35507 ACEH AND NIAS ONE YEAR AFTER THE TSUNAMI The Recovery Effort and Way Forward A Joint Report of The BRR and International Partners, December 2005 2 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version FOREWORD PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA ON THE REPORT OF THE ACEH-NIAS REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION AGENCY Assalamu'alaikum warahmatullahi wabarakatuh Fellow countrymen, Ladies and Gentlemen, This report marks the passing of one year since the devastating tsunami of 26 December 2004 and the earthquake of 28 March 2005. The massive loss of life and tremendous destruction were tragic. The grief they brought the people of Aceh and Nias and the wider Indonesian nation were beyond words. Yet from this great tragedy there came an impressive outpouring of support from around the world for which I offer my heartfelt gratitude on behalf of our nation. The resilience and courage of the survivors have been equally impressive. Their dignity, forbearance and discipline have been clearly seen during the passing of the first Ramadan since the disaster. The peace accord brokered in Helsinki and the subsequent cooperation all round in the peace process are major achievements that bode well for a successful recovery program. I admire and thank all involved. We are now into the hard yards of the recovery process. The journey ahead will be long and hard. I trust and hope it will also be rewarding as we work together in rebuilding and strengthening the affected communities and infrastructure as well as the government and economic capacity on which they all depend for prosperity and success. I have taken a close personal interest in the work of the Aceh-Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency over the past several months since I established it. The Agency has given strong and effective professional leadership to the national and international recovery effort. I will continue to monitor its progress and maintain my support for its excellent work. I trust in it to deliver not just an effective reconstruction program but also a model of reform and development of which we can all be proud. My best wishes and thanks also go to all who have been involved in helping the people of Aceh and Nias. Your contributions to the rehabilitation and reconstruction program are welcome and admired. To the people in the affected communities, I also wish you well. I will continue to do all I can through the Aceh- Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Executing Agency to give you the support you need in the difficulties you face. We have now built a strong platform for delivering sustainable recovery. I urge all to continue in good faith as we all strive to overcome the many great challenges that lie before us. Wassalamu'alaikum warahmatullahi wabarakatuh. Jakarta, 14 December 2005 PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA DR. H. SUSILO BAMBANG YUDHOYONO 3 United Nations Nations Unies Office of the Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery From the United Nations Special Envoy, President William J. Clinton: In the course of my three visits to Aceh since the devastating events of December 26, 2004, I have been moved by the extraordinary strength of the Acehnese people. Their courage and de- termination to rebuild their lives and communities after this devastating natural disaster inspires and motivates the rest of us to do better and to do more. As we approach the anniversary of this terrible event, we have much to be proud of. Great strides have been made in protecting the lives and livelihoods of tsunami survivors. Temporary schools, shelters, and health clinics are filling interim needs while more permanent structures are built. Cash-for-work programs, food distribution, and vocational training programs are helping to protect standards of living while efforts are made to revive businesses, agriculture, and fisher- ies. We have a long way to go to build Aceh back better, but the process is well underway. Kuntoro and his team at the BRR deserve much of the credit for this progress. The agency has played a vital role in coordinating the recovery effort and ensuring that the process is led by Indonesians. President Yudhoyono's decision to create a specialized agency for this massive task, with Kuntoro at the helm, was an inspired one. It will be judged well by history, particularly as the large-scale reconstruction gets underway. The international friends of the Acehnese people have also played critical roles in the recovery effort. This has been an extraordinary partnership, including the military contingents who flew in water and food in the first weeks, the international NGOs -- large and small -- that provided help to entire communities, and the United Nations and international financial institutions like the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. Foreign governments have made much of this pos- sible, through their generous financing of the recovery process. Private citizens from around our world have also played a crucial role, on a scale unprecedented in the history of private giving. The scale of the task and the sheer number of actors involved has made it at times difficult to get a clear picture of what is needed and who is helping to meet these needs. This report will clarify the situation, and I am confident it will make an important contribution to guiding the recovery effort. I will continue to do my part to promote Aceh's recovery. We must sustain the same levels of commitment and effort for as long as it takes to build back better in Aceh and Nias, ensuring that communities are left on a safer and sounder development path. One United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017 USA 4 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version Palang Merah Indonesia By Sunday evening, 26 December 2004, I was in Banda Aceh. Within 15 minutes of my arrival at the airport, I was standing with our first Satgana disaster response volunteers who were al- ready evacuating cadavers and the injured from the surrounding area. The team had begun its first assessment of conditions, and fortunately I was able to receive a first-hand report on this unprecedented catastrophe. The scope of this disaster was far beyond my expectations. Never before could I have imagined nor prepared myself physically and mentally, in my capacity as Chairman of the Indonesian Red Cross, to cope with this grievous calamity. However, the activities going on around me by our Satgana volunteers energized me to deal with the critical nature of the situation. In responding to this most tragic event, PMI, the International Federation, ICRC and dozens of Red Cross and Red Crescent national society staff and volunteers from all over the world worked hand-in-hand to provide relief according to our universal mandate. This massive emer- gency response operation is a success story, with first tribute going to all volunteers who were actively involved. Now, one year later, there are many lessons to be learned, especially that an early warning system must be built with a holistic and community-based approach. We do recognize that the rehabilitation and reconstruction is a difficult and complex challenge. The recovery process necessary to re-build communities in Aceh and Nias is a seminal task. We must reaffirm our long-term commitment and take real action based on the needs and aspirations of the com- munities that require our help. I am confident that all stakeholders will fulfill their commitments for the benefit of those affected; that is our primary responsibility. An effective revitalization of civil society in Aceh and Nias will create even more resilient communities in that region of our country. Mar'ie Muhammad Chairman, Indonesian Red Cross Society 5 THE WORLD BANK December, 2005 PAUL WOLFOWITZ President The December 26, 2004 tsunami caused unimaginable devastation to Aceh and Nias. Only three months later, another major earthquake struck, causing additional heavy damage mainly to Nias. The magnitude of these events triggered an amazing outpouring of compassion and generosity from around the world. Private citizens provided huge amounts of support, and donors pledged generously to help survivors But reconstruction involves more than rebuilding roads, homes, schools and health clinics. It is also about re- building people's lives--so that they can regain their livelihoods and institutions, and heal the emotional wounds that linger in their minds. Aceh and Nias were already poor prior to the disasters, and recovery is further com- plicated by the backdrop of the decades-long conflict in Aceh. I was impressed by the courage and resilience of the people of Aceh during my visit there earlier this year. Indo- nesians were eager to play an active role in the re-development of their communities. Emergency relief needs were met in the months following the disasters, and serious outbreak of disease and malnutrition were averted. Progress was also made in 2005 on understanding local needs, addressing planning and policy issues, and strengthening capacity for large scale reconstruction. BRR, Indonesia's reconstruction agency, is building its capacity for coordinating actors, monitoring programs, and trying to ensure that the needs of communities are recog nized and addressed. It is important that they continue to strengthen and adapt their capacity as needed to ensure the sustainability of the investments being made. Yet one year after the tsunami disaster, we must not lose sight of the fact that we are still at the beginning of a complex reconstruction and recovery process. Delays in getting funds flowing, establishing a brand new agency to manage recovery, and trying to coordinate the hundreds of players trying to help have meant that physical reconstruction has been slow to start. The tsunami provides us with yet another example that countries need to have systems and policies for recovery in place prior to disasters--in order to respond quickly and effectively. One remarkable achievement this year, prompted in part by the tsunami disaster, has been the progress on peace in the region. With the signing of a peace agreement in August between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), and the progress on its implementation, there is increasing confidence that peace will last. In order to nurture this still fragile peace process, tsunami recovery programs will need to be closely linked with conflict recovery and reconciliation efforts to bring hope to all citizens of Aceh and Nias. The coming year will be critical to the long-term recovery of the region. The year 2006 must be one of large- scale action on the ground. Vigorous efforts must be focused on ensuring that the affected communities drive the reconstruction programs, and that government and partners work together to deliver results in a transpar- ent manner. The progress and problems of the past year reviewed in this report should pave the way for rapid progress towards recovery. The recovery of Aceh and Nias is a test for Indonesia, and a test for the entire international community. The eyes of the world are upon us. We must not fail those who responded so generously to this terrible tragedy. More im- portantly, we must not fail the people of Aceh and Nias in supporting their path to a safer, more secure future. 6 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This report was prepared by a joint team of the Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi (BRR) and the international community, led by The World Bank, ADB, Red Cross/Red Crescent and UNDP with large participation and con- tributions by many other government and donor agencies. The report was produced under the guidance of Kuntoro Mangkusubroto (Director, BRR), Sudirman Said (Depu- ty Management Services, BRR), Andrew Steer (Country Director Indonesia, World Bank) and Joel Hellman (Aceh Coordinator, World Bank). The team was led by Wolfgang Fengler, John Clark, Richard Cibulskis (World Bank) and Kate Clifford (BRR). The BRR-team included Agus Halim, Ahya Ihsan, Amin Subekti, Bill Nicol, David Kelaher, Dharma Nursani, Mi- kael Setiawan, Owen Podger, Puteri Watson, Rahmad Dawood, Siduhuaro Dachi, Simon Crewe, Widjajanto and William Sabandar. The international core team included Garth Seneque (UN Office of the Recovery Coordinator), Howard Arfin (Red Cross/Red Crescent), Pieter Smidt (ADB), Simon Field (UNDP), Andre Bald, Amy Sim, Bastian Zaini, Chairani Triasdewi, Cut Dian Rahmi, Indra Irnawan, Jerry A. Lebo, Joe Leitmann, Keith Clifford Bell, Magda Adriani, Mar- garet Arnold, Oleksiy Ivaschenko, Patrick Barron, Prabha Chandran, Rehan Kausar, Rosfita Roesli, and Sophie Naudeau (World Bank). John Aglionby (The Guardian) contributed the Nusa Diaries and provided editorial support. Photographs taken by Arif Ariadi and Bodi Ch (BRR) except Box 2.6 by Peter Biro. A larger multi-agency group contributed valuable input and direction into the report, for which the core team expresses its thanks and gratitude. This group included colleagues from the following organizations: ADB The ETESP team of the Southeast Asia Regional Department with support from sector consultants working under ETESP AIPRD Bernadette Whitelum, Georgina Harley British Embassy Liam Dogherty British Red Cross Clare Graham CIDA/Canadian Embassy Angela Keller, Renaldy Martin Embassy of France Annie Evrard, Jean-Charles Rouge Embassy of Japan T. Fukuwatari Embassy of Germany Monika Allramseder European Commission Destriani Nugroho FAO Bart Dominicus IFC John Callander IFRC Johan Schaar, Fidelis don Chulu, Holger Leipe, Vina Augustina ILO Peter Rademaker and Team Internews Sophie Boudre IMC Alina Paul IRC Joanne Offer Italian Embassy Dario Mariani Multi-Donor Fund Diane Zhang, Sabine Joukes Muslim Aid Fadlullah Wilmot OCHA Indonesia Daniel Nicol, Dora Check OXFAM Claude St. Pierre, Lilliane Fan Royal Danish Embassy Anders Malmgren-Hansen Royal Netherlands Embassy Jaco Mebius, Niek de Regt Save the Children Kara Pierson Swedish Embassy Christina Wedekul Syiah Kuala University Syamsul Rizal, Agus Sabti, Fadrial Karmil, Teuku Iqbalsyah, Zi- natul Hayati Trocaire Orla Fagan 7 The Ceureumen Team UN Office of the Recovery Coordinator Andrew Harper UNEP John Poulsen UNESCO Han Qunli UN Habitat Bruno Dercon UNICEF Dr. Tarek M. Hussain, Dara Johnston, Sayo Aoki UNIMS Ardi Adji, Dylan Shaw, Neil Taylor, Rodd McGibbon USAID Melissa Janis, Theresa Tuano Wetlands International I Nyoman Ngurah Suriada Putra WHO Dr Anshu Banerjee, Jyotti Reddi World Bank Ahmad Zaki Fahmi, Angus Mackay, Arnold Lopulalan, Bam- bang Suharnoko, Erman Rahman, Fajar Pane, Geoffrey Read, George Soraya, Giovanna Dore, James Sheppard, Jan Drozdz, Janelle Plummer, John Victor Bottini, Kathy MacPherson, Kurnya Roesad, Mark Marquardt, Mohamad Al-Arief, Muslahuddin Daud, Pawan Patil, Rajashree S. Paralkar, Samuel Clark, Scott Guggen- heim, Taufiq Dawood, Tim Brown, William E. Wallace and Yoichiro Ishihara. The team also benefited from the insight of a number of staff from various other central and local government agencies: Irhamuddin (Head of Planning, Provincial Education Office NAD), Ari Sumarsono (EMIS, Provincial Education Office NAD), Renani Pantjastuti (Ministry of National Education) and Dr. Marwan (The Provincial Health Office). Karl Jackson, Homi Kharas and John Underwood of the World Bank advised the team. To all of these contributors the team would like to express their deepest thanks and appreciation. Any follow-up questions, or requests for additional information should be directed to Wolfgang Fengler (wfengler@worldbank.org) or John Clark (jclark1@worldbank.org). 8 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version TABLE OF CONTENTS List Of Tables 10 List Of Figures 10 List Of Boxes 10 List Of Maps 11 List Of Annexes 11 Glossary 12 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 14 PART I. ONE YEAR AFTER ­ WHERE DO WE STAND? 27 Chapter 1 - Rebuilding Homes and Communities 27 - Transitional Shelter and Permanent Housing 30 - Land and Property Rights 38 - Communities Leading their own Recovery 44 Chapter 2 - Rebuilding Livelihoods 51 - Fisheries and Agriculture 53 - Creating Jobs 58 - Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) 62 Chapter 3 ­ Restoring Services 69 - Education 70 - Health 77 - Water and Sanitation 84 - Transport 89 Chapter 4 - Sustainable Growth 97 - Economy 98 - Environment 105 Chapter 5 ­ The Peace Process and Recovery 113 Chapter 6 ­ The Impact of the March 28 Earthquake ­ A Special Focus on Nias 123 PART II. FINANCE AND COORDINATION 137 Chapter 7 - Financing Aceh and Nias Reconstruction 137 Chapter 8 - Fund Flows and Bottlenecks 147 Chapter 9 - The Challenge of Coordination 153 PART III. MOVING FORWARD ­ CHALLENGES AND STRATEGY FOR 2006 AND BEYOND 161 Chapter 10 - Moving Forward ­ Recovery Priorities for 2006-2007 161 Chapter 11 - The Longer-Term Vision and Plan for Aceh and Nias 171 Chapter 12 - Conclusions ­ The Implications for all Partners 177 ANNEXES 184 9 LIST OF TABLES 4.2 CPI Trends, Various Cities 1 Damage and Progress in Aceh and Nias 4.3 CPI Increase In October 2005 1.1 Housing Damage Assessment 4.4 Prices of Selected Construction Materials October 1.2 Pledges and Progress by NGO/Donor 2005 vs December 2004 1.3 Damage to Property Rights and the Land Adminis- 4.5 Construction Workers Wages, October 2005 vs tration System December 2004 1.4 Progress in Land Mapping and Restoring Property 4.6 Composition of Disaster-related Losses by Bank Rights BPD 2.1 Employment Status for People 10 Years Old and 4.7 Surface Coverage of the Damaged Area by Func- Older tion, Banda Aceh and Aceh Besar 2.2 Top 20 Listed Professions by Gender in Employ- 4.8 Composition of Financing in the Environment Sec- ment Services Database tor 4.1 Main Banking Indicators 5.1 GAM-GOI Conflict Incidents by Month, 2005 4.2 Environmental Damage Indicators 6.1 Structure of the Nias Economy, 2004 6.1 Estimated Damage and Loss Assessment for Nias 6.2 Price Behavior after March 28 in Nias 6.2 Summary of All Projects 6.3 Nias ­ Comparison of Damage and Funds 6.3 Housing Commitments for Nias Pledged 7.1 Reconstruction Needs : Rebuilding Aceh and Nias 7.1 Reconstruction Needs and Commitments 7.2 Financing Aceh and Nias Reconstruction 7.2 Sectoral Allocation of the Current Reconstruction Program LIST OF FIGURES 7.3 Existing Allocation of Funds Versus "Core Minimum Needs" 7.4 Financing and Needs (spatial) 1 Sequencing of Emergency and Recovery Effort 8.1 Government Budget Processes 2 Reconstruction Needs and Commitments 9.1 Schematic View of the Enhanced Strategy for 1.1 Composition of Financing in the Housing Sector Stakeholder Coordination 2.1 Boats Damaged/Lost and Supply 10.1 BRR's New Organizational Structure 2.2 Distribution of Boats vs Damaged/Lost Boats 11.1 Sequencing of Emergency and Recovery Effort 2.3 Trends in the Provision of Microcredit by Local Commercial Banks 3.1 Cause of Damage to Schools in Bireuen District LIST OF BOXES 3.2 Composition of Financing in the Education Sector 3.3 School Enrollment Before and After the Disaster 1 Comparing Reconstruction Pace Across Countries 3.4 Health Service Delivery in Aceh Before the Earth- 1.1 The Nusa Diary : Housing quake and Tsunami 1.2 Difficult Trade Offs in Housing Construction 3.5 Composition of Financing in the Health Sector 1.3 Learning from the People of Lamjabat 3.6 Number of Agencies by District 2.1 Making a Living from Agriculture in Paya Bakong 3.7 Status of Rehabilitation and Reconstruction for 2.2 Donated Boats Can't Go Out to Sea Damaged and Destroyed Hospitals, Health Centers 2.3 The Nusa Diary : Livelihood Projects and Sub-health Centers. 2.4 Training in Carpentry in Lamlumpu 3.8 Composition of Financing in Water and Sanitation 2.5 No Access to Credit for a Car Sales Business Dam- 3.9 Composition of Financing in Transport aged by Tsunami 4.1 Province-Level Impact-to-GDP Ratios, % 10 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version 2.6 Getting Becak Drivers Back on the Roads LIST OF ANNEXES 3.1 The Nusa Diary: Education 3.2 The Nusa Diary : Health A.1 Summary of Needs, Projects and Gaps 3.3 Easing the Pain A.2 The Reconstruction and Development Program 3.4 The Nusa Diary : Water and Sanitation for Aceh and Nias 3.5 Piping Water to Villages A.3 Financing Aceh and Nias Reconstruction 5.1 The Nusa Diary : Impact of the Conflict and Peace A.4 Damage and Loss vs. Reconstruction Program, Process by Kabupaten 5.2 Memorandum of Understanding between GoI and A.5 The Demographic and Economic Impact in the GAM Disaster Affected Region: Cross Country Com- 5.3 Peace in Cot Tufah parisons 5.4 Days of Doing Nothing A.6 Methodological Notes 6.1 Tired of Chasing Fish A.6.1 General Methodology and Definitions 7.1 The Multi Donor Fund A.6.2 Measuring The Spatial Dimension of Reconstruc- 7.2 The Nusa Diary : Slow Project Implementation tion 8.1 Sources of Delays in the Reconstruction Process A.6.3 Summary of Major Projects in Nias by NGO 8.2 The Recovery Aceh Nias Trust Fund A.7 GOI-GAM Memorandum of Understanding 9.1 Sector-specific Working Groups Meeting Regularly A.8 Aceh and Nias Related Presidential Decrees in Banda Aceh A.8.1 Implementation of GOI-GAM MOU 9.2 The Recovery Aceh Nias Database A.8.2 Establishment of BRR 10.1 Infrastructure Priorities 2006-2007 ­ Plans and A.8.3 Procurement/Services by BRR Progress A.9 Data Sources LIST OF MAPS 1.1 Distribution of Those Currently Identifying Them- selves as IDPs 1.2 Housing Needs and Progress of Reconstruction 1.3 RALAS and Community Inventory Activities 3.1 Primary School Enrollment and Reconstruction of Schools 3.2 Rebuilding Aceh Transport: Current Works, Critical Issues and Solutions 4.1 Projected Decline in 2005 GDP (%) By Kabupaten 4.2 Poverty Headcount Before And After The Disaster 5.1 Conflict and Tsunami Affected Kecamatan in Aceh 5.2 Location of Returnees 6.1 Map of Affected Areas 7.1 Financing and Needs 9.1 Distribution of NGO activities by District compared with needs (represented by IDP numbers) 11 GLOSSARY Adat Social custom or tradition DIPA Issuance of spending authority (Daftar ADB Asian Development Bank Isian Proyek Anggaran) AIPRD Australia Indonesia Partnership for DISNAKERTRANS Regional Office of Manpower and Reconstruction and Development Transmigration Department (Dinas AMDAL Environmental Impact Assessment Tenaga Kerja dan Transmigrasi) (Analisa Mengenai Dampak Lingkun- EC European Commission gan) ECHO European Commission Humanitarian AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission Office AusAID Australian Agency for International ECLAC Economic Commission for the Latin Development America and Caribbean BAPEDALDA District Environmental Impact Man- EIA Environmental Impact Assessment agement Agency (Badan Pengenda- EMIS Education Management Information lian Dampak Lingkungan Daerah) System Bapel Executing Agency of BRR (Badan ERTR Emergency Response and Transitional Pelaksana) Recovery BAPPENAS National Development Planning Board ETESP Earthquake and Tsunami Emergency (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Support Project Nasional) EU European Union Barat West FAO Food and Agriculture Organization BPD Regional Development Bank (Bank FY Financial year Pembangunan Daerah) GAM Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh BPM Community Development Agency Merdeka) BPN National Land Agency (Badan Perta- GDP Gross Domestic Product nahan Nasional) GeRAK People's Movement for Anti-Corrup- BPS Statistics Indonesia (Biro Pusat Statis- tion tik) GIS Geographic Information System BQ Syariah Financial Cooperatives (Baitul GOI Government of Indonesia Qiradh) GPS Global Positioning System BRR Rehabilitation and Reconstruction GTZ German Cooperation Agency (Gesell- Agency (Badan Rehabilitasi dan schaft fuer Technische Zusammenar- Rekonstruksi) beit) Bupati District Head HIC Humanitarian Information Center Camat Sub-District Head IAP Immediate Action Plan CDA Community Driven Adjudication IBI Indonesian Midwives Association CDC Centers for Disease Control and Pre- ICW Indonesia Corruption Watch vention IDP Internally Displaced Person CDD Community Driven Development IFRC International Federation of Red Cross CFAN Coordination Forum for Aceh and and Red Crescent Societies Nias ILO International Labor Organization CGI Consultative Group for Indonesia IMC International Medical Corps. CIDA Canadian International Development IOM International Organization for Migra- Agency tion CoHA Cessation of Hostilities Agreement IRC International Rescue Committee CoSA Committee on Security Arrange- IRD International Relief and Development ments JICA Japan International Cooperation CPI Consumer Price Index Agency CRS Catholic Relief Services JICS Japan International Cooperation Sys- CSO Civil Society Organization tem DDR Disarmament Demobilization and Re- Kabupaten District integration KDK Emergency Humanitarian Committee Desa Village (Komite Darurat Kemanusiaan) Dewan Pengarah Advisory Board KDP Kecamatan Development Project Dewan Pengawas Oversight Board Kecamatan Sub-District DFID UK Department For International De- Kelurahan Village velopment Kerap An elected local committee that DHWS Directorate for Housing, Water and handles and monitors reconstruction Sanitation funds under the Urban Poverty Proj- Dinas Provincial Sub-Project Management ect Dinas Bina Marga Regional Road Offices KfW German Development Bank (Kredi- Dinas Sosial Social Department tanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau) Kota City District 12 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version KPK Anti-Corruption Commission (Komite istration System Pemberantasan Korupsi) RKA-KL Ministry Work Plan and Budget KPPN State Treasury Offices (Kantor Pelay- (Rencana Kerja dan Anggaran Ke- anan Perbendaharaan Negara) menterian/Lembaga) LC Land Consolidation RKP Government Work Plan (Rencana LCS Logistics Coordination Service Kerja Pemerintah) LCT Landing Craft RCRC Red Cross/Red Crescent LDR Loan and Deposit Ratio Rp Indonesian Rupiah LEI Eco Labeling Institute SAKERNAS Labor Force Survey (Survey Tenaga LIPI Indonesian Institute of Science (Lem- Kerja Nasional) baga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia) SAMAK People's Anti Corruption Solidarity LRWG Livelihood Recovery Working (Solidaritas Masyarakat Anti Korup- Groups si) MDTF Multi Donor Trust Fund (for Aceh and SCF Save the Children Fund North Sumatra), commonly referred SD Primary School to as Multi Donor Fund SME Small and Medium Enterprises Mesjid Mosque SNREA Strategic Natural Resource and En- MFI Micro Finance Institutions vironmental Assessment MOC Ministry of Communication (Departe- SPADA Support for Poor and Disadvantaged men Perhubungan) Areas Project MOE Ministry of Environment SST Telephone Subscribers (Satuan MoNE Ministry of National Education Sabungan Telepon) MoRA Ministry of Religious Affairs SUMUT North Sumatra (Sumatera Utara) MOU Memorandum of Understanding Syariah Islamic law MPW Ministry of Public Works (Departe- TELKOM State-owned Telecommunications men Pekerjaan Umum) Company MSF Medecins Sans Frontieres TNI Indonesian Military (Tentara Nasional NAD Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Indonesia) NGO Non-Governmental Organization TSAD Socialization Team for Peace in Aceh NPL Non-Performing Loan (Tim Sosialisasi Aceh Damai) OCHA Office for the Coordination of Hu- UN United Nations manitarian Affairs UNDP United Nations Development Pro- OECD Organization of Economic Coordina- gram tion and Development UNEP United Nations Environment Pro- P3JJ Project of Planning and Supervision gram Roads and Bridges (Proyek Peren- UNFPA United Nations Family Planning canaan dan Pengawasan Jalan dan Agency Jembatan) UNHAS United Nations Humanitarian Air PDAM Government-Owned Water Enter- Service prises (Perusahaan Daerah Air Mi- UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund num) UNIMS United Nations Information Manage- Perpu Regulation in Lieu of Law (Peraturan ment Systems Pemerintah Pengganti Undang Un- UNJLC United Nations Joint Logistics Cen- dang) tre PERTAMINA The National Petroleum Supplier (Pe- UNOCHA United Nations Office Coordination rusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Na- Humanitarian Affairs sional) UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Pesantren Islamic School Services PHC Public Health Center UNORC United Nations Office of the Recov- PHO Public Health Office ery Coordinator PLN The National Electricity Company UPP Urban Poverty Project (Perusahaan Listrik Negara) USAID United States Agency for Interna- PMU Program Management Unit tional Development Posko Coordination Post (Pos Koordinasi) USO Universal Service Obligation (here: Puskesmas Health Center at Sub-District Level public phone) (Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat) WFP World Food Program R3MAS Master Plan for Aceh and Sumut WHO World Health Organization (Rencana Rehabilitasi and Rekon- YIPD Center for Local Government Inno- struksi Masyarakat Aceh dan vation (Yayasan Inovasi Pemerintah SUMUT) Daerah) RALAS Reconstruction of Aceh Land Admin- yoy year-on-year 13 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY On December 26, 2004, an earthquake The effort has now shifted gear from coping struck 150 km off the coast of Aceh. It with the emergency to helping the people was the most powerful the world has seen in a of Aceh and Nias piece back their lives. generation. Forty-five minutes later the tsunami Visitors are still struck by the scenes of utter wave hit Aceh and within minutes it swept clean devastation, but they now see clear evidence an 800 km coastal strip of Aceh ­ equivalent to of recovery activity as disaster survivors, the coastline from San Francisco to San Diego. along with the staff of 124 international Some 130,000 people were killed and 37,000 NGOs, 430 local NGOs, dozens of donor and remain missing. United Nations agencies, various government agencies, some military, and many others are The March 28 earthquake added to the collectively working on reconstruction efforts. toll in Nias, Simeulue and southern parts of Aceh. The power of nature in these events Many new and innovative mechanisms is scarcely comprehensible. To give just one for funding the recovery have ensured illustration: the December earthquake caused that sufficient resources are available. the 2000 sq km island of Simeulue, with its Fifteen donors have come together to pool 78,000 inhabitants, to sink about one meter, their grant assistance in a US$ 525 million while the March earthquake caused it to rise Multi-Donor Fund for Aceh and Nias, co- two meters ­ more, in some parts. Being able chaired by the European Commission (the to walk through exposed coral reefs is a stark largest donor), the World Bank and the BRR. reminder of the surreal transformations nature The Asian Development Bank launched the can bring. Earthquake and Tsunami Emergency Support Project with its own US$ 300 million grant. These events caused immense social, And major bilateral programs of grants and economic and environmental devastation soft loans have been offered by the Australia- to areas that were already poor, while Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction and sparking unprecedented emergency Development, the Governments of Japan and support. Before the tsunami, more than a Germany, and USAID as well as many other third of the population of Aceh and Nias lived generous governments from around the globe. in poverty. Now, almost half live below the International NGOs and organizations such as poverty line or are dependent on food aid. the Red Cross/Red Crescent, CARE, CARDI, Full recovery will take years. The calamity also Catholic Relief Services, MercyCorps, Oxfam, unleashed an unprecedented national and Save the Children, and World Vision have international response for emergency needs. raised record funds to support ongoing relief The Indonesian military and military forces from and recovery efforts. These funds provide hope various countries led the search and rescue, that it is indeed possible to "build Aceh and relief distribution and immediate clean-up Nias back better." activities. The United Nations launched a US$ 800 million flash appeal for the tsunami affected The greatest hope for a lasting recovery countries. NGOs and donors made record has come from the signing of a peace contributions. accord in Helsinki between the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) on August 15, 2005, ending a 30-year- 14 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version conflict during which almost 15,000 people had Most children are now back in school, health died. Past accords have not held, but lessons centers have largely reopened, some two-thirds have been learned and so far the prospects look of farmers are back farming their damaged land, good. Former GAM combatants are smoothly and three-quarters of the fishing boats lost reintegrating into their original communities, have been replaced or are being built. Some arms are being handed over on schedule, progress, but more limited, has been made in Indonesian military forces in Aceh are scaling restoring livelihoods. back as promised and local institutions are welcoming GAM leaders into decision-making Those displaced or who lost their livelihoods positions. There is the possibility of a "virtuous are understandably frustrated that a year circle"; the tsunami gave the chance for later the recovery hasn't been faster. The peace, and the reconstruction effort presents pace of reconstruction following a disaster of an opportunity to strengthen that peace by such magnitude is never fast enough, given bringing entire communities together to plan the lives that have been disrupted, but it is for their future. proceeding at least as rapidly as in other contemporary disasters (box 1). PROGRESS ­ ONE YEAR ON The recovery effort is beset by challenges Emergency relief is still needed, but of enormous complexity. No amount of the burden of effort is now focused on planning or ingenuity could have averted them. reconstruction, and progress is being To quote a few: made on multiple fronts. In Aceh and Nias, · Land has to be cleared of millions of tons of great areas of urban landscape remain nothing debris and silt before it can be used again but rubble; about 67,500 people are still living in ­ whether for farming or building homes; and tents, many of which are going moldy. Hundreds before building houses it is vital to establish of thousands of people still depend on food who owns what land. aid and emergency employment schemes. · Large areas of land are no longer suitable for However, unlike in similar disasters elsewhere, housing because they are now flood plains there has been no major outbreak of disease or due to tectonic plate shifts that depressed hunger, due to the well-coordinated emergency much of the coastal shelf by up to 1.5 effort. Now, almost 1,000 reconstruction meters. projects are underway, many of which have · Water, sewerage, electricity, public transport recorded progress (table 1). and other service connections must be planned before houses are built to ensure Recovery programs are targeting many communities become viable again. needs, with a heavy emphasis on housing, · The single road reaching along the west health and restoring agrarian livelihoods. coast was washed away in many areas, as By early December, 16,200 houses had been were many ports. In spite of the temporary built and 13,200 were under construction for road built by the Indonesian army, which can those made homeless, 15,000 families are only carry 5-ton trucks even when it is dry, it housed in temporary barracks, and the UN is proving a logistical nightmare to bring in and Red Cross/Red Crescent are now leading the thousands of tons of building supplies a temporary house campaign which is intended needed for reconstruction. to get everyone out of tents by early 2006. · The islands, especially Nias and Simeulue, 15 Table 1 Damage and Progress in Aceh and Nias Damage Progress People · 167,000 dead or missing from tsunami · In Aceh, over 300,000 have been able · 500,000 displaced from homes in Aceh to return to homes · 900 dead from the March earthquake and · About 75,000 given shelter by relatives 13,500 families displaced from homes in and neighbors Nias Housing · 80,000 ­ 110,000 new houses needed · 16,200 new houses completed · About 50,000 are housed in barracks; · 13,200 underway · About 65,000 remain in tents · 5,000/month new houses being built Infrastructure · 3,000 km of roads impassable · 235 km roads restored · 14 of 19 seaports badly damaged · West coast road project started · 8 of 10 airports damaged · Major road projects underway · 120 arterial bridges destroyed, 1,500 mi- · 5 major ports being rebuilt nor bridges · 35 arterial bridges rebuilt Education · More than 2,000 school buildings dam- · 335 new schools built or under con- aged struction · Approximately 2,500 teachers died · Over 1,100 new or temporary teachers trained · 1.7 million textbooks distributed Health · More than eight hospitals damaged or de- · 38 hospitals, clinics and health centres stroyed rehabilitated or rebuilt · 114 health centres and sub-centres dam- · 51 more under reconstruction aged or destroyed Economy · US$1.2 billion damage to productive sec- · Construction boom is stimulating econ- tor omy · Projected economic decline of 5% in Aceh; 20% in Nias Fisheries · 4,717 coastal fishing boats lost · 3,122 boats replaced or being built · 20,000 ha fish ponds destroyed or out of · 5,000 hectares fish ponds repaired, action back in use Agriculture · 60,000 farmers displaced · 40,000 farmers assisted to return · Over 60,000 ha agricultural land dam- · 13,000 ha farmland restored aged Enterprise · 100,000 small business persons have lost · 7,000 workers given skills training their livelihoods · Over 120,000 benefited from cash-for- work schemes Source: Range of housing issues based on these sources: IOM damage assessment of houses destroyed adjusted to account for loss of villagers (March) BRR survey of Camats and Village Heads (November); 2005 BPS census shows 192,055 IDPs including 12,353 in tents on own land 16 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version Box 1 Comparing Reconstruction Pace Across Countries · Honduras: Hurricane Mitch devastated several Central American countries in 1998. In Honduras alone, more than 441,000 were displaced. Four years later, about 85,000 houses were rebuilt, but hundreds were still living in temporary shelters. · India: The Gujarat earthquake in 2001 killed about 14,000 people; the recovery program aimed to rebuild 214,000 houses; in the first two years 113,000 had been built (53%) · Iran: In December 2003, an earthquake in Bam killed more than 30,000 and left 75,000 homeless. One year later, most people lived in pre-fabricated temporary shelters and only 5% of the permanent houses needed were rebuilt. · Japan: The Kobe earthquake killed 6400 and displaced 300,000 in 1995. It took seven years to fully recover in terms of population, income, and industrial indices. · Turkey: After the Erzincan earthquake in 1992, a government program to build 3600 houses didn't start until two years later. Following the August 1999 Marmara earthquake (which destroyed 64,000 houses), govern- ment capacity for reconstruction had increased, and it took about three years to complete the bulk of the housing reconstruction. · United States: In Florida some people are still living in mobile housing more than a year after Hurricane Ivan struck in 2004. · Venezuela: The floods and landslides of 1999 displaced 80-100,000; more than one- third of these still lived in barracks/temporary shelter 8 months later. A year after the disaster, all of the displaced had homes; how- ever, many were pressured to relocate. lost most of their ports and never had the clearly too low ­ constrained housing projects. scale of transport infrastructure necessary for It was eventually revised, but not before many the logistics of large-scale reconstruction. programs were already underway. · Since reconstruction began there have been many other earthquakes (not least the giant The budget processes for government one in March), heavy floods, landslides and funds and official aid provided through the gales. Avian influenza and polio have also government have proven slow. Traditionally reached Aceh. in Indonesia (as in many countries), transferring funds from the national treasury can be Though nothing could have been done cumbersome. This year budget execution was to avert these problems, other sources even slower as a result of newly introduced of delay could have been averted. It took reforms, even though a rapid response was the Government several months to formulate required. Inevitably, the new system, though its strategy. Many NGOs and donors made designed to increase transparency and commitments to undertake programs for accountability, initially generated confusion which they had little experience. Many donors and uncertainty, as long-standing practices swiftly pledged aid for recovery but then were overhauled. Just as the need for speed took several months to authorize or transfer in accessing funds was greatest, the budget the funds. And inappropriate policies often system nearly broke down leaving considerable caused unnecessary delays and false starts- for resources assigned by the government for example, the initial policy to limit the budget for recovery languishing in Jakarta until as late as a new house to US$ 3,000 ­ a level that was September 2005. 17 THE RECONSTRUCTION STRATEGY control of the myriad activities underway by donors and NGOs. It established a review and The Gover nment's master plan for approval process to ensure that projects are rehabilitation and reconstruction contained compatible with overall recovery priorities and two critical decisions that were to initially requirements. It drafted policies and guidelines delay reconstruction, but which gave the to lay down common standards and practices recovery a firm foundation for sustainable in key areas with a strong focus on anti- progress in the long term. The first was corruption. It also established an operations to establish a ministerial-level Rehabilitation center to track donor projects and sought to and Reconstruction Agency (BRR) to provide set up new frameworks for donor coordination. leadership of the recovery; though it took And through allocation of substantial resources some months before the agency became fully from the Paris Club moratorium, it became operational. The second was to insist that an important source of government funds for communities take the lead in planning their reconstruction. own recovery; participatory processes are often slower than top-down alternatives but are BRR has now been given additional powers more effective over the long term because the to implement housing reconstruction plans have full community support. Indonesia's projects through direct contracting. This strategic choices have set a different path from will enable it to respond to gaps or poorly that chosen by countries in other disasters, performing programs, by being able to assume but given the complex political and social responsibility for those programs or reassign environment in which the tsunami occurred, them to another agency. It is also giving priority these choices made sense. Indeed, the creation to engaging district government systems in of a credible, independent agency, based in the reconstruction by passing on BRR's own Banda Aceh, to oversee the reconstruction and funds to projects managed by provincial and emphasize community-driven processes, has district administrations. BRR will also use surely contributed to the peace process. block grants to empower local governments to address their middle-level infrastructure needs, Since its formation in April the BRR has while providing the necessary capacity-building quickly established leadership over the through a "learning-by-doing" approach. reconstruction effort. BRR comprises three bodies: an Executing Agency (Bapel), headed by The transition from relief to reconstruction Kuntoro Mangkusubroto; a high-level Advisory has not been seamless. A hiatus in activity Board to guide the reconstruction strategy; in the middle of 2005 gave the impression and an Oversight Board to monitor activities, that the recovery effort was running out of handle public complaints, and conduct audits. steam. Planning for the recovery phase started All three report directly to the President. The in earnest in March and did not end till the term BRR is commonly used for the executing Government's revised budget was approved agency, a practice followed in this report. in June. Disbursements for recovery activities remained on hold just as the emergency BRR's first priority was to clarify its response was beginning to wind down. mission, build its staff and develop a set of This created a trough in the funding flows - standard operating procedures to provide illustrated by the shaded area in figure 1- and coordination, strategic leadership and quality coincided with mounting frustration among 18 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version those displaced who were understandably million per month in 2006. BRR has set out a impatient to see progress. sequencing of the reconstruction effort, as the diagram illustrates, broadening from the current The recovery program has now gained emphasis on housing to include infrastructure momentum and funds are starting to flow and livelihoods in 2006, and in subsequent for reconstruction projects. This became years to longer term infrastructure needs and possible as capacities were built, plans were local capacity building (see figure 1). agreed with communities, contracts were awarded and construction materials were Tangible progress in reconstruction is now procured. Resource flows to reconstruction evident. Any journey now through most of the projects have increased to about US$ 150 tsunami zone reveals a constant stream of new million per month and should grow to US$ 200 houses, public works projects and construction yards run by international or government Figure 1 Sequencing of Emergency and Recovery Effort (schematic) Level of Activity Emergency Physical and Social Infrastructure Housing ediate Long m er Im term Livelihood and Business 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 agencies. However, the remoter areas are still alternative, but about 190,000 people remain seriously neglected, in particular Nias. homeless in Aceh and a further 13,500 families in Nias. Some 67,500 people in Aceh remain REBUILDING HOMES AND in tents. COMMUNITIES The first hurdle to overcome in permanent About 500,000 people were displaced from housing is clarifying who owns what land. their homes by the tsunami. Most have been Often there is no visible trace of property able to return to their property or to find an boundaries. A program is now underway to restore property rights using participatory 19 approaches. People in a village first map RESTORING LIVELIHOODS out their community showing approximate boundaries, damage to property, and who lived The tsunami caused an estimated loss of where. The whole community then collectively US$ 1.2 billion in the productive sectors. adjudicates on who owns or should inherit More than half of this was in the fisheries sector which plot. The National Land Agency then and the rest was divided between farming and certifies the community's decision, draws up manufacturing. Cash-for-work, financed by detailed maps and starts the process of issuing many donors and NGOs, has played a vital legal title to the plots. Speed is of the essence role in providing safety nets and revitalizing in this complex process. the economy. These programs are now being phased out, as more housing construction Dealing with land issues where people projects and other regular employment activities have to move is much more complicated. are being launched. An estimated 30,000 families are likely to have to relocate permanently, sometimes as The construction boom offers many jobs, whole communities. Where NGOs or others but there could be a sting in the tail. The are prepared to help (perhaps in purchasing initial rise in unemployment after the tsunami the land needed) and where local government has been reversed due to jobs in construction, heads provide decisive leadership, these but this boom will eventually end. Although it problems can be resolved. is tempting to reserve recovery-related jobs for local people, this would precipitate wage Current projections indicate that 60,000 and price inflation in the region with damaging houses will have been built by June 2006, consequences in the long term for Aceh and the full housing program should be and Nias. The region cannot revert from a complete by the middle of 2007. This would construction-led economy if labor has priced entail building 75,000 houses in Aceh in 2006. itself out of the Indonesian market, and wage Progress remains slow in the more remote rates are much more flexible upwards than areas, however, particularly the islands of Nias downwards. A balance must be struck between and Simeulue. ensuring that reconstruction jobs help IDPs and allowing flexibility for labor migration. Most housing projects today are in easier- to-reach areas and do not require large In the fisheries sector a great deal of amounts of new land; the most difficult help has been given, but not always of housing projects are yet to start. In 2006 the right type, and gaps remain. A high house-building will be needed for the island proportion of the small coastal fishing boats dwellers, those in cut-off areas, and those have been replaced but many may not last whose land has been washed away or become beyond 12 to 18 months due to poor design permanently flood-prone. Many other policy and craftsmanship and the use of substandard constraints have to be overcome. As a result, materials. Furthermore, even before the tsunami there is a risk that housing starts may soon peak there were doubts about the sustainability of as these more difficult areas are reached. coastal fishing, while there are reportedly large fish reserves in the deeper ocean. Few agencies are providing the larger boats needed to harvest these reserves. There are other gaps 20 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version too. Many shrimp and fresh-water fish ponds still not enrolled in school by August and more have not been rehabilitated and few agencies than ten percent of children aged 13-15 years are helping with marketing-related needs, such were not going to school It appears that many as replacing ice-plants lost in the tsunami. children are leaving school to take up jobs, so potentially being deprived of life opportunities. Agriculture has been one of the few sectors The challenge, moving forward, is to complete of recovery that has proved easier than the repairs to over 2,000 schools in Aceh and initially thought. Emergency employment Nias, replacing the temporary facilities with schemes to clear debris and deposits, and disaster-resistant permanent ones. This also restore drainage and irrigation channels have presents an opportunity to improve the quality assisted 40,000 families to return to farming of education delivery. Donors initially focused (two-thirds of affected households). Some their support on reconstructing primary schools areas are reporting high crop yields due to the in urban areas and along main roads. Better nutritional value of the silt deposits. In other targeting is needed to ensure that the needs areas, considerable investments in drainage at the secondary levels are met, as well as the are needed to bring back lands to pre-tsunami significant needs in less accessible rural areas, production levels. and those places affected by the conflict. Manysmallandmedium-scaleentrepreneurs Most health facilities have been restored are having a hard time getting back on their to pre-tsunami levels. Donors and NGOs feet. A number of NGOs are providing start-up responded quickly and generously to health grants or micro-finance facilities for small and sector needs by establishing field hospitals and medium enterprises (SMEs). But the formal providing staff and equipment. Reconstruction banking system is not providing normal services and capacity-building for permanent health to businesses in Aceh and Nias because facilities are now underway in 70 percent of the high proportion of tsunami-related non- damaged health centres and sub-centres, and performing loans has made them risk-averse. in some areas donors have provided adequate The loss of assets, lack of access to capital, resources. Low levels of public investment and damage to their normal market channels and years of conflict meant that public health has seriously demoralized entrepreneurs. facilities were already in a poor state prior to the natural disasters. Planning for the longer term will be a high priority in the coming year, RESTORING PUBLIC SERVICES as issues of overlap, equity, and capacity for maintenance are critical. More programs Most educational services have been will also be needed to tackle mental health quickly restored, but problems of quality problems which are more complex and longer- remain. Many children are now taught in tents lasting than physical injuries. or temporary learning spaces. A large program was undertaken to train more than 1,100 new Meeting transport needs must become a or temporary teachers. However, children's top priority. The extensive repairs made to the education has suffered from the disruption road network after the disaster allowed relief of service, the movement of communities in operations to reach remote areas, but they were resettling, and the trauma of the disasters. More quick fixes. With the onset of the rainy season, than five percent of children aged 7-12 were access to areas along the west coast has become 21 very difficult and emergency maintenance is now SUSTAINABLE RECOVERY underway. A revised transport master plan is now in the works. Major road works are now Rebuilding the economy is a great challenge beginning. Existing commitments should meet and is best served by starting physical most national road needs, but there are still reconstruction as swiftly as possible. It big gaps in the funding for district roads. Port is estimated that the disasters will reduce the rebuilding is particularly under-funded. Within a 2005 GDP by 5 percent in Aceh and 20 percent year, significant stretches of the west coast road in Nias, though the impact varies greatly by should be in good condition, and emergency district with two of them losing half their GDP. repairs to key ports should be finished. However, This signals that an additional 325,000 people a year is a long time for people living in tents, in Aceh, and 149,000 in Nias might fall below and without transportation to reach the suffering the poverty line without adequate safety nets. communities, recovery will continue to be Post tsunami, prices have increased more disrupted. sharply than nationwide, in particular in Banda Aceh, where year-on-year inflation in October The provision of water and sanitation 2005 reached 37.5 percent - largely due to the must keep pace with house building. heavy demand for construction materials and The emergency operation gave considerable skilled labor. The construction boom has also attention to needs in this sector and, as a result, led to a 30-40 percent surge in wages across there was no major outbreak or water-borne all professions. disease. Still, about 80,000 people have their daily water trucked in by NGOs and donors. Commercial banks suffered major losses Now the recovery operation has moved to due to unrecoverable loans but are slowly the reconstruction of permanent water and recovering. Many banks are seeking to salvage sanitation facilities, especially in the major towns what they can by softening terms for creditors and cities. Such facilities were poor before the in difficulty. Debtors who lost their productive tsunami. Facilities in Banda Aceh are being assets in the tsunami and earthquake are still reconstructed, and a special program to address struggling as they can hardly access credit water and sanitation needs of those in temporary without collateral. However, bank deposits accommodation is underway. have increased significantly as construction While community-level and large scale picks up and there is confidence that this, infrastructure programs are progressing, coupled with the peace agreement, will help there is a significant gap in infrastructure revive the banking sector and restore economic at the level of districts and cities. The confidence. main coordination and funding gaps relate to secondary roads, dykes, sewerage and water Restoring the natural environment will supply which are the responsibilities of local require years of hard work. The natural governments. These are beyond the scope of disasters caused substantial environmental most NGOs and require government planning impact in urban and rural areas. Some 800 and implementation systems. However, district km of coastal Aceh, often up to 5 km wide, governments in both Aceh and Nias currently was severely affected; in Nias, the whole lack the capacity and, in many cases, the drive coastline has changed. The major damage for the task. was due to debris and sediment deposits to farmland and fish ponds. In many places 22 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version beaches were lost and riverbeds changed. FINANCING THE RECONSTRUCTION Although the environment accounts for a small PROGRAM proportion of donor and government recovery commitments, there have been some very The people of Aceh and Nias will need at effective programs of waste management and least US$ 5.8 billion to restore lost assets. ecosystem restoration. Mangrove restoration This includes taking into account rising inflation is a particular priority in the long term. A major due to high demand for reconstruction-related issue is the potentially damaging environmental goods. Additional resources will be needed effects associated with the demand for building to upgrade facilities that were already in poor materials, especially timber and masonry. condition before the disasters hit, particularly in conflict-affected areas and Nias. THE PEACE DIVIDEND One year after the tsunami, US$ 4.4 billion So far the peace is holding but a number has already been allocated for specific of events in 2006 will test its robustness. projects. The Government (including 2006 The peace accord has been widely hailed budget) has allocated US$ 1.1 billion, NGOs by Acehnese people as an important new US$ 1.5 billion and official donors US$ 1.8 opportunity ­ a silver lining to the dark clouds billion (see figure 2). These projects meet the of the past 12 months. In 2006, a new law minimum needs in most sectors, but important is to be enacted on the governance of Aceh, gaps remain, particularly in transport, flood which will inevitably involve fraught processes control and environment. Out of the US$ 4.4 of negotiation and public debate. The upcoming billion, US$ 775 million had been spent by end- elections for the governor of Aceh and most November 2005. district heads will be an important test for the consolidation of democracy in Aceh. There is an opportunity to build back better. Total pledges for reconstruction and The international community can play an development in Aceh and Nias amount to about important role in helping to safeguard the US$ 9 billion. The Government of Indonesia, peace. It is important that tsunami and post- donors and NGOs are each expected to conflict recovery are integrated to the fullest contribute US$ 2.5-3.5 billion. Since Aceh and extent possible. At the least, it is important Nias need US$ 5.8 billion to rebuild, additional that all agencies are sensitive to conflict issues resources of about US$ 3 billion could be used to ensure that aid programs do not exacerbate to make Aceh and Nias a better place (see tensions that could fuel the eruption of conflict. figure 2). For this to happen, all partners need All projects must be strictly equitable and to keep their commitments and implement their inclusive. Agencies must be careful about projects. process as well as outcomes and they should establish responsive complaints-handling mechanisms. 