CONFLICT AND CHANGE IN KOSOVO:

IMPACT ON INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIETY

by

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Kosovo¹ has been depicted as a province dominated by hatred. However, in looking at the evolution of its social institutions over time, one can find traditions of intra-community and inter-ethnic coexistence and cooperation. This study traces the potential for supporting these traditions through the creation of inclusive social institutions that foster trust, cooperation, and participation among Kosovar Albanians, and between Kosovar Albanians and other ethnic groups. It is also proposes a medium-term strategy for development of the region, based on strengthening social capital and supporting the activities of civil society groups. The study does not focus on emergency issues such as shelter, food security and other types of humanitarian assistance, many of which have been reported and analyzed in detail elsewhere, including by the many agencies cited in the footnotes and bibliography. Nor does the study consider exclusively economic vulnerability and poverty, which will be covered by the upcoming World Bank poverty assessment.

The reader should bear in mind that the study relied on data collected by various agencies under difficult circumstances. In some cases, therefore, figures for internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, minorities, and returnees may vary to some degree. Every effort has been made to ensure that the numbers are consistent, and to cite the different sources when the numbers conflict. Figures for remittances may also vary. Moreover, they may be given in US dollars, Deutsch marks, or Swiss Francs, depending on how the data were collected. Because of fluctuations in the exchange rate, it was considered more accurate to give these numbers as they were reported than to convert them to one currency.

The study was prepared by a team headed by Gloria La Cava, World Bank Senior Social Scientist for South Eastern Europe. Raffaella Nanetti, Professor of Urban Planning at the University of Illinois, Chicago, was responsible for designing the assessment methodology, the section on formal institutions, and the trust and social capital case studies. She also contributed to the concluding chapter. Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers, Fellow at the School of Slavonic Studies at the University of London and an anthropologist specializing in Albanian issues, was responsible for the field research and analysis. Arjan Gjonca, a demographer at the London School of Economics, undertook the macro social analysis. Taies Nezam, World Bank Social Development Specialist, contributed to the design of the study, the field research, and the section on minority groups. She was also responsible for revising various drafts and organizing a dissemination workshop in Kosovo to discuss the assessment. Barbara Balaj, a political scientist and World Bank consultant, conducted the research and analysis of the Kosovar diaspora. Astrit Salihu, a sociologist at the University of Pristina/Prishtine and independent researcher, contributed to the field research on informal institutions and to the social assessment. Francesco Del Re, an agronomist with the FAO/WFP Food Security Surveillance Unit in Kosovo, contributed to the macro social analysis and provided general guidance to the assessment team. Deborah Davis, a World Bank writer and editor, wrote the final version of the study. Natasha Bolger, an anthropologist at University College, London, assisted Ms. Schwandner-Sievers with the field research on informal institutions and for the social assessment. Finally, Rathna Chiniah, Daphne Sawyerr-Dunn and Beaulah Noble provided assistance with the processing and formatting of various drafts of the report.

¹ Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), hereafter referred to as Kosovo.
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# ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAK</td>
<td>Alliance for the Future of Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BHRC</td>
<td>Bar Human Rights Committee of England and Wales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEG</td>
<td>Deutsche Investitions und Entwicklungsgesellschaft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>DM</td>
<td>Deutsche Mark</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EWD</td>
<td>Empowering Widows in Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRY</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
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<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IMG</td>
<td>International Management Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>INC</td>
<td>Interim Administrative Council</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
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<td>JIAS</td>
<td>Joint Interim Administrative Structure</td>
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<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
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<td>KLA</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
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<td>KPC</td>
<td>Kosovo Protection Corps</td>
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<td>KTC</td>
<td>Kosovo Transitional Council</td>
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<td>LDK</td>
<td>Democratic League of Kosovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>MA</td>
<td>Municipal Administrator</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIMA</td>
<td>National Imagery and Mapping Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDK</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Kosovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>RIINVEST</td>
<td>Institute for Development Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFRY</td>
<td>Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNC</td>
<td>Serb National Council</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<td>United Nations Development Fund for Women</td>
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<td>United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<td>World Food Program</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

I. INTRODUCTION

This assessment examines how conflict and displacement in Kosovo over the last decade have affected its social relations and institutions. It covers a broad and complex set of issues that, taken together, form an overview of Kosovar society as it has adapted to economic and political changes brought about by: (a) the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY); (b) the enforcement period, when the majority Albanian population was excluded from public life; (c) ethnically motivated violence and displacement; and, more recently, (d) the return of the Albanian refugees and establishment of an international administration. During the most recent phase, intra- and inter-ethnic violence has continued, with the remaining Kosovar Serb and other minority populations suffering from varying degrees of social exclusion.

Given the rapid engagement of the World Bank and other international actors in the province, a comprehensive social assessment of this type was not possible prior to the design of emergency projects and programs. It is our hope, however, that future reconstruction and development program and policy decisions will benefit from this study, which is one of a series of studies of local-level institutions being carried out by the World Bank to guide implementation of its Regional Strategy for South Eastern Europe.

Conceptual Framework: The Need to Build Inclusive Social Institutions in Kosovo

The premise of this study is that efforts to achieve stability and sustainable economic growth in Kosovo depend on the creation of inclusive institutions that promote intra-community cohesion and inter-ethnic reconciliation. The related concepts of social cohesion, social capital, and reconciliation are central to the analysis. The report assesses the presence in Kosovo of two kinds of social capital—bonding and bridging—and the implications of each for promoting social cohesion and managing conflict within and among Kosovo’s various ethnic groups. While bonding social capital can be exclusionary, reinforcing ties within groups but promoting distrust of outsiders and therefore social fragmentation and the impoverishment of public life, bridging social capital tends to nurture relationships across groups, and therefore promotes inclusion, reconciliation, and cohesion. The assessment focuses on the potential in Kosovo for developing bridging social capital as a precondition for the emergence of linking social capital, which is implicit in state institutions that are inclusive and empowering, that foster participation in and transparency of the decision-making process, and that therefore enable the cooperative engagement of all groups in building a peaceful society. The development of linking social capital in Kosovo is not, however, specifically evaluated in this report due to the rapidly evolving nature of state institutions.

It is also important to bear in mind that the study does not focus on emergency issues such as shelter, food security and other types of humanitarian assistance, many of which have been reported and analyzed in detail elsewhere, including by the many agencies cited. Nor does the study consider exclusively economic vulnerability and poverty issues, which will be analyzed by the upcoming World Bank poverty assessment.
Methodology and Scope of Work

The analysis progresses from the macro to the micro level—from formal to informal institutions to families and individuals—to capture a variety of perspectives on the process of social and institutional change in Kosovo. The analysis is divided into four main sections, each analyzing a separate set of issues.

- The **macro social analysis** focuses on broad spatial and temporal dimensions of change in Kosovo during the 1990s due to war damage, displacement, and the international presence. It first considers the demographic characteristics of this change, including age, sex, and ethnicity. It then analyzes socioeconomic dimensions such as health, education, employment, and income.

- The **assessment of social institutions** encompasses both formal and informal institutions. The section on **formal institutions** focuses on the co-management experience at the municipal level and on prospects for enhancing municipal institutional capacity. It provides an overview of the formal institutional context within which the informal social institutions can be understood. The section on **informal institutions** focuses on informal group-level institutions such as kinship networks, village-councils, the family, and civil society groups; and examines how these institutions have changed over time.

- The **social assessment** looks at the needs and vulnerabilities of the population, including (a) household-level strategies for securing food, shelter, and education; (b) people’s perceptions of security, due to crime and remaining inter-ethnic violence; (c) the situation of women and girls, minorities, and other vulnerable groups; and (d) possibilities for inter-ethnic coexistence and reconciliation. This section also assesses the views of the population on the effectiveness of institutions, and of their capacity for promoting modernization and democratization.

- The **diaspora assessment** focuses on the history and demography of the emigration, remittance patterns, incentives and pressures to return, and the role the diaspora might play in the reconstruction of Kosovo.

The macro analysis is based on a variety of data sets for the province from 1990 to 2000. For the pre-conflict period (1990-1999), data are taken from official SFRY statistical yearbooks and census publications. The 1991 census was used for the population projection, while the demographic aspects relied on other official sources. For the period after the conflict (1999-2000), sources consisted mainly of recent assessments undertaken by a number of governmental, non-governmental, and international organizations.

The institutional and social assessments are based largely on fieldwork carried out in March and April 2000 in five representative regions—Pristina/Prishtine, Pec/Peja, Prizren, Gnjilane/Gjilan, and Malisevo/Malisheve. Most of this fieldwork focused on the Kosovar Albanians, who comprise over 90% of the current population. At each site, separate group discussions were held with adult men, adult women, young men (between 15 and 25 years of age), and young women (between 15 and 25 years of age). In addition, a number of open-ended interviews were conducted with representatives of formal and informal institutions. Group discussions and open-ended interviews were also carried out with vulnerable groups (war widows, IDPs, returnees) and minorities (Serbs, Romas, Turks, and Muslim Slavs), where they were present in large numbers. The social and institutional assessments also benefited from the work of a number of local and international organizations.

The diaspora assessment is based on field work carried out in Germany and Switzerland, including interviews with host country officials and representatives of international agencies working with migrants, as well as group discussions with migrants.
The results of the study are summarized below.

II. MACRO SOCIAL ANALYSIS

This chapter focuses first on demographic characteristics of change in Kosovo during the 1990s, and then on its social and economic aspects.

Demographic Changes

**Demographic trends.** Despite the massive emigration of men of reproduction age and the decline in fertility (2.5 children per woman), the population of Kosovo remains very young. People under 25 years of age comprise 46 percent of the population in 2000. The median age is currently 22.2 years. There is also a clearly distorted age structure for 2000, with migration dramatically affecting ages 20-40, especially for males. Kosovo has also experienced other dramatic demographic changes as a result of the conflict, including a decrease in the crude birth rate and an increase in the crude death rate, and, surprisingly, a decline in infant mortality even though health conditions in the province have deteriorated over the last decade.

**Ethnic structure.** With the end of the conflict in mid-1999, the ethnic structure of the population changed dramatically. Of the 356,000 non-Kosovar Albanians in Kosovo in 1991, about 200,000 were still in the province in early 2000: 100,000 Serbs, 47,000 Muslim Slavs, 30,000 Romas, and 20,000 Turks. During the post-conflict period, ethnicity remains a key factor in the risk of falling victim to harassment and violence. As a result, the remaining members of minority groups continue to leave the province or relocate from mixed towns and villages to ethnically homogenous areas. This is particularly true for Kosovar Serbs and Romas.

**Structure of the active population.** The level of the active population (between 15 and 60 years of age) remained relatively stable, at about 55 percent, between 1991 and 2000. The dependency ratios were high, at about 72 percent, during the entire period, largely because of the large proportion of people under 15. These young people will join the active population in the coming years, ensuring that Kosovo does not face an aging crisis similar to that in other countries of South Eastern Europe.

**Rural-urban composition.** The rural population of the province fell only slightly during the past decade, from 62.7 percent of the total in 1991 to 58.6 percent in 2000. At the municipal level, however, the rural-urban composition by ethnic group has changed dramatically, with the Serb population declining in cities and growing in rural areas, and the Albanian population exhibiting the opposite trend. If Kosovo follows the experience of other Balkan countries, it will undergo a rapid shift toward urbanization in the coming years as a result of economic reforms. The most significant gainers will be major cities where most economic, social, and civil activities will be based, such as Pristina/Prishtine, Prizren, and Dakovica/Gjakove.

**Conflict-related displacement and damage.** The areas with the largest number of displaced persons—both IDPs and those who migrated to neighboring countries—also suffered the greatest damage to houses, schools, health facilities, and farm assets. More than 25 percent of all houses in the province were severely damaged or totally destroyed; many villages lost their only schools and health clinics, which has contributed to the reluctance of many villagers to return to their villages; and farm assets were damaged on a massive scale, with the replacement value of animals, farm buildings, and agricultural machinery conservatively estimated at US$700 to US$800 million. There was also significant damage to and looting of agro-processing equipment, especially at private small and medium-size farms. In addition, the high demand for wood (for both fuel and construction) after the conflict has put increasing pressure on forests; and landmines are limiting access to agricultural and forest land.
**Consequences of emigration and conflict on gender.** As a result of the high number of males who emigrated or were killed during the war, more than 15 percent of households in Kosovo are now headed by women. These households may be among the most vulnerable in terms of economic and social needs, including employment, food supplies, education, and health care.

**Social and Economic Changes**

**Health.** The population has a relatively high life expectancy. The majority of deaths among the Albanian population are from non-communicable diseases due to smoking and diet, reflecting an epidemiological pattern more consistent with an industrialized than a developing country. Ante- and postnatal care is currently considered to be inadequate.

**Education.** In 1991, 28 percent of the Kosovar population 10 years of age or older had no education, compared to 13 percent for the rest of the SFRY. The percentage of the Kosovar population with primary, secondary, and higher education has increased significantly during the 1990s, despite the emergence of the parallel education system for the majority Albanians and the conflict. But concerns regarding the quality of this education and gender disparity at the secondary and tertiary levels remain.

**Employment.** In 1984, the number of people formally employed per thousand of working age was 223 in Kosovo compared to 426 in the SFRY as a whole, 665 in Slovenia, and 409 in Serbia. This situation worsened during the 1990s, when Kosovar Albanians were expelled from public employment, but improved in 1999 when many reclaimed their previous positions. At the present time, unemployment is higher among the Kosovar Serbs due to internal displacement and loss of jobs in the industrial sector and public administration.

**Income.** During the pre-conflict period, family income was more than three times higher than at present, with most income (32 percent) coming from small and medium businesses rather than salaries (23 percent). About a quarter of family income also came from remittances. After the war, remittances and humanitarian assistance increased, while income from private businesses fell.

