26883 （ ~t京. 2000 年 10 丹 9 日－ 10 日） (Beijing October g 10, 2000) “ 国家发展计划委员会主办 Sponsored by： τhe State Development 问anning Commission 胁办单位： With the Assistance of ~ 能草草基金会 The Energy Foundation 中国电力部门深化改革座谈会 Workshop: New Waves of Power Sector 民怨·for罢’ns in China 〈北京. 200 台年四月 9 自－ 10 日〉 (Be号： ng October 9a1 O, 2000) 国家发展计划委员会主办 Sponsored by: The Sta量。 Development Plannil咱 Comm 始sion 协办单位： 将ith the Assistance of 世界银行 能源基金会 The World Bank The Energy Foundati。” 本报告总结了 2000 年四月 9 日至 10 日在北京举办的 u 中国电力部门深化改革捍座谈会上的讨论内容和姑论。座谈 会由离家发展计到委员会主办，由世界银行如能谱、基金会协 办。发表本报告的初衷是想在中国国内探诗电力改革，同时为 其他国家对电力改革有兴趣的人士提供参考；本报告中的看 法、诠释和结论不代表洼谈会组织者…～国家发展计划委吴 会、世界银行（包括世行附属机构、拭行董事会成员或其代农 的国家）和能提基金会…一的观点。因家发展计划委员会、世 界银行和能混基金会不保证本报告中数据的准确性，对采用这 些数据所产生的结果也不承担责任。 This report presents the summary of discussions and conclusions of the workshop ”New Wave of Power Sector Reforms ” held in Beijing October 弘 10, 2000 and sponsored by the State Development Planning Commission with the assistance of the World Bank and the Energy Foundation. It is ?ublished to e部ourage discussion and comment within China and for dissemination to p红ties interested in power 部ctor reform in other countries .. ηie opinions, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this report should not be a俭ibuted to 由e organizers of the workshop, the State Development Planning Commission, the World Bank (including World Bank affiliated organiz础。ns, members of its Board of 丑xecuti ve Directors or the countries ·they repres服。， or to the Energy Foundation.ηie State Development Planning Commission, the World Bank, and the Energy Foundation do not guarantee the 在cc町acy of the data included in this publication and accept no responsibi豆.ty for the consequences of their use. 中国电力部门深化改革 座谈会报告和工作报告 2001 年 2 月 国家发展计划委员会 世界银行 能汤、基金会 1 目录 前言.....................…….......... ~＂ . "".""" ""……··…..........…………..........…................….......... 5 第一部分：中国电力部门深化改革研讨会....................….................. 5 研讨会会议总结............…··…........…........……........…........................... 5 开幕．．．．．．…··”…………．．．．．………··…·……·……··…··…··．．．．．…·…··… 5 实践中的竞争性市场...........…..........……..........……1••···· ……........ 7 分阶段引入竞争的框架...................…··……........….................... 10 友也与输自己也分离..........……..........................…….......……...... 12 输电和配电重组……··……..................…................…··……··…….. 17 保证可持续发展…........…··….................................…··…··…...... 20 竞争性电力市场的法律和监管改革……........……….......…...... 22 结束语．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．··＊……·．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．雹....................... 24 会议议程.................................................................................. 26 会议签到表….............................................…··….........…··…··….............. 35 第二部分：自！字经验总结．．．．．……··………... ~.＂……............……..........“ 澳大利亚经基金…··……......................……….................…........…............. 40 中央政府的参与…. ~ .......…...... ~…..............…………………............….. .42 全国电力市场拢到的制定．．．．……........…...........…...................... 46 新南威尔士政府的参与……··……...............................…….........…… 47 昆士兰政府的参与．．．．………··……··…….........…………... ~ ...……... 55 南澳大利里政府的参与．．．．．．．．…. ＂~ .• ".…·….........…··……........…..... 60 澳大利亚首都本土的参与………....... ~….......……··……··…...... 63 塔斯马尼亚政府的参与……........……...........…......................... 64 结论．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．鑫鑫．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．…..…··．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．“ 英格兰和威尔士的电力工业改革．．．·………··……............................ 66 背景....... ~ ...……·..,……….............…··…………........……............. 66 改革 5•••••···· …＂. ~ .. ,. .............….......…··….........……..........…. ~ ....…....... 68 工业组织....................….. ~ .........…............……··…·……..........…··….... 69 5 发电……....................………··….............……… 5 ..........……··…......... 69 2 输电…..........……..................... ~ .............……….......……··………........ 69 自己电………………........………........………··………··……··………........ 70 交易机制．．．·…........…·………··…….......…·…….~……··………......... 70 监管…….........…＂＂ .... "...........………............…….............…·….............. 71 搁浅成本………..........……............….......………………..........…··“.. 72 结果………··……...................….......….......…….........…….......….. 73 发电领域的市场操纵..........…··….......…….............................. 74 零售电价…….............…….......………….........…·……··……··……··… 76 客户支支………………………··……………........….... 77. 新的交易机制.....................…·……..........……··……··…….......…·… 78 第二部分：工作论文….......…··…··…........…......…........…………........ 80 竞争性电力市场乌输电业务组提．．．．……............……··………··…….. 8 在 前言..........….......…........…….......…………......…··…................... 8 0 输电系统的结构……..……··……··……··……··………........……… 81 市场规冲莫及其输电公司组织的关系……............…….............. 85 配电是否应该分斋？”……••;o••••……··….......…··…….............…， 85 决定竞争性市场规模的准则 9 ..........…·……··……··…........……………··“ 主要结论...........…........…….............…··…··……...........…··…..........…… 86 决定竞争性市场规模的因素..........……........……··……............. 87 竞争性市场下不用类型电厂的处理………··……··…．．．．，ι.............. 94 51 宫．．．．……..........………··……··……··……...........…·…….......…........... 94 竞争性市场对发电商的影喃．．．．………………................……… 94 潜在的问题及解决问题的办法…………........…··………….. ~7 处理搁浅成本实例…··……............……..........…...........，…........…… 101 重组与环境….........川…….......…….............…·川……….........…·….......… .103 号！宫．．··…….......………··…...... * ~ ...…··…··渺~ ........……...............… 103 讨论..... :.…...........…··…….... .........…~ ..............….......…........…… .103 5 结论…........….......…··…....... ~ ...........…··…...................….............. 111 3 前言 在过去二二十年中，中国电力工业发展迅速，目前规模往居世 界第二。巨大成就的取得，归功于意义深边的改革 0 80 年代初， 电力工业按行政方式由中央统一管理，而今天，各级电力企业己 进行或准备进行公司化改组，按商业A宝贵才运行。 然而，电力工业在结构和运行上还存在很多问题，如果这挫 问题得不到解决，会新送来之不易的改革成果。目前面格的主要 问题包括：效率不高，布前及地区间电力交易发展这援，由于垄 既使独立电厂受到不公平待遇，小型燃煤电厂的迅速发展严重污 染了环境。 为了发展经济，满足人民生活需要乡必须提供价格合理的电 力。因此，中国政房决定进一步深化电力体制改革，培育竞争， 保证电力工业的可持续发展。 国务院委托离家发展计划委员会研究制定电力体制改革的 方隶，为了广泛征求各方意见，吸取自陈经验教训，国家计委于 2000 年 10 月 9 -10 窍，组织召开了国际研讨会，讨论电力行业 面格的问题，探讨解决这些问题的方案。 本报告包括： (1 ）中爵电力工业改革国际研讨会纪要；（2) 英罔和澳大利亚电力改革的经验教训；（ 3）三篇工作论文，总结 了 2000 年 11 丹 11 自讨论中专家关于市场规模、输电组织和新 老电厂问题方边的看法；（的一篇论文总结了美国能涯基金会在 改革和管制领域的研究成果。 在此，我对世界银抒如美国能潜、基金会为组织研讨会提供的 帮助表示感谢，对爵际专家所提供的宝贵意见表示感谢，对计委 组织此次会议的全体成~表示感谢。最后，对所有乌合代表提出 的建设性建议表示感谢。 因家计委基础产业司哥长 李彦梦 4 第一部：中自电力部门深化改革研讨会 研讨会会议总结 中国电力部门深化改革研讨会于 2000 年 10 月雪白 10 日在北 京召开，本研讨合由国家发展计划委员会主办，世界银行和能源 基金会协办，那才会臼程及与会人员名单附后。 会议曹景 在八十年代初期，电力工业是政府的一个待政部门，由中央 统一管理，并在省、地区、市和县一级设立代表札坊，投资决策 是指今进行，价格也由行政部门制定，价格不能回收供电成本。 、别制定。 目前，也力待业己实夺公号化管理，决策按商业!ff. 国家电力公司成立于于 1997 年，按商业犀刑，代表菌家行使在 各省电力公司的所有者权利。尽管投资仍由中央决定，但号去消 财政拨款，技资来源于各类股东和贷款机坊。私营部门在发电领 域的投资在 1 ”5 年的电力法中得到认可。此外，也价基本反映 边际成本，沿海发达地区更是如此。 尽管二十多年来所取得的成就，电力行立之面 rj备很多结构和运 行上的问题，如果这些问题得不到解决，改革进程会受到影响。 问题主要是：单一购也模式下，在进入市场时和进入市场后都没 有竞争，跨省交易得不到发展，小型污染电厂发展迅速，整个系 统存 1日。 带着这些问题，并决心将改革进行下去，通过改革解决这些 问题。本研讨会的主要目的是都据国内外经段，探讨新一轮改革 应包括的内容。 开蒂 第一部分谈到了一系列问题。酶家计委斟主任张国宝先生首 5 先谈了耳前电力行业中的问题；在某些地区，电力尚不富裕，还 需要大量投资，不仅要满足新的需求，还要沟这系统中的存 l臼设 施。总之，投资需求量很大，他强调需要新的政策，要改善管理。 他谈到，其它国家有了成功改革的经脸，一定有很多东西值得中 国学习。 张先生谈到一个问题，也是本研讨会的主题，中国情况相当 复杂，如快速增长，地域辽阔，中央地方玛级政府等，这是否意 味着中国需要特别的改革方案。换种说法是，改革计划如改革进 程必窥视各国的特点、条件而走。一个国家可以从别的国家吸取 经拴教剖，但不能生搬硬套。 世行东亚地区能源矿产发展局局长莺无良彦先生 (Yoshihiko Sumi) 谈到，尽管中国有其特点，但其电力行业的问 题也是国际上普遍存在的问题。他强调改革必须继续下去，特别 要跨越单一购电机物的模式。张先生，莺克，良彦如欧格顿先生 (Ogden）都期待着本研讨会能提供有用的意兑，也许是进一步改 革的蓝器。 政格领先生，能费、基金会和中爵项自主任，基本同意前面有 关中盟问题的发言，也认为改革应深入下去。此外？他还强调， 在改革的过程中应重视节能，沽净能源技术的发展，及其带来的 健康和环境影响。后面的发言者在谈到，如果在改革初期不重视 这些问题，就会失去宝贵的机会。 菌家计委投资每李副司长也同意，电力工业应深化改革，引 入竞争机制。他强调，改革的目的是提高效率，给用户更多的选 择，而自前，用户只能选择肃屯的多少。学龙生也谈到中爵的特 点，这种情况下改革应如何深化。李先生认为中国特色源自于几 个方面。中国是发展中国家，发展秘诀，用电水平和管理本平忍 不均衡，地 JR 问差异很大，中国正从计划经济向市场经济过渡争 法制法批还不健全。如前面所谈，其它菌家的经晗虽可以参考， 但中爵的改革必须考虑、中国的当地条件。 国家经贸委电力哥副哥长责英华介绍了建立适当法律管制 6 桂架的问题。这垫问题非常重要，两天的·讨论也说明了这一点， 大家时此没有异议。另外，贯先生强调中菌改革应先试点，后推 广，改革的深化应与整个国民经济的发展闰步。根据贯先生萝继 续增长和提高效率的关键是加强电商建设。 实践中的竞争性市场 亨特（ Hunt ）女士首先介绍了这方面的靖况。在九十年代， 很多离家进行了电力工业改革，以前认为很极端 J知如友生的现 象，现在变得平常了，她及以后发玄者都认为中国商前面临的许 多问题在其它居家都得到了很好的解决。 电力工业的结构和市场存在四种模式：横向，纵向垄断的一 体化结构；单一购电机构模式；立售竞争模式（包括向大用户立 接供电）；和零售竞争模式。恕据亨特女士，电力工业的改革不 必经历全部四种模式，如阿根廷，英国？澳大利亚和掷成都没有 经历羊一构龟，机构的模式，而是直接进入了直售和零售竞争模 式。字特女士强调，改革过程应认真设计，并需要明确的法律和 强有力的机构，才能从一种模式进入另一种模式。 改革和爱组是一个长期、复杂而艰皇的过程，需要深忠熟虑 的战略，政府的长期承诺及强有力的政府机构。这是从其它商家 得到的重要经验教剖，负责改革的政府机构应有足够的高素质人 员斧有足够的预算，才能成功地进行改革。 另一个方面，竞争和所有权是两个方面的问题，换句话说？ 简单地改支发电领域的所有权结持并不能带来竞争。竞争需要得 多买方和卖方，它干；1 应能得到可靠的、及时的信息。此外，为了 在电力工业 51 入竞争，必须有很好的市场战，到和结算协议，强有 力的监管机制 7 不能存在能扭曲市场的操纵市场的现象。 国际上，各个国家改革的出发点不完全一样，有的国家是爵 为成本和价格太高（如美国），有的民家是技资太大，政府无力 承担（墨西哥），有的商家是因为信仰（英国），而有的民家是服 务质量太差（阿棒延），有的国家是几个菌素的共罔结果。而在 印度，因为电价太低，电力工业入不敷出，需要改革来提高电力 7 什止的信誉和活力。 尽管改革的出发点不一样，但目的都是要引入竞争。改革的 离家都希望从中获益，实 i导结果也是如此，由于资混（劳力，资 本，燃料等）的夹有效利用而海低了成本箩由于决策的下放而使 行业的运行夹有效。总之，当由价格，而不是由中央决策来决定 供求关系时，带来了具大效益。卒特女士提剑，很多最初对改革 持体疑态度的人也从中获益。 1 研讨会中讨论的一个主要问题是 市场规模问题，市场该多大？简单的回答是越大越好。但市场的 规模受到电网 ~M莫的制约。才民清楚，有些地域大，j、而不可能有真 正的竞争，有些地域发电商太少也不能有竞争。如果发电商太少， 它们会抬高市场价格。应该强调的一点是，市场的最佳规模应由 拭术和经济菌素来决定，品不应由行政边界来决定。在美菌和澳 大利亚，市场都跨过州界，在南美，市垮越过国界。在任何一个 离家，如果市场规模是由其它因素而不是经济和技术因素决定 的，至少会导政史高和更注动的市场价。 车特女士认为，竞争性市场的最基本的结构特拉是发电止务 必须与输电业务分离，价格由市场决定，根据份格进行调度，并 有设计合理的合筒，市场运行在早期就受到强有力的监管（在 国不是这种情况，有很多教训！可以吸取），后面的讨论还谈到了 其它因素，如有足够数量的发电合司，网络准入，市场监管以保 证竞争的公平性。 至于监管，中自西 1j奋与其它国家类似的 i问题，如美器和印度。 在这些国家，存在中央和州两级管制，一方面，有效市场的知J菜 和行政边界并不相同，即时在某一时段，市场和行政具有相司的 边界，随着电网的经济扩展，也会变的不一样。不可避免地，这 涉及民监管问题。特别是在美国，联邦和 9·1·1 管制之间的分工不明 确，责职重叠带来了很多问题，印度目前也在修改法律以解决这 1-i主笑鼠， 19能年 4 月与 2000 .+ 4 月相比，一般家庭的电费从 352 英镑玲到了 2剑英磅每同… 时窃，取决于朵大需求和条荷卒，工~也价下降了 31%.i- 35% ，在阿根泛， ？.t卒约二仨妥效益泛电 厂守了利用率从 1992 年的 48. 1克提高到 1997 年份 78. 2莞；同时时期装机容金从 150台万千瓦上升 到 2000 万千瓦，平均上凋价｛也受和容量价）也大格度下降。如在 1992 年 1 叩 4 月间的平均也 价为$ US40／阴头， ifii 至tl 1997 年的卜4 月间为 $US20/MWh 阳 8 方面的问题，因此，中国在修改电力法时，应吸取这些教训，认 真考虑问题。 布雷福尔德（Bradford）和艾格（Egger ）先生作为讨论者作了 朴充。他们同意各小菌家改革的出发点不一样，改革必须根据其 具体情况进行。他1n 也同意，友电领域的有效竞争要求友电与输 电业务分离，并对残留的垄断业务实施有效的监管。布雷福尔德 先生强烈建议，改革不能半途而废，处于一体化垄断模式和竞争 模式的中问状态时，往往最为糟糕。她也提到，为了能从改我中 获益最大，应该有需求端的反映，即，甩户应能看到真正价格， 并能作出反映。布雷德福尔穗先生提请大家注意，在电价太高时， 如果用户愿意节能，他们应有这种手段。 艾格先生·来韶说，在澳大利亚的改革过程，政府部门的工作， 电力合司的工作和立法部门的工作商时进行，这大大方便了改革 的 J1jpy~1J 进行。这也是一个重要的经验，对中揭很有用。如在后面 第七部分捉到的，电力法应作相应的修改，但也企业可以同时进 行改革。艾格先生也谈到，在澳大利亚的改革过程中，为了制定 市场规，尉，同各方了进行公开、透明的销商，这一点也很有价值。 中纽讨论继续进行，卒特女士，吉尔波尔和卡卢梭先生都件 了评论，吉尔波尔谈了对;fA 营投资者的看法，强调市场应有科于 考材、投资。 卡卢梭先生根据拉美的经验，泼了几点看法。拉美改革的主 要原因是资本不足？由于需求的快速增长，这一问题变得相当严 重。中国自前的状况也是如此。在拉美，由于资金不足，供电质 量严重下降，主要是严重缺屯，服务很差。 根据这一点，改革的政策目标是建立一个有效的电力工业费 以经济拚格满足全部需求，并保证质量，消晗病欺。根据卡卢梭 先生，拉美改革的原则是 u可能时引入竞争，必要时实施管制”。 每个圈家都有其特色，但也有共肉之处，这包持根据是否需要管 制将供电业务分成几个部分，建立竞争性的发电市场，监管输屯 和自己电服务，制定系统有效运行的规则，促进大区内统一市场的 9 形成，用法津保护市场各方，成立相应的札构（如系统和市场运 行者〉，按市场规则运行市场。中爵的问题，可能由于其缺乏金 融市场，留家之大而变更为复杂，但他面临的问题其它国家也成 到过，并都得到了解决。许多国家，如 i可根廷和巳雨，也是发展 中爵家？增长很快，资金严重短缺。还有一些国家，如泼兰和凶 牙利，改革基础设施是其从计划经济过渡到市场经济的一部分。 中国与其它国家一样，有其特别的地方，但其基础设施的问题并 不特别。其它国家的经栓和教训！要根据中国的情况灵活地应用。 分酷段引入竞争的据架 艾格先生介绍了在中南分五个阶段，逐步 51 入竞争市场的提 架，他提到，起初价段可以同时建立省级竞争性电力市场和大区 阔的汉边市场，然后分五个阶段发展省电力市场飞有人指出， 竞争性电力市场不一定要从省钱开始，某主些地区，可以直接建立 大革竞争性电力市场，下面的介绍仅以省级为例，但其原则也适 用于更大的市场。 按黑艾格先生，第一阶段是一个过渡阶坟，该阶段首先实行 发电与输电及调度的分离，建立起全屯最竞争市场，各发电公号 为卖方，省电力公司为单一购电方？另外双方签订差价合约，建 立放立的管制机构，将输电业务转为有公号内部的利润中心。艾 格先生也注意到，在第一阶段，国有的单一购电机构继续承担买 方风险，以居撒~克（Sa lgo）先生（第一k 部分）指出，需前的电力 法允许第一阶段的结构和运行方式。 第二阶段为直售竞争，这时政府拥有的企业不再承担直接的 市场风险，这是很爱耍的一步，在这一阶段，将输电与自己电业务 分开，并按公司法组建成公苟。当然，必须制定输电定价方法。 配电业务也组成公哥，在这一 i琦歧，放立管制机构必须开始正常 运作，市场规别得到批准。差价合约白发电公哥马配电公司签订， 也可允许大用户直接与发电公司签约＊如后面撤尔克先生所说， 2 父格先生的介绍足以浙江发展竞争斗生电力市场的研究为基础，浙江为政府选定的六个试点之 一，进行电力市场改革， 10 要进入第二阶段，民前的法律尚存在一费问题，他建议在进入第 二二阶段前所穆政法律。 第二三阶段是建立零售市场。在这一阶段，配电公司应将其器己 也止务和零售业务分开，所有用户都能选择供电商，目前的法律 不丸许进入第二阶段。 艾格先生也讨论了大区市场的发展过程，他建议在建立大区 电受市场前发展双边交易，各省设立市场交易者，为了以后能形 成大区也董市埠，各有的市场规则必须协调发展，一旦有统一的 规则，就可建立大区竞争性市场，最终，在一个大区内，不同省 的用户能自由选择不同省命的供电窝。 艾格先生的发含引来了很多提问，问题大致可以分为两类， 第一，电力行业是资本密集型产生，建立市场后是否能吸 51 足够 的技资，换句话说，竞争性市场会带来短期效益，但能否满足系 统的长期发展需求；第二二，电力不能储存，怎样才能保证系统的 动态平衡。英国能保证系统的稳定性和可萃，挂是由为有根发达的 输电系统，而中国尚没有。 亭特女士和艾格先生都作了回答，他们认为，往多工业如饭 店，种苹果树都是资本密集型产业，但在全世界都是完全竞争性 工止。其它爵家的改革经验己证明，市场化带来了大受投资，实 际上，只要有好的市场规则及有效的蓝管，投资合滚滚而来。 至于系统可靠性和稳定性，艾格先生答道，块大利亚自改革 以来，可靠性和稳定性大大提高，他特别强调，改革还促进了全 蜀联网及输电系统的强化。亨特女士指虫，只要用户能看到价格 并作业反映，就可以提高稳定性。关于用户能看到现货份格并作 在反映这一问题，很多发言者都强调了这一点。问题的要点是， 如市场价格每小时都在变化，而用户看不到这在是价格信号，他们 就没有机会改变；当费方式，因而不能影响市场扮格。享特女士的 意思是，如果需求方能能改变消费来减少价格块动，这有利于系 统稳定。 11 发电与输配业务的分离 拉马林先生（Lama ch）讨论了中理发电业务间的产权关系及 其对改革的影响，才立马赫先生前意前面的发言观点，并再次强调， 发电必须彻底与输配业务分离，即从管理上和产权上分离，保证 各发电商受到公平对持，并降他新投资者曲，，备的风险，这一点非 常必要。 关于发电公司的数量，没有一个能满足各种环境的最佳答 案，但有些有用的理则可供参考。第一，很明显的一点，生产者 的数量越多，进入市场自力越小，市场就越具有竞争力，第二， 一般来说是同一市场内至少应存在伊 J莫类似的 5 至 6 家公司，但 如果有 5 至 6 家公司，而一家占主导地位，市场也不能得好运作。 一般的原则虽可供参考，但不能提供准确的答案，具体’！青况 必袋具体对待，另升也应注意到，结构问题不是唯一需要关心的 事情。如果存在合适的竞争对手，但它们合谋抬价，也会影响到 市场的正常运行。国此，应有有效的监管体制，以保护用户。总 之，合翠的市场结构和有效的监管都持常必要。 拉玛赫先生继续计论了两小问题，其影响及可能的解决办 法。第一，在电力行业，少数几小国有公号拥有产权，产丰又相当 中，会影响到竞争，四夺中央机构和十多个省投资公哥拥有和 管理了 90骂以上的发电业务，而在某些省份，因电公哥和省投资 公司两家控制了几乎全部发电业务。拉马林认为应建立史多的国 有公司来使产权进一步多样化，如可以由银行，投资信托基金和 其它控股公司来拥有部分资产。 第工个担心是私人投资者在电力行业很少参局管理乡尽管有 很多合资公哥和上市公司，电 f 管理仍有省投资公司和雷电公司 掌握。杜马赫先生捉到是否可以向国内升技资者出售权份，以使 其能控股并管理电厂。 己多次谈到，产权和管理过渡集中会减少竞争时效益。在很 大程度上，只有清按目前的垄断，并侨选自由市场的条件，竞争 12 的效益才能体现。两者的组合会使管理方式，技术等多样化。 菌家计委都卫平先生敢谈了一些看法，都先生同意存在很多 问题，强满要努力去解决它侣，他也强调要制定政策，吸引再生 能潜领域的投资。 有些听众提到，有些检司正在集中雨不是剥离资产， HHI3指 数到底是志么回事。拉马赫免生解释了出 I 指数及如何使用的问 题。对 HHI 指数的解释也说明为什么至少要有 5 至 4 家发电公司。 应再次强调，这是一般恶别，具体情2克，应具体分析，其它菌素， 如各峭的相对规棋，监管的质量，各公司的效率等，都应给予 适应的考虑。 当然，发电公哥的数量仅是一个问题，另一个是这按公司的 内涵，即公司的资产组合。这一问题应认真研究，以保证各公司 间基荷电厂，调峰电厂分配均衡。另外，新考电厂的问题电多次 谈到，这一问题各个国家都遇到过，并且都才良好地解决这一问题。 韦斯勒先生（Wessler）也谈了发输分离的问题，认为是建立 竞争性电力市场的必要步骤。他强调，不管采用什么办法分离， 所有各方都应参加讨论？以使各参与方能受到平等对待。如果有 发电厂与输电业务有关联，即使它们之前没有什么内部交易，别 人也会有这种感觉乡也会影响到竞争的力度，影响新拭资者的信 ＇＂~ 一。 有些人认为，发电与输自己业务分离时也可以有例外，如辅助 服务的提供。国际经拴表明，电网公司不拥有电厂时，也能有效 地获得辅动服务，享特女士发言时也强调了这一点。在英国，改 革书期圈家电网公号保驾了拾水蓄能电站，但几年以后跑着辅助 服务的定价，卖掉了这一电厂。 ' HHI 是一个简单，辈革糙的引导市场委主构的指数，计算如下，最集中的时候为一家公司占有合部 ？君主牵＠望在1 是各公司份额平均受如后的结采，当只有一家公句对，隐：为 10 扩或 10000 ，占有份 额相同的公司时，在HI 为 2 0'+2 01+2 0'+20'+2 o＇吨 000 ，一般说，那I 越低越好，当自HI 为 2000 豆豆 2800 时，一敖革也有令边的竞争，当 5 家公4号份额不等时，意味着有大有小，这时 HHI 楼大，竞 争程皮下降． 13 为了保证竞争环境，发输分离时有几个步骤。输电业务必须 分离出来并单独定价，输电服务的可利用情况及其份4剖言息必须 公开透明，输电电价应有利于系统的有效运行，有利于新的投资。 关于输电问题，卡卢梭在第五部分作了卉绍。 建立发电别竞争市场的关键是制定合适的市场规，肘，竞争性 的市场规别应包括卖实攻方合闰的桂架，现货市场的运行挟，别。 韦斯勒先生强调，发输分开是必要的一步，但其本身并不能 保证市场的竞争性。大家都认识到，要保证竞争，应有合理的规 则，有效的监管，不存在阻止进入市场的障碍，在发输产权共有 的地方料离发电资产。 在吴国，过去二年内剥离了 15%的发电资产。得到的干什格大 大高于预龙的估计，从品使预计的搁浅成本下路。当初估计有 20 创亿美元的搁浅成本？而现在这一数字下降了 700 亿美元。 价格相对较高的原因是电厂都卖给了有经验的公司，他们认均在 新的市场条件下，他们能更有效地经营电厂。 舍雷先生（Wayne Shirley）认为，发电公司的竞争主要取决 于监管的质量。一般来说，监管的环境越差，需要的公司越多 a 舍雷先生还说，对再生能源挟术，如风力等，制定和实施透明的、 公开的准入规则是非营重类的。此外，定街时要考虑到再生能源 技术的特点，再生能满、技术才有竞争力。如，风力发电厂和火电 厂在发电容量一样的’请况下，由于风能的不稳定性，二者可提供 的电量也大不相间。他认为 2 这种差别应在龟，力传输价格上反映 击来，否则将对再生资源带来不利影响。正如第六部分所强调的， 再生技术和能源效卒等此类问题，应在改革设计和引进新的市场 机制时，就予以考虑。 舍雷先生还担心，在！哥时拥有输电和发电产权的地方，往往 倾向于府自己的电厂。其他人也同意他的这种观点。再生能勇、技 术的地点根有局限性，对公开准入的障碍非常敏感。合雷先生最 后谈到，对电厂进行剥离之前，必绩考虑将较老的厂子选行清理 整顿，重新规划，以满足其对环境的要求，否则将丧失一次重要 14 的机会。 卡卢梭和撒尔克先生提供了蜀际上对发电进行重短的实例。 卡卢梭先生说，阿根廷通过 1991 年总统令，制定了电力部门改 革的主典指导政策。能提部各署了第 38 号决议，在总统令的基 础上，创立了电力直供市场。此时，整个电力行生归因家所有， 决议并没有规定所有制方面的变化。电力工业的主体（发屯和输 电业务）由中央拥有的回家公司掌握。同时还有 20 多家在级发 屯和在电公司。 政府对电力部门改革和 11 进竞争时，首先对发电、输电和西己 电领域进行了纵向分割（不管所有制如何）。罔时也用了横向分 割的办法，即将每一个发电厂都千字为一个不同的市场主体。直供 市场的运行由中央操作，由一个独立的系统和市场运行者来控 制给 阿根廷政府认为，多样化可以产生不肉的思想，不町的纽织 ~Jt.构副文化 所有制由政府控制，但由于不向公司，不同权限和不同工会及不 商单位都在负责（能源部，原子能委员会，跨国单位及省政府）， 也有不同程度的竞争。改革的后期，通过允许私有拭资者进入市 场，所有制的进一步多元，化和竞争程度也随之加尉。 操 {Jt 克先生讲了印度的情况。印度在许多领域句中国的情况 不间。在印度，由于诸家固有电力委员合财务严重亏损，使得印 度电力部门改革迅速开展开来。印度改革的立要目的是建立一个 信誉良好的电力部门。因此，也就谈不上对电力部门的重新组合。 Orissa 邦对火电公司 4 州的股份及其管程控制权进行了拍卖，最 终卖给了一家美国公哥。随着印度改革的继续进行，侧重点可能 会放在所有的离有电力委员会发电业务重纽并对其股份进行剥 离。合理的剥离有利于引进竞争。同时，也是电力部门重新赢四 千言誉的必要举措。撤尔克先生因此得出了这样一个结论，对发电 进行都离方面，印度的情况确实不向于中醋。但另一方面，中国 确实可以从即夜的改革中汲取一个教剖，那就是，不管改革过程 中遇到那岳阻力，必须充分重视发电业务的重组。 15 布雷福 fjq患先生和艾格先生还对发电分离和剥离进行了补 充。布雷福 it：德先生说，美国的都离是自愿的？不是强迫的。监 管机鸪起初的意圈是发电和输电分离，并希望通过监管机钩对 《行为准则》的实施，艇，范市场行为。最后证明这并不是最好的 办法。录才离活动始于美国东北的一家公司，主要活动是变卖资产。 变卖中的意升高价格使其他公司错纷进行效坊。 布雷福尔德先生还建议，应有一个边嚼的政策，以便使资产 变卖利益重新用于消费者，以抵琦改革引起的高价及搁浅成本。 布雷福尔德先生还说，在美酶，由于联邦政府和列政府每能从竞 争中取得所希望的部报，对搁浅成本的处理，尤其是由用户承担 的那部分成本的处理不是很好。有一位观众跑后发言说，有按政 府自己拥有资产，台己承担揭浅成本责任，这跟关国的情况差别 很大。 最后，布雷福~德先生认为，只有当用户学会如何正确面对 价格，学会在不罔时段根据价格调整负荷，学会节省电力，或使 用自发电（有些时段比现货市场要便宜），零售竞争市场才有可 能实现40 布雷福尔德先生还向大家介绍说，最近几年，美国主 要的电力供应米自节能。 有雷描 ~1:泰先生又补充说，主口川·阳、最近实施的市场规划和市 场规则中，也得到了一些教训。他认为这一情况值得研究。 艾格先生介绍的澳大利亚的情况品又不一样。维多利亚将其电 厂分成了七家公司，合司的 ~JL模根据预期的销售值决定。每一家 公司都在市场进行了公开销售。他还说，维多利亚和新南成~士 的内部遥远，为发电增加了新的竞争渠道。 新南威尔士棋据发电能力、基础设施、煤炭合冉、劳力等， 分成了三家政府所有的公号。但没有进行私有化。昆士兰州也进 4 应该指出，“零售”和“1i..供”的 JH民并不明确，例如，有必定义中的立供竞争包括沟鼠也公 司和大用户立在是供建~.而另一些定义中， 3豆供足向 3ξ售单位的供也，苦F仅包括器己也公司，不包 括大用户。主~~哥和布雷格尔德先生l有了后者。在关阂，不管其大小，在没有零售竞争的情况下， 不能立接从发电商始龟，而在另一些因家，如夹在号，直供包括大用户。 16 行了类似的改革？共分成了三家在〉哥，并成立了第四家公句 场交易者 场交易者负责的双边合向约占？节场份额的 25 %。昆士兰是全国 电力市场中的一个分市场，它采用了全国市场规则。因此，这一 政琦鼓励乌合国联网，但一旦联网，不必在向意市场规则。 南澳大利亚分成了三家公司，与维多利亚遥远后，开辟了竞 争新渠道。塔斯马尼亚则只有一家发电公司，与维多利亚没有遥 远。 输电和配电量徨 第一部分讲了直供竞争的准备工作。大家都知道，在第二部 分，介绍了第一、第二如第二附段 51 入市场竞争的进展情况。艾 格先生介绍了进入第一阶段和第二阶段前应完成的工作。关于第 二阶碌的竞争问题，没有在此进拧讨论。 第一i号子段竞争的准备有几个重要的内容。活动内容见，以下清 单（未按优先路序排列）。具体程序包括将发电管理从输电中分 离出来，建立电董市场和差份合闰市场。应确立市场规则，制定 输电接入坤、议。此外，必须建立控制新秩序的监管原剔。 艾格先生说，在这一阶段最重妥的是建立输电足价方式，市 场信息系统和信息发布制度。艾格先生认为，第一阶段是过渡期， 主要任务是形成一个是具竞争性的买方为单一殉电机构的市场 结构。在这一阶段内，若输屯和配电为捆绑式，财可维持现状， 但价格不采取目前的定价方式，而应由市场竞争决定。 第二i贷段建立在第一价段之上，复杂性史高。在这一阶段， 输、高乙电己完全分开，并在各由领域成立了公司，因此，需要对 每个公奇的资产和集债进4于认定。输电接入和差价合前必须进行 史新， flp 由多家自己电公司取代单一购电者。此外，市场规则必须 进行适当修改，允许与竞争用户等签定新合肉。问时，还要修改 市场信息系统，以满足第二阶段的要求。艾格先生建议，在第二 阶段内，应有一个具体项目，卖责将发电、配电所有权从电力公 17 司移交给政府。但必须注意决策中会遇到的许多复杂和难以决定 的决策因素，诸如公哥数量、规模及总体告排等。这种明自在卒 按时候丹始 j是为有年1J ，最晚也应在规划时侠开始。 卡卢梭先生！朝边了他关于输电，系统向竞争性市场过授的观 点和要求。一个竞争，技市场的目标是提高运行及其拭资效率。电 厂规模和挟术应根据市场馆号进行决定。正如早先所提到的，在 一个竞争性的市场 3 价格决定着供应，并规花着需求。卡卢梭先 生也非常明确地指出，厂主ii:.选择需要根据输电成本的有关信息决 定。此玲，输电领域的心开准入是正确决策的一个最基本前提。 在一个发育良好的竞争性市场，所有参与方应通过公开准入 输电系统进行文易。监管机构应将准入台动授予所有参与方。电 力调度应透明并在元，歧视原射下进行。为促进电力系统的有效利 用，输电政务成本应从输电收费中进行解决。输电费用的四拭应 有利于略低整个系统的或本，并公平对待各参与方。卡卢梭先生 给挠了几种输电定价的方法雪并就每种方法的利和弊进行了讨 论。卡卢梭先生提出的一个重要观点使是，在许多发展中国家， 大都需要在输电领域进行庞大的技资，这支需要有合理的输电传 。作为一种垄断服务，输电应得再监管。也就是说，输电价格 应由监管机构来制定，并鱼责监督实施公开革入。 为输电系统建立一种卡卢梭先生说的“扩建机制好也是非常 有必要的。扩建可以由系统运行者或市场参与者进行，但技资必 须经监管机稳批准。这是因为输电是垄断行业，新投资成本以及 运行成本由各方承担，最终由 j奇电用户承担。成本如何分配主要 取决于定价方法。 卡卢後先生发言的核心意思可总结如下：输电系统是竞争市 场的中心内容。输电系统作为一种垄断行业，需要进行：合理监管。 监管中要实行公开准入王军则，定价机制应有利于输电系统的有效 利用，系统扩建的成本也要力求挣至最低。 省和地在市场在统一化过程中，有几个问题应值得注意。正 如其他部分中所说，其他国家在经济市场扩大时，由于监管交叉 18 和不一致，导致了许多问题的出现。布雷福~德和韦斯勒先生还 解释说，这正是因拭美国重级的一个大难题。卡卢梭克生强调说， 市场一体化要求不甫的行政地区执行统一的直供和输电定价原 则。从另外一个角度说，就是在制定新的电力法时，很有必要对 上述问题给予考虑。美国就是因为没有协调好州与洲、外！与联邦 的利益冲突而什出了代份。中国应从中汉取这一教训。 输电讨论结束后，接着又对自己电、输电分离进行了集体讨论。 莫斯克，维茨克生提出了输电方曲的四个重要原则，并作了详 细说明。第一是建立合理的结构，他谈到要慎重对待美自 ISO 这 种模式，该模式下 ISO 不辑有输电线路，在系统维护和扩建方面 没有什么权力和义务。第二是通过所采取的监管方式建立激励机 制。最重要的是要在输电企业内建立机制，使其能认真比较堵塞 成本与建设费用，并慎重考虑、各种输电建设方案。第二是要考虑 需求端的反映。他谈到了关自几个市场的缺陆及如何能使所有市 场参与者都作出积极的反映。最后，他注意到有接输电定价方法 对再生能源不利，这样对中民开发西部的政策等碍标也会影成障 碍。 现将讨论中的好的几点总结如下。第一，将整个自己电业务从 输电业务中分亮出来，将其再分为史小的商己也公哥的问题先不在 这里进行讨论。很显然，输自己分离需要对分别属于输屯和配电的 资产进行整理和清理，资产的分配主要根据电压水平进什。但资 产只是一个方面，在财务计划上，还应就卖债分配问题做 tl:: 决策。 将勇己也行业再分为小的公司是一个更为困难的任务。它包括 诸多的因素，如潜在的销售价值，“政治”菌素，将不间的客户 进行合理的组合等。在澳大利亚，维多利亚州共分成了 5 家公哥。 在新南威尔士 9·l·J 分成了六个，在昆士兰州有两个，南澳和塔斯马 尼豆州各有一个。