23 Figure 2 Reconstruction Needs and Commitments (US$ billion) 10.0 9.0 Upgrading facilities in 8.0 Tsunami and earthquake Building back affected areas better GOI Committed conflict reintegration 7.0 and development programs DONORS but not NGOs allocated US$ 6.0 Billion Inflation (1.0) 5.0 NIAS (0.4) 4.0 GOI (1.1) 3.0 Damage and Rebuilding Already Loss Assessment NGOs (1.5) allocated 2.0 (4.5) to specific projects 1.0 DONORS (1.8) 0.0 Needs The reconstruction program THE WAY FORWARD · Rehabilitate vital infrastructure: Especially the transport links along the west Coordination among all stakeholders is coast, urban drainage and facilities, and not yet strong enough and tends to focus coastal protection; also preparing a longer- on information-sharing as opposed to term plan for infrastructure development. common decision making. BRR is trying · Strengthen institutional and human to address this by establishing coordination capacities: By building the capacities forums, policy advisory groups and other of local governments to handle complex mechanisms to ensure that all gaps are filled, infrastructure and development schemes; with a minimum of duplication. It is also helping building the capacities of independent to strengthen coordination at the local level, by organizations to monitor this and help guard opening local offices and working with local against corruption; and by continuing to governments and community leaders. restore education and health facilities and services. BRR has set four key priorities for 2006: · Restore livelihoods: By ensuring the · Provide decent shelter to all: Through the construction boom is used to create transitional shelter campaign, accelerating sustainable job opportunities and new the pace of permanent house-building, skills; completing the revitalization of resolving the remaining policy and strategy 58,000 hectares of damaged farmland; dilemmas, and meeting remaining gaps developing new potential in the plantation through direct implementation where sector; ensuring a more holistic approach needed. to recovery in fisheries; and providing more support to SMEs. 24 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version A c e h a n d N i a s h a v e c o n s i d e r a b l e development potential for the long term which must be nurtured. The sudden opening of Aceh's doors to the world presents the province with a choice. It can either return to being a relatively isolated region at the end of the Indonesian archipelago or it can consolidate its connections with the rest of the country and the wider world. Its location is a potential advantage, with easy sea routes to a number of the world's most rapidly growing economies. It could also choose to strengthen its trade and business connections. Aceh has considerable natural resources it can tap, and a chance ­ with the peace process ­ to better harness its full human potential. With scenic beauty, good beaches and a world class National Park, Aceh and Nias have the potential to develop tourism. The future prospects are promising, and now is an opportune moment to initiate wide public consultation about the direction the people prefer to take. The healing of Aceh and Nias will take a long time, and will inevitably see setbacks, as well as celebrations. It is time to get beyond sentiments of "my project, or yours" and recognize the need for active coordination. There is one common recovery endeavour and all agencies share the responsibility for ensuring its health. BRR is providing leadership in this coordination, but cannot do it alone. All agencies must provide information about their experiences and their programs, and be prepared to work in partnership with others. In this way, it will not just be building houses but building homes. And by respecting community- driven processes, it will not just be erecting settlements throughout the damaged areas of Aceh and Nias, but it will be recreating vibrant communities. This is the goal for which everyone must strive. 25 26 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Part I ONE YEAR AFTER - WHERE DO WE STAND? Chapter 1 REBUILDING HOMES AND COMMUNITIES Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? In the horrifying minutes that the tsunami many years. But they threw themselves devastated coastal Aceh what had once into the challenge with immense energy and been bustling urban neighborhoods and conviction. While the people of Aceh and thriving villages became fields of rubble, Nias will forever be grateful for this, there were covered by millions of tons of debris and mud. downsides. Today, there are 109 agencies The March 28 earthquake inflicted further building houses in Aceh and Nias; each with destruction, particularly in Nias and South their own ideas of what the task entails. For West Aceh. some it is just a house; for others it extends to full site-and-service provision. Some offer Amidst the immediate emergency needs quickly-erectable prefabricated units, others of catering to both the living and the dead, give full-scale 3-bedroom brick houses. This one of the clearest recovery challenges could be a recipe for disaster ­ the diagonal that emerged was housing. Roughly opposite of town planning. It could be, but by 500,000 people were out on the streets ­ if and large it isn't. It isn't for one good reason. they could be called "streets". Initially they The communities are calling the shots. slept in public buildings, under sheeting supplied by the army or volunteers, or in the Early on in the reconstruction phase many homes of those more fortunate. Bit by bit, leading agencies and the government many people have been able to repair and of Indonesia resolutely emphasized clean up their homes; some have built shacks the importance of using participatory on their old house-plots; and some have processes; namely trusting the judgment of even built new houses. But about 190,000 communities themselves and ensuring they remain homeless plus more than 40,000 in are in the driving-seat of their own recovery. Nias. The government ­ in particular the army So most agencies (but not all) have carefully ­ did an impressive job of building barracks- discussed all possible options with survivors style accommodation and coordinating others in a village and help them decide what course in a program of temporary shelters for these to take. For some, they simply want to rebuild internally displaced people (IDPs), which now houses like the ones they lost and do so on house about 15,000 families. the same plots of land. Some are seizing the opportunity to create something better than Within days of the tsunami, hundreds the dense, sprawling alleyways and tightly of international NGOs and donors had packed houses they had previously. Others descended on the province to see what must move wholesale, perhaps because the they could do to help. Some focused on land they once lived on was washed away or giving food, tents, water, medical services and remains permanently flooded. The early idea other emergency needs, but many identified of a master-plan ­ a top-down blueprint for the provision of shelter as their priority. where communities would be relocated and Over the coming weeks and months, many where houses and facilities would be built ­ has more agencies arrived and plans started to given way to Community-Driven Development develop for rebuilding houses, rather than just (CDD) as is described in the `Communities' temporary shelters. section. Many of these agencies had never built Years from now, the story of Indonesia's a house before ­ even ones who had tsunami recovery could well be the text- worked in relief and development for book example of Community-Driven 28 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version Development on a massive scale. This government cost ceiling was inadequate, story is in the making today. With more than especially in light of global public generosity. 1,000 villages and urban parishes involved, In June, the newly-created reconstruction it is probably the most widespread example agency (BRR) formally changed policy to lift of participatory planning the world has ever this ceiling and at the same time make clear seen. It has its costs in addition to benefits, that anyone building houses should assume as the following chapters tell. There will be a responsibility to provide related services many bumps in the road and much frustration. and use CDD approaches. Reworking house But it is already clear that CDD is making a designs together with striking agreements major difference. The better programs that with individual communities (rather than are emerging are not just concerned with just district level governments) has led to providing shelter over peoples' heads but a steady increase in the quality of houses also reflect the facilities people care strongly offered and a commensurate reduction in for, consider people's security and social numbers pledged. Fears of over-supply have needs, and reflect the desire to recover and thus abated. However there is something of strengthen livelihoods. These programs are a "buyers' market" in that communities are not just building houses. They are building often switching from one supplier to another if homes. they are dissatisfied with their original partner or are persuaded they can get a better offer. Determination of housing needs was not CDD has virtues, but can also foster poaching easy. In the first few months after the tsunami, between agencies. the international agencies arriving in Banda Aceh, Meulaboh or other sites saw the need The actual constructing of houses got off to for houses as far as the eye could see. Until what many considered a slow start, though in quite recently it was widely believed that up reality no slower than in most other large-scale to 500,000 people would need a new house. disasters. As the rainy season approached In those early chaotic weeks problematic there was an urgent decision to get the most logistics made it impossible to gather reliable vulnerable IDPs out of tents (67,500 persons) data. At that time, too, the government had by early 2006, and all IDPs by the end of June. decreed a ceiling of about US$3000 on the Suitable, pre-fabricated, easily-assembled cost of a new house. So agencies, wanting to houses are being imported and many NGOs do all they could, calculated how much they are transporting and erecting the temporary could budget for their housing projects and houses in various locations around Aceh and estimated how many they could provide at the Nias. government's ceiling. Housing construction progress has been Some months later the deficiency of such fraught with difficulties ­ most of which a supply-side calculation became clear. have largely now been resolved. The Coordination through a shelter working group time taken for CDD approaches has already together with better data-gathering made been mentioned, but it is clear that this has it clear there was a "disconnect". Offers been a good investment, not time wasted. totaled well over 200,000 houses while the But delays due to inappropriate or unclear need for new houses is probably between policies have been frustrating. The too-low 80,000 to 100,000. At the same time, IDPs price ceiling was one such; others concerned (and many NGOs) expressed anger that the unclear definitions of permanent (as opposed Chapter 1 Rebuilding Homes And Communities 29 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? to temporary) houses, the lack of building key construction needs. codes, an early ruling requiring only the use of domestic timber (which NGOs committed Against all these odds, and with the to using wood from certified sustainable continuing unreliability of much data forestry programs found unacceptable), and concerning communities' needs and lengthy delays and high tariffs on equipment agencies' plans to address those needs, imported to meet reconstruction needs. The progress is being made. Any journey in BRR has since resolved most of these issues Aceh today involves passing many new houses and has provided clearer coordination of and NGO building yards where 6 months ago shelter providers. It has specified a building there was just destruction and decaying tents. code (together with the public works ministry), Everyone involved will always ask whether cleared the blockage of equipment at Medan results could have come faster ­ and that port, permitted foreign timber to be used reflection is needed ­ but the critical conclusion where appropriate and cleared many other is that reconstruction is now happening at bottlenecks. a rapid pace and this momentum must be maintained until the task is done. Some barriers to progress cannot be solved so readily particularly the problem TRANSITIONAL SHELTER AND of land. When communities have been reduced to rubble and there are no visible signs PERMANENT HOUSING of where houses and property boundaries were before it is unsafe to start building houses before getting the agreement of all concerned where those boundaries should be drawn ­ The housing sector suffered about a third otherwise protracted legal battles could ensue of the total estimated tsunami damage. or people could be dispossessed from their A damage assessment carried out in March entitlements. Hence one of the fascinating showed that about 70,000 houses were stories is the effort many are making to help the destroyed and a further 57,000 damaged in National Land Agency (BPN) restore property Aceh. Initially probably more than 500,000 rights. In addition, many families ­ sometimes people were made homeless by the disaster, whole villages ­ will have to move because but most have been able to return, leaving their original communities are uninhabitable. about 192,000 IDPs living in tents, barracks or with host families (SPAN, November 29, The physical difficulty of reaching many 2005). Of those who returned to their homes a of the damaged communities, still less potentially large number are living in temporary bringing trucks of building materials structures built from reclaimed materials. The and heavy-moving equipment to them, earthquake on March 28, 2005 destroyed makes progress in many areas slower than expected, let alone desired. This leads to frustration on all sides, which is why imaginative solutions are being sought, such as setting up production sites to make cement-fiber panels or bricks from locally available materials, rather than bring them in from outside. Agencies are also exploring various ways to combat uncertain supplies of 30 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version several weeks there was a dual approach Table 1.1 Housing Damage Assessment of encouraging people throughout Aceh to Destroyed Seriously Partly Total host displaced families and simultaneously Damaged Damaged Damaged or planning a series of "temporary living centers" Destroyed with barracks-style housing that hold some Aceh 69,932 26,331 30,806 127,069 15,000 IDP families. By April, work started on Nias 12,010 32,454 39,437 83,901 building solid houses. The early programs of Total 81,942 58,785 70,243 210,970 significant scale were the "transitional house" schemes of IOM and other organizations Source: International Organization for Migration (IOM) damage as- sessments of Nanggroe Aceh Darrussalam (March 2005) and Nias comprising prefabricated buildings erected and Simeulue islands (April 2005). Note: Immediately after the on land that was either leased or provided by tsunami, estimates were higher: 127,000 houses destroyed and 152,000 seriously damaged. local government (over 6,000 of these are in place to date). At the same time, donors and The shelter program has had a single NGOs started planning permanent housing objective: to get people into progressively on the site of people's original homes or on better accommodation as swiftly as plots identified by the communities. A long- possible. In the first few days this meant term housing strategy started to emerge. bringing in tents from across the world so This chapter describes the progress with the people could move out of crowded public overall program and discusses the trade-offs buildings and off the streets. In the following and challenges entailed. Map 1.1 Distribution of those currently identifying themselves as IDPs Number of Current IDPs SABANG (KOTA) Source: SPAN 2005 Above 45,000 BANDA ACEH (KOTA) 19,000to 45,000 6,000to 19,000 2,000to 6,000 Below 2,000 No IDP LHOKSUMAWE (KOTA) ACEH BESAR Status of IDPs Source: SPAN 2005 PIDIE BIREUEN 93,000 ACEH UTARA 46,500 9,300 ACEH JAYA BENER MERIAH Current IDPs ACEH TIMUR Former IDPs ACEH TENGAH LANGSA (KOTA) ACEH BARAT ACEH TAMIANG NAGAN RAYA GAYO LUES ACEH BARAT DAYA NIAS ACEH TENGGARA NIAS SELATAN ACEH SELATAN SIMEULUE ACEH SINGKIL Soucre: SPAN 2005 Chapter 1 Rebuilding Homes And Communities 31 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? GETTING PEOPLE OUT OF TENTS PLANNING THE PERMANENT HOUSING PROGRAM Recently, there has been a renewed focus on temporary housing. While communities At least US$760 million is needed to have urged NGOs and donors to help build replace permanent houses. As with all permanent houses as swiftly as possible, such disasters, the government (with support of about 67,500 people still remain in tents. donors and NGOs) is committed to ensuring that During emergencies there is always a difficult everyone who lost a house is entitled to receive trade-off between building temporary and a decent new one in compensation ­ but only permanent houses. As the rainy season up to a certain standard. Those who owned approached, however, there was an urgent expensive houses cannot expect compensation reassessment, encouraged particularly by the up to that level (unless they had private insurance), UN. The tough choice was between replacing but conversely the poor should end up with an old tents for new ­ which would certainly improved home. Some US$700M has been impact morale ­ or diverting some resources committed by the donor community for housing and attention from permanent to temporary ­ almost adequate had it not been for the Nias housing, which would slow the eventual goal earthquake. Of the funds pledged, around 47 of getting everyone into their new home. It percent comes from NGOs (US$ 331 million), and was agreed that the most vulnerable IDPs the remainder from donors (US$ 335 million) and should be out of tents by early 2006, and all domestic sources (US$ 36 million). should be by the end of June. Composition of Financing in the Housing Figure 1.1 A consortium of agencies was formed, Sector (US$ million) led by the Red Cross Red Crescent NGOs, 446 275 GOI Movement (RCRC) to spearhead this campaign. RCRC has identified suitable quickly-erectable houses and has begun the process of importing 20,000 units over the coming 3 months, building up to the rate of 2,000 units per week. IOM and RCRC are transporting them swiftly to various locations Bilateral donors, 28 226 Multilateral donors, around Aceh and Nias, and many NGOs have agreed to erect them, with the support of local Source: BRR, World Bank staff estimates; see also Annex 6. government in identifying land and local labor. UNICEF, Oxfam, the American Red Cross and Soon after the tsunami, agencies started others are providing water and sanitation in assessing how many families they could the new settlements, and the intention is that offer to re-house. NGOs, multi-lateral and those living in the early barracks will also be bilateral donors and some private companies eligible for these units in a second phase such arrived in large numbers (including many from that everyone is living in decent temporary Indonesia). At the outset ­ when it seemed circumstances as soon as logistically possible. that the need for houses was almost limitless Everyone moving into one of the temporary ­ NGOs and donors estimated how much they units will be assured that this will not delay could budget for houses and, using the price their getting a permanent house. ceiling of about US$3000 set by government, 32 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version Box 1.1 THE NUSA DIARY : Housing It is virtually impossible to say how many houses were destroyed in Nusa because no one knows how many there were before the tsunami. On each of my six visits to the village I was given different statistics - which made me appreciate just how hard it must have been for the aid agencies to compile accurate data on anything. Based on all the figures I received, I would say there were between 148 and 160 houses in the village; just over a third were destroyed, just under a third were damaged to varying degrees and about a third survived in tact due to being on higher ground. In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, those villagers whose houses survived put up people whose homes had been washed away or were unsafe to inhabit. Due to its topography, which provided psychological security, the village also welcomed more than 200 people from neighboring low-lying villages which had been wiped out. Many of these displaced people stayed in the primary school and then moved into tents before being housed in barracks nearer their own villages. Nusa was one of four villages in Lhok Nga sub-district to pilot the barracks. Five barracks and a multi-pur- pose communal building were completed by early March and the last displaced people from other villages left by mid-April. The person in charge of barrack construction had no idea whether the wood was from sustainable sources and didn't seem to care. During the year there were occasional problems with water supply and in one storm parts of the roofs blew off a kitchen area and a bathroom block but for the most part the barracks per- formed well. People decorated their sections to make them as homely as possible and the communal areas were always clean and tidy whenever I visited. By early April residents started moving back to their damaged homes, even if only a couple of rooms remained inhabitable; they were understandably preferred to the barracks. By May more than 60 families had moved out. Their rooms in the barracks were taken by families who had been sharing. No house reconstruction had started by my last visit in mid-October except for one man who had become frustrated with the wait and so borrowed money from family and friends to start rebuilding on his own. CARE International is running the reconstruction program. In August they thought building would start by the end of September; in October they hoped the training house would be ready by the end of November. The delays were put down to the need to meet BRR spatial plan criteria which were published later than expected, the size of the task and the need to ensure the workers were properly trained. CARE is building or repairing 162 houses in Nusa and some communal buildings. Wanting to "build back better" and realizing space was not a constraint, CARE decided to build houses about 45 square meters rather than the 36 square meters being built elsewhere at a cost of Rp 35 million per unit. The outer walls will be brick and the room partitions predominantly plywood to reduce the potential threat from future earthquakes. Wood is coming from BRR-approved sources. Villagers have five designs to choose from - the pictures for these were posted in October and provoked much discussion amongst villagers. Each house should take about six weeks to build and CARE estimates all will be completed by the middle of 2006. Source: John Aglionby (The Guardian) This review of housing on the village of Nusa, 10km west of Banda Aceh on the main road to Meulaboh in Lhoknga sub-district, have been contributed by John Aglionby of Britain's Guardian newspaper. He has been one of the few independent people to regularly visit Aceh throughout the year to report on reconstruction and on each trip monitored developments in Nusa. Chapter 1 Rebuilding Homes And Communities 33 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? calculated how many houses they could offer. for wider roads, escape routes and other The result was a supply-side estimate, totaling community facilities ­ has proved complicated over new 200,000 houses. and slow processes. Using community- driven processes, negotiating with each More recently it has become apparent village what exactly they want from which that fewer new houses are needed. Since agency, also takes time and can cause delays June it has become evident that the number (as communities often change their minds). of destroyed houses is somewhat less than Hence the reconstruction of houses has been was first estimated and many have been able somewhat slower as well as more costly than to rehabilitate their houses for themselves and first estimated. are no longer IDPs. Using community driven planning processes, agencies now have a Agencies have therefore scaled back to much clearer idea of what is needed where and more realistic pledges and targets, which have made their commitments to partnering more closely reflect communities' needs. with those communities. The current commitments reported by the major agencies involved in housing stands It has also become apparent that building at about 125,000 new houses and 24,000 housesismoreexpensiveandmoredifficult repairs. This is largely based on their demand- than it first appeared. From the outset, side estimates ­ from consultative processes. communities and housing agencies expressed This still somewhat exceeds aggregate new concern that the government's ceiling of house needs (estimated at between 80,000 US$3,000/house was too low ­ especially as and 110,000)1 probably because some the construction boom started pushing up programs are faltering and communities prices of construction materials and labor, and have switched to other providers and some the price of fuel rose steeply. BRR intervened providers have reached understandings with to change the policy, permitting agencies to the BRR or district governments but not with go beyond this, while urging restraint so that individual communities. Despite such a scale- there is not undesirable competition between back in construction, this compares with past agencies to outdo one another (this voluntary average construction rates of 100,000 homes restraint has only partially worked). The per year for the entire country. To deal with current cost estimate per house on average any possible shortfall in housing BRR is now is now about US$5-6,000/house plus perhaps committed to financing up to 40,000 houses US$2,000 for infrastructure and other costs. in Aceh and Nias out of its own resources Furthermore, various logistical and practical constraints also soon became PROGRESS WITH THE HOUSING apparent. These include acquiring PROGRAM sustainably produced and legal timber, good quality cement, bricks and steel, gravel, other There was a slow start but the program material needs and adequate labor. Access is now accelerating. Although the overall to remote areas outside of Banda Aceh and housing program got off to a slow start ­ other city centers is difficult, and thus costly in largely due to the logistical and policy reasons terms of transportation of building materials. described in this chapter ­ it has accelerated In many areas, site preparation ­ preparing and there are now good prospects that this for water supply and sanitation, and arranging faster pace will be sustained. By the end 34 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version of September a BRR survey of housing houses had been built or were in progress, of progress, as reported by sub-district officials which 6,000 were occupied. This means that in consultation with village heads, indicated the BRR target of 60,000 new houses by the that about 9,500 permanent and temporary end of June 2006 can be reached, and the houses had been built. A similar survey in ultimate aim of completing the re-housing by November found that more than 29,000 the middle of 2007 is certainly attainable. This Map 1.2 Housing Needs and Progress of Reconstruction. SABANG (KOTA) BANDA ACEH (KOTA) ACEH BESAR LHOKSUMAWE (KOTA) PIDIE BIREUEN ACEH UTARA ACEH JAYA BENER MERIAH ACEH TIMURLANGSA (KOTA) ACEH TENGAH ACEH BARAT ACEH TAMIANG NAGAN RAYA GAYO LUES Houses Needed per Thousand Population ACEH BARAT DAYA Source: BRR Geographical Survey & SPAN 2005 Above 220 90 to 220 60 to 90 30 to 60 Below 30 ACEH TENGGARA No damage ACEH SELATAN Housing Reconstruction Status Source: BRR Geographical Survey 18,000 SIMEULUE Commited ACEH SINGKIL In progress and completed Occupied Soucre: SPAN 2005 Source: BRR/World Bank staff estimates Chapter 1 Rebuilding Homes And Communities 35 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? will require, however, a huge ongoing effort. Although more than 100 agencies are involved It would entail building about 75,000 houses in housing it is likely that the largest 15 will in Aceh/Nias during 2006, which is more than account for over 80 percent of houses built. the formal housing output of the whole country But it is also apparent that the smaller agencies in an average year are building faster at these early stages and will Table 1.2 Pledges and Progress by NGO/Donor Donor/NGO Committed New Houses Repairs Finished by 12/31/26 Finished by 6/30/06 Red Cross/Crescent Movement 34,000 1,500 4,000 Multi Donor Fund 6,000 18,000 50 4,000 ADB 11,000 5,000 0 3,621 CRS 6,000 300 4,000 IOM 8-20,000 3,800 6,632 KfW/GTZ 4,500 975 30 2,500 CARE 6,500 150 Unknown Habitat for Humanity 7,500 1,600 7,000 World Vision 4,066 200 2,000 Oxfam 2,100 700 1,900 Samaritan Purse 2,500 400 Unknown UN Habitat 4,745 530 3,000 UNHCR 2,622 10-50 Unknown Save the Children 4,000 423 Unknown Others 24,200 Unknown Unknown TOTAL >130,000 23,000 Source: BRR Housing Sector data collected directly from NGOs and donors account for more than half of the permanent local level. BRR needs considerable support houses completed one year after the tsunami. to serve this coordination role and various With so many agencies involved, coordination agencies (including UN Habitat and the World has been a major challenge. The UN has Bank) have provided such help. convened the Shelter Working Group which has been useful for disseminating information Some areas are better served than others; and revising estimates of needs and progress, but now BRR is evolving an overall planning but because so many donors and NGOs are framework to ensure all communities are involved it has often not been able to give the covered. It is clear that areas close to Banda BRR and provincial government clear policy Aceh and that are easier to reach by road are advice on the major bottlenecks. Hence the getting more attention. Hence almost three BRR has convened a Policy Advisory Group quarters of the houses completed in 2005 will of the larger agencies for this purpose and either be in the Banda Aceh and Aceh Besar has encouraged stronger coordination at the area or on the east coast near the Medan 36 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version road. Meanwhile very few houses will be areas around Banda Aceh and Meulaboh but built in the more inaccessible regions of the leave significant gaps in Nias (7,000 houses), west coast or the islands. Agency planned Simeulue (4,000) and in South-west Aceh. programs similarly attend well to the needs of BRR is now charting carefully where gaps and Box 1.2 Difficult Trade-offs in Housing Construction There are a number of trade-offs that the BRR and all housing agencies have to grapple with. Some have already been discussed ­ such as the trade off between using time and resources for temporary housing or putting all available resources into building permanent houses as rapidly as possible. Other trade-offs include: · The trade-off between speed and quality. Agencies are understandably being urged to speed up their pro- grams wherever practicable. This can lead to a tendency to cut corners or resort to house designs that use readily available and perhaps inferior quality materials. · The trade-off between speed and equity. Moving forward as fast as possible may lead to the difficult geo- graphic regions or the difficult-to-serve population groups (such as those who rented homes and widows) being put to one side while agencies concentrate on the "low hanging fruit". · The trade-off between speed and cost and sustainability. The urge to build rapidly and cheaply may lead some agencies to think less about their programs' environmental footprint. In particular, some agencies are deter- mined only to use timber that they can prove comes from environmentally sustainable forestry schemes. Since there are few such reliable sources in Indonesia, this can mean importing timber, which is both time consuming and costly. · The trade-off between using local versus imported labor. The construction boom is leading to a rapid escala- tion of wages and hence some agencies are keen to bring in contractors plus crews from outside Aceh and Nias. There is also not an adequate supply of skilled labor locally, and so using outside workers can avoid the need for time-consuming and expensive training. On the other hand, using local labor provides livelihood to IDPs and others who have suffered greatly and training programs can impart skills needed later. And using outside labor could possibly create cultural problems and jealousies. · The trade-off between uniform design and local choice. The fastest and most cost efficient approach is to have a few house designs that are built on great scale. However this strips people of the opportunity to make their own choices and risks producing communities of depressing uniformity. slow progress is occurring and is negotiating will become more serious as construction program shifts amongst the major agencies to accelerates. The BRR has reversed an earlier ensure geographic equity and reduce delays. policy of the Ministry of Forestry that required all timber needs to be met domestically, and ISSUES WITH THE HOUSING PROGRAM now UNHCR has been able to import all the IN THE COMING YEAR timber needs for housing in Nias, and the British Red Cross is importing sustainable There are problems in the supply chain timber from New Zealand. for building materials needed and in labor. Timber is the most difficult product Building houses is not enough; they but there are also local shortages of bricks, need to be provided with services and gravel and other materials. These constraints infrastructure. Some agencies are building Chapter 1 Rebuilding Homes And Communities 37 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? housing without the associated infrastructure especially where the repairs are extensive. and basic services including water supply, Few programs have yet started in this area drainage, sanitation, power and lighting, and some donors, including the ADB and roads, and solid waste disposal. Sometimes Multi-Donor Fund are considering reorienting the community-based approach does not lead to their programs in this direction. these needs being properly addressed. BRR and donors are now working together to inject a spatial planning Concerns of quality and equity have approach that gives due attention to these needs and become more prominent. There is mounting coordinates progress on all fronts. This will require the concern regarding the varying quality of contracting of experienced engineering firms to housing provided by various donors. A UN assist local government plan and implement Habitat study indicates, for example, that these programs. the unit price of houses currently varies from US$2,500 to US$11,000 with an average unit Those who rented have had insufficient price of about US$5,000. The juxtaposition of help to date and need help to acquire land. housing of varying quality in neighborhoods is It has been estimated that up to as many as creating jealousy among communities. This 30,000 IDP families rented their homes. While has lead to delays as villagers consider other NGOs and donors are prepared to offer them options to the one they have been given, houses, few are prepared to acquire the land notwithstanding their written commitment with for this and at present the renters would have a particular donor. to do so. While this may be feasible in rural areas, the bulk of renters were urban and The role of local government needs to most would not be able to afford the land be clarified. To date, local government needed. BRR has not yet established a policy involvement in reconstruction has been regarding this group, though one is under secondary, with BRR taking the major role active discussion. working with NGOs and donors. Initially this was understandable as local government staff Many IDPs may not want to have a and facilities were decimated. Now, local new house, but would prefer cash governments are rebuilding, and should be compensation or help to set up a included more fully in the decision-making, business. A high proportion of IDP families in planning, monitoring, supervision, and Aceh are single-person families. Many are still evaluation of reconstruction efforts. This is a traumatized, after having lost all their family priority objective of BRR. members, and may prefer to set up a new life elsewhere. Some may remarry or move in with adult children. At present there are no LAND AND clear policies or schemes to attend to these groups. PROPERTY RIGHTS Programs to help with house-repairs have got off to a slow start and must The earthquakes and tsunami caused now be accelerated. Approximately 95,000 significant damage or destruction to houses in Aceh and Nias require repairs or property on extensive tracts of land. While rehabilitation. While most may be taken care in some areas the land will be rehabilitated, of by the owners directly, many will need help, 38 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version in many areas the land is now permanently on their original locations, there is a need for submerged, flooded or washed away into a substantial number of households to move the sea. These land parcels will never be to facilitate improved community planning and habitable or productive again, and occupants preparation ­ with wider roads and escape will need to relocate. Much farm land was routes--for future hazard events. washed away or damaged by debris and salt water. Even where communities can rebuild Damage to the land administration system is affecting both the re-establishment of Table 1.3 Damage to Property Rights and the Land Administration System Quantification of Damage Loss of BPN staff · 40 BPN staff in Aceh Province, 30% of staff in Kota Banda Aceh. Offices and equipment: · 6 BPN Land Offices destroyed or severely damaged including Banda Aceh District Office completely demol- ished. · Destruction of office and survey equipment, including computers, to support urgent record recovery. Damage to Government land books (the official register of land): · 10% of land books lost. · Remaining 90% needing urgent conservation and restoration work Destruction of official land documents · 80% of land documents lost, including almost all cadastral maps. Damage and disappearance of property rights evidence: · Destruction of much of the physical evidence of property boundaries and witness evidence held in the minds of those who perished. 300,000 land parcels affected · 170,000 urban and 130,000 rural including 549 parcels on Nias affected by the tsunami · 60,000 (40,000 urban and 20,000 rural) and 240,000 non-registered Land Parcels: · 5% of titled land parcels were mortgaged, with mortgages registered by BPN In Nias, land demarcations were also reconstruction efforts, as well as advancing destroyed in areas of complete collapse, the social, economic, and cultural rights of such as in the center of towns. Many affected families and individuals. It is also owners' records and files were destroyed. essential to the development of infrastructure, Moreover, the level of land registration was including the realignment of roads, recovery of extremely low before the disaster, hampering the commercial sector, and efforts to address the ability of many owners to find collateral for coastal zone development. A fervent effort rebuilding their businesses and livelihoods. is needed to deal with land ownership, so Fortunately, BPN did not lose any land records that communities can get on with rebuilding in Nias. Duplicates can be issued, but re- in a safer way, with the assurance that their surveying the parcels will be required. rights are protected. Particular attention is necessary regarding regulations on Protecting land and property rights will registration, ownership, and inheritance for provide firm legal ground for the long-term women, children, and minorities. Chapter 1 Rebuilding Homes And Communities 39 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? RECONSTRUCTING THE LAND ADMINISTRATION SYSTEM Reconstruction of Aceh Land Administration (RALAS) project aims to The first step is to determine ensure that community-led processes are unambiguously who possessed what conducted to a standard that will have land before the disasters, whether a strong legal basis for future titling by or not they held registered title. The landowners. It also supports the rehabilitation approach used by many donors is to help of the land administration system and provides people to prepare maps of their communities a framework for clarifying property rights. It showing where properties were, what type of is implemented under the direction of BPN, properties they were, who lived in them and and funded by a US$28.5 million Multi-Donor how much damage they sustained. This is Fund Grant. Through RALAS, BPN is aiming known as community land mapping. The to ensure that community-led processes process involves: (i) the preparation of a are conducted to a standard that will have village inventory of land owners or heirs; (ii), a strong legal basis for future titling by the placement of boundary markers to identify landowners. The project secures community land parcel boundary corners, by agreement agreement on ownership rights by harnessing between adjoining owners; (iii) the preparation the involvement of existing community of rough sketches of the land parcels; and development workers (from NGOs, donors, (iv) the signed agreement of the community and the government KDP and UPP programs) on the acceptance of each of these outputs. and links them into BPN as the agency with This isn't straightforward because many the legal authority to issue formally recognized communities are in such disarray that there land title. The project also includes provisions remains little or no visible evidence of property to secure transparency and accountability in boundary markings. The death toll took response to concerns over potential corruption with it the "human archive" on which much and mismanagement. RALAS does not cover memory of the location of these boundaries is all land-related issues, such as resettlement, based. Furthermore, the losses sustained by land acquisition, eviction, land speculation or the provincial and district offices of the BPN, compensation. These important issues are both in terms of destroyed land records, lost being addressed by BRR separately. cadastral maps, and the loss of life of land administration specialists, have made the reconstruction task even more daunting. The early, well-intentioned community land mapping efforts were undertaken using different approaches and varied in quality. It quickly became evident that there was a need to standardize these efforts, so that ultimately the "evidence" of community land mapping could be formally processed by BPN, and that legal titles could be issued following the necessary adjudication, legal land survey and public advertising. Only BPN has the legal authority to issue titles. 40 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version Map of Ralas and Community Inven- · Australia provided some initial surveying Map 2.3 tory Activities equipment to BPN and has agreed to sup- port community land mapping in up to 400 Map of RALAS & Community Inventory Activities communities and train 100 facilitators. The Base map is from HIC Sumatra villages map · Oxfam has supported the establishment of 2005 RALAS area a partnership for RALAS, covering training, monitoring, and information dissemination. · A number of local NGO networks, including women's networks, are proposing to moni- tor the RALAS project independently. Ox- fam is also planning to support research on gender, land, and property issues in Aceh. · BPN has established a community secre- High community inventory activities tariat to engage with NGOs and CSOs in Aceh. This secretariat is now being re- shaped as an NGO/CSO forum with which BPN can regularly engage and disseminate information. · Syariah courts are working with RALAS to provide "circuit courts" in the villages, which can advise and deal with cases involving widows and under-age heirs. A number of partners are collaborating In June 2005 a Community Driven Adjudica- to restore property rights. While RALAS tion (CDA) manual was prepared, led by the supports the rehabilitation of the land admin- World Bank and Multi-Donor Fund in collabo- istration system and provides a framework for ration with the government, NGOs/CSOs and clarifying property rights there are a number of donors. BPN subsequently issued a formal important efforts underway in the land sector. decree giving the manual legal status. The BRR has also prescribed the CDA manual as · UNDP is providing support in the critical the standard approach for community land early stages for training, supplying survey- mapping to be undertaken in reconstruc- ing equipment, and support for the website tion areas. CDA training is being provided and internet communications of BPN. It is to NGOs and other agencies involved in re- supporting the training of more than 750 construction. Provided that community land CDA facilitators, and has funded the pub- mapping is completed in accordance with the lication of information brochures on RALAS legal standards prescribed by the government and property rights. in the CDA manual, communities may com- · The European Commission has provided mence constructing houses and infrastructure pre-tsunami satellite imagery (and two tech- before title is formally issued by the BPN. nical advisor missions to build BPN capac- ity in imagery processing), to support com- Land registration is expected to rapidly cover munity land mapping. This imagery is now an increasing proportion of the affected popu- available for all reconstruction projects and lation. Table 1.4 and map 1.3 summarize cur- is available through BPN. rent and anticipated progress. Chapter 1 Rebuilding Homes And Communities 41 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? Table 1.4 Progress in Land Mapping and Restoring Property Rights No. of adjudication teams (20 personnel per team) 10 No. of NGO facilitators/BPN personnel trained in CDA 400/200 No. of villages where community land mapping has commenced 215 No. of villages where community land mapping has been completed# 80 No. of land parcels completed community land mapping# 50,000-80,000 No. of land parcels publicly notified# 30,000 No. of land parcels for which legal title will be issued by end 2005 5,000 # Estimated outputs for December 26, 2005 as provided by BPN November 2005. LAND ISSUES IN THE COMING YEAR the district government paid this compensation so that the communities could move Clarity is needed on options and procedures for helping communities that Guidance is also urgently needed on land need to relocate to new settlement sites2. consolidation and re-allocation. Some The Government of Indonesia has estimated communities will need to re-design their that at least 30,000 families require some villages for several reasons due to incursion form of relocation, and that between 15,000 of the ocean and the desire to reconfigure the and 50,000 hectares of land are submerged village plan to increase preparedness against or uninhabitable. It is estimated that at least future natural disasters and or to also improve 700 to 1500 hectares of land will be required community amenity. This process may require for relocation to support housing alone. While land consolidation and/or land re-allocation the district-level authorities are in the process affecting many families. Some communities of allocating state land for relocation sites, are moving in this direction before they have many of these sites are far away from original legally re-established property rights, raising neighborhoods and resource bases, and the risk of long-term land disputes and social therefore, many people are reluctant to move. problems from disenfranchised land owners or Much state land also needs clearing and heirs. BRR has prepared a draft policy on land leveling before being ready for construction, resettlement, and it is imperative that officials which will require large amounts of resources work with NGOs to prioritize community land and time. To respond to this gap, a land mapping programs for those areas most acquisition policy is currently being drafted likely in need of reallocation or consolidation by BRR. A special unit will be established at programs. the BRR to coordinate, ensure funds for and monitor land acquisition for communities In order to speed implementation, it is in need of relocation. Some NGOs have essential there is two-way communication advocacy programs to help communities between implementing agencies and BPN acquire and negotiate the land they need. For to ensure that community-land mapping efforts example, Oxfam helped two villages in Aceh are coordinated, to enable BPN to manage Besar locate land, negotiate a fair price with its forward planning of adjudication. People the owners and facilitate the process by which overwhelmingly desire to start rebuilding their 42 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version houses and communities and will inevitably well as several communities who are facing begin before BPN is fully operational. While legal complications over the land acquisition BPN will not prevent anyone from building on procedure. It is important that these issues do their land, it strongly prefers that community not drive desperate communities into cycles land mapping, in accordance with the CDA of debt and hardship. BRR has prepared a manual, should be first completed in order draft policy on land speculation. to minimize the risk to property rights in future registration exercises. This is seen as Evictions from land. There have already providing communities and individual property been some reports of evictions. For owners with a high degree of confidence that example, on November 15 a landowner in they are building on the right land parcel and Aceh Besar evicted 725 IDPs originating from well within the boundaries of that parcel. Aceh Jaya from private land (a sawmill site) that they had occupied since February 2005. Protection of the rights of orphans, widows These people moved to a new site on state and other heirs. The CDA will help to ensure land. An NGO has advised that at least one the property rights of vulnerable groups are community in Aceh Barat faces eviction. protected. Registration will only occur if there is clear community agreement and no dispute, A report by local media on November 25, backed up by checks on records (including 2005, advised that some 500 IDPs in Desa tax) and pre-tsunami satellite imagery. BPN Reusak, Kecamatan Samatiga, were given an will only adjudicate and survey those land ultimatum to move by the private landowner parcels which are not in dispute after CDA upon whose land the community has been is completed. While this may delay the final living on since early 2005. These IDPs, many decision, BPN is determined to ensure fairness. who are landless, are awaiting resettlement to Training of the Syariah courts is underway to a new site, which the government has allocated provide "circuit courts" in the villages, where for the community. This land acquisition they can advise and deal with cases involving and resettlement process is facing many widows and under-age heirs. bottlenecks, such as insufficient funds, land clearing, and coordination between various Land speculation: Soon after the tsunami government authorities and implementation struck, BPN issued a decree prohibiting the agencies. transfer (sale) of land as an attempt to protect the vulnerable tsunami victims from being Recovery of damaged land records: pressured into hasty transfers, at a time when Japan is funding the recovery of damaged they were struggling with grief, loss, injury and documents. Approximately 15 tons of illness. Requirements for land purchasing to documents were transported to Jakarta by support resettlement have resulted in inflated three TNI (military) Hercules flights in March requests for land purchasing by bupatis being 2005. Since that time the documents have submitted to BRR, and deforestation is alleged been stored at -40o Celsius. Document to have led to the illegal sale of harvested recovery will be used to support the resolution timber. There is evidence that there is an of any land disputes that may arise over increase in speculative activity as landowners previously titled lands. and third parties anticipate the need to purchase or rent new land for relocation, as Chapter 1 Rebuilding Homes And Communities 43 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? Box 1.3 Learning from the People of Lamjabat Land mapping depends on participation of residents to ensure a smooth process and make certain that nobody is disadvantaged, for example, if heirs lack information on ownership or boundaries of the land they inherit. In the village of Lamjabat, Banda Aceh, most right of land ownership is under customary law with land being inherited from one generation to another, though some heirs are now residing outside Aceh. The acting leader of Lamjabat's community, Ir Asbar, explained that the initiative of the community to conduct land mapping on their own was born out of a desire to rebuild the village. "In the wake of the tsunami our community went into a turmoil. Some stayed temporarily with people in Geuceu, some stayed in other villages. Then we got together and though about our future," said Asbar, a lecturer with the University of Syiah Kuala, Darussalam, Banda Aceh. Two months after the tsunami the people of Lamjabat, whom survived and were displaced to other villages, agreed together to start to return to the village to clean up their homes. "We asked Zamzami A Manaf to conduct the mapping. He works with the Public Works and is native to Lamjabat. He did the mapping with full participation of the surviving community members," he said, adding that from 1,500 people only 240 survived. He explained that the community did the land mapping themselves in order to encourage BRR and other agencies to start rebuilding their village immediately. In October they were receiving 55 homes from IOM, built on loaned land of residents. The sub-district head of Meuraxa, Tarmizi Yahya, confirmed Asbar's statements. According to him, people in Lamjabat conduct their own surveys and mappings, and even resolve disputes on the ground by themselves. "In fact, they are willing to give up some of their land for public interest; for moats, road widening. They are making sacrifices," said Tarmizi. Source: BRR tragic events killed countless religious and COMMUNITIES LEADING community leaders, social workers, teachers, THEIR OWN RECOVERY and organizers of civil society. Splitting up the homeless into tented camps, host A central feature of the reconstruction communities and barracks further eroded effort in Indonesia has been the way in community cohesion. Just when it was most which communities have come together urgently needed, the capacity of communities to determine their needs and priorities and to come together, comfort each other, seek to assert leadership of their own recovery. mutual support in the rebuilding of lives and In most areas, communities are firmly in the create visions for a better future was badly driving seat and this could serve as model for battered. disaster response everywhere. Aceh has a rich tradition of associations, This has not been easy as the tsunami ranging from faith-related and community- and earthquakes destroyed not only based organizations (e.g. Panglima people, homes and infrastructure but Laut­ the association of fishermen, savings also damaged community structures. The clubs, village development associations 44 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version and funeral societies) to semi-government of the impacted villages and about half of structures, based on elected neighborhood these remain displaced from their homes. Yet and community representatives. This sense the situation is highly localized and hence the of community and relatively high levels of most effective response uses local knowledge education have been sources of strength in and leadership. In early 2005, donors and the emergency response. NGOs collaborated to prepare an operational framework3 designed to encourage all Relief agencies quickly found community agencies to commit to high standards of leaders and structures they could work consultation, participation, transparency and with, and where leaders had been killed, coordination. new, informal ones swiftly emerged. While many government units were in disarray, TRADE-OFFS AND COSTS OF community leaders helped with information- PARTICIPATION gathering, re-uniting separated families, and spreading information about available help. Effective participation, however, takes They also gave a coherent message of needs time and necessitates facilitators working to the many organizations that arrived to assist with the communities to guide them in with recovery and reconstruction. these processes. This inevitably leads to a difficult trade-off between wanting swift Community participation, coupled with reconstruction and ensuring that communities the quick emergency response, ensured, truly are leading the effort, with all members of within a short period of time, that almost the community having a voice in reconstruction. everyone had at least basic shelter, that There is a parallel trade-off between wanting few became seriously hungry and that to deliver results and building capacity of local there were no unchecked epidemics. people and institutions. These trade-offs are This convinced the government of Indonesia limiting the pace of community reconstruction and the donor community to make a firm today but hopefully enhancing its sustainability. commitment to using and trusting community- For example, community decision-making driven development (CDD) approaches. in many villages has emphasized employing IDPs as much as possible, rather than outside COMMITMENT TO COMMUNITY-DRIVEN labor. Some NGOs have scaled back the RECONSTRUCTION pace of their housing programs to include training local people in carpentry and other There is a growing conviction that the skills. The fastest way to build a house might best way of addressing smaller, local be to bring in a construction firm, complete infrastructure and household needs is to with their own crews, from outside Aceh, but empower and resource citizens, allowing many communities are voicing a preference to them to prioritize needs and take care of build their own homes. themselves through CDD. One argument for this approach is the widespread nature of Understandably, with the large number the devastation. Over 850 villages in 86 sub- of agencies who see themselves as CDD districts of Aceh and 22 sub-districts of Nias practitioners, approaches and standards were damaged. On average, 130 families vary greatly. This has led to inconsistencies were affected, or 2/3 of the population of each and duplication ­ sometimes with communities Chapter 1 Rebuilding Homes And Communities 45 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? voicing frustration that multiple NGOs arrive, CDD approaches generally lead to more each wanting to practice participatory holistic, integrated, development plans planning and sometimes urging villages to than a top-down, donor designed program. give them "exclusive rights" and tell other The donor might have a particular interest, but NGOs to go elsewhere. Communities often a participatory project reflects trade-offs and voice frustration at the time they are expected compromises between multiple priorities. This to put into meetings with all the NGOs. can result in projects that are spread rather thin, and that are complex ­ but the positive Conversely, some NGOs and donors are side of this is that they are truly owned and frustrated about the fickleness that CDD therefore strongly supported by the bulk of can lead to, and the lengthy processes of the community. At the time of great stress, data collection and assessments. They however, it is not so easy for the community may spend a great deal of time planning a to sustain its enthusiasm for such integrated program with a village, only to find later when projects. People thirst for quick action to they arrive to do the work that the village has resolve livelihood-threatening issues. Some changed its mind and agreed programs with NGOs, such as IRC-CARDI, have resolved other organizations. This is most likely to this through staggering their support. In the occur when only community leaders, rather first months after the tsunami they offered than the whole community, are involved in the support for "quick impact projects", tackling a decisions. defined range of needs as determined by the community. Over time, they offered Integrated Informal, inclusive processes can also Community Development project covering a blur decision-making. A well-run, well- much wider range of activities, and based on a attended village meeting can give a visiting careful community mapping and participatory NGO a clear account of what is wanted. It prioritization process. is human nature at the close for the NGO leaders to tell the community how impressed Aceh and Nias are demonstrating a they were and how they will do what they can particular dilemma in using CDD at times to help. This is meant sincerely; the NGO is of disaster response; namely how and doing what it can to help tsunami victims. But when to replace private versus communal it can be interpreted literally as a promise to assets. Community meetings tend to forge help that village. If the NGO finally decides agreement on rehabilitating or replacing it cannot stretch its resources to include it, community assets ­ the schools, clinics, the community feels betrayed. It has become roads, bridges etc. Seasoned community- increasingly common for villages to voice development workers tend to steer people frustration and even anger towards donors in this direction. In normal times this makes as a result. Sometimes it is well justified; good sense and minimizes the conflicts that certainly many agencies have promised a arise when some in the village benefit from a great deal and not followed up. This may project but others do not. However in Aceh be easing now, especially where sub-district and Nias today, people are overwhelmingly coordination processes clarify who is running preoccupied about their personal losses ­ what program, but there are incidences of their houses, boats, land or businesses. CDD demonstrations against donors. programs in Aceh and Nias are therefore giving more attention to private assets than would be the norm for CDD programs. 