**Livelihood.** Kosovo emerges from the analysis as a still largely rural patriarchal society with a strong attachment to the land. More than 50 percent of the population is engaged in agriculture, with farms of 2-3 ha. Before the conflict, about half of rural household income came from livestock production, and the remainder from small-scale trade, skilled and casual labor, remittances, and formal employment. In the post-conflict period, despite the losses in formal employment from closed factories and businesses, opportunities for both skilled and unskilled labor have increased due to relief and reconstruction programs, especially in urban areas. The free economic environment and widespread use of a convertible currency has also stimulated the creation of small trading businesses and self-employment schemes, especially in the construction and transport sectors.

III. ASSESSMENT OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

This chapter assesses Kosovo’s formal and informal social institutions during the 1990s, up to and including the June 1999 to the present period.

**Formal Institutions**

The first part focuses on formal institutions, and in particular on the co-management experience at the municipal level under UNMIK in five representative sites—Pristina/Prishtine, Gnjilane/Gjilan, Prizren, Malisevo/Malisheve, and Pec/Peja. During this period, Kosovar and international actors have
been working to establish a sustainable system of local government characterized by inclusive institutions, an accountable bureaucracy, and an engaged civil society.

• **In Pristina/Prishtine,** the capital of Kosovo, the co-management system was essentially in place but the relationship between UNMIK and local officials was less than ideal, with the local leadership continually testing the strength of what they called the “UNMIK-imposed” system, and criticizing it for poor services. This stalemate between the co-management partners resulted in, among other things, unchecked urban growth and increasing crime. In addition, the municipality lacked a mandate to levy taxes or allocate resources, which contributed to poor service performance and caused delays in paying municipal employees. This reportedly fostered corruption and forced many civil servants, including teachers, to find supplemental work with international organizations. At the same time, the behavior of foreign NGOs was criticized because they sought permission for their activities from UNMIK but not from local Kosovar officials. There was also evidence of party-controlled channels for accessing social services, although international NGOs and KFOR (Kosovo Force) provided social services to IDPs and minority populations.

While prospects for municipal self-governance in the capital appeared less than promising in the short term, an ‘engaged urban university program’ at the University of Pristina/Prishtine could serve as a model for improvements in municipal governance, by building communication and professional networks in the capital city to ameliorate the city’s problems. The university is currently putting in place an administrative structure that is more transparent and accountable, and will be better positioned to develop the technical expertise to help carry out such reforms at the municipal level.

• **Gnjilane/Gjilan** was the only UNMIK regional office where, due to continuing violence against the Serbs, there was a lack of any effective co-management. The security problem resulted in UNMIK creating a two-track system for basic municipal services—one consisting of schools, clinics and other services used mainly by ethnic Albanians; and the other of a mixture of services provided directly to the Serb and smaller Roma minorities, complemented by other grassroots services they provided for themselves.

The incomplete institutional co-management system was, by definition, not inclusive. However, the two-track service system attempted to provide access to local government services for all population groups, while UNMIK tried to create the conditions for broader inclusion. Meanwhile, the urban-to-rural displacement of the Serbs led to isolated Serb enclaves in the countryside, while the Albanian rural-to-urban migration created the need for shelter and more economic opportunity. Both groups were dependent on the international presence for security and services. At the same time, the size of Gnjilane/Gjilan’s middle class and intelligentsia declined, contributing to pessimism within UNMIK about prospects for the immediate future.

• **In Prizren,** the co-management system was incomplete, following removal of the president of the municipal council, who was unwilling to work with UNMIK. The quality of the municipal workforce was low, due to outmoded professional skills, the brain drain from Prizren to the capital, and patronage in municipal jobs. In addition, UNMIK was unable to take action to stop illegal construction, much of which was reportedly financed by trafficking across the border with Albania. There were also reports of girls being kidnapped, of harassment and the social and economic exclusion of minorities.
In Malisevo/Malisheve, which was not a formal municipality and so had no formal municipal structure, UNMIK aimed to formalize the parallel institutional structure set up by the KLA after 1991. The parallel nature of this institutional system was still apparent in that UNMIK did not have a budget for or an official office in Malishevo/Malisheve, and its municipal administrator commuted from Prizren. However, the relationship between UNMIK and local officials was a close one, and UNMIK allowed village governments to tax commercial activities to finance local services. This gave these local governments more de facto freedom for self-government.

The hybrid institutional situation meant that Malishevo/Malisheve could not attract international reconstruction resources, including building materials for housing reconstruction. This, in turn, kept away local NGOs. Local officials shared UNMIK’s vision for reconstruction, including the strengthening of agriculture and the promotion of tourism, although this vision could not be realized because of the lack of resources. Instead, the local administration focused on political organizing and on supporting the creation of new groups operating within this rural and traditional society. For example, a women’s association founded in January 1999 trains young rural women and widows in sewing, and provides medical advice to pregnant women. While this grassroots approach was admirable, it is not known how inclusive the local administration was in carrying out its other activities.

Pec/Peja had a complete co-management structure in place and municipal departments, staffed with well-trained professionals, despite the fact that Pec/Peja suffered some of the worst destruction during the conflict because of its largely ethnic Albanian population. The relationship between UNMIK and local officials developed at a steady pace after initial coolness and as the psychological trauma of the conflict lessened. However, there was some intra-ethnic violence due to conflicts of interest among the traditional family groups still strong in this area. There were also many accounts of former KLA fighters still acting as police in the city, particularly at night; and of organized criminal activities.

**Informal Institutions**

This chapter focuses on changes that occurred in Kosovo’s informal institutions—civil society organizations, village councils, and family systems—during the 1990s. The chapter first describes civil society groups in terms of their orientation (place-based, identity-based, issue-based with a public interest orientation, issue-based with a self-interest orientation); the type of social capital that each promotes; and how such groups have been affected by the international presence. The focus then shifts to a more in-depth analysis of the principal place-based group, the traditional Kosovar extended family; how tradition and family were used as coping strategies during the conflict; and how the reemergence of the traditional family has impacted women. Finally, the chapter considers how the lack of trust and participation impedes the development of those groups that promote bridging social capital.
Civil society groups

- **Place-based groups.** The principal place-based group is the traditional patrilocal extended family, which tends to foster inward-looking bonding social capital. This institution was strengthened as a result of the conflict, especially in the villages, but also in larger towns, where more modern nuclear families tended to remain in the same neighborhood as their relatives.

- **Identity-based groups.** Groups that narrowly define themselves in terms of ethnicity or religion were also strengthened as a result of their dealings with UNMIK and other international agencies, often as the sole representatives of or service providers for their members. This increased the legitimacy of the identity-based leadership and exacerbated the tendency of the different church groups, social clubs, trade unions, and welfare organizations to operate not only separately but also in opposition to each other.

- **Issue-based groups with a public interest orientation.** The post-conflict legacy of violence and distrust impeded the formation of new public interest-oriented groups that could help to counterbalance the influence of identity-based groups and create the bridging social capital needed for civic development. Few of the sites were found to have a broad-based business or cultural association, although women’s and youth groups have done some remarkable work creating bridging social capital, fostering relationships beyond ethnic boundaries, and thus counterbalancing the influence of the extended family structure.

- **Issue-based groups with a self-interest orientation.** The same conditions that strengthened identity-based groups also encouraged the emergence of self-interested groups destructive to the social fabric. These groups, largely focused on acquiring great wealth and territorial control through violence and criminal activities, have fed on the ample supply of unemployed youth, the opportunities provided by the uncertain legal environment, and the increasing presence in Kosovo of criminal networks. Focus group participants at all sites expressed great concern about the rapid criminalization of Kosovo’s economy and inability of UNMIK and KFOR to control this problem.

**UNMIK’s support for groups that promote inclusion and bridging social capital**

The international community has viewed Kosovo’s emerging public interest-oriented groups as the connective tissue that will link modern and representative local institutions to broader societal needs. UNMIK has provided tangible support to these public interest-oriented groups, many of which applied for recognition as NGOs, as long as their views and activities were not in conflict with UNMIK’s mandate.

**The traditional Kosovar family: coping with the crisis through bonding social capital**

The assessment found that the pre-conflict exclusion from state structures, the conflict itself, and the post-conflict displacement and loss of housing reversed the trend began during the 1970s and 1980s toward nuclear family formation among the Kosovar Albanians. Focus group participants, including village elders, repeatedly noted that the reemergence of the “Kosovo-type” patrilocal extended family during the crisis was a strategy for coping with economic scarcity and threats to survival. In addition, many respondents, particularly the young, expressed a desire for these families to break into nuclear units as soon as economic and security conditions allow.
The Kosovo-type family is a source of both protection and risk for women. The husband’s family is obliged to take care of his wife, but she is always considered a kin-outsider and her children belong “by blood” to the husband’s family. Thus, if the husband dies, she may be obliged to leave her home and children behind. This situation creates an enormous risk of abuse. At the same time, women who lack the protection of a husband, father, or other male relative are both socially and economically vulnerable.

The traditional family has also been associated with both blood feuds and reconciliation rituals, which have historically been performed in times of outside threats to establish cohesion among all Albanians. A broad intra-community appeasement effort based on these traditions was initiated in 1990 to settle customary Albanian blood feuds for the sake of development and national cohesion in the face of increasing Serb hegemony. There is also evidence that this reconciliation initiative provided the logistics for emergence of the parallel state during the 1990s.

The number of men of working age in a family determines the family’s capacity for survival. In rural areas, in particular, men generate the family’s income, although many, both men and women, would like to see a broader employment market with opportunities for women. While some young women expressed pride in devoting themselves to childcare, housekeeping, and needlework, others have started small enterprises such as chicken farms and beekeeping to support their families.

Families also depend on remittances from mostly male family members living abroad. A remittance of as little as DM 100 or 150 a month allows family members in Kosovo to continue agricultural, local trading, or other income-generating activities. Any surplus cash might be invested in education of younger family members, with priority given to sons. These remittances became more important during and after conflict, which interrupted planting and harvesting cycles, enabled the widespread theft and destruction of tools and livestock, and left many fields inaccessible due to landmines.

Many rural respondents said they envy urban residents for the range of employment options available from the international community, and for the chance to earn what, from their point of view, seems like extraordinary amounts of money. They also said they envy city residents for the fact that both men and women have employment opportunities, and that they have to provide for comparatively smaller families. Although city families tend to have fewer children and the extended family structure is less common, old age security is achieved through viri- and patrilocal marriage rules in the city as well as the village. This principle guarantees that one son will always remain with his own nuclear family in the house or flat of his parents and provide for them. Brothers abroad will contribute to this family’s living expenses through remittances.

Trust and participation in local institutions

The assessment also measured two key variables of social capital—trust and participation—through structured questionnaires. The focus was on the level of trust in local institutions such as village councils and municipal administrations; and the level of participation in different types of associations. The data indicated that: (i) there is a lack of trust among people beyond the extended family system, which is one of the key impediments to the growth of inclusive local institutions; and (ii) the effectiveness of civil society organizations is constrained by lack of participation. Women were noticeably more trusting than man, and trust in rural areas was slightly higher than in urban areas. Men participated in associations more than women, and urban areas had noticeably higher participation than rural areas.
IV. Social Assessment

The social assessment considers the experiences and perceptions of the population with regard to housing destruction, displacement, and reconstruction; security and justice; inter-ethnic coexistence; the education system; and the situation of vulnerable groups and minorities. This section also presents ideas of the population regarding possibilities for their own development.

Perceptions of displacement and housing destruction and reconstruction. Most focus group participants reported traumatic experiences of displacement during the conflict. Many fled to other countries; girls and old men spent time hiding in forests; the residents of entire villages were sent to the border; women saw their husbands beaten or executed; Serb neighbors betrayed the hiding places of Albanians. On the other hand, some Albanians were protected by their Serb neighbors, and some men hid their weapons instead of fighting to prevent the killing of women and children in retaliation.

After the conflict, there was an enormous will to repair destroyed houses, with or without the help of international reconstruction aid. Mainly in cities, there was unauthorized construction, and municipalities struggled to reassert the legitimacy of city planning, although people gave higher priority to speedy rebuilding than to regulations.

Perceptions of security, inter-ethnic coexistence, and justice. The post-conflict environment faced by many minorities is characterized by restricted freedom of movement, limited access to employment and services, and harassment and violence. Yet, Albanian respondents emphasized that they are not in favor of continued inter-ethnic violence. Rather, they want a justice system that prosecutes violent offenders from all ethnic groups. Feelings of security have recently increased due to the international presence and increasing ethnic homogeneity in villages and city quarters. Correspondingly, many respondents believe troubles are more likely to occur where there are still Serbs in the neighborhood. Still, it seems more appropriate to speak of ethnic fear rather than ethnic hatred among the majority of the population.

Other threats to security include landmines in rural areas and criminality in urban areas. The increase in post-war crime was related to the vacuum of state power, police negligence, and the absence of rule of law. The fear now, however, is of new crimes such as drug trafficking, car theft, kidnapping, and murderous assaults perpetuated by gangs crossing the border from Albania and by political extremists. Men involved in cross-border trading also mentioned organized crime and the corruption of customs officials.

With regard to the justice system, despite the difficulties encountered in creating an effective multi-ethnic judiciary, people of all ethnic groups and both major religious faiths were able to envisage a multi-ethnic future as long as individual war crimes are prosecuted.

Perceptions of education. All Albanian respondents noted a fundamental improvement in the education system compared to the period before the conflict, which is mostly related to the reappropriation of school buildings and international assistance in repairing and equipping buildings. Yet, in spite of these physical improvements, urban youth complained about the poor and outdated quality of education and the authoritarian teaching style that still characterizes the education system. An UNMIK education specialist in Pec/Peja was also concerned about pervasive physical punishment in the schools, which highlighted the urgent need for teacher retraining. In addition, the assessment team found few parent-teacher associations throughout Kosovo, which could exert a positive effect on the democratization and modernization of the school system, if promoted throughout the province. Other problems include the
high cost of schooling, limitations of access, and lack of commitment on the part of teachers due to economic hardships.

**Perceptions of vulnerable groups.** Kosovars still see the family as the greatest guarantee of security, and view those without family as the most vulnerable members of society. These include women who have lost men, children without fathers and brothers, the elderly without children, the ill and handicapped without family to care for them, and others without men to sustain the family through their work.

