Lessons Learned from World Bank Experience in Post-Conflict Reconstruction

Fareed M. A. Hassan
Senior Evaluation Officer
Operations Evaluation Department, World Bank

Abstract: This note explores recent experience of the World Bank with post-conflict reconstruction with the objective of drawing lessons for future assistance. The need for early engagement in post-conflict settings, for a strong field presence, for adapting Bank services and products to the realities of post-conflict situations, and for effective aid coordination and partnerships with other donors, emerge as key lessons.

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I. Introduction

1. Since 1980, over 50 countries have experienced significant periods of conflict, with severe effects in terms of destruction of physical assets, disruption in trade links, displacement of people, and loss of human capital and income. For example, Rwanda has been scarred by the genocide of 1994, which saw around one million people killed, three million people displaced, halved the gross domestic product and saw worsening poverty. Damage estimates from the 15 years (1975-90) civil war in Lebanon have been as high as $25 billion (150 percent of GDP). In Bosnia and Herzegovina the cost of reconstruction has been estimated at $5.1 billion (100 percent of GDP). Lebanon’s post-conflict real per capita income was estimated at about one-third its 1975 level. Similarly, post-war incomes in Bosnia and Herzegovina have recovered to only about 70 percent of pre-war incomes.

2. The proportion of official development assistance devoted to relief increased from 2 percent in 1989 to 10 percent in 1994, and further to 27 percent in 2003. UN peace-keeping operations alone cost the international community $3 billion in 1995 and $2.6 billion in 2002.

3. The World Bank is engaged in 38 post-conflict countries and areas. A fifth of Bank commitments were devoted to those countries in FY04. The Bank created a new Post-Conflict Unit in 1998 and instituted a new grant facility, the Post-Conflict Fund to reinforce its capacity to respond to reconstruction situations. Twenty-two conflict-affected countries have ongoing Post-Conflict Fund grants. Drawing on the experience of the Bank in post-conflict settings, and in recognition of the unique nature of post-conflict situations, the role of the Bank, and the risks involved, a policy framework paper on the role of the World Bank in post-conflict reconstruction was endorsed by the Bank’s Board of Directors in 1997; this was followed in 2001 by Operational Policy and Bank Procedures 2.30 on Development Cooperation and Conflict. The Bank has also forged partnerships with other donors, as they play a vital role in the reconstruction process.

4. This paper examines the World Bank’s experience in post–conflict reconstruction with the objective of extracting lessons for future assistance. The paper draws on the considerable work completed by the World Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department (OED): (i) a post-conflict report assessing Bank experience in nine countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, El Salvador, Eritrea, Haiti, Lebanon, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, and Uganda (OED 1998); and (ii) country assistance evaluations (CAEs) for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Eritrea, Guatemala, Haiti, Rwanda, Uganda, and West Bank and Gaza. These studies assess the effectiveness (i.e., relevance, efficacy and efficiency) of Bank lending operations and emergency grants, and evaluate the Bank’s role in providing analytical and advisory services, including economic and sector work, policy advice, technical assistance and donor coordination. The paper also draws on the 1997 policy framework paper on the role of the Bank in post-conflict reconstruction and Bank strategy, economic and sector work, project, and program documents.

5. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II draws the main issues that emerged from the Bank’s experience in post-conflict settings. This provides the basis for Section III, which offers some concluding remarks.

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2 Of these 38 countries, 6 are in non-accrual status, 4 have prepared Country-Reengagement Notes, 9 have a Transitional Support strategy, 7 have prepared Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, 9 have prepared full Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, and the remaining have a Country Assistance Strategy as of March 2004 (World Bank data).

3 IDA committed $2.581 billion to the 38 conflict-affected countries in FY04 (29 percent of total IDA commitments) and IBRD committed $1.217 billion (11 percent of total IBRD commitments).

II. Lessons Learned in Light of the Experience Gained

6. Four lessons emerged from Bank experience with post-conflict reconstruction: (i) the need for early engagement in post-conflict situations, (ii) the need for a strong field presence, (iii) adapting Bank services and products to post-conflict situations, and (iv) effective aid coordination and partnerships with other donors. Adhering closely to these lessons helps enhance donor and Bank effectiveness in post-conflict settings.