46 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version SOME LEADING COMMUNITY the block grants to the villages, enabling quick DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS high return investments. CIDA, AUSAID, EU and DFID are also financing the programs. The most widespread CDD program in Aceh prior to the tsunami was the Many other organizations have also Kecamatan Development Project (KDP), provided grant support for CDD. This a government program financed by the World includes US$11 million from International Relief Bank in which a participatory, sub-district level and Development to support the creation of process awards block grants to villages to meet elected Community Empowerment Groups in the infrastructure, basic services or livelihood 22 villages. These assist displaced people to needs they have prioritized. Immediately after return to their villages, agree priorities for re- the earthquakes, the KDP was expanded from starting their communities, and advocate these 87 sub-districts in Aceh and 13 in Nias to all to local government. Other CDD programs 220 and 22 rural sub-districts, respectively. include a Save the Children program which This network of CDD professionals (now concentrates on ensuring that not only are numbering 600, working with over 35,000 children's issues included in village planning, village facilitators in over 6000 villages) has but also that youth and children have the proved extremely valuable in helping tsunami- chance to take part in village discussions. affected communities plan their responses. In Pekka ­ an national association of widows addition, information facilitators have recently ­ has developed an impressive program been appointed in district offices, in particular to providing support, including new houses, to help camats coordinate reconstruction efforts their members. Oxfam is concentrating its and improve the two-way flow of information CDD activities on working with and building about reconstruction needs, programs, gaps up the capacity of Acehnese NGOs (of and community preferences. which they have 63 partners so far). USAID is providing US$20 million for a program of The Urban Poverty Project (UPP) is a Peaceful Democratization and Community- parallel CDD project for urban areas Based Recovery in more than 50 villages, and and in addition includes the election by the the International Federation of the Red Cross community of a board of trustees to represent is providing US$23 million for a CDD program it in the decision-making processes and that combines recovery with "integrated provide oversight of the ensuing programs. It community-based risk reduction". is now operational in Banda Aceh, employing Many donors are also financing the 50 facilitators, and is expanding to cover 352 rehabilitation and rebuilding of community urban parishes. buildings including meeting places, mosques and other religious buildings. Many NGOs The KDP and UPP facilitators have helped and donors have helped communities prepare communities prepare maps showing the maps showing the extent of damage they extent of damage in each village and plan experienced. The Multi-Donor Fund, USAID priority rehabilitation and repair programs. and others have helped strengthen this process KDP has so far this year built or rehabilitated into a formal community land mapping and 145 km of roads, 79 bridges, 187 irrigation adjudication process as a necessary precursor or drainage canals, 14 schools, and four to establishing who owned what land and is clinics. The Multi Donor Fund is financing the entitled to what compensation. expansion of the KDP and UPP programs and Chapter 1 Rebuilding Homes And Communities 47 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? Today's reconstruction efforts also offer another opportunity. The relative isolation of Aceh and Nias, and the long-running conflict mean that civil society is less developed than in other provinces. The pause in the conflict, coupled with the presence of large numbers of highly-experienced NGO leaders from many different countries, offers the chance to build local civil society capacity, for example through training and mentoring programs, resource centers and network building. The Multi Donor Fund is planning to finance such a program through UNDP which is intended to enhance the contribution of Acehnese civil society to the recovery, including by strengthening its roles in monitoring, combating corruption, and helping citizens voice concerns and grievances. 48 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version NOTES 1Shelter Working Group estimate 82,000 new houses are required based on the IOM damage assessment with adjustments for numbers of survivors; BRR survey in November identified 111,000 new houses required based on each Camat capturing housing requirements from displaced people in his sub-district 2This refers to those whose land is now submerged, unsafe, and those who were renting land/ houses 3"Common Operating Principles and Guidelines for Tsunami Reconstruction", included as an Annex to the World Bank Board paper, Indonesia: Proposed Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Aceh and North Sumatra, April 4, 2005, R2005-0074 Chapter 1 Rebuilding Homes And Communities 49 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? 50 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Part I ONE YEAR AFTER - WHERE DO WE STAND? Chapter 2 REBUILDING LIVELIHOODS Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? After basic needs, such as food, water higher than original estimates. In many loca- and shelter4 survivors of the disasters tions, salt will remain trapped in poorly drained see the restoration of their livelihoods areas and will be a chronic problem until the as their most important need. Restoring land is rehabilitated through a combination of livelihoods and the real economy is a criti- tillage, leaching and drainage. The cost of the cal element of the recovery process. It not rehabilitation of 17,500 ha of heavily impacted only moves victims from dependence on aid paddy fields was estimated preliminarily at to self-sufficiency, but also has the important more than $25 million to return production to psychological impact of returning to people previous levels. For many sites, rehabilitation the ability to control their daily activities. Fish- may not be economically viable, and a change eries, agriculture, and small enterprises, three in land use may be a better option. About of Aceh's key driving economic forces prior to 10,000 ha of moderately damaged land will the tsunami, were the sectors most heavily af- also require significant investment to reha- fected by the disaster. bilitate. Recent studies suggest that the real costs could be as high as US$65 million. The transition from relief to reconstruction requires careful monitoring of livelihoods Agencies must recognize that restoring to ensure that those in need receive sus- livelihoods is more than rebuilding physi- tained support. Cash-for-work programs, cal assets. While the replacement of assets financed by many donors and NGOs, have such as boats, ponds and hatcheries, has re- played an important role in supporting liveli- ceived much attention, the challenge is to pro- hoods and revitalizing the economy. However, vide comprehensive livelihood support for sus- many of these programs are being phased out, tainable recovery of the affected communities. as housing construction picks up and other Clearing land or building a new boat is only employment activities are launched. Until ad- the first step. A livelihoods approach should equate employment opportunities are avail- be a core driver of the recovery process, but able, some will need continued assistance. capacity to deliver effective livelihood-based support is deficient. With the necessary skills Information on the impacts of the disas- mix, the opportunity exists to rehabilitate live- ters on livelihoods is still emerging, revis- lihoods in line with the changing social and ing damage estimates up and down in dif- economic background of Aceh and Nias. ferent sectors. A preliminary assessment in January estimated the total damage and loss The economy of Aceh and Nias was al- to the productive sectors at close to US$1 bil- ready declining prior to the tsunami and lion5, (attributing US$511 million damage in earthquakes. During the years prior to the fisheries, US$225 million in agriculture, and tsunami there had been a significant shift in US$218 million in the enterprise sectors). As the workforce back to the agriculture and fish- more information becomes available, it seems eries sectors as urban and service-based in- that in some cases, damage and losses may dustries declined. The restoration of previous be lower. For example, it was initially estimated livelihoods should take place with an under- that 5000-7500 hectares of land were perma- standing of current and future needs and re- nently lost ­ about US$40 million in value ­ but source base. Over the next three to five years an FAO assessment in April suggested that there will be significant growth, driven largely the area is more likely to be 2900 hectares6. by the construction sector. However, if the However, in some areas, recovery costs will be 52 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version underlying factors that caused the economy coastal fish ponds and fisheries infrastructure. to decline over the previous three years are In other areas, newly uplifted and exposed es- not addressed, there will be a significant im- tuary and seashore provide ample opportunity pact once resources allocated to reconstruc- for foresting with mangroves, casuarinas and tion start to decline. others, either to improve the environment, en- hance fisheries habitats, or provide the basis FISHERIES AND for small-scale forestry enterprises. AGRICULTURE Agricultural land suffered serious seawa- ter inundation, marine deposits and other The fishing industry (including aquacul- damage. Farmers in the affected areas lost ture) was the most severely affected of their standing crops and livestock and will all economic sectors, with damage and continue to incur losses in the longer-term losses estimated at US$511 million. Two due to sediment deposits and increased salin- thirds of all boats were damaged, destroyed or ity. In many cases salinity will be overcome lost, and more than a quarter of ports, harbors naturally through irrigation and precipitation. and landing sites rendered inoperable. There Damage to irrigation and drainage infrastruc- has been a reduction in fish supply to local ture is widespread and will require consider- and export markets - particularly in the case able clearing and rehabilitation. Technical of cultured shrimp for which Aceh was a lead- assistance is needed for the rehabilitation of ing producer. Large areas of land and tam- small community-based systems, and exten- baks (fish ponds) have also been eroded. The sion workers need to be trained to facilitate availability of safe harbors is a high priority for the process. many owners of larger vessels. Estuaries and river entrances have become shallow, making The tsunami also damaged 28,000 ha of access to landing places more difficult and plantations, a major part of the Achenese dangerous. While much of the eroded ma- economy. Oil palm and rubber estates were terial was carried out to sea, much was also particularly affected. Coffee estate crops in the deposited in estuaries, together with building Aceh highlands were already heavily impacted materials and uprooted trees. While some by the conflict, with more than 250,000 ha of estuaries and river entrances may ultimately smallholder estate crops left idle. A compre- stabilize through natural outflow of debris and hensive strategy to revitalize the whole planta- sediment, in other cases active intervention tion sector is required and must be integrated and regular maintenance may be necessary to into the strategy for livelihood recovery for restore navigable conditions. rural families affected by the tsunami, earth- quakes and the conflict. The disasters caused serious damage to coastal and marine environments. Man- groves in some parts of Nias are now above the high water level and are consequently dead or dying. Areas of reef have been dam- aged by the force of the tsunami or suffered uplift and died. The sinking of parts of Aceh Barat and Nagan Raya have badly affected Chapter 2 Rebuilding Livelihoods 53 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? Box 2.1 Making a Living from Agriculture in Paya Bakong Paya Bakong in North Aceh was once known as a "black zone" because of the conflict. "Before, when working in the fields, we would immediately lie down when we heard the sound of gun- shots. If we are working in the rice fields, then of course we must lie flat in the mud. Thank God, it does not hap- pen any more. We hope such conditions continue so that we can engage in livelihood activities again to support our family without feeling afraid," said Ismail, a farmer from the village of Cot Tufah and father of four children. It is also known as a centre for the production of chocolate, betel nut, turmeric and soya beans. Rambutan and durian fruits from Paya Bakong are famous throughout North Aceh and the neighbouring areas for their sweet taste. According to Muhammad Dahlan (36), the population of Cot Tufah consists of 60 families or around 230 persons. Almost all the citizens are dependent on the agricultural sector. "On average, the villagers own chocolate fields, but I don't remember how many. But clearly everyone here has a field," he said. Now that there is peace, the villagers are beginning to work the fields once more. Unfortunately, at the time when the villagers have high spirits again, the prices of agricultural products have declined. "The price of dry chocolate is now only Rp. 7,000 per kilogram. Before, it was Rp. 12,000. The wet chocolate (chocolate bean) is even only Rp. 3,500." said Ismail Besides the prices, the increase in living costs is another problem. Production cost, such as expenditure for fertilizer, is more expensive now. "Transporting the agricultural products from the village is very expensive. Going to the city of Matangkuli and back by RBT (motorcycle taxi) costs Rp. 30,000," said Dahlan. Transportation is indeed expensive in Cot Tufah and other villages in Paya Bakong. To buy necessities and sell their agricultural products in Matangkuli, they must travel 15 kilometers on roads that are becoming more and more damaged by the day. Both Ismail and Dahlan hope that the government will repair the roads as soon as possible to help them access markets. Source: BRR LIVELIHOODS RECONSTRUCTION PRO- GRAM There has been a major effort to replace lost small vessels but quality, safety and Restoring fishing port infrastructure is a sustainability are major concerns. To high priority. Vessels which used to be able date, about 1,800 boats have been replaced to unload their catches at small ports now and rebuilt, while about 2350 others are be- often have to ferry their catches, crew, and ing constructed or have been pledged. This materials more than a kilometer to shore us- supply will meet over 80 percent of the total ing small boats. Other ships are floating their need. Some boats are unsuitable in size, de- catches to the beach in plastic boxes. Almost sign and durability. In many cases, fishermen all landing places are expected to be rebuilt in were not consulted first and sometimes those the next one to two years. 54 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version totally lost. Figure 2.1 Boats Damaged/Lost and Supply 8000 Work has started in limited areas on re- 7000 habilitation of mangroves and protective 6000 green belts, and further investment will 5000 be required to restore damaged coastal eco- 4000 4,717 systems, particularly on the highly degraded 1,045 4,167 3000 west coast. Additional work is planned, partly 1,307 in association with aquaculture rehabilitation, 2000 to create buffer zones between the ponds and 1000 1,815 the sea. Investments in coastal ecosystem 0 Boats Replaced/ Boats Under Boats Damaged Boats Pledged Total Supply rehabilitation have been marred by poor plan- Repaired Construction ning and implementation. Close cooperation Source: processed from FAO-Panglima Laut and Konsorsium Aceh between the fisheries and forestry sectors will Nias Bangkit-Panglima Laut database be essential. ADB is supporting coastal plan- ning, and building mangrove and coral reha- that were, were ignored. FAO has trained boat bilitation programs into its investments in the builders and has introduced design modifica- rehabilitation of the fisheries sector. tions and improvements for local vessel types which should result in better construction Eleven-thousand hectares (over 55 per- standards and longer boat life. While smaller cent) of paddy rice areas have been vessels have largely been replaced, the own- cleared of debris, over 25 percent of which ers, skippers and crew of larger vessels remain had returned to production. However, 86 unemployed. Several agencies are planning to percent of the land rehabilitated still requires assist with the construction of larger vessels, drainage, irrigation channels reconstruction many of which will fish further offshore and and repair and farm roads. In Aceh Barat, thus reduce pressure on coastal fish stocks. Aceh Jaya and Nagan Raya over 70 percent In the west coast islands of Nias, Simeulue of paddy land has not been supplied with land and the Banyak islands, nearly one year after clearing, seed, equipment and fertilizer neces- the tsunami disaster, the poorest fishermen sary for productive farming. are still awaiting replacement of small boats for simple subsistence fishing. More than 40,000 farmers have returned to farming this wet season but there is Support to aquaculture has been lim- significant regional disparity in assis- ited, and largely confined to assistance tance. Assistance to the East Coast districts with cleaning of small canals and some reached over 70 percent of affected farming ponds. Around 5000 ha or 25 percent of the households. However, the picture on the West ponds are reported to be back in production, Coast is different, with less than 20 percent of although less than 10 percent are operating at affected farmers receiving sufficient support to pre-tsunami levels. Further investment in re- make a profitable return to the land7 . In Aceh habilitation of ponds, canals, and hatcheries Jaya, UNDP already supported the produc- will be essential to ensure the sustainability of tion of 325 hectares of rice and 40 hectares this important coastal economic activity. On of corn and peanut plantations. Further as- the west coast islands, pre-tsunami aquacul- sistance will assist 1,500 farming households ture operations, although limited, were almost Chapter 2 Rebuilding Livelihoods 55 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? over the next 6 months. In Aceh Besar, the increase the standing stock. In Aceh Selatan, Lampaya ginger farming community of 400 726 ha of nutmeg have been planted with new producers is restoring their industry. NGOs seedlings while 1,850 ha of maize have been are the dominant funding agencies, and will planted as an inter-crop in Aceh Besar (350 continue to provide substantial inputs in the ha) and Bireuen (1500 ha). coming year. There is a need for coordina- tion under BRR of locations and types of sup- LIVELIHOOD ISSUES FOR THE COMING port to avoid overlapping with other donor YEAR and government programs, particularly on the East Coast. Pressure to quickly restore the fisheries industry has led to an inappropriate mix Estate crops reconstruction is under- of fishing vessels and poor quality. Pro- way. Through ADB an oil palm nursery has viders have aimed to deliver as many boats as been established at Nagan Raya with 300,000 soon as possible, resulting in the delivery of seedlings ready for planting in 2000 ha in mid many low cost, smaller boats. In many cases 2006. In Aceh Besar, another nursery has been this has been achieved by minimally trained established with 3-month coconut seedlings boat builders. Lack of consultation and co- sufficient for planting 1500 ha in 5 months ordination with local fishermen, and poor time. In Bireun and Aceh Besar, 1,845 ha of quality construction, has resulted in many of old coconut groves have been rehabilitated to the delivered boats being abandoned due to their unsuitability to local conditions (box 2.2). Box 2.2 Donated Boats Can't Go Out to Sea Fishermen from the village of Lambada Lhok, Baitussalam Sub-District in Aceh Besar, were relieved to hear that the Government of Kuwait would donate 300 boats. But of the 118 boats that have arrived, none can go out to sea. These boats, with a capacity of 8 people, have very low sides unable to cope with the high waves off the coast of Aceh and the fiberglass material is not strong enough to sail the waves of the Straits of Malacca and the Indian Ocean. The chief of the Aceh Organization for Fishermen (Panglima Laut), H.T. Bustaman said he was not consulted in the production of these boats. "All were made in Makassar. We were never invited to speak," he said. The Ambas- sador of Kuwait for Indonesia, Muhammad Fadel al-Khalaf also expressed his disappointment to Tempo magazine last May. "I did not know that the seas of Aceh are different from that of Makassar," he said. In fact, there are many boat-building workshops in Aceh that can do a better job. "The carpenters here know more about the condition of the sea, the ideal design for the boats and the habits of the fishermen," said Musa, a resident of Padang Sirahet in West Aceh. The problematic boats were later reconstructed by local hands and could finally set sail. Yet they are still not ideal. Not only are they small in size compared to the typical Acehnese boats - only 8 metres by 1.5 metres, these boats also cannot produce optimum results due to a lack of fishing facilities, according to the head of the Organization for Fishermen. Source: Adapted from Ceureumen, edition 5 56 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version Figure 2.2 Distribution of Boats vs. Damaged/Lost Boats 1,000 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 Kota Kota Nagan Utara Pidie Timur Besar Selatan Jaya BaratBanda AcehLhokseumaweTamia ng Bireun Barat Daya Singkil Simeulue Sabang Raya Boats Damaged Total Boats Replaced/ Repaire d Source: Processed from output of BRR-FAO-Panglima Laut workshop on boat needs and progress, September 2005 The distribution of the boats across dis- catches. Improved fisheries management is tricts has been uneven and supply driv- required together with the re-establishment of en. Several kabupaten including Aceh Jaya, the fleet to prevent over-exploitation of fisher- Aceh Singkil and Nagan Raya have received or ies resources. will receive many more boats than needed but others such as Aceh Utara, Aceh Timur, Aceh The focus on boats has left major gaps Selatan and Aceh Tamiang have not received elsewhere in the fisheries sector. Perhaps that much attention. Banda Aceh, Aceh Besar, worse, it has not recognized the full dimen- Aceh Jaya and Pidie ­ the four districts closest sions of the sector and the livelihoods of peo- to Banda Aceh - account for 40 percent of boat ple dependant on fisheries and aquaculture. losses but have received 75 percent of all boats The issue has disproportionately distracted the distributed or repaired. Other districts such as attention of donors and government agencies Bireuen, Lhokseumawe and Simeulue still have alike. Fisheries infrastructure, re-establish- large needs but have not received much atten- ment of market chains, restoring of extension tion (figure 2.2). services, coastal environment rehabilitation and aquaculture infrastructure require a major There is a growing concern that the cur- effort and could have much more sustainable rent level of coastal fishing is unsustain- outcomes. able. At the same time there are rich stocks in deeper water. The priority should be to Extension services need to be strength- build and equip larger boats that can fish fur- ened to advise farmers how they can amelio- ther out to sea. There also needs to be more rate soil constraints. Strategies to address soil emphasis on fish processing and ice plants, salinity issues in the short-to-medium term markets, cooperative development, training have been identified. Those farmers who have and other infrastructure so that fishing com- lost their land altogether require land else- munities can reap greater rewards from their where and mechanisms for relocating. Agri- Chapter 2 Rebuilding Livelihoods 57 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? cultural processing facilities such as rice milling cessing and packaging mainly done outside operations that were lost due to the tsunami the region. There is a need to modernize both need to be replaced. Owners that lost such as- sectors through new technologies, finance, sets are finding it difficult to access credit capital and business development services, and by for replacement. encouraging a greater scale of production. Organizing people in cooperatives can be an Gender equity is weak in agriculture sec- important channel. Strengthening these two tor programs. Prior to the tsunami, many rural sectors may allow them to reap greater ben- communities had more women than men work- efits from the expansion of the local demand ing in agriculture, as the conflict caused more for food and other basic goods that should men to migrate to other parts of the country and accompany the coming construction boom, greater male mortality. Women have traditionally and set foundations for the strengthening of played an important role in food crop agriculture the local economy. but have lacked extension services and access to credit, and only been allowed limited partici- pation in decision-making. The high mortality of women from the tsunami could pose a huge CREATING JOBS obstacle to the restoration of farming activities. All this means that integrating gender equity into The impact of the tsunami on employ- agricultural programs needs special attention. ment in Aceh and Nias has been less se- vere than initially expected, but it has led Problems associated with marketing are to major changes in the composition and slowing down rehabilitation and recovery. structure of the workforce. While there was Many markets already weakened by years of con- a spike in unemployment in the immediate af- flict were heavily impacted by the tsunami. Recov- termath of the disaster, labor force participa- ery in the marketing sector has been slow in many tion has recovered rapidly. The participation of areas. Marketing needs to be integrated into the adult males in the labor force has returned to overall strategy for farmland rehabilitation. pre-tsunami levels, while the participation of women and youths (aged 15-24) has grown The construction boom may take needed substantially. Many women and youths were laborers away from the agriculture sector. left with little choice but to search for any type As a result of the construction boom, labor- of work in order to survive. ers will be tempted to move to the more guar- anteed and higher wages in the construction Though these previously untapped labor sector. This could result in labor shortages sources could contribute to faster eco- during the rice harvest and for rehabilitating nomic growth and recovery throughout farmland programs. the region, it will also raise new problems. Without access to decent employment oppor- Agriculture and fisheries are essential tunities in areas of sustainable growth, these parts of the economies of Aceh and Nias, new female workers may be unable to eke out and should be modernized. Even before the enough to support their families. And there is disaster, both sectors were characterized by a evidence that young people may be leaving large number of small farmers and fishermen schooling prematurely, which could diminish producing mainly for their own consumption their opportunities for training and education or for the immediate local markets, with pro- 58 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version Table 2.1 Employment Status for People 10 Years and Older Age group Employed Seeking work Available for Not in labor Total work force 10 ­ 14 17,255 5,337 4,437 418,209 445,238 15 ­ 24 243,793 78,847 52,556 452,982 828,178 25 ­ 34 392,458 49,099 34,281 173,139 648,977 35 ­ 54 579,355 36,480 32,197 190,178 838,210 55+ 204,860 12,353 12,939 105,638 335,790 Total 1,437,721 182,116 136,410 1,340,146 3,096,393 Source: BPS 2005 Population Census Box 2.3 THE NUSA DIARY: Livelihood projects Within weeks of the tsunami, several people in Nusa had started mini-warungs (small shops) selling vegetables, cakes and coffee but this neither met all their needs nor covered more than a tiny handful of the population. The impact, there- fore, of both the original cash-for-work scheme and then the longer-term livelihood projects organized by Mercy Corps - the lead NGO in the sub-district - on the fortunes of Nusa cannot be overstated. With about 70 per cent of the wage- earners farmers who lost everything and many of the remainder having lost their jobs when the tsunami destroyed the local furniture factory, the need for outside assistance was paramount. Through lengthy consultation Mercy Corps ensured virtually every family was represented in one of the farming groups: cassava, chilli, peanuts, ginger and livestock. The gaping hole here was rice, which could not be planted due to a cru- cial floodgate remaining unrepaired (see the Water and Sanitation section). The NGO also ensured the village's cassava cracker industry - for which it had been famous throughout Aceh before the disaster could restart, provided sewing machines for 28 people and financing for a cake-making cooperative. A few people secure assistance from the private sector; the most successful being Nelly Nurila who secured equipment and funding from a flour company in September to open a bakery. Within a couple of weeks she was employing eight people making 600 loaves a day and assessing what the best way to expand would be. Another example of private initiative was Mohammed Yassin who was selected to "host" one of the first televisions given to the village. He quickly opened a warung, charging food makers a commission to sell their products, and so helped at least half a dozen families supplement their earnings. People who looked for work in Banda Aceh, struggled, however, unless they had a relative or friend with a functioning business. Many of the farmers also found it tough to make ends meet while waiting for crops to grow: many planted vegetables but the majority of the village were dependent on food handouts to survive right up until the end of the year. Conditions are likely to remain tough for perhaps another year because rice was not planted. Source: John Aglionby (The Guardian) which are essential for more productive jobs in The latest census shows there is a large the future that offer better remuneration. Re- pool of labor either seeking or available cent evidence from the 2005 census showed for work, but not employed. Currently, that more than 17,000 children aged 10 to 14 nearly 20 per cent of the labor force (more than were employed, contrary to government poli- 300,000 people) are actively seeking work or cy, and another 5,000 looking for work. are available for work. The highest rates were in the 15-24 age group, where nearly 25 per Chapter 2 Rebuilding Livelihoods 59 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? cent were searching for work (table 2.1). The hoods as well as rehabilitating public assets human aspects of livelihood loss is highlighted and farm land. in box 2.3 on the village of Nusa. Over 10,000 jobseekers have been placed PROGRAMS TO PROMOTE EMPLOY- into jobs out of the 46,000 who voluntarily MENT registered with the employment services net- work set-up by the government's manpower Many organizations implemented cash- offices and the ILO. Approximately 30 per cent for-work programs in the affected areas of the registrants were female (table 2.2). immediately after the disaster. Mercy Corps provided employment for more than CONSTRAINTS IN CREATING EMPLOY- 76,000 people in four districts, with an aver- MENT age participation of 35 days. UNDP's scheme to date has assisted more than 34,000 IDP The construction boom is only just start- households in 50 per cent of impacted vil- ing, but will have a large impact on the job lages. These activities provided valuable sup- market. Construction work in Aceh and Nias port to communities in terms of restoring liveli- will be in range of US$100- $150 million per Table 2.2 Top 20 Listed Professions by Gender in Employment Services Database Males Females Category No. Category No. No experience 3905 No experience 5572 Builders 3175 Tailors, dressmakers and hatters 1332 Car, taxi and van drivers 2534 Non-primary education teaching professionals 810 Painters and related workers 1746 Shop, stall and market salespersons 532 Carpenters and joiners 1606 Administrative secretaries and related 453 Production and operations managers 1437 Nursing and midwifery professionals 331 Bricklayers and stonemasons 1370 Cooks 327 Shop, stall and market salespersons 1022 Other office clerks 324 Administrative secretaries and related 983 Primary education teaching professionals 245 Building construction laborers 918 Weavers, knitters and related workers 226 Welders and flame cutters 867 Word-processor and related operators 175 Building and related electricians 787 Pre-primary education teaching professionals 148 Other office clerks 719 Cashiers and ticket clerks 137 Heavy truck and lorry drivers 695 Secretaries 122 Motor vehicle mechanics and fitters 670 Bakers, pastry-cooks and confectionery makers 119 Blacksmiths and hammer-smiths 612 Secondary education teaching professionals 97 Protective services workers 586 Bookkeepers 83 Plumbers and pipe fitters 578 Social work professionals 81 Stock clerks 557 Telephone switchboard operators 77 Plasterers 546 Computer equipment operators 68 Source: NAD Manpower/ILO Employment Services Database 60 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version month range for the two coming years, com- ness climate is created and appropriate types pared to less than US$10 million per month of assistance is provided to potential suppliers. in 2003. To meet this demand, ILO estimates It is critical that when the construction boom about 200,000 skilled labourers (carpenters, ends and demand dramatically declines, ex- bricklayers, etc) are required as well as a sig- isting and newly-established firms in Aceh and nificant number of unskilled workers. BRR and Nias be able to compete in external markets. the Department of Labour have been working A strategy needs to be formulated in order to over the last six to eight months to address realize this potential. this challenge to ensure that a large portion of this demand is filled by workers from Aceh and EMPLOYMENT ISSUES IN THE YEAR Nias. Their focus has been to improve skills AHEAD training. However, given the immediate de- mand for skilled workers and the time lag nec- A labor market monitoring system should essary for adequate training, as well as to pre- be developed in order to prepare for the vent high inflation in wage rates, many of the coming construction boom and longer- highly skilled workers will have to be brought term. Building on existing national labor in from outside the region. Semi-skilled and force surveys, a quarterly update on employ- unskilled workers should come predominantly ment and livelihoods for Aceh and Nias is re- from the affected areas. In addition, the con- quired as a basis for decision making. This struction boom will create a large secondary should provide information on employment, demand for goods and services. income etc. Statistics Indonesia (BPS) and BRR should take the lead on this along with Wage inflation needs to be managed even other donor partners. if it means bringing in labor from outside of Aceh and Nias. Excessive wage inflation will Effective labor market mediation and pro- make it very difficult for the region to shift from active administration services should also being a construction-led economy to an econ- be developed to facilitate the matching of la- omy competitive in external markets in Indo- bor supply with the demand for workers. The nesia and abroad after the construction boom. existing network of four employment service Wage rates are much more flexible upwards centers run by the government's manpower than downwards-- once they become too office and the ILO can be reinforced with ad- high in relation to the medium-term require- ditional mobile placement officers who can ments for a competitive regional economy, it assist contractors in recruiting suitably-quali- will be very difficult to bring them down again fied local labor. The principal activity of these without causing extensive unemployment. It employment centers would be to register job is especially important that the minimum wage seekers and link them to potential employers, rate is not increased relative to those in other based on a comprehensive skills database. provinces, in order to maintain Aceh's com- The network of employment centers could petitiveness in the medium-to-long term. also be used to start labor administration func- tions such as labor inspection and promotion Opportunities for the development of a of harmonious industrial relations. competitive supply of goods in Aceh and Nias should be exploited. Some of the ris- To enhance the employability of the people ing demand for goods can be competitively of Aceh and Nias, skills training must be supplied from Aceh and Nias if a healthy busi- demand-driven and linked to jobs in the Chapter 2 Rebuilding Livelihoods 61 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? market, with a particular focus on short-cycle ensure standard setting, quality control, con- training for workers certain to be engaged. sistency in curricula, and portable certification The BRR, DISNAKERTRANS and a range of of competencies. partners (ILO, GTZ, MDTF, ADB, IOM, and numerous NGOs) are already implementing Attention should be given to special vocational training programs that need to be needs. Although much training is likely to expanded and sustained. A vocational train- be through mobile training centers, specific ing coordination center should be set up to provision should also be made to take train- ing to those that cannot participate in away- Box 2.4 Training in carpentry in Lamlumpu Azhar, 17, comes from the village of Lamlumpu in the sub-district of Peukan Bada, Aceh Besar. He came back to his home to learn the trade of a construction worker. At an abandoned building he and a number of youthful villagers can be seen making door and window casings. "I have got to bring myself up again. We can't count on other people's help forever. They won't be here forever. We must count on our own strength to live," said Azhar, who has worked as construction worker since he was 15. "I can't depend on my family very much because we're poor. I must support myself." Before his home and village was wiped away by the tsunami last year, Azhar lived with his parents and seven siblings. "My home used to be over there," he said pointing to a wasteland that was once Lamlumpu. In the distance, all that could be seen was a mosque and rubble. "After the tsunami there was only the three of us. My father, my brother and myself. My father has moved in with my grandmother. My brother is living in a tent with his friends. I remain here to follow a training course to become a construction worker. I am being taught how to make door casings, window casings and the like," he said while observing his work. There is something else that keeps him around the village. "Should there be an NGO coming around to start building houses I can represent my family and claim for one too. In that way our scattered family can come together again," he said with hope. Source: BRR from-home courses, for example single-par- ent households and disabled people. The special needs of out-of-school youths should be incorporated in all training plans as well as opportunities for women in both the technical and vocational fields. 62 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version will reduce the BPRs' risk in lending to SMEs SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED and thus increase lending productivity. ENTERPRISES The provision of microfinance will need to carefully balance sound business princi- Many SMEs lost their assets during the ples and humanitarian aspects. Aid agen- tsunami and now face difficulties in reviv- cies and NGOs have to carefully design the ing their business activities. While several right mix of loan and grant elements in provid- financial products are reported to be available ing financial aid at the village level in order not for new SME start-ups, there has been a lack to distort the market for financial services. It is of financial support to SMEs severely affect- important that the supply of funds for micro- ed by the tsunami. Although there have been finance projects and programs does not out- some successful examples of SME recovery strip requirements or demand. mechanisms, local banks, while increasingly offering some loan-restructuring options for affected SMEs, are generally reluctant to pro- No access to credit for a car sales Box 2.5 vide new credits to SMEs that cannot provide business damaged by tsunami collateral. However, for most businesses af- A successful car sales business in Banda Aceh was fected by the tsunami the availability of uncol- decimated by the tsunami in December. The three- lateralized loan or loan collateral substitution year-old enterprise was established with capital from schemes is often the only chance for affected the owner's savings and a Rp. 50 million loan provided businesses to recover. by a local commercial bank. The business owner established a highly reliable repayment record and Urgent assistance is needed to help SMEs de- received a favorable initial response to an application stroyed by the tsunami get back to business. for an extension to the existing loan to expand the Currently constrained by a lack of working business. capital and destroyed capital assets, and with exposure to previously-held bank loans, many Following the tsunami, the business-owner requested pre-tsunami entrepreneurs currently have ab- assistance from the bank to refinance the existing loan solutely no one to turn to for assistance. In and to `fast track' the extension application in order to many cases, this has resulted in a demoralised relocate the car cleaning operation and for some working entrepreneurial spirit (box 2.5). capital. The bank refused both and demanded that the outstanding loan be repaid in full. In the meantime the Access to capital is also a major concern entrepreneur has a poor credit rating and does not know for the many small entrepreneurs in dis- whom to approach for help. He is currently a local driver placed communities. NGOs such as Ox- with no prospect of restarting his enterprise. fam and Mercy Corps are currently playing a vital role in this regard by providing links to sources of funding. They also plan to launch the issuance of guarantees of up to 85-100 percent of the amount of credits extended by commercial banks. Mercy Corps and the ILO are working together on providing credit guar- antee funds to selected Bank Pembangunan Daerah (BPRs, or local banks) in NAD, which Chapter 2 Rebuilding Livelihoods 63 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? Box 2.6 Getting Becaks Drivers Back On the Roads Dark clouds hover overhead and the rain lashes down, but that doesn't deter the becak ­or motorbike taxis - wait- ing for passengers in the center of Banda Aceh. They know they are a vital means of getting around this crowded city. And among them is Amir, a veteran driver now back in business with the support of the International Rescue Committee, (IRC). Amir knows the back roads of Banda Aceh inside out. He has been driving a becak since 1980, but the tsunami took a devastating toll. As he explains: "I lost my motorbike taxi and my beloved son driving it on the tsunami day last year." Many other taxi drivers lost their loved ones and livelihoods on 26th December 2004. But now, as the city is be- ing rebuilt and people start to look forward, the becak drivers also want to resume their business and regain their economic independence. Becaks are a popular means of transport in Banda Aceh because minibuses often get stuck in traffic jams, while taxis are too expensive for everyday travel. The becak drivers offer a cheap and useful service to the local com- munity, and the IRC has been supporting them with small grants as part of its Quick Impact Projects, paying the advance payments and the drivers settle the balance over 24months. Now Amir and his fellow drivers can resume their former jobs and start earning money to meet their daily needs. "With this new becak, I can work and have a constant income again. It's much better than waiting for help in the barracks [temporary living centers]. I thank God there are some people willing to help me. We are all very thank- ful," says Amir. Source: International Rescue Committee 64 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version PROGRESS IN REVITALIZING SMES Trends in the provision of micro- Figure 2.3 credit by local commercial banks The main focus in reviving the SME sector % has been to assist small enterprises 140.0 quickly re-establish their operations. This 120.0 assistance is focused on the replacement of 100.0 lost assets, provision of small cash grants, 80.0 and extension of entrepreneurship start-up 60.0 and business management training courses. 40.0 A wide range of activities is being undertaken 20.0 to address these issues (box 2.6). In addition 0.0 to NGO programs, the International Finance Dec-04 Jan-05 Feb-05 Mar-05 Apr-05 May-05 Jun-05 Jul-05 Aug-05 Sep-05 Corporation (IFC) has established an SME % of microcredit in the total volume of loans Facility in Aceh (PEP-Aceh) to identify and nominal volume of microcredit, Dec. 2004=100 remove constraints for SME development. real (inflation-adjusted) volume of microcredit, Dec. 2004=100 UNDP has assisted in the re-establishment Source: Bank Indonesia , World Bank Staff calculations of more than 7000 small businesses and is expected to have helped about 20,000 Swisscontact has initiated a "Business small businesses by June 2006. ILO has Recovery" project targeting the creation of supported the establishment of a network of 5,000-10,000 jobs, and the Asia Foundation entrepreneurship and business management has helped the Aceh government introduce trainers, which deliver `Start Your Business' a one-stop-shop model to help reduce costs (SYB) training courses throughout the province and waiting time for business owners who with more than 600 people completing the need to have lost business licenses re-issued training courses. In addition, more than 2000 or to apply for bank loans. people were provided with technical and vocational training courses. Local commercial banks have been assessing the conditions of their SME Several programs with substantial clients affected by the disaster. For resources have been launched to outstanding loans to businesses that are support the development of sustainable considered potentially viable, banks often offer microfinance for Aceh and Nias. an extended repayment period, grace period Many donor organizations have launched for the repayment of the loan, and reduced microfinance programs, including ADB, GTZ, interest rate. In some cases they also ask ILO, IFC, the German Savings Bank, Save for the repayment of principal only. However, the Children, Mercy Corps and World Vision. for SMEs that lost most of their assets, even BRR, in cooperation with Dinas Kooperasi, these more flexible terms of repayment are has launched the Aceh Microfinance Forum impossible to meet. Although the provision of program designed to set up BQs (Syariah micro-credit since January 2005 has increased Financial cooperatives) in all kecamatans of in nominal terms, it has been stagnant in real Aceh. terms (figure 2.3). Other activities are providing technical assistance and market linkages. Chapter 2 Rebuilding Livelihoods 65 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? SUPPORTING SMALL AND MEDIUM is focusing on providing small businesses with BUSINESSES access to credit markets. However, donors IN THE COMING YEAR and the government must identify ways to enable distribution and marketing chains, President Bill Clinton, UN Special Envoy for which includes the rehabilitation of key the Tsunami Recovery, has emphasized the infrastructure. vital importance of promoting livelihoods through SMEs in the coming year. In order Insurance and other risk financing for SMEs to recover they will need improved mechanisms should be developed to access to financial services. However, existing protect SMEs. Most of the SMEs could banks in the region have a limited outreach not recover their losses because standard and tend to disregard loan applications from insurance contracts do not have clauses for small entrepreneurs and even more from losses from natural disasters. Considering applicants without guarantees or collateral. the hazard exposure of Aceh and Nias, the There is a need to build the capacity of financial availability of affordable insurance against institutions and the promotion of collateral the respective loss or damage of assets is substitute products such as micro leasing and critical for mitigating negative shocks. If the constitution of guarantee funds. the premiums offered by private insurance companies are judged to be too costly for There is also a need to provide non- SMEs to operate, the government may want financial services to SMEs in the form to explore participating in some special risk- of business development services and sharing arrangements which would reduce in general develop such a market where insurance costs for businesses. enterprises are able to source various types of services that will help small scale entrepreneurs to start and grow their businesses. Rehabilitation of key infrastructure is linked to SMEs' recovery. Most assistance 66 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version NOTES 4IOM, "Settlement and Livelihood Needs and Aspirations of Disaster-Affected and Local Com- munities in NAD", May 2005. 5BAPPENAS and the International Donor Community, "Indonesia: Preliminary Damage and Loss Assessment ­ Technical Annex," January 2004. 6FAO, "Indonesia Post-Tsunami Consolidated Assessment", April 22, 2005 (URL: http://www. fao.org/ag.tsunami/assessment/indonesia-assess.html, 7Dinas Pertanian data from 8 affected districts Aceh-Sumatra Workshop 5-7 December 2005. Chapter 2 Rebuilding Livelihoods 67 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? 68 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Part I ONE YEAR AFTER - WHERE DO WE STAND? Chapter 3 RESTORING PUBLIC SERVICES Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? The disaster had a devastating impact on restored. Reconstruction is being held back public infrastructure and the delivery of by shortages of materials and labor, and is public services: constrained by a damaged transportation · Up to 40,000 students and 2,500 teachers system, particularly on the west coast. The lost their lives; more than 2,000 schools enormity of the task and the large number were reported damaged or destroyed. of agencies involved is also overwhelming · Six hospitals, 41 puskesmas, 59 pustu, 44 the management capacity of both local posyandu and 240 polindes were severely government and international agencies. damaged or destroyed. In Nias, the damage included 2 hospitals and 14 puskesmas · Major water treatment installations, the piping network, wells and Banda Aceh's only sludge treatment facility were destroyed. EDUCATION · Local level drainage systems were rendered The earthquake and tsunami of December ineffective by land settlement and shallow 26th took the lives of almost 2,500 teachers wells became contaminated and inundated and tens of thousands of students. In with saline water. addition, many children experienced, and · Extensive portions of the road network were continue to suffer from, trauma-related stress destroyed and many coastal bridges were which impacts all aspects of their daily lives and washed out, especially along the west coast impairs their ability to concentrate in school. in Aceh. More than 2,000 schools were reported as · Fourteen of the 19 seaports and eight of the damaged or destroyed but this figure includes 10 airports were damaged. schools damaged or destroyed during conflict or due to old age. Immediate action helped to restore essential services to a large proportion of The initial success in getting children the population. back to school represents a considerable · Schools reopened one month after the achievement. A school clean-up program was tsunami, sometimes with emergency launched and educational material distributed schooling facilities so that education could including schools tents, text books, `Schools be provided to almost all students, including in a Box,' locally procured teaching/learning those living in IDP camps. materials and recreation kits to almost one · Health services were quickly restored at million children in tsunami-affected districts8. existing serviceable health facilities through This joint effort enabled schools to reopen on the provision of staff, equipment and January 26, one month after the earthquake medical supplies. Temporary field hospitals and tsunami, and for emergency schooling to were established in areas of critical need. be provided to almost all students, including · Emergency water and sanitation services those living in IDP camps. In addition to were provided to more than half a million government contracted teachers, a number of people displaced by the tsunami. organizations recruited, hired and mobilized · GoI carried out emergency repairs to contract teachers to the tsunami affected roads and erected an extensive system of districts, including 1,100 teachers by temporary bridges. UNICEF. But public services are not yet fully 70 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version Cause of Damage to Schools in before the disasters, the education sector in Figure 3.1 Bireuen District Aceh and Nias was characterized by poor quality school buildings, a lack of adequately 50% trained teachers, poor performance of students in national examinations, poor management, 40% and low levels of community participation. A UNOPS survey concluded that most damage to school buildings and collapses was due 30% to improper construction methods, bad workmanship and the use of poor quality 20% materials9. There is already anecdotal evidence that new school building construction is not meeting the required government standards. 10% A major challenge for reconstruction 0% will be to develop adequate education Tsunami Earthquake Old Age Conflict Other facilities and service for all communities of Aceh and Nias. Careful planning will be Source: Dinas Pendidikan Kabupaten Bireuen required to ensure equity and sustainability of the system. Planning will need to consider Teachers also received specific training in targeting, accessibility for the disabled, and howtoimplementstructured,psychosocial disaster risk management. There is a need activities with their students, and several for greater understanding of the required organizations established safe play areas construction standards, and close supervision where children could overcome their fears, of the construction phase. In addition, facilities release their stress, and simply be children built by the recovery program will need to once again. Such activities were particularly consider the local authorities' capacity for important not only right after the tsunami but maintenance of educational facilities. also over time, especially since a number of strong earthquakes continued to shake the region and to psychologically affect survivors PROGRAMS TO RESTORE AND IMPROVE throughout the year. EDUCATION However, much of the school infrastructure BRR's priority is to coordinate the activities was in a poor state before the tsunami of a large number of agencies that are and earthquake, and while school active in the affected areas while at the enrollment rates were high for young children, same time maintaining close dialogue considerable disparity existed between urban with the Ministry of National Education and rural areas. Enrollment rates for Nias (MoNE) and the Ministry of Religious were especially low. Affairs (MoRA). In early February 2005, an education sector working group was set up in The conflict was also responsible for Banda Aceh, providing a coordination forum significant damage to schools, while for government agencies and their partners low levels of public investment and poor to avoid overlaps and to provide an effective maintenance are also concerns. Even response. To date, regular meetings - hosted Chapter 3 Restoring Public Services 71 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? Composition of Financing in the gap until the rehabilitation and reconstruction Figure 3.2 Education Sector (US$ million) of permanent schools could be completed. IOM has constructed 101 temporary schools NGOs, 133 53 GOI on behalf of UNICEF in various locations through Aceh to meet the immediate need for more appropriate school facilities. In addition, the Chinese government has provided 52 temporary schools and support for their construction. Twelve are in Banda Aceh, 30 in Simeulue and the remainder on the west coast. MoRA administers the Islamic education sector where some 19 percent of religious school were damaged or destroyed. Among a number of donors and NGOs, AIPRD is supporting the Bilateral, 106 136 Multilateral reconstruction of eight madrassah and one dayah and is planning to assist up to 15 more. It is also helping to strengthen education Source: BRR, World Bank staff estimates; see also Annex 6 by the provincial MoNE office and facilitated management, teacher support and training by UNICEF - continue to provide an effective and school retention programs. forum for coordination and information sharing for all stakeholders, and MoRA. A similar forum has also been established in Nias. Information management is critical to coordination. Theneedforreliableinformation was addressed by developing an education data pack, available on-line and led by UNIMS and UNICEF in cooperation with the MoNE office. BRR also put in place a mechanism to develop an EMIS database in collaboration with UNIMS. Increasingly, data collected by other parties, including MoNE and UNICEF are also verified by BRR to complement their database. The development of the BRR operations center will facilitate improved sector management information and BRR coordination of education activities in 2006 as the planned UNIMS database transfer to the center occurs in the first half of 2006. From July through December, efforts focused on the rehabilitation and reconstruction of schools. In the meantime, and as school tents wore out, temporary learning spaces were introduced to fill the 72 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version Box 3.1 THE NUSA DIARY: Education Nusa was lucky that both the state primary school (SD) and the pesantran (Islamic boarding school) - run by the orthodox Islamic organization Hidayatullah from Kalimantan - are on high ground and so survived both the earthquake and the tsunami. Three of the nine teaching staff, including the school principal, and two of the 115 pupils at the SD were killed. Within a few weeks the education ministry replaced the deceased teachers with staff from nearby schools which had been destroyed but it took several weeks for the new principal's official appointment letter to arrive so the school was a little rudderless until March. Other promised government support, such as mending the furniture broken by the hundreds of refugees who sought sanctuary in the school for a couple of weeks, either never materialized or took months to arrive. One of the classes was forced to decamp to a shed in the yard for the first couple of months because their room was being used as a store for emergency relief. The school roll initially swelled from 115 to 147 after taking in pupils who had nowhere else to study but then it slowly dropped as school facilities were rebuilt elsewhere. Overall, the new principal admitted to me, the SD is now better off than it was before the tsunami. This is thanks to numerous donations, ranging from UNICEF who provided crates of supplies, through domestic organizations like Dompet Dhuafa who gave materials and did extra-curricular activities for several months, to a slew of gifts like Mickey Mouse school bags from the United States. By May the school was charging fees again. It was a similar picture at Hidayatullah. Additional teachers arrived from around the archipelago and coped well with the extra students. The staff opened a kindergarten and by April 2005, 45 students were attending. Nusa residents attending high school in Lhoknga suffered much greater disruption to their education. Most facili- ties which weren't destroyed were badly damaged and students reported equipment being looted. They also had to cope with many of their friends and teachers dying - more than 50 per cent in some cases - which exacer- bated their already massive psychological trauma. Source: John Aglionby (The Guardian) Reconstruction is underway or completed far, donor assistance focused on the worst in 331 schools and preparatory work damaged schools but significant gaps remain is being conducted in another 400 for schools that are less damaged but still in locations. In Nias, 10 schools have already need of repair. been reconstructed and almost 400 schools (51 percent of the total number of damaged Since July 2005, supplies of textbooks and schools) have been adopted by various other learning materials have continued donors. As of December 2005, around 800 to pour in. BRR data show that more than school sites (70 percent of those worst hit 1.7 million text books were distributed from a by the tsunami and earthquake in NAD and target of 1.16 million. An additional 557,000 Nias) have been adopted for reconstruction textbooks will be supplied in early 2006 with or rehabilitation by various organizations. So ADB support. Chapter 3 Restoring Public Services 73 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? Local governments organized a wide School Enrollment Before and Figure 3.3 varietyoftrainingforteachersandstudents After the Disasters with assistance from Save the Children, 100% UNICEF and others. The training includes: training of trainers for primary and secondary teachers on new teaching methodologies and 80% School Based Management; tutorials for more than 18,000 secondary school students to prepare for national exams; vocational training 60% for youth and equivalent training for school dropouts; life skill workshops for youth; leadership training for scouts; psychosocial 40% training for teachers; vocational training for adults (men and women) covering block 20% making and house masonry; stress-relieving activities for children and youth; and study tours for educational staff of good practices in 0% School Based Management in other provinces. 7-12 yrs 13-15yrs 16-18yrs 19-24 yrs In addition, community learning centers were Aceh: Before Aceh: After established in a number of tsunami affected Nias: Before Nias: After districts, providing non-formal programs for senior education. Source: Susenas 2004, BRR Nias and SPAN 2005. A number of scholarships were provided to students from vulnerable families as well as those living in barracks to allow them to access education. Scholarships were also provided to university students to undertake a short program in neighboring polytechnic institutions. By October the government launched the School Operation Fund by providing a block grant for all schools in the country. School enrollment rates are lower in 2005 than in 2004. In Aceh 5 percent of children aged 7-12 do not now attend school; for Nias the figure is 11 percent. For the population aged 13-15 the non- attendance rates are 13 percent and 29 percent, respectively10 . There is concern that children may be forced into work to help restore livelihoods; 4 percent of children aged 10-14 are employed and another 1.2 percent are seeking work. 74 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version Map 3.1 Reconstruction of Schools and Primary School Enrollment SABANG (KOTA) BANDA ACEH (KOTA) ACEH BESAR LHOKSUMAWE (KOTA) Primary School Enrollment Ratio (%) Source: SPAN 2005 PIDIE BIREUEN Above 96 ACEH UTARA 94 to96 92 to94 90 to92 ACEH JAYA BENER MERIAH Below 90 ACEH TIMUR LANGSA (KOTA) ACEH TENGAH Status of Permanent School Reconstruction Source: Ministry of Education ACEH BARAT 370 ACEH TAMIANG NAGAN RAYA Number of schools damaged and destroyed Number of permanent schools rebuilt or under construction GAYO LUES ACEH BARAT DAYA NIAS ACEH TENGGARA NIAS SELATAN ACEH SELATAN SIMEULUE ACEH SINGKIL Shelter Working Group estimate 82,000 new houses are required based on the IOM damage assessment with ad- justments for numbers of survivors; BRR survey in November identified 111,000 new houses required based on each Camat capturing housing requirements from displaced people in their respective sub-district EDUCATIONAL ISSUES FOR THE COMING rural areas, including Nias. BRR's `fast-track YEAR project' review meetings are increasingly used as a coordination forum. So far, these Some donors prefer reconstructing efforts have led to a redistribution of school primary schools due to higher visibility reconstruction by various agencies. and long-lasting nature of the support, but overlapping is a problem. The There are varying standards of school reconstruction of primary schools is highly reconstruction in Aceh and Nias. BRR, concentrated in urban areas such as Banda supported by UNOPS, is coming up with a set Aceh and Meulaboh as well as along the main of minimum requirements that GoI will enforce roads in rural areas, while significant needs in all school construction projects. This remain unmet at the level of junior and senior standard will also cover accessibility factors. high schools, particularly in the less accessible A workshop on construction standards is planned for early 2006. Chapter 3 Restoring Public Services 75 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? Temporary schools will continue to play improvement and periodic supervision and an important role in a transitional strategy. assessment to ensure that the teaching As families still move around in search of better of curriculum subjects is accompanied by living environments, the population of school- appropriate updated teaching methodologies. aged children remains fluid. Demographic mobility is observed in the context of Education management systems will need temporary schools before permanent schools to be strengthened. In addition to improving are reconstructed. the physical facilities and quality of educational services,focusisneededtostrengthencapacity Coordination, while improving, will need to manage the education system, to ensure to be tightened further. Currently, there are the maintenance and sustainability of quality more than 60 agencies claiming to be working services. BRR will support the revitalization of in Aceh's education sector. Many of these the school cluster system for both MoNE and organizations were `cash rich' and keen to start MoRA and the integration of schools in the their individual activities with limited need and same cluster where this is appropriate. Both incentive to coordinate with local government MoNE and MoRA have recognized the need to or with other actors. In addition, the lack work in a more coordinated way. To this end of clear directions from the representative a joint strategic plan will be developed early authorities of different government agencies in 2006 to ensure improved coordination and created confusion and misunderstanding. more effective use of limited resources. Physical bottlenecks will need to be The recent signing of a peace agreement addressed. In a projection exercise, BRR between GAM and GoI will extend the shows that the physical reconstruction rehabilitation efforts to the areas seriously of various sectors (including school affected by conflict. Currently, most reconstruction) will reach its peak in the second organizations are focusing their assistance on semester of 2006. A number of challenges tsunami-affected areas. Yet the number of are already identified: lack of construction schools that have been damaged either directly materials (especially timber), the rising price or indirectly (e.g. through lack of maintenance) of construction materials (which will affect during the conflict is significant in certain the target committed by various donors), areas. In Bireun, for example, 75 percent of the and a scarcity of skilled workers. BRR, recorded 239 damaged/dilapidated schools in with the help of the sub-working group on the district were either burned down during construction standards, will share information the conflict or suffered from old age or lack of on construction unit price in order to come up maintenance. The peace agreement provides with the most efficient price. more security in the area, which might attract communities to resettle and raise the demand A greater emphasis on providing quality for schooling facilities. education will mark the rehabilitation efforts. As many teachers have little or no training, both in-service and pre-service training needs to be improved. For teachers in the system, meaningful training should be based on the principle of continuous 76 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version 40-50 percent while some 350 physicians and HEALTH 500 nurses had been deployed by NGO's, a surplus of 150 and 200 respectively. Despite some oversupply and gaps in service provision, relief efforts were generally well coordinated and successful in preventing widespread The earthquake and tsunami of 26th communicable disease and famine. December caused widespread destruction in the health sector, damaging or Public health facilities were in a state of destroying six hospitals, 41 puskesmas, neglect before the tsunami. Reconstruction 59 pustu, 44 posyandu and 240 polindes. cannot simply aim to replace what existed. Seventeen doctors, three dentists, 49 Low levels of public investment, poor midwives, 30 nurses, two pharmacists and maintenance and inefficient use of resources 104 support staff lost their lives. In addition, meant that pre-tsunami health services did not 489 health staff were still reported missing by fully meet the needs of the population and the the provincial health office in April. In Nias, quality of such services was generally poor. the March 28th earthquake damaged both The coverage of key public health programs hospitals and destroyed 14 puskesmas. In such as child immunization was low. Rural Simeulue, the medical stores were destroyed populations had inferior access to maternal and 25 of 47 health facilities were either health services. destroyed or rendered unusable. The disasters caused widespread physical injuries and left hundreds of Health Service Delivery in Aceh thousands traumatized, increasing the Figure 3.4 Before the Earthquake and Tsunami demand on a depleted health system. The displacement of half a million people with poor 100% quality housing, water and sanitary conditions exacerbated mental trauma and increased the potential for outbreaks of communicable 80% diseases. The widespread devastation of food supplies and livelihoods also increased 60% the risk of malnutrition. The immediate local and international 40% health response was rapid and substantial. Health services were quickly restored at existing serviceable health facilities 20% through the provision of staff, equipment and medical supplies. Temporary field hospitals were established in areas of critical need. 0% Delivery by Polio Measles Some resources were provided in more than FP user any Medical immunistion immunisation adequate quantities. By the end of January, Urban Rural field hospitals had bed occupancy rates of only Source: Susenas 2004 Chapter 3 Restoring Public Services 77 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? The loss of experienced administrative Composition of Financing in the Figure 3.5 and health staff has added further Health Sector (US$ million) capacity-building needs at all levels of GOI, 48 97 Multilateral the health system. These problems were exacerbated by decades of conflict, which added to disrepair and discouraged staff from working in certain areas. As attention turns to rebuilding the health system, the challenge is to provide sustainable improved quality health services to the population, while at the same time being careful not to overbuild and create a future burden on the Government in terms maintenance and staffing. Reconstruction needs to consider the assistance required by the private sector ­ more than one fifth of NGOs, 244 60 Bilateral curative services in urban areas and one tenth in rural areas were privately provided before Source: BRR, World Bank staff estimates; see also Annex 6. the tsunami. NGOs have broadly covered health sec- Conditions that promote increased rates tor needs in most areas but several gaps of disease transmission persist. Around are evident. More than 35 NGOs and interna- 67,500 individuals are still living in tents and tional organizations are working in the health are prone to communicable diseases (as well sector. The chart shows areas of activity and as mental stress), particularly during the rainy their locations. Comprehensive programs be- season. ing developed with ADB support aim to reduce inequity and will target gaps. PROGRAMS TO RESTORE AND IMPROVE Reconstruction and rehabilitation are un- HEALTH SERVICES derway in most hospitals, supported by donors and NGOs. At Aceh's major refer- The resources available to the health ral hospital, Zainoel Abidin, the rehabilitation sector are likely to exceed what is needed process has included major works such as re- to rebuild services to what they once building and equipping the emergency depart- were. NGOs and other donor projects may ment by AIPRD, which was opened on De- exceed 50 percent of sector funds required cember 8, 2005. AIPRD is also replacing the for reconstruction. In 2005, UN agencies pharmaceutical warehouse. KfW have refur- spent US$44 million out of US$56 million bished the polyclinic, operating theatres and pledged for the health sector, on rebuilding provided equipment while GTZ has supported and equipping health infrastructure, capacity capacity building and systems. The Turkish building, supporting public health campaigns, Red Crescent has rehabilitated the pediatric providing services and donations in kind such ward. A master plan has been prepared for as vehicles (22 ambulances, 46 cars and 450 the hospital. motorbikes), and cold chain equipment. 78 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version Status of Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Figure 3.6 Number of Agencies by District Figure 3.7 for Damaged and Destroyed Hospitals, Health Centers and Sub-health Centers 0 5 10 15 20 25 Banda Aceh Aceh Besar Aceh Jaya Aceh Besar Aceh Jaya Pidie Kota Banda Aceh Nias & Nias S Aceh Barat Aceh Barat Aceh Tengah Aceh Utara Pidie Bireuen Health Service Delivery* Bireuen Simeulue Mother & child Health Aceh Barat Daya Aceh Utara Aceh Selatan Communicable Diseases Simeulue Aceh Singkil Mental Health Aceh Tamiang Nagan Raya Aceh Tenggara Medical Supplies Aceh Timur Aceh Timur Nutrition Bener Meriah Lhokseumawe Gayo Lues Rehabilitation reconstruciton Completed Kota Langsa Aceh Singkil Training In Progress Kota Lhoksumawe Aceh Selatan Not started Kota Sabang Water/ Sanitation Nagan Raya Sabang Aceh Tamiang Source: BRR and UNIMS, December 2005 Langsa Aceh Barat Daya Some 70 percent of damaged or destroyed 0 5 10 15 20 hospitals, health centers and sub-centers are under renovation while 30 percent Source: BRR and UNIMS, December 2005 have been completed. Progress is greater in Banda Aceh and Aceh Besar where transportation networks were less damaged. Several NGOs also provide mobile clinics Reconstruction is slower in Aceh Jaya and to IDP locations, notably World Vision, MSF Nias. In some areas, NGOs involved in health (France and Belgium), AMI France, Yayasan facility construction are also involved in other Sosial KREASI, and Union Aid Abroad. Some sectors and this may delay the progress of operational satellite posts have proved popular reconstruction as higher priority is given to with non-IDP populations who sometimes by- housing. For Nias it is partly due to fewer pass the existing puskesmas and pustu to agencies being involved. obtain services. Many staff initially recruited to work in these facilities left the health service Forty-two satellite health posts have been owing to non-payment of wages; BRR are now built (37 by IOM) to serve IDP communities paying salaries. and all are operational. An additional 14 posts were originally planned, but have been District health offices and other support deemed unnecessary given the size of the services have been assisted in various population or access to suitable alternative ways. BRR, WHO, UNICEF, AIPRD, and SCF facilities. Islamic Relief has developed another have continued to support the Provincial four satellite clinics and MEDCO one clinic. Strategic Planning Process for 2005-2009. Chapter 3 Restoring Public Services 79 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? The process has involved participation of dental, nursing and midwifery - in Banda District Health Offices and BAPPEDA in relevant Aceh, a nursing school in Meulaboh and has workshop activities. It is anticipated that the funded JHPIEGO with US$1 million to support Plan will be finalized for implementation in 2006. the Poltekkes and Muhammadiya midwifery An emergency disease surveillance system schools. International Aid has established a was established by WHO in collaboration Medical Equipment Service Center, opened with the PHO to provide weekly reports on on November 15 in Kota Aceh, to provide the incidence of 9 diseases. Routine disease maintenance and support for medical surveillance is also being strengthened. equipment for Aceh province and beyond. Capacity building and management training were provided to all districts in Aceh by Special campaigns have been undertaken WHO, UNFPA and Save the Children, as to provide essential health protection. well as other donors and NGOs. Forty-two Around 225,000 insecticide impregnated districts health offices (21 in Aceh and 21 in mosquito nets were distributed by various North Sumatra) were provided with cold chain NGOs, WHO and UNICEF. A range of equipment (refrigerators, freezers) by UNICEF agencies has been involved in vector control to strengthen immunization services. Save and prevention activities e.g., Mentor, World the Children Fund, in collaboration with the Vision, MSF Belgium and Save the Children. Indonesian Midwives Association (IBI) and Nearly 4 million children aged six months to 59 JHPIEGO, has revitalized 9 clinical training months received Vitamin A. UNICEF and WHO sites in Banda Aceh and three sites in Aceh assisted health authority to immunize some Besar. WHO has supported four training 1,113,494 children under 15 against measles schools - environmental health and nutrition, in March. A national polio immunization Box 3.2 THE NUSA DIARY: Health Crisis, what crisis? That's the overall impression of the health situation in Nusa during the year. In the initial emer- gency phase the village received many more visits from foreign medical teams than their health warranted: doctors from Japan, Germany, the United States and China were amongst those who checked up on the villagers' health. Relatively minor ailments like diarrhoea, itchy skin, respiratory tract infections and mosquito bites were the main problems. It appeared very much to be a case of there being too many medics with little else to do. A large Turkish delegation set up a well-staffed and well-equipped field hospital in the sub-district in February from where mobile teams visited the village every week for at least six months but no major illnesses or outbreaks of disease were reported. At the end of March, the government opened a clinic in Nusa as part of a larger program. Run by newly-qualified doctors, it was also staffed by nurses, midwives and environmental health officials. There were initially about 15 patients a day but this dropped slightly as the year went by. In August, Red Cross/Red Crescent signs appeared in the village explaining how to maintain basic health standards. A significant reason for good health standards being maintained was the continuous distribution of basic food- stuffs, primarily by Care International but also by other groups and a little by the government. Many villagers said that without this aid, which continued throughout the year, the health picture would have been very different. John Aglionby (The Guardian) 80 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version day on August 30 succeeded in immunizing an attached Polindes and resident midwife, 4,853,297 children aged less than five years provides a good combination of maternal old. But despite achieving immunization and child health services at community level coverage of more than 98 percent, rates in and can serve as a vehicle for other health some districts remain below 90 percent (Aceh and community development programs such Barat, Aceh Jaya, Nagan Raya, Aceh Barat as early childhood development and health Daya, Kota Lhoksemauwe), and the threat of promotion programs. immunizable disease cannot be disregarded (three cases of polio have been detected - in Many disaster victims are still traumatized, Aceh Utara, Aceh Timur and Lhokseumawe). and programs are underway to help them. The census indicated that 1.7 percent in Aceh The tsunami had a significant impact and 2.7 percent of the population in Nias on women's health and related issues. suffered some mental problems as a result of Women, particularly pregnant women, youth the tsunami and earthquake. WHO facilitated and children living in tents and barracks are the implementation of psychological support vulnerable. Priority has been given to pregnant programs to the survivors and the community women in health services and training was as a whole through the coordination of given to district, puskesmas and posyandu agencies working on mental health. WHO by agencies including UNFPA, UNICEF, MSF incorporated this coordination to support Belgium, and Save the Children to ensure the development and related activities of prenatal care and safe delivery. UNFPA PHO for the newly developed Community and UNICEF have been particularly active. Based Mental Health Services program being More than 200,000 personal hygiene kits for finalized by MoH. Many NGOs have provided women have been distributed and sufficient psychosocial programs including WHO, IRC- emergency maternal care kits to cover the Cardi, LDS, MSF, IOM, IMC, Red Cross Red needs of approximately 500,000 over a six- Crescent, CARE, UNFPA, UNICEF and local month period. UNICEF and UNFPA have NGOs and religious organizations. Initial distributed some 2000 and 500 midwifery kits support was in the tents and camps working respectively, in collaboration of the PHO and with survivors and was later extended to the the Indonesian Midwives Association (IBI). The wider community. Programs are of varying electronic media (Radio Republik Indonesia, quality and give rise to some cultural issues in Suara Aceh radio, Suara Muhammadyah radio a few cases. and TVRI, and Serambi Indonesia daily, have been responsive in supporting messages on reproductive health, gender and mental health. Activities were also conducted in camps and barracks to sensitize officials and residents on gender issues, exploitation and violence. To further support reproductive health and related services, UNICEF is planning to construct 250 integrated health, nutrition and early education centers at the community level, of which 100 will be constructed in 2006. An integrated health and education center, with Chapter 3 Restoring Public Services 81 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? Box 3.3 Easing the Pain A team from IMC has been helping 12-year-old Yusuf, whose two sisters and several cousins died in the tsunami. Since the disaster, Yusuf has had post-traumatic stress disorder. In the months after the tsunami he hardly spoke at all, and suffered from palpitations and sometimes lost consciousness. Time with a clinical psychologist, as well as small doses of sedative and anti-depressant, have helped control the symptoms, and he is now talking a lot more and has gone back to school near his home in Lamno. "Lamno was very badly hit in the tsunami," says Dr Asare. "Most of the inhabitants have suffered from a range of psychiatric disorders, predominantly post traumatic stress disorder, depression and delayed grief reaction. A lot of them have not received any help. "Through regular community education sessions, we are supporting them to diagnose and manage these illnesses so they know what symptoms to look out for and how to seek help." Psychosocial support comes in many forms, depending on what communities feel they need. It could be starting up tailoring businesses as in Gle Jong, counseling and community support services such as those at Lamno or organizing sports matches and planning mourning ceremonies. "Our approach is to ask communities what they want to help them move on, and then work with them to put this in place. That way we are following the Acehnese ethos of `gotong - royong' [working together]," says Dr Mohanraj, an IMC psychiatrist. Source: International Medical Corps HEALTH ISSUES FOR THE COMING YEAR Reconstruction of the health sector requires a holistic approach. The current The level of resources available for health separation between community based sector reconstruction may overwhelm services and hospital services does not the management and implementation support rational development of the Aceh capacity of provincial and district level health system, nor does it take into account health offices. While it is positive that so the role of the private sector in delivering health many (particularly NGO) resources have been services and the reintegration of GAM areas. made available for recovery, the situation The current structure, role and functions of requires careful planning and coordination. the health management system as a whole Coordination of the many actors is a challenge requires strengthening if the reconstruction of for BRR but agencies must work together to the health system is to be sustainable in the smoothen health infrastructure and service longer term. Such a vision is difficult to attain delivery, identify gaps and seek donors and because the structure of local government NGOs to respond to identified needs. There does not allow for a strong coordinating role is a need to follow up on NGOs who are not of the provincial health office. The separation known to relevant authorities and ensure that from hospital planning and delivery and the networks are established and that relevant managerial capacity of district health offices information is shared. was only beginning to develop after the rapid decentralization of responsibilities to district level, was overwhelmed by the level of international assistance. 82 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version While many agencies are engaged in monitor services, including routine information reconstruction of facilities and service systems, periodic surveys, sentinel sites, provision, comparatively few are and effective surveillance systems (including concentrating on developing the capacity nutritional surveillance). It will be important of district, provincial health offices and for BRR to draw on existing resources for hospital management. The re-establishment monitoring and evaluation rather than set up of the health workforce, building its capacity in duplicate systems, and ensure that information both management and improved quality service is also available to those who provide the delivery, and development of an effective plan data. for transition of services from NGOs to local institutions are all persistent concerns. The Health services need to be extended development of the strategic plan for the PHO beyond tsunami-affected areas. The is a necessary first step, but it is not sufficient. health sector needs to be responsive to the Community based health services and hospital needs of populations affected by the tsunami services should be more closely coordinated while also establishing clear and fair guidance at the provincial level and some of the more on the extent to which services can be offered difficult structural issues need to be addressed to all citizens of Aceh and Nias. The peace (e.g. job descriptions, career paths, and use process should enable many more services of contracts for particular services). While to be expanded into areas that previously short term gains have been achieved through were deprived owing to the conflict. Nutrition special campaigns, including an increase in interventions may now be expanded to cover immunization coverage, there is a need to non-IDP populations. Other services may ensure that routine services are strengthened. also be needed to be made more accessible This will require support from the provincial to communities not directly affected by the administration. tsunami, particularly where populations have inferior health indicators. There is inadequate planning for maintenance and sustainability of what The risk of communicable disease is being built. Many NGO budgets do not outbreaks remains. Large population accommodate recurrent costs, yet much of the movements, including displaced families, reconstruction envisages improved facilities military personnel, returning combatants demanding more staff, equipment and running and international aid workers, can costs. A medium-term expenditure framework potentially increase the risk of MDR-TB, HIV that takes into account the recurrent costs transmission and AIDS. There is a need for of current capital investment and explores effective surveillance systems and active different options for financing the health sector programs against communicable diseases. In needs to be developed. connection with HIV transmission, there is a need to strengthen safe practices, for example The lack of functioning information with syringes and blood transfusions. Another systems prevents a clear assessment challenge is the occurrence of avian influenza of which agencies are supplying what and the need for a multi-sectoral approach to services to different populations. The deal with it. health sector will need to establish a consistent information base from which to plan and Chapter 3 Restoring Public Services 83 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? The water and sanitation infrastructure WATER AND throughout the province was in poor SANITATION condition before the tsunami. Years of conflict limited investment in urban networks, and reduced access to services in rural The earthquake and tsunami severely areas in Aceh. The PDAM for Banda Aceh damaged the limited water and sanitation was estimated to have less than 30 percent network. The damage included treatment service coverage. Over the entire province, installations, water tankers and vacuum only 9 percent of the population had piped trucks, the piping network, and wells. Banda water connections. In general, PDAM service Aceh's only sludge treatment facility was was irregular and water quality poor. Much destroyed. Local level drainage was rendered of the equipment was in neglect. The utilities ineffective, exacerbated by earthquake- were in debt, and institutional capacity induced land settlement. Many of the widely was low. Urban residents within the PDAM used shallow wells and aquifers in coastal coverage still relied on private vendors and areas have become contaminated and saline; shallow wells for drinking water. All sanitation it is unknown when they will stabilize or in Aceh was on-site, mainly using septic tanks decontaminate. The greatest damage was or pit latrines, both in urban and rural areas. suffered by individual households with more A central challenge for reconstructions is not than 150,000 homes being destroyed or so simply to build back as before, but to build severely damaged they lost water supply and back facilities that adequately serve the needs sanitation facilities. of the population and to develop systems that enable their efficient continued operation. Damage impacted human resources and the ability to respond. Twenty-eight Relief agencies and NGOs are still municipal water utility (PDAM) staff lost their providing basic water and sanitation lives, many of whom were department heads. services to IDPs living in tents and The loss of the capacity of local governments barracks or other temporary housing. and PDAMs precluded rapid restoration of the The focus now is to move these IDPs into larger networks. However, the government, TLCs. There is also a need to build more NGOs, donors, and local communities reacted TLCs and upgrade their services. `Umbrella' swiftly to provide basic services. Their service delivery approaches are now being response focused on providing emergency coordinated, where one agency is responsible water and sanitation services to more than for all services (water, sanitation, drainage, half a million people initially displaced by the solid waste, etc) at an assigned TLC. tsunami. Basic water and sanitation needs are now largely being addressed in all affected PROGRAMS TO RESTORE AND IMPROVE areas, including the needs of those living in WATER AND SANITATION SERVICES tents and barracks. The absence of outbreaks of water and fecal-borne disease confirms the Not all needs will be met with available success of these efforts. However, some of funding. Available funding from NGOs and the early work, notably for the temporary living donors for water and sanitation activities centers (TLCs), was designed to be temporary, in Aceh and Nias is estimated at US$213 and now needs to be upgraded. million. The majority of funds originate from 84 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version NGOs and internal agencies. The damage Siron 2 with both supplying water to Banda and loss assessment estimates are US$64 Aceh and Aceh Besar. UNICEF is planning million, or US$77 million when adjusted for to repair 20 other water treatment plants in inflation. These indicate a sector balance of Aceh. The Spanish Red Cross has repaired $137 million, and $131 for core needs. But and increased the capacity of the intake of this `surplus' is calculated on the cost of the treatment plant in Meulaboh. building back the previous, vastly insufficient piped water system, and poorly designed and · Design and reconstruction of Banda unsustainable on-site household water and Aceh's piped water network. The primary sanitation services. Building water distribution and secondary water supply network for and sewerage networks and household level Banda Aceh is being rehabilitated over the infrastructure that is adequate for current next 10 months with support from JICS and future needs will require more funds than to the value of US$5 million. The 177 km the replacement costs of the original assets. network will follow the existing alignment, The need may be even greater if the current and will include pipes, valves, water ad hoc and decentralized nature of program meters and standpipes. The new network delivery persists and issues of inadequate is designed to supply 90 percent of the coordination, strategic planning, and technical 279,000 projected population of Banda capacity are not addressed. Aceh (2009) through house connections. Several programs to restore and improve services are planned or operational: · Rural water supply. The ADB has allocated US$27 million for rehabilitation · Rehabilitation of drinking water of community water supply and sanitation treatment plants. The Swiss Government facilities, and construction of new facilities is financing the rehabilitation of the main based on community demand, coupled Lambaro water treatment plant while UNICEF with capacity building and training of water, and GTZ are financing works at Siron 1 and sanitation, hygiene and health staff at provincial, district and village level. It is also Composition of Financing in the Figure 3.6 providing hygiene and sanitation programs Health Sector (US$ million) for communities. GOI, 18 52 Multilateral donors · Rehabilitation of Banda Aceh's septic sludge treatment plant. Repairs and upgrades to the original sludge treatment plant were scheduled to be completed by mid-December (funded by JICS/JICA), increasing the original capacity from 30 to 50 cubic meters per day UNICEF is financing a new sludge treatment plant (60 cubic meters per day capacity) to be built next to the existing plant in 2006. NGOs, 108 31 Bilateral donors · PDAM capacity building. Training for PDAMs has been initiated by UNICEF, Source: BRR, World Bank staff estimates; see also Annex 6 USAID-ESP, IRD, Switzerland (the City Chapter 3 Restoring Public Services 85 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? of Geneva), and Netherlands/SAD-SAS, guidelines including those agencies engaged focusing initially on the operation of new in housing projects (v) develop the spatial, equipment and later for longer-term planning and strategy documents to guide programs. infrastructure programs and to coordinate donor assistance. BRR's infrastructure program unit is now fully established. It is engaged in seeking Solid waste management (SWM) programs and coordinating donor support, and reviewing have been established to support and prioritizing proposed programs. It aims to reconstruction. Following the dramatic initial (i) forge working partnerships with provincial post-tsunami clean-up by local authorities, the dinas, (ii) work with local governments who are UNDP implemented a successful program of operating at significantly reduced capacity, (iii) tsunami waste clean-up, focusing on recycling mobilize the right mix of technical assistance of solid waste. All shelter providers have been and human resources to implement projects instructed through BRR guidelines to allow (iv) establish and enforce design standards and for provision and financing of SWM systems, Box 3.4 THE NUSA DIARY: Water and sanitation NGOs responded commendably well to the return of displaced families to their damaged homes. Within weeks Mercy Corps, Oxfam and Islamic Relief were on the way to completing eight toilet blocks and a public outdoor washroom. Clean fresh water was more of a problem. The government water utility reconnected the water supply by early February but its operation proved inconsistent until the third quarter of the year when a 4 km- pipe connecting Nusa and a few other villages to the newly-repaired plant was finished. Until that happened, villages had supply problems because the water from the 20-plus wells which were sunk quite regularly became too saline to drink, even after boiling - leaving people with little choice but to walk several hundred meters to the closest source of water for clothes washing since the water tankers - usually sent daily by Islamic Relief - only provided enough for drinking and cooking. A large part of the problem was because the fields were still being regularly flooded with seawater in October due to a critical floodgate remaining unrepaired. This gate regulated water flow to the fields around Nusa and several other villages and its prolonged state of disrepair not only increased the salinity of the groundwater but also meant hundreds of farmers missed the 2005 rice-planting season. Even in October, Public Works officials could shed no light on when it might be repaired so, Care International and Mercy Corps were amongst those considering taking over responsibility for the project. including local collection points, and planning The accelerated progress of housing for collection and disposal. The spatial construction is often outpacing local planning and local government reconstruction development planning and water and program objective is for each settlement to sanitation provision. In urban and semi- have a basic SWM collection system and urban areas, poorly planned housing will designated sanitary landfill for disposal. create risks, including inadequate water and sanitation infrastructure, difficulty tapping into 86 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version the network, and the need for costly retrofits ISSUES FOR WATER AND SANITATION of infrastructure. There is a lack of spatial plans at the Not all completed work complies with district level to guide water, sanitation established standards. Field surveys and shelter construction. Until this is indicate poor quality of sanitation work, with addressed, houses will be built without septic tanks built too close to shallow wells, network connections, infrastructure will later or overflowing into open drains. Opportunities have to be retrofitted, and some major works to utilize communal septic tanks are being will simply be put on hold. BRR alone does missed. The relative difficulty of constructing not have the capacity to undertake or assist proper sanitation (versus water supply) is the participants in this complex task, but this creating an imbalance ­ with some shelter is a key bottleneck for all infrastructure and providers neglecting sanitation. Water and housing. ADB will provide support for village- sanitation design standards (from the Ministry level and kecamatan reconstruction planning of Public Works) exist, but are not well known in severely affected ones. Work on this is or utilized by some agencies involved in shelter already underway in one kecamatan. work. Septic tanks will be the sanitation choice in urban areas ­ the correct design, Accurate base maps are still not available. layout and construction is a top priority, as this There is a need for maps to a scale of will establish the foundations for public health 1:1,000, with 0.25-meter contour intervals for till 2030. infrastructure work in urban areas. Ground levels are reported to have changed in many Box 3.5 Piping Water to Villages Trócaire and its partner Catholic Relief Services (CRS) collaborate with other NGOs to improve conditions for the people living in the hills of Aceh Besar. What is happening today is true community mobilization and community spirit. Every village has to provide 20 men who will work on the pipe laying operation, connecting pipes, often digging the ground and at times building bridges to carry the supply. The water is taken from high in the hills and the pip- ing will cover 33 km, a huge distance in rugged territory. The communities are helping each other and have not received any money for their work. Pak (Mr.) Din and his friends have been working there since April. "Before the tsunami we were fishermen but now we are training to lay pipes and we will go home to our respective villages and teach others," he says. "Our village once had 351 people and now there are only 130 left so we must help provide a better quality of life for the survivors." The water will be piped into each of the 22 villages covered by the scheme where a communal filling station will be located. Each household will have the opportunity to take their own feed from the pipe and run water into their individual houses. "Before the tsunami, each house had its own well but now all the wells have salty water and are unusable," says Pak Din. Chapter 3 Restoring Public Services 87 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? areas, sinking up to 0.4 to 0.6 meters in involvement, with the recognized need for a Banda Aceh. The implications for the water more turn-key approach to service provision. table changes and provision of sewerage and BRR's preliminary proposed sector strategy local level drainage are formidable. is to create a new urban water supply utility as part of the reconstruction, rather than A strategic plan is needed for implementing assume that former PDAMs will be rebuilt and essential water and sanitation works. The re-staffed, and carry on in the same way as large volume of donor projects and the need before the tsunami. to initially focus on relief operations have made it difficult to efficiently allocate responsibilities, The sector is still difficult to coordinate. coordinate donor works, enforce uniform UNICEF was charged with coordinating the minimum design guidelines, and ensure emergency water and sanitation activities, overall water and sanitation sector needs are and has continued to play a key role in sector covered. coordinationaftertheemergencyphase. Cross- sectoral coordination, especially with agencies Existing databases are not yet effective involved in housing projects, has begun to be budgeting, programming, monitoring addressed since the establishments of BRR. and coordination tools. UNICEF is funding However, many projects pre-date BRR, so the a rapid district level appraisal which should sector is still largely decentralized. yield results before the end of 2005 and serve as a base for future monitoring. Improving There is a need to develop institutions not data collection and monitoring will improve just infrastructure. Future efforts should sector coordination, project selection, asset focus on operations, management, efficiency management, and quality of works. and PDAMs' financial sustainability. The strategy should take forward the lessons of Technical assistance is needed to support PDAM reform elsewhere: commercial behavior, project design, review and preparation management autonomy, customer orientation, works. Preparation work is beyond the capacity building and regionalization of small scope of BRR's mandate and the sheer non-viable PDAMs. The regional PDAM of volume of proposals submitted for review is Medan in North Sumatra may be an example already taxing. Local governments, utilities, to follow. New efforts to emphasize corporate and the provincial technical agencies lack the governance and public disclosure of efficiency resources to handle the load. Donor support indicators to make PDAMs more accountable is urgently needed in these areas to ensure are necessary. Rescheduling or writing-off BRR's budget for 2006 (US$600 million) is PDAMs' debts should be implemented, and adequately programmed, earmarked, and the phasing out of operational subsidies effectively managed and disbursed. over the time should be considered. In rural areas, the community-based model, with The capacity of local governments and communities fully in charge of choosing and water utilities is insufficient to address the managing the appropriate facilities should be reconstruction demands. All reconstruction encouraged (see chapter 1). activities need to address capacity building to ensure local governments can manage facilities Greater emphasis needs to be given to in the future. A key task will be balancing the sanitation. The lack of demand and political appropriate mix of local government or utilities will for improved sanitation, low willingness to 88 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version pay, and the lack of priority given to sanitation has resulted in low coverage and only small scale successes. Public awareness for TRANSPORT sanitation and environment, and public health and hygiene training should be launched without delay, with a strong focus on the The earthquake and tsunami destroyed responsibility of local government to improve extensive portions of the transport sanitation services, treatment and disposal, infrastructure, with the west coast road in and to facilitate the development of sustainable Aceh suffering the most damage. About service delivery. The reconstruction phase will 454 km of national, provincial, and local roads enable supporting agencies to work with local were severely damaged or washed out and will stakeholders to adopt a range of new models need to be rebuilt. Banda Aceh alone reported exploring sanitation marketing, hygiene and that 380 km of secondary urban roads were solutions for meeting the requirements of severely damaged. Throughout Aceh and condominiums in urban and peri-urban areas. Nias coastal bridges were completely washed The community-based sanitation system out or severely damaged and will need to developed over recent years provides a be replaced. Among the 19 seaports in locally-devised model for urban sanitation Aceh and Nias, 14 were classified as badly that is achievable within a few years and can damaged. This, combined with the damage be developed alongside more conventional to the ferry terminals and inter-island boat approaches and on-site sanitation. A critical stations, has limited small boat or landing craft element of a successful sanitation strategy, type (LCTs) vessel access in many places. Of which is often overlooked, will be to develop the 10 airports in Aceh and Nias, eight were sustainable sludge removal and treatment damaged. On the island of Simeulue, four systems. were badly damaged, leaving two inoperable. Local level and major basin storm drainage The early response ensured that relief is a big challenge, exacerbated by the operations could be conducted. The changes in ground levels. While water Ministry of Public Works and the Indonesian networks are relatively flexible to retrofit in the Army carried out emergency works to absence of mapping and planning ­ drainage reestablish strategic transport links on systems depend on levels and layouts. Until the west coast, including placement of an progress is made (including with the design extensive system of temporary bridges and of roads to dictate local street level drainage), construction of 40-50 km of new temporary flooding will be a significant problem affecting by-pass sections. Temporary Bailey bridges public health and progress of the shelter were established on the Tapaktuan-Bakongan reconstruction program. link, access roads were reestablished from Lhok Nga to Meulaboh, and emergency work was conducted on the Banda Aceh to Meulaboh link. Emergency repairs are failing and delaying relief and reconstruction work to communities on the west coast. The Chapter 3 Restoring Public Services 89 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? Indonesia Army did a commendable job Currently, there are very few programs for restoring access through emergency road reconstruction of the substantial number of works. The emergency repairs were mainly access roads which will be needed. temporary, and critical sections of the west coast road are already crumbling, with the RESTORING TRANSPORT SERVICES quick fix coconut timber bridges not sufficient for current loads and volume. Some sections BRR is updating the GoI master plan of the west coast road are again impassable for transportation in Aceh and Nias. due to on-going tidal over-flooding, damaged Transportation projects are currently being sea defenses, and heavy rain. Many developed in the absence of a coordinated communities along the west coast are now regionaltransportationplan.Localgovernments only accessible by boat, with overland routes and BRR are in general agreement on the cut-off. These areas require urgent repairs to vision of the future transportation plan, and ensure supplies can be delivered to support BRR has prepared a list of road projects as ongoing and future relief and reconstruction a basis for the 2006 budget. However, official work. The Multi Donor Fund is financing an planning documents with project justification, immediate Action Plan in an effort to prevent prioritization and backup information have a severe logistics bottleneck, impacting both reconstruction and on-going relief operations. Composition of Financing in Trans- Figure 3.9 port (US$ million The maintenance of emergency roads NGOs, 18 136 GOI exceeds the current capacity of local and provincial governments. To date, implementation of transportation programs coordinated through BRR has lagged. Hence, to ensure flow of supplies for their projects, most road rehabilitation activities are being implemented separately by donor agencies and NGOs, many of which are not infrastructure specialists. Only small portions of the roads on the 65 Multilateral easterncoastwereaffectedbythetsunami, Bilateral donors 310 donors but the heavy volume of overloaded trucks is accelerating the pace of damage Source: BRR, World Bank staff estimates; see also Annex 6 to the network. Maintenance is critical, and pavement strengthening is required to handle not yet been drafted. An initial appraisal of the expected traffic volumes. the damage to the kabupaten roads network is expected to be conducted as early as Most of the access roads connecting December 2005. This will be extended to Nias. communities to the west coast road Should any gaps be found in the provincial were washed out. With a major realignment road network these should also be met. This planned for the new road from Lamno to is a positive step forward and the information Meulaboh under USAID funding, the need will be utilized to assess the requirements of for new access roads will be substantial. the FY2006 program. 90 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version BRR has a budget of US$ 61.972 million for land, sea and air projects. In the FY 2006 for transportation for Aceh and Nias in budget, BRR has a budget of US$61.972 FY 2005. Tenders have been issued and the million. The budget covers important links execution of projects will be carried out by the to and within the central part of Aceh. These provincial dinas. The minister of public works investments are important both for transport has appointed project managers for roads reasons and for equity reasons to balance the and bridges projects, while the minister of major investments in the coastal regions. communication will appoint project managers Map 3.2 Rebuilding Aceh Transport ­ Current Works, Critical Issues, and Solutions Chapter 3 Restoring Public Services 91 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? PROGRESS IN TRANSPORT addressed. The Asian Development Bank plans to spend at least US$17.8 million to Road reconstruction from Banda Aceh to rehabilitate and repair the 490 km east coast Meulaboh has begun. USAID has signed road between Banda Aceh and the border an MOU with the Ministry of Public Works to with North Sumatra. This route is heavily reconstruct the roads from Banda Aceh to trafficked and many of the trucks operating Meulaboh. The road alignment from Lamno- on it are significantly overloaded. Because of Meulaboh will be a new alignment, which funding constraints, rehabilitation will mainly is still under selection. The new road will be for selective parts of the section between be Asian Highway Standard (seven-meter Banda Aceh and Sigli; essential repairs will carriageway with two-meter shoulders) and be undertaken for the remaining sections. will be 240 km long. The construction period It is likely that, once the rehabilitation and is proposed as four years. The project will repairs are completed and traffic normalizes, be implemented in two phases. Phase 1 (80 this route will likely need full reconstruction. In km) will undertake rehabilitation of the section addition to the east coast road, the ADB will from Banda Aceh to Lamno, with construction also finance a comprehensive rehabilitation lasting a period of one year. During the period program for the access roads for Krueung of construction, the contractor will repair and Raya and Ulee-Lheue ports. maintain the existing temporary road, although bridge strengthening is also needed to ensure Small scale bridges, secondary roads the passage of 20 ton trucks. This program and other transport investments are key is progressing on schedule and the road from constraint to delivering the reconstruction Banda Aceh to Lamno should be complete by program. Currently, the movement of supplies August 2006. Phase 2 (160 km) will extend into and throughout Aceh is extraordinarily the road from Lamno to Meulaboh along a new challenging. This is hampering humanitarian alignment ­ the alignment selection process and reconstruction efforts in the areas of food, is underway and is expected to be finalized water, and housing. As a result, several NGOs, soon. However, the design is likely to take six most notably Catholic Relief Services and the to 12 months to prepare before tendering for International Federation of the Red Cross, construction works can take place. in cooperation with BRR, are undertaking to support the operations. Rehabilitation of the existing road (115 km) from Calang to Meulaboh is a priority. Funding for airports has been committed Japan International Cooperation System (JICS) but reconstruction has barely started. A has committed US$45 million to rehabilitate preliminary assessment has determined that the existing road (115 km) from Calang to due to difficult access and road conditions Meulaboh. JICS is procuring the civil works there is an immediate need to repair the existing contractor, and the design and supervision airports, and to develop new temporary team is already in place. Bridge strengthening basic landing facilities in order to reach these and replacement should be a priority under affected areas. This will allow the use of fixed- this contract to ensure 20-ton truck passage wing aircraft which are more economical to along this route as soon as possible. operate than the current helicopter system operated by UNHAS and private operators. Repairs to east coast road between Banda There is committed funding for the following Aceh and North Sumatra are also being airports for FY2005 through BRR: Meulaboh, 92 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version Sabang and Rembele, but there is no sign of mode for movement of cargo outside the work having started. Construction work at greater Banda Aceh area. They presently carry Singkil Airport was temporarily halted during food and, will continue to perform that function the last three months for budgetary reasons, but excess space will be used for other cargo. but is expected to resume during FY2006. There is no accurate projection of how much BRR funding for Sinabang is committed for cargo must be brought into Aceh by sea, but FY2006. Also programmed for FY2006 are this is being actively researched by BRR. In the airports at Tapak Tuan and Pulau Tuanku, view of the magnitude of the rehabilitation and However, there is no committed funding for reconstruction effort, it appears the number of these airports. landing craft that are currently available will be inadequate. Handling capacity at affected ports is slowly being restored. Measures include: TRANSPORT ISSUES IN 2006 · Refurbishment of the ferry terminal and general cargo berth at Ulee Lheue: partly More coordination is needed to achieve operational by the end of 2005 appropriate standards and joint · Refurbishment of the ferry terminal at objectives. Coordination of donor works and Balohan proposed projects has improved. There was · Construction of a jetty at Malayahati by a difficult transition period as BRR assumed government of Netherlands, operational responsibility for coordination, planning, and within a few months programming of transportation projects ­ · Construction of a jetty at Meulaboh by carrying out many of the functions previously Singapore Red Cross dealt with by the Ministry of Public Works · Repair of facilities at Sabang, to be (national roads) and the provincial dinas operational within a few months binamarga (provincial roads). BRR's vision · New facilities for cargo and fish landing at is to work closely with NGOs, donors, and Lamno provincial authorities to plan and deliver the · New facilities at Calang, Sinabang, Nias, needed construction. Meulaboh Thereisnoupdatedregionaltransportation Construction of new facilities will take time to development plan. BRR, donors, and NGOs complete and, to meet immediate requirements are implementing projects, but not according for landing facilities (particularly in view of the to a plan that prioritizes projects, coordinates volume of aid and reconstruction materials), aid and allocates budgets, or one that takes plans are on hand to immediately construct into consideration local access roads. foreshore ramps for the use of landing craft at Calang, Meulaboh, Malayahati and Sinabang. The dinas binamarga lost 39 percent of its staff in the tsunami, and this loss, coupled with Sea transport plays an important role in budgetissuesandtheenormousreconstruction the ongoing relief but also the recovery demands, has significantly reduced its capacity effort. Much of the relief effort is transported by for design and supervision activities. There is two 400 ton capacity Landing Craft Transport a pressing need therefore to provide BRR with (LCTs). These vessels, operated by WFP, are a team of project management experts, as being fully utilized and are the main transport well as engineering design and construction Chapter 3 Restoring Public Services 93 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? supervision expertise to support the provincial Immediate repairs and improvement of processes already in place. access to ports is critical. Supplies must continue to flow for reconstruction work. A Maintenance and repairs are critical to long-term strategy also needs to be developed avoid a logistics bottleneck and keep to define the role for the private sector in port earlier emergency roads and bridges development and management. functioning. Priorities are the whole of the west coast, the sections most in need on the east coast and the more strategic of the central provincial links such as those out of Meulaboh. Emphasis should also be given to increasing the load capacity of existing bridges since many are only five to six tons. Key sections should be upgraded to accommodate 20-ton loads. The delivery in March 2005 of more than 1,000 meters of Bailey bridges from NATO has not been fully utilized and can be used to assist in these efforts, along with the on-going maintenance efforts of the JICS and USAID. The provincial network too must not be forgotten, especially the two inland links from Meulaboh to Geumpang/Keumala and to Takengon. Fuel supplies outside the greater Banda Aceh area are in short supply. Fuel is scarce, limiting the effective range of land, air, and sea transport operations. Fuel shortages for civil works outside the Banda Aceh area is also constraining construction activities and ensuring availability of adequate shipments and storage facilities is required. Currently, contractors, NGOs and international aid agencies often have to negotiate with Pertamina (the national fuel supplier) for specific shipments on an ad hoc basis. The road network needs to be extended to non-tsunami impacted areas. Future works also need to support the recent peace process, by improving the transportation links to more remote areas that were neglected during the conflict. 94 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version NOTES 8 UNICEF: 830,000 students, Save the Children: 150,000 students, 5,000 teachers. 9 UNOPS: "Structural Survey of School Damaged by the Tsunami and Earthquake in Aceh." March-August 2005. 10Children never attending school and children who have dropped out, SPAN 2005 Chapter 3 Restoring Public Services 95 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? 96 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Part I ONE YEAR AFTER - WHERE DO WE STAND? Chapter 4 SUSTAINABLE GROWTH Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? Long-term prospects for the people good coordination among the actors involved. of Aceh and Nias depend on achieving Only if the economic and environmental issues sustainable growth by creating steady go hand in hand will the region prosper. employment opportunities and lifting people out of poverty. Inevitably, the loss of life, destruction of housing, displacement of communities, damage to infrastructure and THE ECONOMY disruption to public services that overwhelmed Aceh and Nias following the disaster, severely affected the economy and environment. The impact of the earthquake and tsunami Economic impacts became evident in the loss was greater in Aceh than in any other of productive assets, a decline in per capita province of the affected countries. The income, rising prices of goods and services, impact (damage and losses) to GDP ratio in an increase in the share of non-performing Aceh province comes close to 100 percent. It loans, and rising reconstruction costs. The is followed by Phang Nga province in Thailand environmental impact was immediately (90 percent), the entire Maldives (84 percent), evident in the significant waste crisis left by the and Krabi and Phuket in Thailand (68 percent tsunami (more than six million cubic meters of each), as Figure 4.1 indicates. The impact of solid waste and debris) as well as damage to the March 28, 2005, earthquake on Nias and marine eco-systems, agriculture and mari- Nias Selatan has been less than 10 percent of culture lands. the total economy of North Sumatra province. The total impact, relative to the overall size of The sustainable growth of Aceh and the economy in Indonesia, is about 2 percent. Nias will depend largely on the removal It is higher than in India (0.2 percent) and of the obstacles affecting the long- Thailand (1.4 percent), but much lower than in term development of the region. Many of Sri-Lanka (7.6 percent) and the Maldives (83.6 these constraints were present prior to the percent). disaster. Policy actions will need to focus on modernizing the economy, diversifying exports, capitalizing on the peace agreement, improving the investment climate, and maximizing employment opportunities. Province-Level Impact-to-GDP Figure 4.1 ratios, % Sustainable growth and livelihood 100 90 opportunities are only possible if 80 immediate economic recovery and long- % 70 term development are environmentally ratio, 60 sustainable. The reconstruction phase itself 50 presents environmental challenges that need 40 30 to be carefully considered ­ first and foremost, 20 the potentially damaging effects of the impact-to-GDP 10 increasing demand for timber and masonry. 0 Environmentally-sustainable reconstruction Aceh Phang Nga Maldives Krabi Phuket (Thailand) (Thailand) (Thailand) and development will require planning and Source: World Bank Staff calculations 98 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version GROWTH about 20 percent. However, these aggregate numbers conceal substantial variation of the Current estimates indicate that in 2005 impact across kabupaten (Map 4.1)11. Aceh's GDP will decline by about 5 percent, and Nias's GDP will decline by In Aceh, the estimated impact on GDP varies Map 4.1 Projected Decline in 2005 GDP (%), by kabupaten SABANG (KOTA) 4.2 BANDA ACEH (KOTA) 18.2 ACEH BESAR 14.4 LHOKSUMAWE (KOTA) 0.2 PIDIE BIREUEN 5.5 3.4 ACEH UTARA 0.6 ACEH JAYA 86.4 BENER MERIAH ACEH TIMUR 1.6 LANGSA (KOTA) Decline in GDP (%) 0.7 ACEH TENGAH 50 to 90 ACEH BARAT 33.2 27.9 20 to 50 10 to 20 ACEH TAMIANG NAGAN RAYA 0.5 5 to 10 34.1 Below 5 GAYO LUES 32.4 No decline No data ACEH BARAT DAYA 2.4 ACEH TENGGARA 23.9 NIAS 20.6 ACEH SELATAN 36.0 NIAS SELATAN 19.2 SIMEULUE 56.0 ACEH SINGKIL 1.9 Source: World Bank staff estimates POVERTY from about a 0.5 percent decline in Aceh Utara and Aceh Tamiang to 56 percent and 86 Some 325,000 people in Aceh, and 149,000 in percent declines in Simeuleu and Aceh Jaya Nias and Nias Selatan combined will fall below respectively. In Nias island, the impact on GDP the poverty line in the absence of mitigation is estimated to be relatively equal between the mechanisms12. The actual pre-disaster poverty two kabupaten, with a 21 percent decline in headcount vs. estimated post-disaster poverty kabupaten Nias, and 19 percent decline in headcount by kabupaten is presented in Figure Nias Selatan. Map 4.213. It is important to bear in mind that the estimated increase in poverty does not Chapter 4 Sustainable Growth 99 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? Map 4.2 Poverty Headcount Before and After the Disaster, % Panel A. Poverty headcount before the disaster SABANG (KOTA) 31.5 BANDA ACEH (KOTA) 8.9 ACEH BESAR 29.9 LHOKSUMAWE (KOTA) 15.0 PIDIE BIREUEN 35.2 29.3 ACEH UTARA ACEH JAYA 34.2 31.6 BENER MERIAHACEH TIMUR 30.0 LANGSA (KOTA) Poverty Headcount 27.9 15.3 Before Disaster (%) ACEH BARAT ACEH TENGAH Above 45 35.7 35 to 45 ACEH TAMIANG NAGAN RAYA 25 to 35 25.2 35.9 GAYO LUES 15 to 25 32.4 Below 15 No data ACEH BARAT DAYA 28.0 ACEH TENGGARA NIAS 23.9 20.6 ACEH SELATAN 27.6 NIAS SELATAN 19.2 SIMEULUE 34.3 ACEH SINGKIL 28.9 Panel B. Poverty headcount after the disaster SABANG (KOTA) 35.8 BANDA ACEH (KOTA) 14.2 ACEH BESAR LHOKSUMAWE (KOTA) 44.1 15.1 PIDIE BIREUEN 41.6 32.5 ACEH UTARA ACEH JAYA 34.9 86.2 BENER MERIAHACEH TIMUR 31.6 LANGSA (KOTA) Poverty Headcount 15.7 After Disaster (%) ACEH BARAT ACEH TENGAH 27.9 Above 45 74.7 35 to 45 ACEH TAMIANG NAGAN RAYA 25 to 35 25.7 76.4 GAYO LUES 15 to 25 32.4 Below 15 No data ACEH BARAT DAYA 30.2 ACEH TENGGARA 23.9 NIAS 53.1 ACEH SELATAN 36.0 NIAS SELATAN 52.5 SIMEULUE 72.7 ACEH SINGKIL 30.6 Source: World Bank staff estimates 100 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version take into account the mitigating impact of between Banda Aceh and Meulaboh rose from food aid, cash-for-work programs, and other Rp 30,000 in December 2004 to Rp 350,000 mechanisms of lifting people's welfare. The in January 2005, before declining again to Rp estimated increase in poverty is also likely to 150,000 in April. be temporary rather than permanent. However, these estimates can definitely serve as a good Prices then stabilized but increased proxy for the increase in the number of people dramatically with the fuel price hike. After vulnerable to poverty. the substantial increase immediately following the tsunami, prices stabilized as transportation improved and market supply of major goods Figure 4.2 CPI Trends (Various cities) increased14. Between April and October 2005 prices in Banda Aceh increased by only an % yoy additional 3.5 percent, making the total price 40.0 Banda Aceh increase since December 2004 an estimated 35.0 18.7 percent. The nationwide fuel price 30.0 25.0 increase in October dramatically increased 20.0 15.0 Figure 4.3 CPI Increase in October 2005 10.0 5.0 % 0.0 Jun-04 Aug-04 Oct-04 Dec-04 Feb-05 Apr-05 Jun-05 Aug-05 Oct-05 14.0 12.4 11.9 Banda Aceh Lokseumawe Medan Jakarta 12.0 10.0 8.6 8.7 Source: BPS, World Bank Staff calculations 7.9 8.0 Inflation 6.0 4.0 Since the tsunami, prices in the affected 2.0 regions have increased more sharply than 0.0 the national average. The most dramatic Banda Aceh Lokseumawe Medan Jakarta Indonesia increase has been in Banda Aceh, which serves as the regional hub for the reconstruction Source: BPS, World Bank Staff calculations activities. Year-on-year inflation in October prices in the disaster-affected region. The 2005 reached 37.5 percent in Banda Aceh, CPI index in Banda Aceh increased by 12.4 23.4 percent in Medan, and 18.3 percent in percent during October alone, a figure much Lhokseumawe, compared to 17.9 percent higher than the nationwide increase (Figure nationwide (see CPI trends in Figure 4.2). The 4.3). This spike in inflation contributed to the major increase in prices occurred immediately overall increase in prices in Banda Aceh of after the tsunami. During the first four months 33.6 percent since December 200415. the CPI in Banda Aceh registered an increase of 14.7 percent. The increase in prices during The transition from the relief to reconstruction this period was mostly driven by damaged or phase pushed up the prices of construction destroyed roads and supply constraints. For materials and construction workers' wages. instance, the cost of one-way transportation Since December 2004, prices of materials in- creased on average by about 50 percent (see Chapter 4 Sustainable Growth 101 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? Figure 4.4 Prices of Selected Construction Materials, Oct. 2005 vs. Dec. 2004 price, Rp. 120,000 100,000 80,000 % change 60,000 40,000 44.4 100.0 74.8 31.6 123.0 20,000 0 cement (50 kg.) brick (x100) wood multilayer wood sand (m3) (5/10X400cm) (120x240 cm.) Dec-04 Oct-05 Source: BPS, World Bank Staff calculations Figure 4.5 Construction Workers' Wages, Oct. 2005 vs. Oct. 2004 Daily wage, Rp. 80,000 70,000 % change 60,000 50,000 40,000 45.8 37.9 33.3 55.2 72.4 81.8 105.5 30,000 20,000 10,000 0 unskilled painter mechanic brick layer plumber supervisor superintendent Oct-04 Oct-05 Source: BPS, World Bank Staff calculations Credit exchange for damaged bills. None of the commercial banks in Aceh and Nias requested The banking system responded rapidly liquidity support from Bank Indonesia. When despite significant loss and internal liquidity was needed, the local banks received difficulties. The actions by Bank Indonesia it from their respective headquarters. (the central bank) in the aftermath of the tsunami resulted in the rapid restoration of Total assets of the banking system basic payment operations, customers' access declined by 10 percent in the immediate to their accounts with easy identity verification aftermath of the tsunami but have partially processes, and the issuance of new bills in recovered. By the end of September 2005 102 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version assets had exceeded their pre-tsunami levels capital. For instance, 45 employees, or 7.2 by 14.1 percent in nominal terms, but still percent of the Bank BPD workforce, were remained 4 percent below the pre-tsunami killed in the tsunami. levels in real terms (Table 4.1). The composition of losses indicates that the greatest loss The tsunami has left many debtors resulted from unrecoverable loans and the loss incapable of repaying loans, which has of major inventories. This is illustrated for the reduced banks' income and increased the local Bank Pembangunan Daerah (BPD) (see number of non-performing loans (NPLs). Figure 4.6) which lost 33.5 billion Rupiah, 66 The percentage of non-performing loans in percent of which was attributed to commercial the Aceh banking system increased from 2.8 loans and working capital. But these numbers percent in December 2004 to 11.3 percent in illustrate only material losses. The earthquake May 2005, but it declined to 7.8 percent in and tsunami also caused huge loss of human September 2005, partly because many NPLs were restructured or written off (Table 4.1). In The Composition of Disaster-Re- Figure 4.6 the worst-affected areas NPL reached rates lated Losses by Bank BPD as high as 40-50 per cent. Most of the banks' losses resulted from commercial loans, since Office buildings, 2.3% 10.0% Other inventories assets were not insured for loss from natural Vehicles, 1.0% disasters. Losses on consumer loans have Office inventories, 10.0% been covered through life insurance payments by insurance companies. For those loans that are still potentially recoverable, banks are offering various types of restructuring. These include: (i) Other assets, 9.2% extending the repayment period (ii) reducing the interest rate (iii) requesting only payment of 68.2% Working capital and commercial loans principal (iv) offering a grace period. For write- off loans, banks are trying to partially recover total estimated loss = 33.5 billion Rp. losses by selling existing collateral through the special auction agency. Source: BPS, World Bank Staff calculations Figure 4.4 Prices of Selected Construction Materials, Oct. 2005 vs. Dec. 2004 Dec-03 Dec-04 Mar-05 Jun-05 Sep-05 Total Assets, billion Rp. (in current prices) 9880 10783 10061 11092 12301 Total Assets, billion Rp. (in Dec. 2004 prices) 10226 10783 9160 9754 10357 Outstanding Credits, billion Rp. (in current prices) 2123 3201 3327 3514 3605 Outstanding Credits, billion Rp. (in Dec. 2004 prices) 2197 3201 3029 3090 3035 Deposits, billion Rp. (in current prices) 7656 7952 8298 9465 10236 Deposits, billion Rp. (in Dec. 2004 prices) 7924 7952 7554 8323 8618 Loan-to-deposit ratio (LDR), (%) 28 40 40 37 35 Non-performing loans (NPLs), (%) 2.7 2.8 6.7 10.0 7.8 Chapter 4 Sustainable Growth 103 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? One of the main concerns has been the cars that are often used for small business lack of a coordinated government strategy purposes or leased to NGOs (ii) small scale on NPLs, and debtors who have no assets traders stocking up (this category is more than now to repay loans: An initiative16 has been 50 percent of the total) and (iii) construction undertaken recently to provide the write-off contractors who need working capital. procedures for debts incurred by state-owned enterprises. However, private enterprises, In their lending practices, several banks including commercial banks, are left to deal appear to have become more flexible in with this problem on their own. their collateral requirements. For instance, Bank BPD accepts a letter from the village A recent Bank Indonesia regulation17 head stating that the land belongs to the loan provides more latitude for banks applicant. This flexibility is important since land in treating debtors affected by the certificates/titles were either destroyed during earthquake/tsunami, but it does not the disaster, or did not exist in the first place. fundamentally solve the problem of bad Bank Mandiri allows for less than 100 percent debts accumulated by commercial banks. collateral, but requires the uncollateralized The regulation allows commercial banks part of the loan to be insured, which adds to provide debt restructuring and/or new about 1.5-2 percent to the cost of the total credit to disaster victims. Nevertheless, it is volume of the insured loan. However, for most ultimately the decision of the commercial bank commercial loans 100 percent collateral is still ­ one which depends on the bank's credit a standard requirement. policy and the debtor's business prospects. Managers of commercial banks have indicated The recent increase in deposits has that the losses suffered by branches affected not yet kick-started significant lending by the disaster will be borne by the nationwide activities. Total deposits increased in real system of branches. terms by 10.2 percent in the second quarter of 2005, and by a further 3.5 percent in the Despite causing substantial losses to third quarter of 2005 as financial resources local banks, the bad debts accumulated from donors started to flow in. However, by banks in the disaster-affected areas although the amount of credits extended by will not impact macroeconomic stability. banks between March and September 2005 The main reason for this is that the size of the increased by 8.3 percent in nominal terms, banking system in Aceh/Nias is only a very it remained practically unchanged in real small part of the national banking system. For terms. By the end of September, 2005, the instance, Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) has outstanding volume of credits, in real terms, only 1.5 percent of its total nationwide loan was still 5.2 percent lower than pre-tsunami portfolio in Aceh, and out of this 1.5 percent volume (table 4.1). only a small share has been affected since not all credit activities were in the disaster-affected Banks in both Aceh and Nias are confident areas. the reconstruction phase will stimulate the revival of the banking sector18. Most bank Banks are reporting an increasing volume managers expect profits in 2006 since the of operations with new customers. These reconstruction activities will be in full bloom. customers consist mostly of: (i) individuals Banks in Aceh also have great expectations buying durable consumer goods, including about the peace agreement, since the conflict 104 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version had depressed economic activity and thus and Calang where 70,000 hectares were banking sector development in the region for damaged and above-ground infrastructure a long time. was erased (see Figure 4.7 for an example of damage in Banda Aceh and Aceh Besar). Table 4.2 summarizes information on environmental ENVIRONMENT impact throughout Aceh and Nias. The disaster generated large amounts The tsunami and earthquakes caused of solid waste and it is estimated that substantial environmental damage in Aceh nearly six million cubic meters of debris and Nias, but with some variation across accumulated in Banda Aceh alone. This the affected region. The effects of the solid waste material (predominately composed tsunami varied considerably, correlating with of saline waters, sands and clay particles proximity to the fault line and the predominant contaminated with a mix of chemicals, oil, direction of the tsunami wave. The areas on sewage, building materials and decomposing Figure 4.7Surface Coverage of the Damaged Area by Function, Banda Aceh and Aceh Besar19 the west coast were more damaged than bodies) constituted a major environmental areas on the north-east and eastern coasts. health problem, blocking river courses and Marine and terrestrial areas along the west other surface water drainage channels. coast that were in the path of the tsunami have The environmental problems created by experienced almost total destruction. From the tsunami were exacerbated during the the infrastructure and settlement perspective, initial clean-up. Some of the tsunami waste the most severe damage was in the urban and was dumped in inappropriate areas. Rice peri-urban areas of Banda Aceh, Meulaboh Chapter 4 Sustainable Growth 105 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? fields, fish/shrimp ponds and other areas of culture infrastructure including banks, dyke sometimes unaffected land became dumping walls and gates were completely destroyed. grounds for this waste. Although most of the affected agricultural areas can be recovered for cultivation in a Drinking water wells and rivers were reasonable time, soil fertility is one of the main heavily contaminated. A complex amalgam concerns in the short to medium term. To of mud-laden residues infiltrated natural and revive agriculture and the livelihoods of many, man-made water sources. Heavy clay soils, an integrated approach is required to repair which were predominant in the affected region, the physical damage and revitalize farming were inundated with salt water. Moreover, solid systems. Critical problems include subsidence particles from debris and dried mud reduced and water-logged land, impact of sediment the air quality. deposits over topsoil, severe erosion, saline conditions and the lack of efficient drainage Severe damage occurred to marine due to blocked channels. Rapid reclamation ecosystems. In many places, the coastline is achievable in low to medium affected areas was physically altered, with losses of beaches, but it will require time to leach salts through changes in riverbeds and the rise and fall a combination of rainfall, irrigation and drainage. Table 4.2 Environmental Damage Indicators Indicator Magnitude of Damage Local environmental agencies suffered Mangrove 2,711 ha severe losses in capacity in the Coastal forest 50,000 ha disaster. BAPEDALDA, the local authority Coral reef 19,000 ha responsible for environmental assessment Coastline 800 km and management, suffered a high level of Aquaculture 20,400 ha staff loss (30 percent of the employees died Agricultural land 64,000 ha in the tsunami). Buildings, records, office Groundwater/soil con- 167,324 ha equipment and mobile laboratories were tamination also destroyed or damaged, including those Tsunami waste 5,765,000 m3 of the Environmental Center at Syiah Kuala University. BAPEDALDA needs to urgently Source: BRR, UNHIC, FAO, UNDP reinforce its capacity so it can successfully of large tracts of inter-tidal land. In Nias for collaborate and ultimately take ownership of, instance, several jetties and piers associated the critical environmental rehabilitation work with fishing activities were left high and dry that is being programmed20. above the water line, indicating the severity of the change. While it is known that coral Environmental damage in Nias is marked. conditions in the region varied widely prior to The damage in Nias has both similarities and the tsunami, rapid EIA studies conducted in differences to that reported in Aceh. On the January reported that shallow coral reefs were one hand, like Aceh, the main concerns are lodged with solid waste as were other marine poor quality of water and inadequate sanitation ecosystems. due to damaged infrastructure. On the other The most significant environmental hand, large tracts of coastal lands have been damage to the local economy is the loss lifted, changing the coastline. Unconfirmed of shrimp/fish ponds, rice fields and land estimates indicate that more than 250 hectares classified as horticultural gardens. Mari- 106 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version of coral reefs near Nias have been destroyed, needed for the rehabilitation and restoration but anecdotal reports confirm that fish have of the environment to pre-tsunami migrated further away from the coastline and conditions. To date, only about US$87.3 many fishing communities have lost their million has been committed for rehabilitation and livelihoods (see further information on Nias in protection of the environment. US$44.8 million chapter 6). However, in light of recent coral has been committed from multilaterals (including reef field work, it is not clear whether this US$ 28.6 million from the Multi-Donor Fund), damage was caused solely by the disaster or US$22.1 million from NGOs, US$10.4 million by previous human activities. from bilateral donors and US$10.0 million from domestic sources. THE RECOVERY PROGRAM AND PLEDGED RESOURCES PROGRESS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION The minimum costs of restoring environmental infrastructure have been Detailed assessments of the damage estimated at US$175 million. This includes were carried out by a range of national rehabilitatingdamagedecosystemsandrebuilding and international environmental actors. capacity for environmental management. A number of donor efforts supplemented the Environmental recovery represents a significant Ministry of Environment (MOE) preliminary site proportion of the rehabilitation and reconstruction assessments, data collection, sampling and works and will require long-term commitment. analysis that were conducted for the purposes of The effort is not expected to be easy, not only emergency planning and coordination process, due to the scale of the damage but also due and subsequent recovery and rehabilitation to the lack of resources and immediate skills planning. needed for ecological rehabilitation. Successful recovery depends on the revival of livelihoods · UNEP conducted an early rapid environmental and the involvement of communities in decisions assessment (REA) and developed a joint that affect them. proposal for strengthening environmental disaster assessment and response capacity There is currently a shortfall of the funds within the MOE. Composition of Financing in the · FAO conducted initial aerial surveys of impacts Figure 4.8 Environment Sector (US$ million) on agriculture and fisheries as well as ground sampling. NGOs 24 6.0 GOI · UNESCO initiated a voluntary Environmental Assessment Coordination Network comprising local and international NGOs and academic institutions to assess coral reefs, mangroves and sea grasses. · UNDP conducted a survey on environment and human health. · USAID conducted a coastal assessment. Bilateral donors, 10 45 Multilateral donors, This presents an integrated approach for preserving environmental assets, developing sustainable coastal resources and mitigating Source: BRR, World Bank staff estimates; see also Annex 6. Chapter 4 Sustainable Growth 107 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? environmental impacts of coastal development timber. along the Banda Aceh to Meulaboh road corridor. Government has adjusted procedures for environmental impact assessments The cleaning up of the massive solid waste to support environmentally-friendly is now largely complete. The first stage in reconstruction. The Minister of Environment environmental recovery has been led by local has decreed new legislation to cope with the governments utilizing local contractors, military pace of reconstruction activities needed in Aceh vehicles and heavy equipment. Community and Nias. BAPEDALDA is coordinating with recycling activities and `cash-for-work' initiatives donor agencies to organize an informal forum supported the process. With international to discuss the need to support environmental support, the huge effort resulted in most debris services during the relief, rehabilitation and in Banda Aceh and Meulaboh being cleared by reconstruction periods. end-March, 2005. During the last six months, a large portion of the solid waste was moved ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES FOR 2006 AND to managed sites, particularly in Banda Aceh. BEYOND However, in some parts of the west coast (where a great deal of debris including vegetation, soil The major environmental challenges in the and building masonry was swept out to sea) the recovery effort include waste management, cleaning up operations is still continuing. restoration of damaged ecosystems and mitigating the environmental impact of Several initiatives to enhance the reconstruction. Waste management continues environmental assessment of the recovery to be a priority in the long term. Without program have already been undertaken. economically viable demolition waste recycling Germany (GTZ) has a project to enhance the initiatives, waste debris will continue to present planning and impact assessment capacity of a physical barrier to housing and agricultural BAPEDALDA in order to facilitate a sustainable redevelopment and remain a constant recovery process and respond to the psychological reminder of the disaster. UNDP has environmental needs of the Master Plan of Aceh taken the lead in this field through the Tsunami Rehabilitation and Reconstruction. With support Recovery Waste Management Program with the fromCIDA,ADBandothers,BAPPENAShasbeen aim of installing an effective and practical waste collaborating on a Strategic Natural Resource management system, including the selection of and Environmental Assessment (SNREA) to proper dumping or recycling sites21. complement the Master Plan and assist BRR in their implementation activities. BAPEDALDA is A primary environmental infrastructure working with Syiah Kuala University, Panglima challenge is the safe disposal of sewage. Laot and local NGOs to coordinate environmental There was almost no sewage treatment in Aceh efforts. WWF is also working to strengthen and Nias before the tsunami; septic tanks were representation from Aceh in the current planning the most common form of sanitation, invariably process through the engagement of civil society leaking sewage and contaminating water from representatives from the region. They are also wells. The potential of health risks from sewage highlighting environmental issues that may be contamination and environmental stress due to associated with the recovery and rehabilitation dumping of domestic garbage in rivers is a central process, in particular potential deforestation issue in the waste management reconstruction caused by high demands for reconstruction 108 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version program. USAID, through International Relief involved with ecologically-friendly and bottom- and Development (IRD), is addressing short-term up site planning in greater Banda Aceh area. sewage treatment needs with the repair of Banda Encouraging protection in association with Aceh's sewage treatment plant and provision of human settlements reduces the pressure on sludge trucks (for more details on Water and land and helps preserve upland watershed forest Sanitation see chapter 3). areas critical for flood protection and improving water quality within the watershed. UNEP has Rehabilitation of damaged ecosystems prepared a project on coastal re-vegetation at will be achieved by facilitating natural three sites damaged by the tsunami in Simeulue, regeneration and investing in restoration. Sabang Island and Aceh Besar. At each site, Where possible, all programs with potential local people will be provided with the knowledge environmentalimpactarerequiredtopassthrough and skills needed to design and implement the AMDAL procedures as well as additional EIA rehabilitation programs. requirements of individual donors. This includes the potential impact of road reconstruction A major concern in the reconstruction and projects such as that adjacent to the Leuser rehabilitation program is the environmental Forest, but also the potential contribution of public impact of reconstruction. There is much spaces to the landscape. Such an approach can concern from all agencies of the potentially be linked to bioengineering of coastal protection severe damage to the environment associated features such as sustainable fish/shrimp ponds with the demand for building material, especially (strongly linked to replanted mangrove systems) timber and masonry. and coastal forestry systems. · BRR has estimated a demand for timber of around 1.5 million m3 of timber. FAO Mangrove restoration is a particular priority estimates that 70 percent of this timber will in the long-term and will require ongoing be required to fuel the rudimentary and highly commitment and monitoring from all inefficient brick kilns in the region. If this was stakeholders. Restoration has been initiated to be supplied from local sources, it would in Banda Aceh and Aceh Besar with assistance mean logging between 125,000 and 250,000 from local and international NGOs22. BRR hectares of forest. recently hosted the launch of a major support · Estimates vary but some research indicates program for mangrove re-establishment, with a that only one in ten logs sourced across particular focus on sustainable livelihoods and Indonesia can be considered to be legal. community participation. It is therefore inevitable that some timber being used in current recovery works would The Ministry of Environment is promoting be illegally sourced and, as a result, cause local restoration initiatives using eco-village increased deforestation. Illegal logging and eco-town concepts. The ADB Spatial and consistent shortfalls of domestic timber Planning and Environmental Management production could mean that natural areas programispresentlyworkingatboththeprovincial close to the tsunami-affected zone23 would be andkecamatanleveltoimproveplanninginitiatives vulnerable to exploitation. for reconstruction and rehabilitation program. · BRR has committed to using legal timber The AIPRD Spatial Village Planning program is for the reconstruction process, prioritizing the assisting in land validation and ownership issues source from national production. To respond in many villages. A number of NGO initiatives are to illegal logging issues, the BRR plans to Chapter 4 Sustainable Growth 109 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? design a Task Force on Wood Supply, Forestry Efforts are being made to mainstream the and Environment involving Government, local importance of the environment and create and international NGOs, and other related a coordinated response. The Indonesian institutions. Donors can provide some timber State Ministry of Environment, UNEP, national from sustainable sources as part of their aid and international NGOs held a Green Aceh programs. Alternative resources will also be conference in June 2005 in Banda Aceh. The considered such as coconut trees, bamboo conference was conceived as a marketplace of and recycled debris. ideas on how to integrate good environmental · There is also evidence of accelerated and practices into reconstruction plans in tsunami- uncontrolled quarrying of stone and affected areas. It focused on practical steps unwashed river aggregates in reconstruction for environmentally-friendly reconstruction, project areas such as the Banda Aceh Sea the urgency of `green reconstruction', coastal Defence System. This sea wall alone could and sustainable fisheries management; waste use up to 330,000 m3 of stone. These management, water and sanitation as well quarrying operations can further degrade as community participation, monitoring and forest ecosystems and do not promote the local laws24. Augmenting this conference, recycling of demolition debris (including the USAID's Environmental Services Program and concrete floor slabs). BAPEDALDA held training for construction managers from a range of organizations to build Environmentally-sustainable reconstruction practical skills in environmentally-sound design. requires planning and involves a range of actors committed to environmental The political goodwill and financial objectives. The FFI and the Leuser International resources generated by the tsunami should Foundation are working on the largest initiative be used to build economies and societies to protect and manage the Leuser and adjacent that are socially and ecologically resilient. Ulu Masen ecosystems, with US $17.5 million The damage to marine and terrestrial resources to be provided by the Multi-Donor Fund. Leuser needs to be addressed but should not distract National Park will complement this effort with attention from the persistent problems of regional assistance from UNESCO to increase its capacity resource management. Neither conservation to monitor and manage. The Indonesian Eco- priorities nor short and long term land utilization labeling Institute (LEI) is available to develop and management issues have been changed a simple, transparent and inclusive Chain of by the tsunami, but the reconstruction presents Custody system and has the necessary support. an opportunity for building back in a manner CIDA is also helping to facilitate the shipment of that is both better and more environmentally timber from Canada. USAID is supporting WWF's sustainable. Timber for Aceh Initiative to ship donated timber to Aceh. The Multi-Donor Fund housing project is introducing a timber procurement monitoring system to track and report back on timber procurement patterns during the initial phase while the ADB's SPEM program is producing guidelines to assist eco-friendly procurement of building materials. 110 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version NOTES 11The methodology of estimating the impact on GDP at kabupaten level is presented in the Annex. 12The poverty line is grounded in the concept of consumption. It represents the monetary value of the typical food basket that provides 2100 calories per capita per day plus the necessary non-food expenditures. The poverty line is equal to Rp 129,615 (US$13) and Rp 108,535 (US$11) per capita per month for Aceh and Nias, respectively. 13To estimate the changes in poverty at the kabupaten level we have used the elasticity of poverty with respect to growth whereby a 1 percent decrease in per capita GDP transforms into 1 percentage point increase in the poverty headcount ratio. 14Food aid ­ via Dolog's market operations and food-aid program of agencies such as WFP ­ also helped to stabilize food prices. 15The price developments on Nias in the aftermath of the March 28, 2005 earthquake are discussed in a separate chapter on Nias. 16The Ministry of Finance, regulation no. 31/PMK.07/2005. 17 No. 7/45/PBI/2005 (issued on November 11, 2005). This regulation replaced the previous BI regulation No.7/5/ PBI/2005 dated January 20, 2005. 18 More discussion on the banking sector in Nias is provided in a separate chapter. 19 Maps of other areas are not presented here due to space constraints. 20 Since October, BAPEDALDA has been organizing a regular coordination meeting of donors and organizations ac- tive in the environmental sector. 21The project is being executed under UNDP's Emergency Response and Transitional Recovery (ERTR) Program in partnership with BRR. The project budget is estimated at US$60 million. The ERTR and Multi-Donor Fund com- mitments are US$14.5 million and US$15.2 million, respectively. Other actors working in the waste management scheme are UNEP, GTZ/ProLH and Danida via support to provincial and district BAPEDALDA. ADB has contributed US$15 million for Spatial Planning and Environmental Management Program while CIDA is working with Canadian consultants on waste management guidelines and strategies. Also included are international NGOs (Oxfam, IRD, Mercy Corp, AusCare, ACTED) and national NGOs (Yehdua, YBI, IDEP). 22International NGOs inlcude Pugar, Yagashu, Japan Surf, Islamic Relief and Oxfam. FAO has funding from the EC for mangrove replanting. Support may also be provided by Koica (Korea), Oisca (Japan) and others to Wetlands International Indonesia for the development of sustainable livelihoods. The Multi-Donor Fund has been identified as a potential mechanism to support mangrove reforestation through community-based schemes. 23 The Leuser ecosystem--a major habitat for Sumatran orangutans, tigers, elephants and rhinoceros--is already un- der pressure from illegal logging, and could be a target for accelerated logging processes in a worst case scenario. 24 Aceh's Governor Mr. Azwar Abubakar recently declared Aceh a designated "green province," with 40 % of the area to be protected as limited-use areas so the need to obtain timber for reconstruction does not destroy remaining forests. Chapter 4 Sustainable Growth 111 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? 112 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Part I ONE YEAR AFTER - WHERE DO WE STAND? Chapter 5 THE PEACE PROCESS AND RECOVERY Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? The tsunami of December 26, 2004, occurred sides and, in part, the impact of the tsunami. This in a province that was already experiencing agreement is the best hope for peace in Aceh a large-scale disaster, albeit one of man's for many years. Both the negotiators in Helsinki own making. A conflict lasting almost 30 years and the EU- and- ASEAN-led Aceh Monitoring between the Government of Indonesia (GoI) Mission (AMM) have learned the lessons from the and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) had left failed Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) 15,000 people dead and triggered a large-scale of 2002-2003. Many of the social, political, and population displacement. Much infrastructure economic factors that have kept Aceh in a state was destroyed during the conflict. Schools of perpetual war were considered in the MoU. A were particularly targeted25. Insecurity was few months later, important progress has been high amongst a population caught between two made and people are increasingly confident that warring sides and movement restrictions had peace will hold. considerable negative impacts for farmers and fishermen. On August 15, 2005 the GoI and GAM signed a peace agreement (the "Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding," or MoU). It resulted from changes in the political environment, the fluctuating fortunes of both Box 5.1 THE NUSA DIARY: Impact of the Conflict and Peace Process According to the villagers, Nusa had never witnessed fighting during the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) insurgency but since rebels regularly passed through the vicinity, Indonesian military (TNI) patrols had become a part of life. This became a problem in March when one man claimed he was accosted by a group of soldiers during a trip up to the hills above the village to tend his crops. He said he was questioned for 90 minutes during which time he was repeatedly threatened even though he was carrying his identity card. "Their parting words were that if I told anyone about what happened they would slit my throat," he told me. As a consequence, everyone else who had plots up in the hills became too frightened to tend their fields precipitating a mini food crisis which added to the extremely high levels of stress. Some soldiers were deployed to the village shortly after the tsunami but they did virtually nothing to help, which bred further resentment towards the TNI. This was mollified slightly in August when 14 troops arrived for unexplained "security reasons" -and they did help with village activities. Sympathy for GAM was hard to gauge but I would say it was on the minimal side. Having said that, the two former GAM members who returned to the village after being released as part of the peace process were welcomed back without any fuss and appeared to settle well into village life. Their reintegration was undoubtedly helped by the fact that their respective families were popular. But their presence has a tenuous basis and if the conflict flares up again matters could rapidly become complicated. "I'm following orders, that's why I've returned," one GAM intelligence operative told me. "If I'm ordered to resume the struggle I`d do it immediately." John Aglionby (The Guardian) 114 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version The tsunami created an unprecedented Implementation details are often unclear, opportunity for peace and recovery in Aceh, and many issues remain unresolved. Next but many challenges remain. Unlike the past year should see the passing of a new governance there are now substantial resources ­ human law that will affect the relationship between and financial ­ in Aceh that can be a foundation Banda Aceh and Jakarta. The law, to serve as for the consolidation of peace. Yet, such an implementing legislation for the MoU, will almost opportunity can only be sustained if continued certainly be contested. Elections for the position attention is given to the many issues that will of governor, and for many of the Bupati (district arise in the implementation of the agreement. heads), are also due for the coming year, and will While this peace agreement is more holistic than provide the first fora for open political competition previous ones, the MoU outlines just the bare involving GAM personnel. bones of a settlement (Box 5.2) Box 5.2 The Memorandum of Understanding The MoU has six sections which cover the following areas: - Governing of Aceh - Human Rights - Amnesty and Reintegration into Society - Security Arrangements - Establishment of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) - Dispute Settlement See Annex 7 for the full text of the MoU. The period following the Aceh Monitoring conflict program which addresses the conflict's Mission's (AMM) departure ­ currently symptoms and attacks its underlying causes is scheduled for March 15 - will be critical. thus fundamental to the success of the transition Over time, development assistance, both national from the current promising, but fragile, short- and international, will need to target the specific term recovery to longer-term reconstruction and needs of those in conflict-affected areas of Aceh development. in addition to tsunami-affected regions. Given the fact that many communities have suffered CONFLICT DYNAMICS POST-TSUNAMI from both the tsunami and conflict, the recovery AND MoU processes clearly need to be integrated more deeply. Conflict was on the increase after the tsunami till the signing of the peace Ensuring that peace holds in Aceh is key for agreement. Immediately following the tsunami, the security and well-being of the Achenese the number of incidents between GoI and GAM people. Even before the tsunami, GDP was tailed off almost to zero since both sides had lost falling in Aceh due to the conflict. Without a troops, diverted their attention to help victims, successful and sustained peace process, it will and took time to adjust strategies. However, as be hard to create a stable investment climate the emergency reconstruction started and then and to reinvigorate economic growth. A post- moved into the rehabilitation and redevelopment Chapter 4 Sustainable Growth 115 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? phase, conflict incidents became more common ended and both parties appear to be strongly (see Figure 5.1). Despite increasing conflict levels, committed to the peace agreement. few international agencies focused attention to the conflict context in which they were working, Box 5.3 Peace in Cot Tufah raising risks that insufficient consideration would be given for how aid flows influenced pre-existing Citizens in Cot Tufah in the sub-district of Paya tensions on the ground26. Bakong, North Aceh, are now facing life with new hopes. This village in the hinterland is known as one of the locations where armed contact frequently GAM-GoI conflict incidents by Figure 5.1 occurred. month, 2005 50 "The last armed contact took place two months 45 ago. Since the peace agreement between the Gov- 40 ernment of Indonesia and the GAM, no gunshots 35 are heard anymore. We can now sleep peacefully. 