**Perceptions of the limitations of family solidarity.** While men feel responsible for women and family, women are much more conscious of the limits of family solidarity and of the vulnerabilities that come with exclusion from the larger society. Women are also much more conscious of how family solidarity cannot protect youth from unemployment and criminality; or protect the aged, pensioners, ill, and handicapped who need social services. This seems to confirm earlier observations that women are a source of bridging social capital in Kosovo; that even in survival situations, when the extended family is assumed to be primary, they are conscious of the situation of others, and often act as mediators and networkers between traditional structures and outside people and groups.

**The vulnerabilities of IDPs.** IDPs comprise a large portion of the population and are concentrated in cities such as Pristina/Prishtine, Prizren, and Pec/Peja. Many have not returned because their homes have not been repaired, services such as education are not available, or they are not able to access their farmland due to landmines. Others do not want to forego occupational programs run by NGOs or leave behind small businesses that they started during their displacement; or they are waiting for incentives such as small loans to buy livestock or building materials.

Most rural IDPs living in cities remain unregistered. Some live with relatives, in the homes of relatives who are abroad, or in collective centers. Others live in flats, houses, or construction grounds that once belonged to Serbs. Many urbanites blame the IDPs, with the majority of them from villages, for the decline in public cleanliness and order. This animosity adds to the insecurity of the IDPs.

**The vulnerabilities of returnees.** German and Swiss plans for the large-scale return of Kosovar Albanian migrants and refugees has caused great concern among families that depend on remittances for their survival. There are also concerns for the reintegration of the returnees themselves, as well as for a large number of Kosovar minorities who had registered in their European host countries as Kosovar Albanians and may be returned to an uncertain security environment.

**The vulnerabilities of minorities.** Although the incidence of serious crime has gone down, ethnically motivated attacks and intimidation continue across the province. As a result, minorities face serious restrictions on their movement and in their access to employment and social services—a process of exclusion that is making them even more socially and economically vulnerable. Based on the limited amount of information available on these groups, and on interviews with members of the Serb, Roma, Muslim Slav (including Gorani), and Turk communities, the assessment team attempted to map the different types and degrees of vulnerability, and the prospects of each group for reconciliation with the majority Albanian population. In general, the team found that:
• Although it is generally assumed that Serbs involved in criminal acts left with the withdrawing Yugoslav forces, the assumption of collective guilt persists. In this climate, the entire remaining Serb population is considered a target by radical members of the Kosovar Albanian community. Many have relocated to Serb enclaves in rural areas, which offer better security conditions and access to agriculture and livestock production. However, in most urban and other ethnically heterogeneous areas, many Serbs are unable to leave their homes, have little access to income, and require KFOR protection and humanitarian assistance. The Serbs face the most difficult challenges of any minority group with respect to coexistence and reconciliation with the majority Albanian population.

• The Romas (including ethnic Romas, Ashkalis, and Egyptians) are the most socially excluded and economically vulnerable population. Although they did not suffer displacement and revenge attacks on the scale suffered by the Serbs, they were already a disadvantaged group before the war, with little access to land and livestock or to formal employment. Yet, their prospects for reconciliation, if not for social and economic inclusion, are relatively better than for the Serbs.

• The Muslim Slavs are less socially and economically vulnerable than either the Serbs or the Romas. They were a relatively prosperous group before the war, with high levels of educational attainment and entrepreneurial activity. At the same time, they do suffer some exclusion now due to their linguistic and other ties with the Serbs. This is particularly true for the Gorani, who seem to experience more social exclusion than other Muslim Slavs due to their links with the previous Serb administration. Nonetheless, Muslim Slavs have good prospects for reconciliation and economic integration given their religious ties with the majority Albanian population.

• The Turks are the least vulnerable minority group in Kosovo because of their close cultural ties with the Albanian population and their entrepreneurial skills. They have suffered fewer revenge attacks and little displacement. Prospects for economic and social inclusion are the best for this minority group.

_Ideas of local populations regarding their own development._ The final section of the social assessment is a forward-looking consideration of how Kosovar Albanians and minorities perceive their immediate needs and prospects for development over the next three to five years. The results show a continuing sense of vulnerability in the present but optimism about the future, and particularly a determination to avoid relying on international assistance. Both male and female respondents expressed the need for specific types of international assistance, with men wanting credits to support their entrepreneurial ideas and women wanting job training, particularly in dressmaking, hairdressing, English, and computer skills. In rural areas, male respondents most often mentioned microcredit for the reacquisition of the means of production (seeds, fertilizer, agricultural equipment, livestock) and the expansion of agricultural businesses. Both urban and rural women also wanted better social services (especially health care), food security, and physical security (especially clearance of land mines).

Respondents also had well-developed entrepreneurial ideas suited to their local circumstances, including how much credit they require, how quickly they could pay the money back to avoid long-term debt, and how many people they could employ. Many wanted information on what agencies to approach for credits, and training on private sector issues such as how to determine supply and demand.

V. DIASPORA ASSESSMENT

The diaspora analysis considers the situation of Kosovar Albanians in Germany and Switzerland, where, they comprise the second largest foreigner group. These migrants came in three distinct waves: (a) a first wave in the late 1960s/early 1970s of Kosovar Albanian guest workers, most of whom were
unskilled, poorly educated, and from rural areas of Kosovo; (b) a second wave, from 1989-1993 in Germany and 1981-1990 in Switzerland, consisting mostly of better-educated and skilled Kosovar Albanians from urban areas of Kosovo, and young men seeking to avoid service in the Yugoslav army during the Balkan wars (1992-1995); and (c) a third wave of asylum-seekers and refugees from the 1998-1999 conflict in Kosovo, mixed in terms of education and origin. The assessment focuses on the employment situation of these migrants; host country policies toward the migrant community; migrant organizations and community relations in the host countries; remittances; pressures on the migrants to return; and the likely effects on Kosovo of their return.

**Employment situation.** The employment situation for Kosovar Albanian migrants is difficult, particularly in Germany, where many have not been able to obtain work permits. In response, those with fewer resources have been forced to work illegally, while those with more resources have established private business such as restaurants and travel agencies.

**Policies and assistance programs.** Germany is leading a broader EU movement to harmonize asylum and refugee policies within five years, beginning with border controls and strict visa requirements. This is being done, in part, to curtail the high cost of German government assistance to refugees, currently about DM 500 million per year. In Switzerland, the Kosovo crisis re-ignited the longstanding debate about the country’s asylum and refugee laws. A number of recent changes in Swiss laws have made conditions for the Kosovar Albanians more difficult. Both countries are struggling to deal with a number of issues related to foreigners, including racism, violent attacks, and socioeconomic discrimination against foreigners; criminality among foreigners; and threats to internal security from the importation of political movements and conflicts from their home countries. In this respect, more could be done in the area of integrating migrants into host country societies, and in educating the host country populace about the migrants and refugees, their society and culture. Integrating migrants into host country institutions and societies could also help foster better community relations. Kosovar women and youth, the two most socially isolated and marginalized groups, require special attention.

In Germany, each state has a Commissioner of Foreigner Affairs office to provide counseling and social services for foreigners, and some repatriation assistance. In recent years, though, such assistance has declined significantly, and conditions for foreigners are becoming increasingly less attractive; e.g., family reunification restrictions, a move toward involuntary repatriation, and the curtailment of social benefits.

The Swiss government, on the other hand, is still very proactive in assisting foreigners, both directly and through NGOs, by offering education, training, counseling, social and legal services, and welfare and integration assistance. The Universite Populaire Albanaise (UPA) in Geneva aims specifically at providing the 10,000-member Albanian and Kosovar Albanian community with educational, social, cultural, and sport activities.

Swiss NGOs are playing a key role in aiding Kosovar refugees and asylum-seekers who come to Switzerland. They also have an important advocacy role vis-à-vis governmental authorities, international organizations, and the general public. Swiss NGOs have gone a long way toward informing the political and public debate in Switzerland over a wide array of issues impacting on the Kosovar community, including foreigners, asylum and refugee laws, foreigner criminality, returnees, and integration.

While there are some German NGOs active in assisting Kosovars in Germany and in the region, these NGOs have, thus far, played a limited role. With greater empowerment and support, they could help bridge the gap in governmental assistance programs, aid in the process of integrating migrants into German society, and assist in the smooth repatriation of refugees. They could also help better inform the public and the general political debate about refugees in Germany.
Swiss governmental institutions and NGOs have effectively employed Kosovars living in Switzerland—particularly those from the second migrant wave—to help with the third wave of refugees and asylum seekers. To date, German state and non-governmental organizations have made limited use of this valuable resource. Greater employment of second-wave Albanian migrants could smooth the process of entry, repatriation, migration and/or integration into German society.

**Remittances.** Remittances have contributed to the survival and wellbeing of families in Kosovo, and to the overall health of the Kosovar economy. Remittances increased substantially as a result of the conflict, from about one-quarter of family income before the war to about half of family income after the war. RIIINVEST estimates that almost half of all families in Kosovo receive remittance income. Total remittances from abroad have been estimated at DM 750-850 million per year, and are used mostly for housing, transport, and trade activities.

**Return.** In Germany, 60,000 Kosovar Albanians were obliged to return by end-March 2000, and another 180,000 will be obliged to return in the near future. The majority of this second group is asylum-seekers, some living in Germany as long as 8-9 years, whose requests for asylum were denied. German officials anticipate a difficult political debate about the future of this group. In Switzerland, about 18,500 Kosovar Albanians were returned to Kosovo by end-December 1999. An additional 65,000 will be obliged to return this year, including those with temporary status, asylum-seekers, and war refugees.

Germany has made special allowances for Serbs and Roma who will not be forced to return, and government officials anticipate the need to provide ongoing social assistance to these groups. On the Swiss side, UNHCR has expressed concerns about Swiss government plans to return Kosovar Serbs and Romas to FRY. There are also ethnic Albanians from south Serbia in Europe. No policy determination has been made regarding their return status.

Both the German and Swiss governments provide a number of assistance programs to facilitate repatriation and reintegration of Kosovar returnees. In addition, a number of organizations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) are working with these governments to organize these returns.

**Impact of the repatriation.** Many migrants from the first wave express a desire to return to Kosovo. These older Kosovars, many of whom began as unskilled laborers but developed skills and businesses, could bring these assets back into the country, along with knowledge of foreign languages and investment capital to establish businesses and create jobs. Some plan to split their time and resources between the host country and Kosovo. However, those who return to retire could also place an additional burden on local social services, especially if their children do not return with them.

Second wave migrants, many of whom were highly educated when they left Kosovo, would also bring new skills, knowledge of foreign languages and business practices, and investment capital. Some in this group have also expressed a desire to set up a life in both places. The children from families of this group would likely return to Kosovo with their parents and provide a new infusion of well-educated and trained human capital. However, this group could place an additional burden on housing and job markets, and on education and medical resources.

The third wave of migrants, war refugees and asylum-seekers, left Kosovo in dire circumstances, and many have no homes or jobs to return to. However, they may have gained useful skills and training, and financial and material resources from host government programs. They will place additional demands on housing, employment and social service providers.

**Kosovar youth are clearly a group at risk.** In particular, young males present a special challenge. Many are disoriented and traumatized by the war, have suffered from unemployment,
inadequate and disrupted education, separation from family members, discrimination, and poor living conditions in host countries. Some have fallen into criminal activities, and may continue their criminality in Kosovo. New programs will be required to address the special needs of youth, especially the most disenfranchised among them.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

A number of major findings emerged from the analysis, including the need for inclusive institutions that promote intra-community cohesion and inter-ethnic reconciliation; the continuing security and economic survival concerns of vulnerable groups; and the desire of the population for an effective justice system. The analysis also found evidence that bridging social capital can be developed and supported through appropriate policies and programs. These findings have implications for the design of assistance strategies over the medium term. In particular:

Local institutions should be strengthened to promote bridging social capital. There is a need for more systematic efforts to develop local capacity in both the government and non-government sectors at the local level, building on the rich organizational and institutional experience gained during the self-management period. There is also a need for programs to foster trust and consensus building among foreign and local officials, and particularly between local civil society groups with a public interest orientation and the local level administrations. Community-driven development efforts can become more effective if the local governments’ capacity to promote bridging relations among grass-root communities, is enhanced in investment projects.

Municipalities, communities, and public interest-oriented groups need to be empowered to address the needs of vulnerable and excluded segments of the Kosovar Albanian population. A comprehensive social protection approach should mainstream community-based social services and increase awareness of the special needs of women and girls. Specialized assistance for traumatized children, other war-affected groups, and the disabled individuals is a priority need to facilitate their resocialization and relieve the excessive burden on families.

The needs of rapidly growing cities must be addressed. Cities lack the infrastructure, public services, administrative capacity, and economic structure to meet the needs of their populations. Assistance and policymaking efforts therefore need to focus on urban planning, services, infrastructure, job creation, and an appropriate public policy framework, to enable the development of a well-functioning and sustainable urban society.

Local specificities and assets should be taken into account in the design of sustainable development programs and projects. Kosovo has a variety of subregional/local settings where different cultural, institutional, and societal assets could be used in development interventions. All such activities should be designed with a strong element of citizens’ participation.

