NORTH-EAST NIGERIA Recovery and Volume I Peace Building Assessment Synthesis Report THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA NORTH-EAST NIGERIA Recovery and Volume I Peace Building Assessment Synthesis Report THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA © 2015 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank Nigeria Country Office: 102 Yakubu Gowon Crescent, Asokoro, Abuja Federal Capital Territory, Federal Republic of Nigeria Telephone: +234 7035830641-4 Internet: http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria World Bank Headquarters: 1818 H Street NW Washington DC 20433, USA Telephone: +1 202-473-1000 Internet: www.worldbank.org European Union Delegation to Nigeria & ECOWAS 21st Crescent, Off Constitution Av., Central Business District, Garki, Abuja, Federal Capital Territory, Federal Republic of Nigeria Telephone: +234 94617800 Internet: www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/nigeria United Nations – Nigeria UN House, Plot 617/618 Diplomatic Drive, Central Business District, Abuja, Federal Capital Territory, Federal Republic of Nigeria Telephone: +2348111399927 Internet: www.ng.one.un.org or www.ng.undp.org This Recovery and Peace Building Assessment (RPBA) for North-East Nigeria is a col- laborative product by the Federal Government of the Republic of Nigeria and the State Governments of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe. The assessment was prepared with support from the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), and the World Bank (WB). Acknowledging the different mandates of the institutions that supported the assessment (EU, UN and WB) and areas of expertise, the findings, conclusions, and recom- mendations expressed in the RPBA do not necessarily constitute the views or formal recommendations of the EU, UN, or WB, nor do they reflect the views of the governing bodies of these institutions or their member States. It is also recognized that due to different mandates not all activities set forth or proposed in the report will be shared by or engaged in by the collaborating institutions, and it is further understood that each institution will carry out or be engaged with any such activities in accordance with its mandate, and operational policies and procedures. The EU, UN, and WB do not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of these partners concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. Rights and Permissions The material in this work is subject to copyright. Because the authors encourage dissemination of their knowledge, this work may be reproduced, in whole or in part, for noncommercial purposes as long as full attribution to this work is given. Any queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to the Publishing and Knowledge Division, The World Bank Group, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA; fax: 202-522-2625; e-mail: pubrights@worldbank.org Volume I Synthesis Report Table of Contents VII ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS VIII FOREWORD IX MESSAGES FROM THE SIX STATES OF NORTH-EAST NIGERIA XII ACRONYMS 01 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 01 Objectives 02 Methodology 02 Recovery Strategy and Framework 03 Financial Impacts and Needs from the Crisis 04 Cross-cutting Issues 04 Critical Success Factors for Implementation and Financing 05 Monitoring and Evaluation 05 Recovery Financing and Public Expenditure Management 05 Next Steps 06 RATIONALE AND SCOPE 06 1.1. Background and Objectives 07 1.2. Objectives and Vision of the Assessment 09 1.3. Assessment Approach 11 1.4. Methodology, Assumptions and Constraints 13 1.5. Report Structure 14 CONTEXT ANALYSIS 14 2.1. Background 16 2.2. Government Response 17 2.3. The International Humanitarian Response 20 2.4. Factors behind the Crisis 22 2.5. Dynamics of the Conflict 23 2.6. Emerging Risks and Scenarios for RPBA Implementation VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT III 25 A FRAMEWORK FOR RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING PRIORITIES 25 3.1. Humanitarian Context 26 3.2. Basic Principles and Values for Recovery and Peace Building 28 3.3. Prioritising and Sequencing Recovery and Peace Building Efforts 29 3.4. An Integrated and Holistic Response 30 3.5. Strategic Framework for Recovery and Peace Building 36 SUMMARY OF RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING NEEDS 36 4.1. Overview of Impacts, Needs, and Financial Requirements 38 4.2. Peace Building, Stability, and Social Cohesion 38 4.2.1. Impacts of the Conflict on Peace Building, Stability and Social Cohesion 39 4.2.2. Overview of Needs for Peace Building, Stability and Social Cohesion 42 4.3. Infrastructure and Social Services 42 4.3.1. Impacts of the crisis on infrastructure and social services 44 4.3.2 Strategic Approach for Infrastructure and Social Services 46 4.3.3. Overview of Needs and Financial Requirements for Infrastructure and Social Services 49 4.4. Economic Recovery 49 4.4.1. Introduction 49 4.4.2. Macroeconomic and Fiscal Impacts 50 4.4.3. Impacts on Private Sector, Trade and Financial Sector 50 4.4.4. Livelihood and Employment 52 4.4.5. Recommended Interventions for Economic Recovery 53 4.5. Cross-cutting Issues 53 4.5.1. Gender 56 4.5.2. Human Rights 57 4.5.3. Explosive Remnants of War 58 4.5.4. Youth 59 OPTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION AND FINANCING 59 5.1. Institutional Challenges 59 5.1.1. Horizontal Coordination 60 5.1.2. Vertical Alignment 61 5.1.3. Front Line Institutional Set Up 61 5.2. Guiding Principles for Institutional Effectiveness 63 5.3. Options for Implementing Recovery and Peace Building Interventions 64 5.4. Critical Core Functions of an Enabling Institutional Framework 64 5.5. Monitoring Framework 65 5.5.1. Improving Existing M&E Systems 65 5.5.2. Mainstreaming Third Party Monitoring and Social Accountability Mechanisms IV VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 66 5.6. Financing Strategy and Modalities 66 5.6.1. Enhancing the Effectiveness of Public Spending 68 5.6.2. Resource Mobilisation 68 5.6.3. Ensuring Transparency and Accountability of Public Spending 69 OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK 86 REFERENCES 88 ENDNOTES List of Figures 10 FIGURE 1 Recovery and Peace Building Assessment Timeline 15 FIGURE 2 North-East Nigeria: Conflict fatalities by LGA and displacement by ward 16 FIGURE 3 Fatalities Related to the Boko Haram Violence and Other Conflicts in Nigeria: 2009 to 2015 18 FIGURE 4 Timeline of the Boko Haram Crisis10 46 FIGURE 5 Damages to Infrastructure (top); Infrastructure and Service Delivery Needs by sector (bottom) 51 FIGURE 6 North-East Region - Consolidated Revenue and Expenditure (Billions of Naira) and Budget Balance (Percent of Total Revenue, 2007-2015) 52 FIGURE 7 Distribution of the employed labour force, by employer for wave 1 (2010/11) and wave 2 (2012/13); Estimates based on GHS 2010/11 and GHS 2012/13 List of Boxes 12 BOX 1 Definitions of Damages, Needs and Building Back Better 28 BOX 2 Do-No-Harm Approach 29 BOX 3 Benchmarks for the Safe, Voluntary and Dignified Return of Displaced Populations VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT V List of Tables 03 TABLE EX 1 Overall Recovery and Peace Building Needs by Component 08 TABLE 1 Recovery and Peace Building Assessment Component Breakdown 20 TABLE 2 Main factors of the conflict in North-East Nigeria, by type and field 30 TABLE 3 Strategic Recovery Framework 37 TABLE 4 Overall Recovery and Peace Building Needs by Component (US$ million) 40 TABLE 5 Estimated Needs for Peace Building, Stability and Social Cohesion by State 41 TABLE 6 Estimated Needs and Recommended Interventions for Peace Building, Stability and Social Cohesion 43 TABLE 7 Estimated damages related to Infrastructure and Social Services (US$ million) 47 TABLE 8 Estimated needs for infrastructure and social services (US$ million) 48 TABLE 9 Estimated Needs and Recommended Interventions for Infrastructure and Social Services 50 TABLE 10 Macroeconomic impacts by State 52 TABLE 11` Estimated Needs for Economic Recovery by State 54 TABLE 12 Estimated Needs and Recommended Interventions for Economic Recovery 63 TABLE 13 Comparative advantages of different institutional framework for recovery 64 TABLE 14 Indicative distribution of core functions across tiers of government for implementation of recovery and peace building strategy VI VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT PREFACE Acknowledgements The North-East Nigeria Recovery and Peace Building Assessment (RPBA) was undertaken by the Federal Government of the Republic of Nigeria, led by the Office of the Vice President and the State Gov- ernments of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe. The assessment was supported by the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), and The World Bank (WB). The Government of Nigeria Core RPBA Team consisted of Dr. Mari- am Masha, Senior Special Assistant to the President on Internally Displaced Persons and Focal Points from the six states, including: Maurice Vunobolki (Adamawa); Mohammed Aminu Ibrahim (Bau- chi); Dr. Baba Gana Umara (Borno); Aliyu M. Kamara (Gombe); Jeji Williams (Taraba); and Muhammad Yusufari (Yobe). The strong support and the contributions of the many different national stakeholders was remarkable. The dedication of the RPBA teams from the Federal and State Governments and three institutions was exceptional. Special thanks go to the Federal and State Govern- ments, the EU, UN and WB, and the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) for financial support pro- vided for this assessment. In addition thanks to the EU for funding the design and layout of this document. The efforts of all made this report possible. The design and layout of this document was created and executed by the team at Bivee Inc. Photo Credits: ** ** Damie Okulaja (cover, 4, 7, 12, 23, 27, 58, 60, 62) Shahrzad Mobasher Fard (53) VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT VII NORTH-EAST NIGERIA FOREWORD Professor Yemi Osinbajo SAN, GCON Vice President, Federal Republic of Nigeria Since 2009, insecurity in the North-East of Nigeria has led to the loss of over 20,000 lives and the displacement of over 2 million people. Throughout the region livelihoods have been disrupted, and homes, public buildings and infrastructure destroyed. In a part of Nigeria where 80% of people rely on agriculture for their livelihoods, much has been lost. People have been forced from their land and livestock has been killed. In many areas, land mines and other remnants of war bring challenges for safe and voluntary return. While Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States bore the brunt of the direct impacts of the conflict, the three neighboring states of Gombe, Taraba and Bauchi have taken in scores of people who have been displaced, taxing their communities, economic resource, social services and infrastructure. Schools have been dam- aged, health clinics destroyed and many people have been left vulnerable by this crisis. The Government of Nigeria has made great strides in retaking and stabilising large portions of the North-East, but the work to restore the lives of those affected is just beginning. This assessment, led by the Government of Nigeria and supported by local, national and international partners, has helped quantify the physical, social and economic impacts of the crisis in the North-East, and will inform the process of stabilisation, peace building and recovery in the region. The RPBA is a necessary tool that will help us gather the resources and develop the capacities to address these challenges. The results will help reduce suffering in affected communities, restore a sense of normalcy and regain the trust of people in the region. VIII VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 01 : THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA MESSAGES FROM THE SIX STATES OF NORTH-EAST NIGERIA Mr. Muhammadu Umaru Jibrilla Bindo Governor of Adamawa State In May 2013 a State of Emergency was declared in Adamawa as a result of the conflict with Boko Haram. Recent advances by the military have made the State more secure and allowed some of the 136,000 displaced people to begin returning home. In many cases, they found their homes and farmlands destroyed and remnants of war, including mines, have further hampered transition back to their pre-existing agricultural lifestyle. Because of the stable security situation in Adamawa and the will of its citizens to return home, full-scale reconstruction can and must begin quickly. The Recovery and Peace Building Assessment has broken barriers and introduced a whole new paradigm in Nigeria for systematic crisis impact assessment, recovery needs assessment and planning pro- portional to impact recovery programmes based on objective criteria. We hope that this process will be a model for other countries that may face similar crisis in the future. Barrister Mohammed Abubakar Governor of Bauchi State Throughout the conflict with Boko Haram, Bauchi has served as host to many displaced people. It was the first place violence occurred. However, through hard work, this violence was driven from the State, allowing a refuge for neighbors looking for safe haven. Surveys show that 75% of displaced people want to return home and the RPBA is helping us develop programmes to assist in that return while providing tools to strengthen host communities. The RPBA is an example of a global good practice for the development of institutional delivery mechanisms for recovery. The report provides the pros and cons of various options for exploring and conceiving the right recovery model, allowing all six states to come to a unanimous agree- ment on a hybrid institutional model for managing the recovery process. Alhaji Kashim Shettima Governor of Borno State Since 2009, Borno State has been embroiled in a serious conflict leaving 1.4 million people displaced within its borders. The violence has been overwhelming, destroying homes, farmland and infrastructure, as well as leaving thousands dead and many more incredibly vulnerable. Two-thirds of all of the reported physical impact from this conflict has occurred in Borno. The RPBA has helped us quantify the true extent of the damages which reach nearly US$6 billion dollars. With such a staggering amount of need, special attention will be needed to ensure the right human resources and funding mobilisation is put into place. The process has also been mindful of the current security situation, allowing for incremental and prioritised implementation. This recovery process will continue to be inclusive and led by the states, as it has since the beginning, ensuring the most urgent needs of our communities are met. Recovery strategies in the assessment also focus on Building Back Better and Smarter, looking at a range of improvements on the pre-crisis situation to help address some of the underlying causes of the conflict. In view of the foregoing, Borno State Government is urging for an expedited implementation with a view to alleviating the suffering of millions of the people affected by the conflict. VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT Ix NORTH-EAST NIGERIA Alhaji (Dr.) Ibrahim Dankwambo OON Governor of Gombe State In Gombe, the main impact of the conflict has been social and economic as the State works to cope with the significant needs of displaced people. The State also suffered collateral damage to infrastructure, in- cluding to roads and bridges as transportation was diverted from conflict areas. The RPBA is significant because it includes both direct impact and recovery needs assessments, as well as displacement-related impacts and needs analysis allowing each state to develop the right recovery interventions based on local needs, priorities and the security situation. Currently, there is relative peace in Gombe State, allowing for quick action to address the needs of both those directly impacted by the conflict and the additional impacts on the host communities. These quick interventions will prevent further deterioration of rela- tionships between displaced people and host communities. Arch Darius Ishaku Governor of Taraba State Taraba is hosting internally displaced people from both Boko Haram related violence and communal violence. This has increased pressure on the social cohesion of the State. By using the RPBA to develop programmes that increase social cohesion and focus on peace building, as well as generating economic growth in the region, Taraba will have a better chance at ensuring long-lasting peace within its borders no matter what the source of the conflict is. The RPBA process had continuous leadership and engage- ment from the states and we must ensure that the post-RPBA phase builds upon the tremendous drive and momentum created by the assessment to translate into quick, efficient and effective mechanisms for delivering much needed recovery support to people affected by this crisis. Alhaji Ibrahim Gaidam FCNA Governor of Yobe State The conflict in Yobe has been characterised by extreme violence and gross human rights abuses, including mass killings, abductions, gender based violence and forced displacement. After Borno, Yobe State has been the most significantly damaged by the conflict. The three tiered approach of the RPBA captures vital information on social services, economic needs, infrastructure damage and service delivery gaps, and will now allow for an integrated recovery strategy across all of these sectors. A central crisis analysis is the underpinning of the assessment, identifying the structural drivers of the crisis as well as common stra- tegic objectives for stabilisation and recovery. Information provided in the RPBA will encourage citizen engagement in the recovery process, ensuring those left vulnerable by the crisis are actively involved in rebuilding their lives and communities. This engagement will ultimately lead to greater social cohesion and commitment to peace, as we rebuild Yobe for future generations. x VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 01 : THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA JOINT FOREWORD OF THE European Union, United Nations and World Bank Nearly fifteen million people have been affected by the insurgency of Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati __ Wal-Jihad, also known as Boko Haram, and the resulting military operations in the North-East of Nigeria __ since 2009. The human, social, and economic losses of the conflict, and the investments needed for the recovery, peace building, and reconstruction of the North-East are overwhelming. Damage to education and health facilities, to markets and farms, the loss of job opportunities and the psychological impacts of the crisis are all adversely affecting an entire generation of Nigerians. The conflict has triggered a humanitarian crisis, with increasing food insecurity and destruction of social services, infrastructure and the environment, all of which has exacerbated already existing socioeconomic disparities. This is not just a problem affecting the North-East of Nigeria, but ultimately the economic stability and social fabric of the whole country, with spillover impact in the region. As the Government of Nigeria makes progress in securing significant parts of the North-East, much of the region remains fragile. The North-East Nigeria Recovery and Peace Building Assessment (RPBA) was conducted by the Government of Nigeria, with the support of the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank (WB) within the framework of the 2008 Joint EU-UN-WB Declara- tion on Post Crisis Assessments and Recovery Planning. The assessment report provides a shared understanding between the Government of Nigeria and its local and international partners on the peace building and recovery needs of the North-East. The report also sets a framework that could bridge the operational gap that can exist between humanitarian relief and recovery programmes, further encouraging a holistic approach to stabilisation efforts in the North-East. The Government will use the RPBA to help improve, expand and refine its overall strategic framework for recovery and reconstruction of the North-East. Findings and recommendations provide an empirical evidence base and reliable data for informed decision-making. The result of these efforts will hopefully help prioritise development programmes, the implementation of which will bring about reconciliation in the region and lead to overall violence prevention in the future. The partners are committed to help- ing the region not only recover from this crisis but also develop programmes to build a prosperous and peaceful Nigeria for future generations. VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT xI NORTH-EAST NIGERIA PREFACE Acronyms ACLED Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project RPBA Recovery and Peace Building Assessment CIMIC Civilian and Military Coordination RPBS Recovery and Peace Building Strategy CJTF Civilian Joint Task Force SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons CM-COORD Humanitarian Civilian Military Coordination SBMC School-Based Management Committees CSO Civil Society Organisations SEMA State Emergency Management Agencies DTM Displacement Tracking Matrix SGBV Sexual and Gender-Based Violence EPA Environmental Protection Agency SME Small and Medium Sized Enterprise ERW Explosive Remnants of War UASC Unaccompanied and Separated Children EU European Union UN United Nations FEWSNET Famine Early Warning Systems Network UNHAS United Nations Humanitarian Air Service FGN Federal Government of Nigeria UNICEF United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund FMOH Federal Ministry of Health UXO Unexploded Ordnance HDI Human Development Index VAT Value Added Tax HRP Humanitarian Response Plan WASH Water and Sanitation ICT Information and Communication Technology WB World Bank IDPs Internally Displaced Persons IEC Information, Communication and Education IED Improvised Explosive Device IGR Internally Generated Revenue IOM International Organisation for Migration IS Islamic State LGA Local Government Areas MDA Ministries, Departments and Agencies MNJTF Multi-National Joint Task Force MRRR Ministry of Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Resettlement M&E Monitoring and Evaluation NEMA National Emergency Management Agency NEST North-East States Transformation Strategy NDHS Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey NGO Non-Governmental Organisations ONSA Office of the National Security Adviser PCNI Presidential Committee on the North-East Initiative PHC Public Health Centres PINE Presidential Initiative for the North-East xII VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY NORTH-EAST NIGERIA RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT Executive Summary Since 2009, nearly 15 million people have been affected by the violence of /// Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad, also known as Boko Haram and the resulting military operations in North-East Nigeria.The fighting /// became particularly intense from 2014, leading to the loss of an estimated 20,0001 lives and the displacement of 1.8 million people directly attributed to the violence,2 while further aggravating the weak economic development of the North-East with an estimated infrastructure damage of US$ 9.2 billion and accumulated output losses of US$ 8.3 billion. /// The government response to the crisis has primarily been a nation- assistance, especially in areas where international actors are not pres- ally based security and humanitarian response, with limited and ent or have no access. unsuccessful attempts at negotiation, and some actions aimed at preventing and addressing radicalisation. Nigeria’s National Emer- /// On 21 August 2015, the Government of Nigeria requested assis- /// gency Management Agency (NEMA), in coordination with State tance in assessing the needs associated with peace building and crisis Emergency Management Agencies (SEMAs) and in partnership with recovery. Support has been provided in accordance with the 2008 /// the International Organization for Migration (IOM), has been mon- Joint European Union (EU) – United Nations (UN) – World Bank itoring Internally Displaced Persons’ (IDPs) movements and provid- (WB) Declaration on Post-Crisis Assessments and Recovery Plan- ing a range of humanitarian relief support to affected communities. ning. A Recovery and Peace Building Assessment was initiated and findings are presented in this report. The assessment was launched /// The Humanitarian Response Plan for 2016 has requested US$ 248 with a workshop in Abuja on 25-26 January 2016, which was attend- million and is 7 percent funded, as of 16 March 2016. Currently /// ed by more than 250 participants representing Federal and State Gov- 62 partners are providing urgent multi-sectoral humanitarian assis- ernments, the WB, EU, UN, CSOs, IDPs and other stakeholders. tance to conflict-affected people in Adamawa, Borno, Gombe and Yobe. Humanitarian assistance is defined as support that addresses the urgent life-saving needs of the affected people and in these states Objectives currently includes food, water and sanitation, health and hygiene ser- vices, shelter and non-food items, education, protection (including The Recovery and Peace Building Assessment (RPBA) informs a col- /// targeted responses for children and Sexual and Gender-Based Vio- lective vision and strategy on peace building and recovery, and provides lence (SGBV) survivors), early recovery activities, and livelihoods. a framework for coordinated and coherent support to assist conflict-af- The State Governments and some 20 national Civil Society Organi- fected people in the North-East. The assessment covers the six states of /// sations (CSOs) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) op- Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Gombe, Taraba and Bauchi, and provides an erating in the North-East are playing a critical role in the delivery of overarching framework for stability, peace building and recovery. VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 01 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA The RPBA is founded on the recognition that a durable resolution /// (d) consultations over sector recovery strategies between sector teams, to the conflict in the North-East requires addressing the structural and discussions over preliminary findings with State focal points in and underlying drivers of violent conflict. This understanding has /// a combined technical meeting in February 2016; and (e) validation also underpinned the identification and prioritisation of needs pre- and consensus building workshops with a wider range of stakeholders sented in this report. over March-April 2016. Consultation and validation of the RPBA findings took place throughout the process and culminated in a work- As in other complex crises, there are many factors contributing to shop from 31 March-1 April 2016. The event brought together State /// the violent conflict in the North-East. The violent repression of what and Federal Government authorities, civil society representatives, the /// was initially an ideological non-violent movement played a central private sector, and other stakeholders in Abuja. The purpose of these role to turn an extremist movement into extreme conflict. The Boko efforts was to facilitate validation of RPBA’s results, and a more gran- Haram armed conflict is further taking place in a setting characterised ular understanding of inter- and intra-State differences. by a number of factors, which include poverty and inadequacies in governance, poor social and economic outcomes, high income in- **The assessment is divided into three main components: Peace build- equality, perceived social injustices, low accountability and legitimacy ing, stability and social cohesion; Infrastructure and social sectors; of State, low levels of human security, human rights abuses, lack of and, Economic recovery. See the breakdown of component structure economic infrastructure, climate change and environmental degra- in Table 1 on page 8. ** dation. Recovery Strategy and Framework Methodology /// The RPBA confirmed the need for recovery and peace building ef- The assessment has been prepared and implemented jointly by the /// forts, to be carried out in tandem with the on-going scaling up of Federal Government, led by the Vice President’s Office, the six af- humanitarian assistance. Therefore, the Recovery and Peace Building /// fected states, and supported by the World Bank, United Nations, Strategy (RPBS) will need to be closely coordinated with the Human- and European Union. The assessment builds on initiatives incorpo- /// itarian Response Plan (HRP) in order to build on the HRP’s achieve- rated in the Presidential Initiative for the North-East (PINE) and the ments and avoid overlaps. North-East States Transformation Strategy (NEST), and on the sub- The basic principles and values to be upheld in the process of recov- stantial activities already being undertaken in the North-East in re- /// ery include humanitarian principles; human rights; national leader- sponse to the on-going humanitarian needs. The RPBA supplements ship and ownership at Federal, State and Local levels; engagement the PINE and NEST by providing: (a) a systematic analysis of the of civil society and private sector; conflict sensitivity; and building impact of the crisis and displacement and its distribution across states back better and smarter. It is imperative that the most vulnerable /// and sectors of the economy; (b) the means for the sector, geographic segments of affected populations (which include women, children, and temporal prioritisation of needs in PINE and NEST; and (c) a youth, widows, elderly and the disabled) are targeted. Efforts should detailed analysis and quantification of the corresponding short to me- include a bottom-up approach, broad-based participation, and effec- dium term needs for stabilisation and recovery to complement longer tive communication. term development. /// Careful and coordinated sequencing of the RBPA and subsequent A multi-stage consultation process was followed for the develop- /// support will be critical in view of the fluidity of the security envi- ment of the assessment methodology, collection and validation of ronment, and the marked variation in security within and among data and progressive corroboration of results. This entails: (a) the /// the six states. Priorities should be carefully assessed on a continuous /// September 2015 scoping mission to agree on the geographical, sector, basis, and adjusted as needed in light of the prevailing situation on and temporal scope of the assessment; (b) the inaugural workshop in the ground. In some areas, a humanitarian response combined with January 2016 to agree on the methodology and data collection tem- stabilisation will be needed, while in other areas, the context will per- plates with the State Governments; (c) field visits over February 2016; mit more substantial movement towards recovery. 02 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY An integrated and balanced approach to recovery is essential. As /// /// aged and destroyed housing units, 95 percent of which are located peace building and social cohesion form the backbone of the assess- in Borno. ment, it is crucial to properly balance peace building, stability and The total need for recovery and peace building across the three stra- social cohesion interventions with other interventions aimed at re- ** tegic areas of interventions in both the stabilisation and recovery constructing or rehabilitating social, physical and productive assets. phase is US$ 6.7 billion, as shown in Table EX1. Peace building, stability and social cohesion interventions will ensure ** the sustainability of recovery interventions on the ground and lay the /// Interventions for Peace Building, Stability and Social Cohesion re- foundation for human security to prevail. quire substantial resources estimated at US$ 151 million. Interven- /// tions include: The assessment sets out four strategic outcomes for recovery and /// peace building: /// (a) strengthening the resilience of host communities, supporting safe and voluntary return and resettlement of displaced populations; • Outcome 1: Contribute to the safe, voluntary and dignified return (b) social cohesion and violence prevention, including sexual and and resettlement of displaced populations. gender based violence (SGBV); • Outcome 2: Improved human security, reconciliation and vio- (c) local governance and citizen engagement; and lence prevention. (d) justice, small arms control and community security. • Outcome 3: Enhanced government accountability and citizen en- gagement in service delivery. The Infrastructure and Social Services interventions are estimated • Outcome 4: Increased equity in the provision of basic services and /// at a total of US$ 6 billion. The highest needs are for the reconstruc- employment opportunities. /// tion of houses (US$ 1.2 billion), followed by agriculture (US$ 881 million), and education (US$ 721 million). Infrastructure sectors of Financial Impacts and Needs from energy, information and communication technology (ICT), transport the Crisis and water and sanitation require US$ 1.2 billion for reconstruction, constituting over 20 percent of total needs. In addition a provision The assessment indicates that the economic impact of the crisis is for community infrastructure and non-formal services has been taken /// substantial, reaching nearly US$ 9 billion across all six North-East into account. States. Two-thirds of the damages (US$ 5.9 billion) are in Borno, /// the most affected state; damages in Adamawa and Yobe account for /// The overall estimated needs for macroeconomic and fiscal recovery US$ 1.6 billion and US$ 1.2 billion respectively. Three-quarters of total US$ 473.5 million. Interventions focus on the private sector, /// the overall damages are on agriculture (US$ 3.5 billion) and housing trade and finance, job-creation, livelihood support and facilitating (US$ 3.3 billion). The conflict resulted in more than 400,000 dam- economic restoration. TABLE EX 1 Overall Recovery and Peace Building Needs by Component Federal/ Adamawa Borno Yobe Gombe Taraba Bauchi Regional3 Total Peace building and social cohesion 27.5 37.8 22.5 13.6 19.4 23.9 5.7 150.5 Infrastructure and social services 594.9 3933.3 668.3 129.1 144.9 202.9 94.7 6040.1 Economic Recovery 37.6 68.8 30.7 22.3 27.7 41.4 245 473.5 Total 660 4040 721.5 164.9 192 268.2 345.4 6664.1 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 03 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA Cross-cutting Issues Critical Success Factors for Reconciliation and sustainable peace can only be achieved through a /// Implementation and Financing human rights-based response, which addresses both the root causes The recovery and peace building process will be highly demanding /// of the conflict as well as its impact. Violence in the North-East has /// for the limited capacity at every level of government. There may be /// contributed to the rise in abduction, mainly of women and children, need for significant strengthening of policy, programme and project implementation capacity to enhance the effectiveness of scarce pub- while men and boys are targeted for killings, forced recruitment and lic spending and revenue mobilisation efforts. However, there is the forced conversions. Addressing SGBV and other forms of violence opportunity to enhance the government’s ability to use evidence and is critically important, and to that end, all interventions will take data to inform policy and implementation decisions, as well as to key gender-related issues into account. Urban and rural youth need strengthen accountability mechanisms. urgent training and skills development as artisans and technicians. Strong government leadership can help to ensure coordination Youth engagement will be considered in all interventions to enable /// across stakeholders, with representation from the wide range of ac- youth-led development. Through a mix of emergency actions and ca- tors at different levels of government, as well as NGOs and benefi- pacity development, the Government of Nigeria, the security forces ciaries. The institutional set up will have to strike the right balance /// and development partners should undertake a mine action program between strategic integration and decentralised implementation. It is in line with international standards. important to build on existing government capacity and structures 04 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY where possible, while ensuring an effective division of responsibility Next Steps between the core institutional functions of the three tiers of govern- ment; Federal, State and Local. This assessment is a step towards implementing interventions, /// which are critical to the future stability and recovery of the North- Based on a review of international good practices, the following East. A number of further steps will need to be undertaken in support /// /// institutional options can be considered for implementing the re- of implementation. It is important that the RPBA is now translated covery and peace building programme: (a) ad hoc set up such as into (a) an action plan including the prioritisation and sequencing /// the establishment of a discrete implementing agency; (b) existing of integrated community-based interventions; (b) an institutional government capacity and structures of Ministries, Departments and framework that will include coordination structures at Federal, State Agencies (MDAs) and; (c) a hybrid framework built on both existing and Local levels, and implementation arrangements at State and Lo- government structures and where possible, while ensuring an ad-hoc cal levels; (c) a monitoring and evaluation system that will also be the organisation. The pros and cons of these three options have been dis- “home” of the data base set-up during the RPBA at the appropriate cussed in the report together with the effective division of responsi- levels; and (d) financing modalities, including the allocation of na- bilities between the core institutional functions of the three tiers of tional and external resources and a resources mobilisation strategy. the government. Monitoring and Evaluation Robust monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems are needed to in- /// form the implementation of the recovery strategy that covers the whole value chain from financial inputs to outputs. The implementation of /// the recovery strategy will require both the mobilisation of existing M&E systems across sectors and the triangulation of information from different sources. Social accountability mechanisms such as grievance redress could also be mobilised to help monitor the impact of the recovery strategy on the conflict situation and affected population. Recovery Financing and Public Expenditure Management Recovery will entail a significant increase of capital expenditure and /// calls on all tiers of the Nigerian government for considerable im- provements in public investment management in the North-East. /// The effectiveness of allocated funds for the implementation of the recovery strategy needs to be ensured through adequate financial management at Federal, State, and Local levels. Revenue mobilisation calls for coordinated efforts among the three /// tiers of the Nigerian government. Establishing a financing strategy /// involves three key steps: (a) agreeing on a set of priorities within the overall cost envelope of the RPBA; (b) mapping the various financ- ing sources; and (c) identifying the range of specific financing instru- ments. VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 05 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA CHAPTER 1 Rationale and Scope 1.1. Background and Rationale budget deficit from 2.8 percent in 2011 to 31 percent of the total revenue in the North-East in 2014. With the loss of markets, damage Since 2009, nearly 15 million people have been affected by the con- to trade infrastructure, and the impact on agriculture and livelihoods, flict with Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad, also known the North-East will continue to feel the economic impact of the cri- as Boko Haram, and the resulting military operations in North-East sis for years to come. This decline in growth will ultimately impede Nigeria. The conflict became particularly intense from 2014, leading national developmental progress and have a major impact on poverty to the loss of an estimated 20,000 lives and the displacement of 1.8 reduction efforts and the growth of the national economy. In addition million people. While many of the displaced people have remained to the financial impacts, the Boko Haram conflict has had a signifi- within the three conflict-affected states of Borno, Adamawa, and cant impact on the national psyche and overall sense of well-being of Yobe, the rest are scattered thorough Northern and Central Nige- the citizens of Nigeria. Until the region is stabilised the entire country ria. Over 170,000 more have sought refuge in neighbouring coun- will continue to feel both the economic and psychological impacts of tries. The human, social, and economic losses of the conflict, and the violence. the consequent need of investment for recovery, peace building, and On 21 August 2015, the Government of Nigeria requested assis- reconstruction of the North-East, are overwhelming. Damage to ed- /// tance in assessing the needs associated with peace building and cri- ucation and health facilities, and attacks on markets and farms, clo- sis recovery. This support has been provided in accordance with the sure of cattle markets, and restricted access to lands with consequent /// 2008 Joint EU-UN-WB Declaration on Post Crisis Assessments and negative impact on livelihoods, are adversely affecting the develop- mental outcomes of an entire generation. The conflict has triggered Recovery Planning. The assessment was launched with a workshop in a humanitarian crisis, with increasing food insecurity, and increasing Abuja on 25-26 January 2016, which was attended by more than 250 pressure on already overstretched and damaged basic social services. participants representing Federal and State Governments, the WB, This has exacerbated already existing socioeconomic disparities in the EU, UN, CSOs, IDPs), and other stakeholders. North-East, further straining a population already among the most This synthesis report and the detailed component and state reports /// underdeveloped and vulnerable in the country. Furthermore, social contained in volume II and III represent the findings and recom- cohesion has been deeply eroded, and with social interaction becom- mendations of the RPBA. It identifies needs and priorities for short /// ing increasingly challenging in an atmosphere of violence which has term stabilisation and in support of medium term recovery. The re- followed, due to communal, property and land disputes, and retalia- mainder of this report is structured as follows: Chapter 1 explains the tion for conflict-related violence. purpose and approach of the RPBA and the constraints and limita- The conflict in the North-East cannot be viewed as a regional issue /// tions of the assessment; Chapter 2 outlines the context, impact, and as it is having a significant impact on both the economic stability underlying drivers of violence in the North-East and the response to and social fabric of Nigeria. Therefore, it merits a national strategy date; Chapter 3 develops and explains the prioritisation framework and Federal leadership to ensure stabilisation and lasting peace. The /// that was developed as part of the analysis; Chapter 4 details needs, region has suffered an accumulated output loss of Naira 1.66 trillion, priorities, and associated costs across the stabilisation and recovery driving significant inflation and ultimately reducing the welfare of phases; Chapter 5 outlines the implementation financing options many residents of the North-East. The crisis has also increased the based on international good practices. 