30 And we are no longer afraid to go out at night," said 25 Muhammad Dahlan (36). 20 15 A number of citizens said there were significant 10 changes since the MoU was signed. Shoot-outs no 5 longer happen. Indonesian Army troops no longer 0 patrol the area. GAM members are no longer seen Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct carrying weapons. Source: Newspaper monitoring dataset "We can work without feeling anxious. There are As it became apparent that an agreement no identity examinations and no more night guards. was imminent in Helsinki, the number Since the peace agreement, we can work without of conflict-related incidents dropped feeling afraid that a gunfight will break out" explains significantly and has remained low. From Suwaibah, a mother of four children. the signing of the MoU until the end of October, there were only 13 incidents involving GAM Source: BRR and Government forces, resulting in four deaths. These were spread across 11 sub- districts. There was a slight increase in the number of incidents in October but at present THE GEOGRAPHIC SPREAD OF CONFLICT the situation looks positive. The surrender of AND NEED GAM weapons and withdrawal of non-organic (those not based long-term in Aceh) troops Conflict locations suggest the extent to and police has progressed largely as planned, which tsunami and conflict responses must with decommissioning and troop withdrawal be tightly coordinated and, in some cases, on-target to be completed by the end of integrated. At the same time, many areas December. While the conflict had restricted badly affected by conflict have been untouched access to certain areas of Aceh, all areas can by tsunami aid. Establishing precise levels of now be accessed safely. Local populations are conflict damage and the geographic distribution cautiously confident that the conflict has really of need must be a priority. 116 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version Conflict is spread across all of Aceh and Second, in many areas, the issues of tsunami is not concentrated in particular districts and conflict reconstruction cannot be divorced. regarded as being conflict-prone. While In many areas, it may be possible to extend conflict-related incidents have been relatively existing projects into villages in-land that have a concentrated this year, the conflict's impact on history of conflict. human security, perceived as well as real, has been felt across the province. As Map 5.1 Conversely, many of the most conflict- shows, sub-districts in Aceh Jaya, Bireuen and affected areas were not affected by the Aceh Barat (all areas heavily affected by the tsunami. In particular, the center of Aceh, tsunami), show high levels of insecurity. There where tensions remain high, has seen almost no are two basic implications. First, the delivery of development aid. Yet in many such areas, the aid for recovery and reconstruction must take needs are great. In Aceh Tengah, an estimated into account the impacts of, and their impacts 4,000 buildings were destroyed in the conflict. on, conflict in tsunami-affected areas. Tsunami In one sub-district in neighboring Bener Meriah, interventions must be conflict sensitive. This 75 percent of the ethnic Acehnese population includes ensuring different groups perceive fled due to the conflict, although many are now themselves as being treated equitably, using returning. Map 5.1 shows the extent to which interventions to help build local institutions, areas affected highly and very highly by conflict and focusing on processes as well as outputs. overlap with areas of tsunami damage28. Map 5.1 Conflict and Tsunami-Affected Kecamaten in Aceh Chapter 4 Sustainable Growth 117 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? Strong institutional coordination ­ across overseen by the governor's office and Jakarta- agencies and levels of government ­ will based ministries. To date, responsibilities for be necessary if reconstruction and post- the peace and reintegration process remain conflict programs are to be effectively vague. It would be useful to set up joint integrated. The current trend has been to working groups at the district level made up separate reconstruction assistance and post- of representatives from regional BRR offices, conflict reintegration. BRR does not yet have from district government, and with input from a mandate to work on post-conflict issues, GAM, to help coordinate tsunami and post- with post-conflict programs currently being conflict programming. Box 5.4 Days of Doing Nothing The days have become longer for Fauzi (26), after the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) on 15 August. He does not carry out any significant activity other than hanging out with friends whom he has not met for a long time. "After the peace agreement, we handed over our weapons to the leaders. We then went home to our villages, reunited with our family and community. But there is nothing for us to do," said Fauzi, who joined GAM in 1998. "I do not know what kind of job I can do. Obviously I can't possibly become a civil servant, especially if they ask me for the red and white coloured identity card, I do not have one," Fauzi said. When asked what he can do, he laughed and replied "fighting". Another returnee, Maulana Nurding (18) from Sama Gadeng Village, Jeunieb sub-district has been spending most of his time in Lhokseumawe because there is nothing for him to do in his village. "I have many relatives and friends in Lhokseumawe. I prefer to visit them rather than feel depressed in my village," he said. According to him, many of his fellow GAM members in Bireuen also need jobs. Although the first reintegration packages have been distributed before Idul Fitri (the celebration of the end of the fasting month), Fauzi has yet to receive his. He can only wait passively as the money flows through his com- mander. On the other hand, Maulana had only received Rp 160,000 before the beginning of the fasting month. The community hopes that the government can respond to the needs of the former combatants immediately. "The regional government should not underestimate this issue. If the government responds too late, we are wor- ried that the GAM members would look for other means to make money," said Zulfikri Yavon (50) from Lhokseu- mawe. The son of a former leader of DI/TII (Darul Islam/Tendara Islam Indonesia) Aceh, Yacob Ali said the government must act immediately on the issue of extortion which has resurfaced lately. He suggested that policies should be made to provide employment for ex-GAM members and that the pledges should be fulfilled on time, so that the people would gain trust in the government. "The livelihood issue is the biggest threat to the peace agreement. Regional leaders such as the district heads shouldn't underestimate this," said Zulfikri. Source: adapted from Ceureumen edition 7 118 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version SUSTAINING PEACE AND RECOVERY IN of former GAM combatants and political ACEH: POLICY ISSUES FOR 2006 prisoners into Achenese society and linking this to a long-term development A key component of the peace process strategy. Map 5.2 shows the location by is the development of a comprehensive district of `returnees', i.e. those combatants strategy for supporting the reintegration and prisoners specified in the MoU. Map 5.2 Location of Returnees Targetingthedifferentgroups(combatants, delineation of this group is extremely vague. prisoners and the affected population) In reality, almost every Acehnese has been a outlined in the MoU is difficult. First, there victim of conflict, whether it is through a lost is no consensus on the numbers comprising family member or friend, through abuse of the different groups in the agreement. human rights (by either side), or lost property Second, at the time of writing, a list of eligible or livelihood. Sourcing accurate data on these beneficiaries has still not been provided, various groups will be crucial, as will ensuring preventing the government and IOM ­ which that corruption is minimized. is running an initial `reinsertion' program with EU funding ­ from providing benefits to former Establishing a strong and effective combatants. Third, the MoU provides benefits complaints handling mechanism is crucial for `those affected by conflict' though the for the reintegration program. The MoU Chapter 5 The Peace Process and Recovery 119 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? (clause 3.2.6) calls for the establishment of a joint Claims Settlement Commission to deal with unmet claims, yet there has been no action towards setting up such a body. In parallel to targeting individuals, and to avoid growing resentment amongst villagers,communitiesaffectedthroughout the conflict also need to be supported. International post-conflict experience clearly shows the need to complement assistance targeted at particular groups with wider community assistance to avoid triggering local tensions and conflicts. IOM, charged with delivering the initial reintegration package, have developed a basic matrix of reintegration programming. This combines both individual and community-targeted programming for both the short- and medium-term. While there is broad agreement on the necessary components of the program, much work remains on fleshing out overall strategy and implementing the different components. Work on this will start soon through a new USAID-supported joint forum on reintegration that includes the above parties plus four Acehnese civil society coalitions. There has been limited funding for the post-conflict program . The largest donor has been the European Union, which has provided around EUR 20 million, including a substantial contribution to the IOM reintegration program. The next largest donor is USAID which, at the time of writing, has committed almost US$10 million. Other donors who have or will provide money include UNDP, World Bank and DfID. The government has approved Rp. 200 billion from the 2005 budget and, as requested, Rp. 600 billion for next year. While these sums are not insignificant, implementing a comprehensive longer-run recovery program will require additional resources. 120 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version NOTES 25This happened for a number of reasons. First, GAM thought that the education system propagated a distorted view of Acehnese history and saw schools as a symbol of the Indonesian state. Second, both sides were viewed as using schools as bases for combatants; this meant that both sides thought they were legitimate targets. Third, there is some evidence that Government troops deliberately burned schools and then blamed it on GAM to try to de-legitimize the organization. 26Burke, Adam and Afnan (2005). "Aceh: Reconstruction in a Conflict Environment." Indonesian Social Development Paper No. 9. Jakarta: World Bank/DfID/DSF. 27The conflict data is based on an index that combines perceptions of insecurity and incidents of conflict in 2005. See Barron, Patrick, Samuel Clark and Muslahuddin Daud (2005). Conflict and Recovery in Aceh: An Assessment of Conflict Dynamics and Options for Supporting the Peace Process. Jakarta: World Bank/DSF. Chapter 5 The Peace Process and Recovery 121 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? 122 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Part I ONE YEAR AFTER - WHERE DO WE STAND? THE IMPACT OF THE MARCH 28 Chapter 6 EARTHQUAKE ­ A SPECIAL FOCUS on NIAS Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? In the middle of the night on March 28, Damage to the islands' infrastructure the second most powerful earthquake28 severely hampered relief efforts. This in decades, struck Nias, Simeulue, and delayed the timely distribution of urgent aid to Singkil. In Nias, the disaster leveled the the victims of the earthquake. Entire villages business district of the capital Gunung Sitoli. moved to camps or erected small huts made Almost 1,000 lives were lost. In Simeulue, the of palm fronds in front of their houses. Ninety southern and western coasts were hardest percent of Simeulue's 78,000 people moved hit. The island of Simeulue is alleged to have to high ground, only returning to their homes sunk 1 meter as a result of the 26th December during daylight hours. On the Pulau Bayak earthquake and then risen 2 meters due to Islands one island, Pulau Balai, is underwater the one on 28th March. The damage in Nias at high tide. This island was its administrative was greater than in Simeulue. The Singkil centre which was then forced to move to district on the southwest coast of Aceh was Pulau Tuangku. In Singkil, half of the town is also hit. On both islands, government and underwater during high tide. religious buildings, schools, health clinics, and key transport infrastructure were damaged, leaving both populations vulnerable without medical services (see map 6.1). Map 6.1 March 28th Earthquake-Affected Areas29 124 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version Nias suffered the most and reconstruction The damage was widely distributed plans are now underway. In Nias, the donors across rural and urban areas. Unlike Aceh, and the international agencies are now where the damage caused by the tsunami coordinating their efforts more to reconstruct and earthquake was heavily concentrated on and rehabilitate as quickly as possible. The coastal urban areas, the destruction in Nias island will require greater participation of the from the second earthquake reached inland international agencies and the NGOs in the and occurred in the evening. Almost 9,300 coming months as current allocations are houses, or 72 percent of the 13,000 houses insufficient cover the damages suffered. required, need to be rebuilt in rural areas. Despite this, the loss of life was particularly NIAS: DISASTERS HIT AN ISLAND marked in the towns where poorly constructed SUFFERING FROM EXTREME POVERTY masonry housing and public facilities in densely populated areas were severely damaged. The devastation and destruction was severe. Almost 13,000 families ­ 10 percent of the Some nine months later, Nias is still in total households ­ lost their homes. The emergency mode. Although the emergency earthquake paralyzed an economy that was phase officially ended on June 1, activities are already weak before the disasters struck. The still focused on short term relief rather than total damage, estimated at US$ 392 million the long term reconstruction effort. Some (see table 1), represents almost 150 percent agencies continue providing emergency relief of the whole economy of Nias. such as food distribution, temporary shelter, medical care, and water and sanitation, while others engaged in the initial emergency effort Estimated Damage and Loss have withdrawn or down-sized their programs. Table 6.1 Assessment for Nias This includes large donors such as USAID, IMC, WFP, and WHO. Sector Estimated dam- age (millions of US$) Nias was among the poorest regions in Indonesia. More than one third of the Social sectors 56 population ­ twice the national average ­ lived Education 23 below the poverty line when the tsunami Health 23 struck. Human development outcomes Community, culture, and religion 10 were low and were not showing the signs of Infrastructure 306 progress achieved elsewhere. An estimated Housing 160 7 percent of children from the age of 7 up to Transport 70 12, and 18 percent from 13 to 15, did not Electricity, water and sanitation, 76 attend school. Many villages lacked access and communication to basic health services, despite the existence Productive Sectors 1 of clinics throughout the island. Access was Cross-sectoral (governance and 29 limited by poor infrastructure, and clinics were environment) not delivering an adequate service. TOTAL 392 Nias' economy is largely dependent on agriculture. Compared with the national average of 11 percent, agriculture accounts Chapter 6 The Impact Of The March 28 Earthquake ­ A Special Focus On Nias 125 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? for almost 50 percent, and manufacturing assets were only partially destroyed by the accounts for only slightly more than 1 percent earthquake, the disaster had a profound of the total local economy (see figure 6.1). In impact on the livelihoods of the population addition to being predominantly rural, the lack because many of them lost their homes. of infrastructure and services on the island The earthquake also took a heavy toll on created significant problems for access and local traders, particularly in the capital town mobility, detaching villages from markets of Gunung Sitoli. It also forced the fish to and resulting in low levels of economic migrate to deeper waters further away development. from the coast impacting the daily lives of fishermen (see box 6.1). Structure of the Nias Economy Figure 6.1 · Increasing poverty. Current trends suggest that poverty is likely to increase to above 50 percent in the short-term. Food aid, cash- Services 11.4 Agricultural 46.7 for-work programs, and transfer programs Bank Rental and Quarrying 0.3 will mitigate the full impact of economic Business Services 5.6 decline but a large share of the population Manufacturing remains vulnerable. In the education Industry 1.2 Transport and sector, almost 87 percent of schools were Communication 4.5 Water damaged to some extent - many students Supply 1.1 are yet to return to a properly functioning Trade, Hotel and school and many are studying in makeshift Restaurant Construction 20.95 10.25 circumstances. THE ECONOMY OF NIAS Source: BPS Given the magnitude of the damage and losses, the economy of Nias is expected to contract by 20 percent in 2005. The The tsunami and earthquake further deepened March 28 earthquake also caused a severe but the social and economic problems of a short-lived increase in food prices. The price lagging region. The current situation is now of basic food staples, such as rice, increased characterized by: · Inadequate housing and shelter. Like Aceh, the lack of adequate and safe housing is extremely serious in Nias. Out of the almost 13,000 familes, an estimated 7,500 are living with host families, 4,000 have rebuilt their homes or occupy self-improvised shelter (which is unlikely to endure the rainy season) and 1,500 are living in 41 camps. Currently, about 14 agencies are providing support, but the needs of the Nias people are not being fully met. · Shattered livelihoods. Even though rural 126 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version Box 6.1 Tired of Chasing Fish Although not as devastating as in Aceh, the earthquake in Nias, North Sumatra, caused massive destruction to buildings and huge loss of lives. Yet reconstruction on the island, also known as the dancing island, remains unapparent. This is specially so in Alora - a fishing village on the island - where the earthquake has not only destroyed buildings but also given rise to a new problem. "After the earthquake, the fish here migrated further to the middle of the ocean, we are unable to go after them," complained Darni, 35, a fisherman from Alora. They still follow a very traditional way of fishing with rowing boats. These boats not only have no engine, they also have no sails to withstand the strong winds. All the fishing boats depend on manual labor. "We cannot afford to buy engines," said Darni. What is considered a large boat in Alora is very different to that in Aceh. According to Darni, the large boats can only carry 10 people, whereas in Aceh a medium-sized boat can hold about 20 people. Before the earthquake, the fishermen of Alora usually went out to sea at 4 o'clock in the morning and returned at midday. Now, many fishermen are not working. Even if they do go out to sea, many return empty-handed. "For the past three weeks I have not succeeded in getting any fish, this is terrible," said a fisherman who is the father of eight children. In the past, the people of Alora could at least earn around Rp 25,000 to Rp. 30,000 a day. It is difficult to earn that much now and some have not had any income for a whole month. Currently, most of the displaced people of Alora are seeking refuge at the Islamic Center complex. A number of them said there has been no commitment from any NGO or government agency to help the fisher- men. They also said that they have received no help for the rebuilding of their homes. "Previously there was someone who came to take down our data, but there has been no aid so far," said one woman. Source: Adapted from Ceureumen, Edition 6 by more than 50 percent in early April but share of non-performing loans (NPLs) from returned to their pre-earthquake levels by May about 1 percent to 40-50 percent. Most of these (see figure 3). Food market interventions by NPLs are commercial loans (used to purchase the government and food aid by NGOs and operating and fixed capital) and most were not WFP helped to contain the increase in prices insured. Banks plan to restructure viable NPLs until September, but with the nationwide but still expect to report significant losses in increase of fuel prices on October 1, food the 2005 fiscal year ­ in the magnitude of at prices jumped again by 15 to 20 percent. least 5 percent of the total credit portfolio. With a rebounding economy in 2006, it is expected The banking system has also been severely that banks will recover, but it is likely to take affected by the March 28, 2005 earthquake. at least three years to get the sector back to All four commercial banks operating in the pre-earthquake profitability. island (BNI, BRI, Bank Danamon, and Bank Sumut ) reported a dramatic increase in the Chapter 6 The Impact Of The March 28 Earthquake ­ A Special Focus On Nias 127 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? Figure 6.2 Price Behavior after March 28 in Nias Price per kg, Rp. 7500 7000 6500 6000 5500 5000 4500 4000 3500 3000 01/01 01/31 03/02 04/01 05/01 05/31 06/30 07/30 08/29 09/28 01/28 2005 rice (local ) rice (Dolog) Source: BPS, World Bank staff calculations THE RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAM AND both Aceh and Nias, only about US$ 205 PROGRESS IN NIAS million has been allocated to Nias (see table 2). Although more than 40 donors and NGOs Rebuilding Nias is as great a challenge as are active in the island (see annex 1), their rebuilding Aceh. Whereas the destruction projects are comparatively small. Donors and in Aceh was total in many areas, in Nias the NGOs have only allocated US$53 million to widespread damage exacerbated already Nias which is equivalent to 2 percent of their chronically weak public service delivery. total reconstruction spending for the tsunami Infrastructure and assets are now in complete and earthquake. disarray: 11 ports were destroyed, 403 bridges are unusable, and more than 1,000 km of local Compared to Aceh, the composition of and provincial roads impassable. This damage financing is also fundamentally different. occurred throughout the islands, and the lack The central government's reconstruction funds, of access and basic services has meant that channeled through BRR, are covering more it has become extremely difficult to deliver a than two-thirds of the current reconstruction reconstruction program that provides results program. The above government financing rapidly. does not include an additional US$ 17 million from the deconcentrated fund to be allocated Nias has not received adequate attention separately for Nias. However, a large part of and resources. Out of a total US$ 4.7 these funds will only become available with the billion dollars of programs and projects for 2006 government budget. NGO's are providing 128 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version Table 6.2 Summary of all Projects (million US$) Government Donors Private TOTAL NGOs Social sector 28 9 16 53 Education 14 0 8 22 Health 8 0 9 17 Community, cul- 6 9 0 15 ture, religion Infrastructure 98 1 24 123 Housing 51 1 21 73 Transport 30 0 0 30 Electricity, water 17 0 2 19 and sanitation, irrigation Productive sec- 7 2 1 11 tors Cross-sectoral 19 0 0 19 (governance and environment) TOTAL 152 12 41 205 approximately 20 percent and donors less Physical infrastructure, education, and than 10 percent of the reconstruction program health sectors still need much higher (see figure 4). levels of financial support. The BRR will allocate 65 percent of the 2005 and 2006 Most of the existing funds have been budgets for housing and infrastructure. While allocated to a few key sectors such as this increase will fill some of the gap, the housing, transport, education, health. current total budget of US$205 million is still However, in each of these sectors, the insufficient to meet the needs of the people of financing envelope is low and funding by Nias and a major funding effort will be required sector is also low: in housing, only US$73 from donors and other agencies. million has been pledged for Nias and is far below requirements, and compares poorly with the US$702 million mobilized in Aceh which is considered sufficient to cover the housing needs. Chapter 6 The Impact Of The March 28 Earthquake ­ A Special Focus On Nias 129 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? programs is constrained by poor roads and Figure 6.3 Nias ­ Comparison of Damage and Funds Pledged communications. The main public hospital in Gunung Sitoli is being upgraded by a Million US$ recently-formed consortium (WHO, Mercy 400 Malaysia, UNICEF, IFRC). Just 4 health clinics (puskesmas) are provided by Mercy 350 Malaysia, International Aid and Red Cross 300 (one functioning, rest to start in 2006). 250 200 392 41 · Despite progress, half of the rehabilitation 15 150 need of the education sector remains 100 unfunded. In education, 214 schools are 151 now operating out of tents with assistance 50 from UNICEF; 43 temporary 3-classroom 0 schools will be built between January and Damage Funds Pledged May 2006, which are expected to last between 5 to10 years (partnership IOM/ Damage NGOs Donors GOI UNICEF). Reconstruction of another 160 · Progress in housing will be the litmus test of schools is expected to start from May the reconstruction effort. By end-November, lasting 2-3 years. only about 200 houses had been rebuilt. The lack of progress in getting people · The lack of roads and transport continues back in permanent dwellings is as marked to hinder reconstruction efforts. While in Nias as it is in Aceh: half the housing the road between Gunung Sitoli and stock was damaged or destroyed and an Teluk Dalam has been repaired (reducing estimated 10 percent of the population is still camped in dwellings without permanent Table 6.3 Housing Commitments for Nias roofs. The BRR and the Red Cross are focused on the rehabilitation of the medium Agency No. of beneficiary and partially damaged homes, covering familes only a small proportion of the total shelter Red Cross Consoritum 2500 requirements. With regards to funding, the BRR (Reconstruction) 1100 housing sector alone needs more than US$ BRR (Rehabilitation) 850 190 million to build at least 13,000 new HELP 785 homes and rehabilitate 58,000. Existing ACTED 520 commitments will only be sufficient to build Samaritan Purse 461 about 8,062 new homes (see table 6.3). The Zero-to-One/Dela Siga 389 sector requires more actors to fill the gap CARITAS Sibolga 250 of constructing the remaining homes. The World Relief and Holiana'a 249 current estimated shortfall is 4,938 houses. UNHCR 240 · In health, almost 200,000 children were YTB 239 vaccinated against measles in a major Others 479 drive in July 2005, achieving almost full TOTAL 8,062 coverage of the island. However, day- to-day implementation of other health 130 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version the travel time by 50 percent), one major in a transition phase and yet to begin the bridge is on the verge of collapse making significant reconstruction required. It is widely this important route precarious. Large accepted that progress this year has been sections of the road network to the south slow adding further frustration and discontent and north are impassable, and village roads to the population affected by two disasters. and local bridges - invariably in the worst While the problems experienced in Nias are overall condition due to a severe lack of similar to Aceh, there are a number of major maintenance and poor construction- are obstacles affecting the reconstruction. creating difficulties for NGOs to reach affected people. It is anticipated that the · Poor infrastructure is a serious ongoing lack of attention to roadside bottleneck to project implementation. drainage will lead to further and rapid Single-lane, partially destroyed roads slow deterioration of all roads until repair work and down the movement of trucks carrying continuous maintenance programs can be building materials and other heavy loads. It implemented. While BRR will be prioritizing is estimated that the existing road network road reconstruction in 2006, the program can only handle 20 trucks per day with covers only a proportion of the estimated maximum loads, half of what is required to need and must be utilized at least in part on meet housing requirements: it is equivalent routine, recurrent and emergency works in to a shocking 2,000 days or 6 years to order to ensure that road access is restored achieve a target of 13,000 new homes. and maintained all year round. The airport runway is limited in length and cannot accommodate larger planes ferrying · In water and sanitation, major NGOs and materials and only 4 ports are capable international agencies such as UNDP and of handling medium-sized vessels. The UNICEF are still urgently trying to restore telecommunication network relies primarily clean water supply and sanitation to prevent on a cellular service which suffers from an outbreak of disease. Large NGOs such many blank spots across the island (fixed as Oxfam, World Vision, and Red Cross line phone density is currently less than 4 are providing temporary bathing stations, percent). building new latrines, and rehabilitating damaged water supply sources such as · Land issues are not yet resolved. community wells. This sector is also not Similar to the difficult land problems being endowed with bilateral or multilateral donor tackled in Aceh, land demarcations have support, and will result in coverage levels disappeared in areas of complete collapse. significantly lower than the ambitious In the centers of towns, this has added to universal coverage anticipated in Aceh. social tension between legitimate owners and local government. Records proving DELIVERING RESULTS IN 2006 AND ownership are now difficult to find, many BEYOND: CHALLENGES AND files were destroyed during the earthquake OPPORTUNITIES FOR NIAS or have been misplaced since. The level of land-registration is very low and the RALAS Like Aceh, it is expected that the pace concept has yet to be implemented in Nias. of reconstruction in Nias will accelerate in 2006. Although the emergency was · The lack of coordination between officially lifted on June 1, the island is still BRR and the national, provincial and Chapter 6 The Impact Of The March 28 Earthquake ­ A Special Focus On Nias 131 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? district governments in setting up work- and more funds. The reconstruction and units for implementation has delayed the rehabilitation will require more than 4 years to commencement of planned projects. be completed and in the medium term, careful Approval processes have been slow because planning and attention is required to "build BRR-Nias approvals are routed through BRR back better" in regions which were already in Banda Aceh for each project, and then lagging - poor and marginalized before the must work their way through departments earthquake and tsunami struck. At present in both Medan and Jakarta. This has taken NGOs are lacking adequate financial and up to 4 months in some cases. human resources to achieve the reconstruction targets and it is clear that major donors and · Shortage of players for the reconstruction. NGOs will need to commit more to Nias in the There are only about 40 NGOs present in future. In order to disburse funds quicker, one Nias compared to almost 300 in Aceh, and of the few active donor-supported projects - while this may be sufficient in number, their the Kecamatan Development Program (KDP) budgets are low. More actors are required - has been restructured to disburse faster. in some key sectors such as health which KDP is active in 22 kecamatans (sub-districts) presently has only 4 major players (YEU, and will spend US$ 8.2 million. IMC, IFRC, and WHO). NGOs are also limited in capacity in terms of personnel and Stakeholders are realizing that the problem is further aggravated by lack fundamental changes are needed to of quality contractors and labor, not easily improve the pace of reconstruction in available on the island. There are a small Nias. The planned reorganization of BRR will number of technical high schools, but it is give greater autonomy to approve and execute unlikely they will build significant capacity projects in a timely and efficient manner. The for recovery efforts. central government has also directed that project managers move to Nias to speed up But reconstruction presents the potential reconstruction. Priority will be given to housing for enormous change in Nias. While the and transportation to get people out from tents opportunities that can result out of tragedy and into temporary and permanent homes and are yet to surface in Nias, they lie on the to achieve this, roads, ports, bridges will need horizon. Driven by the reconstruction efforts, to be repaired and built. the economy is expected to rebound. Local governments will be strengthened and become Careful planning with the communities more involved in future planning and financing and stakeholders is also essential of their regions. With support from the major and the BRR is developing a Kecamatan donors and agencies, the government in Reconstruction Plan framework with donors Nias can prioritize building back the island's and local governments. Similarly, the infrastructure and thus for the first time, bring construction industry forum needs to be set it on par with the rest of the country. In the up quickly to address problems facing the short term, the focus will be on those sectors rebuilding of homes and other infrastructure. needed to sustain the rest of the reconstruction The main issues which BRR and the donors program. and NGOs will need to coordinate and facilitate are quality assurance, availability of materials, The road is a long and difficult one requiring strengthening the labor capacity, ongoing immediate action, careful planning maintenance, and links between local and 132 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version national companies. Reconstruction will create the basis for the first wave of economic development. Local material sourcing, fabrication and transportation, food and services for construction workers are all important keys to unlock the local economy. As construction progresses, more opportunities for work will appear, in reviving tourism and fisheries, in a better government, in regular trade, and in the growth of cottage industries. Chapter 6 The Impact Of The March 28 Earthquake ­ A Special Focus On Nias 133 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? 134 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version NOTES 288.7 on the Richter scale; epicenter located 150 km off the coast of Sumatra. 29Source: © Indonesia-Relief-Org 30For the March 28 earthquake the most comprehensive damage assessment has been carried by IOM (IOM, June 2005). With the help of the IOM damage data, the aggregate sectoral and financial impact has been calculated in applying data international standard ECLAC-methodology that had also been used to estimate the magnitude and losses of the tsunami. 31Source: Draft Unicef Interim Report - Economic and Social Trends of Nias, Nov. 2005 30Source: "Produk Domestik Regional Bruto", BPS Kabupaten Nias, 2004. Comparative figures apply to the smaller Kabupaten Nias Selatan Chapter 6 The Impact Of The March 28 Earthquake ­ A Special Focus On Nias 135 Part I One Year After - Where Do We Stand? 136 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Part II FINANCE AND COORDINATION Chapter 7 FINANCING THE RECONSTRUCTION Part II Finance and Coordination The reconstruction effort has introduced Reconstruction needs: Rebuilding a new paradigm of financing, whereby Table 7.1 Aceh and Nias the host government, official donors and NGOs are involved in equal measure. With Estimated cost Comments and at least US$2.5 billion to spend, and US$ 1.5 (in US$ million) assumptions billion in projects already identified, NGOs are almost as significant contributors as classical Tsunami 4.450 Initial assess- reconstruction financing agencies34. In most ment that natural disasters NGOs play a key role in the remains broadly relief phase, but in this one, they are also valid; trends central in reconstruction. confirmed by IOM damage as- sessment; some COST ESTIMATES sectors possibly overestimated In addition to the March earthquake and (livelihoods, the conflict, the cost of rebuilding will housing) increase further due to rising inflation. March 28 392 Application of The January 2005 damage and loss estimate earthquake ECLAC-meth- of US$ 4.5 billion has remained surprisingly odology to IOM robust35. The March 28 earthquake affecting and BRR dam- Nias added nearly an additional US$400 age data (see million. Rising inflation will increase the costs Annex [X]) of delivering the reconstruction program by Adjusting for 964 Core assump- an estimated 20 percent, or around US$1 inflation tion: At least billion. 20% need to be added to reflect The people of Aceh and Nias will need at true cost36. least US$5.8 billion to rebuild their lives TOTAL (Tsu- 5.810 (see table 7.1). This includes the damage and nami and losses from the disasters taking into account earthquake) rising inflation, particularly for reconstruction related goods. However, since the private Source: Damage and loss assessment, BRR / IOM sector and households will cover some of the damage, Economic assessment (see chapter 4) reconstruction costs directly (as suggested by the Government's Master Plan) funding needs , earthquake- and conflict-affected areas. The from the Government, donors, or NGOs would Master Plan put a heavy emphasis on public be lower service provision, and added an additional US$3 billion for sectors such as education, Further resources are needed to achieve health, transport and electricity37. In addition, the long-term goal of building back better the UN and NGOs will spend several hundred for all of Aceh and Nias. Even though it million US$ to provide humanitarian support in is difficult to cost the concept of building 2006, particularly for temporary shelter. back better Aceh and Nias may use the opportunity to upgrade facilities in all tsunami- 138 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version THE OVERALL RECONSTRUCTION AND government is expected to channel at least DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM US$300 million investment projects through ongoing projects (deconcentration funds). The total reconstruction and development Provincial and local governments are likely program for Aceh and Nias will amount to spend at least US$ 350 million. However, to about US$ 8-10 billion (2005-2009) the potential of regional governments to ­ the largest reconstruction program in the contribute to the reconstruction effort is developing world. Funds come from three much greater (at least US$200 million per main sources, in nearly equal amounts: year) and their fiscal position will remain · The Indonesian Government is strong due to their revenue shares from oil expected to contribute up to US$3 and gas39. billion38. Official donors supported · Donors are expected to contribute at Indonesia in rescheduling US$ 2.7 billion least US$3 billion. This includes bilateral for up to 2 years, which is equivalent to and multilateral contributions of more than approximately US$350 million in net gain US$1.5 billion each, part of which has been (or: Net Present Value) to Indonesia. Out of channeled through the Multi-Donor Fund the US$3 billion, US$2.1 billion have been (US$ 525 million, box 7.1). In addition allocated to BRR. In addition, the central to Paris Club rescheduling, donors have also been channeling an estimated US$ 200 million to NGOs for reconstruction Box 7.1 The Multi-Donor Fund projects40. The Multi-Donor Fund brings together a pool of over US$520 million (m) from 15 donors and is a partnership of the Indonesian government, international community and civil society to support the recovery in Aceh and Nias. At the request of the Government of Indonesia these donors came together to avoid duplication and reduce transaction costs for the central government, the BRR and the affected communities. The Multi-Donor Fund is co-chaired by the BRR, the European Commission and the World Bank. The World Bank administers the Fund and acts as its Trustee. Country/Agency US$ million European Commission 250 The Netherlands 100 United Kingdom 44.5 World Bank 25 Norway 17.9 Denmark 17.5 Canada 11 Sweden 10.4 Asian Development Bank 10 Germany 10 United States 10 Finland 9.5 Belgium 9.5 New Zealand 8.8 Ireland 1.2 Chapter 7 Financing the Reconstruction 139 Part II Finance and Coordination Table 7.2 Financing Aceh and Nias reconstruction (end-November 2005 data and projections, in US$ million) Domestic Government Donors(1) Private TOTAL Funds BRR Decon Local Multilat- Bilat- NGO eral (incl. eral MDTF) Total commitments to the reconstruc- 2,100 300 350+ 2,000 1,600 2,500 8,850+ tion program (2005-2009) Already allocated to specific projects 980 83 72 1,074 695 1,532 4436 Already disbursed 19 31 60 168 127 370 775 Source: BRR, CGI members, World Bank projections, OECD/DAC, Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary Gen- eral of the United Nations, World Bank Local Government assessment. See also Annex 1-3. (1) Excludes US$ 200 million through NGOs, and Paris Club donations. US$4.4 billion has now been translated There is an opportunity to build back into concrete programs41. This is about half better. The Government of Indonesia, donors of the expected overall program and these and NGOs have committed more than US$4 projects will represent the backbone of the billion in additional resources. If all partners 2006 reconstruction program. While these keep their commitments and if these resources allocations are sufficient to match the initial are well spent, there will be up to US$ 3 billion damage and loss estimate, it is not sufficient to make Aceh and Nias a better place than it to build back better, to address post-conflict was before (see figure 7.1). needs or to account for increased costs. Figure 7.1 Reconstruction Needs and Commitments (US$ billion) 10.0 9.0 Upgrading facilities in 8.0 Tsunami and earthquake Building back affected areas better GOI Committed conflict reintegration 7.0 and development programs DONORS but not NGOs allocated US$ 6.0 Billion Inflation (1.0) 5.0 NIAS (0.4) 4.0 GOI (1.1) 3.0 Damage and Rebuilding Already Loss Assessment NGOs (1.5) allocated 2.0 (4.5) to specific projects 1.0 DONORS (1.8) 0.0 Needs The reconstruction program 140 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version Almost half of the current reconstruction program, US$2.2 billion, is allocated to housing and infrastructure. Housing is the most important sector with more than US$1 billion allocated, followed by transport, education, health, governance and community support, all of which have allocations of US$ 400-600 million each. Allocations to the productive sectors, flood control and the environment are all in the range of US$150-250 million (figure 7.2). Figure 7.2 Sectoral allocation of the current reconstruction program Housing Transport Health Education Community,cultureandreligion Governanceandadministration(incl.Land) Industry,tradeandSMEs Water andsanitation Fisheries Other Infrastructure Agricultureandlivestock Floodcontrol andirrigationworks Environment 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 USD Million These allocations are broadly in line with While the reconstruction funds are sectoral needs with a slight bias towards corresponding with spatial damage there is the social sectors. Existing allocations have a visible bias towards areas that are close to now exceeded core minimum needs in several Banda Aceh. The regions of Aceh Jaya and sectors. These additional funds can help Aceh Barat experienced the greatest damage, improve the quality of health-care, education, followed by Nias, Aceh Besar and Banda and other services in comparison with pre- Aceh. With the exception of Nias, all these tsunami levels. However, despite the BRR's districts are also receiving the largest donor 2006 budget allocation, transport remains allocations and in the case of Banda Aceh and heavily under-funded; even more so as almost Aceh Besar funding appears to exceed the 50 percent of the existing transport allocation amount of damage and losses. By contrast, is dedicated only to the road between Aceh other parts of Aceh particularly the South and and Meulaboh. Communications, energy, North-East of Aceh, as well as Nias are still flood control and environment also need more significantly under-funded (map 7.1, see also support. Annexe1-6). Chapter 7 Financing the Reconstruction 141 Part II Finance and Coordination Figure 7.3 allocation of funds versus "core minimum needs" USD Million 400 300 200 Surplus 100 0 -100 Deficit -200 -300 -400 hlta He noigiler noi noti re g tr po Land).l at kcots seire tucutr insu Energi skrow nci( live Fish Ho n and Enterprise ducE tainas ansrT e urtluc,yt noi atrts dnar dna nmentorivnE iota tea ni W erultucirg asfrInreh irrig Communications Ot admi A mmunio dnalortnoc and C e doolF nanc ervo G Map 7.1 Financing and needs (spatial) SABANG (KOTA) 74 BANDA ACEH (KOTA) 190 ACEH BESAR 117 LHOKSUMAWE (KOTA) PIDIE BIREUEN 67 67 69 ACEH UTARA 55 ACEH JAYA 62 BENER MERIAH ACEH TIMUR 38 LANGSA (KOTA) Financing -to-Needs Ratio (%) ACEH BARAT ACEH TENGAH 86 Above 125 100to125 72 75to100 ACEH TAMIANG 50to 75 NAGAN RAYA 42 Below 50 53 Not affected GAYO LUES ACEH BARAT DAYA 42 ACEH TENGGARA NIAS 45 ACEH SELATAN 43 NIAS SELATAN SIMEULUE 40 68 ACEH SINGKIL 82 142 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version Box 7.2 Slow Project Implementation in Nusa Villagers' resentment at the government's perceived neglect of them deteriorated so much during the year that by August some people were openly suggesting that Aceh should separate from Indonesia. "It's not that we support the Free Aceh Movement but we just don't get any benefits from being in Indonesia," one man told me. "I'm sure we'd be better off as part of Malaysia." His neighbor added: "If it wasn't for the NGOs, nothing would have been done here." In many respects their anger and disappointment was justified. The only visible ongoing government project has been the clinic established by the provincial health office (see health section). Meanwhile, the villagers' most press- ing need - the repair of the public works ministry-build floodgate that prevents the paddy fields from being inun- dated (see the Water Sanitary section) - has yet to even reach the drawing board. Bizarrely the public works ministry did however find funds to repave some of the road from the main Banda Aceh-Meulaboh highway; something that was not even on the villagers' priority list, let alone at the top. But many villagers also quickly forgot that Nusa was one of the first villages to have barracks, the PDAM water sup- ply was restored within a few weeks, the electricity company PLN has worked well with the village when required and the teachers who died in the tsunami were quickly replaced. Deliveries of "poor rice", as it became known, were also made regularly. The Camat (sub-district head), Rasidi, who rarely visited Nusa except when it became apparent a clear-the-air meeting was needed, such as over the delayed Jadup payment, told me it was not a case of him or his officials neglecting Nusa but rather that the village was receiving more NGO help than elsewhere. "We're coordinating the aid, so we're focusing our resources on where the NGOs are not going," he said. There was some justification to what he said but he could have handled the situation a lot more sensitively. Many villages also did not appreciate that in order to undertake the majority of projects, NGOs would have had to coordinate with several government agencies. Source: John Aglionby (The Guardian) IMPLEMENTATION However, in recent months the speed of reconstruction has been picking up. This The implementation of these programs has has also been confirmed by progress in key been frustratingly slow for many. At the end of sectors such as housing, education, and health 2005, the gap between budget allotments and (see chapters 1 and 3). By end-September, actual disbursements on the reconstruction disbursements were probably not more than program remains large. Of the US$4.4 billion US$450 million. By the end of November, already committed to specific reconstruction total disbursements of donors, NGO and GoI projects by the Government, official donors combined stood at US$775 million, out of which and NGOs, roughly US$775 million ­17 per US$ 665 million are from donors and NGOs42. cent ­ has been disbursed as of the end of Disbursements appear to have reached US$ November 2005. The frustrations of the people 150 million per month and total spending in in the village Nusa give a human face a human reconstruction is expected to reach close to face to the frustration of waiting (box 7.2). US$1 billion by end-December 2005, which Chapter 7 Financing the Reconstruction 143 Part II Finance and Coordination is a positive sign given that reconstruction spending did not begin in earnest until July 2005. This is in addition to more than US$ 1 billion that was likely spent during the relief phase. The coming year will be critical to the long-term recovery of Aceh and Nias. If 2005 was the year of delivering emergency relief, assessing damage, understanding local needs, investing in planning and policy issues, and building capacity for large scale reconstruction, then 2006 must be the year of pervasive action on the ground. With an additional US$ 3.7 billion ready to spend, the conditions are good to improve the lives of the people in Aceh and Nias, if the lessons of the difficulties in 2005 are applied. With a further acceleration of the reconstruction program, up to half of the whole program could be delivered by the end of 2006. Achieving such an ambitious target would entail that disbursements need to reach an average of over US$200 million per month. In this scenario, US$2.5-3 billion would be spent in 2006, and together with almost US$1 billion in 2005, half of the overall reconstruction program could be delivered in the first two years. Delivering this pace will require ongoing extraordinary effort and must not be taken for granted. 144 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version NOTES 34For a more in-depth review of private contributions to the reconstruction effort see BRR/World Bank, Rebuilding a better Aceh and Nias, October 2005, section 3.1. 35A team of more than 100 Indonesian and international experts prepared the January 2005 damage and loss assess- ment of the impact of the tsunami and earthquake in Indonesia. This assessment was based on the international standard methodology first developed by the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). Follow-up assessments for specific sectors are updating the preliminary figures. 36Underlying this 20% real inflation assumption are the following parameters: (i) 30% nominal inflation (including Nias, which is below the average in Aceh); (ii) 10% depreciation of the Rupiah to the US$ since January 2005; (iii) as- sumption that a large part of reconstruction will occur in 2006; (iv) leveling off of inflation by 2007. 37For more details on the Master Plan and its proposed investment program see Rebuilding a Better Aceh and Nias, BRR and World Bank, October 2005, section 3.1. 38Paris Club debt rescheduling contributed partly to Government's contribution. In May 2005, the Paris Club agreed to reschedule the equivalent of US$ 2.7 billion in debt to Indonesia due in 2005 until December 2006 and to be repaid over a five-year period. The net present value of US$ 2.7 billion debt rescheduling, i.e. the interest rate gain for Indonesia, would depend on the average interest rate during this period. For illustrative purposes, an average 3.5% interest rate would result in a net gain of approximately US$ 330 million. 39For a more detailed overview over local government spending in tsunami-affected kabupatens see Rebuilding a Bet- ter Aceh and Nias, BRR/World Bank, October 2005, section 2.4. 40These are direct transfers from donors to NGO which are different from donor designed projects that use NGOs to implement, and thus counted under NGO-projects (see Annex 3). 41This financial analysis attempts to capture all available sources of reconstruction finance: The government of Indo- nesia (incl. regional governments), donors and NGOs. In order to avoid double counting and to cut out pledges that may not materialize, only ongoing, or already agreed, projects are counted. For practical and consistency reasons, each item is associated with the executing agency, as opposed to the source of funding. For a more details on the methodology see Annexes 1-6. 