The position of women needs to be strengthened through girls’ education, access to productive assets, job training, and security mechanisms that are sensitive to women’s needs. In regard to education, there is a need for grants for disadvantaged girls from rural areas, given the high cost of transportation and other cultural and material impediments. In regard to productive assets, rural women, widows, in particular, asked for livestock to increase the food security of their households. In regard to job training, women respondents noted the importance of proceeding incrementally in developing professional roles so as not to provoke confrontations or be ostracized by their families or communities. Women have been well accepted as teachers, health care workers, and micro-entrepreneurs. In regard to security, there is a need for mechanisms and institutions, such as women-staffed police stations, where women can feel safe denouncing gender-related violence and abuse.
A strong justice system and shared local programs can foster inter-ethnic trust and cooperation. The social assessment found that despite the widespread ethnic mistrust, there are seeds of tolerance between the Kosovar Albanians and the Kosovar minorities. Barriers to reestablishing that coexistence have to do mainly with security concerns. However, focus group results show that a significant percentage of Albanians view such incidents as criminal acts, and would accept the idea of coexistence provided the offenders are prosecuted. These results imply that the way forward on the issue of ethnic hatred is to establish a formal justice system, including laws, police, courts, and prisons, to help stabilize the society and enable it to heal without continuous violent disruptions. They also imply the need for quietly shared grassroots programs to facilitate dialogue and develop social and economic opportunities, all of which will help to reduce ethnic tensions and support the delicate process of healing. These types of low-profile interventions will be less susceptible to intimidation and violence by extremists than more visible attempts by the international community to foster reconciliation.

The vulnerability of minorities is due largely to social exclusion, and programs are needed to address its effects, and, if possible, its causes. The exclusion of Serbs and Romas, and to a lesser extent Muslim Slavs, indicates the need for (a) multi-sectoral investments that specifically target the needs of minority populations; and (b) community-driven interventions that include strong participatory elements. For example, donors could support local efforts to increase cross-border cooperation between Gorani villages in Kosovo and Albania. In addition, more needs to be done to address their social and economic vulnerability.

Private sector development should address the requirements of small and micro local entrepreneurs. Programs need to provide micro and small business credits, and advice and technical assistance, including information on the functioning of a market economy.

The diaspora community is an important resource for investment and skills transfer, but incentives for their return are needed. Incentives should include the strengthening of local banks; a housing and mortgage credit facility; “look and see” visits to Kosovo; support for foreign private sector investment in Kosovo; and social service, educational, and training programs for returnees.
I. INTRODUCTION

Until recent years, the Bank’s analytical work in some cases gave limited attention to distributional and regional imbalances, ethnic tensions, policies of exclusion and predation, and other issues that feed the political events leading to a crisis. This may have resulted in missed opportunities to promote equitable and inclusive development.2

This assessment examines how conflict and displacement in Kosovo over the last decade have affected its social relations and institutions. It covers a broad and complex set of issues that, taken together, form an overview of Kosovar society as it has adapted to economic and political changes brought about by: (i) the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY); (ii) the enforcement period, when the majority Albanian population was excluded from public life; (iii) ethnically motivated violence and displacement; and, more recently, (iv) the return of the Albanian refugees and establishment of an international administration. During the most recent phase, intra- and inter-ethnic violence has continued, with the remaining Kosovar Serb and other minority populations suffering from varying degrees of social exclusion. Given the rapid engagement of the World Bank and other international actors in the province, such a study was not possible prior to project and program design. It is hoped that future reconstruction and development policy and program decisions will benefit from this background study. The study is part of a larger series of local-level institution studies being carried out by the World Bank to guide implementation of its Regional Strategy for South Eastern Europe.3

Background

Under the 1974 constitution of the SFRY, Kosovo enjoyed a high degree of autonomy and a status equivalent in most ways to that of the six Yugoslav republics. The province was able to develop, inter alia, its own health and education policies and decentralized service delivery to its municipalities. However, this period—defined in this report as autonomy without devolution—was characterized by the lack of representative local institutions, an unaccountable bureaucracy, and a relative lack of engagement by civil society.

With the introduction of constitutional changes in Belgrade in 1989, the autonomy of the province was severely restricted. Over the next decade, a series of enforcement measures excluded most of the ethnic Albanians from formal public and private institutions. This period—defined here as centralization with dominance—was characterized by non-representative and centralized political institutions, an unaccountable bureaucracy, and repression of civil society. The Kosovar Albanians responded to these measures by: (i) developing their own parallel institutions (e.g., for the delivery of health and education services), financed by the Albanian community in Kosovo and an increasingly large diaspora; (ii) setting up small businesses (shops, restaurants, factories, etc.); and (iii) emigrating from the province in large numbers. Ethnic conflict increased with the disintegration of the SFRY in 1991 and the subsequent United Nations (UN) sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Between 1990 and 1995, Kosovo’s economy contracted by about 50 percent, bringing its Gross Domestic Product

2 Kreimer et al. (1998).
3 The Regional Strategy for South Eastern Europe, prepared by the World Bank for the Stability Pact, emphasizes that cohesion and socially inclusive institutions within and among South East Europe (SEE) countries are essential preconditions for peace and economic development in the region. At the country level, this implies a systematic attempt to (i) address the needs of war-affected and other vulnerable groups; (ii) increase minority rights, participation, and access to resources and services; and (iii) identify and empower those social groups that are most likely to bring about social change. See World Bank (2000c).
(GDP) down to an estimated US$720 million, or less than approximately US$400 per capita (not including remittances)—lower than that of Albania, the poorest country in Europe.

Ethnic violence escalated in 1998 and 1999, putting increasing pressure on the fragile social fabric and leading to massive displacement. More than 800,000 Kosovars were displaced to neighboring countries and abroad, another 500,000 were displaced within the province, and 9,000-10,000\(^4\) were killed or are missing. At the end of the crisis, as the majority of the Albanian refugees returned to the province, more than 100,000 Kosovar Serbs and Romas fled, fearing retribution.\(^5\)

The conflict ended in June 1999 with UN Resolution 1244, which accorded the province “substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration,” while recognizing the “sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.” The resolution also established the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) as a transitional government with four areas of responsibility: (i) humanitarian affairs; (ii) interim civil administration; (iii) institution building; and (iv) reconstruction. Six months later, UNMIK signed an agreement on a Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS) with a number of Kosovar representatives. This structure currently administers the province. During this period—defined here as \textit{autonomy with devolution}—Kosovar and international actors have been attempting to establish a sustainable system of local government characterized by inclusive institutions, an accountable bureaucracy, and an engaged civil society. One component of this study considers the evolution of this effort (see Conceptual Framework, below).

The autonomy with devolution period has also been characterized by efforts to demilitarize the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and reintegrate ex-combatants into society—a difficult effort given the decentralized structure of the KLA. From its inception as a guerilla group in 1993, recruits were drawn from a few rural areas, and local leaders were given a great deal of autonomy. This structure has led some analysts to refer to the organization as “resembling more an association of clans than a hierarchical military force.”\(^6\) Other analysts have contrasted the organization with the more urban, intellectual, and moderate Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), whose non-violent withdrawal from Serb institutions gave to the parallel system in the 1990s.\(^7\) During the immediate post-war period, some KLA supporters formed several political parties, including the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK), and were recruited into the national-guard style Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). Other KLA supporters allegedly continue to engage in violence against other ethnic groups and more moderate Albanians.

\textbf{Conceptual Framework: The Need to Build Inclusive Social Institutions in Kosovo}

This study was carried out during a period of intense international relief efforts and the development of a strategy for reconstruction and development. It rests on the idea that achieving stability and sustainable economic growth is a complex process that depends on societal factors, especially inclusive institutions that promote intra-community cohesion and inter-ethnic reconciliation. The related concepts of social cohesion, social capital, and reconciliation are, in fact, central to the analysis. While definitions vary, there is an emerging consensus that social capital is the ability of individuals and groups (families, kinship networks, local associations) to secure benefits as a result of their relations with each other, and that it is inherent in the norms of trust and reciprocity that govern their interactions. The report focuses on assessing the presence of two kinds of social capital in Kosovo—\textit{bonding} and \textit{bridging}—which are characterized, respectively, by horizontal relations within and among different groups. These types of social capital have very different implications for promoting social cohesion and managing

\(^4\) The lower figure is a UNFPA/IOM (2000) estimate; the higher figure is a UNHCR (June 1999) estimate.
\(^5\) UNHCR (June 1999) estimate.
\(^6\) ICG (2000b).
\(^7\) Rohde (2000).
conflict. While *bonding* social capital can be exclusionary, reinforcing ties within groups but promoting distrust of outsiders and therefore social fragmentation and the impoverishment of public life, *bridging* social capital tends to nurture relationships across groups, and therefore inclusion, reconciliation, and cohesion. The same bonding social capital that enables groups to survive during a crisis can disable or delay socioeconomic reconstruction and development that depends on cooperation different groups. A third type, *linking* social capital, is vertical in the sense that it has to do with the interaction between citizens and state institutions. Linking social capital is implicit in state institutions that are inclusive and empowering, that foster participation in and transparency of the decision-making process, and that therefore, in the case of Kosovo, make possible the cooperative engagement of all groups in building a peaceful society. The presence of linking social capital in Kosovo is not the focus of this assessment, given the uncertain political status of the province and the evolving nature of its institutions. Rather, the assessment focuses on the potential for developing bridging social capital as a precondition for developing linking social capital and inclusive, empowering state institutions in the coming years.

The study supports efforts to nurture societal inclusion and cohesion by identifying: (i) how indigenous formal and informal institutions have evolved in Kosovo during the 1990s, and their varying degrees of inclusiveness and exclusiveness during different periods of the conflict; (ii) the coping strategies of various groups in the face of social exclusion, economic marginalization, and physical displacement; and (iii) ways that social cohesion and reconciliation can be supported through inclusive institutions and local economic development. Such knowledge is essential for designing policies and programs that promote the cohesiveness needed for stability and growth. It is also essential for developing the capacity of Kosovo’s 30 municipalities—which after the October 2000 elections became important administrative units in the province—to provide the villages under their administrations with inclusive public services, ranging from health, education, water, and power to urban and rural land use planning. This study, therefore, places great emphasis on the capacity of municipal and other local institutions not just to carry out these functions of self-governance, but to create the conditions for the empowerment, inclusion, and reconciliation of all the citizens of Kosovo.

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8 For a more detailed discussion of social capital in conflict-affected countries, see Colletta and Cullen (2000). For a discussion of social capital and poverty reduction, see World Bank (2000a).

9 The UNMIK Draft Regulation on Self-Government of Municipalities in Kosovo (July 2000) states that “the basic territorial unit of local self-government in Kosovo shall be the municipality, which shall exercise all powers not expressly reserved to the Central Authority.” It further states that “all organs and bodies of a municipality shall ensure that inhabitants enjoy all rights and freedoms without distinction of any kind, such as race, ethnicity, colour, sex, language, religious, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, and that they have fair and equal employment opportunities in municipality service at all levels. Municipalities shall give effect in their policies and practices to the need to promote coexistence between their inhabitants and to create appropriate conditions enabling all communities to express, preserve and develop their ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identities.” In this regulation, the term ‘communities’ means inhabitants belonging to the same ethnic, religious and/or linguistic group.
Methodology and Scope

This assessment is a qualitative analysis of the process of institutional and social change. The analysis progresses from the macro to the micro level—from formal to informal institutions—to capture a variety of perspectives on conflict and change in Kosovo. The analysis is divided into four main sections, each analyzing a separate set of issues. The scope and methodology for each section is described below.

The macro social analysis focuses on a number of broad spatial and temporal dimensions of change in Kosovo during the 1990s. It begins by considering the demographic characteristics of this change, including age, sex, and ethnicity. It then analyzes socioeconomic dimensions such as health, education, employment, and income.

The analysis is based on a variety of data sets for the province from 1990 to 2000. For the period before the conflict (1990-1999), data are taken from official SFRY statistical yearbooks and census publications. The 1991 census is used for the population projection, while the demographic aspects rely on other official sources. For the period after the war (1999-2000), sources consist mainly of recent assessments undertaken by a number of governmental, non-governmental, and international organizations, and are cited accordingly.

The assessment of formal institutions focuses on the co-management experience at the municipal level and on prospects for enhancing municipal institutional capacity. It does not provide a comprehensive analysis of all formal institutions or of all aspects of the co-management system, such as staffing and budgeting. Rather, the assessment aims to provide an overview of the formal institutional context within which the informal social institutions can be understood.

The assessment of informal institutions focuses on informal group-level institutions such as kinship networks, village-councils, the family, and civil society groups; and examines how these institutions have changed over time.

The assessment of social issues provides a more in-depth look at the needs and vulnerabilities of the population, including (i) household-level strategies for securing food, shelter, and education; (ii) people’s perceptions of security, due to crime and remaining inter-ethnic violence; (iii) the situation of women and girls, minorities, and other vulnerable groups; and (iv) possibilities for inter-ethnic co-existence and reconciliation. This section also assesses the views of the population on the effectiveness of institutions, and of their capacity for promoting modernization and democratization.

The institutional and social assessments are based largely on fieldwork carried out in March and April 2000. Due to security and other constraints, most of the fieldwork focused on the Kosovar Albanians, who comprise more than 90 percent of the population. Across Kosovo, five representative regions (Pristina/Prishtine, Pec/Peja, Prizren, Gnjilane/Gjilan, and Malisevo/Malisheve) were selected, and within each region one urban and one rural site were chosen. In each site, one group discussion was held with each of the following groups—adult men, adult women, young men (between 15 and 25 years

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11 It should be noted that this census was boycotted by most Kosovar Albanians and some Kosovar Roma, so the data are based largely on estimates by the Belgrade authorities.
13 Although the assessment initially attempted to clarify the relationship among kinship, political leadership, and illegal networks, this was a very sensitive and difficult area to try to investigate under severe security and time constraints.
14 Please note that the names of municipalities will be given in Serbian and Albanian; the names of villages, however, will be given in the language of the majority population living in those villages.
of age), and young women (between 15 and 25 years of age). In addition, a number of open-ended interviews were conducted with representatives of formal and informal institutions.

The assessment team also carried a series of group discussions and open-ended interviews with vulnerable groups (war widows, IDPs, returnees) and minorities (Serbs, Romas, Turks, and Muslim Slavs) at sites where such groups are present in large numbers.

Finally, the social and institutional assessments also include findings from surveys and assessments carried out by local and international NGOs, bilateral agencies, and UN agencies (see annexes I and II).

The analysis of the Kosovar diaspora focuses on the history and demography of the emigration, remittance patterns, incentives and pressures to return, and the role the diaspora might play in the reconstruction of Kosovo.