06 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 01 : RATIONALE AND SCOPE 1.2. Objectives and Vision of **The RPBA is structured around three components: peace building, stability and social cohesion; infrastructure and social services; and the Assessment economic recovery. These components and the sub-components / The joint (Government of Nigeria and international partners) Re- /// sectors are shown in the diagram on page 5.: ** covery and Peace Building Assessment (RPBA) will guide efforts /// The RPBA is founded on the recognition that a durable resolution towards peace building and sustainable recovery in the North-East. /// to the conflict in the North-East requires that the structural and The proposed assessment will build upon initiatives (at Federal and underlying drivers of conflict are addressed. This understanding /// State levels) including the Presidential Initiative for the North-East has also underpinned the identification and prioritisation of needs (PINE) and the North-East States Transformation Strategy (NESTS). presented in this report. Any meaningful effort to recover and de- The overall objectives of the assessment are to: (a) inform the de- velop the six states cannot focus on reconstruction of damaged in- velopment of a collective vision and strategy on peace building and frastructure alone. Rather, recovery will need to start by addressing recovery in North-East Nigeria, including the short to medium term the deep-rooted and evolving grievances of the population, through needs of the conflict affected populations; and (b) provide a frame- a combination of investments and broader national governance and work for coordinated and coherent provision of support from devel- peace building reforms in order to establish the foundations for last- opment and humanitarian partners in order to assist conflict-afflicted ing peace and prosperity. people, and peace building and recovery in the North-East. VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 07 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA TABLE 1 Recovery and Peace Building Assessment Component Breakdown 1 2 3 Safe and voluntary return and Energy Macroeconomic and resettlement of displaced persons fiscal impacts Reconciliation, peace building and Environment Finance, trade, and private community cohesion sector development Governance and citizen Information and Livelihoods engagement Communication Technology Community security, justice, human rights, Transport Employment mine action and small arms control Poverty Education Health and Nutrition Housing Public Buildings Social Protection Water and Sanitation Agriculture and Irrigation Private Enterprises 08 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 01 : RATIONALE AND SCOPE 1.3. Assessment Approach ed by the State Governments. Significantly, this includes social sector, peace building, and private sector assets and infrastructure, which tra- The assessment was guided by the 2008 Joint Declaration on Crisis /// ditionally have not been well documented; available data on such as- and Post-Crisis Assessments. The RPBA started with a joint scoping /// sets remains patchy and dated. Nevertheless, this compilation of data mission exploring the objectives, methodology, and approach for the was a monumental effort that was done very swiftly, by the collective assessment in September 2015. The assessment commenced with a mobilisation of over 100 Federal and State sector focal points respon- workshop in Abuja on 25-26 January 2016, attended by more than sible for data collection across all issues covered by the assessment. 250 participants, representing Federal and State Governments, the WB, EU, UN, CSOs, and continued through to early March, when Two streams of data collection and needs identification were formed: /// /// State and Federal Government focal points and development partners (a) vertical linkages between the Federal and State Governments; and drew together available data and analysis to determine the govern- (b) horizontal linkages between various State sectoral experts, coordi- ment’s priorities and needs for recovery and peace building. nated by State focal points. The identification of recovery needs The extraordinary scale of social, infrastructure, and economic /// has required the development of sector strategies that provide impacts caused by the protracted crisis in the six affected states of consistent criteria for damage determination, classification, quan- Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, Yobe in North-East Ni- tification and validation across multiple datasets on impacts and geria required a methodological approach tailored to the local con- needs across the three components. This in turn required con- text. This demanded an unparalleled level of baseline and impact data /// siderable dialogue to verify the findings of the assessment. The collection across the six affected states, in over 20 subcomponents. resulting quantification in the assessment of recovery and peace Consequently, quantitative data of the entire economic, social, and building needs in each sector is generally based on agreed policy physical infrastructure in these six states – often broken down to the parameters and sector strategies between the Federal and State Local Government Areas (LGA) level – was compiled and document- Governments and partner agencies. VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 09 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA FIGURE 1 Recovery and Peace Building Assessment Timeline 2015 2016 July 21 September 21-23 December 22 February 8-12 February 1-5 The President of Nigeria requests Joint Scoping Mission of the Office of the Vice President RPBA launched with Field missions to Adamawa, President of the World Bank Government of Nigeria and requests WB, UN, and EU two-day workshop Taraba, Gombe, and Bauchi states for support WB/UN/EU to commence the RPBA in Abuja August 21 December 16 January 25-26 February 7-12 Government of Nigeria makes Workshop with the RPBA launched with two-day Receipt of data on impact from official request to the World Bank North East Governors workshop in Abuja the six states The RPBA process required considerable data validation. Firstly, /// /// flict affected people. Remote sensing capabilities were also engaged, pre-crisis asset and infrastructure baseline data was gathered by State using a combination of satellite imagery, social media analytics, and and Federal governments and validated by sector teams through desk information received from partner networks to fill in information review. The States then provided inventory based, post crisis damage gaps identified in certain sectors and geographical regions. This ap- data for most sectors, and where necessary, worked with sector experts proach also helped to validate and augment the findings of on-the- to collectively determine percentage based damage for certain sectors ground assessments where information is scarce or access not feasible. and some geographical areas (such as housing). Thirdly, sector teams A multi-stage consultation process has been followed for the devel- /// validated damage data using techniques and plausibility checks such opment of the assessment methodology, collection and validation as relative-to-baseline, cross-sectoral, and cross-regional comparisons of data and progressive corroboration of results. This entailed: (a) /// of relative/percentage damage. This was complemented and deepened the September 2015 scoping mission to agree on the geographical, through the use of different survey tools, a review of existing literature sectoral, and temporal scope of the assessment; (b) the inaugural produced by credible agencies with on-the-ground presence, and field workshop in January 2016 to agree on the methodology and data visits to the six states. Field missions visited all six states in the North- collection templates with the State Governments; (c) field visits over East over a two week span (1-12 February 2016) and collected data February 2016; (d) consultations over sector recovery strategies be- through interviews with focal points from key Ministries, Depart- tween sector teams, and discussions over preliminary findings with ments, and Agencies (MDAs) related to the different components of State focal points in a combined technical meeting in February 2016; the RBPA, representatives of CSOs, international NGOs, and con- and (e) validation & consensus building workshops planned with a 10 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 01 : RATIONALE AND SCOPE February 15-20 February 22 March 11 March 31 - April 1 April and onwards Subcomponent/Sector First draft of component reports Circulation of RPBA report for Final consultations and validation Post-RPBA process write-up drafted review by Federal Government workshops in Abuja and States February 16-19 February 23 March 14-18 April 8 Briefings to civil society and Technical meeting with state focal State Ssakeholder workshops Finalisation of RPBA report development partners on RPBA points to discuss recovery strategies (including editing, graphic design, and printing) wider range of stakeholders over March-April 2016. Consultation and only focusing on the six states of the North-East Region, even though and validation of the RPBA findings took place throughout the pro- the impact of the crisis has had spillover impacts throughout the country. cess and culminated in a workshop from 31 March-1 April 2016. The Spatial and temporal boundaries were applied to the assessment. It cov- event brought together State and Federal Government authorities, /// /// ers states in the North-East directly affected by the Boko Haram conflict, civil society representatives, the private sector, and other stakeholders and the resulting mass displacement of people, as well as states not direct- in Abuja. The purpose of these efforts was to facilitate validation of ly affected by the conflict, but largely affected by displacement. The six the assessment findings, and to refine the prioritisation of the pro- directly affected states are Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Gombe, Taraba, and posed actions based on a more granular understanding of inter- and Bauchi. The assessment focuses on needs related to factors directly attrib- intra-State differences. utable to the Boko Haram crisis, and does not include impacts and needs arising out of other causes of displacement and physical impact. In terms 1.4. Methodology, Assumptions of timeframe, the assessment uses 2010 as the pre-crisis baseline year for and Constraints comparative data analysis. This is based on the assumption that the con- flict worsened significantly in 2011 (as is explained further in Chapter In order for the assessment – which would inform policy-financing de- /// 2). In instances where the assessment was constrained by access to areas, cisions – to be completed in a timely manner, a number of boundaries where conflict was ongoing, different methodologies were used, such as were agreed. As mentioned above, some spatial and temporal boundaries /// remote sensing, qualitative data, and verification with focus groups, to had to be placed on the assessment, such as using 2010 as the base-line triangulate and verify the estimations. VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 11 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA BOX 1 Definitions of Damages, Needs and Building Back Better Damages: Damages refer to direct and indirect damages and losses ** ** these BBB/S measures into specific categories, these can generically from the crisis, such as physical damage, human capital loss, eco- be considered to include the following range of measures across the nomic losses, service delivery disruptions, and additional burden of three components: service delivery capacity, resulting from the conflict, e.g. due to forced • Social Cohesion and Peace Building: (a) strengthen community co- displacement. The quantification of damage to infrastructure caused hesion through the process of reconstruction, including improved by the conflict is made relative to baseline stock, while factoring in consultation and participation of all segments of the population, additional budgeted or actual recurrent expenditure arising out of and in particular of the most vulnerable; (b) apply a user-centred stresses and strains induced by forced displacement, such as increased approach to design and implementation to ensure physical and operations and maintenance or additional periodic rehabilitation of cultural accessibility and enhancing user-friendliness of services existing infrastructure. and facilities; (c) ensure planning and implementation at the clos- Needs: Needs refer to the interventions and resources required for cri- ** ** est level to the local population; (d) adequate resettlement of im- sis recovery in terms of social recovery, peace building, economic re- pacted population; (e) redress of grievances that may arise through covery, and the restoration of service delivery and reconstruction and the process of reconstruction. rehabilitation of physical, social and productive assets and infrastruc- • Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Service Delivery Restoration: ture. This can also include: (a) spending needed to maintain pre-crisis This is proposed to incorporate the key principles of sustainable quality and access to public services; (b) additional spending needed and resilient recovery including: (a) right-sizing’ and ‘right-siting’ for ‘Build Back Better and Smarter’, including the possible ‘right-siz- of pre-crisis assets and infrastructure based on current demograph- ing’, ‘right-siting’ and structural improvement of pre-crisis assets and ic needs; (b) improved building standards and structural improve- infrastructure; (c) any additional budgeted capital expenditure that is ments as per present sector developmental norms; (c) improved deemed necessary for immediate crisis recovery; (d) additional estab- service delivery standards as per present sector developmental lishment, salary and management costs; (e) additional spending needs norms; and (d) the human resources and skills development re- due to loss of livelihoods and stresses on service provision caused by quired to manage such improvements in service standards. inflow of IDPs, and for bringing about qualitative shifts in the types/ • Economic Recovery: (a) sustainable rebuilding of lives and modalities of service provision; and (f ) quantification of software and livelihoods, including short term employment generation capacity development needs. programs complemented by skill development and incen- Building Back Better and Smarter: For the purposes of this assess- ** ** tives for small enterprise development and entrepreneur- ment, Building Back Better and Smarter (BBB/S) is a reference to ship; (b) diversification of the regional and local economies; the range of improvements, on the pre-crisis situation, that have been and (c) improved macroeconomic and fiscal management. recommended in the recovery strategies and needs analyses under the various components. Although it may be difficult to encapsulate 12 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 01 : RATIONALE AND SCOPE The needs assessment was carried out by considering short and me- /// ing the number of IDPs related to the Boko Haram crisis, compared dium term needs, assuming gradual improvement of the security to other crises. Assumptions were made, based on the best possible situation in the country. The first two years will focus on stabili- /// information and a combination of local and international expertise. sation. For the purposes of the assessment, stabilisation denotes the period during which initial recovery interventions commence and 1.5. Report Structure start taking effect while ongoing humanitarian operations continue. These initial recovery interventions will build upon humanitarian This report contains three volumes as follows: support and avoid duplication. The following two years will focus • Volume I - Synthesis Report: This volume introduces the objec- /// /// on recovery, during which time the initial stabilisation interventions tives, timeline and methodology of the assessment; provides a de- continue, while further medium term recovery and reconstruction tailed context analysis that focuses on the factors behind the crisis activities take shape and scale up. It should be noted that the above and the likely risk and recovery scenarios faced in the future. It phases are more notional, designed to ensure consistency of recovery articulates an overall strategic framework for recovery and peace planning, but do not constitute a linear process across all components building based on the context analysis and provides a summary and all states. analysis of needs for social, infrastructure and economic recovery. The systematic and rigorous costing of needs undertaken for this /// Options for the implementation of the assessment are also ex- assessment reflects an improvement upon past assessments. The key/// plored, concluding with a matrix of the needs identified in the 18 features of the costing approach are as follows: subcomponent analyses in an Operational Framework for Recov- ery and Peace Building. (a) Development of a comprehensive, multi-level cost model that • Volume II - Component Reports: This volume provides detailed /// /// integrates intervention, sector, component and aggregate level and more granular impact and needs analysis with respect to each needs into a cohesive whole; of the three components, disaggregated down to the level of the (b) Detailed costing of social cohesion, peace building and econom- subcomponents. It includes the distribution of impact and needs, ic recovery needs across seven subcomponents/sectors based on: corresponding costing, and modalities for implementation across (i) the distribution of LGAs impacted in each state, or based on the six states. More granular details can be found in the subcompo- distribution of IDPs across the six states, and; (ii) the identifica- nent reports, which while not part of this package, remain available tion and quantification of tangible programmatic interventions to policy makers and implementers for more comprehensive subse- employing consistent unit rates across the states for consulting quent planning and implementation. services, capacity development initiatives, social mobilisation ac- • Volume III - State Reports: This volume disaggregates all impacts /// /// tivities and other interventions; and needs data with respect to each component and subcompo- (c) Detailed costing of infrastructure rehabilitation and service deliv- nent, in the form of separate State Reports. This is for ease of ref- ery restoration needs across 11 sectors, based on: (i) the physical erence and use by the respective states and other stakeholders for impacts caused by the crisis and the added impacts of forced dis- subsequent recovery planning and implementation. placement on infrastructure and service delivery; (ii) differentials for building back better and smarter, and; (iii) rationalisation and corroboration of unit rates for reconstruction and rehabilitation provided by the various states, differentiated by state in some sec- tors and kept uniform in others. The assessment only focuses on the recovery and peace building /// needs of the North-East Region related to Boko Haram conflict and not the other lower intensity conflicts throughout the country. /// However, there are many common underlying drivers contributing to the violence. This disaggregation became a challenge when identify- VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 13 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA CHAPTER 2 Context Analysis This chapter analyses the main political, historical and social factors /// that help to explain the rise of Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal- Jihad, also known as Boko Haram, in North-East Nigeria. It goes on to /// map out possible scenarios of crisis evolution and prospects for peace for the future, with a view to identifying the strategic and operational implications of the potential unfolding of these scenarios towards the implementation of the recovery strategies and interventions proposed under the RPBA. This context analysis has guided the development of the framework of strategic outcomes and priorities for recovery which are in turn based on the need to start to address the structural drivers of crisis identified in the context analysis. This has been a governing consideration behind the formulation of sector recovery strategies and needs analysis, and has also provided the means for the prioritisation and sequencing of the needs identified in the three components of the assessment. 2.1. Background flict and insecurity persist. Figure 2 shows conflict-related fatalities by area and the locations of IDPs in North-East Nigeria. The Boko Haram conflict has affected nearly 15 million civilians /// and left widespread devastation in North-East Nigeria on a level In Northern Nigeria, there has been a long history of protest move- /// unprecedented since the civil war of 1967-1970.4 An estimated /// ments and reformist jihads dating back to the early 19th century. /// 20,000 people have lost their lives, and nearly two million people are Such movements have sought to challenge rulers perceived as unjust displaced internally or across international borders5 and an estimated and corrupt and seek to purify society based on ideological beliefs. 2,000-7,000 people have gone missing, including abducted children Boko Haram had similar origins, and came into wider public atten- and women. While the governments of Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, 6 tion in 2003, when it began to challenge the Nigerian State. The and Niger recognise the need for concerted action and have estab- movement was not violent at the outset and initially received some lished the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF), and the Nigerian local support. Today, it is a multifaceted network with evolving strat- military has successfully regained territory, the tactics of Boko Haram egies shaped by a diverse set of ideological, political, societal, and have shifted back to those of asymmetrical warfare, and serious con- criminal aspirations. 14 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 02 : CONTEXT ANALYSIS FIGURE 2 North-East Nigeria: Conflict fatalities by LGA and displacement by ward Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED ) Project, accessed on 01/30/2016 (Conflict data); International Organization for Migration (IOM) - Displacement Tracking Matrix Round 7, as of December 2015 (Displacement data); ESRI (Geo-data for background map). The precursor to Boko Haram first arose in Borno State in the /// ticians, moderate imams, and civilians, targeted through bombing 1990s, under the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf. Yusuf built a con- /// and shooting attacks on schools, churches, mosques, markets, gov- siderable local following preaching against what he held to be a cor- ernment installations and other public places. As Figure 3 shows, /// rupt and un-Islamic government, while advocating the establishment fatalities have soared in the last two years. Suicide bombings began in of a pure Islamic State based on Shari’a law. In July 2009, following 2011, and since mid-2014 many young women and girls have been deadly clashes between Mohammed Yusuf ’s followers and the police, systematically used as suicide bombers. Boko Haram has also abduct- Mohammed Yusuf was killed extra-judicially while in police custody. ed people: between January 2014 and April 2015, the group abducted Conflict between the group and State security forces then dramati- well over 2,000 women, girls and boys. Many girls have been abduct- cally escalated, and nearly 1,000 of Yusuf ’s followers were killed in ed, forcibly ‘married’ to Boko Haram fighters, are being systemati- confrontations. These marked the beginning of a spiralling campaign cally raped, and forced to carry out caretaking duties. In April 2014, 200 schools girls from Chibok in Borno State were abducted and the of violence by the group. majority remain in captivity. Large numbers of adbucted women and Boko Haram violence broadened from revenge attacks on the Nige- /// girls have been taken to Boko Haram outposts and remote communi- rian police and security forces, to attacks on public servants, poli- ties under Boko Haram control.7 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 15 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA FIGURE 3 Fatalities Related to the Boko Haram Violence and Other Conflicts in Nigeria: 2009 to 2015 14,000 12,000 Fatalities related to Boko Haram insurgency 10,000 Fatalities related to other Conflicts 8,000 6,000 4,000 2,000 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), accessed on 01/30/2016. In addition to continuous sporadic attacks on rural communities, /// declared formal allegiance to Islamic State (IS) that was accepted a week Boko Haram started to consolidate control over territory, most of later.12 The group subsequently changed its name to Wilayat Gharb If- which has by now been recaptured by the government. The group /// riqiyya (West Africa Province of the Islamic State) althoughy they are still established what its leader, Abu Bakr Shekau, allegedly referred to as widely known as Boko Haram. The move may lead to closer ties between a ‘caliphate’, which would extend across national borders.7 In 2014, the two movements, although its precise implications still remain unclear. Boko Haram affiliated groups held a territory the size of Belgium, in There are indications that Boko Haram has benefitted from IS media and Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States.8 The massacre at Baga, on the communication tactics, with reports that IS may have either sent media shores of Lake Chad in January 2015, drew international attention to producers to Nigeria or that Boko Haram media footage was sent else- Boko Haram’s trans-boundary capabilities, and from February 2015 where for production and editing.13 Boko Haram appears to have a wide onwards, the MJTF, a coalition of troops from Nigeria, Chad, Cam- range of sources of funding, including bank, livestock and other robber- eroon, and Niger (with Benin subsequently joining in), undertook ies, extortion through kidnapping, and (perhaps now predominantly) the joint military operations and recaptured most of the territory taken sale of arms, illicit drugs and other smuggled goods. by Boko Haram. However, attacks continue throughout the North- East region. These include suicide bombings in urban areas, of which at least 32 were reported in the region between 1 November 2015 2.2. Government Response and 15 January 2016, where the majority of bombers were allegedly The government response to the crisis has primarily been a na- female.9 /// tionally-based security and service delivery response, with limited Although originating in Nigeria, the conflict has a regional dimension, /// attempts at negotiation, and some broader actions aimed at coun- with incursions into and recruitment in neighbouring countries. In /// tering conflict. On two occasions, a State of Emergency was declared /// 2015 alone, there were 1,335 Boko Haram related casualties in Camer- in December 2011, in parts of Yobe, Borno, as well as Plateau and oon, 936 in Niger, and 412 in Chad.11 In March 2015, Abu Bakr Shekau Niger, and in May 2013, for the whole of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe. 16 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 02 : CONTEXT ANALYSIS In the second instance, the State of Emergency was accompanied by Nigeria’s National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), in coor- /// upward spirals of conflict. More recently, the Office of the National dination with State Emergency Management Agencies (SEMAs), has Security Adviser (ONSA) developed a more integrated approach to been monitoring IDP movements and providing a range of relief sup- counter-terrorism in the form of a Countering Conflict Programme. port to affected communities. Food, access to clean drinking water, and /// Meanwhile, attempts to negotiate have been unsuccessful. That said, other emergency supplies have been provided to IDPs living in camps and it is important to acknowledge how challenging it is to coordinate the many of those staying with host families in the North-East as a result of necessary elements of comprehensive response to a complex emergen- the Boko Haram conflict. NEMA has strategically stockpiled emergency supplies in warehouses in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe States to cater to cy such as in Nigeria’s North-East. the needs of the IDPs. NEMA has taken the lead in camp coordination The military response of the Nigerian government has continued /// and management and has deployed personnel to provide technical sup- to encounter challenges. There have been challenges in coordina- /// port to SEMAs and the Nigerian Red Cross, to manage the IDP camps tion, coherence and clarity of roles and responsibilities among the in the North-East. Emergency education for displaced children became many government agencies involved in responding to the crisis. The a major priority after unprecedented Boko Haram attacks on students, enormous humanitarian and protection needs of IDPs and affected teachers, and school infrastructure. A Safe Schools Initiative (SSI) has also communities are far from being fully met. From late February 2015, been established, whereby school saftey and security is improved and in the MNJTF,under the auspices of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, some case students are transferred (in agreement with parents) to other schools in states not affected by the fighting. launched a military offensive against Boko Haram, expelling the group from almost all of the 25 or more LGAs that had been occu- The government leads humanitarian coordination efforts, and the in- /// /// pied. According to official government reports, by April 2015, Boko ternational community encourages State ministries to lead sectoral work- Haram had lost most its held territories in Borno, Adamawa, and ing groups in the North-East, while NEMA and the SEMAs continue to Yobe States, except for its stronghold in the Sambisa forest in Borno be overall humanitarian coordination partners. State. Although the Nigerian Government regained territory, as Boko Haram was pushed back, these actions caused further displacement 2.3. The International Humanitarian and exposed additional humanitarian needs, without fully enabling humanitarian access. Response The international humanitarian response in Nigeria’s North-East has In April 2015, Nigeria’s incoming president, Muhammadu Buhari, /// /// provided life-saving assistance to IDPs and host communities. This declared that he would take a hard line on Boko Haram, while un- /// support aims to ensure a dignified existence as they wait for durable solu- derstanding and tackling the drivers of the crisis. One of his first /// tions to resolve their current situation. A Humanitarian Response Plan moves upon taking office was to order the immediate relocation of the (HRP) was prepared in November 2015 and presented the latest analysis military command centre from Abuja to Maiduguri; he also commit- of humanitarian needs foreseen in 2016 and includes a country strategy ted to addressing the reports of misconduct by the Nigerian security in the (post-) conflict and forced displacement situation, as well as op- and military forces. Following the relocation of the Military Com- erational response plans for Adamawa, Borno, Gombe and Yobe states. mand HQ to Maiduguri, the actions of government security forces It covers a range of immediate life-saving needs including; health, food, in the region have been more successfully coordinated. At the devel- nutrition, water, sanitation and hygiene, shelter, non-food items, educa- opmental level, the government has formulated regional initiatives in tion and protection of civilians. US$ 248 million has been requested for the form of the Presidential Initiative for the North-East (PINE), and projects listed under the plan. As of 16 March 2016, US$ 16 million has the North East States Transformation Strategy (NESTS). However, been received for projects listed in the HRP and US$ 6 million for hu- the recent sharp fall in the price of oil will likely dramatically reduce manitarian projects not listed in HRP: US$ 9.9 from the Central Emer- the fiscal space for the government’s response to the crisis, whether gency Response Fund, US$ 5.8 million from the European Commission, military, humanitarian, or developmental. US$ 4.5 million from Japan and US$ 2.2 from Germany.15 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 17 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA FIGURE 4 Timeline of the Boko Haram Crisis10 May 2013 April 2014 2009 GoN declares State of Emergency in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe Boko Haram kidnap 276 school girls from Chibok in States Borno State June 2013 June 2014 20 January 2012 Establishment of Civilian Joint Boko Haram capture town 2009 Boko Haram kill 185 in Task Force to work with Nigerian of Gwoza, Borno State, and Boko Haram related violence coordinated attacks in Kano State Military to combat Boko Haram declare a caliphate in controlled commences areas in North-East Nigeria Dec. 2014 261,075 IDPs 2011 2013 2014 Oct 2014 Fighting intensifies, including Boko Haram start attacking Establishment of IDPs camps Boko Haram further intensify attacks on civilians health workers in Kano, Borno, in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe attacks, causing massive and Yobe States. States displacement, including attacks August 2011 in Mubi and other northern Boko Haram bomb UN House Adamawa areas in Abuja Despite widespread insecurity and limited resources, aid agencies /// states in the North-East. This includes food, water and sanitation, /// continue to scale-up their presence and activities in Nigeria’s North- health and nutrition, and hygiene services, shelter and non-food East in line with humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, /// items, education, protection – including targeted responses for chil- impartiality, and independence. The geographical scope of the re- dren and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) survivors, ear- sponse has also expanded, with humanitarian hubs now established