



Report Number : ICRR0020796

1. Project Data

Project ID P115664	Project Name LR-Emergency Monrovia Urban Sanitation	
Country Liberia	Practice Area(Lead) Social, Urban, Rural and Resilience Global Practice	Additional Financing P124664,P146966
L/C/TF Number(s) IDA-49080,TF-94060,TF-A1481	Closing Date (Original)	Total Project Cost (USD) 39,785,001.00
Bank Approval Date 13-Nov-2009	Closing Date (Actual) 30-Dec-2016	
	IBRD/IDA (USD)	Grants (USD)
Original Commitment	0.00	21,720,000.00
Revised Commitment	0.00	21,720,000.00
Actual	3,986,469.45	21,272,101.09

Prepared by Vibecke Dixon	Reviewed by George T. K. Pitman	ICR Review Coordinator Christopher David Nelson	Group IEGSD (Unit 4)
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Project ID P158315	Project Name LR-Emergency Monrovia Urban San. 3AF (P158315)
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L/C/TF Number(s)	Closing Date (Original)	Total Project Cost (USD)
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4,715,000.00

Bank Approval Date
18-Feb-2016

Closing Date (Actual)

	IBRD/IDA (USD)	Grants (USD)
Original Commitment	0.00	0.00
Revised Commitment	0.00	0.00
Actual	0.00	0.00

Project ID

P146966

Project Name

Emergency Monrovia Urban
Sanitation 2AF (P146966)

L/C/TF Number(s)

Closing Date (Original)

Total Project Cost (USD)
16,670,000.00

Bank Approval Date
25-Aug-2014

Closing Date (Actual)

	IBRD/IDA (USD)	Grants (USD)
Original Commitment	0.00	7,000,000.00
Revised Commitment	0.00	7,000,000.00
Actual	0.00	7,000,000.00

2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

According to the Financing Agreement (2011, page 4) the Project Development Objective (PDO) was to "increase access to solid waste collection service in Monrovia".



b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?

No

c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?

No

d. Components

The original project comprised of two components, and a third component was added during the first Additional Financing (AF) in 2011.

1: Solid Waste Collection (*Appraisal: US\$11.2 million, Additional Financing (AF)1: US\$2.3 million, AF 2: US\$5.07 million, AF 3: US\$ 2.51 million, Total Appraisal Estimates: US\$ 21.08 million, Actual: US\$18.41 million*).

This component was to assist the Monrovia City Corporation (MCC) to provide solid waste collection services and increase the volume of collected and disposed waste from 30% of daily-generated waste to 45%. The component had the following sub/components:

(1.1) Primary Collection. This subcomponent provided assistance to community-based Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) that provided door-to-door primary collection services (to households and small businesses) and to MCC in order to: (i) improve SME's managerial and operational capacities to provide service to households; (ii) assist MCC in clarifying its role and responsibilities in oversight and supervision of the primary collection; and (iii) create an environment that will enable MCC to track and report on SME's performance.

(1.2) Secondary collection. This was through construction of solid-waste transfer stations, provision of equipment, and assistance towards the operating cost of collection and disposal of solid waste This sub-component was to support: (i) the operation of the collection and transport system; (ii) construction of two solid-waste transfer stations; (iii) procurement of additional equipment; and (iv) supporting the operation of collection and transportation system modified by the introduction of transfer stations.

(1.3) Public Awareness Campaign. Since solid-waste collection was a relatively new concept after 14 years of no solid-waste collection, a public awareness campaign was to enhance popular understanding on how to handle solid-waste safely, including solid-waste disposal utilizing the available system.

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2: Building Institutional and Technical Capacity at the Monrovia City Corporation (MCC): (*Appraisal: US\$4.9 million, AF1: US\$ 0, AF2: US\$ 1.11 million, AF3, US\$0.2 million, Total Appraisal Estimates: US\$6.21 million, Actual: US\$10.71*).

This component was to strengthen the capacity of MCC for proper revenue administration, financial management, and technical oversight related to the provision of solid waste services in Monrovia. There were two subcomponents:

(2.1) Providing Technical Assistance (TA) to MCC for financial and organizational audit followed by assistance to implement selected prioritized activities.

(2.2) Providing TA to MCC for Project Implementation and Supervision, since MCC does not have any prior experience with managing World Bank projects. This sub-component was to provide TA for project



management, supervision and technical capacity building.

While the first two components remained largely the same, a third component was added with the first Additional Financing (2011) for the development of additional sanitary-landfill cells:

3. Landfill Cell, Piloting Recycling and Studies: (*Appraisal: US\$0, AF1: US\$1.7 million, AF2: US\$0.25 million, AF3: US\$0.41 million, Total Appraisal Estimates: US\$2.36 million, Actual: US\$1.31 million*).

This component included the construction of landfill cells and the Whein town disposal facility in Monrovia. For AF2, this component included maintenance of the existing landfill and preliminary studies to develop a new landfill. In AF3, this component financed preparatory work for a potential new landfill at the Cheesemanburg site, and it also included the piloting of a plastic recycling program.

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In addition, the Credit included:

Audit, Training and Operating Costs: (*Appraisal: US\$0.5 million, AF1: US\$0, AF2: US\$0.42 million, AF3: US\$0.20 million, Total Appraisal Estimate: US\$1.12 million, Actual: US\$ 1.8 million*); and

Contingency (Unallocated) funds: (*Appraisal: US\$1.8 million, AF1: US\$0, AF2: US\$0.15, AF3: US\$0, Total Appraisal Estimate: US\$1.95 million, Actual: US\$0*).

e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates

Project Costs:

The project cost was more than initially appraised as the project were revised through project restructuring and through three Additional Financings (AFs). The first AF added a new component of additional sanitary landfill cells as the activity was not completed under the preceding project. The second AF put forth a plan to gradually transfer responsibilities from the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) to MCC. The third AF removed the requirement for counterpart financing due to the Ebola crisis and the Bank covered 100% of the solid waste collection under the project.

Financing:

The Emergency Monrovia Sanitation (EMUS) Project was initially funded by a US\$18.4 million Grant from the Liberia Reconstruction Trust Fund (LRTF) that was approved in October 2009. An Additional Financing (AF1) International Development Association (IDA) Credit of US\$4.0 million was approved in April 2011. A second AF was approved and funded by a US\$7.0 million Grant from the LRTF in August 2014, and a third AF of US\$3.32 million Grant was approved in February 2016 by the Ebola Recovery and Reconstruction Trust Fund (ERRTF). The total cumulative allocations were US\$32.72 million, and the total actual cost amounted to US\$32.23 million.

During 2011, ineligible expenses amounting to about US\$728,000 were identified and investigated by the World Bank. The total ineligible expenses were reimbursed to the Bank by the Government of Liberia (GoL).

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Borrower contribution:

The ICR does not provide detailed information on what was the actual monetary contribution of the Government of Liberia or MCC. However, in para 28 on page 12 of the ICR, it is stated that the project



would finance 100 percent of all expenditures in the first two years, but that that only 80 percent of operating costs for solid waste collection would be provided in year 3 and 60 percent in year 4. The balance was to be funded by a combination of MCC and Ministry of Finance (MoF) funds. According to the ICR the Government consistently met its counterpart funding obligations until September 2014, when the Ebola pandemic took hold of the country. At that time, a request was submitted and granted for the Bank to pay for 100 percent of contract costs until project closure. This was approved and a third AF (approved in February 2016) was used to support this and other additional activities.

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Dates:

The project was appraised on 02/27/2009, approved on 11/13/2009 and became effective on 11/25/2009. The MTR was undertaken on time on 01/09/2012. The original closing date was 12/31/2013, and the actual closing date was 12/30/2016, three years' later than planned.

3. Relevance of Objectives & Design

a. Relevance of Objectives

At preparation, the project was closely aligned with local and national development priorities. One of the four basic pillars of Liberia's first full Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) (2008-2011) was "Infrastructure and Basic Services", with priority areas including the rehabilitation of roads, water supply and sanitation. The project was developed in accordance with the "Monrovia Solid Waste Letter of Sector Policy" prepared by the MCC in 2009. The Sector Policy established guiding principles for the provision of solid-waste management services in Monrovia, including: (i) providing people with access to solid-waste service at affordable cost; (ii) adopting cost recovery mechanism in solid-waste management for long-term financial sustainability; (iii) involving the private sector for efficiency gains in service provision; and (iv) conducting solid-waste management in an environmentally conscientious manner that conserves natural resources.

The objective was well aligned with the Banks' Joint Country Assistance Strategy for the period of FY2009-2011. Specifically, the project supported Theme 2: "Rehabilitating Infrastructure to Jump-Start Economic Growth, which specified improvements in solid waste disposal as one of its core milestones. In particular, the CAS emphasized assistance to sustain earlier emergency work in the area of solid-waste collection and to improve municipal revenue collections, introduce financial controls, consolidate operations, and build capacity at the sub-national level.

At the time of closure, the PDO remained highly relevant to the GoL's Medium-Term Economic Growth and Development Strategy (2013-2017). Increased access to sanitation and reduced disposal of solid waste in unmanaged sites were aims outlined in the Strategy. It furthermore aimed to develop a comprehensive policy on solid waste in Liberia and to scale up waste services in Monrovia and other secondary cities.

Moreover, the PDO remained highly relevant to the Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) FY 2013-17 at the time of project closure. The CPS included a focus on public health, disaster-risk management, and urban management.

While the objective remained relevant throughout the project cycle and was a necessary response to a development gap in a fragile country, the lack of clarity around what outcomes would be achieved through



improving solid waste services is a shortcoming. Focusing on "increased access" alone is not particularly outcome focused and does not help in understanding what transformation was expected as a consequence of the project. This is reflected in the shifting articulation of relevance both from a sanitation standpoint and in referring to "jump starting" the economy. It would be useful to lift the objective up a level to better reflect the expected result of increasing access to solid waste services.

Rating

Substantial

b. Relevance of Design

The activities and components were sufficient and necessary to achieve the project's development objectives. The project had a simple and clear design which was also sufficiently flexible to address relevant needs as they arose (such as the need to develop additional landfill cells). The objective was to increase access to solid waste collection service in Monrovia, and the activities and components were designed to achieve that; improvement of primary and secondary solid waste collection including a public awareness campaign, strengthening institutional and technical capacity and expand landfill cells and explore recycling opportunities. The statement of objectives was linked to intermediate and final outcomes, and the causal chain between funding and outcomes was clear and convincing.

It is pointed out in the ICR (page 21, para 50) that the main constraint on the amount of solid waste collected was budget constraints faced by MCC. There is no discussion in the ICR on how these budget constraints might have been overcome; how collection of revenues could have been organized, etc. This was not part of the project design. Exogenous factors and unintended effects were also not identified at preparation.

Rating

Substantial

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

Objective 1

Objective

The Project Development Objective was to increase access to solid waste collection service in Monrovia

Rationale

Outputs:

- Vehicle turn-around time (hours): Baseline: 2; Target: 1; Achieved: 0.81 **Target achieved.**
- Targeted households that dump domestic waste in non-designated areas (% of HHs): Baseline: 50%; Target: 40%, Achieved: 42% **Target almost achieved.**



- Transfer stations built: Baseline: 0; target 2; Achieved: 2. **Target achieved**
- Number of SMEs provided with training: Baseline: 0; Target: 10; Achieved: 51 **Target exceeded.**
- People reached by awareness campaigns: Baseline: 0; Target: 60%, Achieved: 78% **Target exceeded.**
- Special Municipal Solid Waste Account for revenue from solid waste established: Baseline: No; Target: Yes; Achieved: Yes **Target achieved.**
- Percentage of MCC staff trained in financial management (i.e. revenue administration, budgeting, accounting (% of relevant staff)): Baseline: 0%, Target: 80%; Achieved 95%. **Target exceeded.**
- Volume of landfill disposal cells constructed (cubic meters): Baseline: 0; Target: 540,000; Achieved: 540,000 **Target achieved.**

All output targets were either achieved or exceeded, except from the percentage of targeted households that dump domestic waste in non-designated areas, which was almost achieved.