This analysis is based on fieldwork carried out in Germany (Berlin, Frankfurt, and Ludwigshafen) and Switzerland (Zurich, Berne, and Geneva). A number of interviews were carried out with host government officials; representatives of international organizations; migration experts; and community, business, and organizational leaders among the migrant Kosovar Albanians. In addition, 10 group discussions were conducted with migrants to understand their situation in the host country and their links to Kosovo. Three groups were targeted for special attention: youth, women, and those active in the private sector (see annexes I and II).
II. MACRO SOCIAL ANALYSIS, 1991 TO 2000

This chapter focuses on a number of broad spatial and temporal dimensions of change in Kosovo during the 1990s. It begins by considering the demographic characteristics of this change, including age, sex, and ethnicity. It then analyzes socioeconomic dimensions such as health, education, employment, and income.

The analysis is based on a variety of data sets for the province from 1990 to 2000. For the period before the conflict (1990-1999), data are taken from official SFRY statistical yearbooks and census publications. The 1991 census is used for the population projection, while the demographic aspects rely on other official sources. For the period after the war, sources consist mainly of recent assessments undertaken by a number of governmental, non-governmental, and international organizations, and are cited accordingly.

Demographic Changes

Population projections

Over the last decade, Kosovo has experienced many demographic changes due to massive emigration, inter-ethnic violence, and widescale displacement. Taking into account these and other events, Kosovo’s current population is estimated, using conventional demographic methods, according to different demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. Estimates of population age and sex are based on three components of population change—mortality, fertility, and migration. Each of these components—based on the assumptions outlined below—are used to project three variants of population changes (low, medium and high) for 1996 and 2000. Most of the analysis in this report relies on the medium variant.

Mortality. Estimates of mortality changes are based on two main assumptions: (i) survival rates did not change during the period 1991-1998. This assumption is based on the fact that there was no dramatic change in the factors determining mortality patterns during this period compared to the period before 1991. And (ii) about 9,000 people were killed during the 1998-1999 conflict or are still missing, the majority of them adult males.

Fertility. While mortality did not change rapidly during 1991-2000, fertility fell from 3.9 to 2.5 children per woman in 2000. This estimate is based on a recent survey, and on the dramatic change in the sex ratio for people of reproductive age (15-45 for females, 20-50 for males)—due to the large-scale emigration of males during 1990s (see Figure 1 and Table 1). This ratio is 72 males to 100 females in 2000 (medium variant), compared to 92 males to 100 females in 1991.

16 It should be noted that most of the Kosovar Albanian population refused to participate in this census, so the data are based largely on estimates by Belgrade authorities.
18 As noted in footnote 4, there are two estimates for this figure. The analysis will use the UNFPA/IOM (2000) figure of 9,000, because is based on a province-wide quantitative survey.
Figure 1. Population Age Structure of Kosovo, 1991 and 2000

For the high variant of population change, the total fertility rate is estimated to be 3.5 children per woman during 1991-1996 and 2.8 during 1996-2000. For the medium and low variants, the fertility rate is estimated to be 3.1 children per woman during 1991-1996 and 2.5 during 1996-2000. These are all relatively high rates by European standards.

Migration. The three estimates of population change due to migration during 1991-2000 are based on different assumptions:

- For the high variant, the assumption is a negative net migration of 100,000 during 1991-1996, and about 300,000 during 1996-2000.
- For the medium variant, a negative net migration of 150,000 during 1991-1996, and about 300,000 during 1996-2000.
- For the low variant, a negative net migration of 200,000 during 1991-1996, and about 300,000 during 1996-2000.

These estimates are based on: (i) figures from different western European countries, which show a total of about 400,000 migrants from Kosovo to western Europe during 1993-1998;\(^{20}\) (ii) a survey carried out by RIINVEST\(^{21}\) in post-war Kosovo, looking at the age and sex composition of the emigration, which found that the emigration was rapid and that the migrants were generally young; (iii) the effect of different political and economic events in Kosovo on the migrant flow; and (iv) the 1991 census.

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\(^{20}\) Vickers (1998) estimates that during this period, 120,000 migrants went to Germany; 95,000 to Switzerland; 35,000 to Sweden; 23,000 to Austria; 8,000 to Belgium; 5,000 to France; 5,000 to Denmark; 4,000 to Italy; 3,500 to Norway; 3,000 to Britain; 2,000 to the Netherlands; 600 to Finland; and 200 to Luxembourg.

\(^{21}\) RIINVEST (1999c; 1999d).
Based on these sources, high, medium, and low variants of population projections were developed for 1996 and 2000, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Projected Mid-year Population by Age and Sex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variant</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>1,009,474</td>
<td>1,956,197</td>
<td>1,930,746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>1,009,474</td>
<td>1,956,197</td>
<td>1,985,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>1,009,474</td>
<td>1,956,197</td>
<td>2,068,632</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All three variants show negative population growth between 1996 and 2000, despite the relatively high fertility in 2000. Thus, of the three components of population growth, migration has had the most significant effect, reducing the population by an estimated 175,782 people between the two years, according to the medium variant.

**Demographic trends**

Despite the massive emigration of men of reproduction age and the decline in fertility, the population of Kosovo remains very young. People under 25 years of age comprise 46.4 percent of the population in 2000, compared to 57.9 percent in 1991. The median age in 2000 is 22.2 years, compared to 20.9 in 1991. There is, however, a clearly distorted age structure for 2000 (see Figure 1), with migration dramatically affecting ages 20-40, especially for males.

Kosovo has also experienced other dramatic demographic changes as a result of the conflict, including a decrease in the crude birth rate and an increase in the crude death rate, and, surprisingly, a decline in infant mortality (see Table 2) even though health conditions in the province were deteriorating. The last figure should be treated with caution and requires further investigation.

Table 2. Demographic Indicators for Kosovo in the 1990s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>1,956,197</td>
<td>1,985,840</td>
<td>1,810,058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net increase</td>
<td>-29,643</td>
<td>-175,782</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median age</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crude birth rate</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crude death rate</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total fertility rate</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 births)</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Ethnic structure of the population**

With the end of conflict, major changes occurred with respect to the ethnic structure of the Kosovar population. According to Belgrade authorities, there were approximately 347,000 non-Albanians (18 percent of the population) in Kosovo in 1991, consisting of 195,000 Serbs, 57,000 Muslim Slavs, 43,000 Romas, 11,000 Turks, and 41,000 Montenegrins, Croats, and other groups. In February 2000, UNHCR/OSCE estimated a minority population of approximately 197,000—about 56 percent of the pre-conflict population—based on a variety of sources, including community leaders, the Kosovo Force (KFOR), and UNMIK police. See Table 3 for a breakdown of the different groups.

### Table 3. Estimates of Ethnic Minority Population in Kosovo, 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Slavs</td>
<td>47,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romas</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


During the post-conflict period, as ethnicity remains a determining factor in the risk of falling victim to harassment and violence, many of the remaining minorities continue to relocate from mixed towns and villages to ethnically homogenous areas. In the northern municipalities of Kosovska Mitrovica/Mitrovicë, Leposavic/Leposaviq, Zubin Potok, and Zvecan, the Serb population is now living north of the Ibar River, and is growing because of the influx of Serbs displaced from other parts of Kosovo. In central Kosovo, the Serb population is steadily declining and is now concentrated in a few hamlets in the municipalities of Obilic/Obiliq, Pristina/Prishtine, Kosovo Polje/Fushe Kosove, and Lipljan/Lipjan. There were about 700-800 Serbs in Pristina/Prishtine in February 2000, down from 20,000 in 1998. In Strpce/Shterpce, the population is now predominantly Serb, with most Albanians living in four homogenous villages. In the southeast, Serbs are increasingly abandoning Gnjilane/Gjilan town in favor of more secure Serb-dominated villages spread throughout the municipality. In the eastern part of the province, Kosovska Kamena/Kamenice is one of the few municipalities that has not experienced a major reduction in its Serb population.

There has been a similar decline in the Roma population, with a tendency for Romas to also move to homogeneous areas, or, in some cases, Serb areas. The Romas are concentrated in the western municipalities of Dakovica/Gjakove, Prizren and Pec/Peja; and in the eastern municipality of Urosevac/Ferizaj.

The other groups, while less affected by the conflict, have also seen their numbers decline. The remaining Gorani are still concentrated in the southern municipality of Dragas/Dragash; and the remaining Turks and Muslim Slavs still represent a large group in Prizren.

**Structure of the active population**

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22 Please also refer to Chapter IV, section on the situation of ethnic minorities.
23 The actual number of Romas in Kosovo in 1991 is believed to have been much higher.
24 1991 census.
26 Of this number, 12,000 are Gorani.
27 The actual number of Romas currently in Kosovo is also believed to be much higher.
28 UNHCR/OSCE (2000a).
29 UNHCR/OCSE (2000a).
The structure of the active population (between 15-60 years of age) did not change much between 1991 and 2000 (55.6 and 54.2 percent, respectively; see Figure 2). There was, however, a slight increase of the population over 60 years of age, mainly because the population under 15 has declined as a result of falling fertility.

**Figure 2. Changes in Age Structure of the Active Population**

![Bar chart showing changes in age structure of the active population between 1991 and 2000.](image)

Sources: The 1991 figures are based on the 1991 census; and the 1996 and 2000 figures are based on the medium population projection variant.

While the percentage of the active population has not changed, the sex ratio has changed significantly, as a result of the high migration among males noted earlier. In 2000, the ratio was about 90 males to 100 females between 15-60 years of age, while in 1991, it was about 108 males to 100 females. This change in the sex ratio is very significant considering the traditional structure of Kosovar society, where men are the principal breadwinners and only a small percentage of women are in the labor force. In 1990, women comprised 24.3 percent of the labor force in Kosovo, compared to 41 percent in the SFRY.\(^{30}\) The change in sex ratio can be expected to have a discernible effect on the structure of the labor market.

The dependency ratios (the economically active to economically inactive population) in Kosovo were high during the entire 10-year period, ranging from 72 per 100 in 1991 to 73.5 per 100 in 2000 (see Table 4). If dependency is separated into the population under 15 and 65 and over, it becomes clear that the ratios are high because of the high proportion of people under 15. This population, however, will join the active population in the coming years, ensuring that Kosovo does not face an aging crises similar to that in other South East European countries such as Bulgaria, Greece, and Romania.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Under 15</th>
<th>65 and over</th>
<th>Under 15 and 65 and over</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>72.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>71.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>73.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The ratios are calculated as dependent persons (under 15, 65 and over, and both) per 100 persons 15 to 64 years of age.
Sources: The 1991 figures are based on the 1991 census; and the 1996 and 2000 figures are based on the medium population projection variant.

Rural-urban composition

At the end of the Second World War, Kosovo was a predominantly rural society, with the rural population comprising 80.4 percent of the total population, compared to 70.3 percent for SFRY as a whole, and 77 percent for Albania. Despite major changes over the next few decades, Kosovo remained the most rural federal unit of SFRY. In 1991, Kosovo’s population was still 62.7 percent rural, compared to 64.45 percent in Albania.

At the provincial level, the situation did not change significantly during the 1990s. The rural population was an estimated 58.6 percent of the total in 2000, only slightly smaller than in 1991. At the municipal level, however, some interesting patterns emerge. Given the post-conflict security situation faced by the Kosovar Serb population, many of those remaining in urban areas are leaving for more secure rural enclaves, particularly in the north and east of the province. As the Serb population declines in cities such as Pristina/Prishtine, Pec/Peja, and Prizren, rural municipalities such as Leposavic/Leposaviq and Zvecan are growing with Serb IDPs. The Kosovar Albanian IDPs, however, are increasingly finding themselves in urban areas such as Pristina/Prishtine, Prizren, Pec/Peja, and Urosevac/Ferizaj, given the destruction in rural areas where they lived during the conflict.

While it is difficult to predict future rural-urban changes, if Kosovo follows the experience of other Balkan countries, it will experience a rapid shift toward urbanization as a result of economic reforms. The most significant gainers will be the major cities where most of the economic, social, and civil activities will be based, such as Pristina/Prishtine, Prizren, and Dakovica/Gjakove. Signs of urbanization can be seen by the decline in the rural populations of Pristina/Prishtine and Prizren (see Figure 3).

33 WFP estimate based on distribution figures.
Conflict-related displacement and damage

As noted above, one major consequence of the conflict was the massive displacement of Kosovar Albanians. More than 800,000 were displaced to neighboring countries (Albania, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Montenegro, FRY) and abroad, while another 500,000 were displaced within the province.

The areas with the largest number of displaced persons—Decani/Decan, Glogovac/Gillogovc, Orahovac/Rahovec, and Srbica/Skenderaj—also suffered the greatest damage to houses, schools, health facilities, and farm assets.

Of the 128,000 damaged houses in Kosovo, more than 84,000 (25 percent of all houses in Kosovo) were severely damaged or completely destroyed. The municipalities with the highest level of destruction were Decani/Decani, Srbica/Skenderaj, Glogovac/Gillogovc, and Pec/Peja, where nearly 60 percent of the houses were severely damaged or completely destroyed.

Damage to schools was greatest in Srbica/Skenderaj, Decani/Decani, and Orahovac/Rahovec. Only 17 percent of schools in all villages suffered no damage, while 24 percent had moderate damage. The destruction of school buildings, however, was only part of the damage to the education infrastructure. There is also an enormous need for school furnishings and supplies. Moreover, the availability of teachers is very low, and only 36 percent of the rural teaching positions are currently occupied.

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34 The post-conflict displacement of the minority populations is discussed in detail in Chapter IV.
35 UNHCR estimates.
36 IMG (2000).
37 IMG (2000); UNHCR/KFOR (2000).
38 UNHCR/KFOR (2000).
The situation is similar for rural health facilities. Only 23 percent of villages had health facilities in July 1999, although the level of health workers in the villages remains at more than two-thirds (68 percent) the pre-conflict level.