ly recovery activities and livelihoods. Some 20 national CSOs and in Damaturu and Yola, and most importantly, in Maiduguri, the NGOs operating in the North-East play a critical role in the delivery epicentre of the crisis. UN agencies are now relocating a number of of assistance, especially in areas where international actors are not Abuja-based staff to these locations to better understand and respond present or have no access. to the humanitarian crisis, and to be closer to State level authorities During 2015, the humanitarian response expanded rapidly to ad- and partners. At the same time, bottom-up coordination mechanisms dress the urgent and growing needs of the affected population in that feed into central decision making mechanisms are serving to im- the North-East. The number of IDPs recorded by the Displacement prove the humanitarian response, and increasingly, local NGOs are Tracking Matrix (DTM) increased by more than five times, from participating in sectoral coordination mechanisms at the State level. around 390,000 in December 2014, to 2.2 million in December Currently 62 partners are providing urgent multi-sectoral human- /// 2015.16 The unpredictable nature of IDP numbers, as demonstrated itarian assistance to conflict-affected people in the most affected by the rapid increase in the number of displaced who now reside in 18 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 02 : CONTEXT ANALYSIS March 2015 Jan 2015 Boko Haram pledge allegiance Boko Haram fighters conduct to ISIS raids into Cameroon, Chad, Territory formerly controlled by and Niger African Union pledges to send Boko Haram has been retaken by government forces of Nigeria 2015 7,500 troops into Nigeria to and neighbouring allied help fight Boko Haram countries Over 5 days, Boko Haram 28 March 2015 September 2015 violent attacks lead to over 150 New government democratically Bomb attack at IDP camp deaths and massive destruction elected with Muhammadu Malkohi in Yola, Adamawa in Baga, Borno State Buhari as President State Feb. 2015 Apr. 2015 Jun. 2015 Aug. 2015 Oct. 2015 1,053,338 1,344,350 1,258,593 1,982,655 1,913,338 IDPs IDPs IDPs IDPs IDPs Feb 2015 28 April 2015 October 2015 Military operations by Nigeria, Nigerian troops rescue 300 Two separate bomb attacks supported by Cameroon, Chad, women and girls from Sambisa in Abuja and Niger, invade the Sambisa Forest in Borno State Agreement between the AU and Forest in Borno State May 2015 the Lake Chad Basin Commission 14 Feb 2015 Forced return of Nigerians living on the operationalisation of Federal Elections due to take place in neighbouring countries back to the MNJTF are delayed until 28 March Nigeria begins Maiduguri (1.6 million), is a challenge for the government and the In 2015, humanitarian access improved due to a significant number /// international humanitarian community to address. The 2016 Hu- of national NGOs that joined the response – immediately adding /// manitarian Response Plan was crafted to address the fluidity of the value through their knowledge of local civil society and communities. IDP situation, and to ensure a level of predictability in the response This extended the reach of the response, enabling assistance to reach of the humanitarian community. people in areas previously inaccessible to the international humanitar- An estimated three million affected people in 26 LGAs cannot be /// ian community. For example, improvements in humanitarian access regularly accessed by international humanitarian partners as a con- have allowed the assessment teams for the Displacement Tracking sequence of the ongoing insecurity. They urgently require multi-sec- Matrix to expand the scope of the assessment in Borno State from /// toral humanitarian assistance and protection services. Many of these zero access in December 2014, to accessing 10 LGAs in December LGAs have not been accessed by humanitarian partners in over a year. 2015. These 10 LGAs are currently housing 67 percent of the total Understanding the needs of these people is often based on anecdotal information coming from recently displaced IDPs and government number of IDPs, and 79 percent of people displaced by the fighting. agencies. There are reports of a dire humanitarian situation in many Also, civil-military coordination has been boosted with the location of these areas, with malnutrition, food insecurity and negative coping by the UN of a Civil-Military Coordination Officer to Maiduguri strategies widely reported. in 2016. VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 19 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA TABLE 2 Main factors of the conflict in North-East Nigeria, by type and field Structural / Root Factors Intermediate/ Proxy Factors Triggers Crisis Dynamics Social Poor social and economic Declining trust and eroded social Social polarization; openness to Changing gender and outcomes (poverty, health, cohesion; political manipulation radicalisation; revenge. intergenerational relations; sexual nutrition employment); high of society and patronage. and gender-based violence; inequality; perceived social displacement; inter-communal injustice; lack of social service violence. provision. Political / Governance Elite political settlement excluding Accusations of corruption and Parties take to the street in the Fractured social contract; majority; historic marginalization impunity; non-State actors fill absence of effective or trusted lack of transparency and poor of North-East as a region; governance and service void channels for re-dress, justice, or accountability creates a spiral of poor performance of government (e.g. community and religious political change. violence. institutions; associations); traditional low accountability and legitimacy institutions eroded. of State. Security Low levels of human security as a Supply of unemployed and Unlawful acts by State and non- Excessive use of force by elements result of poorly performing State disaffected youth, proliferation State actors; Human rights and of the security establishment security services; porous borders in of arms create conditions for humanitarian law violations drive legitimizing rebellion, vigilante an insecure wider region. recruitment and growth of armed sense of injustice and persecution. groups (Civilian JTF) fill security groups and criminal opportunism. vacuum with mixed consequences. Economic Lack of economic infrastructure, Lack of jobs and opportunity; Collapse of Northern Nigeria Military expenditures thwart access to markets, and effective large population of unemployed industrial base; recruitment of development spending; Low policies to support agriculture and and poorly skilled youth. armed fighters from labour force human development outcomes industry; high levels and poverty incentivizes violence. heighten risk of ongoing or and food insecurity. renewed conflict. Cultural / Ideological Religion as source of political Political manipulation of religion; Escalating conflict (widening Religious factionalism legitimacy; History of (sometimes sharia implementation results in targets; suicide attacks). and competition; rise and violent) religious radicalism disillusion. internationalization of conflict. challenging the State. Environmental Climate change and Lack of demarcated grazing lands, Competition over land and Lack of effective natural resources environmental degradation: cattle routes and water sources for natural resources, especially and conflict management. drought, desertification, livestock, agriculture and fisheries. between agriculturalists and contraction of Lake Chad Basin. pastoralists. Logistical developments saw the establishment of a regular United unforeseen, incidents which provoke violence. Table 2 groups these Nations Humanitarian Air Services (UNHAS) flight service, which factors contributing to conflict in the North-East into six broad cate- now provides rapid and efficient access to areas in the North-East, gories and summarises some of the dynamics arising from them. Key which would have entailed a two-day journey by road. points for each category of driver are also touched on below. A context of underdevelopment and inequality: Despite its status as 2.4. Factors behind the Crisis /// /// the economic giant of Africa, social and economic indicators in Ni- 17 As in other complex crises, there are many factors contributing to /// geria are very low, and those in its North-East region are generally the the conflict in the North-East. Structural factors, such as economic /// poorest. The country ranks 152 out of 187 in the Human Develop- and political marginalisation, poverty and poor governance, can cre- ment Index (HDI), which is well below the average for sub-Saharan ate conditions for the emergence of crisis, by stoking frustration and Africa. The country has a quarter of the continent’s extreme poor, and a sense of injustice. Intermediate factors may exacerbate structural comes third internationally, after India and China. Nigeria now has factors over the medium term, while triggers are short term, perhaps 10 percent of the world’s out-of-school children, 10 percent of the 20 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 02 : CONTEXT ANALYSIS world’s child and maternal deaths, and 25 percent of global malarial (CJTF) by the government, expressly or tacitly, to enforce local level cases. Nationally, 33 percent of the population is below the pover- security, has been problematic with human rights abuses attributed ty line, while in the North-East, the figure is 50 percent, increasing to them. Boko Haram continues to spread violence and insecurity between 2012 and 2013. Access to education is also very low with 18 throughout the region through sustained attacks on soft targets, such 52 percent of children being out of school in the region. Of those as markets, using girls in particular as suicide bombers. Their “hit who attend school, 72 percent are unable to read upon completion of and run” attacks on settlements including those of returnees exacer- grade six. In Borno, with the lowest rates of any State in the country, bates challenges of recovery and return. Boko Haram related conflict only 35 percent of female and 46 percent of male adolescents are and military response by the Nigerian armed forces and other armed literate (compared to 98 percent for both genders in Imo State in the groups has severely affected civilians, particularly vulnerable groups. South-East). Under-five mortality rates in the North-East are as high as 160 deaths per 1,000. Economic development: Economic infrastructure in the North-East /// /// is limited, and the industrial base of Northern Nigeria (mostly locat- Governance and political conditions: Weak governance is a cause of /// /// ed outside the North-East regional zone in Kano and Kaduna) has poor development outcomes, a driver of conflict, and a constraint largely collapsed in recent decades. Rural livelihoods in agriculture, on effective responses to both conflict and displacement. Financial pastoralism, and fisheries have been badly eroded as a result of a com- mismanagement undermines the effectiveness of policy and program bination of limited government support, poor management, and lim- implementation, and deprives citizens of access to essential services. ited access to new technology and inputs. The lack of employment For example, about 40 percent of people surveyed claim that they and livelihood opportunities, in particular for young people, is one of have had to pay a bribe to enrol their children in school or get med- the major causes of frustration and discontent with government, and ical attention in health facilities. North-East States, given their weak a possible ‘push factor’ in the incitement of individuals to violence. economies and conflict-generated disruptions to economic activities, tend to have few means of generating internal revenue, and are thus Culture and ideology: For centuries, religion has been central to the /// /// particularly dependent upon transfers from the centre. States have identity of the State in Northern Nigeria. As with many other sources wide responsibilities in the fields of service delivery, including educa- of identity, religion has been mobilised at times as a source to gain tion, health, and infrastructure. At the state level, political power is political legitimacy. Manipulation and exploitation of religious fault effectively centralised in the hands of governors, with weak account- lines for political purposes, such as provoking conflicting views over ability and very low capacity and autonomy at the LGA level. Gov- the imposition of sharia law, have been used as ploys to divert atten- ernment performance, in terms of governance and service delivery, is tion from issues such as inadequacies in governance and financial mis- uneven among states. The Northern Governors’ Forum fosters policy management. This is one of the key factors contributing to the rise dialogue across Northern States and can contribute to emulation of of radicalisation and violent extremism in North-East Nigeria among good practices and successful initiatives. Traditional institutions and numerous other underlying causes and trigger factors, including the local associations have demonstrated resilience and managed to up- rise of international networks of extremists. Attacks have increasingly hold and promote social solidarity within local communities, while shifted from purely religion-based targeting to a general proliferation providing local-level conflict resolution and other services. These in- of targets irrespective of religion. Changes in social values and erosion stitutions are, however, affected directly by the hostilities as well as of moral standards have been reported as a consequence, with eco- being subject to less inclusive cultural norms (notably the low levels nomic standing and wherewithal replacing education and honesty as of women’s representation), and the long-term erosion of their legiti- social merits, leading to a rise in politically-connected criminal activi- macy through the politicization of traditional authority. ty, and a general societal disdain towards the rule of law. Security: Low levels of human security in North-East Nigeria are both /// /// Environmental challenges: The natural environment in North-East /// /// a cause and an effect of the conflict. Military intervention has been Nigeria is fragile, especially in the area immediately surrounding Lake the dominant response of the government to Boko Haram with alle- Chad. This fragility undermines food security and drives environ- gations of violations of international human rights and internation- mental out-migration. Climate and weather variability play a part in al humanitarian law. The alleged use of the civilian joint task force this environmental degradation, exacerbated by man-made stressors VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 21 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA such as irrigation and dam construction. For herders and pastoral- humanitarian assistance.19 The unfolding situation in the region will ists, the scarcity of surface water has added to the difficulties of wa- further exacerbate the pre-existing conditions of poverty and devel- tering animals, causing them to encroach on agricultural resources. opment deficit. Meanwhile, agriculture has expanded into areas previously used for grazing, rendering the remaining herding sites increasingly exposed to Conflict-related psychological trauma is widespread, while mental /// overgrazing. In addition, the reduction in the size of Lake Chad and health services are limited. Psycho-social support and mental health /// associated water-flow reduction have had considerable negative im- interventions are needed, including special care for survivors of SGBV pacts on small-scale fishing throughout the Basin. Overall, the diverse and child abuse and children who have be retained by armed groups. and interdependent livelihood systems that make up the productive There are only three mental health facilities in the region and no sector in the Lake Chad Basin are faced with increasingly inadequate referral mechanism to link the affected population to these facilities, supplies of water and are therefore under strain. and there are insufficient free-of-charge psychotropic drugs available. 20 Such widespread psycho-social needs, especially when left unad- These categories of drivers combine to create conditions for the /// emergence and spread of conflict. The circumstances and motiva- /// dressed, can have serious impacts on health, wellbeing, employability, tions leading to participation in Boko Haram related conflict vary and the emergence of new patterns of violence, including domestic considerably between individuals. ‘Pull factors’ may be ideological, or violence and SGBV, long after the current conflict ends. material; recruitment may also be the direct result of coercion. With the intensification of conflict, the prevalence of SGBV has /// escalated dramatically in the North-East. Women and girls are vul- /// 2.5. Dynamics of the Conflict nerable to rape, exploitation, and forced marriage due to the conflict and resulting displacement, adding to already high rates of domes- One of the furthest-reaching effects of the conflict is the vast scale tic violence and early marriage. Women and girls abducted by Boko /// of forced displacement that it has caused, ranking Nigeria as the Haram (estimated to be at least 2,000) are often raped, forced into country with the third largest number of IDPs in the world, after marriage/labour/religious conversion, physically/sexually/emotional- Syria and Colombia. As government military operations intensified /// ly abused and are highly vulnerable, exposed to sexually transmitted in 2015 and Boko Haram fighters were pushed out of towns and into rural areas, displacement increased further and food production diseases, and often impregnated by their captors.20 was disrupted. IDPs face challenges in accessing basic services and The current conflict and displacement, combined with longer-term /// humanitarian assistance in most areas. Forced displacement creates social processes, have undermined gender norms and child rights a range of serious secondary effects, including physical and psycho- and created a power shift between generations. Conflict and dis- logical trauma, and social and economic hardship, as well as the /// placement have broken communities and families, throwing up large conditions for possible radicalisation and polarisation. Displacement numbers of unconventional households (e.g. headed by women, exacerbates the already existing conditions of poverty and depriva- children, or the elderly). There are serious implications for future tion and its effects are felt not only by the displaced themselves, but stability as the human capital of upcoming generations is compro- also in the communities in which they take refuge. Some 92 percent mised. North-East Nigeria faces an emergency in terms of access to of those displaced by the armed conflict have been taken in by host communities who share space, resources, and services with them, all education, where 600 teachers have been murdered, 19,000 teachers of which are generally already overstretched and increasingly under displaced, and 1,200 schools damaged or destroyed. This has resulted severe strain. The economic dislocation caused by the fighting adds in 600,000 children losing access to learning since 2013. In IDPs further to hardship. Most IDPs remain in Borno (67 percent), fol- camps, 75 percent of children do not attend school. In host com- lowed by Adamawa and Yobe (six percent each). It is estimated that munities where as many as 92 percent of the displaced have found an additional three million people remain trapped in insecure areas. refuge, already thin educational resources are being stretched even They may also be displaced and when the area they are trapped in further. Currently, 1.4 million IDP children urgently require child becomes secure they may also move to urban areas to seek immediate protection services.20 22 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 02 : CONTEXT ANALYSIS Social cohesion has been deeply affected by the Boko Haram con- /// 2.6. Emerging Risks and Scenarios for flict in the North-East. The wide geographical spread and high levels RPBA Implementation /// of conflict, combined with the limited effectiveness of formal and informal mechanisms to prevent and contain violence, have resulted Due to the fluid nature of the conflict situation at present, three /// in widespread levels of suspicion, mistrust, and stigmatisation along possible scenarios have been considered in the RPBA. The actions ethnic, religious, political and geographical lines. The social fabric /// set out in the RPBA are based on the assumption that the situation in the North-East has been deeply damaged, eroding social relations will stabilise over the next 2-4 years, but this will vary from state to between citizens and government, ethnic clans, communities and state and community to community. Boko Haram has shown itself even extended families. Economic, ethnic, religious, political and geographical divisions have hardened, affecting the way in which any capable of adapting to adverse conditions, accessing diverse resourc- recovery effort is perceived. Restoring social cohesion and trust is the es, and switching tactics. While its relatively brief period of holding most critical precondition to recovery and peace building, but also territory in 2014-2015 may be over, Boko Haram has nevertheless the most difficult, given the deep impact of the conflict. Any type demonstrated its capacity to revert to asymmetrical tactics (waves of of recovery and stability intervention needs to be designed with due suicide bombers and Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks) to consideration of its impact on social cohesion and trust. continue perpetrating conflict in Nigeria and to regroup in neigh- bouring countries, in particular Cameroon. The future course of the More generally, the repeated but unpredictable incidences of vi- /// conflict will be a major factor affecting the scope for reconstruction olence have led to fragmentation along religious, ethnic, or other cultural fault lines. The authority of traditional institutions and com- /// and peace building, and vice versa, the scope of reconstruction and munity-level conflict management mechanisms (such as Local Gov- peace building will be a major factor affecting the future course of the ernment councils, local courts, and religious institutions) has been prevailing conflict. In considering the scenarios, it should be borne in eroded. As security is restored and communities are resettled, it will mind that the situation is by its nature unstable and unpredictable, be essential to address the capacity gaps of these institutions. and that there is likely to be marked variation in conditions between VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 23 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA and across states and LGAs. The three scenarios considered in this Scenario 3) Worst-Case Scenario: Boko Haram is resurgent as the /// /// assessment process are explained below. government is unable to address weaknesses in its response to the conflict. A heavy-handed military approach, coupled with weak and Scenario 1) Status Quo: Boko Haram retains the ability to periodi- uncoordinated political measures among stakeholders at the Federal, /// /// cally stage attacks in the North-East and occasionally further south or State and Local levels produces further disillusionment from which Abuja. While return of IDPs and reconstruction are possible in some Boko Haram benefits. The government again loses control of parts areas, the threat and reality of local attacks continue to undermine of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa, which is where Boko Haram targets the revival of agriculture and economic life, and the establishment areas of Nigeria further to the south, while a vicious cycle of securi- of a stable peace. Urban areas are likely to be more secure than ru- ty, economic, social, and political, and international factors lead to ral ones, despite the likelihood of continued bombings. Pressure on a descent into chronic violence. Operationally, insecurity will both ** ** IDPs might be brought by the government to encourage returns be- make physical reconstruction impossible and further exacerbate social fore security can be assured. Significantly, this scenario is not a stable tensions at all levels. Displacement will increase and become chronic, one, since it is relatively easy for Boko Haram to regroup and adapt. and humanitarian needs would predominate. Hence, in the absence of concerted success on the part of the gov- ernment, the tendency may be for this scenario to deteriorate into The RPBA has generally and consistently applied the Status Quo /// the worst-case scenario. Operationally, the security situation would ** ** Scenario for the development of the needs analyse and recovery constrain the re-establishment of infrastructure, social services, and strategies. However, the recovery and implementation strategies pro- /// production, especially in rural areas, and necessitate a flexible and co- posed in the this assessment also remain cognisant of the risks faced ordinated approach by RPBA and others to respond to unpredictable in the potential unfolding of the worst-case scenario. The incremental threats. Displacement would continue. There will be limited scope implementation approach would allow the recovery and peace build- for reconciliation. ing process to build upon potential opportunities that may manifest in the eventual and desirable realisation of the best-case scenario. Scenario 2) Best-Case Scenario: Working with international and /// /// regional partners, through military means coupled with successful Government and/or State level negotiations/peace talks with Boko Haram, and increased attention to addressing the underlying socio- economic factors of the Boko Haram conflict, the government is able to limit the frequency, intensity and scope of attacks in the North- East. Such improved military and political performance on the part of the government would promote trust in the eyes of communities, including elements that may have previously been sympathetic to Boko Haram. The level of success of this enterprise will determine the geographical areas in which return and resettlement, recovery and peace building efforts can be pursued in a sustained way. This could result in large parts of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa being accessible for reconstruction and development interventions and the restoration of economic activities, creating a positive cycle of development which would augment stability and security. Operationally, this scenario ** ** provides favourable conditions for the implementation of the RPBA, wider recovery, and a positive spiral of development, reconstruction, peace building, and return and resettlement of the displaced. The challenging but essential tasks of reconciliation and reintegration will be a priority. 24 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 03 : A FRAMEWORK FOR RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING PRIORITIES CHAPTER 3 A Framework for Recovery and Peace Building Priorities This chapter provides guidance for identifying the overarching /// objectives and strategic outcomes to be pursued over a period of four years. A clear distinction is made between this four-year period and /// the longer-term development agenda. Strategic guidance is provided for implementing stabilisation and recovery interventions in an integrated, sequenced, and incremental manner. Interventions will be determined on a case-by-case basis by the specific conditions and capacity of the six States, respective LGAs and Wards, including the prevailing security environment. 3.1. Humanitarian Context cially relevant with regards to the early recovery interventions undertaken wherever possible by the humanitarian actors as an integral part of their The RPBA confirmed that humanitarian assistance would need to be response to the crisis. Returns organised too early may only postpone /// provided and be scaled up during the forthcoming period. Indeed, de- the start-up of early recovery interventions, increase the suffering of the /// spite all the efforts currently displayed by national authorities with the people involved and consequently extend the scope and cost of recovery support of local and international humanitarian actors, much still needs to be done to cater for the basic human needs of the displaced popula- needs (please refer to Box 3: Benchmarks for the Safe, Voluntary and tions and hosting communities alike, until the security situation allows Dignified Return of Displaced Populations). It is crucial that there is ro- for the commencement of recovery interventions. The impact of the bust engagement with existing coordination mechanisms to ensure that: Boko Haram conflict on IDPs, on communities currently hosting IDPs, (a) The Humanitarian Civilian and Military Coordination (CM-CO- and on communities that will be receiving them, has only exacerbated the ORD) mechanism is regularly consulted to understand in real time dire situation these populations were already facing before, overstretching their already limited incomes, resources and assets, and the capacities of the progress made for accessing wards, LGAs and states; the existing social service delivery systems. Moreover, new displacements (b) A smooth and gradual transition is in place to ensure an effective and of populations have been reported following the regular attacks conduct- efficient link between humanitarian interventions, including early re- ed by Boko Haram and the ongoing military operations. covery response and recovery interventions; The Recovery and Peace Building Strategy (RPBS) will therefore need /// (c) The incremental added value between recovery and humanitarian to be closely coordinated with the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) interventions effectively contributes to the human security of the af- in order to build on its achievements and avoid overlaps. This is espe- /// fected populations on the ground. VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 25 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA 3.2. Basic Principles and Values for Involving civil society and private sector in the recovery effort and /// decision-making: CSOs, including youth organisations, women’s Recovery and Peace Building /// groups, faith based organisations, cultural and traditional groups, and the private sector are important actors, who have the ability to The RPBA process offers an opportunity to galvanize a collective mo- /// mobilise sizable funding and social capital, and can often be sources mentum towards peace and stability: Restoring social cohesion and trust /// of valuable expertise. CSOs often have well-cultivated links to the is the most critical precondition to recovery and peace building, but also affected communities that can prove valuable in project implementa- the most difficult, given the deep impact of the conflict. Hence, any type tion. Creating space for CSOs and the private sector will foster a more of recovery and stability activity should carefully assess and take on board inclusive and locally-owned recovery process, and bring in expert re- its impact on social cohesion and trust across different social groups and sources to help guide the recovery process. This may also include cre- between the State and the citizens. The strategy could bring together gov- ating, or building upon forums already established, for involving civil ernment, civil society, and the private sector around a set of common society, technical institutions, academia, private sector and affected principles and objectives towards peace and stability. The strategy will communities. Such forums can play a significant role in facilitating promote a cohesive approach that mobilises renewed efforts on the part community dialogue, consensus-building, and strengthening own- of the government and civil society to form a new, stronger partnership, ership of sector recovery programs at all levels. They also facilitate promoting trust and reducing the underlying drivers of the current crisis. the direct involvement of community stakeholders, including women and youth groups in recovery planning and programmes. Humanitarian principles, standards and values must be upheld and im- /// plemented: Nigeria adheres to the African Union Convention for the /// Building back better and smarter: In view of the economic and social /// /// Protection and Assistance of IDPs in Africa, known as the Kampala Con- situation in the North-East, the recovery and peace building process vention. The Kampala Convention provides standards to governments will not just aim to restore the physical, productive and human assets to protect the rights and well-being of people forced to flee their homes to the status quo situation that prevailed before the crisis. The RPBS will be guided by the imperative of going beyond the ex-ante crisis due to conflict, violence, natural disasters and human rights abuses. The situation (or baseline scenario), in order to address some of the under- international partners of the RPBA welcome the recent efforts initiated lying drivers of the crisis. By building resilience into the recovery and by the Government aiming at legally protecting the rights of IDPs, and peace building efforts, other potential shocks such as climate change, are committed to advocate, together with the humanitarian community, natural disasters, health, nutrition and economic crises will also be the ratification of the Kampala Convention in the national laws. considered.21 Human rights: Will be upheld throughout the implementation of the Targeting the most vulnerable segments of affected populations and /// /// /// RPBS, and beyond. Likewise, the pride, dignity, and resilience of the af- using a bottom-up approach: Attention will be given to the specific /// fected populations should be highlighted and traditional culture, values needs of the most vulnerable segments of the affected population: and practices should be respected. women, youth, widows, elderly and people living with disability who have found their situations exacerbated by the crisis. While youth is National leadership and ownership: The process will rely on the demon- a driver of development and progress in the North-East, some youth /// /// strated leadership of the Government of Nigeria at Federal, State and may be most inclined to join Boko Haram sympathizers and require LGA levels, and that of national institutions and organisations, including hands-on support. A bottom-up approach is required to support in- civil society, religious and traditional leadership structures and the pri- dividuals and communities in recovery and rebuilding in accordance vate sector. The Government of Nigeria has the ultimate responsibility to with their own priorities, within certain guidelines. Cash support for ensure successful implementation and allocation of adequate resources. IDPs and host communities will be paramount, and finding an ap- Dedicated skills development initiatives will further enhance the absorp- propriate mechanism to channel funding down to the communities tive capacity of national organisations and institutions for engaging and that most need it in a transparent and fair way will be a key imple- coordinating non-state actors as well. mentation challenge. 