在实花改革的印第各邦中，公寻数量有所不哨， 但总的思路大体一致。 莫斯克维茨先生就自己电业务泼了二点。第一，应建立正确的 激励机制，鼓励配电公司投资能源、效率。为此，他建议监管应限 19 制器已电公苟的最高收入，而不是鼓励其增加销售。第五，斗、~发 电技术领域技术发展迅速，由于其环保特性及蜂低输昌己也成本时 的能力，应鼓励高效热电联产和燃料电池的友展。第二，美留环 境监管的方式与竞争性市场互相矛盾。他敦促，在电力改革的同 时，应考虑环保领域的改革。 保证可持钱发摆 布雷福尔德和莫斯克维茨先生发宫的题目是可持续发展。他 们的发含有交叉之处，现，点也比较一致，因此将他们的发宫放在 一起进行总结。 他们发宫的何重点是电力部门改革与环境的关系。主要的经验教 训是，具体问题的具体处理方法以及原别的斜定会对环境产生非 常重要的正语或负面影响。正如其他发言人所说的那样，这些问 题应在规划设计阶段就进行考虑，以避免出现以外的后果。 他有1 建议，改革工作纽应有环境和公共卫生的官员参加，工 作组应具有对缓解环境和卫生影响进拧分析的权力。他们还建 议，有效的市场札制是控制污染物释放另外一种有效的方法，在 可以考虑衍对于那些对环境和卫生有影响但不能完全援解的，应 在资源选择时给予一定的保留。此外，资混采腾规则和费用政策 应体现能源保护效益的价佳。 在规占；设计和实施过程中，对可持续发展有重大影响领域主 要包括以下几个方面： 需求反应 这是一个带有普遍性的观，哉。如前所述，若价格以小时计算， 再消费者并没有看到这种小时份佳，他和就不会对这种价格进行 反应。所谓的反应，是表现为转移负担，节能或使用现场发电等 的活动。对这种价格没有任何反应，使导致了最高价格不能追过 消费者的行为来缓和。需求反应是经济学的最基本原理。在一个 市场中，恰格应诱导供应，并使需求合理化。后者的实现前提是 20 消费者得封的价格必须合理。竞争性市场需要这样的信息。 间歇性资揉 太阳如风力为问歇性资琼，这种资蝶的各小时之间的产虫不 象矿物生产那样有预测性。使用的规则可以促进，也可以阻碍这 些资源的发展也如，若一个电量市场采用的投标原财要求所有的 发电方将小时发电本平提前一天进行申报，并且，若所报发电量 达不到要求，就将施以处罚。这种规时对太阳和风力资涯的影响 是显而易芜的。 容量成本和可信皮定价 不同的电董市场因对容量要求或是否要求单独容堂市场而 不同。也根据他们如何确定电金市场的运行要求有关。有雷福尔 德和莫斯克维茨先生指出，容量市场的存在和所要求的储存水平 将影响将要建立的容量类查。他们建议，在对市场进写于设计决策 时，应考虑、清洁能源资潺的影响。 剥离 正如舍雷先生克前所讲，这里主要强谓的一点是，主发电川、 输电中分离出来时，发电的新拥有者理所当然地有了新的权力和 责任。一是希望新的发电厂不用将环境清洁成本转移给消费者， 相应地也不用电厂自己承担满足法律要求以外的任何义务。这样 就难以将清洁义务加到电厂方面。这一建议旨在将这方面的义务 作为输配电分离任务的一部分。若这样，对潜在购买者义务的评 估，就需从资产的价值上进行反映。 间歇资源的输电定价 持这种观点的人认为，在没有建立一个统一的、透明的输电 定价系统前，有些方法就形成了对风等问款资涯的偏凡。比如， 若价格是根据装机容量来确定，别 100 兆瓦的风力厂研付的价钱 与 100 兆瓦的天然气厂相间，但风力发电厂的能渭、产出〈有时在 21 叫 4 古巴量西子押）可能会少的多。若再生能源都处于离主负荷很 远的边缘地区，那么根据输电距离来进行定价的方法就会导致许 多问题。这一建议的核心，是使用一种能公平地接调再生能滑、和 提高能源效率关系的输电定价方法。莫斯克维茨和布雷福尔德、先 生在这里特意提到了堵塞定份法。 莫斯克维茨和布雷揭尔德先生还阐述了其他一些问题。其中 心内容是，环境保护、能源效率和相对合理的发电途径都应是改 革和重组内容的一部分。否则，将会产生意外的后果，并丧失好 的机遇。 竞争性电力市场的法律如监管改革 揉尔克先生讲了在现有法律桂架下，竞争性电力市场可以实 施的程度。撒尔克先生说乡一个法律柜架不应只有一个《电力法》， 还应包挂有关决策和颂布的条例。在后面的讨论中箩科斯桂先生 (Clifford Gars tang）作了补充，认为时产和合司法也是法律捏 架的一部分。 撒尔克，先生得出的结论是，珉，有法律可以丸许竞争性电力市 场在某种程度的发展。这一结论也得到了科斯坦先生的赞 i习。具 体说来多现有法律允许单一购买者介入。根据 1999 年条例规定， 发电就应从输电中分离出来。品且，法撑也九许单一魏电者在竞 价的基础上买屯。换句话说，法律不会要求羊一购电者具体地制 定价格并进抒购屯。因此，可以合法地，建立竞争性的电力市场， 接求每小时报价，从而决定每，j、时的市场价格。此升，法律九许 并真正鼓励省和地区间的贸易发展。从法律上讲，为了平抑高价 格，可以为买电者和卖电者规划差价合筒，以便保证卖方得到合 理的收入。总而言之，艾格先生所述的第一阱段的竞争问题，有 可能在现有法律的前提下得到实现。 随着竞争性市场的进一步发展，现有法律的弱点就越来越明 显。很显然，现有法律没有考虑到乡至少不能解释为，允许大客 户（或客户）根据吉己的要求直接签定合同。对立供竞争（包括 大用户）影成了几方面的扭力，并明显地阻碍了零售竞争的开展。 22 但还有史重要的一点，那就是，即使现有法律允许有 F豆豆棋 竞争，但不宜过快地向这一同样过液。所有的专家认为，竞争市 场的合程发展需要高段莹的监管，而现有法律并不具备这些特 征。此外，修改后的法律应对输配电，功能进行具体说明。撒尔克 先生所提建议归纳起来就是，在继续进行现有工作的同时，应同 时制定新的法律，将羊一购电者变为竞争性购屯，从而进一步加 深竞争的力度，使法律史加全面。 科斯坦先生补充说，在发展竞争性市场的过程中，还应注意 其他几个法律领域的事宜。竞争政策：这不仅是电力部门的要求， 跑着中国加入世贸纽纸，其他部门也要遵循这一原则。公司法： 科斯垣先生认为，中爵的公司法在改革和竞争市场初期是适用 的，但i连着部门的发展和所有制的多元，化，其弱点也会越来越明 显。主要担心的问题是：少数政权，董事会的地位和作用，传息 的维护和发苟等。合同法：中国在合闻法领域，已经取得了一些 进步，但做得还不够。合同权利和义务及段约等，是市场正常运 作的关键所在。资本市场：应得到进一步解放，以促进扩建和资 产重组。 布雷描¢~意先生就正确监管的特点进行了发言。所有的发言 人也都认为，他们在其他国家的亲自经历中，说明高政莹的监管 是非常重要的。好的监管必须樵立于被监管的单位。有人也许会 说，只有被豆豆管的企业为和人企业时，监管机构的棋立性才相当 重要。实际上当政月号拥有企业时，如果不将监管与产权分开，很 多国家出现了严重问题。 监管机y均应不受过多的政治干预。虽然有的监管决策的制定 会非常艰雄，且冲突不断，但这些决定，或者说所有的决定，都 应由蓝营机构自己做出，而不必面格过多的来自政府的压力，甚 至是政府对蓝管机构决定的修改轧否定。被监管价格的制定，应 以桨优罚劣为原则，并合理地反映监管服务的成本。 监管程序应公开、透明，所选人员应业务精良，专业〈如工 程、财务、经济、会计等）对口。监管机构与各参与方在许多重 大问题上可以进行沟通。这就是通常所说的 4协商”办事程序。 23 此外，所做出的所有决策应为书面式，并写明决策的依据，以及 得出结论的凉因。所做的决策应对公众公开。所有这些政策将提 高监管机梅和监管程序在各市场参与者中的信誉。 最后，监管政策应有持续性和稳定性。要达到这一目标，就 必须保持监管机构政治上的棋立性及信息的可靠性。 布雷福 ~＇b意先生的观点得到了会议的认可，但一位参会人员 的意见也引起了大会的高度重视。这位参会人员认为，也许没有 必要成立一个新的监管札构。中国的问题在于不同部门非常分 散，将这些分散的部分统一起来作为一个监管机坊，也许比成立 一个新的机构要简单易抒。但也有人认为，成立一个新组织，可 以成为一个崭新活动的开端，可以引进新的、吴适合市场经济的 监管方法。 前面已经讲到，改革和重纽是一项长期的和复杂的任务，需 要得到政府的承诺和支持。其中，政府必须对与实施合理的监管 和政策相冲突的政府机构的职责进行重新考虑和安排。正如几个 专家在讨论中所提到的，正确监管的最终结果便是，监管职能将 集中在一个部门，而政策制定职能将集中在另外一个部门。每个 部门必缆配备精良的专业人员，并有充足的资金散保证。若没有 这样一个监管和政策结艳，并且目前的交叉和冲突管理结续存 在，那么改革将处于一种急险的境地。 结束语 最后，厨家计委基础产业司司长宋密女士对会议进行了总 结，宋女士认为，会议开得非常成功，达封了预期的民的。通过 各位发言者的介绍，与会代表了解到世界各国电力体制改革的京 肉模式，为中爵的改革提供了怨多可以借鉴的经验与教训，各岛 在电力体制改革的进程中有自己的特点。 来女士指出，各位发言者为中爵的改革提出了 1良好的建议， 使乌合代表在以下方面加深了对中白电力体制改革的认识。 24 一是进一步认清了改革的必要性与紧迫性，坚定了改革的传 心，中国的改革，要结合中弱的国情，借鉴离际上成功的经验， 吸取教剖，减少失误。 二是典打破垄断、引进竞争。代表们进一步感到，无论任何 改革模式，关键要打破垄斯、引进竞争。作为改革的第一步，要 在发电领域进入竞争札制，首先要做到发电与输电分离。其次要 建立强有力的政府监管部；1 ，制定有效规则，保证市场的古老康发 展。 二是改革一定要有科于发展，中国是发展中国家，要处理好 “发展”与“改革”的关系，通过改革促进电力工业的发展。 四是要通过改革提高效率、降低成本。这实段上就是改革的 出发 五是要处理女子近期改革自林和远据自标的关系。中国的改革 要本别设置近期野林和远期司标，要注意近期和远期的结合。 六是要有利于环境保护以及可持续发展自在电力工业的改革 中要特别重视环保以及可持续发展，通过体制改革影成完善的市 场规则，鼓励清洁和可再生能涯的发展。 七是在改革中，要充分重视法律、法规的重要性，及时对电 力法提出修改意见。 25 深化中国电力部门改革 国际研讨会 国家发展计划委员会。DPC ）主办 世界银行 CWB ）与能源基金会（BF）协办 2000 年 10 月 9 日至 10 日 10 月 9 日 （星期一） 会议第一天 8: 30 开幕 8: 30-8: 50 由主办单位与协办单位致开幕辞 国家计委副主任张国宝先生 世界银行能源行业局局长莺见良彦先生 能源基金会中国可持续能源项目负责人道格 拉斯．欧格顿先生 8:50-9:10 发言人：李彦梦国家计委投资司副司长 题目：面临的问题及改革的目标 主题：明确（ 1 ）过去 20 年来的改革过程中已 经取得的主要成绩；（ 2 ）原有省级单一买方体 制的局限性；（ 3 ）引进竞争所要达到的目标和 应该注意的问题；（ 4 ）引进竞争需要制定哪些 26 具体的政策与策略。 9: 10-9: 20 发言人：贾英华， 国家经济贸易委员会电力司副 司长 9: 20-9: 50 发言人：萨里．亨特女士 题目：国际经验的总体介绍 主题：介绍相关概念并提供简明综述。主要包 括（ 1 ）电力行业中竞争的含义，其重点是： 明确概念；确定现有行业实体和政府机构的角 色和运作程序；预期的效益。（ 2 ）澄清问题， 如：确定可接受市场的大小的标准是什么；是 否存在最大或最小的限额；系统运行人是否需 要拥有主要的发电设施－在没有所有权的情 况下如何进行控制；（ 3 ）实施竞争和获得利益 需要的最小结构、管制和体制变化 。 9: 50-10: 30 讨论一国际经验评价 讨论发言人：比德．布雷福尔德（美国） ， 彼得． 艾格（澳大利亚）， 平均每人 15 分钟引导发言＋ 10 分钟所有参加 人提问和回答 主题：每个发言人讨论的重点应放在（ 1 ）引 入竞争的政策目标和体制背景；（ 2 ）改革的预 期效益及获得的实际利益 ； （ 3 ）实施中存在的 27 问题；（ 4 ）从实践中总结的经拴（应采取的不 同措施）。 10: 30-10: 45 休息 10: 45 『11: 25 讨论 讨论发言人：萨里．亨特（英国）；存治．吉尔波 尔（美国）；路易斯．卡卢梭（拉丁美洲） 平均每人 15 分钟讨论发言＋ 10 分钟提问和回 答 11: 25-12: 00 发宫人：彼得艾格 题 目：竞争的分阶段寻 i 进一框架 主题：主要讨论：（ 1 ）在中国电力行业逐步引 入和扩大竞争的过程中，电力体制的结构和容 堂；（ 2 ）在两个层次，即省级和地区级实施竞 争性电力市场的可行性；（ 3 ）将第一阶段（发 电竞争卧在〉作为重要转换阶段的原因 a 12: 00-12: 30 提问和讨论 12: 30-13: 30 午餐 28 13: 30-13: 45 发言人；兰杰．拉马赫 题 目：中国发电企业所有权的相关分析 主题：（ 1 ）中国现有的交叉控股和垂直所有权关 联问题；（ 2 ）引入竞争机制后 ， 所有权关联中出 现的重要问题；（ 3 ）当引入竞争时可能出现的搁 浅成本。 13: 45-14: 00 讨论 讨论发言人；国家计委基础产业司郝卫平副处 长，国家经贸委代表与国电公司代表 14: 00-14: 30 发言人：文罗特．韦斯勒 题 目：厂网分开一重点和过渡 主题：主要讨论：（ 1 ）输配电公司拥有发电所有 权以及供电商拥有的市场权力将会如何破坏竞 争；（ 2 ）托管和实施发电分离或剥离；（ 3 ）评论 处理搁浅成本的不同机制；（ 4 ）讨论管制保护措 施和实践以确保发电商竞争行为 。 14: 30-14:45 讨论 讨论发言人：怀息．舍雷 14: 45-15: 00 全体提问和讨论 15:00-15:40 讨论：厂网分开一国际实践 讨论发言人：路易斯．卡卢梭（拉丁美洲）；哈威． 29 萨尔克（印度） 平均每人 15 分钟讨论发言＋ 10 分钟所有参加人 提问和回答 主题：每个发言人应重点讨论：（ 1 ）实施发电分 离的机制；评估方案；方法选择和实施结果；（ 2 ) 对中国可资借鉴的经验。 15: 40-16: 00 1：木，患 16: 00-16:40 讨 i仑 讨论发言人：彼得．布雷福尔德（美国）和彼得． 艾格（澳大利亚） 平均每人 15 分钟引导讨论发言＋ 10 分钟所有参 加人提问和回答 16: 40-17: 30 全体提问和讨论 10 月 10 日（星期二） 第二天会议 8: 30-8: 50 发言人：彼得．艾格 题目：开展输电向配电批发竞争的准备工作 主题： 4平论向第二阶段（输电向配屯的批发竞争 阶段）过渡必须满足的要求和条件，重点放在对 主要的输电和西己电重组问题的讨论上。 30 8: 5 • 9: 2白 发言人：路易斯．卡卢放 题目：改革输电环节联引入竞争视制－ 主题：提供实施电力市场竞争辉需的输电改革方 面的问题，包括：（ 1 ）公开准入和所有权问题； (2 ）确保省级和区域市场的一体化的原刑和政 策。 9: 20阳9: 4 在讨论 讨论发言人：怀息．舍宫，艾罗特．韦斯勒，芬治． 吉尔波~ 9: 40-10: 00 全体提问和时论 10: 00-10: 40 讨论：配电环节的改革 讨论发言人：彼得．艾格（澳大利亚），路易斯卡 卢梭（拉丁美洲〉 每人 15 分钟发言＋ 10 分钟全体提问和回答 主题：每个发言人应概括介绍本国配电体制改革 所采取的重要步碟，主要包捂：（ 1 ）确定配电公 司数量和大小的标准；（ 2 ）如何使所有权发生变 化；（引为减少购电风险和容量的增大需要采取 的办法。 10: 40-11: 00 休息 11: 00-11 ：“讨论 讨论发言人：怀息·合雷（美国），芬治古~波尔 （关国），萨旦亨特｛英国人平均每人 15 分钟 发言＋ 10 分钟掰有参加人提问和回答 11: 40-12·: 30 全体提问和讨论． 31 12: 30-13: 30 午餐 13: 30-13: 45 发言人：彼得．布雷福尔德 题目：电力市场化改革中对环境可持续性的考虑 主题：主要探讨在电力 保‘制改革中如何保障环境 的可持续发展。 13: 45-14: 00 发言人：大卫．莫斯克维茨 题目：如何在电力体制改革中保证可持续发展 主题：论述电力行业在环境保护过程中的作用评 论改革过程中需考虑的重点问题和保护措施。 14: 00-14: 30 全体提问和讨论 14: 30-15: 00 发言人：哈成．撒尔古 题 目：在现有法律框架中实施竞争性市场 32 主题：讨论在现有法律框架内如何引入竞争。 讨 论要在 1995 年中国电力法的法律框价内进行。 主要讨论在相关法律不发生根本变化的情况下， 改革所要达到的目标。 15: 00-15: 15 讨论 讨论发言人：科旦大科斯坦 15: 15-15: 30 休息 15: 30-16: 00 发言人：彼得．布雷福尔德／大卫．莫斯克维茨 题目：管制要求 主题：包括：（ 1 ）建议中央和省级管理职能的分 离；（ 2 ）澄清中央和省级管理者的角色和职能。 16: 00-16: 20 讨论 讨论发言人：文罗特．韦斯勒（美国人哈成．撤尔 古（印度） 16: 20-17: 00 全体提问和讨论 17: 00-17: 30 发言人：宋密女士（国家计委基础产业司司长） 题．目：研讨会总结 由哈成－~：散尔古，赵建平 ， 萨里· 亨特，彼得·布雷 33 福 frq悉，怀忠舍雷在会议的过程中协助记录与 整理。 34 会 议 签 到 表 序号 维 名 单 位 职 务 中方代表 张居室 国家发展计划委员会 副主任 2 能和立 国务院研究室 副司长 3 盖越精 由务院法制办 副处长 4 冯飞 国务程发展研究中，b 酣部长 5 贾散华 自务院办公厅 副处长 6 蒋跃 国务院体改办 司级巡视员员 1 李海超 国务院体改办 副湾长 8 来葛龙 国务院经济体制改革办公室 副主t长 9 戴桂英 型家计委 酣司长 10 朱宝芝 国家计委 11 剖建宇 国家计委 12 宋密 国家计委 司长 13 亭云林 国家计委 处长 14 玉碰 自家计委 处长 15 郝卫平 菌家计委 副处长 16 史立山 国家计委 酣处长 17 梁被 国家计委 18 秦海军 国家计委 19 揭重 国家计委 20 韩慧芳 国家计委 副司长 21 李才华 国家计委 剧处长 22 李彦梦 国豆豆计委投资司 副司长 23 王晓涛 型家计委 副司长 24 汪文祥 留家计委 主任 25 亭京京 国家计委能摞所 主任 26 庄辈 国家计委能源所 副主任 27 张正敏 国家计委能漉所 教授 28 彭芳春 国家计委能源所 教授 29 孟松 厨家计委能溜所 itl 教授 30 任东明 国家计委能激所 博士 31 梁志蹄 国家计委能源所 博士 32 林宝 国家计委能摞所 33 刘英翠 眉家计委能源所 35 34 汪普朝 国家计委能源所 35 周大培 自家计委能激研究所 所长 36 周风趣 国家计委能源研究所 37 韩文科 E皇家计委能摞研究所 副所长 38 戴彦德 居家计委能摞研究所 39 果钟现 自家计委能源研究所 40 架时远 国家计委能源研究所 41 商t挂宪 国家计委能源研究所 42 刘树杰 居家计委宏观院 副所长 43 文tl…飞 回家计委宏现院 44 王广辉 国家经贸委 处长 45 韩丛照 财政部 46 唐臻怡 时政部 47 李光辉 财政部 处长 48 藏灵 财政部 49 吴敬超 财政部 50 唐治 财政部 51 王倍茂 国家电力公司动力经济研究中心 主任 52 邓建利 国家电力公司动力经济研究中心 53 胡兆光 国家电力公司动力经济研究中心 54 雷体钩 国家电力公司动力经挤研究中J自 55 垣莹 E建家电力公商动力经济研究中心 56 柴商量每 因家电力公司动力经济研究中，Ci, 高工 57 陆延昌 自家电力公芮 主三桂 58 陈飞虎 国家电力公玛 59 王炳华 国家电力公司 副主任 60 齐志坚 国家电力公司 61 赵尊廉 国京电力公司 主任 62 徐伟良 E望＊电力公司 63 荣绍俊 国家电力公司 主任 64 囊建祖 国家电力公司 65 目操男 国家电力公可法律事务部 副主任 66 谢绍雄 E墨家电力公司颜问 教授 67 越洁 国家电力公带电力规才器设计总院 副院长 68 张学知 国电华电公司 总经理 69 旦在青原 国电华电公词 处长 70 事先满 国电华电公司 主任 71 成德信 中自科学障自动化所 72 越涛 中国科学院自动化所 73 于向红 中国科学院自动化所 36 74 胡鞍销 中国科学院生态中心 研究员 75 曹东 中国环墙科学研究院 76 商褂婷 中国环境科学研究院环境规划研究所副研 77 李蕾 国家环保总局 78 王汉臣 自家环保总周 j腰部、教授 79 姚愉芳 中国社会科学院数量经济 与技术经济研究所 研究员 80 张文涛 中 E雷电力科学研究院 副总工 81 邓可蕴 中国能源研究会 82 苏晓山 清华大学能源环境经济研究所 副主任 83 夏普 清华大学教授 副系主任 84 言茂桂 上海大学 教搜 85 革走路 北京中经追投资咨询 有眼责任公司 副总 86 宰爱挺 北京干禾人科技有限公司 87 龚铮铮 中圈日报社经济部 记者 88 谢黯然 经济日报 记者 89 刘伟 中国经济导报 记者 90 施世主林 中懂经济导报 91 王水石 中国经济导报 92 谭雅佳 中国经济导报 93 卢必成 E露家计委中菌经济导报 编辑、记者 94 玛雅静 国家计委中属经济导报 副主任 95 文tj丽君 经济导报 96 张宽林 人民自报 编辑、记者 97 需善堂 新华社北京分社 醋总经理 98 玉树民 国华电力公司 副总经军在 99 曹乐人 华能集居公司 副总经理 100 药、耀瞧 华能集团公词 处长 101 事雁西 E道家开发银仔 102 蒋兆组 中国国际工程咨诲公司 副主任 103 如j京生 中由国际金融有限公词 副总经理 104 郭江 中国节能按资公司 甜主在 105 踌京藩 中咨公司能器工蛋白部 主任 106 何漉森 四 1 月电力局 周长助理 107 棒维醋 新疆电力公司 主任 108 韩惠明 山东电力集团公司 主任 109 吴东辉 广回电力有限公司 副主任 110 史洪德 二潭水电开发有眼责任公司 副总经理 111 靡义艳 海南省电力有限公司 党总书记 37 112 朱基本 上海宝钢电广 厂长 113 甘光中 上海宝钢电广 114 罗普宝 贵州省电力公司 115 魏茂 电哥拉公词 ，住经理助理 116 管人龙 华东电力集团公司 117 郭圈＂＇ 国家电力调度通信中心 副总工 118 解栓楼 华北电力集团公司 处长 119 晗文蠢 北京东兴泰，臣、特检蹦技术 有限责任公司 号音嚣部主任 120 王万峰 润南最作万方集团公南 处长 121 茅于轼 天则公司 理事长 122 扬名舟 中回电力企业联合会 123 王永干 中国电力企业联合会 副秘书长 124 张长摞 中型电力企业联合会 125 唐件南 华北电力集国公胡 颠问 126 播坤华 国家开发投资公司目投电力公坷 副总经理 127 高凌云 中国人民政治拚商会议金盟委员 会她力图舔旅仔社 外联娃理 能掠基金会代表 128 Doulas Ogden 能源基金会 主任 129 Steve Judd 能源基金会 首席代表 130 杨富强 能源基金会 项目主管 13l 芦红 能摞基金会 项目助理 132 Peter B主adford 能激基金会 ｝晓 i可 133 David Moskovitz 能源基金会 顾问 134 Wayhe Shirley 能源基金会 顾问 世界银抒代表 135 黄宵Jll 世界银行驻京代表处 首席代表 136 Nouredine Berrah 世界银仔 137 刘晓云 世界镀行 138 赵建平 t注界银仔 139 Clifford Garstang 世界银行 140 Sally Hunt 世界银行 咨诲专家 141 Peter Egger 世界银行 咨询专家 142 Luis Caruso 世界银行 咨询专家 143 Harγey Salgo 世界银仔 咨询专家 38 144 Ranjit Lamech t宣界银行 其他代囊 145 曹美玲 荷兰驻华大使馆 146 自爱建 澳大来j亚驻华使馆商务处 （、澳贸委〉离务专员 147 三E 颖 演大利亚驻华使馆商务处 项目任理 148 彭艳 英国大使结发展处 项目官员 149 XAV皿RCHEN 国际能草草署〈部A) 总裁特别助理 150 Penny De Waal UK EMBASSY DFID 一秘 151 罗仕可 刽拚能源咨询公司 152 寓意智 部桥能源咨竭公司 39 第工部分： 国际经验总结 澳大辛lj 亚经拉 在澳大利亚，经过长时间的研究和协商，最终影成了全国电 力市场，很多事’琦发生在中央政府一级，也有很多事情发生在州 政府一级，有些事情发生在 80 年代初，大部分事情发生在 90 年 代。 最后，澳大利亚八个州政府中的五个签订了合作协议，彤戒 了全菌电力市场。签署协议的州色拉：新南威~士州，维多利亚 州，昆士兰州，南澳大科亚；N'l 和首都本土，其它 J三个 1'1'l （塔斯马 龙丘，北方领土和西澳大利亚〉以后可以棋据全国竞争法及各白 的电力工业改革目标决定是否加入企图电力市场。 1989 年，澳大科旦中央政府调查了全自电力工业的效卒， 这成了发展合国电力市场的导火线，以后花了整整山年的时畸 重组电力工业，最终启动了全国电力市场。 在 1989 年至 1998 年的山年期畴，各州、i 政府及中央政府直 接参加了电力市场的研究，设计如运行。下岳先介绍全民电力市 场影成前后的电力工业结构，然后介绍 10 年内各州遇到的问题， 全国电力市场影成前后的工业结构凡国 1. 自 1 左边代表全国电力市场开始前的电力工业结构，函中 S 代农雪山水电及负荷中，这堪培拉，即首都本土。西南威尔士 1•1＇］ 乡 维多利亚州，首都本土及南澳大利亚之间有电网连接，并签订了 商业协议“联网运行动、议’二合向以成边合尾的房、别为基础，如 果 A 州生产成本低于 B F叶，允许 A 州白 B 1•1＇］卖屯，在全国电力市 场启动前，按联网运行协、议运行了 9 年。从囱中可以看出，昆士 兰和塔斯马尼亚 1•1＇］拥有自己的独立屯间，互相之间及与其它电网 都未联肉。多次讨论过联网计划，但资金不能落实，随着全国电 力市场的投入运行及私营机梅的参与，融资己比较容易。 40 叫卫队意烹戴黑JLLJ.主l………叫…叫…々飞辄………去叫 天然气管击毒 国家 电力市场 地区市场 E3 ＇＂＂资盼的 Y 建 : 2'o 白 S 价且会 内部究生是｝ E9 缉寝舍线路的扩珑 图 1 …电力市场实施前和实施后患力供应情况 韶 1 右边代表 2000 年 12 月的电力工业结莉，即全国电力 市场技入运行 2 年以后，新 1每威尔士州，维多利亚州，首都本土 及南澳大利亚州之闰的“机会文挟持合同己终止，取¢代之的是 全商电力市场挠，肘，虽然昆士兰 ~H］是一个独立电网，该判奶决定 按全国电力市场规则运行其电力工业。塔斯马尼亚州政府在 1998 年没有加入全蜀电力市场，它提出从 2003 年是接民家电力市场 规则运行其电力工业，在 1998 年至 2000 年期间，塔斯马尼亚州 政府按自己批准的市场规则运拧其独立的电网，并准备继续应用 这套规则，直到与维多利亚联网 e 从商 1 可以看出全国电力市场对联网的影响，在 200 号年中， 新南成¢士和昆士草之间的一条主流线路（约约万千瓦〉技入 了运行，另一条“受监管”的交流线路（约 100 万千瓦）正在建 设之中，计结＇］ 2001 年 1 丹技入运行，计划中还包括南澳大利亚 和新南威尔士之间的一条交流线路（约 250 万千瓦），预计 2002 年投入运行，最近又￥ti住了维多利亚和南澳大利亚之间的一条立 流线路口 G 万千瓦），计划 2001 年开工，塔斯马龙亚和维多利 豆豆之间也计划在 2003 年建成一条 ω 万千瓦的线路。全爵电力市 场建成以后，各现货份格区的份格水平相差很大，这为这些联络 线的建设提铁了经济依据。 41 回 1 中右边也给出了自全国电力市场授入运行以来，发电 顿域投资的变化趋势，全国电力市场很快地改变了发电投资的取 向。由于装机过剩，新南威尔士 ~·l·J 和维多利亚抖的电价很惧，而 昆士兰和南澳大利亚装机不足，电价很高，商品，电厂方晶的全 部投资都转移到了昆士兰和南澳大利亚，新南威尔士和维多利亚 不再出现新的电厂投资。优化也f 和输电线路方面的教费是改革 的基本自标，从这一点来看，企图电力市场相当成功。 本附件介绍了在改革中各政府所受的影响，管制桂架的变 化以及电力工业的重组过程 a 中央政府的参与 根据澳大利豆法律，中央政府很少直接参与电力工业。在 到年代和 ω 年代，由于雪山本电项目影响到五个州政府，中央 政府参与了该项爵的开发，在 80 年代，中央政府帮助南澳大利 亚、维多利盐和新南威尔士协调了维多利亚与南澳大和j 亚的联闲 事宜。 在 70 年代和 80 年代初期，许多到的电力工业明显显得效率 低下，在“年代，中央政府对各州存在的问题非常扭心，如电 厂管理很茬，各州政府之间相互争夺资金， ~·l'j 政府将电力资金鸡 来建设非生产性的基础设施，由于结构上的缺限，商业和行政职 能不分等。 1989 年，中央政府调查了全国电力工业的生产情况，结论 认为，改革电力工止可以带来 6 亿澳元的收益，这一时期，正好 英国在准备启动电力市场。调查之后，中央政府成立了澳大利亚 委员会（ COAG ），该机构处程中央政琦走，权直接干贺的事宜。 1990 年，在中央政府和各判政府的支持下，成立了电网管 理委员会（ N四川，负责设计全国电力市场， NG配成员包括政府 官员和工业界人士，条贵协调 COAG 和电力工业的交流。 NG即成 立了很多委员会和工作小组，成员包括全民各电力工业组织和机 构，实际上，阴阳成了具体制定电力市场规则和设计信息系统 42 的部门。 1997 年，当所有政府就市场结构达成一致意见，后， e 该 机构被阳刚co 和阳CK 取代。 调查生产率之后，在 1992 和 1993 年期间，中央政府就“竞 争政策掉进行了调查，该调查为制定新的全国竞争法扛下了基础， 竞争法的爵的是允许第二方娟买政府资产并进入基础设施领域， 竞争法不仅涉及电力工盐，也涉及天然气，祺水，铁路，港口， 通讯，法律系统，医疗系统等。澳大利 3E. 竞争法于 1995 年颁布， 适合全自各州，为了实施竞争法，中央政府建立了一个新的机物， 即澳大利亚竞争和用户委员会（ ACCC ），该机构由原来的价格监 督局和贸易委员会合并而成。 新的竞争法是根据 1974 年的全国贸易法修改而成的，依据 该法律， ACCC 是全离工业的经济管制者，保护用户利益， ACCC 有法定权力实施竞争法罗并处罚违法者。中央政府还成立了全国 竞争委员会（阮C ），监督竞争法的实施，并提供政策意见。到cc 和 ACCC 共碍管程竞争政策的实施，使中央政府能独立考虑该政 策的影响，必要时改造政策。因此，一般林 ACCC 为 1虫立管制机 构，史确切地说应该是全国工业管制机构。 在 1993 年 11 月至 1994 年 6 月的 8 个月内，中央政府及西 南威~士，维多利亚，昆士兰，南澳大利亚，塔斯马尼亚娟和首 都本土政府共同参乌了全国市场模拙，各州的大部分电力企业都 参加了这项工作。模拟工作与现有的组织机构业务共存，现有商 业业务未做任何更改，该工作类似于全离性的大学模拟试拴，电 厂按实际可利用卒报价拭标，但其结果不影响电厂的实际调度。 准备了另一套规划指导市场模拟，特别设计和建立了市场信息系 统，每月结算一次。正式审计了模战工作，总结了市场规则的优 缺，轧 模拟工作起到了两个重要作用： 1. 成立了一个全国性委员会来卖责全离电力市场规则（直供竞 争，网络准入和行或管理）的设计如准备。 2. 各；·1·1 政府坚定了电力改革的信心。模探工作结束后，维多利 43 旦旦政房子 1994 年 7 月开始实施竞争性电力市场。 竞争法是电力工业引入竞争的基础，在该法准备期（ 1994 和 1995 年 L CCOAG 批准了实施竞争性电力市场的政策声明，明， 确提由建立全国电力市场，！润明了该市场的需的。 由于该政策声明考虑了在电力工此引入竞争后，结构重组造 成的政治和商业影响，它成了？！？政府改革的指导住文件。建立全 国姓电力市场的主要目标包持： 1. 市场具有竞争性； 2. 用户有权选择供电商（发电商或零售商）； 3. 不管参与者何时加入市场，平等对待各参与者； 4. 平等对待不同的能提及能溃、技术； 5. 平等对待扑i 内交易和；·J·］间电力交易。 在 1997 年以前，法律授权各州全权条贵州内的电力工业， 这种时权力下放押模式成功地动件了 100 年，但效率低下表明要 用新的模式来打破少！·］界分割。 1997 年，通过各州的共闰努力， 全国电力法出台，该法九许实施全国电力市场。 新全菌电力法中规定，步I·］政府可以自行选择是否受该法律约 束，中央政月号提供融资方面的激励机制，鼓励各州加入全岛电力 市场，虽然各州支持 COAG 会议的政策声明，只有 5 个跨选择了 加入全国电力市场，这一历史性协议于 1997 年签订，为建立全 需电力市场铺平了道路。市场是一系列电力系统的组合，在一套 市场规则下运行，虽然有一个电力系统是独立系统，它仍是全国 电力市场的一部分，即该系统采用闰样的市场规肘，由同一个市 场运行者和系统运行者负责，受向一管制机构的监管，市场信息 系统的设计也相同。读到政府这样选择是为了几年后联网时不会 造成动荡。 全国电力法篇惶不长，但从法律上为电力市场的管理提供了 依据，它包括以下内容： 1. 的个公司化机构（全国电力市场管理公碍和电力法管制局〉； 44 2. 全：罔电力规刺〈市场规则）； 3. 全国电力法庭费责电力规则的实施； 4. 对违反市场规划的处罚。 全国电力市场管理公司（昭服co ）是由股东按公司法成立的 扑号，股东为各参与州的政府，每个政府一成。 NE刚co 卖责接 电力法运行电力市场，并不断发展电力市场，提高运行妓卒。 阳刚co 承担了“市场和系统运行者的职能飞独立？输电公司。 选择这种模式时，在维多来j 亚运行的市场中，市场运行和系统运 行与输电是分开的，品在新南威尔士运行的市场中乡市场运行机 构和系统远行机构与输电合为一体，全国市场在比较了两种模式 的优抉点后做出了选择。 电力规别管理局刊ECA ）是一个公司，由各 1·1·］入政纽或，究 责韭管全［￥｝电力市场，包括规则’修改的审批，挠，则的实施和违规 的处罚 e 全民电力规则是一个法律工具（类似于条例），是在与 公众坊、窝， 阳CA 如 ACCC 斡准的基础上形成的。 全国电力市场是一个定替市场，有多个买方（零售商〉和卖 方（发电商），拉立的输电肉络业务和独立的配电网路业务，市 场与 1998 年 12 月 A 动。 1999 年 7 丹，根据市场规则中有关输 电业务的条款，输电网络业务（输价格和服务质量〉的监管由州 监管部门移交到了 ACCC 配电业务的监管仍由川、！负责，待；·1·1 问 意后再移交 ACCC. 撩非它们要求中央政府帮助或它幻的政策影 响到走售市场，；·l'j 政府何究责发展零普市场 α 尽管零售市场是这 样分工的，州政府的零售竞争政策应符合全离竞争法的原则，如 果违反了竞争法， ACCC 有权干预。 商前，澳大利亚政清的重点是发展零售市场，零售市场规则 涉及到对全国市场规射的修改，也涉及到新规则的制定以保护刑 户。川、i 政清正在协调工作，以制定出全国性的零售政策，但各州 也必须考虑到零售改革对本州的不向影响。 全国电力市场规财的制定 45 电力市场规财是全国电力市场的招夺文件，该文件经过数年 的努力才最终定稿。 在 1990 年至 1993 年期间， NGMC 发表了数篇关于竞争性电 力市场的政策指南，根据这些指南，制定了一套管理全国模拟市 场的市场规则，模拟工作过后，则提C 于 1994 年成立了全副市场 规则制定委员会，目前市场规财的结构和内容是该委员会确定 的。 全国市场规则有两个主要部分，竞争规别和准入规则。竞争 规财规定了零售市场买方和卖方的交易机制，准入规则涉及支持 性职能，如接入输电肉络，输电定价，系统安全标准，争议解决， 规则实施和修改。根据竞争法，两部分需要 ACCC 单独审批。 在起草市场规别的过程中，各：)'I·］考虑了本，.l·J 的特点，例如， 新南威尔士政府根据 1996 年的全自市场规则苹稿制定了新南或 ~士的市场规，尉，这种做法有报多益处，可以减少启动全民市场 后带来的影响，也体验到了市场规则的可用性。 1997 年 3 昆士 兰政府用当时的全民市场规，剌作为该如＇！~：虫立系统的运行规则，各 1·1·1 政府还采用了其它规肘来管理市场的过渡。 1998 年，塔斯马尼亚根据企图市场挽则的结构制定了台己 的市场规则，虽然该政府还未决定和入全国电力市场。在 1996 年至 1998 年期词，维多利亚州l 逐步调整了自己的市场规则，以 i乏新全国市场规则的要求。 根据 1974 年的全国贸易法（竞争法），全国亨场规别及其修 改需要 ACCC 审批。 1996 年 10 月，全国电力市场规则的最终草 本提交到了 ACCC ，整个审批过程如下： 1. . 1996 年 11 月，全国电力市场规肘草本正式提交朋脏。 2. 全因电力市场颊，别草本结为公共文件在版。 3. ACCC 调查了市场规射中的反竞争内容。 4. ACCC 邀请工业界，用户，公众及其它和关部门对草本进行 评论。 46 5. ACCC 公布两个临时决定，一是支持竞争颊，则，一是支持准 入规刑， ACCC 介绍了批准前对规则各部分应作的错改。 6. ACCC 举行公众会，讨论格时决定的有关问题。 7. 根据必众会议上的意见， ACCC 审查了格时决定，最后公布 了最终决定。 8. 全犀电力市场规则正式成为法律文件。 ACCC 的审批过程经历了两年，整个过程，从 1994 年开始到 1999 年正式审料，共花了五年时间， 5 年还是比较保守的时间。 可以看出，准备和批准一套适用于全因电力工业的市场规则 是一项在大的工程，不能萃草了事。为此，当市场规则提交中央 管制机构审批时，该机构应具备审查和批准的能力，指由文件中 竞争颊，则和准入规则的优点及缺恨。 手劳改市场规则的程序基本相间，但调查和审批的时商会短一 些，不管怎样，修改市场规，射时要考虑 6 到 12 月的时间，该过 程中要确保与工业界和公众进行足够的协商，保证不会引入反竞 争的内容。 新南戚棋士政府曲参与 啻景情况 由于多年严重缺屯，新南成尔士电力工业于 1950 年进行了 爱纽，当时，地方政府负责零售，电网和发电业务由一个新的机 构新南威尔士电力委91 会，后改为太平洋电力负责，通过合并， 地方面己电公哥从 190 小减到 42 个，这是新南戚本士电力改革的 重要开端，电力企业开始商业经营。 新南成~士的电力工业发展主要张赖煤炭，在以后的 20 年 中，输电设施迅速发展，电厂大部分建在坑口，电力供应稳定， 在 70 年代，新南成¢士政府认识到电力工业的放卒低下，但 70 年代末的能源、繁荣掩盖这一问题。 47 在 1980 年至 1985 年期间，新南威尔士电力工业经历了一系 列事件，包括 3 … 4 小新电厂 tl:: 了事敌，电厂的平均利用车较低 约（ 65射，负荷增长变化较大（ - 2%到 5圳，电价上升较快（一 年上涨 25% ）乡露天矿开工资金不足，管理部门不愿意提供资料。 这一期阔，政府将配电公司的数量从 42 小减到 25 个。 在 80 年代中和 1990 年期间，新南威尔士政府开始改革发电 管理和输电管理。 建立内部电力市场 在 1989 年和 1990 年予新南成尔士政府研究了英民电力市场 的发展，同意在电力公司内部引入内部电力市场。 1991 年，重 纽了电力公司，成立相互竞争的部门，并于 1992 年启动了内部 电力交换“ELEX 市场”。内部市场内，建立了“可变和固定容量 合词”市场，在公司内部引入商业原则，不仅在电厂，也在服务 部门。这些工作完成以后，市场转为电董市场，类似于全电力竞 争市场，公司财务部为单一购电部门，在会计上，内部市场与外 部电份和配电商的财务来往拉立，囱此，对用户没有影响，但周 内部市场机制可以了解豆豆屯的内部成本，并与外部电背过行比 较。 ELEX 市场提供了很多经段，其中包括： 1. f尝试和修改了英国的市场设计，但几个设计特征没有采用， 如容量费用，自为它们会扭曲现货价格。 2. 偿试了分离输电与市场和系统运行。 3. 探索了输电定价问题。 ι f尝试了差价合约的概念。 5. 经历了引入市场信息系统的许多细节。 6. 开发和修改了市场结算程序。 7. 在公司内部引入了内部服务协议。 8. 竞争精神影响了公司各个部门，许多人受到了竞争市场方面 培训。 9. 为全民争论市场改革的原则增多了很多知识，关多地了解了 48 各种方式的特点，在全国模拟工作中，这一点特射重要， ELEX 市场的许多特点在各参与列得到了试验。 内部市场一直延续到 1995 年，拖后新南威尔士政府启动了 外部零售竞争市场。 新南成 ;t- 士政府支持 COAG 发展电力市场的政策，参与了全 国电力规别的制定。 黯高威尔士市场的建立 1995 年，新南成尔士政月号修改了电力法，丸许建立竞争性 电力市场，包括制定了管理输电网络，市场运行机持和系统运行 机构的独立法律。同时，政府消减了哥己也窝的数量（从 25 个到 §个），增加了发电公司数量（从 1 到 4 个），并九许私营发电商 进入市场，发电止务从公司中分离出来，成立了稳立的部门。 1996 年，结构武革全部完成，形成了多个卖方和买方，并 启动了新南成 ;t- 士电力市场。市场运行的两个月内，拭行行政最 高限价（类似于 10盟的差价合同），测试市场信息系统。 1996 年 5 月步取消了行政限价，市场接电董市场运作，最初戚予合问翠 盖 85慧的系统需求。所有买方和卖方都能就其余 is% 的电爱自己 协商豆豆子分合同，宽武予合同的覆盖面逐步减少，到 2000 年年底取 消。吨着赋予合同覆盖聋的减少，买方和卖方可以台由协商接定 差价合约，管理风险。 新南威尔士电力市场于 1996 年 3 月投入运行，采用了全菌 电力市场规则的最新版本，同时，全国竞争法生效，需要 ACCC 授权规则，包括利用差价合约管理市场对参与者造成的影响。 市场运行平稳， 1997 年 5 月，新南或尔士市场与维多利亚 市场接轨，允许跨界交易罗在以后的 14 个月中（ 1996 年 3 月到 1997 年 5 月），由于哦网协议”以成本为基础，要求发电商分 享生产成本，它不再起作用。这一制约要求立即合并珩南威尔士 和维多利亚电力市场，相互坊、调的新曲或 ;t- 士和维多利亚市场又 49 运行了 18 个月（直到 19 始年 12 月），以后市场管理的职能转到 了 NE制co 和 NECAo 1996 年，零售市场竞争性到户成为新南威尔士政府的工作 重点，每个配电商有两个许可证，一小是零售许可证，一个是玛 格服务许可证，建立了服务准则，如用户政务标准，会计标准， 计釜标本，以保证配电业务按政府政策经营，制定了零售发展计 对，在最初几年，只有大用户才能选择零售商。 目前，发展零售市场是新南威尔士政府改革的主题， 2000 年 12 月，新南威尔士政府通过了法律，要求配电扑司把.1玛络业务 和零售业务分开经营，该计划要在 2 悦 1 年 7 月以前克成。 发电、输电和配电的重组 19 费4 年，模拟工作结束后，新南成~士政府将输电业务放 在电力公司的一个于公司，作为发输分离的第一步。 1995 年初，颁写了发令，九许输电子公司成为政府的独立 公司，政府批准了该公司的结构，其职能包括输电（ 50 万和 33 万伏），市场运行和系统运行，但输电乌市场运行和系统运行应 分开。电力公司仍作为发电公司保留，拥有几个电f 如一是是小墨 水电站，政府成立了一小政策部门，制定市场实施政策，新南威 尔士成立了电力管制机构。 