42See Annex 6 for details of measuring disbursements. Chapter 7 Financing the Reconstruction 145 Part II Finance and Coordination 146 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Part II FINANCE AND COORDINATION Chapter 8 FUND FLOWS AND BOTTLENECKS Chapter 8 Fund flows and bottlenecks 147 Part II Finance and Coordination In the immediate aftermath of the only formalized their support in mid-2005. tsunami, relief funds from all sources Government approval of umbrella agreements were mobilized and disbursed rapidly. with donors and individual donor projects often While the bulk of these funds flowed directly to compounded these delays. But even after recipients from donor agencies, foreign military projects were agreed, project implementation support operations, private firms, and national and funds disbursements were slow. While and international NGOs, the Government and these implementation delays were often a the Indonesian military also utilized available function of the sheer complexity and scope emergency funds from the budget to rapidly of the reconstruction challenge, there were commence relief operations. a number of administrative bottlenecks that further exacerbated these delays, especially SOURCES OF DELAYS IN THE for "on-budget" donors (see box 8.1). Indeed, RECONSTRUCTION PROCESS not only foreign donors, but the BRR itself has faced frustrating delays in the disbursement of However, funds flows for reconstruction funds for urgent reconstruction projects. activities have been slow, particularly in the first 9 months after the disaster. Of BOTTLENECKS IN INDONESIA'S BUDGET course, serious reconstruction works require a SYSTEM much longer lead time for project development, planning, review and impact assessment, On January 1, 2005, just days after the procurement, and mobilization. Indeed, it is tsunami, the Government implemented a common in "normal" times for development major, long-planned overhaul of its budget projects in Indonesia to take up to 1-2 years processes. The reform, designed to tighten from initial concept to first disbursement. But fiduciary controls over a budget system rife given the scale of suffering of those who lost with corruption, established a new system of their homes, livelihoods and communities, no checks and balances over all key stages of one can be satisfied with the "normal" pace of the development and execution of sectoral project implementation. In this first year after and project budgets. At the same time, it the tsunami, slow project implementation decentralized spending decisions to line added to the frustration of many stakeholders, ministries and regions. Like all major reforms, most importantly local communities, who felt the new processes and procedures caused that all the main players in the reconstruction initial disruption in standard service patterns process, had lost the sense of urgency leading to delays in budget execution and necessary to push projects forward. hence in the implementation of government and donor projects across Indonesia. The local Donors that disbursed their funds through governments in Aceh and Nias, still reeling from the Government budget faced particular the impact of the disaster, were particularly delays but even the "off-budget" donors overwhelmed by these new processes. have disbursed more slowly than initially expected. By end-November 2005, even the The delays in 2005 were as much upstream NGOs had only disbursed 25 percent of their in the preparation of projects and the reconstruction projects budgets (see chapter budget as they were downstream in the 3.1). Although most donor agencies declared implementation of the budget. The budget their pledges for recovery and reconstruction process, and the associated delays, can be at the CGI meeting in January 2005, many categorized in four phases (see figure 8.1): 148 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version Box 8.1 Sources of delays in the reconstruction process Project preparation and approval processes. Before any project can commence implementation it needs to be pre- pared, appraised and approved. This is part of a natural coordination and quality assurance process to make sure money will flow and be spent effectively once the project implementation begins. In Aceh and Nias, every project is being cleared by the BRR but in addition, coordination needs to happen with central and local governments as well as with other partner agencies. Central Government budget process. The reconstruction budget, including the BRR's allocation, was only ap- proved in June after submission to the Parliament in May. Local Government budgets. The tsunami disrupted the local government budget approval process, scheduled for end-December 2004. Local budget approvals have taken several months to complete. Many local governments have displayed little urgency to support the reconstruction process in the expectation that central government, donors and NGOs will take over the financing. Donor budget processes. Many donor institutions went through equally deliberate budget approval processes, including sign-off by national parliaments. This explains why many donors were only able to allocate their funds by mid-2005. Procurement. Procurement covers a number of steps, beginning with the identification of specification and the ten- der process and ending in the delivery of goods and services and payment. It requires that activities have been de- fined and approved, budgets prepared and available, and designated human resources to conduct the process. (i) Approval of the Government budget: hastily prepared budgets often require Though relief funds flowed from a several rounds of revisions and, coupled special emergency budget under control with slow administrative procedures, were of the national agency for emergency generally the most significant source of coordination (BAKORNAS), Government delays. spending (including all on-budget donors) (iii) Issuance of spending authority (DIPA): for reconstruction projects had to be With an approved budget plan, the incorporated into the revision of the 2005 executing agency then prepares a budget budget to be submitted to the DPR. The execution document (DIPA) against which revised budget was finally approved at the all disbursements are to be authorized end of June 2005. and processed through the offices of the State Treasury offices (KPPN). The BRR's (ii) Project preparation (RKA-KL-process): DIPA was issued in June. Donor-financed The project preparation process for projects executed by line ministries in Government begins with the development Jakarta tended to face even greater delays of a ministry's annual work-plan and in the issuance of their DIPAs. budget (RKA-KL), which is informed by the (iv) Project implementation. Upon completion annual government work plan (RKP) and of the DIPA and appointment of signatory budgetary ceilings. Executing agencies authorities project work units can enter submit draft budget plans to the Ministry into commitments for the provision of of Finance for review and approval, but various goods and services. However, Chapter 8 Fund flows and bottlenecks 149 Part II Finance and Coordination standard procurement procedures, not designed for emergency situations, have caused further delays. It should be noted, though, that off-budget bilateral donors and even NGOs have also experienced delays due to their own procurement procedures, which often require transparent competitive bidding, and thus take time. Figure 8.1 Government Budget Processes DIPA Project implementation Budget preparation - Signature authorities - Procurement Project preparation RKA - KL - Disbursement (several channels) Grant/loan agreement GoI - projects Donor projects Though the revised 2005 budget allocated RECENT PROGRESS AND OUTLOOK FOR substantial funds to the BRR in June 2005, 2006 most of these funds have been channeled directly to line ministries and regional Following direct intervention by President governments. This "pass-through" approach Yudhoyono to accelerate the progress of has also led to slow disbursements from the reconstruction, the backlog of approvals BRR's own funds. The process of identifying for existing on-budget donor projects was appropriate implementation agencies and dealt with decisively. Approved projects appointing project managers ("Satkers") willing of the Multi-Donor Fund (supervised by the to work under BRR's enhanced fiduciary World Bank) and the Emergency Tsunami and controls proved to be slower than expected. Earthquake Support Project (administered In addition, hastily defined projects prepared by the ADB) have now been processed for review by the Parliament in May-June through the budget system and are actively 2005 often required time-consuming budget disbursing. After a slow start, over US$75 revisions in response to rapidly changing million will be disbursed from the Multi-Donor circumstances on the ground. Fund by the end of the year. The BRR also recently established the Recovery Aceh Nias Trust Fund which should help the channeling of resources from donors, including the private sector, in a flexible way (box 8.2). 150 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version Box 8.2 Recovery of Aceh and Nias Trust Fund The Recovery of Aceh and Nias Trust Fund (RAN-TF) was established in October by BRR, making use of its pow- ers given by Presidential decree to provide donors with a funding channel as an alternative to on-budget fund flows. The purpose of the fund is to provide flexibility and speed in responding to program needs, and matching that with donors seeking the most efficient funding means. The Trust Fund includes either `open' funds to be allocat- ed by BRR to the most pressing program needs, or `closed' funds that the donor wishes to earmark for particular projects. Since the fund's inception, donors include governments of Greece and China, and corporations Alcatel, BP, JSE and BNI. The RAN-TF has five commercial bank partners ­ HSBC, Deutsche Bank, Bank Niaga, BNI 46, and Standard Chartered. They will provide all financial management for the scheme, including all accounting and fund admin- istration. BRR will have oversight of program and fund allocation, and a procurement agent will be engaged to manage the delivery of services. This arrangement is intended to ensure professional and robust standards of accountability for the reconstruction program. In response to the delays in the budget system, BRR to directly execute projects and adhere to the Government has approved a carry-over of emergencyprocurementguidelinesinparticular unspent funds from the 2005 revised budget sectors through June 2006 which should into 2006 for reconstruction projects. While significantly accelerate disbursements. normal procedures require unspent funds at the end of the year to be returned to the Despite the recent progress, a flexible, fast- Ministry of Finance, the approval of this track set of procedures for spending on carry-over until April 2006 ­ with the option reconstruction projects in Aceh and Nias with of a further extension until September 2006 appropriate fiduciary controls is still required ­ should provide sufficient space to implement to ensure that the pace of implementation projects slated for 2005. However, it is crucial accelerates in 2006. The "normal" pace of that the procedures to administer this carry- project implementation is simply not good over do not impose additional delays in project enough to address the urgent needs of those implementation. whose lives were disrupted by the tsunami and earthquakes. While decisive presidential The preparation of the 2006 budget appears leadership resolved ongoing problems in 2005, to be on track. The budget was approved by this is not an effective institutional solution to the Parliament on October 27, 2005, including the underlying problems. Once administrative an allocation of US$ 583 million for the BRR bottlenecks require presidential intervention to and an additional US$ 369 million in on- be addressed, they will have already caused budget donor projects. The Ministry of Finance unacceptable delays. Going forward, it is intends to issue the BRR's budget document important to look for solutions that get the job on January 2, 2006, allowing for immediate done, on-budget or off-budget. disbursement to BRR reconstruction projects. A recent presidential regulation allows the Chapter 8 Fund flows and bottlenecks 151 Part II Finance and Coordination 152 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Part II FINANCE AND COORDINATION Chapter 9 THE CHALLENGE OF COORDINATION Part II Finance and Coordination The profusion of donor agencies can lead Coordination problems have led to gaps, to a confusion of activity. With nearly 500 duplication, inefficiencies and areas of organizations participating in the recovery uncertainty. program, including multi-lateral and bilateral This can lead to weak correlation between agencies, national and international NGOs, needs and recovery programs. Banda Aceh private sector firms and associations, and and Aceh Besar have the greatest coverage civil society groups, differing approaches, of NGOs, both more than 50 each. The standards and styles are inevitable. There concentration of IDP is also high in these have been many examples of competition two local governments, but the neighboring between agencies, "poaching" of operational districts (Aceh Jaya and Pidie) still have many territory and an unwillingness to share plans IDPs but much less support. We have seen and studies. Most donors have a cooperative similar gaps in financing of projects across spirit, but are so busy with their direct work sectors in chapter 7. Logistics are part of that they have little time to inform others the problem -donor/NGO activities clearly about their programs, much less the lessons concentrate in areas that are easier to reach learned. by road or UN planes and helicopters ­ but there are more fundamental coordination failures behind these patterns. Map 9.1 Distribution of NGO activities by District compared with needs (represented by IDP numbers) 154 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version Although coordination is a central mandate COORDINATION CHALLENGES AND of BRR, it is a collective responsibility for all STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS THEM stakeholders working for recovery. This was the key conclusion of the Coordination Forum In spite of a long series of working groups for Aceh and Nias (CFAN) in October 2005. covering most aspects of recovery, most This marked the first occasion that leaders seasoned agency staff would say that real of all stakeholder groups came together to coordination is quite weak. Most meetings determine more effective ways to meet the ostensibly for coordination achieve little more recovery challenges. Its theme was better than information-sharing rather than strategic coordination and collective responsibility planning. There is a vicious spiral; agency for ensuring high standards and enhanced leaders are so busy on their own programs that accountability to the people of Aceh and they are frustrated when they attend a meeting Nias. that isn't useful, but largely informational; they are likely to leave these in future for more junior THE STORY OF COORDINATION SO FAR staff, which reinforces their information rather than strategy content. Coordination during the humanitarian relief phase was largely a problem of logistics. Based on a real-time assessment of needs and conditions, it was key to know: who provides what, where and when. Such coordination was effectively provided by BAKORNAS, the Indonesian military, UN Sector-specific working groups meeting OCHA, and the Red Cross/Red Crescent. Box 9.1 regularly in Banda Aceh But as emergency recovery turned to reconstruction, the tasks of coordination Construction/ Social Sector/Other became much more complex. The UN began Development to convene various coordination meetings for bilateral and multilateral agencies, sometimes Shelter Health including the largest NGOs. Transitional Shelter Hygiene Water-Sanitation Food and Nutrition BRR takes the helm. BRR recognized that Logistics Reproductive Health its first priority was to gain a comprehensive Community-Driven Psycho-social and Mental overview of the tsunami response in every part Health of Aceh and Nias, and in every sector. This Development Medical Supply has enabled BRR to establish where there are Governance Malaria unmet needs or duplication, and where there is L Livelihoods Education work of poor quality. BRR's main coordination F Fisheries and Child Protection tool was a fast-track project approval process Aquaculture Gender in which every agency had to submit a Project Agriculture Humanitarian Concept Note detailing the project's plans, Public Information Security location of its activities, budgets and targets, Information Management which was then be fed into a projects database. and Monitoring To encourage coordination and transparency, Private Sector task force this process was in the public domain. (BRR-led) (BRR l d) Chapter 9 The Challenge of Coordination 155 Part II Finance and Coordination At the first CFAN meeting, BRR and sub-district (kecamatan) level. Experience participants reached agreement on a strategy in a number of places where this is well- to make the whole greater than the sum of the developed (especially Aceh Besar and parts through more proactive coordination, Pidie) demonstrates that well-planned, summarized as six objectives: regular coordination forums that involve all stakeholders makes it possible to map the 1) Strengthened policy-making: BRR is needs and existing programs in the various now initiating policy advisory groups to villages to identify problems of quality or reach agreement on how best to address consistency, to spot gaps and overlaps, particular critical issues (such as in the and to determine better ways of working housing sector). In these, BRR convenes together. BRR is now extending such small groups of the most experienced coordination to all damaged areas and will specialists in the topic concerned from the make sure that the results of these meetings provincial agencies, donors, international feed into district-level coordination forums NGOs and civil society. Policy decisions ­ again multi-stakeholder and led by the reached through such processes are bupatis. also likely to be better respected and understood. 4) Collaboration in upholding standards: BRR is charged with overall quality management 2) Collective responsibility for tackling but cannot achieve this without active problems: BRR's early coordination efforts support of its operational partners. It tended towards a "hub and spoke" model is now important to develop effective, in which all agencies dealt individually widely supported mechanisms to monitor with BRR, relying upon it to internalize performance. Various mechanisms to and communicate information across all contribute to this are being considered, other donors. But as the pace of recovery including commissioning independent increased, it became impossible for BRR agencies to survey programs or make to engage with every project or problem; spot checks, promoting peer review it has needed to devolve functions and mechanisms, initiating an "accredited work in partnership, with other agencies. partner" scheme designed to help The key principle to be advanced for smaller NGOs in quality monitoring and problem solving is to create structures for compliance, and strengthening monitoring identifying and solving them at the lowest of government- funded reconstruction level possible, while ensuring there is a activities. For the latter, BRR has put in clear referral route to forward issues that place a program for quality assurance and can't be resolved at that level. monitoring of the $397 million of programs managed under its own budget in 2005. 3) Holistic planning: Many agencies may work in the same village. At that level, 5) Better data gathering: Even now, however, close proximity usually allows the approaching one year after the tsunami, it various parties to avoid overlapping ­ but demands enormous efforts to receive an it is unlikely to lead to a holistic plan for the accurate and consistent picture of needs medium term, agreed with the community and progress, despite numerous studies and with local authorities. For this it is and surveys. Greater professionalism important to evolve coordination at the is needed in future data gathering and 156 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version more discipline for sharing operational This new framework for coordination was information. BRR, the UN Information discussed extensively at CFAN and in follow- Management Systems and the World up meetings with the key stakeholders. Some Bank have now established an Advisory CFAN proposals have been adopted; with Group on Information Management and others there has been only partial follow-up Monitoring to oversee the quality of future ­ however BRR sees acting on the whole surveys and research. And BRR is being framework as a priority for the coming more assertive in requiring all donors and months. The following diagram describes INGOs to provide regular information its key elements. Subsequent CFAN about the progress of their projects to a meetings will be the highest level meeting central system (the Recovery in Aceh and of all stakeholders to confront bottlenecks, Nias ­ RAN-Data-Base) which is available review progress and agree future priorities. It for public inspection. See Box 9.2 comprises Ambassadors, country directors of donor agencies and NGOs, leaders of BRR, senior GoI officials, representatives of the Box 9.2 Recovery Aceh Nias Database provincial governments and its main agencies The RAN-Database is BRR's information management as well as civil society leaders. The priority system for reconstruction projects, using a similar at CFAN meetings will be to identify gaps ­ database as other tsunami affected countries. both geographic and sectoral ­ and explore how best to meet them. This will include a The database was launched at the end of October matchmaking between agencies who have 2005. It contains information on approval and capacity to expand excellent programs but progress of all projects based on the BRR `Concept lack funds with donors who have uncommitted note' approval system, plus monitoring data based resources for recovery. on `key performance indicators' for each sector. All the database contents are publicly available through the website www.e-aceh-nias.org and organizations can update their own project information on-line. 6) Transparency and sharing: At present, there is a tendency for agencies to gather and keep information for their own programs and be reluctant to share it. This competitiveness and lack of collegiality imposes substantial costs to all the stakeholders. Also, many agencies give little attention to informing those impacted by the tsunami about their programs ­ leading most to feel extremely ill-informed about them. They must in future be the first to be informed. Chapter 9 The Challenge of Coordination 157 Part II Finance and Coordination Figure 9.1 Schematic view of the enhanced strategy for stakeholder coordination Other Govt of Donors MDTF NGOs NAD GoI Info donor ­ esp. about about BRR info Aceh/Nias Recovery Forum (& overcoming R & R Donor/NGO/BRR Roundtable (monthly) for obstacles support shelter Sector WGs/policy groups and & $ meeting A. Jaya Kabupaten level coord. for Kab. coord quality-control, problem solving and filtering policy needs/info needs Kecamaten co-ordination Aceh Jaya Communities and affected people 158 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version Chapter 9 The Challenge of Coordination 159 Part III Moving Forward - Challenges and Strategy for 2006 and Beyond 160 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Part III MOVING FORWARD ­ CHALLENGES AND STRATEGY FOR 2006 AND BEYOND Chapter 10 RECOVERY PRIORITIES FOR 2006-2007 Part III Moving Forward - Challenges and Strategy for 2006 and Beyond While many organizations play vital roles construction projects through direct in recovery, the BRR has been created contracting. This will give it greater ability to stand at the helm steering the overall to respond to gaps or poorly performing enterprise. Its leadership makes the programs. It can henceforth assume Indonesian experience unique compared with responsibility to deliver the programs itself, other emergency responses. This part of the or reassign them to another agency. It will report tells of the evolving challenges and also have the capacity to provide support, priorities in the recovery effort. It discusses training, encouragement and oversight to local the contributions everyone can make to these governments to execute quality programs of challenges, but it concentrates heavily on the reconstruction and development. role of BRR and the vision of this agency for both the coming months and the longer term. BRR has defined four key challenges for the months ahead: 1) getting people For its first six months, BRR built itself into houses; 2) addressing the immediate as a new government agency, creating infrastructure and logistics needs to facilitate systems to intervene in crucial areas, and large-scale reconstruction activities; 3) helping coordinating recovery agencies, particularly to strengthen both institutional and human by instituting a common project approval capacities; and, 4) restoring livelihoods. mechanism. This gave the BRR an overview of which agency was doing what, where and with REBUILDING HOUSING what resources ­ the supply-side of recovery. At the same time, the emphasis of BRR and There will be two main housing priorities many agencies on ensuring community-driven in 2006: approaches ­ reaching out to the people hit by the tsunami to understand their needs and · Ensure that all IDPs are out of tents in early priorities for recovery ­ enabled BRR to help 2006 through the provision of suitable match this donor supply-side capacity with transitional housing. While the UN Office of the communities' demand-side needs. This Recovery Coordination, together with BRR, helped identify the major gaps, and therefore has provided much of the impetus for this the priorities for the government of Indonesia's effort, the Red Cross/Red Crescent (RCRC) resources, which started flowing to Aceh only is carrying the brunt of the responsibility in late August. In this formative time, BRR with the support of local government to also established key units, such as the anti- identify land and local labor. RCRC has corruption unit, and built relationships with identified high quality transitional houses other government agencies (nationally and that can be erected quickly. The import of locally). Now BRR leads the recovery effort 20,000 units has begun and is expected by setting standards, monitoring delivery, to be completed over the next 3 months, identifying and solving problems of policy or building up to the rate of 2000 per week. bottlenecks, , and matching needs to funds IOM and RCRC are transporting the units ­ including by submitting proposals to major to locations around Aceh and Nias, and donors. several NGOs have agreed to erect them. UNICEF, Oxfam, RCRC and other NGOs In 2006, BRR plans to take on more are providing water and sanitation in the responsibilities as an implementing new settlements. Those who relocate into agency, directly overseeing large-scale transitional houses will not be shifted to "the 162 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version back of the queue" for a permanent house. help tsunami victims. Some are anxious to return to their homes, but others are happy · Accelerate the pace of building permanent where they are. If incentives are given to homes. The goal is to maintain the recent the hosts as well as the basic compensation pace of about 5000 housing starts per package due to all IDPs, this arrangement month in the first half of 2006 and accelerate may work well for all. 8000 per month in the second half of 2006, 4. What options should be offered to those while rigorously maintaining the quality who don't want to return to their villages? of construction and the participation of In addition to the above, many will opt not communities in decision-making. The to have the new house to which they are total production goal for 2006 is 78,000 entitled. These include young men who permanent houses. The remaining 12,000 have lost all their family members and would be completed in 2007. BRR will might choose to move far away; women closely support and monitor the twenty who might remarry or prefer to move in largest housing programs (which are with adult children; and orphans who are expected to build well over 80 percent of adopted (perhaps by relatives) and who will the planned houses). BRR itself will have not need a house of their own for a long the capacity, in terms of budget and a roster time. For all of these a cash package might of construction companies, to build up to be more appropriate, but this is currently 40,000 houses in 2006 if the need arises. not on offer. 5. How actively should issues of equity be Six important questions will need to be managed? Some communities complain resolved early in 2006, and are likely to that neighboring villages (or even others dominate policy-making in the sector: living in the same village) are receiving much better houses. This is an inevitable 1. What entitlement should renters have to consequence of there being a multitude of compensation? The emerging consensus housing providers, each using their own amongst agencies working in the sector and designs, and an emphasis on participatory BRR is that renters should be entitled to a approaches in which the communities house, albeit perhaps with some obligation themselves decide on which houses they to pay for the land and a portion of the cost want and which NGOs they want to help (for which loans would be available). them. They may come to regret their choice 2. What would be the best program to assist when the alternatives that might have been those who need to repair their homes? At available become evident. present, stringent requirements to provide 6. How interventionist should BRR be in photographic evidence of tsunami damage managing the quality of programs? Clearly is deterring progress in this area; a simpler some NGOs and donors are building sub- approach based on community-ratification standard houses, are unacceptably slow, or of property damage could achieve much are simply failing to meet their commitments. swifter results, so speeding up people's BRR is now determined to take responsibility return to their homes. for reassigning responsibilities in such 3. Should host families be given incentives to situations or undertaking the commitments house IDPs for the long term? Many IDPs itself ­ but how much should BRR negotiate have been incorporated into the homes of with and give notice to the offending agency relatives, friends or others who wanted to before it strips them of their programs? Chapter 10 Recovery Priorities For 2006-2007 163 Part III Moving Forward - Challenges and Strategy for 2006 and Beyond REPAIRING INFRASTRUCTURE Going forward, BRR is preparing a Medium-Term Action Plan for 2006-8 Linked to housing, a parallel priority will including a "Kabupaten Infrastructure be for rehabilitating vital infrastructure. Development Support" plan, for which Indeed if this is not done, the houses won't mapping, surveys and studies have already get built. It will be impossible to build houses been commissioned. Throughout 2006 this along most of the west coast unless roads program will start in the five most affected and ports are repaired (at least temporarily). areas (Banda Aceh, Aceh Besar, Aceh Jaya, Unless housing land is drained or protected Aceh Barat and Nias) and will evolve into an from tidal incursion, many of the houses built intensive program of spatial planning and will be uninhabitable. detailed engineering design, followed by tender procedures for the construction tasks. An Immediate Action Plan (IAP) for The plan also entails building the capacity of infrastructure, financed by the Multi- local government to plan and manage local Donor Fund, will be implemented in the development projects. The full cost of the first half of 2006. The first aim of the IAP program will be in the range US$200-400 is to ensure that the pace of recovery in the million and will extend, in the second year, to most severely damaged communities along 14 districts/cities and eventually to all areas of the west coast can accelerate by conducting Aceh and Nias that were damaged. swift repairs and upgrading to the temporary Banda Aceh to Meulaboh road and bridges, strengthening them from their current carrying capacity of 5-ton trucks to 20-ton; the Government of Japan is similarly upgrading the Calang to Meulaboh stretch of road. At the same time, special ships are being brought in to Aceh that can carry heavy loads yet land on beaches ­ to be able to bring construction materials and other supplies to areas where the ports were destroyed. A further IAP element entails restoring drainage systems, particularly in the city of Banda Aceh, so that the new houses being built are not flood-prone. And work will start to make quick repairs to some of the ports and plan the more extensive port re-building and rehabilitation elsewhere. Finally, IAP includes the provision of water supplies and sanitation to the new temporary living centers being built with the IFRC/UN program. 164 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version Box 10.1 Infrastructure priorities for 2006-2007 ­ Plans and Progress Major infrastructure plans: · 871 km of national road repaired or rebuilt (equivalent to 3-times Singapore to Kuala Lumpur) · 336 km provincial/local roads in Aceh, 366km in Nias · 150m of bridges in Aceh, 125m in Nias · Rebuild ports in Ulee Lheue, Calang, Meulaboh, Malahayati, Tapaktuan, Sibigo, Balohan and Sinabang; expand Sabang port as a hub; rehabilitate other ferry and small ports, and Gunung Sitoli in Nias and 4 small ports; Calang port is top priority, (further ports are needed for which funds are not yet available in Blang Pidie, Singkil, Lamno Langsa and passenger ports in Nias) · Rebuild airports in Gunung Sitoli, Lasondre, Blang Pidie and Tapak Lum. · 37.8 km of coastal protection by 2009 · Potential plans for building coal-fired power station and linked coal-mining development in Meulaboh area; micro-hydroelectricity program in the Eastern highlands (the Leuser area); geothermal power station in West Aceh Plans underway (end-2005): · 5 major construction projects (totaling US$259 million) are underway including: · 244km west coast road to Meulaboh (USAID) · 491 km road rehab from Banda Aceh to North Sumatran border (ADB) · Design of ports, water supply and coastal protection (technical assistance from France, Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Japan and ADB) · Support to district/city governments for project preparation, management of construction projects and institutional development · 11 projects (totaling US$52.1 million) are being tendered including: · Banda Aceh flood control · Major irrigation and drainage program · Rebuilding ports in Nias and Aceh · 3 projects' (US$13 million) MoU or grant agreements are being prepared. STRENGTHENING INSTITUTIONAL AND capacity needs to be built now­ not least so HUMAN CAPACITIES that once BRR dissolves a strong capacity in the service of the people will remain, and With BRR's mandate ending in 2009, it there will be local government ownership, is critical to work side by side with local and therefore willingness to repair and service authorities to strengthen their capacity. the roads and other facilities that have been Local authorities must be fully involved in provided by BRR and donor programs. district-level infrastructure and other programs so that their capacity for managing programs Both in the education and health sectors, and engaging constructively with communities initial success was achieved by rapidly is enhanced as a result. As the BRR increases restoring services through temporary capacity for program implementation and facilities. The challenge now is to ensure delivery, there is a risk that local government these temporary facilities are quickly replaced will further withdraw from the process. Local by high quality permanent ones, and that Chapter 10 Recovery Priorities For 2006-2007 165 Part III Moving Forward - Challenges and Strategy for 2006 and Beyond the quality of education and health care jobs and contracts to workers and companies improves. outside Aceh and Nias. Donors and NGOs should be encouraged to provide on-the-job As attention turns to rebuilding the health training to workers so that they gain skills in and education systems, focus is needed construction, carpentry and other trades ­ on coordination, targeting and planning though this too needs strategic management for the longer-term. Overlap of project and consideration of the likely labor market sites amongst donors is an issue. In addition, once the post-disaster reconstruction boom both sectors were in a poor state prior to dies down. the tsunami, and education was particularly affected by the conflict. Planning should be a At the same time, there is an urgent need high priority for 2006-7, to ensure that facilities for training in a range of other activities are provided equitably to all areas (tsunami, ­ particularly for those who cannot return to earthquake, and conflict-affected), and that their previous jobs. In addition, there is an these will be sustainable by local authorities. opportunity to promote the empowerment of women through training in non-traditional RESTORING LIVELIHOODS skills. BRR will coordinate programs providing training to over 4000 people per year in new Employment skills and will initiate 24 manpower centers in There will be large numbers of jobs in Aceh alone to provide information about work the construction sector in Aceh and Nias opportunities. over the coming 3 years (perhaps as many as 1.15 million). The challenge is to ensure Agriculture that these jobs help IDPs to recover their lives To enable families to return to their farms, the and dignity without creating an unsustainable priorities are to complete the rehabilitation of employment and wage bubble. The most rapid 28,000 ha of paddy land and 30,000 hectares reconstruction might be achieved by bringing of dry-land farms and to compensate for land in construction companies, complete with that will be lost forever through the creation their workforce, from throughout Indonesia of 20,000 ha of new paddy land over 2006- and beyond. However this would mean 7. To capitalize on the opportunities created little local employment, potential resentment by the peace agreement, BRR is proposing towards the incomers and lost opportunities a program to develop 50,000 ha of new for local capacity building. Conversely, if jobs plantations for coffee, fast-growing wood and are reserved rigidly for local people there could other agri-business products, plus related be serious wage and price inflation as well as plants for the processing of these goods. capacity gaps that could cause construction There is also an opportunity to greatly expand delays. animal husbandry, so that Aceh can move from its heavy dependence on imported meat There needs to be clear guidance ­ carefully (notwithstanding the urgency to keep the new negotiated with community leaders, labor outbreaks of bird flu under control). groups and others in civil society ­ on steering the best course. Local labor should be used Fisheries providing wage rates do not significantly A priority for 2006-7 is to develop a more exceed national norms and there are no lengthy integrated and holistic strategy for the delays, but there must also be flexibility to offer recovery of fishing related employment. With 166 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version growing evidence that the current level of preventing future disasters are not lost; coastal fishing is unsustainable, and that rich · Establish BRR's capacity for direct stocks exist in deeper water, the future priority implementation, with procurement should be to build and equip larger boats that mechanisms that enable BRR to directly can fish further out. There also needs to be appoint construction companies under the more emphasis on fish processing and ice emergency powers given to it by Presidential plants, markets, cooperative development, decree; training and other infrastructure so that fishing · Begin the process of capacity building for communities can get greater rewards from district governments; their catch. BRR has also set targets for the · Manage the supply-chain for construction rehabilitation of 11,000 ha of fish ponds by materials to ensure stable supply; end 2006 and 15,000 by 2007, to enable · Strengthen the monitoring and data 30,000 families to regain their livelihoods. systems to end the lack of clarity concerning numbers of IDPs, numbers of new houses Enterprise needed, and progress of NGO and donor Microfinance to support the quick recovery and programs; expansion of small and medium enterprises will · Establish a well-functioning grievance be a key priority. By 2007, BRR anticipates that system so that IDPs and communities can there could be 650 microfinance institutions have their concerns and complaints listened underway providing credit to 20,000 people; to and effectively addressed; by 2009 livelihood programs could help start · Establish a one-stop shop to help provide 167,000 home industries and aid 56,000 the visas, work-permits and import licenses small businesses through training schemes, needed by international agencies engaged microfinance, and advice on management and in the reconstruction effort. marketing. DONOR AND BRR PRIORITIES TO MEET THE BRR IN THE FUTURE: EXTENDING THE CHALLENGES OF 2006 ITS OPERATIONS AND STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT To reach these goals, BRR and the donors will need to focus on the following issues for BRR is significantly widening its 2006: functions beyond general coordination, oversight, and project approval. This is · Ensure that government, donor and NGO designed to enable BRR to assert stronger pledges translate into real programs, or that strategic leadership and coordination, to be ­ where commitments cannot be honored more effective in managing the quality and ­ others are found to take on the work; pace of the overall recovery effort, to press · Maintain the quality as well as pace in the and support local government in playing a recovery, and again reassign programs steadily increasing role in recovery, and to to other agencies where it emerges that accelerate recovery by becoming itself a competence is lacking; major implementer of construction projects. · Address with communities the inter- These changes have major implications for related issues of land titling, phasing of BRR's relationships with provincial, district reconstruction efforts, and re-design of governments and other stakeholders. communities so that opportunities for Chapter 10 Recovery Priorities For 2006-2007 167 Part III Moving Forward - Challenges and Strategy for 2006 and Beyond To equip it for these broadened functions, liaison staff to open these offices. Over time, BRR has recently undergone a major existing BRR staff will be transferred to these restructuring. Its operation core comprises offices to develop close links with officials and four sections, each led by a BRR Deputy (for other stakeholders at the district and sub- Infrastructure,Housing/Settlements,Economic district levels. and Business Development; and Institutional and Human Resource Development). Other The ultimate aim is a gradual shift of functions are arranged as illustrated below. decision-making and management BRR also plans to decentralize to help responsibility from BRR to district and accelerate the housing and infrastructure city authorities. BRR's role would be programs and to be able to work closely with, reduced to monitoring, countering corruption, galvanize action by, and carefully monitor problem solving, gap-filling and donor the activities of local governments. While in relations (including mobilizing more funds that 2005 some 90 percent of BRR staff were in its may be needed from the donor community) Banda Aceh and Jakarta office, by 2008 it is so that, in 2009, it can dissolve itself leaving estimated that 50 percent staff will be located a well-functioning recovery and development in 7 or more regional offices. The start will machine in place. be made in 2006 by the appointment of BRR Director Internal Auditor Management Special projects; Service Center: Policy and Strategy; Finance, Admin., Advisors Chief Operations Communications, Officer Anti-corruption Unit Regional Offices Nias, Calang, Deputy Deputy Deputy for Deputy for Meulaboh, for for Business & Institutional Simeulue, Infra- Housing Economic and HR Lhokseumawe, structure Development Development Pidie, Banda Aceh 168 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version Chapter 10 Recovery Priorities For 2006-2007 169 Part III Moving Forward - Challenges and Strategy for 2006 and Beyond 170 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Part III MOVING FORWARD ­ CHALLENGES AND STRATEGY FOR 2006 AND BEYOND Chapter 11 THE LONGER-TERM VISION AND PLAN FOR ACEH AND NIAS Part III Moving Forward - Challenges and Strategy for 2006 and Beyond There are a thousand ingredients in attention to the remainder of the west coast, recovery from a major disaster ­ especially Nias and Simeulue. In 2007, they will ensure one as complex as that of Aceh and Nias. It that parts of the interior and the rest of the is not possible to attend to all of them at once east coast are adequately supported and without plunging the whole endeavor into by 2008 programs will be extended to all a mire of planning and indecision. Effective vulnerable areas, especially in the highlands, progress means tough choices, separating where both conflict and the tsunami have had what is vital from the merely important. a devastating impact. The previous chapter concentrated on the immediate priorities for the next two years. As BRR also envisages a similar sequencing things progress, it will be possible to expand by sector. After emergency relief, the operations to include vital needs that are less immediate focus of recovery was on housing urgent and eventually, build beyond recovery and work programs to support livelihoods and to development. kick-start economic recovery. In 2006-2007 priority will be extended to building physical SEQUENCING THE RECOVERY and social infrastructure. The infrastructure program will largely entail working with local Geographically, this sequencing accounts government, which requires building capacity for why priority in 2005 largely went to the for project management and supervision, coastal areas from Banda Aceh towards planning, and monitoring corruption to enable Bireuen in the north-east and southwards them to assume full responsibility so that, in to Meulaboh. In 2006, BRR and donors 2009, BRR can dissolve. This sequence of will ensure a broadening effort to give due prioritization is illustrated below. Figure 11.1 Sequencing of emergency and recovery effort (schematic) Level of Activity Emergency Physical and Social Infrastructure Housing ediate Long m er Im term Livelihood and Business 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 172 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version MONITORING PROGRESS program management and enabling a range of stakeholders to assess progress. Monitoring and evaluation of the reconstruction effort presents unique LONG TERM DEVELOPMENT GOALS challenges. The scale of the disaster, the range of sectors covered, and the number There is enormous potential to build a of partners involved makes getting a grasp "New Aceh and Nias". Aceh has fertile of progress difficult. Several surveys were soil and good fishing prospects; rich natural undertaken soon after the disaster to assess and mineral resources; an educated and the extent of damage and the needs of the hard-working population; plentiful reserves population by NGOs, donors and government of oil, coal and renewable energy sources agencies and various systems established for and tremendous scenic beauty and beaches recording affected individuals. In addition with tourist potential. Its location ­ with easy the national statistics agency conducted a sea-routes to India, Malaysia, Singapore, and full population census in August and BRR Thailand, ­ links Aceh and Nias to one of the has established databases to record pledges fastest growing economic regions of the world. and progress with recovery projects and has A holistic development strategy is needed. commissioned periodic surveys to establish And the consultative structures established progress of reconstruction at village level in for tsunami and earthquake response together key sectors such as housing and livelihoods. with the new peace dialogue between politically These sources of data, however, often present diverse factions, offers a precious chance to widely differing results. As a consequence it is have an intense public debate about the future often difficult to know with accuracy the extent development trajectory for the region. of need and progress. Altering the course of a province is a Coordination of the different monitoring bold venture that, to be sustainable, activities is important to avoid duplicate requires the active involvement of the requests for information and to improve people as well as the provincial and the quality of the data. Hence, BRR has local governments. It is therefore critical established an inter-agency working group to that there be intensive, broad participation in give greater strategic direction to monitoring defining the vision for the long-term growth efforts. BRR is receiving support from the of Aceh and Nias. To ensure all stakeholders international community in operationalizing have a chance to be heard entails extensive, its monitoring systems. Many government and therefore time-consuming, consultation. reporting systems were not working well However, if the deliberations take too long before the disaster and it is unlikely they this unique opportunity may be lost. So the can be rejuvenated quickly. Nevertheless, challenge for planning the long-term strategy BRR needs to be careful not to duplicate the must be to "make cautious haste." activities of existing government departments, and look forward to building capacity in SOMEOFTHELONGER-TERMPRIORITIES provincial and district governments. Finally, INCLUDE: emphasis needs to be given to the analysis and dissemination of information, incorporating it Realizing the long-term economic potential in to priority setting, policy formulation and of the region. The economic prospects of Chapter 11 The Longer-term Vision And Plan For Aceh And Nias 173 Part III Moving Forward - Challenges and Strategy for 2006 and Beyond the region hinge upon removal of the key support for women's cooperatives, providing barriers to growth that have been holding microfinance and management training, back Aceh and Nias for many years before and business advisory services. A gender the tsunami and earthquake. To fully realize strategy should include legal rights programs the economic potential of the region, the to offer women protection in employment and following key issues need to be addressed: (i) enterprise, protection from domestic violence, modernizing economy; (ii) diversifying exports; counseling services and access to lawyers (iii) maximizing the employment opportunities; and paralegals that are specially trained to (iv) developing the processing units at district fight gender equality cases. Women should level; (v) ensuring that economic recovery is also receive civic education, encouragement environmentally sustainable; (vi) exploring to run for elected office and to participate in investment opportunities; (vii) benefiting from decision-making at all levels. To meet the the peace dividend. Millennium Development Goals in Aceh and Nias, special attention must also be paid to Integration, connectivity and equity. The ensuring a child-focused development strategy longer-term vision is for a public infrastructure ­ including clarifying and protecting all basic development program that promotes a web rights of children, starting with the universal of infrastructure schemes throughout Aceh provision of birth certificates; and legal aid and Nias to better connect it to the rest of and counseling services for children. Young Sumatra and to external markets. With roads adults could be helped by enterprise training reaching to the remoter districts and into the programs to tackle youth unemployment and poor highland regions, future development by international youth exchange programs. can become more equitable, reducing the risk of resentments that fuel conflict. Safeguarding the peace. The immediate demobilization and reintegration program Better use of natural resources. Aceh and needs to be followed by a broader Nias have enormous potential that their reconstruction program for all conflict-affected relative isolation and history of conflict have areas comparable to the program in tsunami- not allowed them to realize. For example, affected areas. Among the issues that should there is potential for geothermal energy in be considered: the mountains near Banda Aceh; small scale · Support for ex-combatants returning to hydro-electricity generation throughout the communities and the provision of houses; extensive mountain areas; wind, sea and solar · Traditional ishlah (reconciliation) through energy production particularly on the islands; community-driven approaches; unexploited coal deposits near Meulaboh; and · Socialization of peace-building among key opportunities to diversify farming, forestry and groups-- TNI, youth, women, teachers, plantations. Both Aceh and Nias offer natural traders and professionals; beauty that is rich for tourist development. · Training of traditional religious and community leaders in peace-building and Unleashing the potential of all the people. conflict resolution skills and programs to A long-term strategy should include a encourage their activities in these areas; bold strategy to improve opportunities for · Use of media, specially radio and TV to education and training. Special efforts create public awareness and dialogue; are needed to ensure gender equity at and, school and in enterprise ­ including through · Vocational training for ex-GAM members. 174 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version Building responsive, responsible and honest preparedness; hospital and health facilities government. With more than US$4 billion must be built so that they are functional worth of projects and almost 1000 projects on in the post-disaster aftermath to serve the ground, it is vital that the most energetic the injured; investments in farming should measures possible are taken to guard against consider sustainable agricultural practices; corruption in the recovery effort. The province and infrastructure must be built to provide of Aceh has a poor reputation, even by protection from hazard risks. It is crucial for Indonesian standards, for corruption. There is communities to lay the foundations for reducing an active anti-corruption unit within the BRR their disaster risk now, by considering the itself and it is now expanding its monitoring, planning of their village or community, where information and evaluation system so that it structures are sited, the standards to which can watch very carefully the use of government they are built, and how they manage their funds it channels through local governments. environment and natural resources. As BRR increases its capacity for direct implementation it will become increasingly Experience in other parts of the world tells us important that its independent Oversight thatsuchchallengescannotbeunderestimated. Board (Dewan Pengawas) play a stronger role It's important to recognize that while disasters in monitoring BRR's activities. It will also be offer opportunities for change, they also reveal important to strengthen the judicial system to and exacerbate pre-existing weaknesses. ensure IDPs get their full entitlements and that After Hurricane Mitch devastated the Central their grievances are adequately addressed. America region in 1998 ­ dropping nearly 3 feet of rain and causing about 18,000 lives Ensuring preparedness against future to be lost and nearly US$5 billion in damage disasters. It takes time to seed and nurture and losses ­ the presidents of the four most a culture of disaster prevention, but multi- affected countries (El Salvador, Guatemala, hazard disaster risk management is a vital Honduras, and Nicaragua), along with donors element of long term recovery in Aceh and and communities called for a "transformation" Nias. Increasing capacity for hazard risk of the region rather than mere reconstruction. mitigation cannot be achieved within the This was to be based on transparency, good context of a recovery program of 2-3 years. governance, decentralization, tackling social Much attention has been given to installing a vulnerability, environmental management, tsunami early warning system for the Indian local development, trade, and migration. Ocean. While this is beneficial, there are other hazards that occur with more frequency in the region, including earthquakes, storms, floods and landslides. A comprehensive risk management system should include the necessary structural and non-structural measures to deal with all relevant hazards. Reconstruction and development activities in each and every sector should integrate risk reduction measures. For example, schools and community centers can be sited and built to serve as evacuation centers; education curricula can include materials on disaster Chapter 11 The Longer-term Vision And Plan For Aceh And Nias 175 Part III Moving Forward - Challenges and Strategy for 2006 and Beyond 176 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Part III MOVING FORWARD ­ CHALLENGES AND STRATEGY FOR 2006 AND BEYOND Chapter 12 CONCLUSIONS ­ THE IMPLICATIONS FOR ALL PARTNERS Chapter 12 Conclusions ­ The Implications For All Partners 177 Part III Moving Forward - Challenges and Strategy for 2006 and Beyond Those involved in bringing Aceh and Nias and maintain the sense of urgency and vision back from devastation know just how needed over what will inevitably be a lengthy great the challenges are in rehabilitating process of recovery and reconstruction. The and reconstructing the communities, the Government tasked the BRR not only with infrastructure and the livelihoods for those in leading the reconstruction, but setting new the affected areas. Yet just as the challenges standards for efficiency and integrity to secure are great, so too is the spirit of those who have the confidence of the millions of people around endured the trauma of the events and those the world that so generously contributed. 