26 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 03 : A FRAMEWORK FOR RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING PRIORITIES Conflict sensitivity: A conflict analysis was carried out to inform the /// /// Broad-based participation and effective communication: A transpar- /// /// development of the priorities and interventions recommended in the ent, consultative and participatory approach to the RPBA has been RPBA. This analysis, summarised in Chapter 2, will need to be reg- used both during the assessment and to validate the findings and recommendations. Consultations have been organised with a broad ularly updated in light of the evolving situation on the ground, to range of Federal, State and Local stakeholders (both governmental redirect or adjust priorities and interventions as may be needed. In and non-governmental, including the private sector) in the assess- order to avoid or mitigate the occurrence of new or existing crisis, ment of needs and definition of recovery and peace building prior- the response will address both the needs of the displaced populations ities. Clear and effective communications and grassroots outreach and those of the host and receiving communities. Sources of conflict have been a critical part of the assessment to ensure that progress is existing prior to the crisis will be given due consideration and be inte- effectively conveyed, findings and recommendations understood, and grated in the response in order to mitigate or reduce their occurrence. expectations managed. These principles should be thoroughly applied in the subsequent phases of the recovery programming and project development, in- cluding rigorous risk analysis. VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 27 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA BOX 2 3.3. Prioritising and Sequencing Do-No-Harm Approach Recovery and Peace Building Efforts While well intended, recovery efforts in conflict affected areas may end The prioritising of the recovery and peace building interventions /// up causing more harm than good, if conflict dynamics, local context, and will be carefully assessed on a continuous basis, and adjusted as need linkages among these and programming are not thoroughly understood, according to the prevailing situation on the ground and following /// and programming is not adapted to these realities.23 Ensuring that inter- the “Do-No-Harm” approach set out in Box 2. There is wide recog- ventions do-no-harm entails: nition that the military action led by Government (and by the sub-re- (a) Understanding the context of conflict: this includes the geograph- gional coalition) has improved the security situation, but this will not ic, demographic, cultural, ideological and institutional drivers of the suffice to further stabilise the North-East. Security incidents contin- conflict, and sources of social cohesion and resilience, and the way ue to occur on a regular basis albeit with different levels of intensity in which these factors relate to the proposed intervention. This in- across the North-East. At the national level a harmonised approach cludes the geographic and thematic areas covered by it, its target- will need to be developed that will include differentiated support in ing mechanisms, monitoring and evaluation, and grievance redress the six states, down to the LGA level. The main factors that will guide mechanisms. this differentiated approach include: (b) Identifying and analysing conflict triggers and conflict resolution (i) The volatile and unpredictable security situation in the North- mechanisms: this entails the identification of specific factors that East due to the asymmetric warfare that is being conducted by tend to trigger violence, as well as those mechanisms used to manage Boko Haram and their capacity to react to the government’s ef- tension when it arises. (c) Identifing and analysing the details of the proposed recovery pro- forts; gramme and its linkages with the context and conflict triggers. Pro- (ii) The level of effective access to LGAs and communities in the gramme details should be carefully identified, paying equal attention most affected areas and progress made over time with the gradu- to large and small programming details, as they all may impact the al and incremental implementation of interventions. success of the initiative. (iii) The extent of the physical damages and human impact in the (d) Analysing the assistance programme’s impact on the context of con- respective states and LGAs. The six states have been affected by flict by identifying the areas in which programme details and driv- the crisis in very different ways and at different levels of inten- ers/triggers/social cohesion and resilience sources/conflict resolution sity:22 mechanisms impact each other positively or negatively. This includes • Borno, the epicentre of the conflict, is the most directly af- not just technical aspects of the project, but also social perceptions by fected state, immediately followed by Yobe and Adamawa; the different stakeholders. Risks and adequate prevention/ mitigation • Bauchi, Gombe and Taraba can be considered at this stage as measures should be then identified, including communications strat- being stabilised to some extent, as they are affected mainly by egies that are sensitive to the context. receiving IDPs; (e) Revisiting programming options: Alternative programming options • The nature and extent of human and physical damages in should be identified if the risk analysis identifies elements of the re- the LGAs can differ significantly between states and within covery programme that has a negative impact on drivers/triggers/so- each state. cial cohesion and resilience sources/conflict resolution mechanisms, (iv) The careful monitoring of the “Do-No-Harm” principles will so as to mitigate conflict drivers and triggers and strengthen sources also guide the adjustment of priorities as needed. of social cohesion and resilience and conflict resolutions mechanisms. Therefore, careful sequencing of recovery and peace building in- /// (f) Adopting an iterative approach to programming design and im- terventions will be critical in view of the fluidity of the security plementation: testing, learning and adapting should be a continu- environment, and the marked variation within and among the six ous process in areas affected by conflict as conditions continuously states. In some areas, the context for implementation will be one of evolve. /// continuing insecurity, and a humanitarian response combined with 28 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 03 : A FRAMEWORK FOR RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING PRIORITIES stabilisation will likely continue to be a priority for a number of years. BOX 3 In other states the context will permit more substantial movement Benchmarks for the Safe, towards recovery and development. This implies: Voluntary and Dignified Return of (a) the need for rigorous ongoing security assessment at a local (like- Displaced Populations ly LGA) level, including the capacity of Local Governments to The following elements constitute a checklist of key considerations for contribute to enhancing and maintaining security conditions, by the safe, voluntary and dignified return of displaced populations, devel- bringing together a range of stakeholders including civil society oped by the Protection Sector Working Group in February 2016.24 and communities in this assessment; (b) the appropriate combination and sequencing of immediate short Safe Return: /// /// term support with medium term solutions; and • Physical safety, or the absence of threat to life, liberty and integ- ** ** (c) assessments of partners’ institutional capacity, particularly at rity of the person, including physical violence and verbal threats LGA level. and intimidation; freedom of movement; safe routes, housing and livelihood areas free of mines, booby-traps and unexploded ordi- nances. 3.4. An Integrated and Holistic Response • Legal safety, namely, the presence of adequate law enforcement ** ** Peace building, stability and social cohesion are the backbone of /// mechanisms and access to justice, particularly as regards recovery the assessment, and of the response. It is crucial to closely integrate /// of property and housing. • Material safety that is notably equal access in the early phases of peace building, stability and social cohesion interventions with other ** ** return to means of survival and basic services, such as potable wa- interventions aimed at the physical reconstruction or rehabilitation ter, food, housing, health and nutrition services. of social, physical and productive assets, or the resuscitation of live- lihoods opportunities on their own merits. Peace building, stability Voluntary Return: /// /// and social cohesion interventions will ensure the sustainability of re- • Absence of coercion: This includes not only direct coercion ** ** covery interventions on the ground and lay the foundation for human through, among others, physical force, harassment or intimida- security to prevail. They will be instrumental for allowing the affected tion; but also indirect coercion including the provision of erro- populations to start: neous information, and denial of basic services or closure of IDPs camps or facilities without an acceptable alternative. (i) feeling more confident and secure for returning home (or other • Clear expression: IDPs must express in a clear and unambiguous ** ** places); and way their willingness to return. In principle, the decision must be (ii) healing from the fear, physical and psychological trauma they individual. However, in many cases there may be a group-based have endured for several years now. Peace building and recovery decision-making process. Authorities must ensure that all groups interventions will need to be addressed at the same time and on have been consulted, and that options are available for those with a geographical basis across the three main components of the valid reasons not to return. response. Dignified Return: /// /// An integrated approach is key to ensuring a comprehensive and du- /// • Promote respectful treatment of IDPs by authorities and human- ** ** rable sectoral response. For example, the re-deployment of a suffi- /// itarian actors, through sensitisation programmes and trainings. cient number of skilled human resources (to be trained or retrained) • Ensure representation of IDPs groups in decision-making. ** ** that will manage the social delivery systems and their recurrent costs, • Conduct proper consultation with IDPs in all stages of the return ** ** need to go hand-in hand and be integrated at the outset when plan- process, considering different views. This would include an inten- tion survey that considers the obstacles for return and the condi- ning and implementing the physical reconstruction/rehabilitation/ tions IDPs would like to see improved before returning. equipment of the corresponding basic social infrastructure. VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 29 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA 3.5. Strategic Framework for Recovery TABLE 3 Strategic Recovery Framework and Peace Building The overall vision of this process is to provide a framework of /// support to assist conflict-affected people, and peace building and Vision Statement recovery in North-East Nigeria. Four key strategic objectives have /// Provide a framework for coordinated and been identified as necessary to achieve lasting peace and sustainable recovery: coherent provision of support to assist conflict- (1) Contribute to the safe, voluntary, and dignified return and re- affected people, peace building, and recovery settlement of displaced persons; in North-East Nigeria. (2) Improve human security, reconciliation, and violence preven- tion; Strategic indicators: (3) Enhance government accountability and citizen engagement in (1) Improved socio-economic resilience of communities affected by service delivery; conflict and forced displacement through the provision of inte- (4) Increase equity in the provision of basic services and employ- grated, holistic and sustainable solutions to needs and impacts ment opportunities. of the conflict. These strategic objectives have informed the development of a Stra- (2) Community security and social cohesion strengthened in com- /// tegic Recovery Framework presented below in Table 3, as well as munities reached by reconciliation, violence prevention and a more detailed Operational Framework for Recovery and Peace community security initiatives. Building, which can be found on page 67.25 The relationship be- (3) Social fabric in the North-East strengthened by building trust /// tween the strategic and operational recovery frameworks must be in government institutions through improved governance ca- clearly understood. The strategies and the broad strategic elements/ pacities, mechanisms and practices, and enhanced transparency, pillars required to achieve these objectives have been mapped against accountability and citizen engagement. specific outcomes in the Strategic Recovery Framework. This in turn (4) Reduced service delivery and livelihoods gaps between individu- has been translated into a much more detailed Operational Frame- als and communities affected by conflict and displacement and work for Recovery that maps all of the needs identified in the 18 sub- those not affected by them. component analyses against the same set of strategic outcomes. The Operational Framework also provides more granularity in terms of an indicative sequencing of these interventions across the stabilisation Process indicators: and recovery phases, as well as key indicators for measuring progress (1) Alignment between RPBA identified priorities and government and performance towards the achievement of these outcomes at the and partner programming. subcomponent level during the implementation phase. (2) Improved coordination and complementarity with humanitar- ian efforts. These frameworks will be further developed through more detailed (3) Strengthened national leadership and ownership. planning and programming during the post-RPBA phase, at Fed- (4) Enhanced participation and involvement of key actors including eral, State and LGA levels, and in close coordination with partners government, traditional and religious authorities, civil society and stakeholders. Chapter 5 proposes an Institutional Coordination and the private sector in recovery and peace building efforts. Framework, wherein clear roles and responsibilities are identified to (5) Effective targeting of the most vulnerable segments of the pop- ensure timely, efficient and effective implementation. ulation including IDPs and returnees, women, children, youth, elderly and people with disabilities. (6) Improved conflict sensitivity of operations. 30 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 03 : A FRAMEWORK FOR RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING PRIORITIES Objective: Contribute to the safe, voluntary, and dignified return and resettlement of displaced population Outcome Strategy Pillars of the strategy Urgent needs of displaced populations are met Risk analysis and rapid provision Food Assistance: of services to meet displaced (a) General food assistance for emergency and famine phases of food insecurity populations’ needs (b) Supplementary food assistance for most vulnerable for 4 months (c) Short-term food assistance (for 6 months) for less directly affected states Establish of temporary education space during reconstruction Provide solid waste management collection service to displaced populations Integrated and holistic approach to address Risk analysis, framework Establish a policy and operational framework to ensure safe and voluntary return and identified needs of displaced persons unable to and programs to ensure safe, resettlement of displaced persons, including the deployment of human right monitors and return, populations already returning, and host orderly and voluntary return or legal aid counsellors communities resettlement of displaced persons Support and strengthen broader access to basic needs at local level for newly displaced persons, and displaced population with no intention to return in short to medium term Provide psycho-social support to displaced persons, returnees, and host community members Develop livelihood initiatives for displaced persons, host communities, and those who stayed behind Provide compensation to service providers of displaced population, including hardship allowances for government employees returning to conflict-affected areas Support prevention of gender-based violence in host communities and camps Conflict prevention and mitigation training in host communities and camps Violence prevention programming Specific programming for people with disabilities, men, women and children Objective: Improved human security, reconciliation, and violence prevention Outcome Strategy Pillars of the strategy Physical security for both host communities and De-mining and mine awareness Reduce risks related to Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) displaced persons campaigns Develop mine action coordination mechanism Implment mine action emergency risk education campaign Conduct mine action integrated survey of hazardous areas with risk education and explosive ordnance disposal Conduct mine action victim assistance needs assessment and individual rehabilitation response VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 31 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA Outcome Strategy Pillars of the strategy Governments and communities are better Establishment of peace building Social fund for CSOs to support peace building equipped and more aware of peace building and funds; conduct community violence prevention measures trainings and awareness programs Community participation on security/small arms and light weapons (SALW); awareness and reduction in the North-East enhanced through provision of advocacy and sensitisation the dangers of SALWs Reconciliation, Peace Building and Countering Conflict Training Violence prevention programming Capacity building and development Justice, Community Security, and Control of Small Arms: of legislative frameworks for peace (a) training building and violence prevention (b) Information and Communication Technology (ICT) for case management (c) Model/pilot projects to promote model police stations and legal aid institutions Legal and regulatory frameworks required for sustained fight against SALW Programmes and facilities for de-radicalisation Capacity of security apparatus in the North-East strengthened through the provision of best practices in border security and stockpile management Reconciliation, Peace Building and Countering Conflict Training Violence prevention programming Sustainable reintegration Training and programs for Disarmament and reintegration technical assistance sustainable reintegration of defectors from all armed groups Assessments and studies: (a) Mapping of available trauma response services (b) Trauma Survey Micro-grants/credits for reconciliation, peace building, and countering violence Prevention and mitigation of SGBV Programs to address and prevent Further assessments and studies: SGBV (a) Study on SGBV (b) Initial needs assessment (c) Mapping of available services Train available mental and medical services personnel to address SGBV, and provide immediate attention to victims Establish sexual assault referral centres Create safe spaces and provide psycho-social support to victims Comprehensive planning for SGBV Comprehensive programming on SGBV, including immediate attention to victims of victims’ needs; strengthening legal SGBV, as well as prevention initiatives and social provisions for victims Legal and social protections for women and children affected by SGBV Specific programming for children borne out of conflict Psycho-social support is available for affected Capacity building of service Train service providers working among conflict-affected populations in psycho-social populations providers support and peace building Psycho-social support to populations exposed to high level of violence 32 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 03 : A FRAMEWORK FOR RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING PRIORITIES Objective: Enhanced government accountability and citizen engagement in service delivery Outcome Strategy Pillars of the strategy Government has strengthened capacity to Comprehensive capacity Capacity development programme for recovery and peace building effectively manage the recovery and peace development building process Promotion citizen engagement and strengthening accountability at local level Promotion of community radios and community outreach programmes fostering community engagement Communities are empowered to engage with Awareness raising and public Health risk mitigation awareness campaigns government campaigns for citizen engagement Water and sanitation promotion campaigns including distribution of information, education and communication (IEC) materials to the affected areas plus the host communities Outreach and advocacy to communities/civil society for enhanced community engagement Government engages with citizens Capacity development, and Develop capacity of School-Based Management Committees (SBMCs), e.g. to conduct technical assistance to community- enrolment drives, monitor enrolment based organisations Establish a community based grievance redress mechanism Strengthen systems at community level for improved management of water and sanitation facilities Form and train community based structures for implementation and monitoring of sanitation and hygiene promotion activities Establish and support community platforms Capacity building among Local governance and citizen engagement training for Local Governments Local and State Governments to strengthen participation, Local governance and citizen engagement, policy dialogue, and mentoring for State accountability and transparency in Governments their systems VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 33 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA Objective: Increased equity in the provision of basic services and employment opportunities Outcome Strategy Pillars of the strategy Basic service delivery infrastructure, equipment Planning for reconstruction Formulate debris management plans for each of the conflict affected states and systems are equitably accessible and Formulate state wide solid waste management plans operational Establish mechanism to implement the housing reconstruction programme through home owner driven processes Technical assistance for initial water and sanitation assessments, strategic planning and capacity building on project management Complete assessment of educational and vocational facilities damaged in six states Complete assessment of land resources for agricultural purposes (Re)construction/repair of Reconstruct and repair of agriculture and irrigation facilities service delivery infrastructure Reconstruct or rehabilitate, refurbish and re-equip of educational facilities Reconstruct electricity distribution substations Reconstruct electricity distribution lines Reconstruct electricity transmission substations Reconstruct electricity transmission lines Promote the use of renewable energy and off-grid access to energy for conflict affected communities Reconstruct or rehabilitate Primary Health Care facilities Reconstruct or rehabilitate referral facilities (secondary hospitals) Repair or reconstruct damaged houses Refurbish damaged infrastructure for telecommunication: mobile phone base stations and towers Repair and reconstruct public buildings Rehabilitate Federal roads, and State roads and bridges Repair, reconstruct and rehabilitate all damaged water facilities (hand pumps, motorised and solar powered) boreholes in communities and piped schemes in small towns and urban centres Repair, reconstruct and rehabilitate all damaged water facilities (hand pumps, motorised and solar powered) boreholes in public places (excluding schools and health facilities) Replacement/Rehabilitation of damaged sanitation infrastructure in public places (excluding schools and health facilities) Replacement of all damaged protected dug wells with hand pump boreholes Construct new water facilities (hand pumps, motorised and solar powered boreholes) and network extension in small towns and urban centres in affected areas as well as in select host communities Construct new water facilities (hand pumps, motorised and solar powered boreholes) and sanitation infrastructure in public places in the affected areas as well as in select host communities Onetime provision of water and sanitation equipment and logistics support (vehicles, office equipment, furniture, ICT infrastructure, etc.) Operational support for fuelling of water and sanitation vehicles, purchase of chemicals, working tools and office expendables Replacement of lost solid waste management infrastructure Replacement of community infrastructure, such as community buildings or small pathways or bridges Removal of debris/ensuring Clear debris from areas where it hampers access or reconstruction access Remove debris aggregations from areas of human settlement Recycle, reuse, or reprocess as much debris as possible, especially through sustainable small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) Safe disposal of unusable debris 34 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 03 : A FRAMEWORK FOR RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING PRIORITIES Outcome Strategy Pillars of the strategy Rehabilitation of existing Cash transfer/scholarship to address financial barriers to enrolment in educational institutions service delivery methods, and Increase availability and utilisation of essential health services including deliveries attended by skilled expansion of service delivery to personnel and increased coverage of immunisations meet crisis needs Restorate of health system functions: training of community health workers Restorate of government health sector early warning and response functions Expand coverage of the social protection measure of the forthcoming National Social Safety Nets Programme to unconditional top-up for first 2 years Provide social protection measures such as old age and disability allowance Targeted social protection subsidy of Community Bases Social Health Insurance Programme for children under 5, lactating mothers, and pregnant women Restore public transport Community led total sanitation approach in rural areas Capacity building of Social Protection institutions at the Local Government Establish / strengthen of water and sanitation institutions at the State and LGA level Reactivate Local Emergency Management Agencies (LEMAs) at local level Re-establish community infrastructure and non-formal services Equitable employment opportunities are Skills training to boost Public employment scheme as a social protection measure available and accessible in the North-East employment opportunities that meet crisis-related needs in the Labour force skills developed including: (a) rehabilitation of existing facilities and addition of North-East new facilities; (b) skill development training; and (c) skill development outreach using mobile teams Women and youth empowerment through skills training for employment including (a) professional skills trainings relevant to the communities; (b) adult literacy and continuing education; (c) life skills training/peace education; (d) distribute start-up kits; (e) identify employment; (f ) set up micro-enterprises; and (g) build up cooperatives Strengthen institutional capacity of state employment centres and related institutions Sector economic recovery Reinforce existing waste management and resource recovery livelihood sector to boost employment opportunities Private sector recovery including: (a) support to youth entrepreneurship including in the agro sector; (b) reopening of border stations; and (c) recovery of markets Increased access to financial services for micro, small, and medium enterprises Private sector recovery to create jobs in (a) formal private sector: small and medium enterprises; and (b) informal private sector: micro-enterprises Agriculture based Value Chains and agro processing centres established and strengthened. Develp and commercialise natural resource based and solid minerals value chains and enterprises for sustainable broad based local economic recovery Strengthen agriculture and irrigation related services value chains for increased food security and agricultural productivity Employ displaced persons in procurement of forthcoming national school feeding program VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 35 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA CHAPTER 4 Summary of Recovery and Peace Building Needs Building on the guiding principles laid out in the overall Strategic /// Recovery and Peace Building Framework in Chapter 3, this chapter summarises the impacts, needs and recovery and peace building requirements for the three components: (a) peace building, stability /// and social cohesion; (b) infrastructure and social services; and (c) economic recovery. Cross-cutting issues including gender, human rights, explosive remnants of war and youth are also discussed. For more depth see Volume II of the RPBA which contains detailed component reports. 4.1. Overview of Impacts, Needs, and The rapid deterioration of the conflict, and vacuum of law en- /// forcement mechanisms to contain and control conflict, resulted in Financial Requirements widespread levels of suspicion, mistrust and stigma along ethnic, The conflict in the North-East has had devastating impacts on the /// religious, political and geographical lines. The social fabric in the /// population. While the impact on the component peace building, sta- /// North-East was deeply damaged, eroding social relations between citizens and government, down to ethnic clans, communities and bility and social cohesion is hard to financially quantify, the crisis even extended families. Economic, ethnic, religious, political and has affected 14.8 million people and resulted in massive displacement geographical divisions have hardened, affecting the way in which within Nigeria and across the border to Chad, Niger, and Cameroon, any recovery effort is perceived, while new divisions have emerged. since 2009. By December 2015, the number of IDPs reached 1.8 mil- The sequentially overlapping phases of humanitarian, early recov- lion, of which nearly 80 percent were women, children, and youth. In ery and development assistance need to incorporate confidence and addition to the destruction of infrastructure and interruption of basic trust-building, collaboration and mutual understanding. Social im- services, the city of Maiduguri, with a 2007 resident population of pacts of efforts are central considerations in all proposed interven- 1.2 million, is hosting 1.6 million IDPs, with some sheltering in pub- tions in such a fragile social system. lic buildings and schools. During the conflict, more than 600 teachers were killed, 19,000 teachers displaced, and 1,200 schools destroyed.27 The impact of the fighting on infrastructure and service delivery is /// As the government regains control over some areas that were taken substantial. This assessment estimates nearly US$ 9 billion in dam- /// over by Boko Haram and the recovery process starts, signs of social ages across all six states. Two-thirds of the damages (US$ 5.9 billion) fragmentation, based on ethno-religious, social, and other divisions, are in Borno, the most affected State; damages in Adamawa and including between IDPs and hosts, are evident in some areas. Yobe account for US$ 1.6 billion and US$ 1.2 billion, respective- 36 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 04 : SUMMARY OF RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING NEEDS TABLE 4 Overall Recovery and Peace Building Needs by Component (US$ million) Federal/ Adamawa Borno Yobe Gombe Taraba Bauchi Regional3 Total Peace building and social cohesion 27.5 37.8 22.5 13.6 19.4 23.9 5.7 150.5 Infrastructure and social services 594.9 3933.3 668.3 129.1 144.9 202.9 94.7 6040.1 Economic Recovery 37.6 68.8 30.7 22.3 27.7 41.4 245 473.5 Total 660 4040 721.5 164.9 192 268.2 345.4 6664.1 ly. Three-quarters of the overall impacts are on agriculture (US$ 3.5 The total needs for recovery and peace building across the three /// billion) and housing (US$ 3.3 billion). The conflict resulted in more components in both the stabilisation and recovery phase is US$ 6.5 than 400,000 damaged and destroyed housing units, 95 percent of billion, of which Borno would require US$ 4 billion, Yobe, US$ 721 /// which are located in Borno. Also, private enterprises, transport, ener- million and Adamawa, US$ 660 million. Table 4 provides a summary of the needs across states and components. gy and water infrastructure, as well as health and education facilities were damaged or destroyed during the crisis. Interventions for Peace Building, Stability and Social Cohesion re- /// quire US$ 151 million for durable solutions. The approach ensures The Boko Haram conflict and insecurity has prevented households /// that the return and resettlement of displaced persons are voluntary /// from pursuing their livelihoods and regular economic activity. The and conducted in a secure and dignified manner.29 Further priorities /// crisis has further deteriorated the already weak economies of the include building trust within communities, among different groups, North-East. It is estimated that the region suffered from an accumu- and between citizens and government, as well as preventing conflict at lated output loss of US$ 8.3 billion between 2011 and 2015. Borno 26 community level by reducing violence in the context of Boko Haram suffered from the largest loss as State output fell by US$ 3.5 billion hostilities. For a sustainable stabilisation and recovery, it is crucial to between 2011 and 2015, while food prices rose by nearly 7.5 percent. increase access to effective justice and redress, and strengthen local 27 The combination of output loss and increase in prices implies a governance to support service delivery and accountability. Flexibility significant reduction in welfare of the people. During the crisis, pov- in implementation is important in response to changing circumstanc- es and to the scale of the challenge. erty rates rose from 47.3 percent in 2011, to 50.4 percent in 2013. Restrictions on food availability and access to farms and markets in The Infrastructure and Social Services interventions total US$ 6 /// Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe have generated a localised crisis of acute billion. This is mainly due to the high costs of infrastructure and /// food insecurity during the lean period. Food insecurity has increased building rehabilitation, and the needs for restoring basic services in drastically among IDPs, host communities and states most severly both areas directly affected by the conflict as well as those areas that affected by the conflict. have received a large influx of IDPs. The highest needs are for the reconstruction of houses (US$ 1.2 billion), followed by agriculture The recovery and peace building process requires a holistic ap- /// (US$ 881 million), and education (US$ 721 million). Infrastructure proach, which promotes peace, stability and social cohesion, address- /// sectors require US$ 1.2. billion for reconstruction, making up over es the rehabilitation of infrastructure and services, and also addresses 20 percent of the total needs. underlying macro-economic issues to overcome the nexus of insta- The overall estimated needs for Economic Recovery total US$ 473.5 /// bility, conflict and deteriorating development. Lessons from other million. Key interventions include the recovery of private sector and /// conflict and crisis contexts highlight that rebuilding trust and cohe- markets, reopening international borders, addressing long term cross sion are as essential as the restoration of services and reconstruction, cutting issues (finance and investment climate), developing youth economic revitalisation and rebuilding livelihoods. entrepreneurship, livelihood support and the provision and establish- VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 37 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA ment of a small grant funding programme coupled with initiatives ing school children and teachers: more than 600 teachers have been to strengthen business management skills and the diversification of killed, hundreds of pupils kidnapped or killed and over 1,200 schools employment opportunities. Strengthening the institutional capacity destroyed.30 Girls and young women have been kidnapped for sexual of State Employment Centres to implement skill training and job abuse and forced marriage. Men and young boys are often killed espe- placement initiatives would further support employment creation. cially when they refuse to join the group, with many reporting having witnessed mass murders of male family and community members.30 Mainstreamed across the three components, the RPBA addresses Trauma is widespread in the population. Forty-one percent of vul- /// four key cross-cutting issues: gender, human rights, explosive rem- nerable households surveyed in Borno had witnessed killing/violence. nants of war and youth. All interventions need to pay particular at- Children and adolescents suffer disproportionately from psycholog- /// tention to the specific position of women and girls. Other vulnerable ical trauma, are vulnerable to exploitation and abuse, and lack tools groups to focus on include unaccompanied and separated children with which to access support. (UASC), unemployed youth, child heads of household, elderly peo- ple and people with disabilities. Reconciliation and sustainable peace The number of IDPs has risen from 1.2 million people in Febru- /// can only be achieved through a human rights based comprehensive ary 2015 to an estimated 2.1 million people in December 2015, of response, which addresses the root causes of the conflict, as well as which 1.8 million are directly displaced by Boko Haram conflict its impact. A dedicated mine action programme with emergency risk and hostilities. Women, children, and the youth bear the brunt of /// education reaching all the population, especially those working in po- forced displacement, accounting for nearly 80 percent of affected tentially dangerous zones, is of utmost importance. populations. Of the 1.8 million identified IDPs nationally, 53 per- cent are women, and 57 percent are children (of which 28 percent 4.2. Peace Building, Stability, and are five or younger).30 Social Cohesion Borno, at the heart of the crisis, hosts 67 percent of all IDPs. The /// /// population of Maiduguri, the State’s capital, has more than doubled The peace building, stability and social cohesion component ad- due to displaced persons. The scale of displacement in other parts /// dresses four inter-linked sub-sectors: of Borno is unclear due to continuing instability and inaccessibility. /// (a) Safe and voluntary return and resettlement of displaced persons; Yobe and Adamawa also share large IDP burdens, hosting 130,000 (b) Reconciliation, peace building and community cohesion; and 136,000 respectively, or around 6 percent in each State. The (c) Local governance and citizen engagement; Displacement Tracking Matrix VII reported that 94 percent of IDPs (d) Community security, justice, human rights, mine action small expressed the intention to return, but conditions are not yet in place arms control. that would allow them to do so. The majority of IDPs live in host Rebuilding trust and cohesion are as essential as restoration of /// communities with only 8.5 percent in camps and camp-like sites. Al- services and reconstruction, economic revitalisation, and building ready poor, host communities have been sharing resources with IDPs livelihoods. Lessons from other conflict and crisis contexts highlight /// for over 24 months with little external support, and are now reliant the importance of rapidly addressing relationship and trust building, on negative coping strategies. reconciliation, peace, access to justice, citizen participation, citizen se- Displacement has affected every aspect of people’s lives. Individuals curity, and psycho-social recovery as these are fundamental elements /// /// and families fled from conflict and lost all their productive assets, of a sustainable recovery and peace building process. homes, and possessions, relegating many of them into extreme pov- erty overnight. Traditional livelihoods have been destroyed, render- 4.2.1. Impacts of the Conflict on Peace Building, ing people food insecure and dependent on external support to cover Stability and Social Cohesion their needs. Services previously available in their places of origin are The population has been exposed to multiple forms of violence and /// also affected, shutting off and limiting access of entire communities human rights abuses, including extreme and barbaric violence per- to health, education, justice and other social services. In the process of petrated by Boko Haram. The group has targeted civilians, includ- /// 38 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 04 : SUMMARY OF RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING NEEDS displacement, families and communities became separated, severing In most of Borno, and in parts of Yobe and Adamawa, the majority /// crucial social ties and safety nets, all of this translating to an increased of police stations have been destroyed and officials have fled with level of vulnerability, particularly on the part of unaccompanied chil- the population to safe areas. This has resulted in a breakdown of /// dren, women heads of household, and older people. As entire com- security, law and order in some areas. The traditional authorities who munities have been displaced community social support was lost, would normally provide grievance redress to the majority of the pop- limiting the availability of coping mechanisms for affected people. ulation have been weakened due to a combination of being targeted by Boko Haram, decreasing legitimacy, and changing generational Displacement has also increased vulnerability in many ways, in- /// dynamics. This has led to an increase in recourse to violence when cluding to SGBV. There is evidence from humanitarian agencies that /// disputes arise, further intensifying the crisis. The already low quali- sexual abuse of women and children is widespread. There is little con- ty of local governance further deteriorated during the conflict. Boko crete data, as social stigmatisation hampers the reporting of SGBV; Haram has deliberately targeted public institutions and officials, in however, the National Demographic Health Survey in 2013 reported order to force out Local Government officials. that 30 percent of women said they had suffered from sexual abuse. Human rights violations have been committed on both sides of the Girls