Early engagement in post-conflict situations

7. The need for early engagement in post-conflict countries is strongly indicated by Bank experience, as time is of the essence in post-conflict situations. Often, there exists windows of opportunity within which significant progress is possible, but these windows can quickly narrow or close. In general, the Bank has responded quickly and flexibly in initiating contact and preparing, or participating in the preparation of, a strategy and funding packages. Experience in Bosnia and Herzegovina and West Bank and Gaza, for example, illustrates the critical value of early planning and preparation of reconstruction programs. The Bank was involved in West Bank and Gaza even before the 1993 Oslo Accord, preparing a comprehensive analysis of the development needs of the area (World Bank 1993). Although this early involvement has now become an integral part of the Bank’s guidelines, at the time the Bank’s role was unusual. Although the Bank was initially hesitant to engage in a territory in a highly visible and politicized context, representing neither a sovereign state nor a member country, OED noted that the Bank took an appropriate risk, given the importance of sustaining the peace process to achieve any development effectiveness (OED 2002a). Also, the Bank moved quickly to support reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Bank approved an exceptional level of IDA/Trust Fund resources for Bosnia and Herzegovina over the 1996-2003 period, committing a total of $983 million; on a per capita basis, this is more than any other post-conflict country to date. On the other hand, the failure of the international community as a whole to provide early and adequate support to Rwanda during the first three months of genocide (April-June 1994) had undermined stability and development efforts (Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda 1996). The Bank responded to the conditions created by the genocide with an Emergency Assistance Grant in August 1994, which was implemented through UN agencies.

8. Many factors constrain Bank’s early engagement in post-conflict situations, including the presence of “stateless societies” and arrears to the Bank. The lack of a government counterpart for the Bank when states collapse and no clear authority emerges, as in Somalia, constrains the nature and size of Bank assistance. In other cases, where the outcome is fairly clear, the Bank has creatively worked within the existing framework to provide resources to governments even before their states are recognized as formal members of the Bretton Woods institutions, as occurred with the emergency loan for Eritrea, via an agreement with the Ethiopian government.

Other solutions were found in the cases of West Bank and Gaza and Bosnia and Herzegovina (see paragraph 9

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5 The rapid response of the Bank, in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was possible in part because, beginning in late 1994, Bank staff met frequently with the officials outside the country. After October 1995, Bank staff were able to work with the government and agencies in the country to develop estimates of reconstruction needs and prepare specific reconstruction projects. In early 1996, the Bank established a $150 million Trust Fund for the country and opened a Resident Mission in Sarajevo.

6 The 1993 Recovery and Reconstruction Project for Eritrea became effective in advance of Eritrean Bank membership.
below). In the case of the West Bank and Gaza the World Bank Executive Directors agreed that the assistance to nonmembers was warranted “for the benefit of members”.

9. Outstanding debt and arrears to the Bank constitute an additional complication to Bank early engagement. Since access to resources from the Bank and other international financial institutions (IFIs) is important for most post-conflict countries’ medium and longer term development, planning financial normalization is crucial. Normalization will depend on a variety of factors, including the size of the arrears and the amount of support available from the international donor community to assist with financing. The resumption of Bank lending to a number of post-conflict countries has depended on resolving the issue of outstanding debt. For example, before Bosnia and Herzegovina could join the Bank in 1996 a solution had to be found for the stock of Bank debt ($621 million) which the country had assumed as its share of the debts of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, of which 80 percent was in arrears. The Bank re-negotiated this debt as three new Bank loans on relatively concessional terms. In the case of Lebanon, despite the conflict, repayments on loans were made without undue delays, such that arrears were not a problem for Bank re-engagement. For countries in non-accrual status (e.g., Haiti), the Bank has prepared Country Re-engagement Notes to position the Bank to provide assistance when conditions permit.

10. However, in a number of post-conflict countries, Bank support began with little or no sustained contact between the Bank and the country for critical or extended periods of time. For example, the Bank was absent for significant periods of time prior to reentry in Cambodia (20 years) and Lebanon (15 years). In such instances, the Bank’s absence from a conflict country for extended periods has restricted the Bank’s response capacity once the conflict has receded. For example, the quality of the Bank’s portfolio in Lebanon has been low and has deteriorated since 1997. OED evaluated four completed projects during FY97-04 and concluded that only one project was rated as moderately satisfactory in terms of outcome and the Bank performance was only satisfactory in half of the cases. Even absences during shorter but critical intervals (e.g., Rwanda in 1994 and 1995) have had an impact on the Bank’s ability to interact effectively with a new government and have adversely affected the ability of staff to recognize in a timely fashion opportunities to support the transition of a country out of conflict.