1995 年，新南成~士通过了法律，要求将 25 个配电公司｛ 13. 23 及以下〉合并为 6 个配电公司， 2 个城市配电公司， 4 个 农村配电公司，新南成~士的 270 万用户（最大需求 1180 万千 瓦）被分配给了这些新配电公司。 1. 公哥 1 ；以城市为主， 130 万用户； 2. 公司 2 ：以城市为主， 70 万用户； 3. 4是司 3 ；以农村为主， 53 万用户； 4. 4总司 4 ；以农村为主， 11 万用户； 50 5. 公司 5 ：以农村为主， 22 万用户； 丘 公句 6 ：以农村为主， 5 万用户。 公司产生了新的董事会，新的执行总经理，全部政份由政府 拥有，新公司有 6 个月的时间完成合并计划，；参备进入竞争市场。 1996 年初，新南威尔士政府将发电厂（ 1430 万千瓦）组成 4 个 奋司，各公司情况如下： 1. 公司 1 ：椅上燃煤电厂， 8 台机组，共 464 万千瓦； 2. 奋司 2: 4 个燃煤电厂， S 台机组，共 424 万千瓦； 3. 公司 3 ：一个燃煤电厂， 4 台机组， 2 个水电站，一个抽水 蓄能电站，总装机 290 万千瓦； 4. 在〉寻 4 ；新南威尔士川、！在雪山水电的股份，很多机钮，可利 用容量 250 万千瓦。 公司产生了新的董事会，新的总经理，全部股份政府拥有， 这费公司的成立有很多争议，一提认为是分割的第一步。分步实 施的原囱包括公用基础设施，容最相对集中在几个厂址，长岛供 煤合同，工会反对。 1997 年就发电厂的分离进行了一项研究， 由于地方反对和奥运会，改革暂时终止，以后可能进一步分离。 1998 年 12 月，全国电力市场开始运行，新 I告成 $ 士政府将 市场运行和系就运行的责任移交给了阳刚co ，输电公司保留了 规如j 和雄护责任。 维多利亚＋M 政厨的参与 活动背景 维多利亚州电力工业的结构，不向于新南威尔士州的电力工 业。在维多利亚，一家电力公司集责所有的生务：发电、输电、 系统运行、配电网络和零售生务。该电力公司的电大都直接卖给 消费者，但在，有一些卖给几家小型市配电公司，由配电公司再将 电卖给消费者。 51 维多利亚电力工业的发展主要依赖褐煤。发电扩建过程中， 使电站集中于一个，j、区域内，在小城镇形成了较大的劳力市场。 此外，褐煤电站比烟煤电站成本岛，因此，维多利亚州政府建立 同样规模的电厂比新南成~士所需的资金要多。电厂过多地集中 在一个小地区范醋，给社区苦来了环境问题、给维多利亚 1•1＇） 政府 带来了劳力问题，给电力公司带来了输电设计问题。对这费问题 进行管理，成本昂贵，资金紧张的情况因此随之出现，并在 80 年代明显化。 伴趟着资金 E苦难，电价猛涨，接踵品豆的是对电力公司管理 能力的按查。此外，八十年代中期维多利亚州政府实行的发电扩 建项自与新南威尔士政府实行的发电扩建项目结成了资金竞争 的局面。这些问题的存在，造成了维多利亚州政月号和新南威~士 州电力公司管理层之间的紧张局势。维多科亚 1·1·） 政府挫续执行自 己的发电扩建项窍，导敖了资金上的史留难局面。这些问题又导 致了一场资金怠机 2 使维多利亚州电力公司面格破产边埠。 在九十年代初期，由于资金缺乏息机的影响，维多利亚州政 月号发起了私有化运动，目的是将发电资产进行变卖。这一项目开 始进行得稳後’度，但在 1993 年由于政舟换届品使进程加快。在 同一年，维多利亚列政府宣布了维多利亚电力工业的重大改组规 划。 19 判年中期，维多利 ill2.1·1·J 政府开始了维多利亚电力市场的 运行工作。随着电力市场的引入，电力公奇的全面改革电开始了。 维多利亚到政府支持 COAG 关于发展电力市场的政策，并参 加了四家电力市场规则的制定工作。 维多手！Jill!. 电力市场的彭成 维多科亚电力市场以“容量市场”的形式开始于 1994 年 7 月份，包括将高于合闰容量的屯最进行现场销售。这种设计通常 称之为“净电董市场飞英爵政月号窗前就正准备采取这种设计方 式。与新南威尔士也力岳母内部现货市场运行方案比，这种设计 方案的缺点很快就暴露出来。 52 1995 年 7 月份，维多科豆豆州政府将“容量市场”转换为“电 量市场”（“总董市场’吟。这种竞争性电力市场有一个共同的结 算价，这种价格不受容量附加费的影响。盹时，维多利亚；·I·］政府 引 j哥了＂页武子合罔 些不向的条f牛 ο 这些额升的条件扭曲了市场，维多利亚州在随后 的凡年里对此深有体会。“成予合同”设立的期限为 5 年（ 20 台台 年底）， 5 年后终止。届时，买卖双方将月差扮和约谈抖价代替 u腻予合间罚（目前正在这样实施）。副赋予合再占，总需求的 95骂， 随着吕定客户数量的；或少品减少。 1996 年，维多科亚政府挑准对市场准则进行改善和规芜， 以与当时的商家电力市场规则草案相一致，新南威尔士；－1·1 巳采用 了这一苹案。 1997 年，锥多利亚和新南威尔士州政府同意，并经 ACCC 批 准，协调两州市场，促进新南威尔士和维多利亚的跨州市场贸易。 联网协议休眠 14 个月后，正式结束。和谐市场运行方式于 1997 年 5 月份开始，形成了一个国家电力市场同时有两个走售价区的 早期形式。在这一时期，国家电力市场规则已递交至 ACCC ，但 没有得到正式抗准。 和谐式市场体制又结埃运行了 18 个月，之后由自家电力市 场协议取代。在目前阶坟，发展零售市场是推多利亚政府反革的 主要任务。 发电、输电及商电重组 1994 年中期之前，维多利亚电力公号为一体化结构公司， 其职能包括发电、输电、系统主运行、昌己也如零售业务。随着市场 的发展，对电力公司进行了分离，具体步骤如下。 第一步（ 1993 年底至 1994 年底〉，所有的发电分给一家发电 部门，输电到归另一家不间的部门，系统运行和输电扩建由 另外一个部门管理，自己电由五家不同的单位管理。成立了一 夺政府政策部门，卖责对市场运行政策进行咨询。成立了一 53 个新的电力监管机构。 第二步（ 1995 年），配电部门转换成了公司，并卖给了私有 才是资者。销售公哥的工作 12 个丹之内就完成了。拥有 200 万客户（最大需求量接近 7700 MW ）的西己电公司，有如下特 征： 叩公司 1 ：覆盖地区为农村，有 53. 万客户； 公司 2 ：莲盖地区为城市，有 23 万客户； …公司 3 ：覆盖地区为农村和城市，有 23 万客户； 一公司 4 ：覆盖地区为城市，有 52 万客户； …公司 5 ：覆盖地区为农村，有 47 万客户。 第二步（ 1996 年），发电部门分成了 5 家公司化发电公苟， 卖给了私营投资者。销售公司的工作在随后的两年中就完成 了。拥有近 8200酬的发电公司，其特点如下： 一公司 1 ：煤发屯，单个厂址，两台发电机组，总容量 10 告。班W; 一公司 2 ：煤炭屯，单个厂址 3 甜台发电机组，总容量 2000陆有； 一公每 3 ：煤发屯，单个厂址，四台友电机组，总容量 1450MW; 一公哥 4 ：煤发屯，一个厂址，八台发电机组，总容釜 1600提W; －公司 5 ：天然气发屯，两个电厂，两台发电机组，总容量 970MW; 由公司 6 ：水力发电， 10 个电厂， 21 台发电机组，总容量 460MW; …公司？；雄多和1J ilE在雪山水电站中的成份，有许多发电机 组，现有容量为 12 仰自有； 在第四步（ 1997 年），输电单位转变为公司化公司，并卖给 私营投资者。 系统运行部门规模扩大，职能包括市场运行，并作为一个政 府部门一直工作至 1 ” 8 年国家电力市场的开始为止。届时， 该部门的职责转交至附则伪，该部门随之被取消。 54 电力公司和配电用户的重组方式主要取决于重组后公司的 销售值。 据了解，雄多利亚政府在输电、系统运行及市场运作功能方 面的重组不同于新南威尔士州政府所采取的方法。在维多利亚 州，改革以后的输电公哥负责输电资产的维护和帮动新用户入 网。输电规划（输电扩建）、系统运行及新市场运作职能交给了 一家单独的、新成立的部门。在国家电力市场开始的时候，输电 规划职能转交给了另一个政府部门。 与此相反，在新南威尔士州，输电部门则开始时，拥有所有 的职责（输电规划、输电维护、系统运行、市场运行）。国家电 力市场开始的时候，该部门保留了输电规划职能。 琵士兰件i 政府的委参与 活动背景 昆士兰州电力工业的发展主要以烟煤为基础。在 70 年代中 期，电力工生布局结构与新南或~士州电力工业类似。不同的一 点就是昆士兰州公司的商业特征相对较，j 、，公哥的布局史具有部 门特征，而商业贸易结椅特1正相对不明显。电力部门拥有发电、 输电骂只能。另外还有七家单稚的自己电部门。然而，与新南成尔士 归国i 不同的是，昆士兰州有一家单独的政府部门负责发电、输电规 划工作。此外，昆士兰州有史大的地域，但人口比南成~士州少。 因此，资金就成了昆士兰州发屯和输电规划的主要问题。 80 年代，昆士兰判面将几个方面的主要问题。首先，人口 不断增长，从维多利亚和新南威尔士；·l·］向北迁移。发电扩建旦在不 上电力需求的增长。第二，他们还要与其他州政府竞争资金。第 二，他们遇到了劳力资提问题，但与其他 j•l＇］政府不同的是，昆士 兰州的配电部门也存在着劳力资捕、问题。然而，昆士兰州与其他 药个州政府机梅相比，有几个主要的优势。烟煤矿的露天开采， 使他们拥有了澳大利亚最低的烟煤成本。他的电厂的可利用率1莫 高，职工校少。这与维多利亚和新南威~士的电力公司是不同的。 55 1984 年罗皮屯和输电部门（规划和运行）进行了合并。尽 管政府管理的责任与新南威尔士到的结构相比，有一定差距，但 合并后与新南威尔士电力工业结构更如相似。 在 80 年代中靡，维多科亚、新南威尔士和昆士兰州之间爆 发了电价竞争。在此之前，新南威尔士到被认为是电价的领导者， 其后才是维多利亚和昆士兰州。然 1日，当新南威尔士分i 和维多利 亚州宣布电价大幅度增长时，昆士兰州却考虑降低电价。到 90 年代早期，昆士兰判的电价，在大陆；·l'j 政府中是最然的。这样昆 士兰州便成为一小有吸引力的居住地，随着人口的增长，用电量 也开始增长 a 新南威尔士电力公司也因此开始了管理领域的改革 活动。 9Q 年代初期，昆士兰州政府出于时环境的考虑 z 放弃了原 先计划的一个 ω 眼W 本力发电项目。此外，政府同意将一个大电 厂卖给一家铝合金生产厂家，以促进铝合金冶炼厂工件的继续。 这两嘿活动推迟了发电规，是J 项目，从而大大延边了增加未来发电 能力的计划。这些主运这对昆士兰州电力工业随后的发展产生了不 科影响 a 1993 年和 1994 年，昆士兰州政府参加了国家模拟项目。昆 士兰州政府支持 COAG 关于发展电力市场的政策，参加了国家电 力市场规则的发展工作。 1995 年初，为解决由于发电扩建项目的延迟品带来的潜在 问题，昆士兰州政府同意建设与新南威尔士之间的输电线路（输 电能力 500隅，将于 1999 年技入使用），并开始工期提｛但价格 昂贵）的 750阴燃气电厂，增加基荷电厂（在 2003 和 2006 年间为 600 至 140 创W 之间〉。 1996 年初，发生的主要事件 包括： 中央政府敦使各级州政府同意发展自家电力市场； 乌新南成尔士联两过程中，遇到了大社这中环保主义者以及 土地拥有者的反对。 政月号在 1996 年初的选举中失败。 56 昆士兰州、！新一届政府与社 JR 通过谈判，选定了一个输电走 廊，并将联络线的输电能力提高到 1000隅，同意参加即将开始 的商家电力市场。为了使昆士兰州能参加全国电力市场，新一届 政府制定了电力公奇的重组任务。 目前，零售市场的发展是昆士兰州政府改革的主要任务。 昆士芷电力市场的影成 鉴于以上原因，昆士兰州电力市场的形成大大晚于维多利益 和新南成尔士判。 1997 年 7 月，昆士兰州政府以可交和固定容量合同为基础， 开始了第一期的电力市场。第一期为筹备期，接下来便是 1998 年 1 月份的电堂市场时期，在这一时期，市场规射以离家电力市 场规则苹本为基础，阳则co 是市场管程方。从而使 附则co 在 1998 年 12 月底正式实行国家电力市场之前，有机会 进行市场的试，运作，以发展并完备市场体系。需要注意的是， 1998 年 1 月份，昆士兰州实好的仍然是独立的电力体系，与新南威尔 士州的联网一直推迟到 2000 年底。 昆士兰州政府因为参与电力市场，而获得了巨大的效益。首 先，昆士兰电暴力增长率高，在向一年，市场结算价格上升到了高 水平，在几个交易期达到了 5000 吴元／时Wh （为市场规则下的最 高允许值）。价格的上升增加了以于领域的压力： 电厂管理层必须改善电厂的运行； 零售公司必须提高自身的风险管理技术。 第二，在这一年的 8 月份，一个大发电厂由于内部机器失灵， 品导致所有发电机组跳剖。许多小时的电价升至 5000 美元／监阳。 这一影响提程了其他的电厂贸易商，他们如道这是一个大事件， 所有的能用的友也能力都应马上技入使用。市场的持用，避免了 一次重大尼负荷乡 i建后各友也;fJL纽重新技入运行后，份格重新回 到了正常的水平。这次事件也给其他电厂经营者敲响了警钟，使 57 他们认识到设备失灵问题，因此，使他们能比以前更早地得知电 厂失灵信息的有关情况。 第二，昆士兰外l 政府在市场开始之前的几年中， 5 与私营投 资者建立了病电合同，约相当于市场份额的 25% 。政府想重新对 这按合同进行谈抖，以促使电厂参与电董市场。然而，有合同保 ！哮的私营投资商不愿意重新进拧谈割（史确切地说，他们的融资 机构不愿意承担一个史高的风险）。西此，政府建立了一个市场 贸易公号，并将她电合同转交始了该机劫。根据市场长期预测价 格，预计该机构在合同期内 i 每年将按失的 800 告万美元，左窟。 实阵的生务情况完全与此相反。由于现场价格的交幻无常，人们 为从合向中取得最大利润局对均电合闰高度重视，以及乌电厂运 行和比，风险管理技术的提高，市场贸易方在头两年的运行中得 到了正增长。 第四，也是一件极为重要的事件，即一个私营挟资者得到了 ACCC 许可，安装新南成尔士和昆士兰州之间的输电线路（容量 为 180MW ）。该线路于 2000 年中期投入使用，先于拭监管的联络 线。 第五，昆士兰较高的屯，情和私营投资的输电线路给受监管的 输电线路带来了巨大的压力，促使其如，诀建设速度，争取提前竣 工。 第六，昆士兰州这售价区公布的段高的市场价，激励了私营 投资者向昆士兰州政府主管申请友电许可。这些私营投资者计划 在今后五年，为昆士兰州的国家电力市场增加约 2200削的燃煤 电厂。此外，有一家私营技资者已得到了天然气边输许可证，九 许其将天然气从已布亚新儿内亚运输到昆士兰州？，以支持昆士兰 州政府的环境政策。这样荆莹的天然气运输到昆士兰州以后，有 可能为本；·l·j 增如 lOOOMW 的、价格中等的天然气发屯。 第七，由于煤燃朴成本’鼠，即将投入运行的输电践路的能力 也很大，昆士兰州在今后有望成为爵家电力市场南部的主要出口 万。 58 马囱此，昆士兰辩政府在电力工业领域，已经具备了取得显著 放率的能力，有能力满足资助新电厂扩建的需求，宣布了今后环 境政策方面的主要变化，并退出了过去 10 年中对电力工业的政 治干预。 发电、输电和配电的重组 1995 年中期以前，昆士兰电力工业由一家电力部门（发屯 和配电）和七家单独的配电部门组成。继 COAG 诗议成立国家电 力市场后，昆士兰电力工业在几个方面进拧了重组： 第一步（ 1995 年中期），将发电职能从输电职能中分离出来， 并因此成立了一个单独的发电公司。将输电职能与配电职能 按下列方式合并。所有的单位组合成立了一个控且是公司，所 有的输电职能交给了该拉政公司的一个分公司，器己电部门继 结按以前的职责这行。 第二步（ 1997 年中期），输电分公司成为了一个单独的公司。 配电部门的网络和零售业务实行了分离。一匕家网路公每作为 配电商络部门结续存在，位零售业务变成了二家零售公司所 有。控或公司转变为市场贸易部门。成立了经济工业1主管机 辑，成立了一个政府政策部门，负责对市场实施政策进行咨 询。 零售公司拥有 140 万用户（最大需求量约为 6300照），零售 公司的特点如7 所述： … 第一家零告公号：覆盖地区为城市，有 100 万用户； 一第二家零售公司：覆盖地区为沿海地区，有 30 万用户； • 第二家零售公司：覆羔地区为城市和农村，有 10 万用户； 1998 年中期，昆士兰主升i 政府将第二家零售公司和第二三家零售 公司进行了合并，从品将该 E三零售商的数量捧为两个。 1 乡 99 年中期，昆士兰州政府将六家配电商络部门合并为一个 大型商络公哥。配电部门的结构变成了： 一第一家零售公司，覆盖地 11 为城市，有 1 创 Ji用户； 59 - 第一家网络公司，覆盖地区为域市； 一 第二家零售公司，覆盖地区为沿海和农村，有 40 万用户； 一 第二二家网络公司，覆盖地区为沿海和农村 发电公司的容量约为 7700隅，它有如下特点： - 第一家公司，煤、抽水蓄能和天然气发龟，三个电厂， 七台发电机组，总容量为 1950 MW; - 第二家公司，煤、水力和天然气发龟，四个电厂， 11 台 发电机组，总容量为 2600 刑； 第二家公司，煤友屯，五个电厂， 12 台发电机组，总容 量为 1680 刑； 一第四家市场贸易机构，煤、天然气发屯，五个电厂， 12 台发电机组，总容量为 2420 日W; 系统运行职责转交始了 NE棚co. 昆士兰州政府告知社区，电力工业将不会实行现有化。 发屯和零售公司成立了新的董事会，有一个新的总经理，股 份仅限于昆士兰；N·I 政府。并给了这在些新公司六个丹的时间进行合 并和为定售电力市场做准备。 南澳大利亚细政府的参与 活动背景 南澳大利豆州电力工业是在燃料资渥有限的条件下发展起 来的。主要燃料资源为可燃煤、燃料油以及 ω 年代末期开发的 天结气。由于燃料成本的因素，！每澳大利亚判电价比新南威尔士 州、维多利亚州和昆士兰扑！都要高。电力系统规模与新南威尔士 和维多科亚比财较小。 1999 年的装机容量（包持并商发电）约 为 2800 削， 最大需求量约为 240 台 MW. 40 年代中期，南澳大利亚州政府成立了单一的电力公司， 来管理电力工业。该公司包持发电规划和经营，输电规划和经营， 60 系统运拧，配电网格服务和零售业务。 1980 年，在中央政琦帮踊下，开展了一些列的调查、研究， 商的是为了与维多利亚和南涣大科亚联网，科用这两个州的廉价 电力 a 这些调查研究最终促使二个所政府签署了联网（容量为南 澳大和j 亚判进口容量 500阴）的协议。 275kV 的联路线于 1989 年 末投入使用，从而解决了南澳大利亚州政府当时二二分之一的用电 芮题。 这二个州政府根据联同长身效益预滞共间分享联附成本。当 联网计划得到批准时，二家 1·1·1 政府达成了为期 20 年的商业协议 （联陪发电运行钵议〉，根据协议，他们将自器将富余电量以生 产成本价进什贸易。 T每澳大科亚外i 夏季中有垫日子通营合非常炎热，用电高峰在 出现在这一时期。在即年代，每年炎热天气来，，岳之时，空调用 量不断上升。 1993 年早期，高温期出现在南澳大利亚 1·1·］示，维多 利亚州，高温天气要持续好几天。维多利亚电厂在现事故，反映 到联络线上，并要求南澳大利亚必须拉闸限电。这种情况在高温 期发生过两次 a 五家少J·l 政府就提高联络钱的输电能力进行过磋 商，但没能就成本问题达成协议。 1993 年的事件又在 1999 年和 2 在 00 年重复发生，但这一次〈因为国家电力市场已经开始）所 产生的影喃反映在市场价格上面。结果是，森营投资者积极地进 行发电和输屯的扩建规划。 南澳大利亚 1·1·） 政蔚在圈家电力市场开始之前，并没有引进电 力市场。但是，南澳大利亚州政府支持 COAG 关于发展电力市场 的政策，参与了民家电力规，剧的制定，并牵头制定了电力法。南 澳大利亚州政府在菌家电力市场实施之前，对其电力公司进行了 重纽。 发电、输电和配电重组 雄 COAG 通过了成立国家电力市场的协议后，南块大利亚电 力工业分几个步辍进行了重纽： 61 1997 年，南澳大利亚电力合哥按业务类型分成了不商业务 处，这些处包括友电、输电、系统运行、自己也肉络如零售业 务。 1998 年，在自家电力市场实施之前，南 j奥大利亚州政府将电 力公碍各业务处转交为法立的部门。成立了三家发电部门， 一家输电部门，一个配电网络部门和一家零售部门。成立了 一个政府政策单位，对市场实施进行咨询。在这一时期，还 成立了一家电力工业监管机构。 南澳大利亚州’i 社区不愿、意让政府将这些部门资产卖给和有 投资者〈但由为可以收回多余的债务，茵此对政府是很有吸 5l 力的）。但政府已开始将这些部门资产出租给私营技资者， 出租期限为 100 年。 1999 年中期，南澳大利亚政琦通过立法，九许对电力工业 资产进仔~租。 2000 年初，配电网络和零售部门（拥有约 75 万府户和 2400 酬的最大需求量）被租赁给了一家私有投资者。在谈判期 间，班期提高到了 200 年。这家来有技资部门在接手租赁 后，马上将自己电网络和零售业务组成了粮立的公司， 零售 公司成立后又租挣了独立的第二方一一个如管零售商。 2000 年期坷，王家发电部门均丰献且赁。这三家发电部门的 装机容量约为 2400 隅，它们有如下特点： 一第一个部门，煤或天然气发龟，一个电厂，八台发电机 绍，总容量为 1280 附； 一第二个部门，煤发龟，两个电厂，五台发电机组，总容 量为？台。削； - 第二二小部门，天然气和柴油发电，四个电厂，九台发电 机姐，总容量为 380 MW; 输电网络（主要为 275 盯电缆），包持至维多科亚的输电联 珞线，在 2000 年中期在租给了一家私营投资部门。 至1J 2000 年底，所有的公司都羊皮牙且赁由去。 系统运行职责与 1998 年 12 月交给了 NEMMCOo I韦澳大和j 亚州在加入国家电力市场方面是非常成功的。在两 62 年之内，高能量电价吸引了 lOOOMW 以上的联合椅环电 f ，这在是 电厂从 1999 年就大量地投入使用。此外，私营技资者已得到挑 准，建设维多利亚与南澳大利亚之间的输电能力为 200 阳的线 路。一条受监管的，容量为 250隅，联接新南成~士和南澳大利 亚的线路正在规到之中。由于对输电资产的出租，南澳大利亚州 政府已成功地摆脱，了以前在输电扩建方面遇到的资金菌难问题会 澳大利里首都本土政府的参与 活动背景 澳大利亚首都本土（ ACT ）电力工业仅有一家配电公司，拥 有约 125000 用户。它没有另外的发电或输电容量，所有的电由 新南威尔士提供。 首都本土财政府参加了国家模拟项目，支持 COAG 政策漂肘，是 同意成立国家电力市场的创建政府之一。该公司从 1998 年 12 月份起参加市场交易。 配电重组 首都本土州政府意识到，它们的电力公司太小，难以在零售 市场生存，因此考虑了各种结构模式，如出售、租赁、合营或与 新南成~士自己也公司合并等。最后与一家和营电力零售部门达成 了合营协议，这家私营部门巳取得了南澳大利亚；·1·1 零售租赁（同 时也是雄多利亚的一家配电公司之一）。这一家新的合营投资者 有天然气零售的业务经检。这小新的协议为首都本土的用户提供 了吴广告守能源选择权。合营协议于 2 在 00 年谈判。 首都本土政清的新刽举说明，引入竞争性电力市场前后，电 力改革有许多不码的方法。 塔斯马尼亚州政府的参与 活动背景 63 塔其可马足，亚州！是澳大利亚大陆南部的一个山岛。因此，塔斯 马尾亚的电力工业主要以水力发电为基础，马大陆没有联间，最 临近的？！？是维多利亚。由于使用束力发屯，塔斯马尼亚到政月号的 电价在全澳大利亚是最低的。大约从 1930 年开始，一家电力公 司使管理和棋间足，亚电力工业，这家公司具有发电、输电、系 统运行、民电网络如零售业务的全部职责。 在？§年代末期，塔斯马尼亚州政府由于发电将一个山谷淹 没，因此遭到了对其环境问题的严重抗议。虽然水力电厂最后技 入运营，但它却引起了澳大利豆社区对电力工业活动的自益担 心。这种担心在此事件后又不新地暴露宿来，它是 90 年代初昆 士兰州政府也厂计划掉这，以及 90 年代中期新南威尔 τ1::-iN·］乌昆 士兰外i 并网计划搁浅的主要原理。 在 1980 年对维多余j 亚和南澳大利亚州之间联网进拧研究的 闰时，也对维多利圭和塔斯马尼，亚~·月之间进行的联网进行了研究 和考虑，但由于费用问题没有通过。到 90 年代初期，由于没有 史多的水力发电来源，塔斯马尼亚州政府的水力发电扩建计划告 一段落。很显然，未来发电扩建计划的不确定性限制了该岛工业 的发展 a 1993 年至 1994 年间，塔斯马尼亚州！政府参加了国家模拟试 斡，是支持 COAG 发展国家电力市场政策的成员。 1997 年，政府因为电力工业私有化政策问题，在选举中失 利。新一届政府采用了另外一种替代性策略来参加电力市场。到 1 ” 8 年中期，新一届政府将电力公司重组玲一个单一的发电公 司，一个输屯和系统运行公司，一个混负责网络，又负责零售业 务的面己也公司。成立了一个工业监管机构。公布了以国家电力市 场规别草本为结构框架的市场准则，主要是为满足塔斯马尼亚州 政府所选择的有限竞争模式，主要的变化体现在发电领域的报价 和调度，稳据合闰和监管电份进行调度。 塔斯马尼亚电力市场于 1998 年 7 月份在没有电董市场的情 况下开始运行的。 64 发电公司的装机容受为 2200 刑，其主要特点如下： 径流和抽水蓄能发屯， 27 个电厂， 57 台发电机组，总容 量为 23 悦隅。 油发龟，一个电厂，两台发电机组，总容量为 240 酬。 自己也公哥有如下特点： 最大需求量约为 16 告。刚； 有约 25000 台用户。 继 1998 年 12 月实行国家电力市场之后，塔斯马尼亚州政府 向私人技资者发出邀请，了解它们对建设塔斯马足，亚和维多利亚 之间联线的兴趣。最后，州政月号将标授予了一家私营技资部门， 由其来建设这条 275kV ，容量为 600峭的立琉线路，预计 2003 年技入使用。 塔斯马尼豆州政府在开始实施塔斯马尼亚妈和维多利亚州 之间联同时，也宣布在 2003 年将孤立的电力市场转变为国家电 力市场的计蜡。 结论 在澳大利豆，中央政府和州政府之闰的关系不同于中国国务 院和各省之间的关系。即使如此，中国还是可以从澳大利亚的经 拴中学到一些东西，这些经验概述如下： (a）从一小中央集权的电力工业过泼到市场化电力工业需要许 多年的时坷。 (b）每个地区的具体要求各不相间，在重组电力公司时，会遇到 不同的书包战。 (c）需要制定总体竞争法规，提供市场行为政策以及第二乙方对基 础£妇色的准入政策。 (d）.需要对电力法进行修改，以便由一个工业监管札物对竞争性 电力市场进行监管，促进市场准则的实施，斧对违反市场行 65 为进行处罚。 (e）电力市场需要新的技能。在由中央集权的电力工业向竞争性 和服务性市场过漠中学习这些新技能是各级政府的主要挑 战。对竞争性电力市场进行“示范掉性运行是积累新技能的 重要步辑。建立民家电力市场准则的过程也是发展这些新技 能的一个机会。这一进程是绽’i爱的，要求配备有实践经验的 人来从事运行示范和市场试点工作。 的对市场规则进什审批需要过硬的监管技术， 在市场开始运 作后的最初几年中，需要对规则做许多必要的修改。监管机 构应在市场需要对爵京市场准则进行批准时的前几年就成 立起来。 (g）电力批发市场应有尽可能多的卖主。一旦市场开始运行，贸 易法中的兼并和收购准则应对卖主重组进行控制。 (h）在每一个这售市场开始之初，辟有的各方买主均应配备充足 的用户。 (i）省政月号在向割家电力市场过液中，尤其是作为国家监管机构 的代理，在引入零售竞争方萄，起着非常重要的作1号。中央 政月号应考虑、使用资金激励机制，以管理由国家电力市场巨变 的进程。 英格芷和威尔士电力改革 一、背景 拥有 6000 多万千瓦装札的原中央发电局（ CEGB ）在“年 代和知年代，在英国保守党全面改革菌营企业的浪潮中被私有 化。改革的驱动力有二，一是要减少政府的作用，二是希望筹措 资金。在改革期间，电力销售增长极度。需／年），峰荷基本不变， 但 CEGB 要求大量的资金，大力发展核电，以取代燃煤电厂。政 府认为，只要有足够的激励机制，至少发电领域可以史有效地技 资和运行。 1998 年政府发布白皮书，确定了新的电力工业结构，那时英留 电讯和英国煤气已经和有化，但仍为垄断业务。尽管两个行业的 私有化历史不长，政府部长巳稳不喜攻受监管的和有垄断行业。 66 他们有一种要促进竞争，提高放率的强烈总望，这也决定了新电 力工业的结构。 改革前， CEGB 垄斯了发电和输电止务，它生产，输送，最 后将电卖给 12 个地区电力局（请参兑囱川。地区电力局负责自己 龟，并蚕渐向用户的供电业务。为了 ~I 入竞争， CEGB 将发电业 务与输电业务分离，发电领域成立了数家公哥。 图 2: 棋有化之前英格兰和威尔士电力结构 1il: 也海 联合发电 CEGB E 联网是基 k旦旦 用户 所有各级 二、改革 在过去 11 年中，改革一直在进行之中。自 3 到告了迄今为 止英国的改革历程。 图 3 ：英国改革大事记 日 J挺 大 事 67 1988 年 2 月 政府公布白皮书，确定工业结特 I 纯9 年 通过电力法，为改革提供了法律基础 1989 年 9 月 电力监管办公室成立（独立管制机椅） 19 约年 3 月 31 日 CEGB 分成爵家电网公司，英圈也能，英国电力 核电公司，签定了无数合闰 12 个地区电力局改 为 12 家配电公司， 12 家配电公司共向拥有因家 电网公司 1990 年 4 月 1 日 电力市场开始运作，负荷大于 1隅’的用户写了选 择供电商 1 ” a 年 12 月 12 家在电公司如有化 19 费 1 年 3 月 英国电力和英国电能 60% 的成份上市出卖负持 大于 10 号千瓦的用户可以放开 1995 年 3 月 英国电力和英国也能其余 40% 的成份出卖 1 ”5 年 4 月 政府故弃在配电公司的金色股价， 兼并、出 售开始 19 雪 5 年 12 月 因家电罔公司如有化，其抽水蓄能电站在卖 1996 年 7 月 英国能滑、（除 Magnox 外的先进核电站）私有 化 1995 叫 1996 年 英罔电力和英国能源第一项次剥离部分发电资 产 蛇年雪月－ 99 年 6 月 100 千瓦以下用户分讲段放开 1 ”9 年 英国电力和英国电能第二次剥离电厂 2000 年 天然气朵也力且在营合并 2001 年 新电力交易机制取代企电量竞争市场 1 、工业组织 中央发电玛拔分割后，分别成立了发电、输屯和配电公司， 见图 4 。政府用新的法律将中央发电局的资产和职员转到了新公 司，建立新公司的过程称之为 4腻子”， 1990 年 3 月 31 日是自戚 子”目，各新公司签订了全部合碍。 68 图 4: 改革之际英格兰相威尔士的电力工业结掏 英阙电力公稳 妥雷核电公司 英隐密自在 发电商 教立公司 出坐 自尊家电网公司 ·~ 12 家地区电力公司 l!a]i,,f#isiftb~t~~, ' ·· · ~h;j~sqn;, Ma!Jiii:µ So~g ifi,:m,..~tQr G~o~ral QfDBI;1SDPC /: 1 v •t. . ';' ·~,. '','- .~[(,.)'~ ''.- ,·.~· ~- ""}.' ~ • .; :~~"'-~:...,,=~· ...~•... ,;~..,~~ .. ;;.__~..:,,;.:...&,,. .• ;,,,,.. 'm.< ••:10.< ..x~~.~~ . ·;,~~ ...0-.~ ...J&.::w,,...:::. ....:;;~ ..:L. :~; ; :. , .~ .t:,. ::,:: .>,. . ;+. :·:; : . ~:;;:. . ::. .'<~ ;.;'.. .J 8:30- 8:50 Preparing for Wholesale Competition Mr. Peter Egger Objective To review and emphasize ihe key requirements and conditions that must be satisfied to move to stage 2 (wholesale competition) - focus on main transmission and distribution restructuring issues. Presentation will introduce the main issues to be considered for the transition. 8:50-9:20 Restructuring Transmission to introduce competition Mr. Luis Caruso Objective Provide a clear overview of the transmission restructuring required to implement competitive power markets. Focus on: (a) open access and ownership issues; (b) principles and policies to ensure integration of provincial and regional markets. 9:20-9:40 Discussants: Mr. Wayne Shirley Mr. Eliot Wessler Mr. George Gilboy 9:40-10:00 Questions and Open Discussion 10:00 - 10:40 Panel Discussion: Preparing the distribution sector for wholesale competition Mr. Peter Egger, (Australia) Mr. Luis Caruso (Latin America) - 15 minutes each + JO min Q&A Objective Each speaker should outline the key steps taken to restructure distribution in the above countries/regions. Focus on: Workshop Agenda 37 (a) criteria/process used in defining the number and size of distribution firms; (b) how changes in ownership were implemented (c) capacity building needs and preparin~ distributors to handle power purchase risks 10:40 - 11 :00 Coffee Break 11:00 - 11:40 Panel Discussion: Preparing the distribution sector for wholesale competition (continuation) Mr. Wayne Shirley (USA) Mr. George Gilboy(USA) Ms. Sally Hunt (UK) - JO minutes each+ 10 min Q&A 11:40 - 12:30 Questions and Open Discussion 12:30-1:30 Lunch 1:30 - 1:45 Environmental Sustainability Considerations in Power Market Reform Mr. Peter Bradford Objective To review key considerations and safeguards that may be built into the reform process to ensure an environmentally sustainable market transition. 1:45 -2:00 Assuring Sustainable Development Mr. David Moskovitz Objective Describe the role of the power sector in environmental protection and the opportunities and options to carry out reforms to produce environmentally beneficial results. 2:00-2:30 Questions and Open Discussion 38 New Waves of Power Sector Refonn in China 2:30-3:00 Competitive market implementation within the existing · legal framework Mr. Harvey Salgo Objective To discuss how competition can be introduced within the boundaries of the existing legal framework. This discussion should be based on a review of the existing Electricity Law in China (1995) and should aim to show the extent of key reforms possible without fundamental changes to the Law. 3:00-3:15 Discussant: Mr. Clifford Garstang 3:15- 3:30 Coffee Break 3:30-4:00 Regulatory Requirements Mr. Peter Bradford Mr. David Moskovitz Objective To expand on the main points in the 1996 report on power regulation in China, with the discussants stressing the split Federal-State regulatory experience in the USA and Indian. To discuss: (a) recommended institutional and functional separation of regulatory functions at the Central and Provincial levels; (b) clarify the roles and functions of the Central and Provincial regulators. 