and women who have experienced sexual violence from Boko /// conflict. With violations by all sides going unreported or not fully ad- Haram members are stigmatised by their communities, especially /// dressed by State authorities, a climate of impunity may have been fos- when they become pregnant. In these situations, the mother and her tered. The proliferation of cheap and easily available small arms and children often become detached from their communities and fami- light weapons has fuelled the violence, while the presence of mines lies, putting them at further risk of poverty and abuse. Men and boys and undetonated explosives adds to the risks for the population. also confront a range of threats, including violence, abduction, forced Weak governance and the lack of provision of justice and security recruitment by Boko Haram and vigilante groups, and detention on by the State constrain effective responses for addressing violations of suspicion of militancy sympathies. international human rights and international humanitarian law, im- punity for the rule of law, armed conflict and displacement. Improv- Nigeria’s National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and ing governance and justice provision is therefore essential to address /// State Emergency Management Agencies (SEMAs) of the six affected immediate challenges and support the return of stability and peace. states have served as the coordination and response mechanism to provide life-saving support to IDPs. NEMA and SEMAs have also /// 4.2.2. Overview of Needs for Peace Building, coordinated responses across agencies and line ministries, clarifying Stability and Social Cohesion roles and responsibilities in the aftermath of the displacement crisis. The total needs for the peace building, stability and social cohesion /// Given the scope of the displacement crisis and understanding that /// component are estimated at US$ 151 million as shown in Table 5. /// Nigeria has not dealt with a displacement situation of this magni- Needs are greatest in the subcomponents of safe and voluntarily return tude in the past, the country should formulate a regulatory and pol- of IDPs (costing US$ 48.7 million) and local governance and citizen en- icy framework on forced displacement. Although a signatory coun- /// gagement (costing US$ 49.7 million). Critical needs for the safe and vol- try of the Kampala Convention, this legal framework has not been 32 untary return and resettlement of IDPs such as housing, service delivery domesticated and sanctioned in Nigeria. The magnitude of the crisis and economic activities are accounted for under the infrastructure and calls for coordination and accountability mechanisms that allow for social services and economic recovery components. Addressing the needs in a holistic and integrated manner is critical for success, and seen as a a comprehensive and holistic response to the specific needs and chal- precondition for stability and key for sustainable recovery. lenges of forcibly displaced populations. In the absence of this system, support would become scattered, roles and responsibilities diffused The situation in the North-East differs within and among the six States /// and lines of accountability too vague, putting most of the burden affected by the Boko Haram related crisis. Borno, along with parts of /// of displacement on host communities, increasing social tensions and Yobe and Adamawa, remains very seriously affected by insecurity, dis- deepening a sense of abandonment by the Government, undermining placement, and acute humanitarian needs. Borno State has the greatest peace and stability efforts. needs estimate for this component, amounting to US$ 37.8 million. VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 39 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA TABLE 5 Estimated Needs for Peace Building, Stability and Social Cohesion by State Adamawa Borno Yobe Gombe Taraba Bauchi Federal Total Safe and Voluntary Return of IDPs 9 11.3 7.5 5.2 7.1 8.6 0 48.7 Reconciliation, peace Building and Community Cohesion 3.7 4.7 3 1.9 2.8 3.5 0 19.5 Local Governance and Citizen Engagement 9.3 11.9 7.5 4.9 7.1 8.8 0.2 49.7 Community Security, Justice, Human Rights, Mine Action 5.6 9.8 4.6 1.7 2.5 3 5.6 32.6 and Small Arms Control Total 27.5 37.8 22.5 13.6 19.4 23.9 5.7 150.5 The recommended interventions under peace building, stability and /// the scale of the challenge is important. While more detailed assess- /// social cohesion lay the foundations for the effective implementation ments at sub-State level are needed to develop further disaggregated of sustainable recovery for all components. Many issues addressed in /// and targeted programmes, this should not diminish the urgency of the recommended interventions are preconditions for future stability. the response. Further analysis is to be the first step of implemen- Interventions are therefore closely interrelated in terms of both pri- tation. The phasing and prioritisation of interventions should also ority needs and timelines. Due to the rapid nature of this assessment consider: (a) the return patterns of IDPs; (b) approaches to working and the lack of quantitative data in some areas, the RPBA does not in highly insecure contexts; and (c) a tailored strategy for the cluster provide detailed location-specific analysis or recommendations. Gen- of States (i.e. Borno, Yobe and Adamawa; and Bauchi, Gombe and eral recommendations are made for conflict and displacement affect- Taraba), taking into account their specific needs. The principles of ed communities in the six states and at national level. This initial set engagement will remain the same, but the interventions will need to of recommendations needs to be complemented by a more detailed be demand driven. and targeted set of interventions designed on the basis of further and deeper analysis. As a general principle, the assessment adopts an integrated approach /// to recovery, in particular to address displacement and return needs, Specific measures that facilitate confidence and trust building can /// instead of the traditional sectoral approach. A gradual or incremen- /// be directly linked to community involvement in recovery measures. tal implementation strategy is recommended, taking into consider- /// The sequentially overlapping phases of humanitarian, early recovery ation the security situation, the extent of the human and physical and development assistance need to incorporate these principles. This damages faced by the population, and the specificities of each state. report identifies a number of priority interventions that would be- Table 6 provides a summary of the estimated needs and recommend- gin immediately and expand over the next four years. Recommenda- ed interventions. tions also reflect international experience, which demonstrates that there cannot be any meaningful or lasting peace or recovery without For the recommended interventions to be effective, local ownership /// addressing and resolving grievances and root causes of conflict via and community participation needs to be ensured throughout the a process that involve all affected groups. In addition, this cannot stabilisation and recovery process. Decisions on return and resettle- /// happen without a national policy framework that underpins regional ment need to be taken in close consultation with key stakeholders and local interventions. and beneficiaries. Given such an integrated, multi-stakeholder and A phased implementation strategy, divided into a stabilisation phase /// community-based approach, it will also be necessary from the outset and a recovery phase, forms the basis for peace building, but flexibil- to clarify the mandates of key actors and establish appropriate but ity in implementation in response to changing circumstances and to flexible mechanisms and processes. 40 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 04 : SUMMARY OF RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING NEEDS TABLE 6 Estimated Needs and Recommended Interventions for Peace Building, Stability and Social Cohesion Areas of intervention Recommended Interventions Cost Safe and Voluntary Return and • Develop and implement a policy and operational framework to determine how and when displaced persons can be 48.7 million Resettlement of Displaced Persons supported to return • Enhance institutional arrangements and apply and enforce existing international legal frameworks regarding safe, dignified Objectives: and voluntarily return and resettlement To meet the basic needs of displaced people and people unable to return • Develop a holistic, integrated programmatic approach targeting displaced persons and host communities concurrently to due to security constraints in the short- avoid new or recurring conflicts, including: to-medium term, while simultaneously • Broader access to basic needs and support of displaced persons providing holistic and integrated • Development and implementation of protection interventions, such as psycho-social support to affected populations support to people willing and able to and targeted provision of basic services to the most vulnerable return and resettle Integration of Mental Health and Psycho-social Support (MHPSS) into primary health care in order to enhance accessibility and opportune response • Strengthen prevention and response mechanisms in camps, camp-like settings and host communities ensuring services are provided in integrated manner • Livelihoods and skills initiatives and training • Implementation of tailored interventions to support unaccompanied and separated children (UASC) • Programs to address the needs of unattended elderly focusing on provision of care and livelihoods • Scale up existing livelihoods initiatives in camps, camp-like sites and host communities particularly those focused on vulnerable populations; Reconciliation, Peace building and • Training of key stakeholders (village leaders, religious leaders, teachers, etc.) in particular in areas with high numbers of 19.5 million Community Cohesion IDPs and where returns of displaced persons are likely • Technical assistance for implementation of ‘safe corridor’ policy, legal and policy frameworks and programmes for Objectives: reintegration of former Boko Haram members To promote peace building, social cohesion, truth and reconciliation, • Development and implementation of a communications strategy and outreach campaign aimed at local population and while working towards reduced potential Boko Haram members numbers of Boko Haram sympathizers/ • Comprehensive survey to determine the extent of trauma and establishment of specific psycho-social support programmes, members through demobilizing, dis- for children (including former child combatants), women, and youth arming, and reintegrating CJTF and • Support to civil society through capacity building and the establishment of a social fund for CSOs to contribute to peace vigilante groups building initiatives in the affected States • Prevention and mitigation of SGBV Local Governance and Citizen • Rapid needs assessment in settlements of IDPs, stakeholder mapping and building of a bottom-up planning model 49.7 million Engagement • Establishment of community platforms to identify community needs, grievances and security challenges at village level Objectives: • Capacity building for Local Governments on project implmentation including budgeting, planning, monitoring and To strengthen Local Government reporting, and on judicial and extra-judicial referrals (including to legal aid providers) and conflict resolution capacity, participation, accountability • Capacity building for local CSOs on community planning, independent monitoring of service delivery and recovery and transparency, improving local programme implementation, community-based targeting of beneficiaries for social protection programmes and for core democracy, and supporting the coordination groups on community mobilisation; return of displaced governments and • Mentoring and on-the-job training on revenue mobilisation IRG, PFM, accountability and transparency and policy governments hosting IDP communities implementation capacity (including targeting mechanisms for social protection) at Local Government levels • Support for political advocacy and policy dialogue between local stakeholders, including on anticorruption mechanisms Community Security, Justice, Human • Support to police (equipment, rehabilitation of police posts/offices, training) to strengthen and re-introduce policing in 32.6 million Rights, Mine Action and Small Arms areas of need, e.g. IDP camps Control • Strengthen justice systems through capacity building for judiciary, prosecutors and court staff, provision of materials (stationary, law books, forms, etc.) and establishment of mobile justice in locations without courtrooms Objectives: To re-establish security and rule of • Mine action, including emergency risk education, survey of hazardous areas and explosive ordnance disposal, assessment law, including the monitoring and of victim assistance needs and individual rehabilitation response punishment of human rights abuses, • Strengthen oversight bodies to monitor police, security forces and judicial conduct and to reduce risks of proliferation of • Capacity building for CSOs and community stakeholders on human rights and gender sensitive dispute resolution small arms and presence of mines • Strengthen traditional dispute resolution mechanisms and increase female participation in decision-making fora VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 41 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA Given that there is no indication that a peace process will take place /// The total impact of the conflict on infrastructure and social services /// in the immediate term, certain interventions will need to take place is estimated at US$ 9.2 billion. Three quarters of the damages are in /// within this framework. This includes the demobilisation, disarma- /// Borno (US$ 6.9 billion), the state most affected by the crisis, followed ment and reintegration of ex-combatants, and transitional justice sys- by Yobe (US$ 1.2 billion) and Adamawa (US$ 828 million). The im- tems. While not included here, these activities remain highly relevant pact on the other three states and at the federal level is less than three to the North-East context, and should be considered a priority should percent of the direct damages and impacts. Table 7 below provides a a formal peace process eventually take place. detailed overview of estimated damages to each sector by state. The impact varies substaintially across sectors the sectors. The most 4.3. Infrastructure and Social Services /// /// affected sectors were agriculture (US$ 3.7 billion) and housing (US$ The Infrastructure and Social Service Component estimates the /// 3.3 billion), which together account for three quarters of the overall impact of the crisis on physical infrastructure and social services impacts. The physical sectors account for 8 percent of damages, the as well as the corresponding recovery needs. The following sectors /// social sectors account for 42 percent, and the productive sectors ac- were considered: count for 50 percent of the damages. Below brief damage descriptions • Physical sectors: Energy, Environment, Information and Commu- are given for each sector. nication Technology, Transport • Social Sectors: Education, Health and Nutrition, Housing, Public Physical sectors: Energy; Environment; Information and Commu- /// /// ** Buildings, Social Protection, Water and Sanitation nication Technology (ICT); Transport ** • Productive Sectors: Agriculture, Private Enterprise • Energy: Transmission lines and the electricity distribution network ** ** The sustainable restoration and improvement of infrastructure and so- /// were in parts destroyed. cial services is crucial to stabilising livelihoods and economic recovery • Environment: The impact on the environment was mainly caused ** ** and is a prerequisite to create an environment for the return of those by damaged and destroyed solid waste collection facilities, the displaced. In addition to the ‘brick-and-mortar’ damage to infrastruc- burning of forests (including Sambisia forest), the impacts to wet- /// ture, the loss of equipment, the exodus of employees and a drop in staff lands and private orchards and the high use of natural resources capacity in the directly affected regions are challenges that need to be (including wood for fires) in areas of increased population density addressed. Ensuring provision of social services in indirectly affected areas is further complicated by the influx of displaced people. due to communities hosting IDPs. • ICT: Telecommunications infrastructure was heavily targeted, par- ** ** 4.3.1. Impacts of the crisis on infrastructure and ticularly base stations or base transceiver stations, used for creating social services a mobile phone network. Roughly 480 base stations, or 1.6 percent This section provides a summary of the direct and indirect impacts /// of stations, in the region have been reported as damaged. of the conflict in the different sectors, identified by representatives • Transport: Roads and bridges have been damaged extensively by ** ** of the Federal and State Governments and technical experts in early explosive devices, while the movement of military vehicles dam- 2016. The impact on the physical infrastructure and related social /// aged many roads. services can be divided into four broad categories: Social Sectors: Education; Health and Nutrition, Housing; Public /// /// ** (a) damages caused by armed conflict; Buildings; Social Protection; Water and Sanitation. ** (b) the loss of facilities; • Education: The conflict had a particularly high impact on the (c) damages to service provision and supply infrastructure that pre- ** ** vent services from reaching the affected population; and education and vocational system. Schools were damaged and de- (d) lack of human resources/staff since many have left the areas di- stroyed, teachers were threatened and in some cases killed, and rectly affected by the conflict, or have been killed as stated else- schools were transformed into shelter for IDPs. At least 50 schools where. in Borno State host IDPs. 42 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 04 : SUMMARY OF RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING NEEDS TABLE 7 Estimated damages related to Infrastructure and Social Services (US$ million) Adamawa Borno Yobe Gombe Taraba Bauchi Federal Total Physical Sectors Energy 31.9 16 4.3 7 129.5 188.7 Environment 1.2 2.9 0.6 0.2 0.8 <0.1 5.7 ICT 25.1 Transport 73.8 306.1 116.9 29 525.8 Social Sectors Education 58 143.8 47.3 2.1 10.2 11.6 273 Health/Nutrition 21.1 59 32.9 0.4 6.5 27.8 147.7 Housing 25.8 3179 118.3 2.9 2.8 1.2 3.329.9 Public Buildings 2.3 15.3 14.5 1.1 2.3 35.5 Social Protection N/A Water & Sanitation 7.3 35 3.6 46 Productive Sectors Agriculture 457.9 2377.7 868.7 4.9 12 7.6 3729.7 Private Enterprises 149.8 763.6 <0.1 2 <0.1 915.4 Total 828.9 6898.5 1207.2 42.5 39.2 50.5 129.5 9221.5 • Health and Nutrition: Health facilities have been systematically ** ** • Social Protection: Damages in this sector were measured in terms ** ** targeted, leading to damage and destruction of facilities. Out of of the households’ well-being, as no physical damage was incurred. 788 reportedly damaged facilities (including 21 hospitals), 45 per- Comparison of household characteristics pre- and post-crisis cent were destroyed. The already weak health infrastructure has showed that school attendance of children decreased, health expen- further deteriorated. In 2014, the North-East states recorded more diture per household increased, while food expenditure decreased. than 35,000 cholera cases. These negative developments cannot only be attributed to the cri- • Housing: The impacts on housing were substantial with 431,842 ** ** sis, as some of these indicators have worsened in the non-affected units fully destroyed (68 percent) or partially damaged (32 per- states as well. Nevertheless, one can confidently assume that the cent). Borno was particularly affected, accounting for 95 percent of crisis has had a negative impact on the well-being of the house- the damaged housing units. Damages were caused by bomb blasts, holds. shelling and fire. • Water and Sanitation: The conflict has seriously damaged water ** ** • Public Buildings: In the conflict affected areas, nearly 700 public ** ** and sanitation infrastructure. Additionally, the increase in popu- buildings were impacted by the conflict, of which 94 percent were lation in some areas due to inflow of IDPs has placed additional fully destroyed or dysfunctional. burden on already strained water and sanitation facilities. VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 43 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA Productive sectors: Agriculture and Private Enterprises /// /// ** ** All sectoral initiatives should be conceived, designed, and imple- /// • Agriculture: The impact on agriculture is estimated to be US$ 3.7 ** ** mented to strengthen social cohesion and resilience of conflict and billion, mainly affecting Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe. Impacts in- displacement affected communities. In the first instance interven- /// clude the destruction and loss of livestock, irrigation facilities, ma- tions should support displaced populations and their host commu- chinery, seeds, fertiliser, farm roads, offices, and veterinary health nities, better protect conflict-affected populations, promote reconcil- facilities. In addition, a large part of the population fled the area iation and strengthen community safety and access to justice where leaving their land fallow. Farm labourers were not able to work conditions allow. on fields, substantially reducing production and increasing food The intervention actions proposed under this component are briefly /// insecurity. described below and include important actions in the area of insti- /// • Private Enterprises: The commerce sector was particularly affected ** ** tutional capacity building and reform, transparency, and governance by the high number of damaged and destroyed businesses, estimat- of natural resources. ed at 1.3 million units, including mainly small shops, petrol pumps and other commerce infrastructure. Physical Sectors /// /// • Energy: Effective energy sector recovery is expected to constitute a 4.3.2 Strategic Approach for Infrastructure and ** ** complex mix of public sector–led implementation and regulation Social Services and facilitation of private sector recovery interventions. The guiding principles for prioritisation and phasing upon which • Environment: Removing hazardous waste, managing debris and /// ** ** the implementation of the infrastructure and social service recovery solid waste and restoring the natural environment require the col- is built include: lective efforts from Federal and State levels, together with commu- /// Securing areas that have been inaccessible: Reconstruction and re- /// /// nities and the private sector. State-specific solid waste management covery activities in conflict-affected areas require a careful approach plans should be formulated to identify the most effective approach with regard to the clearance of the remnants of war, such as unexplod- in dealing with solid waste, safe disposal, and recycling. Similarly, ed ordnances, mine removal, clearing of hazardous waste and debris specific debris management plans should be formulated. removal. Ensuring that these issues are taken care of by specialised • ICT: The availability and affordability of high-quality telecom ser- ** ** and certified entities before construction (e.g. of roads and bridges) vices, including broadband and mobile phone services, are seen as commences is crucial and a prerequisite for any intervention. a necessary precondition of economic development, job creation, recovery and peace building. Recovery of the ICT sector will re- Stabilisation: In the stabilisation phase, the focus will be on the re- /// /// quire strengthening the enabling environment and reconstructing construction of essential and basic infrastructure, health and educa- telecommunications infrastructure. tion facilities, while promoting farmer-driven recovery through the • Transport: The recovery strategy for the transport sector primar- ** ** provision of seeds and fertilizer, as well as homeowner-driven recon- ily aims to promote mobility of goods, services and people. The struction of houses for the most vulnerable population. This stabili- implementation of large transport infrastructure rehabilitation sation phase will also focus on restoring basic services and providing programmes requires the collaborative effort of State and Federal social safety nets. Government and dedicated institutions managing the design and implementation of these programmes. The reconstruction of criti- Recovery: In the recovery phase, the longer term recovery and recon- cal infrastructure, such as bridges and Federal roads would be given /// /// struction of infrastructure is envisaged including the reconstruction priority. of the transport network, irrigation and agricultural infrastructure, rolling out housing reconstruction through all areas, and rebuilding Social Sectors /// /// education and health facilities. The service provision in all sectors • Education: In order for the reconstruction and recovery of the ed- ** ** would be restored and public buildings reconstructed. ucation sector to occur as efficiently as possible, a concerted effort 44 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 04 : SUMMARY OF RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING NEEDS across Federal, State, and Local Government actors will be nec- ernment facilities should be restored at the earliest. The reconstruc- essary. School based management committees would be involved, tion of public buildings requires a two-phased approach, where with the participation of displaced population representatives to first the reconstruction policies and standards would be defined support the rehabilitation of the sector together with different ac- and build back better and smarter guidelines established; and then tors at State, including State Universal Basic Education Board, and the damaged administrative and police buildings reconstructed as Federal level, including Universal Basic Education Commission soon as possible. and NEMA (as they are supporting IDPs access to education). • Social Protection: In the crisis context, the programme would be ** ** • Health and Nutrition: The recovery strategy is composed of two ** ** paced giving priority to areas with a high number and influx of complementary approaches: ensuring access to essential health and displaced populations. It would be important to establish a clear nutrition services for target groups, and restoring critical health and transparent targeting mechanism to reach the most vulnerable system functions. Recovery planning for the public health sector population with clearly defined and transparent criteria for vul- needs to involve all Federal, State and local Government with the nerable groups, and to establish a workable identification mecha- State Primary Health Care Development Agency being central to nism. The institutional arrangements for establishing and scaling health and nutrition recovery efforts. Long-term reforms should be up of social protection programmes need to be carefully thought aligned with the Nigeria Health Strategy, with overall support for through, and should build upon the National Social Protection management, human resources and capacity development. Policy and related instruments. • Housing: The housing recovery strategy consists of repairing and ** ** • Water and Sanitation: Water and sanitation recovery needs entail ** ** rebuilding damaged and destroyed housing units. Considering the repair and rehabilitation of damaged water supply and sewage in- extent of the housing recovery needs and inadequate institutional frastructure, increasing the capacity of water supply and sewage capacity of states to design and implement the program, it is rec- systems to accommodate IDPs, and institutional support and ca- ommended the reconstruction needs should be phased at the level pacity development support. The different actors responsible for of different LGAs, based on impacts and social needs. The recon- water management at the policy level (Federal Ministry of Water struction should be designed in two stages, targeting first the 25 Resources), river basin level, Urban State Water Agencies (USWA) percent most vulnerable families and critical housing needs. as well as Rural and Small Town Water Supply and Sanitation • Public Buildings: In order to restore and improve the social con- ** ** Agencies, need to come together effectively restore the water sup- tract between the population and the government, damaged gov- ply and provide sanitation facilities in the affected areas. VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 45 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA FIGURE 5 Damages to Infrastructure (top); Infrastructure and Service Delivery Needs by sector (bottom) 3% 5% 5% 3% 6% 15% 12% 12% 20% 9% 10% 40% 10% 36% 10% 2% 1% 2% 6% 3% Physical Sectors Social Sectors Productive Sectors Energy Education Agriculture Environment Health & Nutrition ICT Private Housing Public Buildings Private Enterprise Transport Social Protection Water & Sanitation Productive Sectors /// /// 4.3.3. Overview of Needs and Financial • Agriculture: Successful rehabilitation of the agricultural production ** ** Requirements for Infrastructure and and of the value chain requires a community-led recovery involving Social Services the different ministries and agencies at Federal, State and Local levels This section provides an overview of the costed strategic options /// as well as farmer associations and irrigation water user associations. In and scenarios for recovery and reconstruction for the different sec- the stabilisation phase, support to food security, the provision of seeds tors. This includes a qualitative assessment of infrastructure, service and fertilisers, and emergency employment programmes especially for /// delivery, capacity and human development needs as well as quanti- youth will be important, while irrigation, veterinary clinics and exten- sion facilities would be addressed in the recovery phase. fication of resources required to reconstruct needed infrastructure and restore social services. Need estimations respond to the damages Community infrastructure and non-formal services are important for reported and also consider (a) the reconstruction of damaged infra- /// local communities, but it is challenging to make an exact estimation of needs. Therefore a contingency has been added to cater for community /// structure to improved standards; (b) restoration of service delivery infrastructure and non-formal services, which is particularly relevant for and the replacement of facilities; and (c) the provision of social ser- the education, health and nutrition, public buildings, transport and wa- vices to displaced persons. The needs are prioritised according to the ter and sanitation sectors. This accounts, for example, for non-formal or principles laid out in the RPBS. traditional education and schools as well as locally managed community infrastructure, such as community centres or local pathways, which are The key objective of ensuring the equitable delivery of infrastruc- /// not yet specified in the assessment. It also accounts for a security premi- ture and social services in conflict-affected areas has been incorpo- um, which, for example, relates to higher costs for construction material rated in various sector needs assessments. Further recommendations /// due to security premiums charged by traders. The contingency is estimat- to mainstream displacement issues in terms of recovery and peace ed as a ten percent premium over the above-mentioned sectors. building include the following: (a) ensuring schools, health care fa- 46 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 04 : SUMMARY OF RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING NEEDS TABLE 8 Estimated needs for infrastructure and social services (US$ million) Regional / Adamawa Borno Yobe Gombe Taraba Bauchi Federal Total Physical Sectors Energy 31.9 15.9 3.3 3.4 92.5 147 Environment 10.6 235.9 15.9 15.6 34.4 2.7 315.1 ICT 272.1 Public Buildings 40.3 295.9 22.7 2.7 5.8 6.7 374.1 Transport 74.5 337.5 126.7 37 575.8 Water & Sanitation 25.9 115.3 17.2 3 4.7 5.8 171.9 Social Sectors Education 83 513.6 77.1 6.8 17.4 23.5 721.4 Health & Nutrition 50.6 481.7 86.2 4 12.7 29.3 2.2 666.7 Private Housing 15.7 1097.4 46.6 1.8 2.2 0.7 1164.4 Social Protection 93.8 180.3 69.6 34.3 30.6 91.1 499.5 Productive Sectors Agriculture 141.1 485.4 170 18.5 29.7 36.6 881.4 Contingency Community Infrastructure 27.4 174.4 33 5.4 4.1 6.5 250.8 Total 594.9 3933.3 668.3 129.1 144.9 202.9 94.7 6040.1 cilities, water and sanitation systems are supported to accommodate mated US$ 6 billion. The highest needs arise for the reconstruction /// new demand associated with the presence of IDPs; (b) ensuring equal of houses (US$ 1.2 billion), followed by agriculture (US$ 881 mil- and adequate access by displaced population and host populations to lion), education (US$ 721 million), health (US$ 667 million) and rehabilitated services so as not to engender conflict between them; social protection (US$ 500 million). The physical sectors account for (c) involving both displaced persons and hosts communities in the 21 percent of needs, the social sectors account for 60 percent, and the process of identifying rehabilitation priorities in communities from productive sectors account for 18 percent. An additional contingency the beginning of the recovery process; (d) weighing-in displaced per- catering for community infrastructure and non-formal services has sons’ return options, surveying return intentions and needs in order been added, estimated at US$ 251 million. to prioritise the rehabilitation of infrastructure and social services that Nearly two-thirds (62 percent) of the needs are required for Bor- will enable and sustain return; and (e) employing displaced persons /// no, while the lesser affected states like Adamawa and Yobe still ac- and local vulnerable population skills in public works in the recov- count for 22 percent and 9 percent respectively. The states that were ery process. /// involved to a lesser extend in the conflict and are mainly affected Table 8 provides an overview of the recovery needs for the Infra- /// through their roles as hosts to the influx of IDPs account for just 4 structure and Social Services interventions, with the total an esti- percent of the needs. Less than 2 percent of needs are related to the VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 47 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA TABLE 9 Estimated Needs and Recommended Interventions for Infrastructure and Social Services Sectors Recommended Interventions Costs Physical Sectors Energy • Restoration of key transmission and distribution infrastructure in the most affected States (Borno, Taraba) 147.0 million • Restoration of medium and low voltage infrastructure in less affected States and subsequently in Borno and Taraba • Reconstruction of buildings related to the energy infrastructure • Provision of solar panels and diesel generators to overcome urgent energy shortages Environment • Safe removal of ERW, clean up of polluted areas and hazardous waste 315.1 million • Mine risk education, UXO disposal, State wide debris management plans need to be put in place • Debris clearing, transport, disposal, recycling • Rehabilitation of solid waste management infrastructure and provision of services for IDPs and host communities • Restoration of community wood lots • Extensive, long-term restoration of protected areas Information and • Refurbishment of damaged infrastructure for mobile phones base stations and towers 272.1 million Communication • Modernisation of weak and deteriorated mobile phone networks Technology Public Buildings • Reconstructing key government facilities, offices, and police stations across all affected States based on a build-back-better approach 374.1 million • Reconstruction of government facilities, such as post, election, and audit offices based on a build-back-better approach Transport • Clearing and controlling roads of mines and UXO 575.8 million • Reconstruction of destroyed and damaged bridges and trunk roads based on a building back-better approach • Reconstruction of damaged roads at State and Local Government level based on a build-back-better approach • Rehabilitation of public transport infrastructure (buses) in affected States and improvement of transport facilities for conflict and displacement affected areas Water and Sanitation • Recovery of water supply and sewage infrastructure in communities and institutions 172.9 million • Increasing capacity of water supply and sewage systems to accommodate displaced persons in host communities and return areas • Engaging displaced population in hygiene and health promotion • Capacity development and institutional support Social Sectors Health and Nutrition Ensuring access to essential services for target groups including IDPs, host and receiving communities 666.8 million • Restoration of critical (primary) health system functions • Provision of free health care services addressing maternal health, childhood diseases, nutrition, malaria prevention, and HIV/Aids • Upgrading existing health care facilities in areas with high IDP workload, upgrading existing structures to FMOH standards • Secondary referral structures as a priority for safe areas • Redeployment and training/retraining of sufficient health staff to manage health delivery systems Private Housing • Home owner driven reconstruction and rehabilitation of houses based on the build-back-better approach 1,164.4 million Social Protection • Expansion of the National Social Safety Nets Project to reach the 10 percent of the poorest households in the affected areas 499.5 million • Public employment scheme focusing on displaced persons, widows and stigmatized women, children heads of household and vulnerable population in host communities combined with cash assistance and support for school feeding programmes • Old age and disability allowance • Subsidy for community based social health insurance program, with specific access for lactating mothers, children under the age of five and pregnant women • Capacity building for policies and implementation 48 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 04 : SUMMARY OF RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING NEEDS Sectors Recommended Interventions Costs Productive Sectors Agriculture • Food security interventions across all States, with a particular focus on IDPs and host communities building upon ongoing 881.4 million humanitarian interventions • Clearing and preparation of farm land, support to herders, and provision of fodder through emergency employment programs, especially for at-risk youth • Capital support for rehabilitating irrigation infrastructure, earth dams, boreholes, buildings, and other agricultural infrastructure • Rehabilitation of veterinary clinics, extension services, and institutional infrastructure • Replacement of agricultural machinery and equipment • Technical assistance for extension services, facilitation of growth schemes, and capacity development • Support on land tenure issues, especially for returning IDPs who have abandoned their land due to the crisis Contingency Community • Contingency (10%) for community infrastructure, including non-formal services (such as non-formal or traditional education 250.8 million Infrastructure and Non systems) and security premiums in the education, health and nutrituion, public building, transport, and water sectors Formal Services Federal level, mostly related to the rehabilitation of key energy infra- ployment and/or enterprise recovery, which would be optimally structure. Table 9 provides an overview of the different recommended implemented over the next year. Track B would involve enterprise interventions by sector. development and support in rebuilding enterprises, which would be implemented over the short to medium term horizon. Finally, Track C would support policy formulation and implementation, which 4.4. Economic Recovery would take place in medium to long term horizon. The focus for the current programme is on Track A and Track B activities. 