Outcomes:

- Number of people in urban areas provided with access to regular solid waste collection under the project: Baseline: 274,000; Target: 360,000; Achieved: 540,000. **Target exceeded.**
- Number of households with access to door-to-door solid waste collection: Baseline: 5,300; Target: 10,000; Achieved: 9,487. **Target almost achieved.** The target was exceeded in 2012, 2013 and 2014 by reaching 15,000 households. Following the Ebola crisis, the number achieved was reduced to just under 10,000 due to high mortality rates following the crisis, fewer SMEs operating and some SMEs refusing to collect rubbish from Ebola-affected households due to the stigma.
- Quantity of solid-waste collected compared to total solid-waste produced (Tons per day). Baseline: 210 (30%); Target: 330 (45%); Achieved: 350 (45%). **Target achieved.**

The project did not measure institutional outcomes, such as the effect of the MCC staff training, and the effect of the public awareness campaign. However, even without this data, it is clear that the planned outcomes were achieved and exceeded.

The higher-level objective of this project was to help reduce extreme poverty and promote shared prosperity by creating the conditions and linkages needed to achieve broad-based growth and poverty reduction and improved health (ICR page 4, para 9). The project did not measure achievement of the higher-level objective.

Rating

Substantial

5. Efficiency

According to the ICR, (page 21 and Annex 2, pages 35-38), a post-implementation economic analysis of this



project, with conservative assumptions, indicated that the project had a positive Net Present Value (NPV) over a Y-year investment planning period and at a discount rate of X percent. The NPVs were estimated for two scenarios: (i) for benefits ranging from 30% to 50% of the per capita health impact as the level of collection increase from 30 to 45% and population ranging from 945,000 to 1.1 million; (ii) the same health impact per capita to the population estimate of Greater Monrovia ranging from 1.13 million (2010) to 1.30 million (2016) based on US CIA population estimates for Greater Monrovia.

The economic analysis presented in the ICR indicate that the project had a Net Present Value of US\$1.16 million. A sensitivity analysis based on a higher estimate of the population of Greater Monrovia increased the Net Present Value to US\$2.5 million, which was slightly better than the base case. The EPP (Emergency Project Paper) did not contain a cost-benefit analysis or other economic analyses at preparation or closure. It is pointed out in the ICR (page 21, para 50) that the main constraint on the amount of solid waste collected was budget constraints faced by MCC. There is no discussion in the ICR on how these budget constraints might have been overcome; how collection of revenues could have been organized, etc. This was not part of the project design, and may as such jeopardize the sustainability of the project outcomes.

Some operational efficiencies were gained in the course of implementation, for example in the area of vehicle turnaround time. Over the implementation period, the vehicle turnaround time reduced from 120 minutes to 48 minutes (ICR annex 2, table 2) particularly in the last years of operation.

Efficiency Rating

Substantial

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

	Rate Available?	Point value (%)	*Coverage/Scope (%)
Appraisal		0	0 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable
ICR Estimate		0	0 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable

* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

6. Outcome

Relevance of Objectives and Design is rated Substantial. The PDO statement was linked clearly to intermediate and final outcomes and the causal chain was both clear and convincing. Efficacy is rated Substantial as there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate achievement of output and outcome targets, as well as achievement of the objective. The project design did not set out to measure the achievement of the higher-level objective. Efficiency is rated Substantial as the NPV was positive.



a. **Outcome Rating**
Satisfactory

7. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating

Financial sustainability: High

Despite attempts during the project to establish user charges and regular budgetary transfers from the Government, the occurrence of the Ebola epidemic deteriorated Liberia's economy and prevented the implementation of revenue collection and regular budgetary transfers. Even so, the Government showed a high level of commitment to the project and fulfilled its obligation of gradually financing an increased part of the project. However, following the Ebola-crisis, the Government entered into a period of acute financial crisis and was not able to fulfill its obligations. There is a risk that despite a clear commitment to urban sanitation, the Government will not be able to fully finance solid-waste collection services in the future.

□

Technical sustainability: Moderate

The *primary* solid waste collection was established under the project and 45% of solid-waste is now collected in Monrovia on a regular basis. 45 CBEs were contracted and trained during implementation and received concessions against a monthly licensing fee for specific zones. According to the ICR (page 24, para 62), the financial model of the CBEs is strong and allows them to operate for many years, provided that the secondary collections system is operational.

The *secondary* solid-waste collection is now operated directly by MCC and is running smoothly. Despite various attempts during implementation to identify a permanent site for solid-waste disposal in Monrovia, the project closed with a landfill disposal capacity of three years. However, the project was proactive in financing a site identification study for a new landfill and preparing an environmental and social impact assessment document prior to closure. A follow-up project to finance the construction of a permanent sanitary landfill is under preparation.

a. **Risk to Development Outcome Rating**
Substantial

8. Assessment of Bank Performance

a. **Quality-at-Entry**

While the project was prepared under the emergency procedures of OP/BP 8.00, the preparation process built firmly on the experience and lessons learned from the previous solid waste collection project and the design was simple, robust and flexible, paving the way for a steady improvement in solid waste collection in Monrovia, in a fragile context of a country in a post-conflict situation. Following a 14-year civil war where solid-waste collection had been completely interrupted, the preceding Emergency Infrastructure Project Supplement Component (EIPSC) project had funded a one-time city-wide clean-up campaign and had



introduced a simple collection system. The EMUS project built on the previous project and aimed to build the foundations of a solid-waste collection system by expanding its scope both in terms of technical activities as well as institutional strengthening. The project design was suitably simple for the fragile context and had built in enough flexibility for the project to develop with the context's ability and needs. The strategic relevance and approach was clear, poverty and environmental aspects were adequately taken into account, implementation arrangements were robust, and M&E arrangements and the risk assessment were adequate.

Quality-at-Entry Rating

Satisfactory

b. Quality of supervision

The Bank undertook 14 supervision missions in the seven years of project implementation, except from during the Ebola crisis in 2014/15, when the task team was not able to conduct missions for approximately one year. The Bank team nonetheless remained in close communication with the Government and reacted quickly to requests to relieve the country of their counter-financing obligation during the crisis. The Bank team also demonstrated agility and flexibility in adapting and expanding the scope of the project to ensure relevant and progressive achievement of the project's objective through three AFs. When financial fraud was detected through the Bank's Integrity Vice Presidency (INT) investigation, the Bank team instigated immediate measures to mitigate the fraudulent activities. However, safeguard support was not adequate during implementation, contributing to the project's shortcomings in safeguards compliance.

Quality of Supervision Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

9. Assessment of Borrower Performance

a. Government Performance

The Government of Liberia were highly committed to achieving the project's objective and demonstrated good ownership of the project from preparation and throughout implementation, despite the capacity constraints experienced during the Ebola-crisis. The Government consistently met its counterpart funding obligations until September 2014, when the Ebola pandemic took hold of the country. The GoL then submitted a request for the Bank to cover for 100% of the contracts costs until project closure. The Government continued to show its commitment to the solid waste sector in Monrovia by providing US\$1.35 million to continue the solid-waste service when the project closed. The Government recruited and maintained a project coordinator, procurement staff and M&E staff. However, environmental and social safeguard specialists were not available which led to the discontinuation of safeguard monitoring.



Government Performance Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

b. Implementing Agency Performance

Despite achieving and exceeding nearly all output and outcome targets, the performance of the Project Implementation Unit (PIU), the Infrastructure Implementation Unit (IIU) and the Project Financial Management Unit (PFMU) responsible for the Financial Management, is rated Moderately Satisfactory mainly due to three factors: (i) failure to properly implement the environmental and social safeguards; (ii) the revelation of fraudulent practices by some of the contracted private firms, which instigated investigation by INT; and (iii) shortcomings in following up on complaints by local communities around the landfill and transfer stations.

The PIU was responsible for the overall project implementation and showed commitment to the project development objective, according to the ICR (page 26 para 70). Before the PIU was established and staffed in the initial period after project effectiveness, project implementation and procurement was handled by the IIU at the Ministry of Public Works (MPW). Implementation and procurement responsibility was transferred to the PMU in May 2010. At the time of the second Additional Financing in August 2014, the PIU was merged into MCC. According to the ICR (page 25, para 66), financial management and procurement support was adequate throughout project implementation.

The PIU failed to monitor and implement the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) and the Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP), and an environmental audit conducted by the World Bank in September 2016 revealed that the periodic surface water, ground water and leachate sampling program had been discontinued in 2013. Sampling reports for the preceding years could not be produced either. Grievance mechanisms were non-existent.

The Performance of the Financial Management delegated to the PFMU was satisfactory, according to the ICR (page 26, para 73). All quarterly interim unaudited IFRs and the annual audited financial statements were submitted on time and were acceptable to the Bank. The internal control weakness led to the declaration of ineligible expenses amounting to US\$ 728,000. The funds were repaid to the Bank by the GoL, and remedial and mitigation measures were put in place.

Implementing Agency Performance Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Borrower Performance Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

10. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization

a. M&E Design

The M&E design was adequate with relevant output and outcome indicators identified in the Results Framework. The PDO indicators and the intermediate indicators reflected the objectives and expected outputs and outcomes of the project, and were adequately modified during implementation to capture the projects' development through the three AFs. The PDO remained unchanged throughout the life of the



project. Baseline and targets were established at appraisal. Table 1 on page 5 of the ICR gives a detailed and clear overview of the indicators from the original design and throughout the three AFs.

As pointed out in the ICR (page 15, para 38), some of the indicators were difficult to measure such as percentage of households targeted that dump domestic waste in non-designated areas. Moreover, there was no indicator to capture the MCC's revenue generation and utilization which would have been useful for assessing the MCC's financial sustainability.

b. M&E Implementation

The M&E design was adequately adapted to relevant changes and to the corporate scorecard, and, according to the ICR (page 15, para 39), it was fairly well implemented. At preparation, it had been recognized that MCC's M&E capacity was very low, and a dedicated M&E specialist was recruited to strengthen the PIU and enable it to compile the annual data and reports. The accuracy of the M&E data was challenged in 2012 when the INT investigation identified fraudulent practices in the alteration of tally sheets used to estimate volumes of solid-waste before weighbridges were installed.

c. M&E Utilization

M&E data were used to track project progress and to appraise the AFs.

M&E Quality Rating

Substantial

11. Other Issues

a. Safeguards

At appraisal, the project was classified as Category 'B' under OP/BP 4.01 Environmental Assessment, and OP/BP 4.12 Involuntary Resettlement, was triggered. During the first Additional Financing, the environmental safeguard category was changed from 'B' to 'A', due to the proposed additional activities that included construction of landfill cells. The project prepared an Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA), three Environmental Management Plans (EMPs) and two Abbreviated Resettlement Action Plans (for two different geographical areas). According to the ICR (para 40) compensation was paid with no outstanding issues.

The ICR outlines two cases environmental non-compliance: (i) neither the PMU nor the landfill and transfer stations management staff had dedicated staff to oversee implementation of the project ESIA and ESMPs, contrary to the requirements of the project safeguards instruments. The periodic surface water and ground water and leachate sampling program was discontinued in 2014 during the Ebola crisis. The Bank requested MCC to undertake water analysis of water resources in and around the landfill in December 2016, and the results showed no major deterioration in water quality in comparison to results recorded in the baseline study.



For Social Safeguards, the project’s engagement with the Whein Town community during project implementation was weak and Grievance Mechanisms were non-existent. This caused frustration in the community, resulting in two cases of vandalism at the landfill site

b. Fiduciary Compliance

Financial Management

The Project Financial Management Unit (PFMU) was responsible for financial management oversight of the project. The project complied with the financial covenants and submitted all audit reports on time throughout the life of the project. The auditor’s opinions were unqualified for each of the Annual Audited Financial Statements over the years. Even so, the internal control weaknesses later led to the declaration of ineligible expenses amounting to US\$ 728,000. Adequate FM remedial and mitigating measure were put in place including the reimbursement of the total ineligible expenses to the Bank by the GoL. The World Bank’s FM procedures were generally complied with during project implementation (ICR para 45 page 17).

Procurement

Procurement was managed by the PIU in accordance with the Bank’s Guidelines, the Legal Agreement and the approved procurement plan. The procurement design was handled by an international procurement specialist, but the contract ended before the project, which weakened the project’s procurement capacity. Furthermore, the procurement function suffered during the Ebola crisis as most procurement activities were slowed down. The PIU benefitted from hands-on support from the Bank team. High-value procurement activities were reviewed by the Bank. ISRs consistently rated procurement performance Moderately Satisfactory.

c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)

The ICR mentions reduced flooding as an unintended positive effect of solid waste collection in the city.

d. Other

12. Ratings

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	---
Risk to Development Outcome	Substantial	Substantial	---
Bank Performance	Moderately	Moderately Satisfactory	---



	Satisfactory		
Borrower Performance	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	---
Quality of ICR		Substantial	---

Note

When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006.

The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column could cross-reference other sections of the ICR Review, as appropriate.

13. Lessons

The lessons are taken from the ICR with some modification of language:

- 1 . **In fragile contexts, a simple and flexible project design may be key to achieving the development objectives.** An aim to gradually re-establish infrastructure and basic services with realistic targets in fragile contexts where these have been interrupted or discontinued may be a crucial element contributing to achievement of the PDO. The combination of a gradual re-establishment of basic services coupled with institutional strengthening activities is key.
- 2 . **Engaging the private sector to deliver Solid Waste Management (SWM) is not a panacea in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.** There might be too low capacity also in the private sector to manage parts of the SWM value chain. Building capacity in the public sector both to deliver basic services and to manage and supervise private sector contracts are crucial elements in fragile contexts
- 3 . **Achieving financial sustainability for Solid Waste Management in fragile and capacity-constrained contexts requires an incremental, long-term approach.** National governments’ commitment to provide sustained funding to the operation of SWM services in addition to finding solutions for increased revenue income are crucial building blocks to achieve financial sustainability. Such measures take time to implement and will need to be done carefully and sensitively
- 4 . **Integrating the PIU into the local government has the potential to greatly enhance local capacity.** The integration of the EB-trained PIU staff into the local government has the potential to contribute to capacity building and institutional strengthening of local institutions.
- 5 . **Solid waste data collection through weighbridges coupled with an independent third-party to monitor solid waste data is important to minimize the risk of fraudulent practices.**
- 6 . **Continuous and thorough consultation and engagement of local communities around landfill sites is a necessity for successful solid waste operations.** Effective handling of complaints and a solid communications strategy coupled with adequate management of landfill sites may reduce local resentment with solid waste operations.

14. Assessment Recommended?



No

15. Comments on Quality of ICR

The ICR is well written and provides clear, poignant and detailed information of relevance. The quality of the analysis is good and the evidence presented is adequate. The ICR is results-oriented and the lessons are based on evidence and analysis presented in the ICR. The ICR is furthermore internally consistent and in consistency with the OPCS guidelines.

a. Quality of ICR Rating Substantial