4:00-4:20 Discussants: Mr. Eliot Wessler (USA) Mr. Harvey Salgo (India) 4:20-5:00 Questions and Open Discussion 5:00- 5:30 Workshop Summary Workshop Agenda 39 Madrun Song Mi, Director General of DBI, SDPC (Assisted by Harvey Salgo, Zhao Jianping, Sally Hunt, Peter Bradford, Wayne Shirley) 40 New Waves of Power Sector Refonn in China WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS No. Name Employer Title Chinese Participants 1 Zhang Guobao State Development Planning Commission (SDPC) Vice Commissioner 2 Jia Yinghua Department of Power, Vice Director General State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) 3 HuHeli Research Institute of the State Council Deputy Director General 4 Dong Chaojie Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council Deputy Division Director 5 Feng Pei Development Research Center of the State Council Deputy Section Head 6 Jia Shihua General Office of the State Council Deputy Division Director 7 Jiang Yue State Council Office for Restructuring Director General the Economic System (SCORES) 8 LiHaichao SCORES Deputy Director General 9 Song Gelong SCORES Deputy Division Director 10 DaiGuiying SDPC Deputy Director General 11 ZhuBaozhi SDPC 12 HeJianyu SDPC 13 Song Mi SDPC Director General 14 Li Yunlin SDPC Division Director 15 Wang Jun SDPC Division Director 16 HaoWeiping SDPC Deputy Division Director 17 ShiLishan SDPC Deputy Division Director 18 Liang Bo SDPC 19 QinZhijun SDPC 20 Zhou Huang SDPC 21 HanHuifang SDPC Deputy Director General 22 Li Caihua SDPC Deputy Division Director 23 Li Yanmeng SDPC Deputy Director General 24 Wang Xiaotao SDPC Deputy Director General 25 Wang Wenxiang Investment Research Institute of SDPC Director 26 Li Jingjing Energy Research Institute of SDPC Director 27 ZhuangXin Energy Research Institute of SDPC Deputy Director 28 Zhang Zhenmin Energy Research Institute of SDPC Professor 29 Peng Fangchun Energy Research Institute of SDPC Professor 30 Meng Song, Energy Research Institute of SDPC Associare Professor 31 Ren Dongming Energy Research Institute of SDPC Doctor 32 Liang Zhipeng Energy Research Institute of SDPC Doctor 33 Lin Bao Energy Research Institute of SDPC 34 Liu Yingqin Energy Research Institute of SDPC 35 Wang Yuan Energy Research Institute of SDPC 36 Zhou Dadi Energy Research Institute of SDPC Director 37 ZhouFengqi Energy Research Institute of SDPC 38 Han Wenke Energy Research_Institute of SDPC Deputy Director 39 Dai Yande Energy Research Institute of SDPC 40 WuZhonghu Energy Research Institute of SDPC 41 Liang Shiyuan Energy Research Institute of SDPC 42 GaoShixian Energy Research Institute of SDPC Workshop Participants '41 43 Liu Shujie Macro Institute of SDPC Deputy Director 44 Liu Yifei Macro Institute of SDPC '45 Wang Guanghui State Economic & Trade Commission (SETC) 46 Guo Congzhao Ministry of Finance (MOF) 47 TangZhenyi MOP 48 LiGuanghui MOP Division Director 49 Gu Ling MOP 50 Wu Jingchao MOP 51 TangZhi MOP 52 WangXinmao State Power Economic Research Center Director 53 DengJianlL State Power Economic Research Center Deputy Director 54 Hu Zhaoguang State Power Economic Research Center 55 Lei Tijun State Power Economic Research Center 56 Wu Xuan State Power Economic Research Center 57 Chai Gaofeng State Power Economic Research Center Senior Engineer 58 Lu Tingchang State Power Corporation of China (SPCC) Deputy General Manager 59 ChenPeihu SPCC Director 60 Wang Binghua SPCC Deputy Director 61 QiZhijian SPCC 62 ZhaoZunlian SPCC Director 63 Xu Weiliang /SPCC 64 Jiang Shaojun SPCC \ Director 65 GongJianzu SPCC 66 LuZhenyong SPCC Deputy Director 67 Xie Shaoxiong SPCC Consultant and Professor 68 ZhaoJie Hydropower Planning (,Jenera! Institute of SPCC Deputy President 69 Zhang Xuezhi Central China Branch of SPCC General Manager 70 Mao Qingyuan Central China Branch of SPCC Division Director 71 U.Guangman Central China Branch of SPCC Director 72 ChengDexin Automation Institute of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 73 Yue Tao Automation Institute of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 74 Yu Xianghong Automation Institute of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 75 Hu Angang Eco-Center of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Researcher 76 Cao Dong Chinese Academy of Envirdhmental Sciences 77 GaoShuting Environmental Planning Institute of The Chinese Academy ofEnvironm~ntal Sciences Associate Researcher 78 Li Lei State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) 79 Wang Hanchen SEPA 80 Yao Yufang · Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Researcher 81 Zhang Wentao China Electricity Research Institute Deputy Chief Engineer 82 DengKeyun China Energy Research Society Deputy Director 83 Su Mingshan Energy and Environmental Ecorlomic Research Institute, Tsinghua University Deputy Director 84 XiaQing Tsinghua University Deputy Dean 85 YanMaosong Shanghai University Professor 86 Yuan Peng Beijing Zhongjingtong Investing Consultant Ltd. Vice President 87 ZaiAimin Beijing Qianheren Science and Technology Corp. Ltd. 42 New Waves of Power Sector Reform in China 88 Gong Zbengzheng China Daily Journalist 89 XieHaoran Economic Daily Journalist 90 Liu Wei China Economic Herald Journalist 91 Shi Shilin China Economic Herald 92 Wang Shuishi China Economic Herald 93 Tan Yajia China Economic Herald 94 Lu Bicheng China Economic Herald Editor and Journalist 95 FengYajing China Economic Herald Deputy Director 96 LiuLijun Economic Herald 97 Zhang Kuanlin People's Daily Editor and Joumalist 98 Pan Shantang Beijing Branch of Xinhua News Agency Deputy General Manager 99 WangShumin Guohua Electric Power Company Deputy General Manager 100 CaoLeren Huaneng Group Company Deputy General Manager 101 Sun Yaowei Huaneng Group Company Division Director 102 Li Yanxi China Development Bank 103 Jiang Zhaozu China International Engineering Consulting Company Deputy Director 104 Liu Jingsheng China International Financial Company Ltd. Deputy General Manager 105 Guo Jiang China Energy Saving Investment Company Deputy Director 106 JueZongpan China Consulting Company, Energy Projects Dept. Director 107 HeYuansen Sichuan Power Bureau Assistant to the Director 108 Yang Weili Xinjiang Power Bureau Director 109 HanHuiming Shrandong Power Group Company Director 110 WuDonghui Guangxi Power Company Ltd. Deputy Director 111 Shi Hongde Ertan Hydro Power Development Corp. Ltd. Deputy General Manager 112 Tang Yizhi Hainan Power Company Ltd. Secretary General 113 ZhuJiben Shanghai Baogang Power Plant Head 114 Gan Guangzhong Shanghai Baogang Power Plant 115 LuoShanbao Guizhou Power Corporation 116 Wei Mao Northwest Corporation of Guohua Electric Co. Assistant to General Manager 117 Guan Renlong East China Power Corporation 118 Guo Guochuan State Power Dispatch and Communication Center Deputy Chief Engineer 119 XieSongling North China Power Corporation Division Director 120 HaWenhui Beijing Dongxing Test Technology Company Ltd. Director for Management Research Center Senior Engineer 121 Wang Wanfeng Henan Jiaozuo Wanfang Group Company Director · 122 MaoYushi Tianze Company Council 123 Yang )\1i11gzhou China Power Enterprise Union 124 Wang Yonggan China Power Enterprise Union Vice Secretary General 125 Zhang Changyuan China Power Enterprise Union 126 Tang Zhongnan North China Power Corporation Adviser 127 Pan Kunhua China Investment Power Company of China Development and Investment Corporation Vice General Manager 128 GaoLingyun International Cooperation Agency for Tourism in People's Consultative Conference Vice General Manager Representatives from the Energy Foundation 129 Douglas Ogden Energy Foundation Director 130 SteveJudd Energy Foundation Chief Representative 131 Yang Fuqiang Energy Foundation Program officer Workshop Parlicipants 43 132 Lu Hong Energy Foundation Program Associae 133 Peter Bradford Energy Foundation Advisor 134 David Moskovitz Energy Foundation Advisor 135 Wayne Shirley Energy Foundation Advisor Representatives from the World Bank 13 6 Yukon Huang World Bank, Beijing Country Director and Chief of Mission 137 Yoshihiko Sumi Energy & Mining, World Bank, Washington DC Sector Director 138 Noureddine Berrah World Bank, Washington DC Lead Energy Specialist 139 Elaine Sun World Bank, Beijing Lead Energy Specialist 140 Zhao Jianping World Bank, Beijing Senior Energy Specialist 141 Cliff Garstang World Bank, Washington DC Senior Legal Counsel 142 Ranjit Lamech World Bank, Washington DC Senior Energy Specialist 143 Sally Hunt Consultant 144 Peter Egger Consultant 145 Luis Caruso Consultant 146 Harvey Salgo Consultant 147 Other Representatives 148 Lei Meiling Royal Netherlands Embassy 149 Bai Ailian Commercial Section, Australian Embassy Commercial Attache 150 Wang Ying Commercial Section, Australian Embassy Project Officer 151 Peng Yan Development Section, UK Embassy Project Officer 152 Xavier Chen International Energy Agency (IEA) Special Assistant to the President 153 Penny De Vual British Embassy, DFID 154 Luo Shike Cambridge Energy Research Associates 155 Gao Chengzhi Cambridge Energy Research Associates 156 Gilbert Gilboy Cambridge Energy Research Associates 157 Eliot Wessler Federal Energy Regulatory Cpmmission (US) Director 44 New Waves of Power Sector Refonn in China SECTION 2: SUMMARY OF INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE I POWER SECTOR RESTRUCTURING IN AUSTRALIA The national electricity market in Australia was formed as the result of many events. Some of the events occurred at the national government level and some of the events occurred at the jurisdictional government level. The early events were experienced during the 1980's. Many of the events occurred during the 1990's. The national electricity market was finally formed as a cooperative legal agreement between five of the eight jurisdictional governments in Australia. These were: NSW, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia and the Australian Capital Territory and they are known as the "participating jurisdictions." The remaining jurisdictions (Tasmania, Northern Territory and Western Australia) have an opportunity to join the national electricity market at some future time, in accordance with the National Competition Law and their individual electricity reform objectives. In 1989, the National Government established an inquiry into the efficiency of the energy industry in Australia. This was the trigger for the development of the national electricity market. It took another ten years for the electricity supply industry to be re-organized to a point where the national electricity Gas Nation Electricit Mark Reaional (il Government funded : 200 (oooortun interchana Gill Investor funded market could commence. Power Sector Restructuring in Australia 45 Figure 1 Electricity supply arrangement before and after market commencement During the ten-year period (1989 to 1998), each participating jurisdictional government (as well as the national government) became involved in the design issues associated with development of an electricity market. Before explaining the unique issues that each jurisdiction encountered during the ten- year period, it is useful to consider the electricity supply arrangements prior to and after the formation of the national electricity market. This can be best described by reference to Figure 1. The left-hand arrangement shown in Figure 1 describes the electricity supply industry before the commencement of the national electricity market. The jurisdiction of the Australian Capital Territory is shown as "S" which represents Snowy Hydro as well as the load center of Canberra. Each jurisdiction had an electricity supply industry .• The jurisdictions of NSW, Victoria, Australian Capital Territory and South Australia were interconnected and operated on the basis of a commercial contract, known as the "Interconnection Operation Agreement". This operated in a manner similar to the proposed East China Regional Market, except that it was cost based (rather than price based). The contract was structured on the principle of a voluntary bilateral contract and allowed jurisdiction A to sell power to jurisdiction B if the cost of production in jurisdiction A was cheaper than the cost of production in jurisdiction B. The Interconnection Operation Agreement was in operation nine years prior to the commencement of the national electricity market. It will be noted in the left-hand arrangement that the electricity supply industries of Queensland and Tasmania were isolated. There was no interconnection between Queensland and NSW, and there was no interconnection between Tasmania and Victoria. Plans to form these interconnections had been discussed but funding could not be easily justified. Justificatidn became easier after the commencement of the national electricity market due to the involvement of private investors. The right-hand arrangement shown in Figure 1 describes the electricity supply industry in December 2000, two years after the start of the national electricity market. The "opportunity interchange" contract between NSW, Victoria, Australian Capital Territory and South Australia has been terminated and replaced by the National Electricity Code (market rules). The Queensland government had agreed to operate its isolated electricity supply industry in accordance with the National Electricity Code from the start of the national electricity market. However, the Tasmanian government did not join the national electricity market in 1998. Instead, it has nominated 2003 as the date when it will operate its electricity supply industry in accordance with the 46 New Waves of Power Sector Refonn in China National Electricity Code. In the period between 1998 and 2000 the Tasmanian government has operated an isolated power market based on Tasmanian government approved market rules and will continue with these rules until interconnection with Victoria is in place. The impact of the national electricity market on the formation of interconnectors can be observed from Figure 1. A new direct current interconnector (approximately 200 MW capacity) was commissioned between NSW and Queensland in mid 2000. A new alternating current "regulated" interconnector (approximately 1,000 MW capacity) is being built between NSW and Queensland and is to be commissioned in January 2001. A new alternating current interconnector (approximately 250 MW capacity) is planned to link South Australia with NSW and is due for commissioning in the year 2002. A new direct current interconnector (approximately 200 MW capacity) is approved to connect Victoria with South Australia during the year 2001. The capacity of the new interconnector planned to interconnect Tasmania with Victoria in 2003 will be approximately 600 MW. The funding of these interconnectors has been justified largely on the relative prices of each wholesale price region which has been established as part of the national electricity market. The right-hand arrangement shown in Figure 1 also identifies shifts in generation investment that have occurred since the commencement of the national electricity market. The national electricity market quickly changed the focus of generation funding. The pool prices in NSW and Victoria dropped to very low values due to surplus power plant capacity, whereas the pool prices in Queensland and South Australia rose to high values due to a lack of generation capacity. As a consequence, all investment in power plants shifted to Queensland and South Australia and stopped in NSW and Victoria. The shifts in resource funding for both interconnectors and power plants was one of the fundamental objectives of the national electricity market and in this regard the national electricity market has been an outstanding success. In addition, the building of a natural gas pipeline between Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Queensland has become a major investment project and is based on the emerging energy market opportunities and environmental limitations of coal. This Attachment will explain how each government (national and jurisdictional) was affected by the reform process, the changes required to the regulatory framework and how the industry was restructured as reform developed. National Government Involvement Ip accordance with the Australian Constitution, the National Government had Power Sector Restructuring in Australia 41 only a small direct involvement in the electricity supply industry. This was associated with the development of the Snow Mountains Hydro Electricity Scheme during the 1950s and 1960s due to the involvement of the three jurisdictional governments who were affected by the water contained within the scheme. In the 1980's the National Government assisted the jurisdictional governments of South Australia, Victoria and NSW by coordinating the plans for interconnection between Victoria and South Australia. During the 1970's and early 1980's instances of inefficient practices were evident in many jurisdictions. During the 1980' s the national government became concerned with the poor performance of generating plant in all jurisdictions, the massive funding required for each power plant and the competition for these funds between the jurisdictional governments. This became particularly evident once the exchange rate was floated in 1983. Evidence of electricity industry funds being used by jurisdictional governments on other industry initiatives, or in non-productive infrastructure was observed. Commercial and administrative accountability was low due to past structural barriers. In 1989 the National Government undertook a productivity review of the national energy industry and concluded that savings of around A$6 billion could be achieved if the industry was reformed. This review coincided with the work being carried out in England for the commencement of a National UK electricity market in 1990. In coajunction with this review, the National Government established the Council of Australian Governments (COAG), a forum for national cooperative decision making on areas where the National Government did not have direct constitutional power. In 1990, the National Grid Management Council (NGMC) was formed, funded in part by the National Government and the jurisdictional governments, to facilitate the design of a national electricity market. The NGMC, which consisted of government and industry officers, became the interface between COAG and the electricity industry. The NGMC set up many committees and working groups supported by people from electricity industry organizations across the nation. In effect, the NGMC became the project manager for the introduction of market rules and market information systems. The Council was later (1997) replaced by NEMMCO and NECA, when all governments had agreed the structure of the market. ·Following on from the productivity review, the National Government undertook a second review in 1992 and 1993, this time on "competition policy". This review provided the foundation for a new national Competition Law, which aimed to provide third party access .to government assets and infrastructure. Competition Law covers much more than the electricity industry - it covers gas and water, railways, ports, telecommunications, the 48 New Waves of Power Sector Reform in China legal systems, the medical system, etc. The Australian Competition Law was established in 1995 and applied to all jurisdictional governments. To implement the Competition Law, the National Government created a new government agency called the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). This new age:ncy was formed by the amalgamation of two previous agencies (the Pricing Surveillance Authority and the Trade Practices Commission). Amending the existing national Trade Practices Act 1974 formed the statute on Competition Law. This arrangement had the effect of making the ACCC · the national economic regulator for all industries and the protector of consumer's rights. The ACCC has been given legal powers to enforce the Competition Law and to impose penalties for a breach of the Law. The National Government also established a National Competition Council to monitor the performance and advise on policy for Competition Law. Both the ACCC and the NCC act on behalf of the National Government, but operate at "arms length" from the National Government. Together, the NCC and the ACCC