4.4.1. Introduction The Boko Haram related conflict and hostilities have negatively af- /// 4.4.2. Macroeconomic and Fiscal Impacts fected the productive capacity, employment and livelihoods of over Prior to 2010, the performance of the North-East economy contin- /// six million people in the North-East. The economy of the region has /// uously lagged behind the national average and has deteriorated fur- suffered as the output level plummeted, increasing prices and food ther between 2011 and 2015, as measured by GDP, inflation, and insecurity. The six states have been unevenly and differently affect- food prices. It is estimated that the region suffered an accumulated /// ed. Adamawa, Borno and Yobe have experienced significant physi- output loss of Naira 1.66 trillion (US$ 8.3 billion) Borno suffered cal destruction and massive movements of displaced persons, which from the largest loss as output fell by Naira 708.18 billion (US$ 3.54 undermined their local economies and livelihoods. Bauchi, Gombe billion). At the regional level, prices for all items rose by 5.4 percent and Taraba have been affected by the spillover of IDPs into their ad- annually during 2011-2015, while prices for food items rose by 7.5 ministrative boundary, which have imposed a large economic burden percent annually. Prices for food and for all items rose in four states, on the host state. except in Bauchi and Taraba.34 The combination of output loss and increase in prices implies a significant reduction in the welfare of res- The economic recovery interventions proposed include supporting: idents in the region. /// (a) livelihoods and employment; (b) private sector development, trade, and finance; (c) institutional capacity building for economic The conflict has severely affected food production and agricultural /// recovery strategy; and (d) skills development for economic recovery productivity, particularly in the hardest hit states of Borno, Yobe, strategy. Overall, livelihood activities will be implemented using a /// and Adamawa. The hostilities and conflict have resulted in numer- /// three-track approach with a differentiated time horizon. Track A 33 ous casualties and continued population displacements, preventing would consist of livelihood stabilisation, through emergency em- households from pursuing their typical livelihoods and interrupting VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 49 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA TABLE 10 Macroeconomic impacts by State Adamawa Bauchi Borno Gombe Taraba Yobe Region GDP - Estimated Loss for 2011-2015 -314 -86.3 -708.2 -280.9 -49.1 -222.3 -1660.8 (Naira billion) Inflation, All Items 10.4 -4.5 10 12.7 -2.9 6.6 5.4 (%) Inflation, Food 9 -22.6 11.3 46.3 0 0.7 7.4 (%) Calculation based on the data provided by NBS and CBN (further details on methodology is provided in Volume II) trade and market functioning. In February 2016, markets have been kets for security reasons (to avoid attacks or to disrupt supplies to closed in Borno and Yobe states by the authorities, including the cat- Boko Haram).37 As of December 2015 (see Figure 7), most markets tle market in Maiduguri (one of the biggest in West Africa), to curb in Borno have minimal or no activity or are significantly disrupt- transactions with Boko Haram, which resulted in food price increas- ed with limited activities. In Yobe, around half of the markets have es. Restriction on food availability and access to farms and markets minimal or no activity and the other half have reduced activity. The in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa has generated localised food crises of situation has markedly improved in Adamawa between October and acute food insecurity during the lean period.35 As a result, food in- December 2015, with most markets having normal activities, except security has increased dramatically among IDPs but also within the in the North-East of Adamawa, where markets face significant dis- hosting communities.36 ruption. The consolidated budget deficit for the region worsened during /// The economy has been significantly affected by reduced connec- /// the crisis and is two times higher than the average pre-crisis budget tivity as people flee their villages, and others are isolated. Trade has /// deficit. The aggregate fiscal deficit (as percentage of the total reve- /// been significantly disrupted as mobility of humans and goods and nue) for the region increased rapidly prior to the crisis, largely due to services is curtailed by damaged infrastructure, continued insecurity and closed borders. Trade has long been strong in the North-East an expansion of the state budgetary expenditure and to some extent, region and its contribution to the overall economy was especially pro- reflecting the impact of the global economic crisis. During the crisis nounced in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa. The volume of trade severely period, the aggregate budget deficit increased from 2.8 percent in diminished as all the major trade routes became inaccessible. Trad- 2011 to 31 percent of total revenue in 2014 as the total revenue fell ers have taken alternative (longer) trade routes to reach Maiduguri, faster than the total expenditure, reflecting the declining statutory which has negatively impacted the roads and bridges in the states of allocations. The level of deficit improved slightly in 2015, as spending the alternative routes. declined, however the fiscal impact varies across states. Both VAT and Internally Generated Revenue (IGR) across all states decreased, but 4.4.4. Livelihood and Employment capital spending increased in the three states directly affected by the Prior to the crisis productive jobs were fewer in the North-East and conflict, widening their budget deficit. /// have become far scarcer during the crisis. The labour force participation /// was concentrated in agricultural activities (43 percent) and the largely 4.4.3. Impacts on Private Sector, Trade and informal, non-agricultural sector (39 percent). With the onset of the con- Financial Sector flict, the proportion of labour participation in agriculture has reduced to Physical destruction affected the private sector by undermining the /// 27 percent in 2012-2013, reflecting that the continuing conflict has lim- operation of small and medium enterprises and markets. Markets /// ited access to land for crops and livestock, and has curtailed agricultural have been regularly attacked and the army has also closed some mar- activities significantly. People in the region resorted to a range of income 50 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 04 : SUMMARY OF RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING NEEDS FIGURE 5 North-East Region - Consolidated Revenue and Expenditure (Billions of Naira) and Budget Balance (Percent of Total Revenue, 2007-2015) 600 0.0 500 -5.0 -10.0 % of Total Revenue 400 Billions of Naira -15.0 300 -20.0 200 -25.0 100 -30.0 0 -35.0 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total revenue Total expenditure Budget balance Source: Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) generation activities, with unpaid household activities doubling from 11 and IDPs often end up competing with local host communities who are percent (2010-2011) to 22 percent (2012-2013), indirectly capturing a also desperately looking for income generation opportunities. large increase in de facto unemployment. Negative impacts on the local economy and livelihoods have under- /// The livelihood situation of IDPs is dire as they lack regular income /// mined the well-being of the population in the region. During the crisis, /// sources, and competition of jobs is also putting strain on the host com- the poverty rate rose from 47.3 percent in 2011, to 50.4 percent in 2013, munities. IDP households, who used to earn their income from farming, /// the highest in the whole country. Contraction of the local economy is have no access to their own land or any land in their location of dis- most acutely felt in the area of price increases, particularly food prices, placement; most households with other sources of livelihoods (traders, and subsequent food insecurity. It is noted that 2014-2015 main-season shop owners, artisans, etc.) lack access to infrastructure, tools, and most and off-season harvests came in well below average in Borno, central and importantly customers with sufficient purchasing power. The only IDPs southern Yobe, and northern Adamawa, the states worst impacted by still able to access their income appear to be the LGA employees. Large- the conflict.40 The heavily impacted harvests have contributed to limited scale displacement also causes significant stress for the host communities household own-production stocks as well as low market stocks, increas- and family members supporting IDPs, as more than 90 percent of IDPs ing food prices. Displaced people, who have limited access to farming, live in host communities with relatives or friends or in accommodations savings (left behind or used up), or other safety nets and jobs, are likely to they rent or can use free of charge. Jobs are scarce in the region as a whole, suffer more from price increases and food insecurity. VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 51 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA FIGURE 5 Distribution of the employed labour force, by employer for wave 1 (2010/11) and wave 2 (2012/13); Estimates based on GHS 2010/11 and GHS 2012/13 100% 9% 10% 7% 7% 14% 13% 10% 6% 11% 25% 11% 22% 7% 10% 11% 9% 10% 13% 10% 11% 9% 2% 2% 11% 13% 1% 14% 80% 39% 45% 5% 11% 16% 9% 7% 44% 6% 7% 31% 16% 11% 10% 2% 12% 56% 58% 39% 37% 43% 60% 29% 6% 38% 41% 38% 29% 40% 43% 45% 37% 31% 33% 34% 31% 20% 25% 26% 27% 22% 22% 16% 13% 0% w1 w2 w1 w2 w1 w2 w1 w2 w1 w2 w1 w2 w1 w2 Nat. NC NE NW SE SS SW Self - Ag Self - NonAg Private Public HH Unpaid Others Calculation based on the data provided by NBS and CBN (further details on methodology is provided in Volume II) 4.4.5. Recommended Interventions for Economic and youth. Furthermore, reopening the border and recovering mar- Recovery kets will increase trade activities both internally and cross-border, and increase jobs and the income of the population. Sustained livelihoods and economic stabilisation and recovery re- /// quire the private sector, trade and financial activities to recover. Pri- /// Recommendations for economic recovery are premised on an un- /// vate sector recovery requires proactive interventions in both the for- derstanding that socio-economic recovery in troubled communities mal sector (medium and small enterprises) and informal sector (micro is strongly linked to job creation and economic restoration. In this /// enterprises) to support the development of high value chains in regard, as an overarching approach to stabilisation and recovery, as agri-businesses and solid minerals as well as youth entrepreneurship, in other components, it is recommended that economic recovery in- in addition to employment promotion schemes focusing on women terventions coordinate with the on-going needed humanitarian as- TABLE 11 Estimated Needs for Economic Recovery by State Federal/ Adamawa Borno Yobe Gombe Taraba Bauchi Regional41 Total Private sector, Trade and Finance 245 245 Livelihood and local economic recovery 24.2 31.1 19.6 12.7 18.4 23.1 129.1 Employment 13.4 37.7 11.1 9.6 9.2 18.4 99.3 Total 37.6 68.8 30.7 22.3 27.7 41.4 245 473.5 52 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 04 : SUMMARY OF RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING NEEDS sistance in the primary states (especially in Borno and Yobe), while 4.5. Cross-cutting Issues enabling reconstruction efforts as much as possible. The employment and income generation should be designed and implemented with a A cross-cutting issue is one that dynamically interacts with all or a substantial number of sectors/sub-components and, therefore, re- ‘do-no-harm’ approach, in order to avoid deepening or creating fur- quires a multi-sectoral approach. The RPBA has taken gender, hu- ther disputes or conflicts. In view of this, other recommendations for man rights, explosive remnants of war and youth as key cross-cutting implementing potential interventions include an inclusive, pro-poor issues. It advocates for further development of the cross-cutting issues approach to economic recovery and tailored proposals for different in the recovery strategy and implementation process to ensure effec- groups of affected people: (a) general population in the North-East; tive integration of these issues across all of the interventions. (b) displacement affected persons; (c) host communities; (d) return- ees; and (e) vulnerable groups, which include youth, older people and 4.5.1. Gender women. Lastly, these interventions should take a community-based In Nigeria, women are disadvantaged compared to men on all so- /// approach to foster local ownership and facilitate a transparent and cial development indicators. In education and earnings for instance /// acceptable selection of beneficiaries. The estimated needs and recom- which are factors that greatly influence the health of women and chil- mended interventions identified for the economic recovery subcom- dren. Thirty eight percent of women age 15-49 have no formal edu- ponents are presented in Table 12. cation compared to 21 percent of men in the same age bracket. Lack VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 53 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA TABLE 12 Estimated Needs and Recommended Interventions for Economic Recovery Interventions Recommended Interventions Costs Private Sector, Trade and • Private sector recovery in the North-East States 245 million Finance • Support to private sector development in high potential value chains – agribusiness and solid materials; • Support Youth Entrepreneurship • Reopening of border stations • Recovery of markets; • Improved Investment climate in the six North-East States; • Increased access to financial services for micro, small and medium enterprises; Livelihood and Local Stabilisation phase 129.1 million Economic Recovery • Immediate restoration of disrupted and destroyed livelihoods and economic assets, which can lead to the revitalization of the local economy in the medium term • Immediate livelihood support through the provision of cash transfers, grant funds and case-for-work programs, coupled with initiatives to strengthen business management skills and low cost, quick return and needs-based activities. • An assessment of existing and required vocational and professional trainings as well as of required skills, particularly in view of the immediate reconstruction needs Recovery phase • Establishing agriculture-based value chains and agro-value addition centres, which can not only diversify employment opportunities but also contribute to cohesion and stability as different communities and individuals interact in value chains • Development of natural resource-based value chains and enterprises, with public investment in exploring the potential of various natural resources and solid minerals; • Skills training geared towards diversifying livelihoods Employment Stabilisation phase 99.3 million • Provision of professional or vocational trainings in a shorter duration (3-6 months), linked to a rapid job creation scheme (in particular for the youth) for deployment of qualified labour directly into the rehabilitation efforts during the immediate stabilisation phase or with provision of start-up kits and further assistance to establish businesses/enterprises • Targeted training for youth and women, consisting of adult literacy, life skills (health and hygiene, legal issues such as access to land/ finances/justice, SGBV protection, etc.) and vocational/professional skills that can lead to rapid income generation, in combination with peace education, counter-radicalisation and strategic communications, such as youth reorientation and de-radicalisation programs; • Rehabilitation of the State and State level training and job centres, recruitment of staff and training of the existing staff and trainers Recovery phase • Strengthening of the institutional capacity of State employment centres and related institutions to implement skills training and job placement initiatives and to better match workers to new labour markets to increase (re)employment options • A Technical Vocational Education and Training (TVET) Program with (re-) built facilities and well-drafted curricula in alignment to Federal TVET programs; 54 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 04 : SUMMARY OF RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING NEEDS of education for women is higher in the North-East where more than ing throwing acid in their faces — for not following religious prac- 70 percent of women over 30 are illiterate compared to 34 percent in tices such as covering their heads or wearing sufficiently conservative the South.41 Nationally, the majority of women earn less than their clothing.46 Women have also been used as instruments of war to lure husbands and ironically, female heads of household are taxed more 42 opposing forces or to mobilise weapons.47 While women and girls than their male colleagues.43 are strategically targeted for violence, there are several reports that note assaults and rape of men as well. While several incidents have Women and girls have significantly fewer opportunities to partic- garnered international attention including the kidnapping of 276 /// ipate in decision making than men and boys, and violence com- school girls in Chibok in 2014, fear of retaliation by Boko Haram or pounds and reinforce this disadvantage.45 Women are also woefully its adherents persist, contributing to a broader culture of silence that /// under-represented in the political structure of Nigeria. During the impedes reporting or help-seeking behaviour by survivors of conflict. 2015 elections, women in the North-East states constituted a huge voter population of 3,905,283 (11.9 percent of the national total of Addressing SGBV and other forms of violence is critically import- /// female voters) in the Voters Register yet in the entire North-East only ant for survivors’ medical, emotional and psycho-social well-being, eight women were elected. and also for broader social cohesion and communal stability. The /// developmental impacts of sexual and gender-based violence can be Women marry much younger than men, which limits women’s ed- severe. Survivors often lack access to basic health services that address /// ucational and earning potential. Married women have less control the physical and mental consequences of violence, whether due to the /// over their own lives than married men; nearly half of married women absence of or disruption in access to qualified personnel and services, do not participate in decision making regarding their reproduction, or to restrictive socio-cultural norms that inhibit women’s mobility personal health care, education of their children, major household and freedom of movement. Beyond the physical and psychological purchase, or visits to family or relatives. In the North-East, 13.3 per- damage for the individuals involved, SGBV in particular also carries cent of females aged 15-24 have experienced physical violence, and important social and economic costs. Moreover, survivors often face 8.9 percent of married women and 23.5 percent of those who have barriers to seeking redress that include a lack of knowledge within never been married have had similar experiences.44 the community about their legal/justice options, some of which are The conflict has exacerbated the security situation of women and /// costly and inaccessible, and a lack of understanding among officials of girls A survey of 17,534 households indicated that 12,338 house- /// the unique support that SGBV survivors need. Impaired functioning, holds (70 percent of respondents), reported incidents/risks of SGBV, compounded by a climate of fear, impedes participation in social, including 2226 households with survivors of SGBV. 43 Women and political and economic life and survivors may further confront stig- girls are bearing a considerable part of the costs. The Boko Haram ma and rejection by spouses, families and communities. In Nigeria tactics increasingly include targeting women through gender-based specifically, incidence or fear of violence impedes girls’ attendance at violence, kidnapping, sexual slavery, and forced marriage, and most schools.46 These factors ultimately undermine the development po- recently, using young girls as suicide bombers. Thousands of women tential of women and girls, as well as erode trust at all levels of society, and girls who are associated with perpetrators of the violence, or have adversely affecting social cohesion. borne children out of rape, risk stigmatisation by their communities. Displaced populations confront a range of severe protection chal- /// The conflict has contributed to the rise in targeting civilians partic- /// lenges. Among those displaced, 52 percent are female and 48 per- /// ularly women and children. Emerging in part in response to govern- /// cent male, while children under the age of 18 account for nearly 60 ment detentions of women and children associated with the armed percent.48 The context of displacement often leaves affected popu- group in 2012, Boko Haram has increasingly targeted women for lations, particularly women and children, particularly vulnerable to abduction. Women and girls face protection challenges including ab- protection challenges, including varying forms of SGBV. While most duction, rape, torture, forced marriage and forced conversion. Several security related incidents reported by IDPs in the North-East relate to reports also noted prevalence of attacks against businesses owned by tensions within displacement sites or with host communities, alcohol women, and of assault and violence against women and girls—includ- or drug abuse, or theft, there have also been reported incidences of VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 55 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA SGBV, including domestic violence, sexual exploitation, harassment Addressing gender issues is vital. All interventions will take into ac- /// and rape.49 Child physical and emotional abuse has also been reported count key gender related issues including: /// at multiple displacement sites. 50 • access to education and vocational training; Displaced males, and conflict-affected male youth more generally, /// • information on SGBV and Protection from Sexual Exploitation confront a range of vulnerabilities as well. In the context of pro- /// and Abuse (PSEA); tracted conflict, men and male youth often experience both econom- • representation in recovery and rebuilding planning; ic hardship and social and psychological dislocation. Loss in assets, • improved access to social, government and financial services; combined with lack of access to education, skills training and op- • reintegration of stigmatised women and girls into their commu- portunities to earn an income, leave men and male youth unable to nity. fulfil often exacting norms of manhood and masculine identity as 4.5.2. Human Rights protectors and as providers. High rates of trauma compound these vulnerabilities, manifesting in a range of often-negative coping be- North-East Nigeria faces a human rights and protection crisis as a /// haviours including depression, addiction, and/or aggression. Rates of result of the Boko Haram related conflict. In most of the directly /// domestic/ intimate partner violence frequently increase under such affected communities, any semblance of rule of law institutions and conditions, as men seek outlets for feelings of frustration or dislo- government presence has been destroyed. The conflict has been char- cation. Others often engage in illicit behaviours, such as crime and acterised by allegations of human rights abuses and violations under violence or are more vulnerable to radicalisation and recruitment into international humanitarian law committed by Boko Haram, which armed networks such as Boko Haram. A study noted that poverty, includes killings, forced recruitment, the use of children in hostil- unemployment and disaffection render youth and destitute children ities, abductions, and torture and ill-treatment, especially of girls vulnerable to manipulation by religious extremists, which in turn and young women, including rape and forced marriage. There have leaves them vulnerable to further exploitation.46 also been reports of heavy-handed counter-insurgency response from 56 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 04 : SUMMARY OF RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING NEEDS other actors including the national military and those of the neigh- majority of the risk is from IEDs, including victim-activated IEDs bouring affected countries. Allegations of violations of international that maim and kill indiscriminately and can be considered ‘landmines’. human rights and humanitarian law by security agents, including Additionally, some factory-made mines may have been used, but to extra-judicial killings, enforced disappearances, torture, and ill treat- date the available information on how extensively they have been ment, and arrests and detentions, have been reported. used and their impact is very limited. Military activities, including Human rights challenges include Boko Haram targeting men and /// aerial bombardment and the use of other munitions, have led to the boys for combat operation, while women face conflict-related sexual proliferation of Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) in areas impacted by violence including stigmatisation of babies born from rape. These/// the crisis. Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) and IEDs can be found challenges underline the need for enhanced psycho-social assistance on roads, in abandoned houses and buildings including schools, and in agricultural fields; it is also possible that water sources were ‘mined’ to the victims and implementation of strategies to enhance commu- by Boko Haram members. nity reconciliation and social cohesion. On their return, displaced persons will more likely than not face challenges over their rights to A mine action program in line with international standards does /// land and property, with women and orphans being at the greatest risk not exist in Nigeria. The Security Forces are taking great risks to of not receiving redress from already weak dispute resolution mech- identify and dispose of IEDs and to destroy ‘bomb’-making facto- anisms. ries. NEMA/SEMA and the police have begun to warn people of the /// existing dangers and asked to be informed of any suspicious devices A major challenge for IDPs from Borno state remains the lack of the public notices. To address the overall threat according to interna- /// access to most of the areas outside Maiduguri due to the security tional standards and best practices, a significant scaling up of these situation. While the Government is encouraging return, security re- efforts is needed. /// mains a major challenge. It is imperative to ensure that recovery and return takes into account and is informed by the security situation in A joint undertaking of the Government of Nigeria, the security forc- /// affected areas. es, and development partners is required to address the threat of mines, IEDs, and ERW, through a combination of emergency ac- Reconciliation and sustainable peace can only be achieved through /// tions and capacity development. Setting up an institutional and op- /// a human rights based approach to address the root causes of the erational framework to allow such activities will require a concerted Boko Haram related conflict, as well as its impact. The human rights /// effort. Currently, a team to coordinate mine action at the Federal level standards that inform the recovery and peace building response are is planned. To ensure access and a route of safe return for displaced the promotion and protection of civil, political, social, economic and persons, roads have to be assessed and de-mined. Additionally, a risk cultural rights of those who are most affected, marginalised, excluded reduction mechanism for ERW needs to be in place to ensure removal and discriminated against as a result of the Boko Haram conflict. The of debris, and burning waste can be carried out safely. guiding human rights principles applied are equality and non-dis- To allow for safe return, an emergency mine risk awareness educa- crimination, participation and inclusion, accountability and rule of /// tion campaign needs to be implemented for all IDPs, refugees, and law, addressing recovery and peace building complexities holistically, the local population, as well as those working temporarily in poten- consideration of the connection between the populations and systems tially dangerous areas. A systematic survey coupled with risk educa- /// of authority/power expected to respect, protect and guarantee human tion and explosive ordnance disposal in each conflict-affected LGA rights, and create dynamics of accountability. will provide the required data to formulate a response for de-mining action. The proposed action would consist of teams of four including 4.5.3. Explosive Remnants of War explosive ordinance disposal specialists, de-miners, and medics, who The threat from explosive devices, particularly in Borno, Yobe and /// are well trained both in the technical and non-technical interventions Adamawa states, stems extensively from Improvised Explosive De- of a demining response. This team would also serve as community vices (IEDs), as well as mines and other unexploded ordnance. A /// liaisons providing risk education to the population. VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 57 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA 4.5.4. Youth recruits for Boko Haram; however, youth unemployment does not directly lead to violence; nevertheless, it is an enabling factor and eco- Nearly 63 percent of the population in Nigeria is under the age of nomic opportunities have a dramatic impact on durable peace and /// 24. Youth, in the 15-34 age group, are Nigeria’s most important and reconciliation. /// dynamic human resource.51 In North-East Nigeria young people ac- count for many of those adversely affected by the conflict as it has dis- Revisiting the schooling system in the post-conflict environment is /// rupted their access to education and social services. Some have been important. Urban and rural youth need training and imparting of /// subjected to overwhelming violence, including separation from fam- skills as artisans and technicians. Mainstreaming youth in post-cri- ily that will have a long-term impact on their psychological well-be- sis activities for recovery and reconstruction is key and youth should ing. In many instances, young people are the sole providers for their be considered in all three components intervention areas to enable siblings and wide family. In many instances all over the workd, youth youth-led development. In general, youth want to be viewed as pio- tend to be extremely vulnerable to radicalisation. Surveys, interviews, neers as well as leaders of today, who have the ability to shape their and focus groups discussions conducted in 2013, suggest that pover- own tomorrow. Addressing their rights and including them in the ty, unemployment illiteracy and weak family structures contribute to recovery and peace building process will insulate them against future this trend, and failure to address the needs of the youth may further instability, and bring energy and engagement to the stabilisation pro- push them to gravitate toward radicalised groups. 52 cess. Even prior to the conflict, educational levels in the region were very /// low. In Adamawa state alone, recent data show that over 75 percent of /// the youth are illiterate. The North-East states have among the lowest educational enrolment rates of girls in the world. But youth want to receive education; a 2016 survey found that education was the top priority for youth of both genders.52 The average unemployment rate in Nigeria is 38 percent and much /// higher in the North-East States. Many young people fall in the Not /// in Education, Employment or Training (NEET) category. A huge reservoir of unemployed urban youths, widespread poverty and dis- enfranchisement are factors used to explain the ready availability of 58 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 05 : OPTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION AND FINANCING CHAPTER 5 Options for Implementation and Financing Recovery will be highly demanding for the limited institutional, /// implementation and financing capacity at every level of the Government of Nigeria. The recovery and peace builiding process /// will require significant strengthening of policy, programme and project implementation capacity, enhancing effectiveness of scarce public spending and a coordinated and sustained effort at revenue mobilisation. Strengthening the use of evidence and quality data to inform implementation and strengthen accountability mechanisms, including through citizen engagement, would significantly strengthen the quality of the overall process. 