2006 who have joined the endeavor to restore their will put these hopes to the test. This report lives. The world was moved by the tragedy sets out a clear timeline for the reconstruction and moved with collective will to address it. process and concrete indicators of success to judge that performance. All would wish that greater progress was made in the year since the tsunami, but To achieve these results will require the that should not overshadow the progress work of hundreds of organizations pulling that is being been made. New houses are together in operations, analysis, problem being built by the thousands, although twenty solving, quality-control and intelligence- to thirty thousand may seem few given the gathering. This can be achieved. By learning need for so many more. Less visible but from the valuable experience of past months, essential are the softer elements of progress: and by pulling together, the pace of recovery vocational employment training, the slow but could accelerate greatly. steady development of livelihood programs, local government capacity building and the To achieve this, however, it is time to peace agreement between the Government think beyond questions of `my project' and GAM. Such advances may not be as easy or `yours', and recognize that there is to see as physical structures but they are no one single recovery endeavor, in which all less important. When combined they reveal actors have a role to play and share a burden a picture of a recovery program being waged of responsibility. Effective partnerships entail on many fronts with gradual but increasing crossing institutional divides to ensure that the success. whole recovery effort becomes much more than a sum of all the component projects. The Government of Indonesia chose to The remainder of this chapter sets out the key build a new institutional foundation to challenges needed for a quantum leap in the anchor the reconstruction process in recovery effort, and goes on to suggest the recognition of the magnitude of the disaster, responsibilities of all stakeholders to make this the challenges of the environment in which it happen. occurred, and the need to ensure a coordinated approach among the unprecedented number KEY CHALLENGES FOR ALL PARTNERS of actors engaged in the recovery. The drafting of a Master Plan for Rehabilitation and The Coordination Forums for Aceh and Nias Reconstruction and the creation of the BRR in October and December brought all the did take months of consultation, deliberation key stakeholders together for the first time to and preparation. But the hope was that, once discuss priorities for the recovery. This, and established, such a foundation would ensure the ensuing discussions, can be summarized a more effective and sustainable recovery as eight key and collective challenges. 178 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version or policy authority, and actively creating 1) We must cooperate in identifying speedy processes for both on-budget and problems, gaps and bottlenecks and off-budget funds are all vital. finding ways of solving them at the most local level. This entails joint mechanisms 5) We must work hard to revitalize the to ensure both high quality and a rapid pace economy through restoring livelihoods of reconstruction, as well as a willingness to and employment. Reconstruction to shift program responsibility from one agency date has concentrated on houses and to another if this will accelerate progress. infrastructure; it now needs to enter a more It also entails cooperation to ensure equity holistic phase, otherwise we will simply ­ between regions and genders, between be creating places where people have house owners and renters, and among all shelter but not a decent life. This calls for population groups. imaginative support for entrepreneurs to restart businesses, for long-term livelihood 2) We must coordinate effectively in promotion,andforfosteringsustainablejobs policy-making and analysis, not just ­ while retaining emergency employment operations, to ensure that systematic and welfare schemes as a vital stop-gap. problems are cleared up by appropriate policy shifts and guidelines, and that new 6) All of us, working in our various policies are well informed by realities on agencies, must constantly remind the ground. This has implications for policy ourselves that the path of recovery advisory groups within Aceh and Nias and is not for us to determine, but for the also for ensuring that BRR's boards (the people who suffered. The communities Advisory and Oversight Boards) become must be firmly in the driving seat ­ effective instruments. which means scrupulously adhering to principles of consultation, participation 3) We must be systematic in tackling the and transparency. It also means helping infrastructure logistics problems that communities put in place mechanisms to hamper recovery in the most challenged ensure their grievances are heard. The areas. This includes cooperation in ramping starting point for this should be well- up sea and road transportation to cut-off planned coordination forums at village areas, in repairing the ports, roads, bridges and sub-district level to bring together and drainage systems, and in restoring the supply side and the demand side: the utilities and coastal protection. representatives of the communities and local officials plus the donors and NGOs 4) We must cut through red-tape wherever who are offering support. it adds delay. All agencies should return as far as possible to the sense of urgency 7) We need to consider the needs of that pervaded the first few months, when communities who were ravaged by people on the ground felt empowered conflict along with the natural disasters to make the decisions on which lives to seek a virtuous circle by integrating re- depended. Now, too many decisions are building and peace-building. Bringing the still bogged down because of bureaucratic two together can help reunite communities, approval processes. Ensuring more direct and demonstrate the real possibilities of a lines of authority, clarity on who has financial peace dividend. Chapter 12 Conclusions ­ The Implications For All Partners 179 Part III Moving Forward - Challenges and Strategy for 2006 and Beyond 8) We need to strengthen intelligence participatory and consultative practices while gathering and information systems so also building institutional mechanisms to that we have a clearer idea of needs support these initiatives. and progress, and greater confidence in the data and analysis on which we base Central Government of Indonesia: our programs. The main responsibility of central government is to do everything possible to These are the key challenges, and all speed up decisions and ensure line ministries stakeholders have a part to play in realizing and budget processes maintain the sense of them. urgency necessary to get he job done. The President has given a clear message that he will CONTRIBUTIONS BY ALL PARTIES not tolerate obstruction in the reconstruction process. He expects senior ministers to BRR ­ the reconstruction agency: support him by actively clearing blockages. BRR is committed to providing stronger They in turn will look to competent, senior strategic coordination at all levels to assert staff to shepherd each important initiative, clear priorities, resolve problems, close gaps ensuring it passes smoothly. Government and, provide clear policy guidance. In support will also need to facilitate the seamless roll- of these it will continue to help communities, over of funds between budget years to avoid donors and NGOs cut through unwelcome interruption of programs, and rise to the bureaucracy. It will also continue to build challenge of facilitating flexible and speedy a solid and reliable base of information and on-budget and off-budget mechanisms in the data on which sound program decisions can best interests of delivery. Increasingly, major be based. In addition, BRR will take the new recovery issues are raised to Cabinet level step of creating a strong network of regional for discussion and BRR's Advisory Board will offices to promote greater coordination of need to resolve blockages and complexities effort at the district and sub-district levels. The of intra-governmental arrangements. It is agency is determined to establish a capacity also important to strengthen BRR's Oversight to implement construction projects directly as Board in support of its functions of monitoring, one option to meet emerging gaps, albeit as the grievance handling, guarding against "constructor of last resort". It will become more corruption, promoting transparency and directive in reassigning program responsibility maintaining an open dialogue with tsunami where agencies are clearly not delivering affected communities and civil society. adequately or, conversely, where agencies have surplus capacity and a good track record. Local authorities: It is directing increasing attention to restoring District and sub-district leaders (bupatis business and economic vitality ­ so ensuring and camats) are called upon to play a more holistic recovery effort ­ among other stronger coordinating roles. The Aceh things by encouraging investment from abroad Governor's office and an increasing number and the rest of Indonesia and by restoring the of bupatis and camats are being engaged banking system. BRR will continue to assert in this role. Their contribution will be and reinforce high ethical standards, tackle extremely important, particularly in identifying corruption, demand full transparency and and clearing local bottlenecks, working to insist on respect for communities through ensure tsunami victims get all the help they 180 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version are entitled to (including the regular cash The contributions of donors will be pivotal payment), negotiating with NGOs and donors in building the capacities within civil society operating locally to ensure the community and local government so that Aceh and Nias (and especially its most vulnerable) get the can perpetuate the positive development best possible support, convening regular momentum after the donors leave. coordination meetings of community leaders and all agencies working locally to ensure the International NGOs: communities truly drive their own recovery, Everything that applies to donors also and ensuring the communities have access to applies to NGOs. In addition, it is important the fullest information about local programs. that NGOs strive collectively for greater It is hoped they will empower village leaders discipline in their sector. Although many to solve problems locally where possible while programs are wonderful, there is also much ensuring there are clear referral routes to sub- delinquency. Communities increasingly district, district and province level if needed. complain about NGOs who promised help but They should be resolute in stamping out then disappeared, about programs that are corruption and other malpractices. Clearly, just not getting off the ground, or about poor they themselves will come under greater quality projects (especially when compared scrutiny in doing so and must set the highest with better quality programs in neighboring examples as community role models. villages). NGOs should endeavor to strengthen performance in their sector, not just their own Donors: programs. This entails a preparedness to blow Donors need to sustain the "emergency the whistle on the poor performance of peers, culture" in their processes to ensure rapid to offer advice to willing but less experienced decision-making and delivery. These efforts NGOs, to help community leaders and camats should include an active contribution to inter- plan local coordination mechanisms, to be agency coordination. They will, of course, diligent in reporting progress and problems need to report regularly and objectively on the to BRR and coordination forums, and to be progress of their programs, especially to the candid when problems and delays arise, RAN database maintained by BRR and maintain including being prepared to hand program best practices in independent auditing and responsibility to others who have the capacity monitoring. Contributions to the post-conflict to work faster. It is vital to avoid over-pledging reintegration process will also need to be and under-delivering. considered and negotiated. Donors are also welcome to extend their contributions to the Civil Society: areas of enterprise and business revitalization. Aceh's recent history of conflict and The sustainability of program contributions international isolation means that civil will need to be considered with greater care, society has evolved rather differently including environmental impact. Less obvious compared with other provinces. There are but equally vital will be the need for donors few local NGOs with large-scale operational to ensure the financial sustainability of the capacity, but on the other hand there are facilities they construct. Detailed cost-benefit many who are strong in advocacy and in and fund flow analysis will be of increasing protecting human rights, and there are strong importance in assessing the impact of donor associations, for example of fisher folk. While projects, particularly in the health sector. many INGOs and donors have programs to Chapter 12 Conclusions ­ The Implications For All Partners 181 Part III Moving Forward - Challenges and Strategy for 2006 and Beyond help strengthen civil society's capacities, the strongly together there are good prospects for most important roles civil society can play the recovery continuing to accelerate without immediately are in ensuring citizens know losing quality. If this is so, we will be able to and claim their entitlements and are aware build homes, not just houses. We will not of recovery programs intended to help them, just be erecting settlements throughout the helping communities voice their grievances, damaged areas of Aceh and Nias, but we will and tackling problems of corruption and be re-creating vibrant communities. This is abuse. They can also provide independent the goal for which we must all strive. monitoring of recovery projects, ensure the needs of the most vulnerable groups are met and serve as an interface between citizens and all institutions involved in the recovery of their communities. Civil society can also play a valuable role in helping tsunami-affected communities understand the many challenges involved in delivering such a large and complex recovery program. Managing community expectations is not easy. Disappointments are no doubt many. It would be inappropriate to exploit them improperly. Civil society can and should continue to strengthen the already strong foundations of community so essential to a stable working environment enabling all national and international contributors to deliver their products and services with confidence. FINALLY... At the outset, the government made two important choices for the recovery program; these appear to be robust ones, but it is still relatively early days. The government decided firstly that recovery would be led by a specially- created agency and secondly that it should follow a community driven approach. There is evidence that coordination is becoming stronger and bottlenecks are being resolved. There is also evidence that communities make good choices when they are allowed to do so and have access to good information. Providing these features prevail and providing the agencies working for recovery pull more 182 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version Chapter 12 Conclusions ­ The Implications For All Partners 183 ANNEXES ANNEXES Annex A.2: The Reconstruction and Development Program for Aceh and Nias (million US$) Domestic Donors TOTAL Funds BRR Decon Multilateral NGOs 1 Social Sector 156 14 396 187 547 1,299 Education 45 8 136 106 133 428 Health 48 0.1 97 60 244 449 Community, culture and religion 62 6 163 20 171 422 Infrastructure 495 55 420 406 624 2,000 Housing 227 48 226 28 446 976 Transport 134 2 65 310 18 529 Communications 7 0 17 10 1 35 Energy 27 5 10 0 1 43 Water and Sanitation 18 0 52 31 108 210 Flood control, irrigation works 81 0 36 10 9 135 Other Infrastructure 0 0 15 17 41 73 Productive Sectors 101 6 152 21 302 581 Agriculture and Livestock 29 2 34 0 72 138 Fisheries 33 3 52 16 73 176 Enterprise 39 1 66 6 157 268 Cross Sectoral 228 8 106 81 59 482 Environment 6 0 45 10 24 85 Governance and Administration (incl. land) 222 7 61 71 31 392 Bank and Finance 0 1 0 0 4 5 Total 980 83 1,074 695 1,532 4,362 1 Multilateral includes Multi Donor Funds 184 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version Annex A.2: The Reconstruction and Development Program for Aceh and Nias (million US$) Domestic Donors TOTAL Funds BRR Decon NGOs Social Sector 156 14 396 187 547 1,299 Education 45 8 136 106 133 428 Health 48 0.1 97 60 244 449 Community, culture and religion 62 6 163 20 171 422 Infrastructure 495 55 420 406 624 2,000 Housing 227 48 226 28 446 976 Transport 134 2 65 310 18 529 Communications 7 0 17 10 1 35 Energy 27 5 10 0 1 43 Water and Sanitation 18 0 52 31 108 210 Flood control, irrigation works 81 0 36 10 9 135 Other Infrastructure 0 0 15 17 41 73 Productive Sectors 101 6 152 21 302 581 Agriculture and Livestock 29 2 34 0 72 138 Fisheries 33 3 52 16 73 176 Enterprise 39 1 66 6 157 268 Cross Sectoral 228 8 106 81 59 482 Environment 6 0 45 10 24 85 Governance and Administration (incl. land) 222 7 61 71 31 392 Bank and Finance 0 1 0 0 4 5 Total 980 83 1,074 695 1,532 4,362 1 Multilateral includes Multi Donor Funds 185 ANNEXES ANNEXES Annex A.3: Financing Aceh and Nias reconstruction (status as of end-November 2005, US$ million) Domestic Government Funds Donors Private TOTAL BRR(1) Decon Local(2) Multilateral Bilateral NGO (1) (incl. MDTF) Total commitments to the 2,100 300 350+ 2,000(4) 1,600(4) 2,500(5) 8,850+ reconstruction program (2005- 2009) Already allocated to specific 980 83 72(6) 1,074 695 1,532 4436(7) projects Already disbursed 19 31 60 168 127 370 775 (1) Government budgets and BRR-data (2) Based on research of 2004 budgets in 10 Tsunami-affected local governments (3) Assumes continuation of deconcentrated funding 25% below 2005 levels. (4) Based on the latest commitments including grants and loans. (5) The total NGO-envelope for reconstruction in all tsunami-affected countries has been estimated at US$ 5 billion. In Indonesia the current NGO-envelope is already US$1.8 billion, if the full amount of the Red Cross/Red Crescent allocation, including not yet specifically allocated funds, were considered. (6) Actual allocation for capital spending in affected local governments. (7) This is higher than US$ 4,362 million (see Annexes 2 and 3) because of the inclusion of the US$ 72 million funding from the local (kabupaten) governments which cannot be disaggregated by sector. 186 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version Annex A4: Damage and Loss vs. Reconstruction Program, by kabupaten Panel (A). Damage and Loss Panel (B). Reconstruction Program 187 ANNEXES ANNEXES Annex A5: The demographic and economic impact in the disaster-affected region: cross country comparisons Source: compiled based on the data from the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center. Note: * - most affected province in each country; for Maldives the data refers to total country. 188 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version Annex A6: Methodological Notes A6.1. General Methodology and Definitions A6.1.1. Definitions used in this Report A significant amount of data has been categorized and analyzed for this report. The key objective of the analysis was to get reliable estimates of the: (i) reconstruction and development needs for Aceh and Nias (by sector); (ii) funding commitments and disbursements (by sector). The definitions of the key concepts used in the analysis are provided below. DEFINITION OF NEEDS There is no uniform definition of needs. This report has reflected the concepts of the damage and loss assessment as well as of the Master Plan, and in addition estimated core minimum needs: · The Damage and Loss Assessment estimated total costs to replace damage and losses caused by the disaster (replacement value). Total damage and losses (Aceh and Nias) have been estimated at US$ 4.8 billion and after being adjusted for inflation the total is US$ 5.8 billion.1 · The Master Plan used the Damage and Loss Assessment as the baseline figures but made two important distinctions: (i) Build back better in certain sectors (particularly social sectors and infrastructure), (ii) Compensate private sector damage only up to a limit, which affected particularly the allocations for housing and the productive sectors. · Core minimum needs are a sub-set of the Damage and Loss Assessment and of the Master Plan. Core needs are defined as (i) full replacement of all public sector damage (per damage and loss assessment); (ii) financing of private sector needs such as housing, agriculture, fishing, up to the limit set by the Master Plan; (iii) partial financing of environmental damage, which can only be addressed to a very limited degree by external interventions, and (iv) inflation adjustment given the recent price trends. For the March 28, 2005 earthquake in Nias the IOM and BRR carried out a separate damage assessment. The estimation methodology used to compute damage and loss in Nias is described in the following sub-section (A6.2). This estimation builds on the IOM and BRR data to compute estimates of damage value at the aggregate level as well as by sector. KEY PARAMETERS Timeframe. Many projects will take more than one year to complete. The database of funds from donors and NGOs contains single and multi-year projects. Area. Financing figures could include both tsunami-affected areas and non-affected areas. Reconstruction activities include the tsunami-affected areas only, while development activities include both tsunami affected and non-affected areas in Aceh and Nias. 1 For the Earthquake in Nias on March 28, the government carried out a needs assessment which estimated total damage at US$ 392 million. Comparisons with the January assessment for Aceh and Sumut confirm the magni- tude of the damage if the IOM damage numbers are used as a basis. 189 ANNEXES ANNEXES Ongoing activities and agreed projects. Figures in tables include both ongoing activities (i.e. being disbursed and executed) as well as agreed projects that are currently prepared. On and Off-budget. The tables in this report include both on-budget and off-budget spending. Donor funds which are channelled through the government are defined as on-Budget. If funds are channelled directly to projects they are defined as off-budget. Donor Disbursement: Donor disbursement data is directly gathered from each major donor. The financial allocation made by donor is classified as disbursement if the fund had been spent on a project. The fund transferred to the Government or NGO accounts but not ready to be spent on a project would not be defined as disbursement. Data are as of November 30, 2005. NGO Disbursement. Disbursement refers to the funds that have been spent on the projects directly or has been transferred to implementing agencies. NGO disbursement data is obtained mainly from the BRR Project Monitoring Database that was received in November 2005, and to some extent additional information from NGOs' websites and financial reports. GOI Disbursement. Central government disbursements consist of two categories: BRR budget and deconcentrated (line ministries) expenditures. The term disbursement refers to actual spending against project's activities, i.e. based upon disbursement orders (SP2D) from the treasury service offices (KPPN) to the central treasury account (BUN). Data has been provided by the Directorate General of Treasury in the Ministry of Finance. Data are as of December 6, 2005. Double Counting. Occasionally financing figures are susceptible to double counting, since an institution provides financial resources through other institutions. For example, a donor country provides project fund, but the project is implemented by other donor country or NGO. Both institutions report the same project concept note to the BRR. In order to avoid double counting, distinction between execution and contribution is made. The financing numbers in this report are based on an execution basis. In other words, they take into account the institutions implementing projects rather than institutions contributing to funds. Exchange Rate. The financing numbers are expressed in US Dollars. Data in non-US Dollar donor country currency was converted to US Dollar using exchange rate at the time of a project being entered into the BRR concept note database. The exchange rate between Indonesian Rupiah and US Dollar is: US$1=10,000 Rupiah. Sectoral Analysis. In this report, financing is categorized functionally into the following 4 sectors: social sector, infrastructure, productive sectors, and cross sector, each of which is composed of several sub-sectors (see next section for sectoral definitions). 190 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version A6.1.2. Sector definitions Education · Revitalizing delivery service and · Australia: Education Rehabilitation management system of education Assistance (ERA) · Designing, rehabilitating, and · Save The Children: Revitalization reconstructing school and other of Community and District educational buildings Educational Systems · Supplying education material and equipment · Teacher training, advocacy, research and support on education. Health · Revitalizing health service and · UNICEF: Provision of primary health management system health care services and supplies · Designing, rehabilitating, and · The Mentor Initiative: Rebuild reconstructing health facilities capacity of Communicable · Supplying medical and health Disease Control of the Provincial equipments Health Office and District Health · Training, advocacy, research and Offices throughout the Province support on health of Aceh and Nias Community, culture, and religion · Housing design · UNDP: NAD Housing · Rehabilitating and reconstructing Rehabilitation Project permanent housing (implementing partnership with UN-HABITAT) · World Vision International: Meulaboh Permanent Housing Transport · Revitalizing transport · USAID : Reconstruction of Banda infrastructure such as road, Aceh - Meulaboh road bridge, port, air port and bus · IACO (International Aid and station Cooperation Organization): · Transport logistics. Reconstruction of Batee Bridge, Pasir Gentang, Pidie Communication · Generating early warning · JAPAN: Support for Radio/TV communication system Broadcasting Activities · Distributing publication and · Red Cross and Red Crescent information on the progress in (RCRC): Early Warning tsunami-affected area Communication System · Radio broadcasting to support the social activities · Other revitalizing activities on the infrastructure for communication system 191 ANNEXES ANNEXES Energy · Rehabilitating and reconstructing · ADB: Power Sector Project energy system and infrastructure · Soluziana S.A: Feasibility study such as on the electricity system for the development of wind · Research, study and workshops energy in Nias regency, Nias on energy issues Island, North Sumatra Water and sanitation · Rehabilitating water and · UNICEF: Provision of Clean Water sanitation facilities including the Supply and basic sanitation water supply network such as facilities piped water, well and spring · THW: Rehabilitation of springs · Improving the access to safe and water intakes for the tsunami drinking water and the hygiene and earthquake victims of condition Simeulue island, Nanggroe Aceh · Study, research and training Darussalam, Indonesia on water system, water infrastructure, and environmental sanitation Flood control & irrigation works · Cleaning, rehabilitating and · Japan: Selected Emergency reconstructing river, drainage and Repair Work of Flood Way Dyke irrigation system in Aceh · Study and research on · Muslim Aid Indonesia: Banda aquaculture project and system Aceh Flood Relief Flow Valves & Pump Stations Other infrastructure · Rehabilitating and reconstructing · UNDP: Restoration of minor infrastructure facilities other than infrastructure the ones mentioned above, such · Red Cross and Red Crescent as on the warehouse and repair (RCRC): Regional ware house shops preparedness Jakarta, Surabaya, Medan, Banda Aceh Agriculture & livestock · Cleaning, rehabilitating and · ADB: Restore support services, revitalizing agricultural sector community empowerment, and · Supplying agricultural restoration of farming equipments/tools and inputs such · Food for the Hungry International: as seeds, fertilizers, crops, plant Aceh Jaya Agriculture Recovery protections, etc Program · Providing workshops, trainings, and technical assistance on agricultural planning, land mapping, and production management system for sustainable livelihood 192 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version Fisheries · Rehabilitating and reconstructing · World Bank: Support for fishery piers, market, cold Fisheries Sector Post-Tsunami storage, and ponds Rehabilitation · Reconstructing and supplying · World Relief: Kreung Raya boats, nets, and other fishing livelihoods, fishing and small materials and tools grant project · Providing workshops, training, and technical assistance on fishing techniques, navigation, system, and distribution management Enterprise · Revitalizing trade and industries, · Canada: Private Enterprise SMEs and cooperatives, as well Participation (PEP) as on manpower issues Implementation Project · Community regeneration through · Save The Children: Economic small industry development and Recovery Assistance & Micro financial access or loan for micro enterprise Development enterprises · Reconstructing and rehabilitating markets, factories, and other business activities · Workshops and training on economic capacity, skill training, production management, entrepreneur skills, etc. Environment · Rehabilitating degraded areas · MDTF: Aceh Forest and and regenerating nature and Environtment Project forest through enrich planting · Leuser International Foundation and increase the environment (LIF): Integrating Environment awareness in community & Forest Protection in to · Redeveloping and protecting the Recovery and Future coastal area and coastal Development of Aceh ecosystem by planting mangrove and such · Providing workshops, training and technical assistance in environment planning, public education on environment · Assisting in developing natural hazard law, policy and regulations 193 ANNEXES ANNEXES Governance and Administration (inc. · Rehabilitating, renovating and · Australia: Restoring Local land) reconstructing government Governance and Communities in building Aceh (RLGCA) · Government administration · LGSP: Local Governance Support activities such on population Program / LGSP census, registration of birth, registration of beneficiaries to receive relief aid · Land use rehabilitation program including land clearing, land mapping, land administration, land record · Capacity building including workshop and training for supporting local government Bank & Finance · Rehabilitating and reconstructing · Savings Banks Foundation banking and other financial for International Cooperation buildings (SBFIC): Savings Banks · Monitoring, evaluating and Reconstruction Fund for South appraising on micro and small Asia loan portfolio · Capacity training and workshop on bank and finance issues A6.2. Measuring the Spatial Dimension of Reconstruction A6.2.1. Nias: Technical Notes on the Computations of the Damage & Loss Input data used for the calculation of Nias' damage is drawn from a report by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) entitled: "Post Disaster Damage Assessment on Nias and Simeulue Islands", the survey of BRR Nias and Satuan Koordinasi dan Pelaksanaan (SATKORLAK) and the technical report prepared by BAPPENAS and the International Donor Community entitled: "Indonesia: Preliminary Damage and Loss Assessment Report: The December 26, 2004 Natural Disaster", henceforth referenced as IPDLAR. This assessment was based on the international standard methodology first developed by the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). The IOM report and the survey of BRR Nias/SATKORLAK provide information on damage of physical infrastructure, such as buildings and roads and the percentage of infrastructure that is still functioning. The IPDLAR provides information on the total monetary value of damage in Aceh by every affected sector. These data are used as the reference to estimate the monetary value of damage in Nias. 194 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version The calculation of the total value of physical damage in Nias is based on the estimation of unit values. To calculate the unit value of a damaged building, the total value of all damaged buildings reported by the IPDLAR is divided by the total number of damaged buildings. This unit value is then multiplied by a factor corresponding to the level of damage incurred - 1 is used for total damage, 0.5 for medium damage, 0.25 for minor damage, and 0.1 for very minor damage. These values are then multiplied by the total number of damaged buildings for each related level and sector in Nias. A similar method is also used to compute the estimated value of damage for roads, settlement areas, and infrastructure for communication, energy, and water. That is, for "damage per meter of road" the total value of damaged road reported by IPDLAR is divided by the length of damaged road in meters. For the energy, water and communication sectors the financial value of total damage reported by the IPDLAR is divided by the reported overall percentage of damage sustained in each sector to compute the monetary value of the unit percentage of the damage. The damage cost per unit percent of each of these sectors (energy, water, and communication) is then multiplied by the corresponding percentage of damage per sector. For other sectors such as education and health, the unit cost for each damaged building of school and health facilities is directly available from the IPDLAR; hence no calculations of unit cost are required. The exchange rate used in all computations is Rp 10,000/ US$1. Table A6.2.1. Impact Simulation Damage per Sector in Nias Sector/Sub Sector Total Impact Total (in million USD) Social Sector Education (unit building) 723 23 Health (unit building) 414 23 Religious and Cultural Affairs (unit building) 1,787 10 Infrastructure and Housing Housing (unit building) 70,900 160 Road (in km) 1,066 45 Telecommunication (% disfunctional) 52.11 21 Energy Electricity (% disfunctional) 32.3 20 Drinking Water and Sanitation Water Resources Infrastructure Piped water (% disfunctional) 90.62 28 Well (% disfunctional) 31.3 3 Spring (% disfuntional) 28.42 3 Other Infrastructure Bridge (unit) 403 21 Piers (unit) 11 4 195 ANNEXES ANNEXES Production Sector Agriculture and Food Fishery Industry and Trade (unit) 181 1 Manpower SME and Cooperatives Cross Sector Environment (in hectars) 1948 5 Administration and Government (unit building) 539 24 Banking Total value in million rupiah 3,916,730 Total value in million USD 392 A6.2.2. Technical Notes on the Geographical Analysis A6.2.2.(A). Geographical Project Allocation The data source for project allocations to districts comes from the government budget 2005 and 2006, and the BRR project concept notes (Batches 1-11) database for NGOs and donors. The data in most cases provides information on the targeted districts for the projects. Nevertheless, as the information in the data source on the geographical allocation is sometimes limited, and as the projects are sometimes targeted to more than one district, the allocation by district (kabupaten) is estimated using the weights. The weights are obtained by dividing the value of damage and loss assessment for each of the impacted district by the total damage and loss. The estimation is based on the IOM assessment of damage, and the methodology is similar to the one applied for Nias (see Annex A6.2.1.). A6.2.2.(B). Estimating the impact of disaster on GDP at the kabupaten level Estimating the impact on GDP at the kabupaten level involves the following steps: · Estimate the value of damage at kabupaten level (as described above); · Since the estimates of damage only cover damage to non-productive sectors, we first use the aggregate D&L assessment to estimate the ratio of the damage in productive sectors (incl. 50% of damage to infrastructure) to the damage in non-productive sectors, and then use this estimated ratio (25%) to obtain monetary value of damage to productive sectors by kabupaten; · The aggregate D&L assessment for the productive sectors indicates that damage (incl. 50% of the infrastructure damage) is US$ 670 million (352 + 318), and losses (over 4 years) are US$ 952 million (incl. 50% of infrastructure losses); assuming that 40% of the losses will be borne during the first year, these number indicates that every 1$ of damage (stock concept) will transform into $0.57 of losses (flow concept) during the first year after the impact; · Applying this ratio to the previously obtained estimates of the productive sector damage by kabupaten, we obtain the estimates of productive sector losses by kabupaten, which are then compared to the 2004 levels of GDP by kabupaten. 196 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version A6.2.3. Technical Notes on the Computations of the Financial Commitments (Projects) in Nias The data used for the calculation of the financial commitments for Nias (see Table 6.2 Chapter 6) was primarily taken from the BRR Concept Notes ­ Batches 1 to 11. The approach was to use data for the donors and NGOs which have dedicated projects and budgets only for Nias. In cases where the donor or NGO has a combined total amount allocated for both Aceh and Nias, this budget is not included since it is not possible to ascertain the percentage of funds dedicated only to Nias. As a result the total amount allocated to Nias is possibly slightly above the current estimates which present the minimum allocation. The government figures were provided directly by the BRR office in Nias. The domestic funding from the central government (de-concentrated) sources is not included in this table. All numbers are for the two kabupatens: Nias and Nias Selatan. NGOs Sectors Help e.V. Housing, land, & markets IMC Restoring of health facilities ACTED Housing and shelters World Vision Rehabilitate education, water, and sanitation, food distribution Croix Rouge Francais Reconstruct 3 schools, rehabilitate markets Tomorrow's Hope Build orphanage, build schooling facilities CWS Build houses, provide water and sanitation facilities LEAP Restore livelihood by developing coconut oil industry Red Cross & Red Crescent Rehabilitate and reconstruct schools and health centers, build houses, water and sanitation facilities, and rebuild markets and shopping centers TEARFund Restore government health services structure Soluziana Study of wind as alternate energy source United in Diversity Housing and provision of boats to villages Samaritan's Purse Permanent housing program LPAM Nias Reconstruct schools and houses Caritas Reconstruct houses and community development Food for the Hungry Intl. Repair water piping and build treatment system LDSC Hospital medical equipment TEARS Intl. Renovation of public hospital AMDA Community based emergency shelter rehabilitation IOM Community development, livelihood, and logistics Catholic Relief Services Housing and shelters GTZ Water and sanitation facilities Johannitar Schools and education Lazarus Schools and education Surfaid Community water and sanitation facilities 197 ANNEXES ANNEXES A.7 GoI ­ GAM Peace Agreement: Key Points from the MoU Note: this is not a complete or faithful translation but a selection of key points Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement, signed on 15 August 2005:The Government of Indonesia (GoI) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) confirm their commitment to a peaceful, comprehensive and sustainable solution to the conflict in Aceh with dignity for all. The parties commit themselves to creating conditions within which the government of the Acehnese people can be manifested through a fair and democratic process within the unitary state and constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. The parties are deeply convinced that only the peaceful settlement of the conflict will enable the rebuilding of Aceh after the tsunami disaster on 26 December 2004 to progress and succeed. The parties to the conflict commit themselves to building mutual confidence and trust. This Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) details the agreement and the principles that will guide the transformation process. To this end the GoI and GAM have agreed on the following: 1.1 Governing of Aceh · Aceh will exercise authority within all sectors of public affairs, which will be administered in conjunction with its civil and judicial administration, except in the fields of foreign affairs, external defense, national security, monetary and fiscal matters, justice and freedom of religion, the policies of which belong to the Government of the Republic of Indonesia in conformity with the Constitution. · International agreements entered into by the Government of Indonesia which relate to matters of special interest to Aceh and other decisions with regard to Aceh will be entered into in consultation with and with the consent of the legislature of Aceh. · The borders of Aceh correspond to the borders as of 1 July 1956. 1.2 Political participation · Not later than one year from the signing of this MoU, GoI agrees to and will facilitate the establishment of Aceh- based political parties that meet national criteria, and within 18 months the political and legal conditions for the establishment of local political parties in Aceh in consultation with Parliament. · Until 2009 the legislature of Aceh will not be entitled to enact any laws without the consent of the head of the Aceh administration. 1.3 Economy · Aceh has the right to raise funds with external loans. Aceh has the right to set interest rates beyond that set by the Central Bank of the Republic of Indonesia. · Aceh has the right to set and raise taxes to fund official internal activities. Aceh has the right to conduct trade and business internally and internationally and to seek foreign direct investment and tourism to Aceh. · Aceh will have jurisdiction over living natural resources in the territorial sea surrounding Aceh. · Aceh will enjoy free trade with all other parts of the Republic of Indonesia unhindered by taxes, tariffs or other restrictions. · GAM will nominate representatives to participate fully at all levels in the commission established to conduct the post-tsunami reconstruction (BRR). 1.4 Rule of law · The legislature of Aceh will redraft the legal code for Aceh on the basis of the universal principles of human rights as 198 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version provided for in the United Nations International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. · An independent and impartial court system, including a court of appeals, will be established for Aceh within the judicial system of the Republic of Indonesia. 2 Human rights · GoI will adhere to the United Nations International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. · A Human Rights Court and a Commission for Truth and Reconciliation will be established for Aceh. 3 Amnesty and reintegration into society · GoI will grant amnesty to all persons who have participated in GAM activities as soon as possible and not later than within 15 days of the signature of this MoU. · Political prisoners and detainees held due to the conflict will be released unconditionally as soon as possible and not later than within 15 days of the signature of this MoU. · Use of weapons by GAM personnel after the signature of this MoU will be regarded as a violation of the MoU and will disqualify the person from amnesty. · GoI and the authorities of Aceh will take measures to assist persons who have participated in GAM activities to facilitate their reintegration into the civil society. These measures include economic facilitation to former combatants, pardoned political prisoners and affected civilians. A Reintegration Fund under the administration of the authorities of Aceh will be established. · GoI will allocate funds for the rehabilitation of public and private property destroyed or damaged as a consequence of the conflict to be administered by the authorities of Aceh. · GoI will allocate suitable farming land as well as funds to the authorities of Aceh for the purpose of facilitating the reintegration to society of the former combatants and the compensation for political prisoners and affected civilians. 4 Security arrangements · All acts of violence between the parties will end latest at the time of the signing of this MoU. GAM undertakes to demobilize all of its 3000 military troops. GAM members will not wear uniforms or display military insignia or symbols after the signing of this MoU. · GAM undertakes the decommissioning of all arms, ammunition and explosives held by the participants in GAM activities with the assistance of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM). GAM commits to hand over 840 arms. The decommissioning of GAM armaments will begin on 15 September 2005 and will be executed in four stages and concluded by 31 December 2005. · GoI will withdraw all elements of non-organic military and non-organic police forces from Aceh. The relocation of non-organic military and non-organic police forces will begin on 15 September 2005 and will be executed in four stages in parallel with the GAM decommissioning immediately after each stage has been verified by the AMM, and concluded by 31 December 2005. 5 Establishment of the Aceh Monitoring Mission The tasks of the AMM are to: a) monitor the demobilization of GAM and decommissioning of its armaments, 199 ANNEXES ANNEXES b) monitor the relocation of non-organic military forces and non-organic police troops, c) monitor the reintegration of active GAM members, d) monitor the human rights situation and provide assistance in this field, e) monitor the process of legislation change, f) rule on disputed amnesty cases, g) investigate and rule on complaints and alleged violations of the MoU, h) establish and maintain liaison and good cooperation with the parties. GoI and GAM will not undertake any action inconsistent with the letter or spirit of this Memorandum of Understanding. A.8 Aceh & Nias Related Presidential Decrees ­ Key points A.8.1 Kpres 15/2005 ­ Implementation of MoU between GoI and GAM · The coordinating ministers and related ministers are to synchronize planning and policies and to provide solutions to any disputes arising during the implementation. · Minister of Home Affairs to facilitate planning and policies and to implement capacity building to local governance practices · Minister of External Affairs with related instances to provide administrations and to facilitate foreign parties involving in the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) with plans, policies and diplomatic measures to obtain international supports in implementing the Note of Agreement · Minister of Defense to coordinate with the National Soldiers of Indonesia (TNI) to relocate non-organic soldiers, to organize the remaining soldiers and the other defensive components. Minister of Law and Human Rights to prepare laws and regulations related with governance, political participation, human rights and socializing the Note of Agreement · Minister of Finance to manage finance, funds and budget from the National Budget, and those from multilateral and bilateral donors. · Minister of Communications and Information to prepare materials to disseminate information on the Note of Agreement in Indonesia and abroad and to coordinate with AMM in the implementation of the Note of Agreement. · Minister of Transportation to prepare and manage the building of ports and airports in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam and their lines abroad in coordination with the Governor. · Minister of Manpower and Transmigration to manage issues on manpower and the return of ex-displaced transmigrants. · Minister of Social Affairs to provide proper social insurance to previous member of the Free Aceh Movement and the members of community affected by the conflict. · Minister of National Development Planning to provide the implementation plan of the Note and to coordinate with international donors in mobilizing and allocating fund. · The Attorney General to assist in providing amnesty and abolition to the inmates, to appoint Attorney and to empower attorneys in Aceh Province, in implementing laws and regulations · The Chief of National Indonesian Soldiers to prepare plan and policies to pull out non-organic TNI soldiers out of Aceh up to 31 December 2005, to provide plan to the remaining soldiers in Aceh, to provide plan and policy to support the AMM duties and to provide fair opportunities to any of previous Free Aceh Movement to join TNI · The Chief of the Indonesian Police to prepare plan and policies to pull out non-organic Police elements from Nanggroe 200 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version Aceh Darussalam Province up to 31 December 2005, to provide plan to the remaining police in Aceh, to provide plan and policy to support the AMM duties and to provide fair opportunities to any of previous Free Aceh Movement to join the Indonesian Police. · The Head of the State Intelligent Agency to provide plan, policies and activities to enable conducive situation to take place following the implementation of the Note. · The Head of National Land Issues to provide policies to provide farming land for previous members of Free Aceh Movement and people affected by the conflict · The Head of the Executing Agency for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Area and Living of Community in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Province and the Nias Islands of the North Sumatera Province to provide plans and policies to include representatives of previous Free Aceh Movement to fully participate in the Agency as per the required criterion and skills. · The Governor of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Province to provide plans and policies on the local governance and its related issues, on political participation, and on reintegration previous members of Free Aceh Movement All budgets arising from the implementation of the Note of Agreement will be included in the National Budget and Regional Budget and in the support from the donating nations/formal donating institutions. 201 ANNEXES ANNEXES A.8.2 KPRES 69/2005 ­ Establishment of BRR Referring to the implementation of rehabilitation and reconstruction area and living of community in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Province and ones living in Nias islands of the North Sumatera Province the Government of Indonesia provide opportunities to all parties to participates, including foreign institutions/ individuals. In this regard, the involvement of the above parties needs to be managed as per the Grand Plan of the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Area and Living of Community in both provinces. · The Regulation restated the definition of Rehabilitation and Reconstruction as per quoted in the Government Regulations in lieu of Law Number 2 Year 2005 on The Agency for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Area and Living of Community in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Province and Nias Islands of North Sumatera Province. · To participate in the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction efforts, any foreign institutions/individuals need to submit program proposals to the Executing Agency quoting identity, programs to be implemented, local partners involved in the said programs, sector, location and duration of programs, expected results, budgets and local community involvement · The Regulation mentioned the role of The Executing Agency in examining the program proposals prior to agreeing or disagreeing the proposals. · Once the program proposals verified and agreed, the Head of the Executing Agency may make MoUs to the institutions/individuals · The institutions/individuals bear responsibilities of duration of programs, the implementation and quality result satisfy the ethical codes and guidance provided by the Executing Agency. · The foreign institutions/individuals may expect an ease on immigration and working regulations, technical regulations on equipment, goods and services and customs and taxes related with existing laws. · The executing agency conducts monitoring and evaluation to the program implementation. · The executing agency has the rights to continue or discontinue any institutions/individuals on certain findings and regulations Any related regulations needed to implement this Presidential Regulations will be decided by the head of Executing Agency and related governmental departments as per related duties and responsibilities. 202 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version A.8.3 Kpres 70/2005 ­ BRR procurement Considering that the Executing Agency of Rehabilitation and Reconstruction for Aceh and Nias, implements provision of procurement/services under existing laws, the President of the Republic of Indonesia considers it is necessary to equip the Executing Agency of Rehabilitation and Reconstruction for Aceh and Nias with a Regulation to gear up the provision of procurement/services and to implement them in immediate, effective and efficient manners while keeping the principles of healthy competition, transparency, accountable and just for all parties, including: · The compulsory need to set up a procurement committee for any provision with the amount of Rp 50,000,000 (fifty million Rupiah), comprising of civil servants with related technical advice The procurement committee has duties, authorities and responsibilities, among others the setting up schedule, preparing related documents and implementation of the provision, selecting participants of tenders, reporting tender processes and signing in an integrity pact prior to the commencement of implementation procurement/services provision. · The divisions of procurement/service provision contract are based on the remuneration (lump sum, single prices, a combination of lump sum and single price, turn key, percentage), based on duration of implementation (single year, multi years), and based on the number of users of goods/services (single provision contract or collective provision contract). · The conditions of delayed works because of both procurement/service providers and users and how to settle any arising disputes on targets and results. · Specific conditions on how to cope with emergency situation for the national defense and security of community and service providers including in the time of natural disaster, confidential works, small scale works and works involving licensed/patented agencies. · Provision of goods and logistic distribution for the Regional electoral activities is also included in the regulation. The regulation also mentions immediacy in the provision of goods/services in regard to the rehabilitation and reconstruction for Aceh and Nias especially to provision of housing works prior to July1, 2006 and continuation of leftover or remaining works in provision of housing and special condition related with formal tariff, specific works/goods, products of small scale industry and complex works utilizing specific technology leading to specific goods/service provider. 203 ANNEXES ANNEXES A.9 Data Sources Several types of institutions contributed to recovery financing, namely, bilateral donors, multi-lateral donors, NGOs and government own sources (central government and regional governments). This report collates data from the following institutions: · CGI and non-CGI bilateral donors: Data mostly from BRR concept note project database and confirmation from donor countries. Data reported for UN programs is drawn from UN flash appeal for Indonesia. MDTF data is obtained from the MDTF representative, and cover approved projects and concepts. · NGOs (Indonesian and non-Indonesia NGOs and/or private contributions): Data from BRR concept note project database. On disbursement, data is obtained from BRR monitoring database, which represents the disbursement around late September and October, 2005. · Indonesian governments (central, province, local): Data from DG Treasury provided by the MoF. BRR funds for reconstruction and rehabilitation are from the 2005 and 2006 budget. The BRR disbursement data is obtained from KPPN Khusus as per December 6, 2005. It represents the actual spending on the projects, including project and administrative spending. APBN-deconcentration disbursement for reconstruction is estimated from total disbursement of deconcentration budget. Local government disbursements are obtained through a local government assessment supported by the World Bank. For details on the local government assessment see the BRR/World Bank Report "Rebuilding a Better Aceh and Nias ­ Stocktaking of the Reconstruction Effort", October 2005, chapter 2.4. Other documents and data sources include: Aceh-Reconstruction website: http://e-aceh.bappenas.go.id APBN (2005) Deconcentrated fund and BRR, from Regional DG Treasury, MOF and BRR. BAPPENAS, Rencana Aksi Rehab-Rekons TA 2005 Hasil Konsultasi Teknis Renaksi R2WANS di Provinsi NAD, May 2005 BAPPENAS. (2004). Indonesia: Preliminary Damage and Loss Assessment, December 26, 2004 Natural Disaster. A Technical Report prepared by Bappenas and the International Donor Community. BRR, Geographical survey, September 2005 and November 2005. BRR. (2005). Meletakkan Fondasi Membangun Harapan: Laporan Kegiatan Enam Bulan Badan Pelaksana Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam dan Nias. BRR/World Bank. (2005). Rebuilding a Better Aceh and Nias: Stocktaking of the Reconstruction Effort. BRR Project Database of Donor Country and NGO/Private Sector Projects on Aceh Reconstruction and Development. Budget data from DG Treasury, Ministry of Finance as well as regional Treasury offices Credits and banking data from Bank Indonesia Office in Banda Aceh. Education Management Information System Website EMIS Indonesia: Notes on Reconstruction, December 26, 2004 Natural Disaster. A Technical Report Prepared by Bappenas and the International Donor Community. IOM Damage Assessment for Nias and Simeulue Islands; June 2005. Input financing data from Germany, Ausaid, UN, ADB, MDTF, Red Cross Movement. National Labor Survey (Sakernas) ­ various editions, Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS). OCHA's fund tracking website. (http://ocha.unog.ch/fts/index.aspx) Price data from BPS Office in Banda Aceh. 204 December 2005 Report Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami Advance Release Version Provincial Health Office data Settlement and Livelihood needs and Aspiration Assessment Survey 2005, IOM SPAN: Population Census of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, BPS, November 2005. Kerangka Peta Aceh dan Nias v. 2.2 (mapframe), bappenas, BRR,, BPS, ADB, IHS, 2005 205