operate to administer and maintain competition policy, allowing the National Government to "independently" consider the strategic implications of that policy and to enhance the policy where necessary. For this reason, the ACCC is often referred to as an "independent" regulator, whereas it is more accurately referred to as a national industry regulator. For 8 months, between November 1993 and June 1994, the National Government and jurisdictional governments of NSW, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory agreed to participate in a national Paper Trial. Most electricity busin~sses within each jurisdiction participated in the exercise. This Paper Trail was organized to operate in parallel with existing organizational activities - for this reason, none of the existing commercial arrangements were modified. The exerci.se was similar to a nation wide university modeling experiment, where the generation bids were made in accordance with real plant availability, but the exercise did not impact on the actual dispatch of generating units. Separate market rules were prepared to govern the Paper Trail, market information systems were specially designed and built (although much was leveraged off the NSW. internal market practices at the time), and settlement of the market was undertaken on a monthly cycle. An official audit of the conduct of the Paper Trail was undertaken and conclusions drawn as to the merits of the market rules. The Paper Trial resulted in the following two significant events: • A national committee was formed to manage the design and preparation of a set of national market rules (later to become the National Electricity Code) for wholesale competition, access to transmission infrastructure and administrative practices·. Power Sector Restructuring in Australia 49 • Each jurisdictional government raised the level of conillritment to electricity refonn. The Victorian government who introduced an early version of competition in w holesale electricity in July 1994, immediately after the finish of the Paper Trial led this. Competition Law was the foundation stone for the introduction of competition in the electricity industry. At the same time as this Law was being prepared (1994 and 1995), the Council of Australian Governments approved policy statements on the formation of a competitive electricity industry (April 1995), firming up on the introduction of a national electricity market and the objectives of such a market. These policy statements became the guidelines for the lower level activities undertaken by jurisdictional governments and industry as it considered the commercial and political implications of the structural changes necessary to introduce competition in electricity. The major objectives established to guide the formation of the national electricity market were: • The market should be competitive; • Customers should be able to choose which supplier (including generators and retailers) they will trade with; • A person wishing to enter the market should not be treated more favorably or less fa~rably than if that person were already participating in the market; • A particular energy source or technology should not be treated more favorably or less favorably than another energy source or technology; • The provisions regulating trading of electricity in the market should not treat intrastate trading more favorably or less favorably than interstate trading of electricity. Up to 1997, each jurisdictional government had legislative powers to control the electricity industry in their jurisdiction. This "decentralized" model had worked extremely well for 100 years, but evidence of inefficient practices suggested that a "new decentralized" model which removed jurisdictional boundaries was needed. In 1997, as a result of cooperation between jurisdictional governments, the National Electricity Law was introduced which· permitted the introduction of a national electricity market. The new National Electricity Law was established in such a way as to allow jurisdictional governments the choice of participating in the Law. The National Government offered an innovative funding incentive to encourage the jurisdictional governments to exercise their choice in a favorable way. Whilst all jurisdictional governments supported the policy statements arising from the COAG meetings, only five of the jurisdictional governments elected to participate in the formation of the national electricity market. The historic agreement was signed in 1997 and allowed for the formation of the national electricity market. This "market" was a collection of electricity systems all operating under the same set of market rules. Although one electricity system was isolated from the other systems, it was still operated as part of the national electricity market structure. This means that the same set of market rules, the 50 New Waves of Power Sector Reform in China same Market and System Operator, and the same industry regulator were used to manage the isolated electricity market within that jurisdiction. The design of the market information systems was identical in the isolated electricity system, as were the administrative processes. The jurisdictional government of the isolated electricity system chose this arrangement to remove the harmonization shock that would have otherwise occurred at the time of interconnection, planned for several years after market commencement. The National Electricity Law is a relatively short and simple statute that provides governance of the electricity market. It establishes the following key structural elements: • two incorporated companies (the National Electricity Market Management Company and the National Electricity Code Administrator); • a National Electricity Code (the market rules); • a Natiopal Electricity Tribunal, to manage the enforcement of the National Electricity Code; and • penalties for the breach of the National Electricity Code. The National Electricity Market Management Company (NEMMCO) is a company formed under Company Law with shareholders. Shareholding is restricted to the governments of each participating jurisdiction, with one share being held by a nominated Minister from each jurisdiction. · NEMMCO is responsible for operating the national electricity market in accordance with the National Electricity Code and for developing the market so as to improve its efficiency. National Electricity Market Management Company (NEMMCO) carries out the role performed by a "Market and System Operator", and is separate from the transmission network companies. At the time of c;:hoosing this model, the Victorian government was operating with a market and system operator that was separate to 'transmission, whereas the NSW government was operating with a combined transmission, market operator and system operator. The advantages and disadvantages of both structures were available to guide the final national solution. The National Electricity Code Administrator (NECA) is a company, also formed with shareholding jurisdictions, but with respon~ibilities for providing "light handed regulation" of the national electricity market, including providing formal controls for any changes to the Code. NECA's role includes enforcement of the Code and the assessment of any breaches. The National Electricity Code is a legal instrument (similar to a Regulation) but with a formal public consultation and approval process that involves both NECA and theACCC. The national electricity market was established as a wholesale market with multiple sellers (generators) and multiple buyers (retailers), separate transmission network businesses and separate distribution network businesses. Power Sector Restructuring in Australia Sl The wholesale market commenced in December 1998. In July 1999 the regulation of all transmission network businesses (transmission prices and quality of service) was passed from the separate jurisdictional regulators to the ACCC in accordance with transitional arrangements contained within the National Electricity Code. The regulation of the distribution networks remains with the jurisdictions until such time as they agree to hand this responsibility to the ACCC. Responsibility for the development of the retail electricity market also remains with the jurisdictional governments, unless they request assistance from the National Government or unless their policies impact directly on the wholesale market. Not withstanding this separation of responsibility for the retail markets, the jurisdictional governments must restrict their retail competition policies to the guidelines established by the national Competition Law. If a breach of Competition Law occurred, the ACCC would be able to intervene. The development of the retail competition market is now the major focus for the governments of Australia. The retail competition rules partly involve modification to the National Electricity Code and partly require the development of new rules to protect customers. The jurisdictional governments are working together to develop, wherever possible, national policies and processes to govern retail competition. However, each jurisdictional government has to consider the implication of retail reform on the different experiences and practices within their jurisdictions. As a consequence, they require control of policy design and timelines to effect a smooth transition to a national competitive retail market in electricity. Formation of the National Electricity Code (Market Rules) The national electricity market is governed by the National Electricity Code (market rules). This Code was developed over many years in accordance with directions provided by the National Grid Management Council. In the period between 1990 and 1993, the NGMC published several policy guidelines on possible elements of a competitive electricity market. These guidelines resulted in the formation of a set of market rules for the management of the national Paper Trail (late 1993 and 1994). In late 1994, after the completion of the Paper Trail, the NGMC formed a National Market Code Development Committee. It was within this committee that the structure and content of the National Electricity Code, as it operates to day, was formed. The National Electricity Code consists of two major parts, the competition rules and the access rules. The competition rules govern the trading arrangements for sellers and buyers in the wholesale electricity market. The access rules govern support functions, such as connection to the transmission network, transmission pricing, system security arrangements, dispute 52 New Waves of Power Sector Reform in China resolution, enforcement rules and rule changes. Both parts are required to be separately approved by the ACCC in accordance with Competition Law. During the course of preparing the draft National Electricity Code, each jurisdiction made use of its emerging characteristics. For instance, the early 1996 version of the dtaft National Electricity Code was used by the NSW government to form the basis of the NSW rlla:rket rules. This was beneficial, since it minimized harmonization shocks at the time when the market became national, and it was an opportunity to test the viability of the draft rules. In 1997, the Queensland government made use of the pending National Electricity Code as the market rules for their isolated electricity market. Additional rules were added to manage the transitional rules required by each government. In 1998, Tasmania used the structure of the National Electricity Code as the foundation for their isolated electricity market even though the government had not formally joined the national electricity market. Between 1996 and 1998, Victoria progressively adjusted their jurisdictional market rules to adopt the emerging new national market rules. The National Electricity Code and its amendments are required to be approved by the ACCC in accordance with the competition requirements of the national Trade Practices Act 1974 (Competition Law). The final draft of the National Electricity Code was submitted to the ACCC in October 1996. The approval process was managed in the following way: • The draft National Electricity Code was formally submitted by the NGMC in November 1996. • The draft National Electricity Code was published as a public document. • The ACCC carried out an investigation on the anti-competitive elements of the National Electricity Code. • The ACCC invited submissions on the draft National Electricity Code from industry, interested parties, consumers and the public. • The ACCC released two interim determinations, one in support of the competition rules and one in support of the access rules. The ACCC advised of changes that they required enabling each part of the Code to be approved. · • The ACCC conducted a public conference on the National Electricity Code to consider the issues regarding the interim determinations. • As a result of comments raised at the public conferences, the ACCC reviewed its interim determination and published a final determination. • The National Electricity Code was then formally converted into a legal document. The approval process by the ACCC took over 2 years to complete. The development process, from commencement in 1994 to formal approval in 1999, took nearly five years to complete. It is noted that the period of five years is conservative, since the ability of the teams to prepare such a large and complicated document was assisted by the experiences gained from the National Paper Trial and the experiment with an internal market prior to that perioc;l. Power Sector Restructuring in Australia ~3 It can be observed that the task of preparing and approving the first set of market rules, which are to apply nationally to all electricity businesses, is a large exercise and its formation and approval should not be rushed. Further, by the time the market rules are submitted to the national regulator for approval, the national regulator has to have mature skills in place to manage the large task of examining the submission and forming a conclusion as to the merits of the competition and access rules presented in the document. Changes to the National Electricity Code follow a similar process, but in general the time for investigation and approval is reduced. Nevertheless, a period of six to twelve months could be expected when seeking to make changes to the National Electricity Code. The process has been designed to ensure that adequate industry and public consultation has been carried out on any Code change proposal and that the proposal does not introduce anti- competitive barriers. NSW Government Involvement BACKGROUND EVENTS In 1950 the NSW electricity industry was restructured following years of significant shortages of power. At this time, the local (community) governments were restricted to retailing and network activities (the interface with the consumers) and all responsibility for generation (and subsequently transmission) was handed to a new organization (the Electricity Commission of NSW, later to become Pacific Power). The number of local electricity . distributors was reduced from approximately 190 to 42 at this time by amalgamation. This is an important starting point for market reform in NSW as it created commercial interfaces, and hence a higher level of accountability, between all entities. The NSW electricity industry had been developed on a large source of black coal. During the next 20 years, transmission development allowed power plant expansion to occur at coal mines away from cities and power supply enjoyed a period of stability. During the 1970s the NSW government recognized that inefficient practices were developing within the electricity industry, however an expected energy boom in the late 1970s masked this growing issue. This was compounded by the underground mining techniques used in NSW (compared with the open cut techniques available in Queensland) In the period 1980 to 1985, the NSW electricity system experienced a series of significant events, including the failure of three out of four generating units at a relatively new power plant, low availability of power plants (around 65%), swings in load growth, from positive 5% to negative 2%, large increases in 54 New Waves of Power Sector Reform in China electricity tariffs (25% in one year), funding restrictions for the completion of an approved power plant expansion program, environmental concerns preventing the opening of an open cut coal mine and management resistance to providing timely information. During this period, an opportunity was taken by the government to reduce the number of Distributors from 42 down to 25 through amalgamation of smaller entities to form larger entities . . Between the mid 1980s and 1990, the NSW government commenced administrative reform of generation and transmission management structures. FORMATION OF AN "INTERNAL" ELECTRICITY MARKET In 1989 and 1990, the NSW government, through its generation and transmission corporation, examined the developments of the UK electricity market and approved an initiative to introduce "internal" competition within the organization. In 1991, a restructure of the organization into competing business units was carried out, followed by the introduction of an internal electricity exchange "ELEX market'.' in January 1992. The internal market commenced as ·a "variable and fixed capacity contract" market to enable commercial practices to be introduced across the organization, not only in power plants but also in all service entities in .other parts of the organization (such as Information Technology services). Once these new processes had been established, the market was transformed into an energy pool, which was essentially a mandatory power pool with a corporate finance unit as the single buyer). This internal power market was ring fenced in the accounts from the external tariffs and revenue arrangements with Distributors. Hence, there was no impact on consumers. However, the internal cost of generation could now be tracked using the internal market systems and a comparison made with external tariffs. Many advantages were able to be derived from the operation of the ELEX market. These are summarized as follows: • The design of the UK market was able to be tested and refined. Several design features were not utilized, such as capacity uplift payments, since they were considered to introduce distortions into the spot price. • Separation of transmission from market and system operation was tested. • Transmission pricing issues were able to be explored. • The concept of financial contracts (CIDs) was able to be tested. • The many detailed issues involved with introducing market information systems were experienced. • Market settlements processes were able to be developed and refined. • Internal service agreements were introduced at the same time in most parts of the organization. • The competition spirit influenced all parts of the organization in some way, with many people trained in competitive market concepts. ·Power Sector Restructuring in Australia 55 • Debate on market reform principles at the national level was able to be entered into with detailed knowledge and insight as to the merits of adopting one approach over another. This was particularly important during the national Paper Trial, where many of the concepts identified in the ELEX market were tested across the participating jurisdictions. These internal competition arrangements remained until 1995, at which time the internal market was reformed to enable the NSW government to commence an external wholesale competitive power market. The NSW government supported the COAG policy on electricity market development and participated in the development of the National Electricity Code. FORMATION OF THE NSW ELECTRICITY MARKET In 1995, the NSW government changed the NSW Electricity Law to allow for the formation of competitive power markets. This included the formation of a separate Law to manage the Transmission network, the market operator and the system operator. At the same time, the government decreased the number of distributors (from 25 to 6) and increased the number of generator companies from (1 to 4) as well as allowing private generation to enter the market. At this time, the transmission business within the power company was formed into a separate government owned agency. These structural changes were completed in time for a commencement of the NSW electricity market in March 1996, with multiple sellers and multiple buyers. The market operated for two months with an administered price cap (similar to having a 100% vesting contract) whilst all market information systems were tested. ill May 1996, the administered price cap was removed and the market operated as a spot energy pool market, supported initially with simple vesting CfDs set at 85% of the system demand. All sellers and buyers were able to negotiate CfDs for the remaining 15% of the market. The vesting contracts were scheduled to progressively lower their coverage in steps, and to be phased out at the end of 2000, in line with the Victorian government vesting contracts. As the vesting contracts dropped off in quantity, the sellers and buyers were able to enter into negotiated CID contracts to manage their risk exposure. The NSW market commenced in March 1996 with the latest available draft market rules that had been prepared for the national electricity market. At this time, national Competition Law was in operation and the ACCC was required to authorize the rules, including the use of vesting CID contracts to manage the transition funding impacts from the market on participants. The market operated smoothly and in May 1997 the NSW market was 56 New Waves of Power Sector Refonn in China harmonized with the Victorian market to allow trade to flow across the jurisdictional boarder. For a period of 14 months (March 1996 to May 1997) the Interconnection Operation Agreement" did not operate since it was cost based and required generators (who by now were competing companies) to share their co'sts of production. This limitation created an urgent need to combine the isolated NSW and Victorian electricity markets. The harmonized NSW and Victorian markets operated for a further 18 months (until December 1998) at which time responsibility for managing the separate NSW and Victorian markets were handed over to NEMMCO and NECA. During 1996, retail market contestability for consumers became an important priority for the NSW government Each distributor was allocated a License to operate as a retailer and a License to operate as a network business within NSW. Codes of Practice, in matters such as customer service standards, accounting practice and metering, were established to ensure that the distribution businesses operate within government policy guidelines. A retail market development program was introduced with only the large consumers being able to select their retailer in the first few years. The development of the retail market is the major topic of reform for the NSW government at the present time. In December 2000 the NSW government passed legislation to require distribution companies to allocate their network and retail busin~sses to separate incorporated companies. This program is required to be completed prior to July 2001. RESTRUCTURING OF GENERATION, TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION In 1994, at the completion of the Paper Trial, the NSW government placed the transmission function of the power company into a subsidiary company as the first of two steps to separate transmission from generation. In early 1995, legislation was enacted to allow the transmission subsidiary to become a separate government agency. The NSW government approved an agency structure that consisted of a transmission function (500kV and 330kV), a market operator and a system operator, with the market and system operator functions being ring fenced from the transmission responsibilities. The power company was retained as a generation company consisting of seven power plants and a number of small hydro generators. A government policy unit was formed to advise on market implementation policy. NSW had already established an electricity industry regulator. In mid 1995, the NSW government enacted legislation that required the amalgamation of the 25 distribution companies (132kV and below) into six larger distribution companies. Two of the distributors were city based whilst the other four distributors were rural based. The 2. 7 million consumers in Power Sector Restructuring in Australia 51 NSW (with maximum demand of approximately 11,800 MW) were allocated to the new distributors as follows: • Company 1: city based with 1.3 million consumers; • Company 2: city based with 0.7 million consumers; • Company 3: rural based with 0.33 million consumers; • Company 4: rural based with 0.11 million consumers; • Company 5: rural based with 0.22 million consumers; • Company 6: rural (outback) based with 0.05 million consumers; The companies were formed with new Boards of Directors, a new Managing Director and shareholding restricted to the NSW government. The new companies were given six months to complete their amalgamation program and preparation for competing in the wholesale electricity market. In early 1996, the NSW government separated the powe~ plants (total capacity of approximately 14,300 MW) into four companies with each company having the following features: • Company 1: two coal power plants with eight units and a total capacity of 4,640 MW. • Company 2: four coal power plants with. eight units and a total capacity of 4,240 MW. • Company 3: one coal power plant with four units, two hydro power plants, one pump storage power plant and a total capacity of2,900 MW. • Company 4: NSW share of the Snowy hydro scheme with many units and available capacity of approximately 2,500 MW The companies were formed with new Boards of Directors, a new Managing Director and shareholding restricted to the NSW government. The formation of these new power companies was controversial and is generally regarded as a first step in the unbundling of generation. Reasons for the staged approach involved shared infrastructure, capacity concentrations at several sites, long term coal contracts, and labor opposition. In 1997 a major study was carried out into the further separation of the power plants but due to major community opposition and the pending Olympic games program, the reform agenda was placed on hold. It is possible that further unbundling will occur at some later stage. In December 1998, at the commencement of the national electricity market, the NSW government handed over the system operation and market operation responsibilities of the transmission agency to NEMMCO. The transmission agency retained its planning and maintenance responsibilities and was transformed into an incorporated company with government shareholding. Victorian Government Involvement BACKGROUND EVENTS 58 New Waves of Power Sector Reform in China The Victorian electricity industry was structured in a different way to the NSW electricity industry. In Victoria, one power company was responsible for all of the following functions: generation, transmission, system operation, distribution network and retail sales. The Power Company sold most of the electricity directly to consumers, but some was sold to a number of small municipal distribution companies, who in-turn on sold to consumers. The Victorian electricity industry was established on a large source of brown coal. The impact of generation expansion was to concentrate power stations within a small locality, creating a large workforce within small townships. In addition, brown coal power stations are more expensive to build than black· coal power stations. Hence, Victorian government had a· higher funding requirement than the NSW government for the same capacity power plant. The concentration of generation capacity in a small area introduced environmental problems for the community, labor problems for the Victorian government and transmission design issues for the power company. These factors were expensive to manage and resulted in a funding difficulty, which became evident during the 1980s. The funding difficulties were accompanied by large tariff increases, and subsequent reviews of the management of the power company. In addition, · 'the generation expansion program adopted by the Victorian government in the mid 1980s created funding competition with the generation expansion program adopted by· the NSW government. These issues were of such proportion as to create management tensions between the power companies in the Victorian and NSW jurisdictions. As a result, the Victorian government proceeded with its own generation expansion program creating a further funding difficulty. The totality of these problems created a funding crisis for the Victorian power company leading to a near-bankruptcy position. In the early 1990s, and as a result of the funding crisis, the Victorian government initiated a privatization program to sell its power company generation assets. The program commenced slowly, but accelerated with a · change in government in 1993. In that year the government announced the plans for a major restructuring of the Victorian electricity industry. In mid 1994, (and at the end of the National Paper Trail), the Victorian government commenced operation of the Victorian electricity market. The introduction of the electricity market was accompanied with a full restructuring of the power company. The Victorian government supported the COAG policy on electricity market development and participated in the development of the National Electricity Code. FORMATION OF THE VICTORIAN ELECTRICITY MARKET Power Sector Restructuring in Australia 59 The Victorian electricity market commenced in July 1994 as a "capacity pool" which contained spot trading for production in excess of the assigned capacity contracts. This design is generally known as a "net pool" and is the design that is currently being adopted by the UK government. The limitations of this design, when compared to the internal spot market operating in the NSW power company, were quickly identified. In July 1995 the Victorian government transformed the "capacity market" into an energy pool ("gross market"). This competitive power market has a "pure" common clearing price, which was not distorted by capacity uplift payments. At the same time, the Victorian government introduced ''vesting contracts" that were based on the CID principle but which had some unusual conditions. These extra conditions added distortions to the market, as Victoria experienced in the years ahead. The vesting contracts were established for a period of five years (end of 2000) at which time they would cease. It was proposed that the sellers and buyers would then have the opportunity to replace the vesting contracts with negotiated CID contracts (this activity is occurring at the current time). The vesting contracts were set at 95% of the demand and were set to reduce in accordance with the reduction in franchise consumer loads as these consumers became contestable. In 1996 the Victorian government approved the refinement of the market rules to align with the emerging draft National Electricity Code which had been adopted by the NSW government. In 1997, the Victorian and NSW governments endorsed, and the ACCC approved, the harmonization of the two individual market rules to enable market trades to be carried out across the NSW-Victorian border. The Interconnection Operation Agreement, which had been dormant for 14 months, was officially terminated. The harmonized market rules commenced in May 1997 and formed the early version of a national electricity market with two wholesale price areas. At this time, the draft National Electricity Code had been submitted to the ACCC but had not received interim approval. The harmonized market continued for another eighteen months before it was replaced by the national electricity market arrangements. The development of the retail market is the major topic of reform for the Victorian government at the present time. RESTRUCTURING OF GENERATION, TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION Prior to mid 1994, the Victorian power company was a fully integrated structure consisting of generation, transmission, system operation, distribution 60 New Waves of Power Sector Reform in China and retail sales. With the commencement of the market, the power company was unbundled in several steps: • In the first step (late 1993 to late 1994), all generation was allocated to a single generation agency, transmission was allocated to a separate agency, system operation and transmission expansion was allocated to a separate agency and distribution was allocated to five separate agencies. A government policy unit was formed to advise on market implementation policy. A new electricity regulator was formed. • In the second step (1995), the distribution agencies were transformed into incorporated companies and sold to private investors. The sale program was completed within 12 months. Characteristics of the distribution companies, which covered 2.0 million customers (and maximum demand of approximately 7,700 MW), were as follows: Company 1: rural based, with 0.53 million customers; Company 2: city based, with 0.23 million customers; Company 3: city/rural based, with 0.23 million customers; Company 4: city based, with 0.52 million customers; Company 5: rural based, with 0.47 million customers; • In the third step (1996), the generation agency was separated into five incorporated generation companies and sold to private investors. The sale program was completed over the following two years. Characteristics of the generation companies, which had an installed capacity of approximately 8,200 MW, were as follows: Company 1: coal fired, single site, 2 generating units with total capacity of l,OOOMW; Company 2: coal fired, single site, 4 generating units with total capacity of 2,000MW; Company 3: coal fired, single site, 4 generating units with total capacity of 1,450MW; Company 4: coal fired, single site, 8 generating units with total capacity of l,600MW; Company 5: gas fired, two power plants, 2 generating units with total capacity of970MW; Company 6: hyrdo, 10 power plants, 21 generating units with total capacity of 460MW; . Company 7: Victoria's share of Snowy hydro scheme with many units and available capacity of 1,200MW; • In the fourth step (1997), the transmission agency was transformed into an incorporated company and sold to a private investor. • The system operation agency was expanded to include market operations and retained as a government agency until the start of the national electricity market in December 1998, at which time the agency responsibilities were passed over to NEMMCO and the agency closed down. The major factor used in determining the manner in which the power plants and distribution consumers were grouped was the sale value of the company formed by the re-structure. It is observed that the Victorian government approached the re-structuring of the transmission, system operation and market operation functions in a manner Power Sector Restructuring in Australia 61 that was different to the NSW government. In Victoria, the reformed transmission company had responsibility for the maintenance of the transmission assets and for the connection of new customers. The transmission planning responsibilities (transmission expansion), the system operation responsibilities and the new market operation responsibilities were given to a separate and newly formed agency. At the start of the national electricity market, the transmission planning responsibility was transferred to another government agency. As a contrast, in NSW the transmiss10n agency was initially assigned responsibility for all functions (transmission planning, transmission maintenance, system operation and market operation). At the start of the national electricity market it retained the transmission planning responsibility. Queensland Government Involvement BACKGROUND EVENTS The Queensland electricity industry had been developed on a large source of black coal. In the mid 1970s, the industry was structured in a manner similar to the NSW electricity inqustry, except that the corporations had limited commercial accountability and represented an agency structure rather than a commercial trading structure. The power agency had responsibility for generation and transmission, and there were seven separate distribution agencies. However, unlike NSW, a separate government agency was responsible for the generation and transmission planning program. In addition, Queensland had a larger geographic coverage but had a lower population than NSW. As a consequence, generation and transmission planning presented major funding problems. Queensland face several major problems in the 1980s. First, they had a growing population, which was moving north from Victoria and NSW generation expansion was not able to keep up with the growth in electricity demand. Second, they had to compete for funding allocations with the other jurisdictional governments. Third, they were confronted with labor problems (but unlike the other jurisdictions, these problems were experienced within the distribution agencies). However, Queensland had several major advantages over the other two jurisdictions. They had open cut black coal mines, which provided the lowest cost black coal in Australia. They also had good power plant availability and low power plant manning levels, unlike the Victorian and NSW power companies. In 1984, the generation and transmission entities (planning and operation) were combined and in this regard closely resembled the NSW power company, although government's management accountability was limited when 62 New Waves of Power Sector Reform in China compared to the NSW structure. In the mid 1980' s a tariff competition broke out between the Victorian, NSW and Queensland governments. Prior to this time, NSW was considered the tariff leader, followed by Victoria and then Queensland. However, as substantial tariff rises were being announced in NSW and Victoria, Queensland advised of a tariff reduction. By the early 1990s, Queensland had the lowest tariff of the .mainland jurisdictions. This made Queensland an attractive place to live and the population grew, along with the growth in electricity. This overall performance added to the management reform initiatives undertaken within the NSW power corporation. In the early 1990s, the Queensland government abandoned a planned hydro development of 600 MW due to environmental considerations. In addition, the government agreed to sell a large power plant to an aluminum producer to enable the expansion of the aluminum smelter'to proceed. These two actions delayed the generation planning program and created substantial delays in adding future generation capacity. Tµese delays had an unfavorable effect on the subsequent performance of the Queensland electricity industry. In 1993 and 1994 the Queensland government participated in the National Paper Trial. The Queensland government supported the COAG policy on electricity market development and participated in the development of the National Electricity Code. In early 1995, and to address the potential problem of a delay in the generation expansion program, the Queensland government agreed to the building of a transmission inter-connection with NSW (capacity of 500 MW - to be in service by 1999), the commissioning of approximately 750MW of fast start (but high priced) gas turbine power plants and the addition of base load generation capacity (between 600 and 1400 MW between 2003 and 2006). In early 1996, the following events occurred: • The National Government was seeking commitments from jurisdictional governments for a national electricity market; • The interconnection with NSW was meeting large community resistance, both from conservationists and land holders; • The government lost the election, which was held in early 1996. The new Queensland government negotiated a new transmission corridor with the community, increased ~e transmission capacity of the interconnector to 1000 MW and agreed to participate in the forthcoming national electricity. market. The new government then set about the task of restructuring the power corporations to enable Queensland to participate in an electricity market. Power Sector Restructuring in Australia 63 The development of the retail market is the major topic of reform for the Queensland government at the present time. FORMATION OF THE QUEENSLAND ELECTRICITY MARKET For the above reasons, the formation of a Queensland jurisdictional electricity market was substantially delayed compared to Victoria and NSW. In July 1997, the Queensland government commenced the first phase of an electricity market based on variable and fixed cap'!city contracts. This was the setting up phase and was followed in January 1998 with an energy pool market using the draft National Electricity Code as market rules and NEMMCO as the market manager. This gave NEMMCO a test market in which to operate and perfect its market systems prior to the official commencement of the national electricity market in December of that year. Note that in January 1998, Queensland was still operating as an isolated electricity system and that interconnection with NSW had been delayed until the end of 2000. The Queensland government achieved enormous benefits form this early participation in the electricity market. First, the Queensland electricity growth rate was high and during the year the common clearing price rose to high levels and reached $5,000/MWh (the maximum value allowable under the market rules) in afew trading intervals. The impact of these price rises was to put pressure on: power plant management to improve the performance of their plants; and retail companies to improve their risk management techniques. Second, in August of that year a major power plant had all units trip due to an internal equipment failure. The price rose to $5,000/MWh for many hours. The impact of this event was to alert all other power plant traders that a major event had occurred and that all available generation capacity should be immediately placed in service. The market response averted a major load shedding event with prices returning to normal as the units were returned to service. The event also signaled to other power plant managers to beware of this type of equipment failure problem and hence provided a faster communication of plant failure information than had occurred under previous arrangements. Third, the Queensland government, in the years before market start, had established power purchase contracts with private investors equal to approximately 25% of market share. The government tried to renegotiate these contracts to enable the power plants to participate in the energy pool. 64 New Waves of Power Sector Reform in China However, the private investors, who were liable for loans that were secured by the contracts, were unwilling to renegotiate (or more accurately, their fmanciers were unwilling to accept a higher risk). As a consequence, the government established a Market Trader corporation and assigned the power purchase contracts to this entity. Based on long term forecast market prices the entity was projected to lose approximately $80m per year over the life of the contracts based on low pool prices. Actual performance was totally opposite. Due to the volatility in spot prices, focussed attention on the power purchase contracts to extract maximum gains from the contracts and advanced skills in risk management (compared to power plant operational skills), the Market Trader returned a surplus in the first two years of operation. Fourth, and an extremely important event, one private investor was given permission by the ACCC (and in accordance with the National Electricity Code) to install a transmission inter-connector (with capacity of 180 MW) between NSW and Queensland. The private interconnection was placed in service in mid 2000, in advance of the regulated inter-connector. Fifth, the higher Queensland pool prices and the private investor interconnector put pressure on the regulated inter-connector to speed up its planned completion date. Sixth, the higher pool prices published from the Queensland wholesal~ price area has encouraged private investors to seek generation Li~enses "in the Queensland jurisdiction. These private investors plan to add approximately 2,200 MW of coal fired generation to the Queensland region of the national electricity market over the next three years. In addition, a private investor has been granted a gas License to bring gas from Papua New Guinea to Queensland to support the Queensland government's environmental policy. The introduction of this quantity of natural gas into Queensland is expected to be accompanied by an additional 1,000 MW of medium priced gas fired generation. Seventh, and due to the low cost coal fuel base and the large interconnection capacity about to be placed into service, Queensland expects to be a major electricity exporter to the southern part of the national electricity market in the future. As a consequence, the Queensland government has been able to achieve major efficiency improvements within its electricity industry, achieve funding of new power plant expansion requirements, announce major changes to future environmental policies and remove the political attention given to the industry over the last 10 years. RESTRUCTURING OF GENERATION, TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION Power Sector Restructuring in Australia 65 Prior to mid 1995, the Queensland electricity industry consisted of a power agency (generation and distribution) and seven separate distribution agencies. Following the agreements adopted by COAG to form a national electricity market, the Queensland electricity industry was restructured in several steps: • In the first step (mid 1995), the generation responsibilities were separated from the transmission responsibilities. As a result, a single generation company was formed. The transmission responsibilities were then combined with the distribution responsibilities in the following way. A holding company was formed for all entities, with the transmission responsibilities being placed with a subsidiary company and the distribution agencies continuing to operate in their previous capacity. • In the second step (mid 1997), the transmission subsidiary was formed into a separate company. The network and retail businesses of the distribution agencies were separated. The seven network businesses remained as distribution network agencies, but the retail businesses were formed into three retailer companies. The holding company was transformed into a Market Trader agency. An economic industry regulator was formed and a government policy unit was formed to advise on market implementation policy. • Characteristics of the retail companies, which covered 1.4 million customers (and maximum demand of approximately 6,300 MW), were as follows: Retail company 1: city based, with 1.0 million customers; Retail company 2: coastal based, with 0.3 million customers; Retail company 3: city/rural based, with 0.1 million customers; • In mid-1998, the Queensland government combined retail companies 2 and 3 and in doing so reduced the number· of retailers in the jurisdiction to two. • In mid-}999 the Queensland government combined six of the distribution network agencies to form one large network corporation. The structure of the distribution sector became: Retail company 1: city based, with 1.0 million customers; Network company 1: city based. Retail company 2; coastal/rural based, with 0.4 million customers; Network company 2: coastal/rural based. • Characteristics of the generation companies, which had an installed capacity of approximately 7,700 MW, were as follows: Company 1: coal, hydro pump storage and gas, three power plants, 7 generating units with total capacity of l,950MW; Company 2: coal, hydro and gas, four power plants, 11 generating units with total capacity of2,600MW; Company 3: coal fired, five power plants, 12 generating units with total capacity of 1,680MW; Market Trader 4: coal and gas, five power plants, 12 generating units with total capacity of 2,420MW; • The system operation responsibilities were passed over to NEMMCO. 66 New Waves of Power Sector Reform in China • The Queensland government advised the community that the electricity industry would not be privatized. The generation and retail companies were formed with new Boards of Directors, a new Managing Director and shareholding restricted. to the Queensland government. The new companies were given six . months to complete their amalgamation program and preparation for competing in the wholesale electricity market. South Australian Government Involvement BACKGROUND EVENTS The South Australian electricity industry was established on limited fuel sources, using lignite coal and fuel oil, and from the late 1960s natural gas. Due to the fuel costs, the South Australian electricity tariffs were higher than those of NSW, Victoria and Queensland. The electricity system was relatively small when compared to NSW and Victoria, having an installed generation capacity (including interconnection) of approximately 2,800 MW and a maximum demand of approximately 2,400 MW in 1999. In the mid-1940s the South Australian government established a single power company to manage the electricity industry. The company consisted of generation planning and operations, transmission planning and operations, system operations, distribution network services and retail sales. In 1980 the National Government facilitated a series of studies to provide transmission interconnection from Victoria to South Australia. This would give the South Australian government access to cheaper electricity generation of Victoria and NSW. The studies allowed an agreement to be signed with the three jurisdictional governments to build the interconnector (with capacity of 500 MW import to South Australia). The 275kV interconnector was subsequently placed in service in late 1989. This provided one-third of the South Australian government's requirements for electricity at that time. The three jurisdictional governments shared in the cost of the interconnector in accordance with their long-term benefits expected from the interconnector. At the time of approving the interconnector, the jurisdictional governments entered into a 20-year commercial agreement (the Interconnection Operations Agreement) to voluntarily trade surplus electricity on a cost of production basis. South Australia often experienced very hot days during summer and its maximum demand occurs at this time. During the 1990s, as the hot days occurred each year, there was evidence of a growing air-conditioning load. In early 1993, the hot period covered both South Australia and Victoria and Power Sector Restructuring in Australia 67 lasted for several days. Plant failures in Victoria reflected in the Interconnection Agreement and required the South Australian government to shed load. This happened on two separate occasions during the hot period. Discussions betv:'~~n the three jurisdictional governments were undertaken to increase the interconnector capacity but no agreement on cost could be reached. The events of 1993 were to be repeated in 1999 and 2000, but this time (since the national market had commenced) the impact could be seen as a price signal. As a consequence, it encouraged the fast tracking of generation and transmission expansion plans by private investors. The South Australian government did not introduce an electricity market prior to the commencement of the national electricity market. However, the South Australian government supported the COAG policy on electricity market development, participated in the development of the National Electricity Rules and was the lead jurisdiction in the establishment of the National Electricity Law. Immediately prior to the commencement of the national electricity market, the South Australian government restructured the power company. REsTRUCWRING OF GENERATION, TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION Following the agreements adopted by COAG to form a national electricity market, the South Australian electricity industry was restructured in several steps: • In 1997, the South Australian power company was restructured into business units consisting of generation, transmission and system operation, distribution network and retail sales. • In 1998, and just prior to the commencement of the national electricity market, the South Australian government transformed the power company business units into separate agencies. Three generation agencies were formed, a transmission agency, a distribution network agency and a retail sale agency. A government policy unit was formed to advise on market implementation policy. An electricity industry regulator was also established at this time. e The South Australian community would not permit the government to sell these agencies to private investors (which was attractive to the government in order to retire excessive debt). Instead, the government undertook to lease the agencies to private investors. A 100-year lease period was proposed. • In mid 1999, the South Australian government passed legislation permitting the lease of the electricity industry assets. • In early 2000, the distribution network and retail agency (with approximately 0.75 million consumers and a maximum demand of 2,400 MW) was leased to a private investor. During negotiations the lease was subsequently increased to 200 years. On receiving the lease, the distribution network and retail businesses were immediately grouped into separate companies by the private investor - the retail company was then leased to an ind~pendent third party that was a private electricity retailer. 