5.1. Institutional Challenges tional effectiveness. At State level, the Federal institutional set up is often replicated with State level executive agencies mirroring Federal Recovery will require significantly enhanced institutional capacity /// ones (e.g. in education, health, etc.). The multiplicity of public enti- and effectiveness. This will include progress in horizontal coordina- /// ties undermines the coherence of public action, entails overlaps, du- tion at each level of government as well as in intergovernmental co- plication and conflicts of jurisdiction, and dilutes scarce institutional operation with a specific focus on alignment between the Federal and capacity and already weak chains of accountability: e.g. executive State Governments. Several country specific institutional challenges agencies are not legally or de facto accountable to parent ministries may need to be addressed for the effective implementation of the and regulatory authorities do not exercise effective oversight on State Recovery and Peace Building Strategy (RPBS). owned companies. In this context, effective horizontal coordination will be paramount 5.1.1. Horizontal Coordination /// to the successful implementation of the RPBS at Federal and State A high number of public entities, line ministries, and executive /// levels. This integrative function will need to be exercised under the /// agencies will be involved in the implementation of the RPBS at each highest executive authority at Federal and State levels, i.e. at the Pres- level of the government (Federal, State and Local). At the Federal /// idency and governorship respectively under the present constitutional level, several hundred Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) set up. At Federal level, the role and institutional levers of the Presi- are operating and there is a realisation that this number may have to dential Committee on the North-East Initiative (PCNI) may need to be streamlined to reduce the cost of governance and increase institu- be further clearly established. VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 59 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA 5.1.2. Vertical Alignment Interstate coordination fora, such as the Governors’ Forum or the /// Northern Governors’ Forum, also contribute to policy alignment Most activities to be conducted under the RPBS, be it reconstruc- /// across State Governments and at the Regional level. They can be tion, service delivery, social protection or peace building, fall under /// usefully mobilised to monitor the implementation of the RPBS, to the concurrent responsibility of the Federal and State governments. benchmark results and foster exchange of experience and the emula- /// Some of them also involve Local Governments (e.g. primary educa- tion of best practices across North-East states. Although they do not tion and health, local roads, water supply and sanitation, etc.). As have any implementation capacity, these fora are critical for policy in any other Federal State, the exercise of shared responsibility by dialogue and consultation, and could help harmonise State level im- different tiers of government is often contentious and may result in plementation frameworks. conflicts of jurisdiction, which impede the effectiveness of public ac- tion and policy implementation. At the State level, policymaking has not usually been devolved to /// Local Governments, which are de facto local branches of the State Nigeria is endowed with collegial decision-making bodies that are Government. Consequently, intergovernmental coordination within /// /// meant to ensure policy alignment between the two upper tiers of the States could be vested with the ministry of Local Governments, the governments, such as the National Economic Council chaired which is often responsible for traditional rulers-Chieftainship, allow- /// by the Vice-President, or at sectoral level, the National Council on ing it to reach beyond Local Governments to community leaders. Education or Health. These collegial bodies can usefully be mobilised to ensure collective political leadership – including between the Presi- In addition, intergovernmental coordination is key in areas that are /// dency at Federal level and the Governors at the State level. beyond the concurrent responsibility of the different levels of gov- 60 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 05 : OPTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION AND FINANCING The Recovery and Peace Building interventions will need to be very ernment such as security. The lower tiers of government often step /// /// closely coordinated with the Humanitarian Response Plan, and the into areas of responsibility of the upper tiers of government when it is coordination with humanitarian actors should be formalised. This failing to exercise it or to complement its limited capacity. For exam- /// is of utmost importance to avoid duplication of efforts and to ensure ple, State and Local Governments are funding and arming vigilante that an incremental added value between humanitarian interventions groups who complement or substitute for the police and the military, and recovery interventions materialises and effectively contributes to both falling under the exclusive responsibility of the Federal Govern- the human security of the affected populations on the ground. ment. Intergovernmental coordination could take into account such interventions at the lower levels of government, given their significant bearing on the overall success of the RPBS. 5.2. Guiding Principles for Institutional Effectiveness 5.1.3. Front Line Institutional Set Up Experiences from other crisis countries indicate the importance of Capacity and accessibility constrains the responsiveness of Local /// institutional arrangements. Strong government leadership can help to Governments and communities when effective recovery and peace ensure coordination across stakeholders, with representation from a building needs mobilisation down to the village or settlement level. wide range actors at different levels of government, as well as non-gov- /// The North-East has only 112 Local Governments for an estimated ernmental organisations and beneficiaries. It is therefore suggested population of 19 million people and a landmass of 276,000 square that programme leadership and coordination be agreed upon and es- kilometres. On average, each Local Government is supposed to cater tablished at the three tiers of government. This mechanism would be to the needs of a few hundred thousand people spread over an area cross sectorial, include different levels of the government (Federal and of close to 50,000 square kilometres on average, and in rural areas State levels), and to what extent possible, build upon existing struc- scattered across small villages often far from the Local Government tures. Where necessary, ring-fenced mechanisms could be considered headquarters. Due to a lack of local elections, local communities are to improve implementation effectiveness. Nigeria’s track record of ad not represented at the Local Government level – as they would be if hoc implementation mechanisms (such as executive agencies) seems local councillors were elected at the ward level. to be problematic and warns against the establishment of parallel This may call for the mobilisation of local communities down to /// structures or systems with weak accountability. the village or settlement level. Informal institutions, such as village The mechanism for coordination and exchange with communities /// ** heads and community organisations, can be leveraged for that pur- and civil society is critical and could at least consist of the following pose by institutionalising their participation to decision making in two elements: ** the implementation of the recovery strategy (e.g. for local planning • Community and civil society forum: Community and civil society and monitoring). Stakeholders’ representation and participation in ** ** involvement is critical for the success of the recovery and peace local institutions at the community level could also help restore pub- building programme in North-East Nigeria. An active involvement lic trust in government and its responsiveness to public demands, in the programme design, Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E), needs, and expectations. while ensuring fair and transparent procedures for the implemen- At the community level, both formal and informal institutions /// tation of the programmes, requires the establishment of a dedicat- may need to be mobilised to respond to people’s needs. The justice /// ed space for civil society. The community and civil society forum system, with lowest courts operating at district level at best, needs could contribute directly to the monitoring and evaluation process to be supported and complemented by informal conflict resolution and conduct a critical review of the results achieved so far. mechanisms at the community level to address personal and collective • Grievance redress mechanism: It is recommended that an inde- ** ** grievances generated by the conflict situation, including population pendent grievance redress mechanism be established to ensure a displacement and return, loss of property, etc. fair and transparent handling of concerns before conflicts arise. VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 61 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA The Federal Government may consider appointing an indepen- and six North-East States) as well as civil society to ensure a suc- dent Ombudsman tasked to respond to relevant concerns of citi- cessful implementation of the RPBS. Elements of such a framework zens and communities in the six affected states, with the objective may have already been established (such as PCNI at the Federal level, to mediate in disputes or complaints arising from the conflict sit- or the Ministry of Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Resettlement uation. In abidance with international best practices, the grievance (MRRR) in Borno State). Their role and functions, their modus redress mechanism may provide the possibility to submit requests operandi and institutional levers may still need to be clarified. The and complaints through different means of communication, in- establishment of ad hoc institutions may or may not be required to cluding anonymous requests. ensure the effectiveness of the overall institutional framework for the implementation of the recovery strategy. The institutional set up will have to strike the right balance between /// strategic integration and decentralised implementation. The RPBS /// The current situation calls for an approach that supports the exist- /// is a process, which would be implemented in the six states, and to ing government structures at the Federal and State levels to imple- some extent at Federal level, according to the states’ specific needs. ment the recovery process. At the same time, flexibility is needed to /// While in Borno, stabilisation may first apply, other States might move adapt to evolving needs and to provide additional, external capacity faster to address recovery issues. The overall implementation structure for a timely and effective recovery process. Successful implementa- would thus need to be adapted to the different States, their institu- tion of the RPBS will require professional institutional arrangements, tional context, and specific program and sequencing of interventions. aligned and rapid disbursement of funds, and appropriate, transpar- This could bring together the different levels of government (Federal ent and clearly mandated implementation arrangements, in order to 62 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 05 : OPTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION AND FINANCING achieve tangible results in the short term while providing lasting im- The pros and cons of these options are listed below in Table 13. They pacts. The specific institutional arrangements will need to be adopted are to be understood as virtual and highly contextual. and agreed upon by the Federal and State level governments, taken It should be noted that experience from other crisis situations has forward by the Federal and State level leadership, and build upon /// existing strategies, structures, and mechanisms, notably the NEST shown that a hybrid model can work very well once roles and re- developed in 2015. In case of capacity gaps (for example in engineer- sponsibilities are clearly distributed. This hybrid model entails a /// ing, financial management, procurement or staffing) pooling existing dedicated coordination entity unit for policy setting and implemen- capacity may be considered until they are adequately developed. In tation support on the one hand, and implementation through exist- addition, a central programme coordination unit can provide support ing line ministries on the other hand. The program coordination and for implementation, communication and documentation, M&E, as day-to-day implementation of the program is ideally housed within may be required. or supported by an apex coordination entity, and builds upon strong collective leadership from the Federal and State Governments. The 5.3. Options for Implementing Recovery apex coordination entity would not implement programme activi- ties directly, but support Federal and State Governments’ agencies to and Peace Building Interventions implement the programme in an effective and timely manner, and Based on a review of international good practices, the following in- /// provide overall guidance on policies. Its overall tasks include provid- stitutional options can be considered for implementing the recovery ing support to the implementing agencies at Federal and State levels and peace building programme: /// to complement their capacity in financial management and procure- • ad hoc set up such as the establishment of a discrete implementing ment, to elaborate on overall programme policies and implementa- agency; tion guidelines, to conduct M&E, to report to donors, and provide • existing government structures (MDAs); overall guidance and coordination of communication. The apex coor- • hybrid framework built on both existing government structures dination entity needs to be flexible and responsive to quickly arising and an ad hoc organisation. needs and demands, including for capacity development. TABLE 13 Comparative advantages of different institutional framework for recovery Recovery Agency Line Ministries Hybrid Approach Pros • Facilitates coordination of recovery • Respects and strengthens existing government • Leverages existing government structure • Draws on resources beyond the civil service structure and capacities and capacities resource pool • Avoids creating competition for resources • Subsumes into regular structures upon completion • Focuses on tasks specific to recovery and power of recovery through a sunset clause • Facilitates transition from reconstruction to • Complements capacities of MDAs longer-term development • Streamlines the distribution of responsibilities and the chain of accountability • Focuses on tasks that are specific to recovery Cons • Risks potential jurisdictional conflicts with • Strains further capacity already weakened by • Relies heavily on MDAs for implementation existing MDAs the crisis • Risks lacking the political clout and convening • Takes more time and resources to establish • Draws away MDAs from routine responsibilities power to coordinate MDAs and other • Requires strong central government support • Reinforces the need for third important actors • Creates sustainability issues party implementation • Risks generating overlaps and • Lacks the capacity to focus on recovery confusion responsibilities • Risks bypassing and undertraining existing accountability systems VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 63 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA TABLE 14 Indicative distribution of core functions across tiers of government for implementation of recovery and peace building strategy Functions Federal State Local Political leadership & strategic oversight XX XX YY Programme management and implementation YY XX YY Horizontal and vertical coordination XX XX YY Policy setting & alignment XX XX Capacity development YY XX XX Monitoring and Ensuring Transparency & Accountability XX XX XX Community participation & outreach YY XX Fiduciary integrity (fund flow management & procurement) YY XX XX Environmental and social safeguards YY XX YY Resources mobilisation XX XX YY Public investment planning & management XX XX YY Access to and quality of basic services YY YY XX Monitoring and Evaluation YY XX XX Conflict resolution & grievance redress YY XX Safety and security (including demining) XX YY YY XX Important and leading role YY Minor role 5.4. Critical Core Functions of an Table 14 shows an indicative distribution of core functions across the three tiers of government needed for recovery and peace building. Enabling Institutional Framework Most institutional functionalities are shared, even if each level of gov- /// 5.5. Monitoring Framework ernment contributes to their fulfilment differently. For example, for /// The Recovery and Peace Building Operational Framework, pre- M&E, data collection would happen at Local level and be aggregated /// sented in this assessment report in Chapter 6, could be used as a at State and Federal levels; evaluation can be handled at the Federal level basis to monitor progress towards common targets. A Monitoring /// provided it benchmarks outputs and outcomes at Local or State levels. Framework would be a key management tool for the National and Adequate implementation of the recovery strategy calls for an enabling Local government authorities, as well as individual ministries, donors institutional framework ensuring the following critical functions and and implementing partners. Meanwhile, a Strategic Results Frame- their shared exercise to be disaggregated at the three tiers of government. work that builds on the Strategic Framework for Recovery and Peace 64 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 05 : OPTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION AND FINANCING Building in Chapter 3 would be the foundation for a social contract cluding surveys of beneficiaries and third party monitoring). Given /// between citizens and the State on recovery, by demonstrating to the the limited capacity of the three tiers of the Nigerian government in population that recovery efforts are proceeding in the right direction monitoring and evaluation of public action, the implementation of and yielding tangible results. As such, it would be expected to be the recovery strategy cannot be informed by a comprehensive, three widely shared publicly and visibly discussed as part of periodic prog- tiered, and regularly updated M&E system. But it will require that ress reviews. Experience in other conflict situations shows that this patchy and inaccurate administrative data be complemented and matters towards repairing the fractured social contract. triangulated with other sources of information (provided by surveys and third parties). It will also call for the operationalisation of avail- Robust M&E systems are needed to inform the implementation of able data that is neither analysed, owned, nor collected by the public /// the recovery strategy that covers the whole value chain from finan- institutions in charge of the implementation of public policies and cial inputs to outputs. Existing M&E systems do not provide the programmes. /// kind of quality information that can be both relied on and operation- alised to inform policy making and implementation. Despite their 5.5.2. Mainstreaming Third Party Monitoring and institutionalisation across the three tiers of the Nigerian government, Social Accountability Mechanisms existing M&E systems provide scant and inaccurate information and evidence to inform policy making and programme implementation. Access to public information is still scant in Nigeria and so is the /// Administrative data is unreliable. Capacity and financial resources reliance of the government on citizens’ feedback. Compliance with /// for M&E are scarce. Lack of intergovernmental coordination entails the Freedom of Information Act of 2011 by public entities is low, duplication of efforts, lack of standardisation of collected data, and including when it comes to voluntary disclosure of information. reluctance to share data with other tiers of government. Mechanisms to gather citizens’ feedback are still rudimentary and not at scale. SERVICOM, which rolled out at Federal level in 2011 to No existing M&E system covers the whole value chain from finan- improve quality of service, is practically defunct for lack of resources. /// cial inputs to outputs (quantitative: such as the number of built or rehabilitated facilities, and qualitative: such as unit costs) and Existing social accountability mechanisms, such as School-Based /// outcomes (such as beneficiaries’ access to service and service qual- Management Committees (SBMC), can be usefully emulated and ity standards). In such conditions, measuring and benchmarking /// mainstreamed to monitor access to and quality of service at the bot- progress is both challenging in practice and politically sensitive. Par- tom level of the delivery chain. SBMCs have been operating in Ni- /// adoxically, a dense web of public institutions is mandated to monitor geria since 2005, and are made up of representatives from local com- policy implementation across the three tiers of government and the munities. They ensure transparency, efficiency, and performance in institutional framework for M&E calls for significant streamlining. school management by regularly engaging with and reporting to and from local communities. Such social accountability mechanisms can 5.5.1. Improving Existing M&E Systems be usefully mobilised to monitor the implementation of the recovery These constraints call for two main remedies: (a) enhancing capaci- /// strategy and take account of feedback from beneficiaries (through us- ty for data collection; and (b) data validation. For that purpose, third /// ers’ survey) into its implementation. party monitoring needs be institutionalised across sectors. Successful In instances where for security reasons direct monitoring by public initiatives to that effect need be mainstreamed across areas and sectors /// entities may be impeded; local independent verification can usefully of intervention. An M&E capacity assessment can help determine be relied on as experience has shown in other conflict situations. the extent to which existing systems can be built on, and the extent /// Trained communities can ascertain, for example, the completion and to which they will have to be complemented. There is no dearth of quality of work in areas which are inaccessible to public officials or monitoring mechanisms on service delivery in Nigeria and existing donor agencies. Third party monitoring can be relied on to mon- ones can usefully be operationalised (while probably streamlined). itor: (a) the actual delivery of goods and services (including social Accordingly, the implementation of the RPBS requires both the mo- /// allowances); (b) the quality of service provision; (c) the use of funds; bilisation of existing M&E systems across sectors of interventions and (d) that recovery interventions do not exacerbate conflict in the and the triangulation of information from different sources (in- affected states. There are a wide range of examples on the use of IT- VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 65 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA based solutions for monitoring in remote areas which are used in oth- munication in local language. A dedicated M&E team that works er countries, and which the recovery strategy can build on. closely with the communities will therefore be required. Social accountability mechanisms, such as grievance redress, could /// The results framework would be publicly disclosed and made acces- /// also be mobilised to help monitor the impact of the recovery strate- sible to the local communities benefitting from the RPBS. M&E re- /// gy on the conflict situation. Conflict-sensitive indicators would pro- /// lated data and information should be geo-coded, to the extent possi- vide early warning of potentially negative impacts of interventions, ble, and made available in an open source and open data management which may necessitate further mitigation strategies and adaptation. system. Every effort should be made to disclose information that is Conflict-sensitive indicators need to be crafted based on the conflict accessible to and comprehensible by the local populations. specifics. In order to measure the effectiveness of conflict resolution mechanisms, IT-based solutions, such as SMS, have proved effective to convey grievances in other countries. 5.6. Financing Strategy and Modalities Recovery and peace building will be an adaptive process in tune /// Available public resources are scarce at all levels of government, with /// with the evolving needs in North-East Nigeria. This would be moni- /// limited effects on positive development outcomes and results. With /// tored to inform programme implementation. For example, as soon as government expenditure amounting to less than 10 percent of GDP, areas still controlled by Boko Haram or under its threat are accessible, recovery calls for (a) coordinated and sustained resource mobilisation communities would be supported to benefit from the recovery and to expand the narrowly limited fiscal space; (b) significant improve- peace building programme. Over time, changes in the nature of the ments to output effectiveness of capital expenditure; (c) enhanced al- crisis as well as progress in the implementation of the programme or locative efficiency; and (d) the leveraging of private resources. Finan- other issues might require a review of the policy framework. Available cial management systems (including the procurement of works and financing flows, priorities, and local needs may require a revision of goods) will need to be significantly strengthened to mitigate the risk the strategy. As certain interventions prove to be successful or less suc- of leakages and inefficiencies. Transparency and accountability need cessful, the RPBS implementation should be adapted accordingly. In be institutionalised to help ensure fiduciary integrity in the manage- this regard, the programme could be reviewed every 12 months with ment of fund flows from appropriation to disbursement, including a midterm review after two years at the juncture between the stabilisa- the payment of benefits to targeted beneficiaries. tion phase (month 1–24) and the recovery phase (month 25-48). The overall review would be conducted by the programme coordination 5.6.1. Enhancing the Effectiveness of unit together with the states and the involvement of the communities Public Spending and beneficiaries from the program. The effectiveness of allocated funds to the implementation of the /// The responsibility for integrating information on programme im- recovery strategy needs to be ensured through adequate financial /// plementation lies with the apex programme coordination unit. management at Federal, State and Local levels. Since existing public /// However, data and information will be collected by responsible sector /// finance management systems are weak and cannot be significantly ministries, States and Local Governments. M&E would include the improved in the short term, nor commensurate to identified financ- active involvement of beneficiary communities and civil society in the ing needs, ring-fencing mechanisms are called for to shelter allocated six states. Participatory processes that support the engagement of the resources from leakages and other inefficiencies. In parallel, existing population in the conflict-affected area would be promoted wherever possible. Community involvement could include community based fiduciary systems and capacity (e.g. accounting and reporting, in- mapping of results, for example, using simple cell phone based ap- ternal and external auditing) need to be strengthened: financial re- plications that provide location based information and photos from porting should be comprehensive and compliant with international the progress (e.g. areas, where roads have been constructed, houses standards (for cash based and accrual accounting); external auditing been completed and provided to local communities, or cash-for-work should also follow international standards and audit reports should be programs implemented). This requires the active mobilisation of the publicly disclosed; cash management should be significantly strength- communities in North-East Nigeria, presence in the field and com- ened to improve budget credibility. Given the nature of public spend- 66 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 05 : OPTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION AND FINANCING ing to be granted to the recovery (essentially capital expenditure and their disbursement rate is remarkably low (e.g. 36 percent in Adama- social allowances), fund flows will have to be tracked down to their wa in 2014). It has recently been decreasing under the fiscal crisis and intended purpose or beneficiaries. needs to be significantly improved if recovery funds are to be routed through government budgets. This would take significantly improved Since recovery and peace building in the North-East will entail a public investment management (e.g. project prioritisation, appraisal /// significant increase of capital expenditure, it calls for considerable and budgeting) to ensure that available liquidities match commit- improvements in public investment management in the North-East ments for capital expenditure through enhanced cash management. from all tiers of the Nigerian government. Public investment man- /// agement is notoriously poor across the country, at Federal, State and The recovery calls for strategic allocation of public expenditure. /// /// Local levels. Nigeria fares comparatively poorly on public investment This requires costed medium term sector strategies, adequate budget selection and appraisal and post-evaluation. Planning, appropriation, allocation and enhanced expenditure effectiveness based on robust and execution are also problematic. The lack of an adequate public impact evaluation. For security reasons, the implementation of the investment and asset management framework (including that with recovery strategy may need to rely upon ad hoc monitoring mecha- which to inform budget preparation) affects the quality of capital ex- nisms of procurement transactions and contract management: penditure. This results in a significant number of abandoned projects • Monitoring agents who would provide fiduciary assurance where due to unavailability of cash and the accumulation of arrears, which required, by pre-screening bidding documents and contract awards features high in the budgets of each tier of government. of major contracts. The agent would raise issues to contracting Bottlenecks in the disbursement of capital expenditures need to /// agencies (and donors in case of externally-funded projects) for be addressed for adequate implementation of the recovery strate- quick resolution. gy. Capital expenditures amount to nearly half of State Government /// • Local independent verification at delivery points to ensure the budgets across the country and in the North-East in particular, but qualitative and quantitative compliance of contract execution, VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 67 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA including the identification of under- or over-invoicing or detect and corrupt spending and — because it shuts the public out of decision qualitative and quantitative deficiencies. making — reduces the legitimacy and impact of anti-poverty initiatives”. • Usage of technology may also be considered to remotely ascertain 55 But the level of budget transparency across the states varies somewhat the delivery of commodities. with a few states (including Adamawa, qualified as a “moderate perform- • Training of credible local NGOs and civil society organizations to er”) standing out. check financial management and procurement aspects of the af- fected projects. Accountability of recovery operations calls for enhanced budget trans- /// parency across the three tiers of governments. Fiscal transfers from Fed- 5.6.2. Resource Mobilisation /// eral, State and Local Government expenditures need to be accounted for In Nigeria public resources are comparatively scarce, with a tax/ /// and publicly disclosed to allow for necessary public scrutiny and third GDP ratio below 10 percent (compared to 20 percent on average in party monitoring of public expenditure effectiveness at the Local level. low income countries, and 30 percent in oil producing countries). /// No audit report on Federal, State or Local Government budgets has been This drastically limits the government capacity to allocate necessary made publicly available despite the fact that legally, each of these budgets public resources to the recovery. is to be audited. North-East States are highly dependent on fiscal transfers, and are The implementation of the recovery strategy will mobilise different /// /// suffering from their steep decrease as a result of the fiscal crunch. sources of public funding and calls for a concerted financing strategy. /// /// None of the North-East States have an Internally Generated Revenue As Nigeria is Africa’s biggest economy and as a middle-income country, (IGR) that amounts to more than 5 percent of total State Govern- recovery financing is expected to come from a combination of regular ment revenue. In states directly affected by the fighting such as Yobe, budget allocations and loans, and only to a limited extent from grants. revenue mobilisation has been directly impacted by disruptions to economic activities and tax collection. in Yobe, between 2010-2012, Pooling resources in a single financing instrument may be considered /// IGR collected by the State Government has decreased by 60 percent, for expediency. A multi donor trust fund can help prevent duplication /// and it has only partially recovered since then to 50 percent of revenue and fragmentation of activities, generate economies of scale, and facilitate collected in 2010 (Joint Tax Board). collective action and risk management. Importantly, a pooled fund can Revenue mobilisation calls for coordinated efforts between the three /// provide a platform to finance those priority areas where collective focus tiers of the Nigerian government. So far, tax competition has ham- /// and attention is absolutely critical, and/or where financing through coun- pered adequate tax assessment and collection. The Joint Tax Board try systems at the necessary scale seems particularly challenging (such as recently started to promote tax cooperation between the three tiers for specific capacity strengthening activities and projects focused on social of government by promoting joint tax audits, streamlining the tax cohesion, reconciliation, and peace building). A key consideration during schedule, etc. These efforts need to be actively pursued to sustain the the development of the RPBS will be to explore whether a critical mass recovery even though IGR can only significantly increase with the of grant financing can be mobilised to justify the initial higher operating resumption of economic activities. costs of establishing a pooled fund. 5.6.3. Ensuring Transparency and Accountability of Establishing a financing strategy involves four key steps: (a) agreeing on /// /// Public Spending a set of priorities (financing needs) within the overall cost envelope of the Budget information is scant in Nigeria across the three tiers of gov- /// RPBA; (b) mapping the various financing sources that can be accessed to ernment. No budget information is publicly available for local Govern- /// deliver on these priorities; (c) identifying the range of specific instruments ments. In most Nigerian States, “the public does not have access to com- needed for delivery (strategic allocation framework); and (d) establish- prehensive and timely information needed to participate meaningfully ing appropriate institutional arrangements, including governance in the budget process and to hold government to account. With some and accountability mechanisms, to promote joint responsibility for variation, this lack of transparency encourages inappropriate, wasteful, outcomes. 68 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 06 : OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK CHAPTER 6 Operational Framework VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 69 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA Strategic Objective 1: Contribute to the safe, voluntary and dignified return and resettlement of displaced population Expected Implementation Framework (% completion) Baseline Indicators Stabilisation Recovery Responsibility for Needs (Present State as of December 2015) for Stabilisation & Recovery Year 1-2 Year 3-4 Implementation 1.1 Rapid provision of services to meet displaced population’s needs Food Assistance (a) General food assistance for (a) Borno 600,000, (a) % of IDPs and host community population (a) 86% (a) 14% populations in emergency and Yobe 200,000, in food insecurity provided food famine phases of food insecurity Adamawa 41,000 Federal/State Government/ (b) Supplementary food assistance (b) Borno 420,000, (b) % of most vulnerable provided (b) 86% (b) 14% Development for most vulnerable for 4 months Yobe 201,000, supplementary food Partners/ other stake Adamawa 123,000 holders (c) Short term food assistance (for (c) Bauchi 70,000, (c) % of IDPs and host community populations (c) 89% (c) 11% 6 months) for less directly affected Gombe 30,000, in food insecurity provided food during the States Taraba 50,000 lean period (March-August) Establishment of temporary number of temporary learning spaces 100% State Universal Basic learning space during reconstruction established Education Board Provision of solid waste 2 million people number of people with regular (once a week 100% EPA management (SWM) collection displaced, a large min.) waste collection service within 100m service to displaced populations majority have not of their home (according to international received SWM standards) collection 1.2 Framework and programs to ensure safe, orderly and voluntary return and resettlement of displaced population Policy and operational framework N/A • domestication of Kampala convention 25% 75% to ensure safe and voluntarily return and resettlement • agreed policy and operational framework for safe and voluntarily return and resettlement Support and strengthen broader number of IDPs • number of IDPs and returnees have access access to basic needs at Local level and returnees who to food in camps/camp-like settings/host for new displaced persons and those have access to food, communities with no intention to return in short WASH, education • number of IDPs and returnees have access to medium term and health services in to WASH in camps/camp-like settings/host camps, camp-like sites communities and host communities • number of IDPs and returnees have access to education in camps/camp-like settings/host communities • number of IDPs and returnees have access to health care in camps/camp-like settings/host communities • number of elders, UASC, widows who have access to food, shelter, WASH, education and health services 70 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 06 : OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK Expected Implementation Framework (% completion) Baseline Indicators Stabilisation Recovery Responsibility for Needs (Present State as of December 2015) for Stabilisation & Recovery Year 1-2 Year 3-4 Implementation Psycho-social support to affected • number of surveys implemented on the issue population, including IDPs, of trauma and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder returnees, and host community • number of initiatives undertaken to members address trauma and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder needs of displaced people and host communities • number of beneficiaries of psycho-social support included UASC, widows, elders, survivors of SGBV in camps, camp like sites and host communities • number of new staff trained to provide psycho-social support • number of health care centres with specialised staff providing psycho-social support • number of referral mechanisms put in place Livelihoods initiatives for displaced • number of initiatives that aim to provide persons, host communities, and livelihoods means to IDPs, returnees, host those who stayed behind communities and communities who stayed behind • number of safety nets programs implemented (i.e. conditional cash transfers, life skills training, tools, and inputs provided) • number of market analysis undertook to support livelihoods programs • number of IDPs/returnees/members of host communities receiving livelihood trainings • number of IDPs/returnees/members of host communities receiving life skills training • number of IDPs/returnees/members of host communities receiving in-kind or cash support for livelihood • number of elderly, widows, UASC and survivors of SGBV included in livelihoods programs Preventing SGBV in host • number of comprehensive mechanisms put in 60% 40% communities and camps place to identify survivors of SGBV • number of cases of SGBV reported • number of victims of SGBV supported • number of female community discussion groups conducted • number of trainings on SGBV conducted • number of physical and psycho-social health personnel trained to support SGBV survivors Compensation to service providers • number of service providers of displaced 50% 50% of displaced populations, including persons; number of service providers returning hardship allowances for government to conflict areas employees returning to conflict- affected areas VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 71 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA Strategic Objective 2: Improved human security, reconciliation and violence prevention Expected Implementation Framework (% completion) Baseline Indicators Stabilisation Recovery Responsibility for Needs (Present State as of December 2015) for Stabilisation & Recovery Year 1-2 Year 3-4 Implementation 2.1 De-mining and mine awareness campaigns Reduce risks related to ERW N/A • hectare handed over as safe to the Local 100% TBD – Army not Government; capable according to • Information on suspicious items correctly humanitarian mine reported by affected population (behaviour action standards change indicator) Mine Action coordination • coordination mechanism in place at Federal 50% 50% mechanism and State levels Mine Action Emergency risk • number of LGAs 75% 25% education campaign • number of initiatives Mine Action Integrated survey of • number of teams 100% 0% hazardous areas with risk education and explosive ordnance disposal • number of square meters surveyed • number of LGAs Mine Action Victim assistance • injuries evidence mechanism established 100% 0% needs assessment and individual rehabilitation response • number of victims identified • number of victims supported/referred 2.2 Establishment of peace building funds; conduct community trainings and awareness programs Social Fund for CSOs to support • number of direct beneficiaries peace building 50% 50% • number of indirect beneficiaries • amount disbursed increase in performance of CSOs (on-the-job evaluation) Community participation on • number of people sensitised 75% 25% security/SALW awareness and reduction in the North-East • number of weapons collected enhanced through provision of advocacy and sensitisation the • number of communities/LGAs dangers of SALWs Reconciliation, Peace Building and • number of training modules 75% 25% Preventing and Addressing Violent Extremism Training • number of people trained • increase in performance as a result of training (on-the-job evaluation) 72 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 06 : OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK Expected Implementation Framework (% completion) Baseline Indicators Stabilisation Recovery Responsibility for Needs (Present State as of December 2015) for Stabilisation & Recovery Year 1-2 Year 3-4 Implementation 2.3 Capacity building and development of legislative frameworks for peace building and violence prevention • number of courts Justice, community security and 0% 100% control of small arms ICT for case management • number of cases processed Justice, community security and • number of model police stations 40% 60% control of small arms model/pilot projects to promote model police • number of advice lines for legal aid established stations and legal aid institutions • number of beneficiaries of legal advice line • number of mobile court sessions Justice, community Ssecurity and • number of training modules 60% 40% control of small arms training • number of people trained • increase in performance as a result of training (on-the-job evaluation) by law enforcement and justice agents • increase in level of services delivered by law enforcement and justice agents • increase in quality of services delivered by law enforcement and justice agents Capacity of security apparatus in the • number of facilities established with 60% 40% North-East strengthened through international standards/ammunition storage the provision of best practices in border security and stockpile management Legal and regulatory frameworks • framework established in accordance with 50% 50% required for sustained fight against international standards SALW established Programs and facilities for de- • number of facilities built 100% 0% radicalisation programme • number of people placed in facilities [Reconciliation, Peace Building and • number of training modules 75% 25% Countering Conflict Training • number of people trained • increase in performance as a result of training (on-the-job evaluation) VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 73 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA Expected Implementation Framework (% completion) Baseline Indicators Stabilisation Recovery Responsibility for Needs (Present State as of December 2015) for Stabilisation & Recovery Year 1-2 Year 3-4 Implementation 2.4 Training and programs for sustainable reintegration of defectors Disarming and reintegration • number of registration facilities established technical assistance to defectors • number of ex-combatants reintegrated 50% 50% • number of sensitisation campaigns carried out in the communities • number of defectors included in the programming • number of defectors receiving livelihood training • number of defectors receiving life skills training • number of defectors receiving psycho-social support • number of defectors engaging in income generation activities after the training program Assessments and studies • completion of assessments or studies 100% 0% (a) Mapping of available trauma response services; and (b) Trauma survey [Reconciliation, Peace Building and • number of direct beneficiaries, disaggregate 40% 60% countering conflict] Micro grants by gender (micro loans) • number of indirect beneficiaries, disaggregate by gender • amount disbursed repayment rate 2.5 Programs to address and prevent sex- and gender-based violence Assessments and studies • completion of assessments or studies 100% 0% (a) Study on SGBV; (b) Initial needs assessment; and (c) Mapping of available services Establishment of Sexual Assault • number of facilities established 100% 0% Referral Centre (SARC), create safe spaces, and provide psycho-social • number of beneficiaries support to victims Train available mental and medical • number of personnel trained services personnel to address SGBV, and provide immediate attention to victims 2.6 Comprehensive planning for SGBV victims’ needs; strengthening legal and social provisions for victims Comprehensive programming • number of programs developed on SGBV, including immediate attention to victims of SGBV, as • number of beneficiaries well as prevention initiatives Legal and social protections for • number of beneficiaries women and children affected by SGBV 74 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 06 : OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK Expected Implementation Framework (% completion) Baseline Indicators Stabilisation Recovery Responsibility for Needs (Present State as of December 2015) for Stabilisation & Recovery Year 1-2 Year 3-4 Implementation 2.7 Capacity building of service providers Train service providers working • % of service providers trained 100% State Universal Basic among conflict-affected populations Education Board in psycho-social support & peace building Psycho-social support to • % of affected population that receives support 100% State Universal Basic populations exposed to high level Education Board of violence Strategic Objective 3: Enhanced government accountability and citizen engagement in the delivery of services Expected Implementation Framework (% completion) Baseline Indicators Stabilisation Recovery Responsibility for Needs (Present State as of December 2015) for Stabilisation & Recovery Year 1-2 Year 3-4 Implementation 3.1 Awareness raising and public campaigns for citizen engagement Health risk mitigation awareness No activities of awareness • % of LGA with budgeted plan for awareness 20% 70% campaigns campaigns Water and sanitation promotion • number of people reached with hygiene Ministry in charge of campaigns, including distribution of messages water, RUWASSA, IEC materials to the affected areas, STWSSA, LGA plus the host communities WASH Unit, WASHCOM Outreach and advocacy to • number of media campaigns 50% 50% communities/civil society for • number of community meetings enhanced community engagement • number of NGOs involved in monitoring 3.2 Capacity development, and technical assistance to community-based organisations Develop capacity of school-based • % of SBMCs that conduct enrolment drive 50% 50% State Universal Basic management committees (SBMCs), and monitor enrolment Education Board e.g. to conduct enrolment drives, monitor enrolment Establish a community based establish LGA level beneficiary • establish Village Rehabilitation Committees Establish Quarterly Establish a North- grievance redress mechanism identification and grievance redressal to monitor housing assistance delivery beneficiary auditing/ East Housing mechanism mechanism auditing and Supporting Reconstruction technical uncompleted Project/State auditing housing Housing Ministry teams units to completion Strengthen systems at community • number of communities with active structures Ministry in charge of level for improved management of • number of communities with water safety water, RUWASSA, water and sanitation facilities plans STWSSA, LGA WASH Unit, WASHCOM VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 75 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA Expected Implementation Framework (% completion) Baseline Indicators Stabilisation Recovery Responsibility for Needs (Present State as of December 2015) for Stabilisation & Recovery Year 1-2 Year 3-4 Implementation Form and train community based • number of communities with structures for Ministry in charge of structures for implementation hygiene and sanitation promotion water, RUWASSA, and monitoring of sanitation and STWSSA, LGA hygiene promotion activities WASH Unit, WASHCOM Establish and support Community • number of CPs established Platforms (CP) • number of meetings on quarterly basis • number of informal and formal leaders involved on permanent basis in CPs • number of Local Government representatives involved on permanent basis in CPs • implementation of decisions taken by CPs • number of needs assessments conducted through CPs ratio of IDPs, returnees and host community members participating in CPs 3.3 Capacity building among Local and State Governments to enforce participation, accountability and transparency in their systems Local governance and citizen • number of training modules engagement training for Local • number of people trained Governments • increase in performance as a result of training (on-the-job evaluation) • number of needs assessments conducted by LGAs • level of implementation of needs assessments (projects) • increase in level of services delivered by Local Governments • budget delivery figures • number of reports released by Local Governments to public Local governance and citizen • increase in performance as a result of engagement, policy dialogue and mentoring (on-the-job evaluation) mentoring at the State Government • increase in fiscal allocations to Local level Government • increase in budget delivery • State policies developed to address recovery needs across different sectors • State policies developed to support rebuilding social cohesion across different sectors 76 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 06 : OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK Strategic Objective 4: Increased equity in the provision of basic services and employment opportunities Expected Implementation Framework (% completion) Baseline Indicators Stabilisation Recovery Responsibility for Needs (Present State as of December 2015) for Stabilisation & Recovery Year 1-2 Year 3-4 Implementation 4.1 Planning for reconstruction Formulate debris management plans No institutional framework for the • number of debris management plans 100% State Environmental for each of the conflict-affected management of debris formulated and adopted by State Governments Protection Agency states to frame the management of debris in their (EPA) jurisdiction Formulation of state-wide solid No waste management strategy • number of states with a formulated and 100% EPA waste management plans available at the State level adopted SWM management plan Establishing mechanism Establish North-East Housing • open bank accounts by beneficiaries and share publish Establish Establish a North- to implement the Housing Reconstruction Project/Gazette at least 10% of the cost in cash and kind the list of Material East Housing Reconstruction Program through Operations Guidelines to design beneficiaries Coordination Reconstruction home-owner driven processes and implement home-owner driven based on Teams to Project/State Housing Recovery Program detailed ensure easy Governments/ assessments access to Lead Commercial and open building Banks/Lead Micro bank accounts materials by Credit Institutions/ by 100% people Chamber of beneficiaries Commerce Technical assistance for initial Water • assessment report and capacity building plan Federal/State & Sanitation assessments, strategic available Government and planning and capacity building on ESAs (WB, EU, project management UNICEF) Education: complete assessment of • survey completed with precise estimates of 100% Complete assessment facilities damaged in six focus states rehabilitation/reconstruction needs (building, of facilities damaged furniture, equipment, learning materials, in six focus states textbooks) 4.2 (Re)construction/repair of service delivery infrastructure Reconstruction or rehabilitation of 60-100% destroyed by the crisis • % of agriculture and irrigation facilities -40% -60% Federal/State agriculture and irrigation facilities reconstructed Government/ Development Partners/ other stake holders Reconstruction or rehabilitation, • % of facilities rehabilitated, reconstructed, 30% 70% reconstruction refurbishment and re-equipping of re-equipped or rehabilitation, educational facilities refurbishment and re-equipping of educational facilities Reconstruction of electricity 28% destroyed • number of substations 60% 40% Yola and Jos Disco distribution substations State Governments Reconstruction of electricity 29% destroyed • km of lines rehabilitated 60% 40% Yola and Jos Disco distribution lines State Governments Reconstruction of electricity 16 substations destroyed • number of substations 60% 40% TCN, FGN transmission substations State Governments VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 77 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA Expected Implementation Framework (% completion) Baseline Indicators Stabilisation Recovery Responsibility for Needs (Present State as of December 2015) for Stabilisation & Recovery Year 1-2 Year 3-4 Implementation Reconstruction of electricity 257 km of lines destroyed • km of lines rehabilitated 60% 40% TCN, FGN transmission lines State Governments Health: reconstruction or PHC facilities damaged • % of PHC facilities reconstructed/ rehabilitation of PHC facilities Adamawa 7% rehabilitated Adamawa 32% 75% Bauchi 27% Bauchi 18% 41% Borno 46% Borno 17% 70% Gombe 1% Gombe 100% 100% Taraba 3% Taraba 48% 100% Yobe 46% Yobe 27% 93% Reconstruction or rehabilitation hospitals damaged • % of secondary hospitals reconstructed/ of referral facilities (secondary rehabilitated hospitals) Adamawa 33% Adamawa 33% 100% Bauchi 14% Bauchi 67% 100% Borno 21% Borno 40% 100% Gombe Gombe Taraba Taraba Yobe 25% Yobe 100% 100% Rehabilitation (repair) and 431,842 of the housing stock • 25% of total damaged houses (107,960 25% of the 100% of Establish a North- reconstruction of damaged houses damaged during Boko Haram related units) repaired and reconstructed in damaged Operation the fully East Housing conflicts affected LGAs as part of Operation Plan Plan target and partly Reconstruction fully damaged damaged Project Unit/State units and targeted units Governments/ 75% of reconstructed Ministry of partially Reconciliation, damaged Phase 2 of the Rehabilitation and units operational Reconstruction plan for 107,960 units kick starts based on the Phase 1 progress and conflict situations (US$ 400 million) 78 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 06 : OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK Expected Implementation Framework (% completion) Baseline Indicators Stabilisation Recovery Responsibility for Needs (Present State as of December 2015) for Stabilisation & Recovery Year 1-2 Year 3-4 Implementation Refurbishing damaged Approximately 480 base stations • No repaired base stations and towers 60% 100% Relevant ministry infrastructure for mobile phone base damaged across six states at State and Federal stations and towers level; private sector entities Repair and retrofit partially 706 public buildings are damaged; • All partly damaged public buildings are All partly Remaining Public Works damaged public buildings repaired and made functional damaged partly Departments/State Local damaged Governments Government building (19) (13) and are repaired ministry and made buildings functional; (4), police stations/ barrack (7) and election office (1) are repaired and made functional; (57% of total partly damaged buildings) 44 partly damaged (functional) and 100% of require repair/retrofitting the partly damaged public buildings restored Reconstruct/rebuild fully damaged 662 public buildings are completely • North-East Reconstruction Project (NERP) 25% of the 100% of Establish a NERP/ public buildings destroyed (non-functional) and need established total fully all fully Project Management to be rebuilt • All fully damaged public buildings are damaged damaged Consultants (PMC)/ reconstructed and made functional Local public State Governments Government buildings and ministry reconstructed buildings, and made police stations functional and barracks are rebuilt and made functional Rehabilitate Federal roads 878 sq m of Federal road damaged • square meter of rehabilitated roads and bridges 80% 100% Federal /State Ministry of Transport Rehabilitate State infrastructure 3326 sq m of State/LGA road • square meter of rehabilitated roads 80% 100% Federal /State (roads and bridges) damaged Ministry of Transport 11262 sq m of bridges damaged • square meter of rehabilitated bridges VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 79 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA Expected Implementation Framework (% completion) Baseline Indicators Stabilisation Recovery Responsibility for Needs (Present State as of December 2015) for Stabilisation & Recovery Year 1-2 Year 3-4 Implementation Repair and reconstruction of • number of water points restored Ministry in charge all damaged water facilities • number of schemes rehabilitated of water, Water (hand pumps, motorised and • number of beneficiaries Board, RUWASSA, solar powered) and boreholes in STWSSA, LGA communities and of piped schemes WASH Unit, in small towns and urban centres WASHCOM Repair and reconstruction of all • number of water points restored Ministry in charge damaged water facilities (hand of water, Water pumps, motorised and solar Board, RUWASSA, powered) boreholes in public places STWSSA, LGA (excluding schools and health WASH Unit, facilities) WASHCOM Replacement of all damaged • number of water points restored Ministry in charge of protected dug wells with hand • number of beneficiaries water, RUWASSA, pump boreholes STWSSA, LGA WASH Unit, WASHCOM Replacement/rehabilitation of • number of water points restored Ministry in charge of damaged sanitation infrastructure in water, RUWASSA, public places (excluding schools and STWSSA, LGA health facilities) WASH Unit, WASHCOM Construction of new water facilities • number of new water points Ministry in charge (hand pumps, motorised and solar • Additional population served by piped of water, Water powered boreholes) and network schemes Board, RUWASSA, extension in small towns and urban STWSSA, LGA centres in affected areas as well as in • number of beneficiaries WASH Unit, select host communities WASHCOM Construction of new water facilities • number of new water points Ministry in charge (hand pumps, motorised and solar • number of new sanitation facilities of water, Water powered boreholes) and sanitation Board, RUWASSA, infrastructure in public places in STWSSA, LGA the affected areas as well as in select WASH Unit, host communities WASHCOM Water and sanitation: One time • number of supplies delivered Federal/State provision of equipment and logistics Government and support (vehicles, office equipment, ESAs (WB, EU, furniture, ICT infrastructure, etc.) UNICEF) Water and sanitation: Operational • % of functional WASH facilities Federal/State support for fuelling of vehicles, Government and purchase of chemicals, working ESAs (WB, EU, tools and office expendables UNICEF) Replacement of lost SWM 15 vehicles destroyed and 8 damaged • number of vehicles replaced 100% EPA infrastructure directly by the conflict 80 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 06 : OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK Expected Implementation Framework (% completion) Baseline Indicators Stabilisation Recovery Responsibility for Needs (Present State as of December 2015) for Stabilisation & Recovery Year 1-2 Year 3-4 Implementation 4.3 Removal of debris / ensuring access Clear debris from areas where it 290,000 fully destroyed housing • number of structures cleared of debris, ready 100% To be defined by hampers access or reconstruction units, 135,000 partially damaged for reconstruction State level Debris housing units Management Plan. Likely State level EPA, potentially the Army in logistical support Remove debris aggregations from Up to 7.3 million cubic metres of • cubic metres of debris removed from areas of 100% As defined by debris areas of human settlement debris generated from damage to the human settlement management plans housing sector above, most likely EPA. Recycle, reuse, or reprocess as Not quantifiable, some informal • cubic metres of debris diverted from the 50% 50% EPA, private sector much debris as possible, especially sector recovery occurring, as well as disposal route through reuse or processing for through sustainable SMEs direct reuse on site recycling • number of livelihoods supported in the process of recycling Safe disposal of unusable debris Current disposal sites are • % of disposed debris which is disposed in a 100% EPA unmanaged and uncontrolled safe site, as described by International Solid Waste Association (ISWA) standards 4.4 Rehabilitation of existing service delivery methods, and expansion of service delivery to meet crisis needs Cash transfer/scholarship to address • number of boys/girls who receive cash transfer/ State Universal Basic financial barriers to enrolment scholarship 50% 50% Education Board Increased availability and utilization Coverage of DPT3/Penta3 • % of children of 23 months or below of essential health services, immunized with DPT3/Penta3 particularly provided through non- Adamawa 45% Adamawa 60% Adamawa 80% permanent structures: coverage of DPT3/Penta3 Bauchi 15% Bauchi 50% Bauchi 70% Borno 32% Borno 50% Borno 50% Gombe 24% Gombe 45% Gombe 75% Taraba 26% Taraba 55% Taraba 80% Yobe 8% Yobe 25% Yobe 50% VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 81 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA Expected Implementation Framework (% completion) Baseline Indicators Stabilisation Recovery Responsibility for Needs (Present State as of December 2015) for Stabilisation & Recovery Year 1-2 Year 3-4 Implementation Increased availability and utilisation skilled deliveries per State • % of deliveries attended by skilled personnel of essential services: deliveries attended by skilled personnel Adamawa 38% Adamawa 50% Adamawa 65% Bauchi 26% Bauchi 45% Bauchi 60% Borno 29% Borno 45% Borno 60% Gombe 47% Gombe 60% Gombe 70% Taraba 33% Taraba 45% Taraba 60% Yobe 9% Yobe 20% Yobe 40% Restoration of health system None of the CHEWs has been • % of facilities with CHEW trained for the 20% 60% functions trained in the provision of the essential package of service essential package [Health] Restoration of governance None of the LGA/States has an • % of LGA with operational Early Warning & 10% 40% and resilience functions restored operational EWARs Response System Expansion of coverage of Poverty incidence: 50.4% (2013) • Output indicator: number of households 50% 50% forthcoming National Social Safety covered Nets Programme, unconditional top-up for first 2 years • Ratio of IDP/returnee to non-IDP beneficiary households • Outcome indicator: poverty incidence and poverty gap • Household income/expenditure Old age and disability allowance Poverty incidence of households with • Output indicator: coverage of older persons 50% 50% older persons: 57.9% aged 65 years and above and PWDs, in terms of absolute numbers and share of total older persons/PWDs • Outcome indicator: poverty incidence and poverty gap Social Protection: Targeted subsidy Immunisation of children under 5: • Output indicator: number of total individuals 0% 100% of Community Based Social Health 43.4% covered Insurance Programme for children • Individuals covered as share of total under 5, lactating mothers and population in the North-East pregnant women • Health expenditure per individual/household • child immunisation rates Restore public transport • restored public transport assets 60% 100% Federal /State Ministry of Transport; Public Transport Corporations of Borno and Yobe 82 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 06 : OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK Expected Implementation Framework (% completion) Baseline Indicators Stabilisation Recovery Responsibility for Needs (Present State as of December 2015) for Stabilisation & Recovery Year 1-2 Year 3-4 Implementation Implementation of community led • number of people in communities certified as Ministry in charge of total sanitation approach in rural 'open defaecation free' water, RUWASSA, areas STWSSA, LGA WASH Unit, WASHCOM Capacity building of social Low institutional capacity to • Output indicator: 100% 0% protection institutions at the Local implement social protection schemes • number of LGA-level implementers receiving Government training Water and sanitation: • number of States Institutions strengthened Federal/State Establishment/strengthening of Government and local institutions (MDAs) at the • number of LGAs with WASH Units/ ESAs (WB, EU, State and LGA level Department established and operational UNICEF) 4.5 Skills training to boost employment opportunities that meet crisis-related needs in the North-East Social Protection: Public Poverty incidence: 50.4% (2013) • Output indicator: number of households 50% 50% Federal Government employment scheme covered (Ministry of Labour & Employment, Ministry for Women etc.), State Commissioners for Employment, Reconstruction, and Women etc. • Ratio of IDPs/returnee to non-IDPs Donor Organisations beneficiary households • Outcome indicator: poverty incidence and Implementing poverty gap CSO (international and national), Community Representatives, Training Centre Staff • Household income/expenditure Beneficiaries Labour force skills development % of unemployed persons • number of skills development facilities 60% 40% rehabilitated Rehabilitation of existing facilities • number of training facilities newly constructed 30% 70% and addition of new facilities Skill development training • number of trainings conducted in centres 40% 60% Skill development outreach using • number of trainings conducted by mobile 50% 50% mobile teams teams VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 83 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA Expected Implementation Framework (% completion) Baseline Indicators Stabilisation Recovery Responsibility for Needs (Present State as of December 2015) for Stabilisation & Recovery Year 1-2 Year 3-4 Implementation Women empowerment through • number of women trained for professional 40% 60% skills training for employment skills Professional skills trainings • number of women participating in adult 40% 60% literacy Adult literacy & counting education • number of women attending life skills/peace 40% 60% education Life skills training/peace education % of unemployed women • number of women placed in employment 30% 70% Start-up Kit distribution • Start-up kits distributed 30% 70% Employment identification • women enterprises built up 30% 70% Micro-enterprises set up • numbers of women cooperatives built up 30% 70% Cooperatives building up Youth empowerment through skills • number of youth trained for professional skills 40% 60% training for employment Professional skills trainings • number of youth participating in Catch Up 40% 60% Literacy Adult literacy & counting education • number of youth attending life skills/peace 40% 60% education Life skills training/peace education % of unemployed youth • number of youth placed in employment 30% 70% Start-up kit distribution • Number of start-up kits distributed 30% 70% Employment identification • number of youth enterprises built up 30% 70% • number of youth cooperatives built up Micro-enterprises set up 70% 30% Cooperatives building up Strengthen institutional capacity % of employment centres and related • % of employment centres rehabilitated 40% 60% of State Employment Centres and institutions are damaged, destroyed related institutions or not functional • % of employment centre staff trained 40% 60% • number of new staff for employment centres 30% 70% recruited • number of job seekers placed in new 30% 70% employment 4.6 Sector economic recovery to boost employment opportunities Reinforcement of existing waste Unquantified number of SMEs • number of livelihoods created within the 50% 50% EPA management and resource recovery informally supporting municipal SWM and DM resource recovery sector livelihood sector SWM system through resource recovery activities Support to youth entrepreneurship Limited youth entrepreneurship and • 500 business plans supported under You Win 30% 70% Federal Ministry high youth unemployment initiative of Industry, Trade and Investment, SMEDAN 84 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT CHAPTER 06 : OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK Expected Implementation Framework (% completion) Baseline Indicators Stabilisation Recovery Responsibility for Needs (Present State as of December 2015) for Stabilisation & Recovery Year 1-2 Year 3-4 Implementation Reopening of border stations All border stations in Borno State • All border stations in Yobe, Borno, Adamawa, 60% 100% Nigeria Customs are closed and Taraba are open Services, Federal Ministry of Finance Recovery of markets Market activities significantly • All markets in the 6 North-East States are 60% 100% State Ministries affected by conflict, with markets operational of Industry, Trade destroyed and/or closed and Investment, National Emergency Management Agency, State Emergency Management Agencies Increased access to financial services 68.4% of adults financially excluded • 10,000 micro, small, and medium enterprises 20% 80% Development Bank for micro, small and medium in the North-East have received a loan from a financial of Nigeria, Financial enterprises institution Inclusion Secretariat Private sector recovery in the North- Private sector activities significantly • 2,000 small and medium enterprises receive 30% 70% Federal and State East States reduced because of the fighting recovery support (matching grants) Ministries for Formal private sector: small and (destruction, reduced mobility, • Support to micro-enterprises captured in Industry, Trade medium enterprises reduced trade) Livelihoods component and Investment; Informal private sector: micro- SMEDAN enterprises Support to private sector Small formal private sector, with few • 100 small and medium enterprises receive 10% 90% Federal and State development in high potential industries support in the agribusiness and solid minerals Ministries for value chains: agribusiness and solid value chains Industry, Trade minerals and Investment; SMEDAN Agriculture based value chains and Significant reduction in human • number of returning IDPs/ returnee, youth, 60% 40% Federal/State agro processing centres established mobility thus limiting access to women and affected hosting communities Government/ Local and strengthened. extension services and productive members participating in along agricultural Government/ assets value chains Development • number of people active at agro processing Partners/private centres sector/other stake holders Strengthening agriculture and Significant reduction in human • % of farmers IDPs/refugees with access to 60% 40% Federal/State irrigation related services value mobility thus limiting access to agricultural inputs and extension services Government/ chains for increased food security extension services and productive Development and agricultural productivity inputs/assets Partners/other stake holders Natural resources based and Not developed as much before • number of community members including 60% 40% Government/ Local solid minerals value chains conflict as farming was dominating youth, women and men active along the Government/ and enterprises developed and developed value chains Development commercialized for sustainable Limited skills in artisanal mining, • number of viable natural resources based and Partners/private broad based local economic natural resources based production solid mineral based enterprises established and sector/ other stake recovery. processing ( value addition and functional holders beneficiation ) Social Protection: Employment • Output indicator: number of IDPs/returnee 70% 30% of IDPs in procurement of employed in the forthcoming program forthcoming national school feeding program VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 85 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[Accessed on Mar. 11, 2016] UNOCHA, Jul 2015, Humanitarian Bulletin Nigeria Issue 04. Zenn, J. and Pearson, E., 2014, ”Women, Gender and the evolving tactics of Boko Haram. __ UNOCHA, Nov 2015, Nigeria Humanitarian Needs Overview. Journal of Terrorism Research” ,5(1). DOI: http://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.828 __ UNOCHA, Dec 2015, Humanitarian Response Plan: Nigeria. UNOCHA, Mar 2016, Nigeria Humanitarian Funding Overview, Update. VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT 87 NORTH-EAST NIGERIA Endnotes 1 UNOCHA, 2015 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP). 23 OECD has produced guidelines for the implementation 34 In fact, Bauchi experienced a cumulative decline in both Note other sources indicate higher human tolls, of do-no-harm approaches in conflict recovery prices, especially for food items. In contrast, Gombe however could not be verified for the purpose of programming along similar lines of those here experienced the highest cumulative increase in prices for this report. described. For more information visit: http://www. all items and for food. Cumulative increases in prices for oecd.org/dac/governance-peace/conflictandfragility/ all items were much higher in the primary affected States, 2 IOM, NEMA, 2015, Displacement Tracking Matrix docs/do%20no%20harm.pdf while in the secondary affected States, an increase in the (DTM) Round VII. price for food was slightly higher. It is noteworthy that it is 24 Protection Sector Working Group (PSWG), 2016. significantly higher than a price increase for all items (23.8 3 The Federal level pertains to assets and interventions PSWG provides the Humanitarian Country Team percent compared to 5.3 percent). of the Federal Government, while the Regional level (HCT) and the National Humanitarian Coordination pertains to needs that would require interventions Forum strategic advice and ensures coordination of 35 Africa Growth Initiative Working Paper, 2014. across all States, or those activities that cannot be protection issues, including with the subsector working disaggregated by state. groups on child protection and SGBV. It is co-led by 36 FEWSNET, 2015. the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 4 UNOCHA, 2015, HRP. (UNHCR) together with National Human Rights 37 Daily Post, 2016. Commission. For further information see https://www. 38 FEWSNET, 2015. 5 IOM, NEMA, 2015, DTM Round VII. humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/nigeria/ protection 39 Note: Population-weighted proportion. Questions used: 6 UNOCHA, 2015, HRP. “In your main activity, what is the employer in this 25 The Operational Framework is contained in Chapter 6 7 NSRP, 2014a. job?” combined with “Have you received wages, salary of this Volume. or other payments either in cash or in other forms from 8 Chothia, F., 2015. this employment for this work?” 26 Estimated in Naira: 1.66 trillion. 9 Nigeria Watch http://www.nigeriawatch.org/index. 40 FEWSNET, 2015. 27 Estimated in Naira: 708.18 billion. php?urlaction=evtStat 28 Federal level pertains to assets and interventions of the 41 Federal level pertains to assets and interventions of the 10 UNOCHA, 2015, HRP. Federal Government, while regional pertains to needs Federal Government, while Regional pertains to needs that would require interventions across all States, or that would require interventions across all States, or 12 ACLED, 2016. those activities that cannot be disaggregated by state. those activities that cannot be disaggregated by state. 13 BBC Monitoring Africa, 2015. 41 GHS, 2012/2013. 29 Critical needs for return and resettlement and peace 14 UNOCHA, 2015, HRP. building such as housing, livelihoods and service 42 NDHS, 2013. delivery are accounted for in Infrastructure and 15 UNOCHA, 2016. Social Services component and Economic Recovery 43 British Council, 2012. component. Peace Building, Stability and Social 16 The number of LGAs that the DTM teams were able to Cohesion Component focuses only on needs that are 44 Ibid. access also increased over the same period. not yet accounted for. 45 Ibid. 17 In addition, 1 in 6 Africans is Nigerian. With up to 30 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for 60 percent of its population under 24 of age, this Human Rights, 2015 A/HRC/30/67. 46 Nigeria’s Political Violence Research Network, 2013. represents a huge demographic left largely without 31 IOM, NEMA, 2015, DTM Round VII. 47 Zenn and Pearson, 2014. education and represents a huge loss to economic and human development. 48 IOM and NEMA, 2015, DTM VII. 32 The African Union Convention for the Protection and 18 World Bank, 2014. Assistance of IDPs in Africa is known as the Kampala 49 Ibid. Convention, formulated to protect the rights and well- 19 UNOCHA, 2015, Humanitairian Needs Overivew being of people forced to flee their homes by conflict, 50 Ibid. (HNO). violence, and natural disasters, and human rights abuses. The Convention reflects the norms included in the 1998 51 NSRP, 2014b. 20 Human Rights Watch, 2014; Amnesty UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, while International 2015. articulating the obligations and roles of African States 52 United States Institute of Peace, 2013. and other key actors such as the African Union (AU), 21 All six States are known to be exposed to natural 53 Awojobi, 2014. armed groups, international organizations and civil disasters with various degrees of vulnerability. society, to prevent and respond to internal displacement. 54 NSRP, 2014b. The Convention has the potential to make a significant 22 Other factors should also be taken into consideration. contribution to improving the wellbeing of IDPs across 55 CIRDDOC, 2015 http://www.internationalbudget.org/ For example, the main reason for the displacement groups/civil-resource-development-and-documentation- Africa, depending on its effective implementation, and of populations in Taraba State is due to communal ratification by signatory AU member States. centre-cirddoc-nigeria/ conflicts. Also, the six States are vulnerable to natural disasters, albeit to various degrees. 33 UNDP, 2013; UN, 2009. 88 VOLUME I : SYNTHESIS REPORT RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT The North-East has suffered tremendously in the past six years. We have all been witness to the destruction of infrastructure, farmlands, businesses and trades, of schools and the loss of school years. Rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating what has been lost or damaged will cost money and time. ...the tasks before us are many and profound but paramount: to fix brick and mortar and to mend hearts and minds damaged by senseless, murderous violence. − His Excellency, Professor Yemi Osinbajo, the Vice President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria About the Recovery and Peace Building Assessment (RPBA): On 21 August 2015, the Government of Nigeria requested assistance in assessing the needs associated with peace building and crisis recovery. Support has been provided in accordance with the 2008 Joint European Union (EU) – United Nations (UN) – World Bank (WB) Declaration on crisis assessment and recovery planning. A Recovery and Peace Building Assessment was initiated and findings are presented in this report. The Recovery and Peace Building Assessment (RPBA) informs a collective vision and strategy on peace building and recovery, and provides a framework for coordinated and coherent support to assist con- flict-affected people in the North-East. The assessment covers the six States of Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Gombe, Taraba, and Bauchi, and provides an overarching framework for stability, peace building, and recovery. The RPBA is founded on the recognition that a durable resolution to the conflict in the North-East requires addressing the structural and underlying drivers of violent conflict. This understanding has also underpinned the identification and prioritisation of needs presented in this report. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA