaps in the recent African SSFs for fish stock healthy status, risk resilience, market performance, and postharvest industry performance. The case-study fisheries also lag behind in harvest performance, harvest asset performance, and postharvest asset performance. They appear to slightly outperform the rest of the database in wealth accumulating to processing workers, which might be attributed to the fact that the majority of these processing workers in African SSFs come from the local community, whereas they are often outsiders in those more advanced fisheries in developed countries. Figure 2.1 also demonstrates that harvest rights tend to improve the wealth-generating performance of the fishery, particularly along the dimensions of environmental performance and harvest performance. The analysis in this chapter focuses on the role played by indi- vidual ecological, economic, and community measures and demonstrates how the FPI scores can yield a framework for rigorous econometric comparison of fishery wealth generation. Table 2.1 depicts the average score for all case-study fisheries and some relevant com- parison groups across each of the three output sustainability categories. It appears that the gap between the recent African SSF performances is the largest in ecology and economics and the smallest in community indicators. The case-study fisheries appear to be underperforming in most dimensions even relative to other African fisheries. This could be because the case-study communities were targeted based on their poor ecological status and the majority of the fisheries surveyed are artisanal Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries 7 Figure 2.1. Average Scores for FPI fisheries that are producing fish for local consumption Output Indicators and not targeting export markets. The rest of this chap- Outputs Fish stock ter provides a detailed explanation on the results of the health and triple bottom line. environmental performance Processing workers 5 4 Harvest performance Ecology Processing 3 The ecological performance of the case-study owners and 2 Harvest asset fisheries is very low relative to the rest of the managers performance 1 database and especially relative to fisheries with 0 effective harvest rights. Figure 2.2 summarizes the Postharvest asset Risks performance of each fishery along ecological measures. performance The case-study fisheries perform even worse than the aver- Postharvest Owners, age African fishery, which might be due to the fact that permit industry holders, and these fisheries were targeted for intervention because of performance Market Crew captains unhealthy fishery stock status. The recent FPI scores should performance be considered as a baseline of performance before imple- mentation of the proposed management interventions. Avg for all recent Africa case studies Avg for all FPI The only exceptions to the norm of abysmal ­ ecological Avg for all harvest RBM indicators are the Liberian fisheries. Part of the reason Source: Collected by authors and Anderson et al., forthcoming. is the success of a trawler spotter program implemented Table 2.1. Fishery Performance Indicators (Output Sustainability Average) Avg. Avg. Avg. Sierra Sierra Liberia Sustainability All All Case Leone Leone Ghana Semi- Liberia Kenya Kenya Category FPIs Africa Studies Tombo Sherbro Artisanal industrial Artisanal Artisanal Octopus Malawi Senegal Ecology 3.5 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.7 2.7 3.7 3.7 2.7 2.4 3.0 2.7 Economics 3.4 3.1 2.8 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.0 2.7 3.4 2.8 2.6 Community 3.7 3.5 3.6 3.9 3.4 4.0 3.7 3.7 3.2 3.7 3.1 3.5 Source: Collected by authors and Anderson et al., forthcoming. Figure 2.2. Average Score for Ecology Outputs Senegal Kenya octopus Liberia artisanal Ghana Sierra Leone Sherbro Average for all Africa Malawi Sierra Leone Tombo Average for all harvest RBM 5 Kenya artisanal Liberia semi-industrial 4 3 3.71 3.71 3.91 2 3.0 3.16 2.71 2.71 2.71 2.71 2.57 2.43 1 Ecology Source: Collected by authors and Anderson et al., forthcoming. 8 Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries in 2009 that has been effective at keeping illegal indus- ­acilities that are certified to export to the European Union f trial trawlers out of inshore zones. The danger of such a (EU) or the U.S. markets, and a low proportion of har- program is that artisanal and semi-industrial fleets may vest undergoing product enhancement (which is defined see short-term ecological gains in the form of increasing as the proportion of harvest going into certified, branded, stocks. If no attempt is made to limit their capacity, then fresh premium, portioned, live, or value-added products). these gains will be eroded by increasing effort from the This contributes to very low postharvest wholesale prices artisanal sector. The Kenyan octopus fishery scores lowest relative to similar products and inhibits the fisheries from in the attainment of ecological sustainability because this extracting maximum economic rents from their value has recently become an export fishery in which harvesters chains. According to the FPI scoring methodology, the have large incentives to overfish. The case-study fisheries production of low value-added products decreases eco- are much more prone to overfishing, illegal landings, and nomic performance, and targeting international markets degrading of critical habitat than the average FPI fishery. through product improvement is one route toward increas- ing the economic benefits that accrue through the fishery. Currently, the majority of the case-study fisheries lack the Economics infrastructure, capital, and training in sanitation necessary The recently scored SSFs in Africa perform lower to process fish with the goal of product improvement. than average along economic measures, particu- larly in the postharvest sector. The economic per- As demonstrated in figure 2.3, the only exception to poor formance of the fisheries is very low relative to the rest of economic performance is the Kenyan octopus fishery in the database and especially relative to fisheries with effec- which processors from the coastal hub of Mombasa play tive harvest rights. This might be due to the fact that the a large role in targeting export markets. The postharvest majority of the surveyed African SSFs target local mar- sector of this octopus fishery performs particularly well kets and their main product is of low value, for example, with regard to ex-vessel to wholesale margins and the smoked, dried, or fermented fish that is processed for facilitation of international trade. Prior research in the local consumption with the aim of preserving the maxi- Indonesian and Philippines blue swimming crab fisher- mum amount of fish with low capacity. It is evident that ies (Chu, Anderson, and Anderson 2012) suggests that the average recent African SSF has a low percentage of processors can play a pivotal role in sustainable manage- landings going to international trade, very few ­ processing ment of fishery resources; in the Philippines, ­processors Figure 2.3. Average for Postharvest Sector Economic Performance Kenya octopus Average for recent Africa case studies 5 Average for all Africa Average for all FPI 4 3 5.0 4.0 4.0 3.7 2 3.0 3.1 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.0 1.3 1 International trade Wholesale price Capacity of firms to Product relative to similar export to the United States improvement products and European Union Source: Collected by authors and Anderson et al., forthcoming. Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries 9 insist on a minimal size for all the crab they buy, which The recent African SSF samples experience more annual contributes to sustaining the stock and prohibits over- fluctuation in total revenue, landings, and prices than the fishing. In the absence of effective federal or local man- average African fishery or database fishery. The instability agement, processors have a vested interest in ensuring fostered by such oscillations inhibits harvest sector invest- the sustainability of the stock, especially if they have ments and efficient exploitation of the resource. As a lake sunk capital ­ investments in the form of facilities and fishery, Malawi is an exception to the rest of the recent improved ­ technology. The  Kenyan octopus fishery is studies and the annual harvests and landings are signifi- experiencing short-term economic gains relative to the cantly more stable in this fishery. rest of the Kenyan artisanal fishery by targeting export markets, but for these gains to be sustained in the long run, the processors need to promote sustainable harvest Community strategies. The community performance of the recent Afri- can SSFs is much closer to the average for all FPI The African SSFs also underperform in variables that fisheries than the ecological or economic out- relate to the harvest sector. The case-study fisheries comes (figure 2.4). This might be because community have a low ratio of harvest asset value to gross earn- measures are scored relative to local alternatives and not ings, the majority of harvest sector capital investments entirely on a global scale. The fishery scores high in gen- are facilitated by informal credit arrangements, and the erating community income if fishing is a desirable occu- average age of the vessels is high. Vessel maintenance pation that affords participants a lifestyle that is high in appears to be a high priority in many fisheries; this is amenities relative to other members of the community. predominantly out of necessity as vessels are primar- The average participant in these predominantly rural fish- ily made of wood and require constant maintenance to eries has access to basic and simple drug treatment at the remain seaworthy. local pharmacy, with occasional access to nurses or medi- cal practitioners for emergencies. They can also afford to Another informative comparison in the harvest sector is send their children to middle school or simple technical along the dimension of risk. The volatility measures in the training. Community scores are driven upward by the FPI database reflect a risk-based impediment to achieving participation of local residents compared with outsid- higher levels of wealth and the extent to which they can ers; the recent case studies have the majority of harvest- be controlled. Risk in the fisheries may inhibit investment ing and processing undertaken by locals, whereas many and prevent the development of high-value supply chains. high-revenue fisheries attract participants from outside Figure 2.4. Average Score for Community Outputs Senegal Kenya octopus Liberia artisanal Ghana Sierra Leone Sherbro Average for all Africa Malawi Sierra Leone Tombo Average for all harvest RBM 5 Kenya artisanal Liberia semi-industrial 4 3 4.0 3.86 3.82 3.48 3.72 3.65 3.69 3.52 3.14 3.17 3.38 2 1 Community Source: Collected by authors and Anderson et al., forthcoming. 10 Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries the community who may extract resource wealth with- ­ andling of human waste and basic handling of fish h out contributing to local economies. On average, from 70 waste (not entirely up to global health standards). to 95 percent of participants come from the local fish- ing community, with processing owners being more likely The FPI scores allow us to analyze the equity to come from outside the village. The fisheries in Ghana, within the fishery. It has been posited that increased Kenya (octopus), Sierra Leone (Tombo), and Liberia score harvest rights improve ecological and economic outcomes particularly high along community dimensions. These at the expense of equitable distributions. Those at the top fisheries are generating livelihoods that permit wealth to of the value chain (harvest quota owners and processing accumulate in local communities and allow participants to facility owners) may accumulate wealth at the expense of access health, education, and high social standing. others who are excluded from the fishery or hired at low wages. The FPI database shows that fisheries with strong The two community measures in which the harvest rights do tend to see more wealth accumulating to case-study fisheries score lowest relative to the the harvest and processing capital owners, but this does rest of the database are harvest safety (an aver- not seem to come at the expense of the harvest and pro- age of 0.5 to 1 death per thousand persons per cessing crew who are no worse off than in fisheries with- fishing season) and sanitation at landing/pro- out strong property rights. In comparison with the rest of cessing sites. The low harvest safety scores can be the database, the average wealth distribution in the recent attributed to the small size of the average vessel (even African SSF is very close to being equal. The outlier is those that undertake long voyages in the open ocean) the Kenya octopus fishery that relies on export processing and the lack of nationally funded search and rescue and shows clear accumulation of wealth to boat captains teams. On average, there are functional toilets available and processing facility owners. When compared with the (often pit latrines), but fish or fish handlers are exposed remainder of the Kenyan artisanal fisheries, the octopus to untreated sewage. This can be compared with the harvest crew is doing slightly worse, but there are gains in FPI average level of sanitation, which is adequate for all other occupations. Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries 11 CHAPTER THREE FPI INPUT SCORES—ENABLING WEALTH CREATION The main input components of the FPIs include macroenvironment, property rights, comanagement, management, and postharvest. Each input component is broken into several key dimensions, each of which is a composite of one to six individual measures (see appendix B for details). Importantly, the structure of the FPIs does not presup- pose whether, how, or how much these inputs support wealth creation. The FPI scores merely facilitate data analysis to determine the empirical causal or correlative rela- tionships between these inputs and the different dimensions of wealth creation. This chapter demonstrates the results of FPI input scores between the African SSFs and the other comparison groups. Figure 3.1 compares the average score on each input dimension across the recent African SSFs, the entire FPI database, and the subset of FPI fisheries that is managed using harvest rights (quotas). It shows that there are large performance gaps in the recent African SSFs with regard to macroindicators such as general environmental performance (measured by the country’s Environmental Performance Index); governance (World Bank indicators); and economic conditions (measured by Index of Economic Freedom and gross domestic product). The case-study fisheries also lag behind in general environmental perfor- mance, governance, economic conditions, access rights, harvest rights, data manage- ment, and infrastructure. All of the recent African case-study fisheries are relatively data poor. The average African SSF has available data based only on small samples with much missing data ­ that impedes making the inferences needed for management. Even when data on land- ings exist, they are used only inconsistently or irregularly, as shown in the average data analysis score. In Senegal, for example, they score very high in the collection of ex-vessel price and quantity data but these data are rarely analyzed to inform policy decisions and may be collected by federal agents without being distributed to local authorities. Despite the proliferation of cellular phones, price and quantity information are often inaccurate, delayed, or available to only a few and very little ­historical data Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries 13 Figure 3.1. Average Scores tariff/nontariff barriers to international trade. Vertical for Inputs integration could also be considered prevalent because Inputs General men in the harvest sector often sell fish to their wives in environmental Exogenous the harvesting sector; if households pool income, then this Infrastructure 5 Markets and market 4 environmental is a form of vertical integration. Governance institutions 3 Management 2 Economic conditions In the remainder of this section, the analysis focuses on methods 1 0 a few key roles played by individual input measures and Data Fishing access rights demonstrates how the FPI scores can yield a framework Management Harvest rights for rigorous econometric analysis of the pathway for inputs Gender Collective action enabling fishery wealth accumulation. Community Participation Avg for all recent Africa case studies Avg for all FPI Rights Avg for all harvest RBM The FPIs collect data on the status of existing rights and Source: Collected by authors and Anderson et al., forthcoming. responsibilities along two dimensions: access rights and harvest rights. Access rights are defined as those that grant the user the rights to access the resource and harvest are recorded. The exercise of collecting the FPI scores rights are those that give the user property rights over a set demonstrates that even in such data-poor fisheries quantity of the harvest (generally community or individ- we can still obtain accurate quantitative scores ual quotas). Access rights can range from a regulated open that facilitate comparison and inference. access scenario, wherein a local beach community has been given control over who fishes from their beach and In addition, all of the fisheries recently profiled they choose to grant an unlimited number of permits, to have lesser infrastructure than the average Afri- a limited access scenario, wherein there is an enforced cap can fishery and the average FPI database fishery. on the number of vessels that are allowed to fish and these Many of the recent fisheries are in remote locations where vessels are granted tradable permits. All of the fisheries ocean/air shipping from landing site to port of export is scored recently can be classified as regulated open access. available only irregularly. The roads are most likely to There is a local authority who must be consulted before be poorly maintained gravel or paved two-lane roads at accessing the resource but these authorities have chosen best. Technology adoption is limited to cellular phones not to limit the number of harvesters, which undermines and there are no sophisticated fish finders or produc- their ability to exercise control over the sustainability of tion technology as is the norm in other fisheries. Where the resource. There is very little effort to limit entry electricity is available, supply chains often lose produce in any of the recent African SSFs, which means because of irregular fuel supply or unreliable generators. that they score moderately well in the existence Importantly, ice is available, but not in sufficient quan- of access rights but very low in the exclusivity of tities to meet the demand. It is often reused and is not these rights. applied to the entire catch throughout the supply chain, which explains why product improvement is often so low. Harvest rights are separate from access rights in that they If fish is not sold fresh within hours of landing, then it will grant property rights over a fixed quantity of fish and are be smoked, dried, or fermented as a necessary means of predominantly in the form of a Total Allowable Catch preserving the catch, not adding value. coupled with community or individual quotas. The defini- tion is more complex when we consider sedentary fisheries A dimension in which the recent case studies score rela- with spatial property rights because these have effectively tively high is markets and market institutions, probably guaranteed rights over a portion of the harvest. However, because these fisheries tend to have competitive landings all of the recent fisheries are for nonstationary species and pricing systems with lots of buyers and very few official none of the management regimes make an effort to assign 14 Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries rights to a portion of the harvest so that all of these fisher- the remote nature of the lake fishery. Ghana also scored ies score a “1” in harvest rights (indicates that these rights relatively high because of the strong tradition of de facto do not exist). rights that influenced participants’ perceptions of secu- rity and durability. Liberia scored slightly higher than Both access and harvest rights are scored along six dif- they would have otherwise because of the recent trawler ferent measures in an attempt to accurately portray the spotter efforts, but they still suffer from low security status of rights along the lines of existence, transferability, scores because of the unstable nature of the national security, durability, flexibility, and exclusivity. This oper- government. ates under the assumption that more strongly enforced rights that are felt to be more secure and grant the user flexibility and transferabil- Community ity will have a different impact on outcomes than Comanagement will rights that exist but are subject to dilution The case-study fisheries score higher than and infringement. Unlike the harvest rights scores in the average FPI fishery in the comanagement the recent fisheries, the access rights scores did vary across dimensions of collective action, participation, fisheries. This is due to differences in the exclusivity of and community. To test Eleanor Ostrom’s hypotheses the access rights (some had more intrusion from indus- on the role of social capital such as trust and reciproc- trial trawlers or aquarium fishers); in the flexibility of the ity in resource outcomes (Ostrom 1990), the FPIs col- access rights (some were subject to very strict gear/area lect data on community comanagement variables such restrictions); and in the security/durability of the access as leadership and social cohesion. For leadership, the rights (certain fisheries had a very strong tradition of de fishery is scored based on whether there is a widely rec- facto open access whereas others were subject to arbitrary ognized individual leader or a small group of individual federal government decisions). leaders who provide vision for management and are able to attract stakeholders to that vision. For social cohesion, The variation in access rights is evident in figure 3.2. fisheries are scored based on the existence of social capi- The average for the recent case studies is much lower tal—meaning that the resource users are socially con- than the average in fisheries that were characterized nected and interact regularly in fishing and nonfishing as limited access (a cap placed on the number of ves- spheres. sels). Access rights in Malawi were the strongest because there was a higher degree of exclusivity than elsewhere; As shown in figure 3.3, the recent fisheries scored above there were fewer incursions from outsiders because of the FPI average in leadership and much higher in social cohesion. This is primarily due to the role of traditional authorities as national governments in Africa are seldom Figure 3.2. Average Access Rights able to effectively lead centralized management systems. In the case of Ghana, the scores are exceptionally high Inputs Scores Liberia artisanal because they have had centuries of traditional ­leadership Senegal Kenya octopus Ghana Sierra Leone Sherbro Average for all Africa from the Chief Fisherman and Fish Mommy who gov- Average for all limited Malawi Sierra Leone Tombo access ern the harvest and postharvest sectors, respectively, with Kenya artisanal Liberia semi-industrial 5 absolute authority. Ghanaians of diverse religious beliefs 4 still honor the Sea God, and the Chief Fisherman derives his authority directly from people’s unwillingness to anger 3 this god by disobeying fishing regulations. Within the 3.86 2 3.0 3.33 2.67 region, Ghanaians are renowned as expert fishermen and 2.5 2.33 2.17 2.2 2.17 2.63 2.33 their heritage of shared cultural norms and centuries of 1 Average of six access rights measures fishing experience are demonstrated in their high social Source: Collected by authors and Anderson et al., forthcoming. cohesion scores. Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries 15  verage Leadership and Figure 3.3. A Figure 3.4. Role of Women in Social Cohesion Scores Fisheries Ghana Average for all Africa Business management Labor participation in Average for recent Africa Average for all FPI influence harvest sector case studies 5 Resource management Labor participation in 5 influence postharvest sector 4 4 3 3 5.0 5.0 3.8 2 3.0 3.7 3.7 4.0 3.6 2.6 3.6 3.5 1.2 1.3 1.9 1.2 2 1.7 1 All recent Africa All FPI 1 Leadership Social cohesion Source: Collected by authors and Anderson et al., forthcoming. Source: Collected by authors and Anderson et al., forthcoming. postharvest sector, particularly in the recent studies in which an average of 60 to 80 percent of processors were Gender female. In general, the role of women was very simi- lar across the case-study fisheries; women are There are a few exceptions to this general delineation of dominant in the postharvest sector. A total of four gender roles. In the Kenyan fisheries, women were slightly measures are used in the FPIs to describe the influence more likely to be involved in harvesting; in Malawi, there of gender (figure 3.4). The first looks at their influence on were a larger than average number of men involved in pro- business management (including harvest and postharvest cessing. The Ghanaian fishery demonstrated a high degree businesses); it is shown in the graph that women in the of female participation in businesses because of the tradi- recent African case-study fisheries have balanced busi- tional role of the “Fish Mommy” or “Fish Queen” who ness influence with men, whereas in other fisheries, the is the local authority on postharvest operations. This Fish men tend to dominate the business sector. If the mea- Mommy exercises a high degree of control over the local sure was exclusively for postharvest businesses then the market because she sets the prevailing price at the begin- African SSFs would score even higher. Similarly, the sec- ning of each trading day by examining the first three land- ond measure looks at women’s influence over resource ings and making a judgment on the market price of that management; owing to the dearth of women in positions day. For the remainder of the day, her price is the standard of power on the community management associations at which fish is traded with discounts for lower-quality prod- (CMAs) or the national fisheries organizations, this score ucts. This degree of influence by women is far greater than is low. The last two measures clearly show that across that of most developed country fisheries where both harvest all fisheries women are more likely to be involved in the and postharvest sectors tend to be dominated by men. 16 Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries CHAPTER FOUR HYPOTHESIS TEST The FPIs are designed to allow researchers to test for causal relation- ships between the wealth-enabling inputs and the outputs that represent wealth accumulation, as well as other hypotheses related to the ecological, social, and economic dimensions of fisheries. This report does two prelimi- nary graphic tests of correlation to show what can be done by using the FPI database. Hypothesis (i): Increased rights over management of the resource lead to improved ecological, economic, and community outcomes (in both harvest and postharvest sectors). Figure 4.1 tests for correlations between access rights and the attainment of the triple bottom line. The variable on the horizontal axis is the average of all six access rights input measures (existence, transferability, security, durability, flexibility, and exclusiv- ity); therefore, increases along this access can be interpreted as a strengthening in the exclusivity and security of an individual’s rights and not an extension of access rights to a greater number of individuals. The variable on the vertical axis changes in each graph, but it is the average of all output measures that either deal with ecology, eco- nomics, or community. Access rights refer to a set of enforced regulations that give harvesters the right to determine who can access the resource. In the recent African SSF case studies, all of the fisheries had official organizations (predominantly at the local landing site level) that were granted the authority to determine who could fish or land from their beaches. However, as was previously discussed, none of the fisher- ies made a strong attempt to limit the amount of harvesters who were allowed to fish. When permits existed, there was no cap on the number allocated and the de facto right to open access trumped any effort to limit participants. In this sense, none of our fisheries are limited-access fisheries in the way that the term is used by economists. (The “All limited access” data point does not include the case-study fisheries. It aver- ages across the scores of fisheries in which there is an enforced limit on the amount of vessels allowed to access.) ­ Increasing the exclusivity of access rights leads to improved ecosystem health and less overfishing. The Liberian fisheries in particular are outliers ecological because they score relatively low in exclusivity and security, yet have high ­ Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries 17 Figure 4.1. Correlation of Ecology, Economic, and Community Outputs Scores and Access Rights a. Correlation of ecology outputs and access rights 5.0 4.5 Ecological outputs score All harvest RBM 4.0 Liberia SI Liberia Art. All FPI All limited access 3.5 All Africa All LDC 3.0 Senegal All recent Africa Malawi y = 1.9742 + 0.4116x Sierra Leone S Ghana 2.5 Kenya art. Sierra Leone T Kenya Oct 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 Access rights score (higher scores indicate increasing exclusivity and security) b. Correlation of economic outputs and access rights 5.0 4.5 Economic outputs score 4.0 All harvest RBM 3.5 Kenya Oct All FPI All limited access All Africa Liberia SI All LDC 3.0 Liberia art. All recent Africa Sierra Leone S Ghana Malawi 2.5 y = 1.8385 + 0.4242x Sierra Leone T Senegal Kenya art. 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 Access rights score (higher scores indicate increasing exclusivity and security) c. Correlation of community outputs and access rights 5.0 4.5 Communtiy outputs score Sierra Leone T Ghana All harvest RBM 4.0 Liberia Art. Kenya Oct All FPI 3.5 All recent Africa All LDC All limited access y = 3.4564 + 0.0511x Senegal Liberia SI All Africa Malawi 3.0 Kenya art. Sierra Leone S 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 Access rights score (higher scores indicate increasing exclusivity and security) Source: Collected by authors and Anderson et al., forthcoming. scores. In addition, implementing strong access rights slight positive correlation between exclusive access rights leads to better economic outcomes such as decreased and fishery participants’ access to health/education. volatility, higher earnings, and more value added in the postharvest sector. In the community correlation plot, we The results showed that increasing the exclusiv- see no evidence that limiting access and making it more ity and stability of access rights leads to large exclusive corrodes the health of communities; there is a improvements in the ecological and economic 18 Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries Figure 4.2. Correlation of Economic Outputs and Community Inputs (Leadership and Social Cohesion) 5.0 4.5 4.0 All harvest RBM Economic outputs score All limited access 3.5 All FPI Kenya Oct y = 2.5643 + 0.1187x All Africa 3.0 All LDC All recent Liberia art. Liberia SI Ghana Senegal Africa Kenya art. Malawi 2.5 Sierra Leone T Sierra Leone S 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 Score for community leadership and social cohesion Source: Collected by authors and Anderson et al., forthcoming. scores but has zero impact on community scores. (figure 4.2). In addition to the data from the most recent Although the results are not presented here, we also found round of African SSF case studies, we also use the set that the additional implementation of harvest rights that of relevant comparison fisheries (All FPI, All Africa, All give users a secure share of the landings further increased ­ Harvest RBM, All limited access). ecological and economic scores while still having no impact on community sustainability. As a disclaimer, these graphs should not be taken to rep- Hypothesis (ii): Ostrom’s theory that communities with strong resent rigorous economic analysis as they are very prelimi- social cohesion and a vision for leadership will have better out- nary and no effort was made to control for confounding comes. factors such as macroeconomic variables that might be correlated both with successful RBM and improved out- There is very little evidence from the FPI data- comes. They should be interpreted as raw correlations base to show that social cohesion and leadership but nonetheless yield some striking results that will inform alone are sufficient to ensure that harvesters future research using the FPI data. At the very least, they and processors earn high wages, can access tell us whether there is any support at all for the theories health/education, and have high social standing of fisheries management outlined above. Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries 19 CHAPTER FIVE HIGHLIGHTS OF KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS The findings in the preceding sections lead us to the following conclusions. (a)  The FPIs are a useful tool for data-poor fisheries because they provide cost-effective yet holistic estimates of the existing state of fisheries management by efficiently relying on the input of local ex- perts. Fisheries can be scored by using the FPI framework in only one to two weeks, yet the information gathered provides insight into economic and social variables that are traditionally ignored in fisheries management benchmarking. Collection of quantitative FPI data led to a high degree of variation in scores across the nine individual case-study fisheries, which allowed us to make inter- esting comparisons across management regimes. There was not a correspond- ingly high variation in the confidence scores of our experts, which leads us to conclude that these scores are reasonably accurate and the specificity of the scoring bins used by the FPIs permits us to compare scores across both devel- oped and developing countries. The FPIs are not a substitute for more detailed household and firm-level data that could be used to drill down and uncover the causal relationships that underlie some of the more interesting trends we observed, such as whether processor-driven market integration leads to higher economic scores or more exclusive access rights contribute to ecological and economic sustainability but not to community welfare. However, the FPIs are a necessary starting point from which to observe more macrolevel trends and lend insight into the avenues that will be more fruitful for more detailed survey work. (b)  The variability of fishery rankings when done according to ecology, econom- ics, or community FPI output scores leads us to conclude that ecological variables are not suitable proxies for economic welfare or commu- nity well-being. Fisheries that score high in environmental sustainability do not necessarily contribute livelihoods and economic growth to the communi- ties where they are based. Economic and social variables cannot be omitted and replaced exclusively with stock assessments. This makes a case for continu- ing to collect data on economic and social variables and not neglecting these areas in favor of exclusive focus on stock assessments. Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries 21 (c)  Access and harvest rights appear to be a range of social science models will be possible positively correlated with ecological and only if FPI data are collected in the same fisheries economic sustainability, whereas other over time. In the long term, repeated collection inputs such as leadership and social cohe- of FPI data within a given project is an important sion do not contribute to the same increase component of evaluating and monitoring the in- in scores. Although some fisheries management vestments in fisheries management. Data should experts have predicted that the implementation of be collected within these case-study fisheries at RBM will lead to higher levels of inequity within regular intervals so that managers can map the in- the fishery, the lack of declining community scores termediate steps that accompany policy changes. with more exclusive rights arrangements leads us Now that we have a baseline for these nine African to conclude that this is not true. The improvement fisheries, many of which are about to experience in access to education and health care offsets the a strengthening in formal resource rights, we can decline in local ownership so that community anticipate long-term lessons that will be learned scores remain stable. These preliminary results from tracking their evolution over time. suggest that interventions will have a stron- (e)  Comparison of the recent case studies leads to ger impact if they target the ­ enforcement the recognition of two key outliers: ecological of stable, durable, transferable, flexible, outcomes in Liberia and economic outcomes in and exclusive access rights agreements Kenyan octopus. We learned that trawler spotter rather than focusing on empowerment programs such as the one operating in Liberia can and cooperation within the community. be effective at generating short-term ecological Although these two strategies are certainly in- gains and we recommend that the community- terlinked and not necessarily mutually exclusive, based monitoring program be scaled up based on several examples from the case studies, it and accompanied by efforts to simultane- appears that more formal and exclusive rights ar- ously limit the activity of smaller vessels rangements do not necessarily follow from strong so that stock recovery is not temporary. local leadership, particularly when the macrolevel The Kenyan octopus fishery suggests that a post- governance is unstable or when the infrastructure harvest sector focused on value addition and ex- and capital for product improvement are missing. port is capable of generating large economic gains (d)  FPI data should be collected regularly to for boat owners and processing managers that do track the progress and impact of interven- not appear to come at the expense of the local tions. This report demonstrates that collecting community. Improvements in infrastruc- data on the FPIs provides decision makers with ture should be coupled with strengthen- valuable baseline data on the ecological, social, ing tenure to enhance the efficiency of the and economic performance of their fishery and value chain. In the absence of effective federal also allows for informative comparisons across or local management, processors have a vested in- fisheries. The FPIs have the power to test hypoth- terest in ensuring the sustainability of the stock, eses from a range of social science models and are especially if they have sunk capital investments constructed to measure enabling factors alongside in the form of facilities and improved technol- a multitude of outcomes. Even in the short term, ogy. The Kenyan octopus fishery is experiencing cross-sectional analysis permits policy makers to short-term economic gains relative to the rest of draw useful conclusions about the relative im- the Kenyan artisanal fishery by targeting export portance of factors such as property rights, infra- markets, but for these gains to be sustained in the structure, leadership, and other management in- long run, the processors need to promote sustain- puts, but a more rigorous test of hypotheses from able harvest strategies. 22 Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries REFERENCES Anderson, J. L., C. M. Anderson, J. Chu, J. Meredith, F. Asche, G. Sylvia, M. D. Smith, D. Anggraeni, R. Arthur, A. Guttormsen, J. K. McCluney, T. Ward, W. Akpalu, H. Eggert, J. Flores, M. A. Freeman, D. S. Holland, G. Knapp, M. Kobayashi, S. Larkin, K. MacLauchlin, K. Schnier, M. Soboil, S. Tveteras, H. Uchida, and D. Valderrama. “The Fishery Performance Indicators: A Management Tool for Triple Bottom Line Outcomes.” PLOS One. (Forthcoming 4/2015.) Chu, J., J. L. Anderson, and C. M. Anderson. 2012. “Evaluation of New Fishery Performance Indicators (FPIs).” ARD 52, World Bank, Washington, DC. http:// imagebank.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2012/05 /14/000333038_20120514011203/Rendered/PDF/687100NWP0P123020Blue Crab0web0final.pdf. FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization). 2014. The State of World Fisheries and ­Aquaculture. Rome, Italy: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. http://www.fao.org/3/a-i3720e.pdf. Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. World Bank and FAO. 2009. The Sunken Billions: The Economic Justification for Fisheies Reform. Washington, DC: World Bank. http://siteresources.worldbank.org /EXTARD/Resources/336681-1224775570533/SunkenBillionsFinal.pdf. Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries 23 APPENDIX A OUTPUT INDICATORS Table A.1. Output Indicators, Dimensions, and Measures Source: Anderson et al., forthcoming. Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries 25 APPENDIX B INPUT INDICATORS Table B.1. Input Components, Dimensions, and Measures Component Dimension Measure General Environmental Performance Environmental Performance Index (EPI) Disease and Pathogens Natural Disasters and Catastrophes Macrofactors Exogenous Environmental Factors Pollution Shocks and Accidents Level of Chronic Pollution (Stock effects) Level of Chronic Pollution (Consumption effects) Governance Quality Governance Governance Responsiveness Index of Economic Freedom Economic Conditions Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Per Capita Proportion of Harvest Managed Under Limited Access Transferability Security Fishing Access Rights Property Rights & Durability Responsibility Flexibility Exclusivity Proportion of Harvest Managed with Rights-based Management Transferability Security Harvest Rights Durability Flexibility Exclusivity Proportion of Harvesters in Industry Organizations Collective Action Harvester Organization Influnce on Fishery Management & Access Harvester Organization Influnce on Business & Marketing Comanagement Days in Stakeholder Meetings Participation Industry Financial Support for Management Leadership Community Social Cohesion Business Management Influnce Resource Management Influnce Gender Labor Participation in Harvest Sector Labor Participation in Postharvest Sector Management Expenditure to Value of Harvest Enforcement Capability Management Inputs Management Management Jurisdiction Level of Subsidies Data Availability Data Data Analysis Marine Protected Areas and Sanctuaries Management Methods Spatial Management Fishing Mortality Limits Landings Pricing System APPENDIX C . CASE STUDY SUMMARY Availability of Ex-vessel Price & Quantity Information Number of Buyers Markets & Market Institutions Degree of Vertical Integration Postharvest of Tariffs Level by This appendix provides an overview of each case-study fishery summarizing the scores and key conclusions. Level of Non-tariff Barriers International Shipping Service 25 Road Quality Technology Adoption Infrastructure Extension Service Reliability of Utilities/Electricity Access to Ice & Refrigeration Source: Anderson et al., forthcoming. Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries 27 APPENDIX C CASE STUDY SUMMARY This appendix provides an overview of each case- »» Liberia (Robertsport and Marshall: Artisanal and study fishery by summarizing the scores and key Semi-Industrial)—Robert Arthur/MRAG ­conclusions. »» Malawi (Lake Chiuta)—Friday Njaya »» Senegal (Ngaparou)—Lamine MBaye Source of the data was collected by each individual listed »» Sierra Leone (Sherbro Estuary and Tombo)—Max below: Schmid »» Ghana (Axim)—Wisdom Akpalu »» Kenya (Shimoni: Artisanal and Octopus)—Lorna All the graphs in Appendix C, were created by the authors Slade of this report, Jingjie Chu and Jennifer Meredith. Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries 29 GHANA Table C.1. Summary of Ghana Artisanal Fishery in Axim Fishery Type Species Gear Characteristics Management Vessels Artisanal •  Anchovy •  Bottom set •  Two fishing •  Regulated open •  One-man canoe (small canoe •  Atlantic Little net seasons (Main: access using paddle) Tuna •  Small drift July–September; •  Local •  Small canoe (motorized) •  Atlantic net and Minor: communities have •  Medium-size canoe Sailfish •  Hook and November– strong sense of de (motorized) •  Barracuda line January) facto entitlement •  Large canoe (motorized) •  Blue Marlin •  Drag net •  Major upwelling •  Traditional •  Bumper •  Drift gillnet during bumper institutions: •  Dolphin Fish •  Ring net season; Minor village chief, chief •  Halfbeak upwelling in fisherman, and •  Horse minor season chief fish trader Mackerel •  Fisherman reside •  Community- •  Moonfish in communities based Fishery •  Rays along the coast Management •  Red Pandora •  Local Ghanaians Committees Photo credit: Paulinuk, Flickr. •  Chub engaged in the (CBFMCs) and Mackerel fisheries District Fishery •  Shad/Bonga •  About 80% Management •  Threadfin of fish landed Committees are processed (DFMCs) are (smoked 60% being revamped and salted 20%) to implement fisheries laws. Figure C.1. Summary of Ghana Case Study Output and Input Scores Fish stock Ghana outputs health and Ghana Inputs General environmental environmental performance performance Harvest Exogenous 5 Infrastructure 5 Processing workers performance environmental factors 4 Markets and 4 Processing 3 market institutions Governance Harvest asset 3 owners and managers 2 performance Management 2 1 Economic conditions methods 1 Postharvest 0 0 asset Data Fishing access Risks performance rights Management Harvest rights Postharvest Owners, permit inputs industry holders, and Gender Collective action performance Crew captains Market Community Participation performance Ghana Avg for Africa case studies Ghana Avg for Africa case studies Relative Strengths »» Annual catches and total revenue are relatively Economic indicators are average. stable, which reduces exposure to risk. »» Within the harvest sector, capital is quite well »» Within the processing sector, the firms have high maintained. The fishermen set aside the off-fishing ­ capacity to export to Europe and the United States days, typically once a week, to mend their nets and if the fish is certified by the Ghana Standard maintain their boats. Authority. 30 Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries Figure C.2. Ecology, Economics, There is strong evidence of effective preexisting norms of and Community comanagement in the form of social cohesion and lead- ership within the fishery. The Chief Fisherman and Fish Sustainability for Mommy are very effective at enforcing management and Ghana Artisanal Fishery setting market prices because of the cultural norms and Ghana 5.0 Average for all recent Africa case studies traditions surrounding the Sea God. 4.0 3.0 2.0 4.0 Relative Weaknesses 3.6 1.0 2.7 2.9 2.8 2.8 Ecological indicators are slightly below average. 0.0 »» At most, a quarter of the landings are certified. Ecology Economics Community »» A large proportion of the stock is overfished and catch per unit effort has been declining over Community indicators are above average. time. »» The artisanal fishery enjoys a very high level of »» Although regulations exist to protect juvenile harvest safety. One of the reasons provided is that stocks, sea turtles, and gravid lobsters, the regula- the fishermen support one another at sea. tions are openly violated. »» Wealth seems to be accumulating in the harvesting »» The practice of pair-trawling and use of light and processing sectors. Fishery participants earn aggregation equipment has led to high levels of higher wages than the national average wage rate, illegal, unreported, and unregulated landings. and high school education is available in the com- munity and affordable to the processors. The fishery scores very low in participation, which means »» There is evidence of industry financial support for that comanagement inputs in the form of days in stake- management. holder meetings and financial support are very low. Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries 31 LIBERIA Table C.2.  Summary of Liberia Artisanal Fishery in Robertsport and Semi-industrial Fishery in Marshall Fishery Type Species Gear Characteristics Management Vessels Artisanal •  Shallow and •  Cast nets •  Highly seasonal •  Regulated open access Small dugout canoes with (Kru) deep-water •  Floating (mainly fish in •  Local fishing paddles or sails demersal and dry season) associations focus on •  Small bottom •  Less mobile equitable access to fish pelagics gillnets •  Local Liberians and safety at sea •  Flying fish •  Hand •  Processors •  Separate fishing •  Barracuda lines predominantly associations and sea •  Shark •  Set hook smoke fish chief for artisanal/ and line for local semi-industrial consumption •  West Africa Regional Fisheries Program Photo credit: Paul Donovan. Semi- •  Primarily •  Large •  Highly seasonal (WARFP) is in the industrial small ring nets •  Highly mobile process of setting Large planked canoes with (Fanti) pelagics •  Gillnets (migrate entire up a CMA in outboard engines •  Shallow and •  Hand coastline) Robertsport with deep-water lines •  Harvesters plans to implement a demersal of Ghanaian Territorial Use Rights •  Sailfish ancestry in Fisheries (TURF) •  Shark •  Processors predominantly smoke fish for local consumption Photo credit: Varasca, Panoramio. Figure C.3. Summary of Liberia Case Study Output and Input Scores Liberia outputs Fish stock Liberia inputs General health and environmental environmental performance Exogenous performance Harvest Infrastructure 5 environmental factors Processing 5 performance Markets and 4 workers 4 market institutions Governance Processing 3 3 owners and Harvest asset 2 Economic 2 Management managers performance conditions methods 1 1 0 Fishing Postharvest 0 Data access rights asset Risks performance Management Harvest rights inputs Postharvest Gender Collective action Owners, permit industry holders, and Community Participation performance captains Market Crew performance Liberia artisanal Liberia artisanal Liberia semi-industrial Liberia semi-industrial Avg for Africa case studies Avg for Africa case studies 32 Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries Figure C.4. Ecology, Economics, frequent cooperation between artisanal and semi- and Community industrial harvesters (information sharing about fish location and spatial rules that regulate harvest Sustainability for technology). Liberia Artisanal Fishery Liberia semi-industrial Liberia artisanal Relative Weaknesses 5.0 Average for all recent Africa case studies Economic indicators are only slightly above average. 4.0 »» Prices are reported to be generally increasing but 3.0 show large seasonal variation due to changing 2.0 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.6 1.0 2.9 2.9 3.0 2.8 availability of fish, which exposes the postharvest 0.0 sector to market risk. Ecology Economics Community »» There is very little harvest that goes to interna- tional markets. Relative Strengths »» The landings pricing system is not competitive— Ecological indicators are above average. there are a large number of first buyers/fishmon- »» Due to the implementation of a trawler spotter gers but harvesters tend to sell only to one buyer program, local experts consider the fish stock to (often their wives) and frequently have credit rela- be healthy as overfishing declines. There are few tionships with the buyer. It is difficult to gain access bycatch issues. to other credit. »» Recent efforts have led to a reduction in the num- »» First buyers tend to try to associate both to influ- ber of industrial vessels and less illegal activity inside ence prices and to exclude outside competition, as the Inshore Exclusion Zone (IEZ). Fishermen report securing supplies is an important factor. that this has increased fish stocks and landings. »» Harvest safety is an important concern, particu- larly in the artisanal fishery. Community indicators are slightly above average. »» Relative to their local communities, participants in Rights inputs are below average. the fishery are earning good livelihoods. »» The tradition of regulated open access and highly »» The semi-industrial fishery is predominantly peo- migratory harvesters mean that establishing ple of Ghanaian ancestry who have been living TURF boundaries and setting up RBM may be in the local community for extended periods, but difficult. there are also a larger number of migratory har- »» Infrastructure, expenditure on management, and vesters in this fishery. participation in comanagement (days in stakeholder »» Although there is a level of mistrust and occa- meetings and industry financial support) are all sional conflict between the two fleets, there is ­below average. Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries 33 SIERRA LEONE Table C.3. S  ummary of Sierra Leone Artisanal Fishery in Tombo and Sherbro River Fishery Type Species Gear Characteristics Management Vessels Tombo •  Barracuda •  Drift net •  Close to urban •  Little Predominantly small canoes Northern •  Morlit •  Pin chain Freetown area; management paddled by 1-5 fishermen. Yawri Bay •  Herring •  Clamp chain improved from central (mainly Tombo) •  Beach seine market for catch, or local •  Tarpon (mainly •  Morel or hook alternative government Bonthe) and line livelihoods, and and weak •  Grouper •  Lego chain infrastructure traditional •  Lady •  Channel •  Significant authorities. •  Spanish fishing proportion of •  Monitoring •  Cowreh •  Ghana/ catch is sold and Photo credit: EJF. •  Bonga (mainly Reggae fishing fresh enforcement Bonthe) •  Fencing is extremely •  Gwangwa limited. Sherbro (also known as •  Remote area •  Strong Mainly propelled by outboard River yellow croaker- with poor links traditional motors and used by 5-10 Estuary sold to Korean to larger urban authorities fishermen. businesses for markets, and less enforce basic export) access to health/ local rules. •  Shark (most education •  Advocacy for common in •  Processors better practices Bonthe) predominantly undertaken smoke fish for by the NGO local markets Environmental Photo credit: Kris, Flickr. or sell frozen to Justice foreigners. Foundation. Figure C.5. S  ummary of Sierra Leone Case Study Output and Input Scores Sierra Leone outputs Fish stock health Sierra Leone inputs General and environmental environmental performance performance Exogenous Processing 5 Harvest Infrastructure 5 environmental factors workers performance 4 Markets and 4 market institutions Governance Processing 3 3 Harvest asset owners and 2 performance Management 2 Economic conditions managers 1 methods 1 0 0 Postharvest asset Risks Data Fishing access performance rights Postharvest Management Harvest rights industry Owners, permit inputs performance holders, and captains Gender Collective action Market Crew performance Community Participation Sierra Leone Tombo Sierra Leone Tombo Sierra Leone Sherbro Sierra Leone Sherbro Avg for Africa case studies Avg for Africa Case Studies 34 Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries Figure C.6. Ecology, Economics, and Relative Weaknesses Community Sustainability Ecological indicators are below average. for Sierra Leone »» Years of overfishing and the use of illegal gear (monofilament nets, channel fishing, fishing in Artisanal Fishery breeding grounds) have led to declining stocks and Sierra Leone Tombo 5.0 Sierra Leone Sherbro landings in recent years. 4.0 Average for all recent Africa case studies »» There are issues with selectivity/bycatch. 3.0 »» The critical habitat is affected by mangrove defor- 2.0 3.9 3.4 3.6 estation, coastal erosion, zakam mining, agricul- 2.6 2.7 2.9 2.6 2.7 2.8 1.0 tural activities, and salt mining. 0.0 Ecology Economics Community »» Pollution from oil spills and urban runoff has been an issue in recent years. Relative Strengths Community indicators are above average in Tombo. Economic indicators are below average. »» There is wealth accumulating in the harvesting sec- »» In Tombo, total revenue is falling, total landings tor (primarily with captains) and in the processing are very low, and the season length is short. sector. »» The processing industry does not meet the hygiene »» The presence of relatively sophisticated and expen- or sustainability standards that would allow export sive large “Ghana Boats” in the Tombo area means to the EU or the United States. that many boat owners have significant capital invest- ments and earn well above the regional average. Community indicators are below average in Sherbro. »» There is evidence of social cohesion, strong lead- »» There are issues with harvest safety. ership, and industry financial support for manage- »» Earnings in the harvesting and processing sector ment. are below regional averages. »» Price volatility is relatively low, which means that harvesters are shielded from some market risk. Access and harvest right inputs are below average. In »» In Tombo, international trade with Liberia and Sherbro, traditional authorities play a large role and Korea is facilitated by relatively sophisticated infra- rights are slightly more exclusive and stable than in structure and access to ice. Tombo. Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries 35 SENEGAL Table C.4. Summary of Senegal Artisanal Fishery in NgaparoU Fishery Type Species Gear Characteristics Management Vessels Ngaparou •  Lobster •  Bottom •  Boat owners seldom •  Local fishermen Dugout 25 m canoes and planked •  Grouper set net fish and instead hire committees have boats •  Sea •  Small contract crews been given formal bream drift net •  Crew is paid based comanagement •  Pandora •  Hook on share system powers •  Sardinella and line •  Long experience •  Spatial •  Horse •  Drag with traditional management with mackerel net management an MPA, buffer •  Crayfish •  Drift •  Some fish harvested zone, and regulated gillnet for export markets fishing area •  Ring net •  One-year renewable •  No limit on the Photo credit: Lance Dietrich. license required to number of licenses fish in protected area Figure C.7. Summary of Senegal Case Study Output and Input Scores Senegal outputs Fish stock health Senegal inputs General and environmental environmental performance Processing Harvest performance 5 Exogenous workers performance Infrastructure 5 environmental factors 4 Markets and Processing 4 3 market institutions Governance owners and Harvest asset 3 2 performance managers Management 2 Economic 1 conditions methods 1 0 Postharvest asset Risks 0 performance Data Fishing access rights Postharvest Owners, permit Management Harvest rights industry holders, and captains inputs performance Market Crew Gender Collective action performance Community Participation Senegal Avg for Africa case studies Senegal Avg for Africa case studies Figure C.8. Ecology, Economics, Relative Strengths and Community »» Wealth appears to be accumulating in the harvest Sustainability for sector, particularly among captains who are more likely to be residents of local communities than are Senegal Artisanal their crew. Fishery »» Income in fisheries is generally higher than in other 5.0 Senegal Average for all recent Africa case studies rural occupations. 4.0 3.0 Management methods and data collection are slightly above average for the other case studies. 2.0 2.7 2.9 2.6 2.8 3.5 3.6 »» There is a marine protected area where the man- 1.0 agement has had some success at limiting fishing 0.0 effort. Ecology Economics Community 36 Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries Participation in stakeholder meetings and industry finan- »» Monofilament net is forbidden but fishermen are cial support for management are very high. using it. »» Harvesters pay a fuel tax that is used for fisheries »» There is an incursion of fishermen from other surveillance and monitoring. communities into the protected area. »» Trawlers fishing with explosives have degraded the The processing sector has the capacity to export to the EU. critical environment. »» Some processors appear to be efficient and modern- ized and have large ex-vessel to wholesale margins. The government provides subsidies for fuel, gear, and ves- »» The infrastructure is relatively good as Ngaparou is sels that further incentivize overfishing. not far from Dakar, there is an ice-making facil- ity in town, and fishermen have access to modern Harvest safety is an issue as there are several accidents and technology. deaths each year. Relative Weaknesses Limited support from the Department of Fisheries may Ecological indicators are below average. weaken capacity of Beach Village Committees (BVCs) to »» Almost all stocks are overfished. enforce resource regulations. »» There is a high level of illegal and unreported »» Local committees have not been effective at limit- ­landings. ing access to the fish resources. Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries 37 MALAWI Table C.5. Summary of Malawi Artisanal Fishery in Lake Chiuta Fishery Type Species Gear Characteristics Management Vessels Lake Chiuta Pelagics and •  Gill net •  Fish year-round •  The local fishing Dugout canoes and a few semi-pelagics: •  Fish traps but peak season association and planked boats •  Makumba •  Hook and is during rainy BVCs formulate •  Tilapia line season (December- and enforce •  Mlamba February) management •  Matemba •  This is a remote •  On the Malawian •  Chitondolo fishery that relies side of the •  Mphuta on sun-drying or lake, there is a smoking for fish combination of to reach distant restrictions on the markets, including use of gear and those located in regulated permits. urban centers •  On the Mozambican side, it is open access Photo credit: Friday Njaya. Figure C.9.  Summary of Malawi Case Study Output and Input Scores General Malawi outputs Fish stock health Malawi inputs environmental and environmental performance Processing performance Exogenous 5 Harvest Infrastructure 5 workers environmental factors 4 performance Markets and market 4 Governance Processing 3 institutions 3 owners and Harvest asset 2 2 Economic managers performance Management 1 1 conditions methods Postharvest 0 0 Risks Data Fishing access asset rights performance Management Owners, permit inputs Harvest rights Postharvest industry holders, and captains Gender Collective action performance Crew Market Community Participation performance Malawi Avg for Africa case studies Malawi Avg for Africa case studies Figure C.10. E  cology, Economics, and Community Sustainability Relative Strengths for Malawi Artisanal Economic indicators are average Fishery »» Annual catches and total revenue are stable and 5.0 Malawi there is no evidence of a shortened season due to Average for all recent Africa case studies 4.0 excess capacity. This reduced volatility is largely 3.0 2.0 due to the nature of a lake fishery. 3.6 1.0 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.8 3.1 »» Price volatility is low, which means that harvesters 0.0 are shielded from some market risk. Ecology Economics Community 38 Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries Ecological indicators are above average. »» Within the processing sector, wages are also below »» Fish stocks do not appear to be overfished and national averages. there are few problems with bycatch. »» The rural location of the fishery means that »» Illegal and unreported landings are not a serious higher education and health care are less likely issue as there are no foreign trawlers, only intrusion to be accessible to the children of harvesters and from the unregulated Mozambican side of the lake. processors. Harvest safety is very high compared with marine fisheries. industry. There is no capacity for export in the processing ­ »» Because of the remote nature of the fishery, infra- Harvest rights are above average. structure and technology are very poor. »» The local BVC does not allow harvesters owning »» There are no fillets or improved products; all fish is illegal gear (such as mosquito nets) or those who immediately smoked. are not members to access the fishery. »» Regional support businesses are almost nonexistent »» They have been very effective at enforcing the ban and processing yield is low. on nkacha nets on the Malawi side. »» There is strong evidence of social cohesion and Seining operations (predominantly originating from leadership within the fishery. Mozambique) are a threat to stock levels and biodiversity. Relative Weaknesses Limited support from the Department of Fisheries Community indicators are below average. may weaken capacity of BVCs to enforce resource »» Earnings, educational attainment, and access to ­regulations. health care are below national averages in the harvesting sector, particularly for captains. ­ Environmental, Economic, and Social Evaluation of Africa’s Small-Scale Fisheries 39 E N V I R O N M E N T A N D N AT U R A L R E S O U R C E S G LO B A L P R A C T I C E P O L I C Y N OT E W O R L D B A N K G R O U P R E P O R T N U M B E R 95557-GLB 1818 H Street, NW Washington, D.C. 20433 USA Telephone: 202-473-1000 Internet: www.worldbank.org/environment