Strong field presence

11. The need for a strong field presence is the second lesson to emerge from Bank experience. Post-conflict situations are complicated and involve a multitude of players and organizations. Field presence is essential to monitor, to maintain coordination with other donors (see paragraph 22 below), and to respond flexibly to changes. Bank field missions need to be strengthened to meet post-conflict roles. An expansion of field presence and the devolution of authority to managers in the field has proved to be a critical aspect of Bank programs in the West Bank and Gaza and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and should be considered strongly for other countries where local dynamics are similarly complicated and in flux. West Bank and Gaza was the first program to be decentralized to the field, in 1994, before the practice was mainstreamed throughout the Bank. It provided a model for transferring decision-making and accountability to the field.

12. To enhance the effectiveness of its intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina the Bank opened a Resident Mission in early 1996 (despite concern over personal safety), hired competent local professional staff to help supervise projects, and established project management units (PMUs), all of which enhanced the effectiveness of Bank interventions. Almost all of the
reconstruction projects had successful outcomes and the Bank performance is judged both timely and highly relevant and should serve as an example of good practice in post-conflict reconstruction. Although PMUs helped the Bank implement its projects in a transitional/emergency phase, longer-term measures should be undertaken to strengthen the country’s institutions, as discussed below. The Bank has met the need for strong field presence through other mechanism. When the Bank first began work in Eritrea, for example, it worked through the UNDP office to organize the first economic report and emergency recovery program.

13. By contrast the absence of a strong field presence reduced Bank effectiveness in a number of reconstruction programs. The current absence of Bank representation in Haiti reduced the ability of the Bank to work with key donors, such as IDB and USAID, which are more decentralized, as well as government and civil society; any decision to gear up the Bank program may necessitate an increased Bank presence (OED 2002b). Also, the Bank’s working relationship had been mixed in the aftermath of the Rwanda genocide due to the lack of a fully staffed Bank country office for two years after the genocide (OED 2004b). The OED evaluation of Bank assistance in Rwanda also reported that some government implementing agencies felt that there was a shortage of operational staff in the Kigali country office. The comments made by the government on the evaluation emphasized that strengthening the local Bank office is vital in early stages. As indicated earlier, a limited Bank field presence can be supported by partnership with UN agencies with significant presence in the country or through the use of extended Bank missions by task managers. The evaluation of Bank assistance in Rwanda concluded that the Bank did not put as many resources into supervision, as were required by complex project design, and should continue to closely coordinate its effort with other donors (see paragraphs 19 and 23). Similarly, frequent changes in Bank staff reduced the effectiveness of Bank programs in Eritrea and Haiti. 

Adapting Bank services and products to post-conflict situations

14. The uncertainties inherent in post-conflict situations, suggest a different approach is required, as it is not always feasible for the Bank to define an overall country assistance strategy (CAS) a priori. Rather an “opportunistic” approach is needed, building on what is feasible. When conditions do not warrant a full CAS, the Bank has recently adapted its approach and has prepared Transitional Support Strategies (TSS) for nine countries, including Afghanistan (2003), Angola (2003), Burundi (2002), Democratic Republic of Congo (2004), and Eritrea (2000), consistent with the Bank’s post-conflict policy. The Bank has also implemented flexibly and reviewed and revised its existing services and products to facilitate an appropriate and efficient response in light of the experience gained. For example, the Bank has appropriately adapted its strategies to the changing circumstances in West Bank and Gaza, initially focusing on infrastructure development, shifting to emergency support for employment creation in response to the 1996 economic crisis, and, as the situation stabilized, shifting to medium term institutional development (OED 2002a). Similarly, in the intermediate post-genocide period in Rwanda, emergency assistance dominated, but this was later replaced by assistance for economic policy.

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7 For example, a reorganization in 1991 moved Haiti to a different department, and between 1994 and 1997, Haiti had three directors and three country operations division chiefs.

8 According to the Operational Policy and Bank Procedures 2.30 on Development Cooperation and Conflict when a conflict leads to significant changes in the environment for Bank assistance, the country director, determines whether: (i) continued assistance in accordance with the CAS is feasible, (ii) conditions warrant initiating a transitional support strategy, or (iii) continued assistance is no longer feasible, and a watching brief should be initiated.
reform, with emphasis on poverty reduction, reconciliation, improvement of basic social services and institutions (OED 2004b).

15. Most of the Bank’s lending to post-conflict countries has, however, been in rebuilding physical infrastructure such as roads and buildings carried out under the Bank’s guidelines for emergency lending.\footnote{The Bank’s policy on emergency recovery assistance is set out in Operational Policy 8.50 (OP/BP 8.5).} Between fiscal years 1985-95, 14 emergency projects were approved to support reconstruction in countries emerging from conflict. During FY96 and the first half of FY97, 16 additional emergency projects were approved for Bosnia and Herzegovina alone with a total IDA and Trust Fund commitment of $356 million. For the first time in the history of the Bank, most of a portfolio in a country is being implemented under emergency provisions. Similarly, Rwanda’s emergency and reconstruction period lasted until 1998, but normal development activities have predominated only since 2001. It should be noted these emergency recovery loans do not address long-term economic, sectoral, or institutional problems and do not include conditionality linked to macroeconomic policies. They include only conditions directly related to the emergency recovery activities and to preparedness in the event the disaster recurs. Although such an approach is valid for reconstruction following natural disasters, post-conflict reconstruction requires a broader approach that takes into account the multifaceted impacts of long, violent conflict.

16. Recent Bank responses have included operations specifically designed to promote economic adjustment and recovery, social development, and, to a lesser extent, institution building. With Bank support, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s education and health services were restored, a degree of pension reform was achieved, and some cross-Entity cooperation has been realized.\footnote{Customs harmonization is one example.} The Bank has made a positive contribution to employment generation and poverty alleviation in West Bank and Gaza. Recent lending operations also involve unique post-conflict elements, including self-standing demining operations\footnote{Although there are strong economic and humanitarian reasons for demining, the main lesson learned from the OED post-conflict report is that the Bank’s comparative advantage in stand-alone demining projects is not apparent and support for landmine clearance should be provided always as an integral part of a specific development activity, for example, road construction (OED 1998).} (e.g., Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia) and demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants and refugees (e.g., Cambodia, Rwanda, and Uganda). In Rwanda, for instance, over 19,000 combatants have been demobilized through the Bank supported Demobilization and Reintegration Program.

17. However, in a number of highly visible and politically charged post-conflict situations, the Bank found itself operating in ways that were inconsistent with its more traditional role of supporting long-term economic and social development. For example, the Bank administered the financing of recurrent budgetary expenditures over a number of years in West Bank and Gaza, something it has never done before; and developed a program of emergency employment creation, which initially involved non-productive activities (like street-sweeping), although this was quickly converted to support for more productive activities. More important, OED evaluation of Bank assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Haiti, Rwanda, and West Bank and Gaza finds that the Bank has been unable to use leverage (conditionality, delayed program/project funding, overall levels of funding) in support of the implementation of important reforms, particularly in governance and public sector management and in sound economic policies; political pressures of other stakeholders and the fragility of the whole situation were simply too great to allow the Bank...
to operate as it would have in a more normal setting.\footnote{The Rwanda CAE noted in page 10, “At the heart of the 1999 strategy was the assertion that Rwanda should be treated as a special case for international assistance because of the legacy of the genocide, the need to resolve the conflict in the Great Lakes, and the country’s high external debt burden. By defining Rwanda as a special case, it enabled the Africa Region to obtain more IDA funding than the country would normally have received since the government was exiting from a state of war” (OED 2004b).} For instance, the 2002 Rwanda CAS was frank in citing weaknesses of past Bank post-genocide strategies, including the lack of attention to public sector capacity building and relatively little analytical work to underpin Bank assistance. The Haiti CAE concludes that the development impact of Bank assistance to the country since 1986 has been negligible, as the critical constraints to development—governance and public sector capacity and accountability—have not diminished (OED 2002b).

18. Building on the CAE recommendations, Bank assistance in post-conflict settings should give priority to governance and institutional issues in almost all sectors. The West Bank and Gaza evaluation recommends that the Bank should try to ensure a competent, transparent, fiscally sound governing structure which will be at the heart of the sustainability of the development effort. The Cambodia and Bosnia and Herzegovina CAEs find that the Bank could have done more to address problems of governance, particularly the weak customs administration, tax evasion, and smuggling, and should rethink its approach to private sector development (e.g., imposing hard budget constraints on public enterprises, removing legal and institutional barriers to privatization, and strengthening privatization agencies). Similarly, the West Bank and Gaza and Rwanda CAEs recommend that Bank assistance should be centered on enhancing the enabling environment for private sector development, emphasizing the rule of law and property rights development. Bank assistance should also focus on helping Rwanda resolve the technical and institutional constraints to development of the agriculture sector, which dominates the economy, with 90 percent of the population residing in rural areas. Finally, the Haiti CAE notes that without improved governance and institutional reforms, the Bank and other donors will be able to accomplish very little.

19. Overly ambitious Bank program and weak county capacity. In a post-conflict setting, in particular, where there is a considerable uncertainty, assistance programs should not be ambitious and their objectives should include capacity building. The Rwanda CAE recommends that project design should be simple and sufficient Bank resources should be allocated to ensure close project supervision. The recommendation is based on the CAE finding that project lending regularly failed for two reasons: overly ambitious design and inadequate supervision given the county need.\footnote{Sixty percent of disbursements for investment projects were evaluated as having unsatisfactory outcomes (OED 2004b).} Government comments on the Rwanda CAE noted that in designing projects and programs, limited capacity should be assumed and compensated for until steady state is attained. Likewise, the significance of weak capacity has to be recognized and provided for in the case of Eritrea (OED 2004c). Also, the Haiti CAE concluded that the Bank and other donors erred by offering traditional assistance programs to the country without identifying the fundamental governance and political barriers to development, and by overwhelming the fragile absorptive capacity (OED 2002b). Similarly OED’s post-conflict report found a total mismatch between the levels of foreign aid to Haiti and government capacity (OED 1998). In such instances, lending could be channeled through piloting activities—possibly through the use of learning and innovation loans (LILs), which would contribute to institution building—or through adaptable lending instruments.

20. A flexible approach to technical assistance. In post-conflict situations, the challenge of delivering effective technical assistance may be even greater. In Cambodia, Eritrea, and West
Bank and Gaza, for example, delivering effective technical assistance has been plagued with difficulties. These findings reinforce the conclusions from experience with technical assistance projects in more normal settings. First, within broadly defined priorities, flexibility should be built into technical assistance provided in post-conflict situations. Second, the Bank should make particular effort to ensure adequate resources and staff continuity for supervision. It is preferable to take a flexible approach to providing technical assistance, start with modest amounts of funding and be prepared, as it was in the case of West Bank and Gaza, to commit large resources to close supervision.

21. Reduce dependence on PMUs. The establishment of project management units (PMUs) has served the Bank well in the immediate post-conflict, as the CAEs for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Eritrea, Haiti, and West Bank and Gaza point out. However, the short-term benefit of good project implementation has a direct trade-off with long-term institutional development of line ministries. Sometimes the existence of a PMU creates tensions and jealousies among government officials. The Bosnia and Herzegovina CAE recommends that the use of PMUs should be discontinued and PMUs should be absorbed into government structures (OED 2004a). This recommendation is endorsed by the government in its commentary on the CAE. Similarly the Eritrea CAE recommends that PMUs should be used with an explicit exit strategy (OED 2004c). To reduce dependence on PMUs, certain PMU activities (particularly procurement and financial management) could be contracted out to safeguard the Bank’s fiduciary obligations, until significant strengthening of government procedures and processes take place.14

**Effective aid coordination and partnerships with other donors**

22. Effective aid coordination in a reconstruction program improves Bank responsiveness to the realities of post-conflict situations. The Bank collaborated with the IMF in developing a stabilization program15 and played a catalytic role in supporting, mobilizing and coordinating aid for the reconstruction effort. At the request of international donors, the Bank has played a key role in coordinating international aid in the West Bank and Gaza and Bosnia and Herzegovina and other transitional situations through the Holst Fund ($270 million pledged by 26 donors) and other mechanisms. The Bank has successfully mobilized additional assistance to post-conflict countries. For example, between fiscal years 1994-01, the West Bank and Gaza program secured an extraordinary amount of cofinancing/parallel funding of $541 million against $326 in Bank commitments, a ratio of $1.66 on every Bank dollar. Similarly, donors funded more than 50 percent of the cost of projects which the Bank prepared in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Bank’s expertise has proved to be a critical aspect of the Dayton talks on Bosnia and Herzegovina, contributing a reconstruction and development perspective and providing practical advice on intermediate matters such as the implications for economic governance, budgets, economic incentives of proposed government structures, and taxation and demobilization arrangements. On the other hand, had the Bank played a more formal role in the negotiations leading up to the El Salvador Peace Accords of January 1992, a clearer, more realistic picture of the costs of the various provisions might have emerged earlier (OED 1998).

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14 However, the Haiti CAE noted that the nearly constant state of crisis and recurring instability in the country have blocked any longer term strategy to reduce dependence on PMUs (OED 2002b).

15 There was tension between the Fund and the Bank over stabilization in Uganda, in particular how large the budget deficit could be, and whether expected donor inflows could be counted. As a result, the Bank arguably pushed for raising taxes prematurely (OED 1998).
23. Partnerships with the UN and other donor agencies need to be forged as soon as possible, as they play a critical role in delivering aid and services in post-conflict situations. However, early agreement should be reached at a high level on the respective roles of the main players and especially on who will have the lead role in each sector. Early Bank involvement helps to define its role to ensure that its comparative advantage is put to its best use within the international community, to ensure realistic planning on the part of the Bank, and to facilitate integration of the goals of the peace process into Bank strategies. OED noted in general that an understanding was reached on which institution would take the leading role in specific sectors in reconstruction programs. For example, the Bank organized a Consultative Group Meeting in Haiti in 1997, which designated lead donors in priority sectors, and included NGO, civil society and media, and was considered a model for other post-conflict programs (OED 1998). There are indications that the overall response of the international community is enhanced by cohesive multi-donor funding strategies. In the case of West Bank and Gaza the Bank worked closely with UN agencies in the field, which proved to be an effective partnership but in the cases of Haiti and Rwanda, while partnering effectively with other donors at the higher levels, the Bank did not promote effective coordination on the ground (OED 2002a and b and OED 2004b). The Bank took an appropriate risk in assuming the roles of administering donor and Bank funds to West Bank and Gaza. Also, the Bank’s strategy and objectives for Bosnia and Herzegovina were timely and relevant for the country situation and were closely integrated with the approaches of other donors (OED 2004a).

24. In collaborating with other donors, the Bank’s main role is to help close the gap between relief and development. Fostering a better understanding of the operational implications of this transition would help avoid negative patterns that can jeopardize later reconstruction and development efforts. The Bank should have a clear appreciation early in the process of how its assistance will engage and take over from emergency operations. The Bank managed to close the gap between relief measures and longer term development in many instances in West Bank and Gaza, for example, by converting the short-term emergency assistance program into the Community Development Projects. Several voluminous reports, including recent Bank’s analytic work: Development Under Adversity: The Palestinian Economy in Transition (1999) analyzed challenges and policies needed for long term growth. In the case of Rwanda, however, the relative paucity of Bank analytical work in a country transitioning from enormous social, political, and economic upheaval is striking (OED 2004b).

III. Concluding Remarks

25. Lessons that emerged from Bank experience with post-conflict reconstruction included: engage early and deploy a strong field presence; coordinate aid, establish partnerships with other donors, and agree on respective roles of each donor; and adapt services and products to post-conflict situations. These lessons are relevant for effective Bank and donor assistance to post-conflict countries.

16 These projects supported small-scale labor intensive works, but involved communities more proactively in the selection and implementation of projects; and maintained its focus in other areas on longer-term objectives.
17 The Bank undertook two large public expenditure reviews, as well as smaller analyses of public expenditure in the health and education sectors. The only other post-genocide analytical work was a strategy note for the agriculture sector (OED 2004b, p. vi)
Bibliography