68 New Waves of Power Sector Reform in China • During the year 2000, the three generation agencies were leased. Characteristics of the generation agencies, which had an installed capacity of approximately 2,400 MW, were as follows: Agency 1: coal or gas, one power plant, 8 generating units with total capacity of l,280MW; Agency 2: coal frred, two power plants, 5 generating units with total capacity of 700MW; Agency 3: gas and diesel, four power plants, 9 generating units with total capacity of 380MW; • The transmission network (mainly at 275kV), including the interconnector to Victoria, was leased in mid-2000 to a private investor. • By late 2000 all companies had been leased. • The system operation responsibilities had been passed over to NEMMCO in December 1998. The entry into the national electricity market was successful for the South Australian government. Within two years the high pool prices had attracted over l,OOOMW of combined cycle gas turbine power plants which were being placed in service progressively from 1999 onwards. In addition, private investors had received approval to interconnect Victoria with South Australia with a transmission capacity of 200 MW. A further regulated interconnector was being planned between NSW and South Australia, with a capacity of 250 MW. Due to the lease of the transmission assets, the South Australian government had successfully removed themselves from the difficulties previously experienced in funding transmission expansion. Australian Capital Territory Government Involvement BACKGROUND EVENTS The Australian Capital Territory (ACT) electricity supply industry was only a distribution power company with approximately 125,000 consumers. It had no separate generation or transmission capacity and received all electricity by direct transmission from NSW. The ACT government participated in the National Paper Trail, supported the COAG policy statements and was one of the founding jurisdictions that agreed to establish the national electricity market. The company commenced trading in the market in December 1998. RESTRUCTURING OF DISTRIBUTION The ACT government realized that the power company was too small to Power Sector Restructuring in Australia 69 survive in the retail market and investigated various structural options, such as sale, lease, joint venture or amalgamation with a NSW distribution company. Agreement was reached on a joint venture with a private retail electricity investor who had obtained the retail lease in South Australia (and was also one of the distribution companies in Victoria). The new joint venture partner had experience in gas retail and this arrangement offered the ACT consumers a wider energy choice. The joint venture arrangements were completed in late 2000. The novelty of the ACT government's approach to electricity reform highlights the many various options that are available to governments during and after the introduction of a competitive power market. Tasmanian G-Overnment Involvement BACKGROUND EVENTS Tasmania is a mountainous island to the south of the Australian mainland. Consequently, the Tasmanian electricity industry was based on hydro generation, with no interconnection to the mainland the closest jurisdiction is Victoria. Due to the hydro power, the Tasmanian government provided the lowest electricity tariffs in Australia. From approximately 1930, a single power company who had responsibility for generation, transmission, system operation, distribution network and retail sales managed the Tasmanian electricity industry. During the late 1970s the Tasmanian government experienced severe environmental protests at the flooding of a valley for the purpose of electricity generation. Although the hydro power plant was eventually placed in service, it established a growing awareness in the Australian community to the activities of the electricity industry everywhere. This community concern was evident on many occasions after this event, and was a major cause of the delays to the Queensland government's generation plans in the early 1990s and the delays to the NSW to Queensland interconnector experienced during the mid 1990s. In the 1980 study into interconnection between Victoria and South Australia, the study of an interconnector between Victoria and Tasmania was also considered but rejected due to cost. By the early 1990s, the Tasmanian government's hydro generation expansion plans had been completed as no further access to hydro generation sources was available. It was evident that the uncertainty r('fgarding future generation expansion plans _had restricted the industrial development of the island. During 1993 and 1994, the Tasmanian government participated in the National 70 New Waves of Power Sector Reform in China Paper Trial and was a supporting member of the COAG policy on the development of the national electricity mar~et. fu 1997, the government lost the election on a policy of privatizing the electricity industry. The new government consequently adopted an alternate strategy for participating in the electricity market. By mid-1998, the new government had restructured the power company into a single generating corporation, a transmission and system operation corporation and a distribution corporation that was responsible for both network service and retail sales. An industry regulator had been established and market rules had been published, structured on the draft National Electricity Code but substantially altered to meet the Tasmanian government's limited competition model. The major changes were in regard to generation bidding and dispatch, with dispatch managed by agreed contracts and regulated tariffs. The Tasmanian electricity market commenced operation without an energy pool in July 1998. • Characteristics of the generation corporation, which had· an installed capacity of approximately 2,200 MW, were as follows: hydro run of river and pump storage, twenty-seven power plants, 57 generating units with total capacity of2,300MW; oil fired, one power plant, 2 generating units with total capacity of 240MW; • Characteristics of the distribution corporation were: maximum demand of approximately 1,600 MW; - a consumer base of approximately 250,000. Following the commencement of the national electricity market in December 1998, the Tasmanian government invited expressions of interest from private investors for an interconnector (under-sea cable) between Tasmania and Victoria. As a result, the government has issued a tender to one private investor to build the interconnector (275kV HVDC, capacity 600MW) with a planned in service date of 2003. · The Tasmanian government has announced plans for the transfer of its isolated electricity market to the national electricity market in 2003 at the time of commissioning of the interconnector between Tasmania and Victoria. Conclusion fu Australia, the controls between the National Government and ·the jurisdictional governments are different to those between the Sate Council of China and the Provincial governments. Even so, there are many points to be learnt form the Australian experience. These points are summarized as follows: Power Sector Restructuring in Australia 71 a. The transition from a centrally controlled electricity industry to a market controlled electricity industry will take many years. b. Each area will have different requirements and will experience different challenges in: restructuring of electricity companies. c. General competition laws are required to provide policy on market behavior and access to infrastructure by third parties. d. Changes to the Electricity Law are required to provide for the regulation of competitive"power markets by an industry regulator, the enforcement of the market rules and the application of penalties for the breach of those rules. e. The electricity market requires new skills. The learning of these new skills during the transition from a centrally controlled power company to competing and supporting companies is the major challenge for governments. The development of "pilot" competitive power markets is an important step in building up the new skills. The development of national market rules offers one opportunity to build up these new skills. The process is slow and requires people who have had some actual experience in operating pilot and trial markets. f. Strong regulation skills are required to manage the initial approval of the market rules and the many alterations that will be required in the early years after the start of the market. The regulator should be established several years before the market needs to have an approved national market rules. g. The wholesale electricity market should have as many sellers as possible. Merger and acquisition rules under Trade Law should control the re-structuring of sellers once the market has commenced. h. There should be multiple buyers all allocated with adequate consumers at the start of each wholesale market. Provincial governments have an important contribution to make in the transition to a national electricity market, particularly as agents of a national regulator for the introduction of retail competition. The use of funding incentive should be considered by the State government to manage the speedy transition to a national electricity market. 72 New Waves of Power Sector Refonn in China ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING IN ENGLAND AND WALES Background The Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB), which owned 60,000 MW of generating capacity, was privatized as part of the Conservative Government's widespread refonns of the UK public sector during the 1980s and 1990s. The refonns were driven in part by an ideological commitment to reducing the role of the state, and a desire to raise funds. At the time of the reform, energy sales were growing by only about 2 percent per year and peak demand was almost static. However, the CEGB had been demanding huge financial resources for a massive program of investment in nuclear power to displace British coal. The Government believed that the generation business, at least, could find more efficient ways to carry out its investments and operations, if given the right incentive. By the time the Government White Paper setting out the new structure was published in 1988, both British Telecom and British Gas had been privatized as integrated monopolies. Although neither company had been privatized for long, Ministers already showed a dislike for regulated private monopolies. The new structure of the electricity industry was therefore driven by a strong . desire to promote competition in order to provide good incentives for efficiency. Prior to restructuring, the CEGB had a complete monopoly on generation and transmission. It produced, bought, sold and delivered electricity to the 12 Area Boards, as shown in Figure 2. The Area Boards in tum had a distribution and retailing monopoly over their customers. To create competition, the CEGB's generation was to be separated from its transmission business and broken up into more than one company. Electricity Restructuring in England and Wales 73 Figure 2 England and Wales Structure Prior to Privatization Generators ----i Cogeneration CEGB I HV Transmission J ,________,----i lnterconnectors Bulk Tariff I LV Distribution Customers The Reform The process of reform has continued for the past eleven years. Figure 3 lists the steps of the reform process to date. Figure 3 Timetable of Reforms in the United Kingdom DATE EVENT Feb 1988 Government publishes White-paper outlining industry structure 1989 Electricity Act passed to provide the legislative basis for industry restructuring Sep 1989 OFFER (Office of Electricity Regulation) established under the DGES (Director-General of Electricity Supply)- the independent regulator. Mar 31, Vesting of the new companies: CEGB split into the National Grid Company 1990 (NGC), PowerGen, National Power and Nuclear Electric. Hundreds of "Vesting Contracts" signed 12 Regional Electricity Companies (RECs) formed from the 12 Area Electricity Boards Ownership ofNGC passed to the 12 RECs 74 New Waves of Power Sector Refonn in China DATE EVENT April 1, Pool operation commences. 1990 Retail competition opened to > lMW load Dec 1990 12 RECs privatized Mar 1991 60 percent privatization of National Power and PowerGen Apr 1994 Retail competition opened to lOOkW - lMW load Mar 1995 40 percent privatization of National Power and PowerGen April Golden shares in RECs lapse, and takeovers/mergers begin 1995 Dec 1995 NGC privatized NGC's pumped storage sold to Mission Energy (USA) Jul 1996 Privatization of British Energy (modem nuclear plant, excluding Magnox) First round of divestiture by National Power and PowerGen (to Eastern 1995-96 Electricity) Sep 98 - Staged opening of competition to under 100 kW customers June 99 Second round of divestiture by National Power and PowerGen (to a variety of 1999-> owners) Utilities Act combines electricity and gas regulation under OFGEM (Office of 2000 Gas and Electricity Markets) Replacement of the Pool with the New Electricity Trading Arrangements 2001? (NETA) Industry Organization. The CEGB was broken up and separate companies were formed for generation, transmission and distribution, as shown in Figure 4. The government used a new law to transfer assets and personnel from the CBGB to the new companies. The process of creating new companies is called "vesting". Vesting Day was March 31 1990, when all the contracts between the new companies were signed. Electricity Restructuring in England and Wales 75 Figure 4 England and Wales Structure at Vesting National Power Nuclear Electric Power Gen Generators Independents HV Transmission National Grid Company LV D islribulion 12 Regional Electricity Companies Retailers RECsand Others Captive Customers with Customers Customers Choice Generation Three generating companies were formed: National Power, PowerGen and Nuclear Electric. At vesting, these three companies accounted for 91 percent of total generation. The remainder came from independent power producers (IPPs), co-generators and interconnections with France and Scotland. Entry to the industry was made as simple as possible, and RECs were encouraged to contract with new generators; until 1993, the prices to small consumers were subject to price caps; after 1993 contract costs could be passed to customers, although after 1996 this pass-through was limited in some respects. Transmission NGC was formed to own and operate the transmission grid. It is the System Operator and the Transmission Owner, and in effect it also became the Market Operator, following rules established by the Pool, which was a separate. organization. NGC is national in scope and although competing transmissfon companies are not prohibited, no license for such a company has ever been issued, so that NGC has a de facto monopoly on constructing new lines. (However, there is not much demand growth, and there is little need for new lines, so the scope of the monopoly has never been tested). Initially NOC was given the pumped storage plant, which plays an important role in frequency control, but this was sold to Mission Energy (US) in 1995. 76 New Waves of Power Sector Refonn in China Distribution At vesting the 12 Area Electricity Boards were transformed into 12 Regional Electric Companies (RECs). A study was done to decide how many RECs there should be, and the study concluded that the existing organizations should be kept just as they were. The RECs were privatized in December 1990 with the Government maintaining a "golden share" in each until April 1995. (A golden share prevented takeovers by other companies) With the lapse of the golden shares ownership of all 12 RECs has been the subject of mergers or acquisitions. Ownership of the RECs now includes multi-utilities, companies . with major interests in generation and foreign (US) companies. The most significant change is the integration of some RECs with UK generators: ManWeb (Scottish Power), East Midlands (PowerGen) and Southern Electric (merged with Scottish Hydro). National Power took over MEB's retail business through a complex web of contracts. British Energy took over South Wales retail business but subsequently sold it to London Electricity (which in the meantime had been bought by EDF of France. Trading Arrangements In England and Wales the Pool Rules provide the mechanisms for short-term trading of electricity. However, 80-90 percent of the traded electricity is hedged through medium- and long-term bilateral contracts. These contracts are structured as CtDs. Parties to any such contract settle it outside the Pool's settlement procedures, usually between themselves rather than via any exchange. There is just one market in England and Wales, and a single national price. (England and Wales landmass is only 600 miles from end to end) Locational differences are taken into account in transmission charges, not in the Pool price. One useful reform in the rules was made in 1994 to improve incentives for efficiency. "Uplift" is a charge to users that comprises all the costs arising from transmission constraints, generation shortfall and demand-forecast errors, plus specific payments for ancillary services. Uplift grew from 1990 because no one had any incentive to reduce the cost. Since 1994, NGC has to pay a proportion itself, which has reduced the cost of uplift, by small investments in the transmission system, and improved management. The initial design of the UK pool is well known, and in any event it is due to be changed soon. A discussion of NETA the New Electric Trading Arrangements -- is given later in this note. (Implementation has just been pushed back to March 27 2001) Electricity Restructuring in England and Wales 77 Regulation An Independent Regulator was established by law. It used to be called OFFER (the OFfice of Electricity Regulation) but it was combined with the gas regulator in 1998, and is now called OFGEM (Office of Gas and Electricity Markets). A visit to the website of OFGEM, at www.ofgem.gov.uk will show how much work goes on there. No fewer than 78 public papers produced in the period July-November 2000 alone can be downloaded from the website. Regulation is carries out via the "licenses" under which the companies operate. Each company has a separate license that governs their rights and obligations. For example, the price a regulated company may charge is a clause in the license; when prices are changed, the license condition changes. One of the duties of the regulator is to promote competition, and the current regulator recently tried, and failed, to control market power by changing the generators' licenses (see below). He failed because the companies can, and did, appeal to the Competition Commission, which supported their position. Figure 5 : The Distribution Xs ( %) in the United Kingdom Note: A negative X means that prices are allowed to rise. A positive X implies a reduction. Before Nfer ]9)4 Review Nfer 2()JJ Reiiew Review 1990-1995 19!J5.19% 1996-1997 1997-.DX> 200).20012001-20022002-2003 2003-2004 2ro:l-200:i E.astem Electricity -0.25% 11% 10% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% East Mdlarrls -1.25% 11% 13% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% Electricity LJmn Electricity O.EB -l.4Wi 14% 11% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% SEEOOARD -0.75% 14% 13% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% ScctOOn Electric -0.65% 11% 10% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% SWAIB:: -250% 17% 11% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% Swth \\l'stein -225% 14% 11% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% Electricity Yai