Farm assets were damaged on a massive scale during the conflict, with the replacement value of animals, farm buildings, and agricultural machinery conservatively estimated at US$700 to US$800 million. Most losses of equipment and farm buildings were in the western municipalities. There was also significant damage to and looting of agro-processing equipment, especially at private small and medium-size farms. Finally, the high demand for wood (for both fuel and construction) after the conflict is putting increasing pressure on forests, and landmines are limiting access to agricultural and forest lands.
Consequences of emigration and conflict on gender

A UNFPA/IOM survey\(^\text{39}\) has found that women currently head 15 percent of the households in Kosovo—a very high figure considering the traditional patriarchal structure of the society. While it is difficult to give a precise reason for this situation, it might be explained by two factors. First, the

\(^{39}\) UNFPA/IOM (2000)
emigration of 450,000 Albanians (medium variant estimate) from Kosovo during the 1990s was a male-dominated phenomenon, and women and children might have been left behind in households without an adult male. Another factor might be the number of males killed during the war. More detailed information on deaths and migration broken down by age and sex is needed to determine the relative importance of each of these factors. In any case, these households may be among the most vulnerable in terms of both economic and social needs (employment, income, food supplies, education, health care, etc.), and should be considered in the design of social policies and investment projects. Although kinship networks might ease the effect of this social burden in the short term, the transition to a modern society will make it necessary for other types of institutions to meet the needs of these families.

Social and Economic Changes

This section provides a broad overview of social and economic changes in the province. Along with the previous section on demographic changes, it establishes a context for understanding the rest of the analysis. More detailed economic and sectoral analyses have been undertaken elsewhere.40

Health

The population of Kosovo has a relatively high life expectancy. In 1990, life expectancy at birth was 69.5 years for males and 76.2 for females, despite an infant mortality rate of 52 and 51 deaths per 1,000 live births for males and females, respectively41 which was very high by European standards. More recently, the infant mortality rate has fallen to 25 deaths per 1,000 live births for the year 2000.42 Adult mortality has been and remains low.

Recent surveys show that the majority of deaths (53 percent) among the Albanian population43 of Kosovo are from non-communicable diseases, followed by neonatal deaths (28 percent) and deaths from communicable diseases (12 percent).44 The relatively high proportion of deaths from non-communicable diseases due to smoking (especially among young males) and diet reflects an epidemiological pattern more consistent with an industrialized than a developing country. While recent damage to water and sanitation infrastructure has increased the likelihood of communicable disease, such outbreaks are not expected to remain a major health risk. Risks associated with smoking and diet are of more concern for the medium and longer term.

Among Kosovar Albanian children under 6 months of age, 64 percent are breastfed—above the levels found in many European countries—while the rest are fed formula and cow’s milk. The prevalence of diarrhea is relatively high (24 percent in urban areas and 36 percent in rural areas), due in part to the lack of piped water. Immunization rates are low, with a significant number of children under 5 years not completing their full course of vaccinations. Children 2 to 3 years, while not sufficiently covered, have higher coverage than children 1 to 2 years, but coverage has been steadily decreasing. This may be the result of decreasing access to public health services, or declining confidence of Kosovar Albanians in these services, during the last decade.45

While adult mortality is low in general, there are problems related to mothers’ health and health care. Antenatal care in Kosovo is inadequate, with 15 percent of pregnant women not seeing a doctor or

40 See, for example, World Bank (2000e).
43 A similar survey was also undertaken for the Serb population of Kosovo, but the results were not available.
44 Spiegel and Salama (2000).
45 Spiegel and Salama (2000).
health care worker during their pregnancy, and about 20 percent of deliveries taking place at home without the assistance of a professional midwife or doctor.\footnote{UNFPA/IOM (2000).}

**Education**

At the end of the Second World War, Kosovo was the least educated region of the new SFRY. Seventy-one percent of the population 10 years of age or older had no education. As a result, the province had few professionals or specialists. This situation improved considerably over the next few decades. However, in 1991, 27.9 percent of the population 10 years of age or older still had no education, compared to 17.3 percent for the federation, 3.6 percent for Slovenia, 13.5 percent for Croatia, and 25.2 for Bosnia and Herzegovina.\footnote{Savezni Zavod za Statistiku (1986).} The percentage of the population with primary, secondary, and higher education increased significantly by 1999.\footnote{The results of the UNFPA/IOM and RIINVEST surveys are similar. The UNFPA/IOM data are used mainly because they show education level by sex.} Yet, gender disparities at the secondary and tertiary level are still apparent (see Table 5), reflecting the traditional structure of Kosovar society.

**Table 5. Level of Education for People 10 Years and Older, 1991-1999**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Education</th>
<th>1991 Kosovo Males</th>
<th>1991 Kosovo Females</th>
<th>1999 Kosovo Males</th>
<th>1999 Kosovo Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No education</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than Primary</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\footnote{1UNFPA/IOM (2000).}

\footnote{2RIINVEST (2000a).}

Sources: Except where noted, the 1991 figures are based on the Statistical Yearbook of Yugoslavia (1990).

When analyzing these figures, it is important to note that education in the Albanian language was abolished in Kosovo in 1991, resulting in the Kosovar Albanian population creating a parallel education system. Despite the positive results of the system, these dramatic measures slowed the progress of higher educational attainment, and the closure of schools created a large flow of emigrants. Integrated education is still not the norm in Kosovo, with many minorities attending separate facilities and studying different curricula.
Employment

In 1984, the number of people formally employed per thousand of working age was 223 in Kosovo compared to 426 in the SFRY as a whole, 665 in Slovenia, and 409 in Serbia. This situation worsened during the 1990s, when Kosovar Albanians were expelled from public employment, but improved in 1999 when many reclaimed their previous positions. At the present time, unemployment is higher among the Kosovar Serbs due to internal displacement and loss of jobs in the industrial sector and public administration (see Table 6). Unemployment is also higher among males compared to females in both the Albanian and Serb populations (21 and 37 percent respectively), although a larger percentage of the female Serb population is seeking employment.

Table 6. Percentage of Population by Activity, 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Serbs</th>
<th>Albanians</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>Males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributing family worker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schooling</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Income

It is difficult to compare the pre- and post-conflict situation with respect to household/family income given the different types of indicators used by various institutions during the two periods. Our analysis relies on a series of surveys carried out by RIINVEST.

Table 7. Family Income (percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>pre-conflict</th>
<th>post-conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salary</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pension</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian aid</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittances from abroad</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>45.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private business</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other sources</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: RIINVEST (1999c; 1999d)

The data shows that average family income in pre-conflict Kosovo was more than three times higher than in post-conflict Kosovo; and that during the pre-conflict period most of this income (31.7 percent) came from private businesses rather than salaries (23.4 percent). This indicates that the pre-conflict Kosovar economy was oriented toward small and medium businesses given the fact that public
employment was not open to the majority of the population. In addition, quite a large percentage of the family income also came from remittances. After the war, these remittances and humanitarian assistance increased in response to reconstruction needs, while income from private businesses fell.

The same surveys also indicate that expenditures to meet basic needs increased after the conflict, from 13.8 to 19.4 percent on food, 5.2 to 7.8 percent on clothing, and 3.2 to 4.9 percent on healthcare.\(^{49}\)

**Livelihood**

Kosovo is still largely a rural, patriarchal society with a strong attachment to the land. More than 50 percent of the population is engaged in agriculture, with the sector characterized by more than 160,000 holdings of 2 to 3 hectares. Although output is sometimes scarce, farming is still the backbone of the rural family and guarantees survival during difficult periods.

The main agricultural areas are two major valleys watered by numerous streams extending from the mountain ranges to the north and east. The farming systems include intensive arable production in the plain; mixed cereal and grape production in the central and peripheral piedmont areas; and forestry and extensive grazing in the mountains. Livestock breeding is always associated with cultivation but assumes more importance in the central highlands and the western piedmont part of the province. The main crops are wheat, barley, oats, maize, sunflower, and vegetables. Irrigation is essential for intensive farming in the spring-summer season.

Before the conflict, about half of rural household income came from livestock production, while cereal production was used mainly for self-consumption and livestock feeding. Only farms with larger plots and a tractor would engage in commercial wheat production. The remaining half of household income came from small-scale trade, skilled and casual labor, remittances, and formal employment. This dependence on formal employment meant that when jobs for Kosovar Albanians became rare during the enforcement period, emigration was the only option left to many families. This was especially true for those unable to start up micro or small businesses. Within a few years, nearly 20 percent of the population emigrated to Western European countries, and their remittances become critical to the survival of family members remaining in Kosovo. Now, about half of the rural households receive average monthly remittances of US$250 to $500 (see Chapter V).

In the post-conflict period, despite the losses in formal employment from closed factories and businesses, opportunities for both skilled and unskilled labor have increased due to relief and reconstruction programs, especially in urban areas. The free economic environment and widespread use of a convertible currency has also stimulated the creation of small businesses and self-employment schemes, especially in the construction and transport sectors.

\(^{49}\) RIINVEST (1999c; 1999d).
This chapter assesses Kosovo’s social institutions during the 1990s, up to and including the autonomy with devolution period, June 1999 to the present. The first part of the chapter focuses on formal institutions, and in particular on the co-management experience at the municipal level under UNMIK. During this period, Kosovar and international actors have been working to establish a sustainable system of local government characterized by inclusive institutions, an accountable bureaucracy, and an engaged civil society. The focus is on those local institutions where the interaction between the control of resources and democratization takes place. As noted in the introductory chapter, we do not present a comprehensive analysis of the formal institutional environment in Kosovo, or of all aspects of the co-management system. Rather, the overview of formal institutions presented here is meant to provide a context for understanding the informal local social institutions (civil society organizations, village councils, extended family systems, and so on) in the province. The second part of the chapter assesses the changes in informal institutions during the 1990s, and considers how they can create the conditions for empowerment, bridging social capital, reconciliation, and democratization.

**Formal Institutions**

The Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS) is evaluated at five representative sites—Pristina/Prishtine, Pec/Peja, Prizren, Gnjilane/Gjilan, and Malisevo/Malisheve—in terms of six different aspects: (i) how completely the joint system is in place at each site; (ii) the degree to which various political actors are cooperating—an implicit condition for the system to be operational; (iii) the efficiency of the system; i.e., tangible results in the face of resource constraints; (iv) the effectiveness of the system; i.e., the extent to which it expresses people’s needs and aspirations; (v) its legitimacy; i.e., the degree to which it is representative of Kosovo’s majority and minority populations; and (vi) how well it is enhancing the capacity of Kosovo’s municipal institutions to create and maintain the conditions for empowerment, bridging social capital, and reconciliation for all the citizens of Kosovo (see Annex II, Local Institutional Assessment Interview Guide).

**UNMIK and the Joint Interim Administrative Structure**

Since UNMIK was established on June 13, 1999, with the mandate to serve as an interim administration for Kosovo pending a final settlement, its purpose has been to provide a transitional administration while organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government, including the holding of elections.

At the beginning, UNMIK’s main challenge was to decide whether to use a direct administrative approach or try to operate through the provisional municipal administrations, most of which had been set up in the few weeks between the end of the conflict and the time that UNMIK could be organized. With little time to prepare for its role and little knowledge of municipal affairs or local actors, UNMIK decided on the direct approach, particularly in regard to emergency services and municipal administration. In reality, however, most of the UNMIK municipal administrators arriving in the summer of 1999 to displace the self-proclaimed mayors had no resources (offices, staff, or money) and few clear instructions from UNMIK headquarters in Pristina/Prishtine; and in fact needed to rely on those mayors and other Kosovars in the area to get established.

Six months later, in recognition of this reality, UNMIK elaborated the Joint Interim Administrative Structure, which integrates elements of direct UNMIK administration with a reliance on local Kosovar administrators and community leaders—although the provisional mayors themselves were,
by UNMIK policy, not recognized, so as to further the co-management system’s goal of minimizing political partisanship and intolerance toward minorities.50

Administratively, the co-management system thus comprised two groups: (i) those internationals and some Kosovars, mostly support staff, in the UNMIK structure; and (ii) Kosovo’s civil servants, including new department heads, judges, and staff appointed by UNMIK. Staff from these two groups sometimes shared offices, although UNMIK’s budget came from the UN General Assembly and peacekeeping payments, while the civil servants were paid from the highly constrained domestic budget and direct donations.

At the central level, the JIAS has been organized into 20 departments, each co-headed by an international and a Kosovar. The Kosovars were selected through an intense process of negotiation, with the increasingly fragmented political parties vying for influence over the number and importance of the departments they would head.

At the municipal level, a Municipal Administrator (MA) appointed by UNMIK selected an inclusive municipal council, organized the municipality into departments, and appointed municipal personnel according to the criteria of ethnic and gender inclusiveness. The MA also appointed an administrative board, consisting of department heads and other members, which carried out administrative functions; approved all revenue-generating activities; and, in accordance with Kosovo-wide regulations, applied taxes and charges for services. Municipalities collected and retained little revenue, and reportedly received only four percent of Kosovo’s budget.

While the flexibility of this system allowed it to be responsive to local needs, cooperation and other determinants of success (see above) were found to vary enormously across the five sites, depending on the relationships that evolved between the UNMIK and local officials. As a result, the local systems themselves developed differently during this recent period, incorporating remnants of the centralized or the parallel system (1989-1999) to varying degrees, with implications for their capacity for inclusive self-government. The impact of UNMIK’s support for inclusive informal institutions and civil society groups has also varied according to local circumstances, as discussed in the second part of this chapter.

50 ICG (1999g).
51 The other five departments, Education and Science, Nonresident Affairs, Reconstruction, Sports, and Utilities, are co-headed by a third Kosovar Albanian party. There may have been changes in the number and representation of the departments since the conclusion of the fieldwork.
Joint Interim Administrative Structure: site assessment findings

Pristina/Prishtine

Pristina/Prishtine, the capital of Kosovo, was characterized by increasingly poor infrastructure; uncontrolled and poor quality construction; wealthy homes on the hillsides; poorer homes, an expanding commercial sector, a high concentration of international offices (including 300 NGOs), and unchecked growth in the urban center; mostly imported goods, including food staples; widespread public poverty; and a climate of personal insecurity. There was also evidence of child labor and deprivation for a relatively small segment of the population.

Status/cooperation. The co-management system was essentially in place in Pristina/Prishtine, but the relationship between UNMIK and local officials was less than ideal, with the local leadership continually testing the strength of the “UNMIK-imposed” system and criticizing it for poor services, for having final say in the selection of candidates for police training, and in other ways interfering with municipal autonomy. At the same time, the local leadership contributed little to solving municipal problems.

Efficiency/effectiveness. While local department heads had some professional skills in their areas of responsibility, those not close to the board president seem to have been underutilized. The assessment team saw no evidence of the various departments preparing project proposals to submit to UNMIK. On the contrary, municipal officials lacked the capacity to set priorities or to control activities such as crime and illegal construction. In fact, the institutional tug-of-war between the co-management partners produced a stalemate that resulted in, among other things, unchecked urban growth and crime. UNMIK was strongly criticized for being ineffective against crime, but officials said it was “impossible” to stop the illegal construction because of the lack of courts, or to stop the forced takeover of apartments throughout the city by organized crime. The municipality also lacked a legal mandate to levy fees and local taxes or to allocate resources, which contributed to poor service performance and caused delays in paying municipal employees—a situation that fostered corruption and forced many civil servants, including teachers, to find supplemental work with international organizations. In addition, law enforcement at the local level was greatly constrained by external factors such as understaffing of international police. At the same time, foreign NGOs were criticized because they sought permission for their activities from UNMIK but not from the board president.

Legitimacy/prospects. There was no evidence that the bashkesia lokale (community-level councils that existed under the communist system) continued to function. Instead, there was evidence of party-controlled channels for accessing such services, including, for example, information about which schools offered what programs and double shifts. Pristina/Prishtine also had partial assistance networks, differentiated by party, working with internally displaced persons (IDPs), although most assistance for minority populations was provided by UNMIK, international NGOs, and KFOR, which had to use a show of force for Roma children to be accepted at municipal schools. On the issue of crime and security, focus group participants criticized UNMIK for being so passive as to “provoke young Kosovar males” into either acting like criminals or having to defend their own families.

52 Public poverty is a concept that addresses the lack of cohesiveness in a society. It is characterized by run-down public spaces and other evidence of lack of concern about quality of life outside the home.

53 At all five sites, there was a general problem of outmoded professional skills, due to the lack of opportunities for people to receive current training, either at universities and training institutes or through travel abroad. Use of the terms “technical capacity” and “professional capacity” throughout the report takes this problem into account.

54 Differences in salaries paid by international organizations and NGOs in relation to local salaries are on the order of 10-50 to 1. See Morozzo Della Rocca (2000).
Overall, prospects for municipal self-governance in the capital appeared less than promising in the short term, although the institutional development and reforms initiated by the new UNMIK administrator to increase accountability and transparency at the University of Pristina/Prishtine could serve as a model for improving municipal governance.

**Gnjilane/Gjilan**

Gnjilane/Gjilan was characterized by physical separation of the Serbian minority population; a military presence around orthodox churches, with a high degree of tension and security checks; burned-out homes, with not much evidence of new housing construction; reasonably good road infrastructure; and mostly intact commercial facilities, defaced by extensive graffiti.

**Status/cooperation.** Gnjilane/Gjilan was the site where the co-management system was most incomplete, because of the Serbs’ refusal to choose their representatives for the municipal council. This refusal was based on the fact that most Serbs were driven out of the city after the conflict ended, bringing their numbers down from 50 percent to 2 percent of the population; and to the Serbs’ insistence that the allocation of council seats and co-headships of departments be based on their population before this had occurred. The Serbs also wanted UNMIK to support the return of a similar proportion of ethnic Serb IDPs. They were also concerned about security, given the ongoing violence and the ghetto-like circumstances in which the remaining Serbs were now living in Gnjilane/Gjilan. As a consequence, UNMIK still directly conducted municipal affairs.

**Efficiency/effectiveness.** Gnjilane/Gjilan was the only UNMIK regional office where, due to continuing violence against the Serbs, there was a lack of effective co-management. Indeed, the security problem resulted in UNMIK creating a two-track system for basic municipal services—one consisting of schools, clinics, post offices used mainly by ethnic Albanians; and the other of a mixture of services provided directly to the Serb and smaller Roma minorities and complemented by other grassroots services these groups provided for themselves. Examples of UNMIK services provided directly to the Serbs and Romas included operation of the UNMIK ambulance service and the clinic in the Orthodox Church compound, and the UNMIK bus and armed protection services for funerals moving from churches to cemeteries. While the two-track system may have been necessary, it provided the Serbian and Roma minorities with less than optimal services. For example, Serb children from villages could not attend high schools in the city, and classes were often held in tents or private homes. In addition, the system did not generate much economic activity and continued to segregate the minority populations.

The security problem also affected the majority Albanian population, especially young women, who were reportedly at risk of being kidnapped and taken to Europe for sexual exploitation. Politically and economically motivated violence, including house burnings, intimidation, and murder also affected civil servants such as judges and doctors working with UNMIK, and some supporters of the LDK.

**Legitimacy/prospects.** The incomplete institutional co-management system was, by definition, not inclusive. However, the two-track service system attempted to provide access to local government services for all population groups, while UNMIK tried to create the conditions for broader inclusion. Meanwhile, the Serb urban-to-rural displacement led to isolated Serb enclaves in the countryside, while the Albanian rural-to-urban migration created the need for shelter and more economic opportunity. Both groups were dependent on the international presence for security and services. At the same time, the size

55 In April 2000, the Serb National Council decided to suspend its boycott of the co-management system and participate as observers for three months.

56 While prostitution is reported on the rise in Gnjilane/Gjilan, it is young women from Eastern European countries who fill the local ranks of prostitutes, while ethnic Albanian young women are forcibly taken to Europe. See Strazzari and Dognini (2000) for a summary of press accounts of this problem.
of Gnjilane/Gjilan’s middle class and intelligentsia declined, contributing to pessimism within UNMIK about prospects for the immediate future.

Prizren

Prizren was characterized by little destruction in the city but extensive destruction in some rural areas; an influx of IDPs that doubled the city’s population; non-operational factories; inadequate basic services; extensive illegal construction; environmental degradation, with historical monuments at risk; poor infrastructure; deteriorated municipal buildings; a lively downtown area; and several well-patronized market areas.

**Status/cooperation.** The co-management system was incomplete, following removal of the president of the municipal council—the former provisional mayor—who was unwilling to work with UNMIK. A high-ranking former KLA commander served for a time as municipal director for environmental affairs, and worked to promote Serb inclusion, but tolerance suffered a serious setback in early spring 2000 when he was assassinated. The weakness of local government institutions was evident in the relationship between the municipality and UNMIK, with UNMIK initiating services such as historic preservation and garbage collection in the town center.

**Efficiency/effectiveness.** Even accounting for its incompleteness, the co-management system showed a low level of performance because of the poor quality of the municipal workforce, which can be attributed to outmoded professional skills and lack of professionals within Kosovo and abroad; the brain drain from Prizren to the capital; and patronage in municipal jobs. In addition, many municipal appointees were opposed to receiving technical assistance from UNMIK for activities such as historic preservation. Municipal officials also reportedly demanded bribes from those who applied for building permits.

Performance was better in the area of education, with the city having repaired most of its 48 schools, which served 28,000 students. Thirteen percent of the students were Muslim Slavs and 8 percent were Turks.

**Legitimacy/prospects.** Prizren’s educated professional class, its artisans and craftsmen, and its history as a regional trade center gave it an economic vitality and a tradition of relative ethnic diversity and tolerance upon which the co-management system could have been built. The increasing illegal activities to and from the border with Albania, however, undermined the legitimacy of the joint system. Episodes of kidnapped girls in villages having to be freed by international forces only added to the concern.

Prizren still had sizeable minorities, in larger numbers and proportions than other areas of Kosovo. Nevertheless, violence and intimidation caused Muslim Slavs and Turks to leave throughout the fall and winter, and there were reports of ostracism of the few Catholics. In addition, the Gorani faced increasing economic, social, and political exclusion, and some intimidation, all of which contributed to their continuing out-migration. There were also direct attempts to limit the inclusiveness of local government through politically motivated acts of violence, including the high-profile murder of the KLA official mentioned above. Thus, the multi-ethnic culture of the city and region was at risk.

Malisevo/Malisheve

Malisevo/Malisheve was characterized by small and extremely undeveloped rural villages; widespread display of Albanian flags; nonexistent road infrastructure; inadequate electricity supply;
extensive housing destruction; self-separation of women and men; limited availability of basic commercial goods; limited consumption; and widespread poverty.

**Status/cooperation.** Malisevo/Malisheve had not yet been recognized as a formal municipality, so there was no formal municipal structure. Instead, UNMIK’s implementation of the co-management system aimed to formalize the parallel institutional structure set up by the Kosovar Albanians after Belgrade broke it up as a municipality in 1991 and redistributed its 45 villages across four other municipalities. The parallel nature of this institutional system was still apparent in that UNMIK did not have a budget for or an official office in Malisevo/Malisheve, and its municipal administrator commuted from Prizren. However, the relationship between UNMIK and local officials was a close one, and UNMIK allowed village governments to tax commercial activities to finance local services. This meant that these local governments had, de facto, more freedom for self-government. Given that Malisevo/Malisheve had been a KLA stronghold during the conflict, it was not surprising that many former KLA fighters were running its parallel institutions during the co-management period.

**Efficiency/effectiveness.** The poverty of the area was compounded by the terrible destruction it suffered during the conflict and the lack of reconstruction resources, compared to other areas, because of the hybrid institutional situation. Many NGOs reportedly stayed away because of this lack of resources. In fact, the relative scarcity of NGOs in Malisevo/Malisheve illustrated UNMIK’s limited ability to direct foreign aid resources to the area, including building materials for housing reconstruction. Local officials, many of whom were young former fighters—several with college degrees—had a clear vision of development for the area, although it seemed unrealistic in terms of time and resource expectations. Their vision closely reflected UNMIK’s own plans for reconstruction, which included the strengthening of agriculture and the promotion of tourism, given the presence of caves, thermal waters, and waterfalls. However, it was difficult for team to assess the operational impact of the local administration because of the overwhelming conditions of underdevelopment and the real lack of resources.

**Legitimacy/prospects.** After Malisevo/Malisheve regains the status of municipality, it will have more access to international resources. In the meantime, the local administration has been focused on political organizing, and on supporting the creation of new groups operating within this rural and traditional society. A notable example was the women’s association founded in January 1999 by three local women close to the administration, and operating out of a building donated by local officials and repaired with public resources. The association trained young rural women and widows in sewing, and provided medical advice to pregnant women. While this grassroots approach was admirable, it is not known how inclusive the local administration was in carrying out its other activities.
**Pec/Peja**

Pec/Peja was characterized by widespread destruction and reconstruction in the city; relatively good infrastructure; many large new buildings; few remaining historical buildings; numerous very substantial private homes; a large commercial area in the center; and evidence of sustained consumption.

**Status/cooperation.** There was a complete co-management structure in place and clear evidence of municipal departments working better than at other sites, despite the fact that Pec/Peja suffered some of the worst destruction during the conflict because of its largely ethnic Albanian population, the presence of great Orthodox monasteries, and the border with Montenegro, where support came to the Yugoslav army. The relationship between UNMIK and local officials developed at a steady pace after a cautious beginning, as the psychological trauma of the conflict lessened. During early meetings with UNMIK representatives, there was a lot of posturing by municipal officials, including the display of arms, as well as a clear distrust of the international community in its mandate for governance. The regional office’s approach of not responding to such behavior while conveying the message of wanting a professional relationship seems to have largely succeeded. The relationship eventually came to be characterized by trust and a sense of pragmatism. The almost total absence of minorities was acknowledged as contributing to that relationship.

**Efficiency/effectiveness.** Municipal departments were staffed with well-trained professionals, some of whom had studied abroad. When the emergency ended, the departments worked in a rather coordinated manner on reconstruction projects, through an inter-departmental commission set up by the municipal administrator. Reconstruction was the most urgent task, and a small but good team of architect planners worked on site plans, aided by a temporary team of architect planners from Barcelona. NGOs helping in the reconstruction of the remaining private buildings—estimated at 70 percent of the original total—were advised to ask for proof of ownership and request building permits from the municipality. There were two UNMIK architects working with municipal professionals on housing reconstruction plans, but more were needed. There was also a need for specialists in historic preservation to work on the old market, which was destroyed. Another example of the working relationship with UNMIK was the submission of requests by municipal planners to the legally trained UNMIK administrator to approve the expropriation of property when called for by the reconstruction plans.

In addition to addressing the reconstruction of private buildings, UNMIK also focused on the more serious problem of neighborhood infrastructure, ranging from roads to green space. The decision to update the 1963 town plan was in line with this, although the obstacles were enormous. Some were technical, such as the difficulty of recovering property documentation that the Serbs had brought to the Patriarchate. This plan also faced opposition from entrenched private interests, and the need for an extended commitment of large resources by major donor countries. While the Pec/Peja region had an extensive network of NGOs and received more donor resources than other areas, the same level of commitments in the future was not assured.

On the issue of rural reconstruction, the co-management system created a rural development directorate to discuss with donors development-based ways to ease IDPs back to the surrounding villages by creating employment opportunities. On education, UNMIK played a lead role in working to integrate the small number of Roma children into schools; children of the Muslim Slav minority, estimated at one to two percent of students, were reported to be well integrated. Of 120 schools that had been totally demolished, 20 were rebuilt, although poor quality construction was reported. Attention was also focused on teaching the new curriculum and improving the training of teachers.

On the issue of security, there was some intra-ethnic violence due to conflicts of interest among the traditional family groups still strong in this mountainous area of Kosovo. There were many accounts of former KLA members acting as police in the city, particularly at night. There were also many reports of threats and intimidation, including in the courts, by men known to have been KLA. As in
Pristina/Prishtine and Urosevac/Ferizai, they were purported to levy taxes on business for their own use, and to intimidate business people and judicial officials. Resentment was expressed cautiously but clearly to the study team, though open denunciations did not occur. There were also numerous accounts, confirmed by UNMIK, of organized crime activities, involving trade at the border and smuggling, which drew the attention of the international press.58

**Legitimacy/prospects.** Interestingly, Pec/Peja still had the old intermediate institutions, the bashkesia lokale, with 12 operating in city neighborhoods and 16 others across 91 villages in the municipality. The most active were reportedly in the villages, where they provided direct services such as documentation and registration of the population. The bashkesia lokale were housed in municipal offices, and the salaries of their small staffs paid by UNMIK.

**Social capital case studies at two sites**

To investigate in greater depth the effects of bonding and bridging social capital in Kosovo, the assessment team carried out brief case studies in two cities: Pec/Peja, where bonding social capital may be constraining the development of a strong civil society (Box 1); and Prizren, where civil society organizations, with UNMIK support, are strengthening the city’s bridging social capital across communities (Box 2).

58 Del Re (2000).
Box 1. Bonding Social Capital and Civil Society in Pec/Peja

Pec/Peja is an old Balkan trading city and business center situated at the foothills of the mountains bordering Montenegro. From medieval times, it has had a Serbian, Albanian, and Turkish culture, with many churches, mosques, and one of the most important Serb Orthodox monasteries. The old city center, particularly the bazaar streets, was almost entirely burned down during the war, and now the city is almost exclusively Albanian, with no Serbs and a small number of Romas.

Pec/Peja’s economy is concentrated in the hands of five powerful and wealthy families, each representing one gjak (blood). These families compete with each other both commercially and socially, and often use their wealth for philanthropic purposes. For example:

- One family owns a printing house and television and radio stations. During the parallel system the family printed and distributed Albanian schoolbooks, and employed more people than needed. More recently, the family organized and paid for roadside garbage removal and ran a radio campaign to create environmental awareness.
- Another family owns an appliance factory, and under the co-management, one member was the director of the electricity for Pec/Peja.
- Another family, former fruit merchants, now owns a juice factory in Albania, three factories of various types near Pec/Peja, a food processing factory with an Albanian partner from Croatia, and a shopping center complex in the city center that includes its own restaurant. Between 1985 and 1990, approximately 350 patrilinear male relatives in this family ran 650 supermarkets in Kosovo and employed 7,500 workers. During the conflict, they distributed milk at factory price to all municipal schools. They also acted as mediators in conflicts over land, and provided free office space to local NGOs.
- The two remaining families are less socially active; one owns a sponge factory and the other has a large real estate holdings and rents a building to OSCE.

Despite these philanthropic activities, some city residents view these families with ambivalence because of the tight control they exert over the city’s economy. Others wonder how their assets escaped destruction during the war. There are also suspicions that some members of these families are involved in organized crime. The bonding social capital found among these families can limit opportunities for the development of a strong civil society—although the more progressive members of some of these families may also present opportunities to transform bonding social capital into bridging social capital through their support for civil society groups working for social change.

Pec/Peja has, to date, a relatively modest set of developments with regard to such groups, which have generally failed to thrive despite a relatively strong tradition of political stability and a professional administration with little turnover of municipal employees. Of the 36 civil society groups that existed in Pec/Peja as of April 2000, only a few were reported to be active. One of the most active is a women’s group, in existence since 1989 and associated with the LDK. This group helps women in villages to exhibit their crafts, and supports women whose relatives are missing. Of the two human rights associations, one has been existence since 1991 and is now devoted to identifying war criminals. Two minority associations have also become active—one a Muslim Slav NGO and the other a Roma association. Both are being nurtured by the international community to evolve from assisting minority families through humanitarian aid to providing them with job training. The large presence of international NGOs in Pec/Peja is, similar to other areas of Kosovo, a double-edged sword; they provide much needed assistance but are also constraining the development of local groups.
Box 2. Bridging Social Capital and the Co-management System in Prizren

Prizren is a picturesque medieval trading and artisan town known for its metal work and leatherwear. It has traditionally been the most ethnically and culturally diverse city in Kosovo, with many historic houses, 28 mosques, 9 Serb Orthodox churches, 5 Catholic churches, an ancient castle, Turkish baths, and old hans, places where Ottoman trading caravans stayed overnight. Prizren was the site of the Albanian revival movement, with the first Albanian language school and one of the first Albanian girls’ schools in Kosovo. Nevertheless, the city maintained a relatively high degree of multi-ethnic tolerance.

The spirit of tolerance in the city was due in part to the presence of a large intellectual class and professional associations (teachers and doctors), which played an important role during the parallel period. At that time, many of these associations included non-Albanians, except for Serbs. The conflict and out-migration of the 1990s made the ethnic base for building networks of associations significantly less diverse and most associations less inclined toward inter-ethnic cooperation than during the previous decades. Now, despite the incompleteness of the co-management system, many of these associations and other civil society groups have made up for the disappointing performance of the municipal administration. For example, there was a high degree of cooperation with UNMIK on educational affairs, with 9 (of 39) primary and 5 (of 5) secondary schools being multilingual.

In addition, UNMIK’s attempts to promote such public interest-oriented associations achieved some notable successes. On March 8, 2000, OSCE’s NGO Resource Center opened at a central location in Prizren, in the vicinity of IOM’s Internet Café and the city’s Culture House. The Center’s primary purpose is to assist in the rebuilding of inter-ethnic relationships across Prizren’s majority and minority communities, by providing professional assistance, equipment support, and meeting places for newly created cultural and service NGOs. The Center also encourages the registration of local NGOs that comply with UNMIK’s ethical and operational standards. As of April 2000, the census of majority (Albanian) and minority (Muslim, Turkish, Roma) NGOs in the municipality of Prizren listed 62 organizations: 7 women’s, 2 children’s, 3 youth, 14 cultural, 12 humanitarian, 9 reconstruction and economic development, 2 for the protection of religious freedom, 2 environmental, and 11 professional. At the time of the assessment, 34 of these groups had submitted the documentation for formal registration as NGOs; 7 others had stated their intention to complete the submission soon; one was fully registered; and the remainder had not initiated the process.

Of particular significance is the emergence of associations for economic development, which are replacing family-based networks in the city’s commercial and artisan communities. UNMIK’s support for these local NGOs led to the creation of the first chamber of commerce in Kosovo; UNMIK provided this organization with technical assistance so that it could offer its members management training and financial planning programs. The emergence of independent trade unions, entrepreneurs’ clubs, and a civic forum on development issues also holds much promise for creating bridging social capital and economic growth.

UNMIK also made particular efforts to promote women’s organizations. One proposal involved organizing a women’s group to restore an old Turkish bath as a museum, with a space for craft activities. UNMIK and the international community also supported inter-ethnic cooperation among youth by investing in recreational and sports facilities.
Informal Institutions

This section continues the analysis of how local institutions create the conditions for empowerment, bridging social capital, reconciliation, and democratization. The focus in this section is on changes that occurred in Kosovo’s informal institutions—civil society organizations, village councils, and family systems—during the 1990s. The first part of the analysis is concerned with civil society groups. It describes these groups in terms of their orientation (place-based, identity-based, issue-based with a public interest orientation, issue-based with a self-interest orientation); the type of social capital that each promotes; and how such groups have been affected by the international presence. The focus then shifts to a more in-depth analysis of the principal place-based group, the traditional Kosovar extended family, and of how tradition and family were used as coping strategies during the conflict. This section also considers how traditional family systems are linked with local political institutions, particularly village councils and village-level conflict-resolution mechanisms; how they contribute to the livelihoods of their members; and the gender implications of the reemergence of such systems. Finally, the chapter considers how the lack of trust and participation impedes the development of those groups that promote bridging social capital.

Civil society: comparative findings on informal institutions

The assessment identified similarities and differences in the ways that civil society organizations at the five representative sites changed as a result of the conflict and the international presence.

Types of civil society groups

Place-based groups. The principal place-based group is the traditional patrilocal extended family, which fosters inward-looking bonding social capital. This institution was strengthened as a result of the conflict, especially in the villages, but also in larger towns, where more modern nuclear families tended to remain in the same neighborhood as their relatives. The conflict also strengthened ties with returnees and IDPs, many of whom depended on extended families for survival; and with family members in the diaspora, who contributed heavily to reconstruction, especially in the devastated western and mountain areas. The international community represented an external resource for these families, enabling them to cope by replenishing lost crops, replacing tools, reopening local schools, and providing employment.

The village council also largely survived as a local institution, with families represented on such councils in proportion to their size and economic strength. In fact, the conflict increased the visibility and importance of the councils, which during the co-management period played a role in securing physical protection for village residents, articulating their needs to international agencies, and negotiating with UNMIK representatives.

Identity-based groups. Groups that narrowly define themselves in terms of ethnicity or religion were also strengthened as a result of their dealings with UNMIK and other international agencies, often as the sole representatives of their members. Many of these groups also expanded their functions as service providers and sources of humanitarian assistance to their members, which increased the legitimacy of the identity-based leadership and exacerbated the tendency of social clubs, trade unions, and welfare organizations to operate not only separately but in opposition to each other. In the diaspora, too, the self-selection of Kosovars into groups by ethnicity and religion has impeded their integration into host countries.

Issue-based groups with a public interest orientation. The post-conflict legacy of violence and distrust has impeded the formation of new public interest-oriented groups, which could help to
counterbalance the increased influence of identity-based groups and create the bridging social capital needed for civic development. Few of the sites were found to have a broad-based business or cultural association, although women’s and youth groups have done some remarkable work creating bridging social capital.

Especially in Prizren, young women have shown a bridging capacity in forming relationships, and in organizing activities and NGOs, beyond ethnic boundaries. There are also a number of strong individual women in many villages, some of whom had been representatives of the LDK women’s group before the conflict. During the 1990s, the LDK had continued the communist tradition of women’s organizations with branches and sub-branches covering the entire territory. Although these structures have not been reconnected in post-war Kosovo, the women’s groups are still locally important. In the village of Cernice, for example, they are affiliated with the work of the village council.

Sensitive NGO activities organized by groups such as the Center for the Protection of Women and Children, the Women’s Forum, and the Motrat Qiriazi have targeted urban and rural women where they live, since some cannot leave their villages or even their courtyards for security reasons, or because they are poor and must spend their days doing needlework. The NGO services most in demand are psychological counseling and classes in sewing, computer skills, English, health care, and family planning. Focus group participants expressed the need for distractions from everyday difficulties and trauma, and from simple boredom, but also had a clear vision of the need to create their own economic opportunities. Women asked for help especially in marketing home products such as embroidery work or small carpets. In response, the Pec/Peja office of the Center for the Protection of Women and Children organized an exhibition of village home products and handicrafts in that city. The executive director of this organization believes that empowering women through economic opportunities also has a positive effect on the reduction of domestic violence. She warned, however, that the high proportion of funds going to international NGOs tends to distort local civil society initiatives that could help to develop less patriarchal structures.

The director of Motrat Qiriazi expressed concern about the small number of women appointed and promoted within UNMIK, which she says contributed to the restoration of patriarchy in Kosovar society.

Youth groups, like women’s groups, have played an important role in the lives of their members and acted as a counterbalance to the extended family structure. Albanians and Serbs have tended to have separate organizations, although with similar activities—football, skiing, mountain climbing, ecology, folk culture, social welfare, poetry, modern dance, and music. The desire of these groups to exchange experiences with other organizations has created opportunities for bridging social capital. However, it should be noted that Serb youth organizations currently face severe security and resource constraints and are receiving limited assistance from the international community. Both Albanian and Serb organizations

59 Discussions with Benedicte Giaever, Director, and Ingrid Halmova, NGO/Civil Society Officer, Prizren Region, OSCE, April 14, 2000.
60 Interviews with Vjosa Dobruna, founder, Pristina/Prishtine, January 20, 2000; Sevdie Ahmeti, Executive Director, Pristina/Prishtine, January 19, 2000; and with Mimi Mysafere Shoshi, Director of the Pec/Peja office, April 19, 2000. The organization has eight offices across Kosovo. The Italian co-sponsorship of the organization was coming to an end at the time of the interviews.
61 Interview with Women’s Forum activist in an IDP shelter, April 5, 2000.
62 Interview with Igibale Rogova, Motrat Qiriazi, Pristina/Prishtine, January 2000.
63 Interview with Sevdie Ahmeti, Executive Director, Center for the Protection of Women and Children, Pristina/Prishtine, January 19, 2000.
64 Interview with Igibale Rogova, Motrat Qiriazi, Pristina/Prishtine, January 2000.
have a male-female ratio of two to one, which may be due to the fact that young women prefer to join local women’s organizations.65

**Issue-based groups with a self-interest orientation.** The same conditions that strengthened identity-based groups and discouraged the creation of public interest-oriented groups during the co-management period also encouraged the emergence of self-interested groups destructive to the social fabric, including place-based traditional institutions. These groups have been largely focused on acquiring great wealth and territorial control through violence and criminal activities. The traditional family structure may have facilitated their growth by protecting family members involved in such activities.

These groups have fed on the ample supply of unemployed youth at risk (all sites) and their connections to criminal groups in the diaspora (Pristina/Prishtine and Pec/Peja), the increasing presence in Kosovo of Albanian criminal networks (Prizren and Gnjilane/Gjilan), and the vast opportunities provided by the uncertain legal status of economic and housing property. Kosovar Albanian organized crime is also well-established. Economic activities controlled by these groups range from the distribution of gas and ownership of hotels and commercial centers (Pristina/Prishtine), to control over illegal construction and the real estate market (Pristina/Prishtine and Prizren), to takeovers of property (Gnjilane/Gjilan), to exaction of taxes (all sites), to control of border trade (Pec/Peja). More criminal and violent activities range from kidnapping and trafficking women for prostitution (reported in Gnjilane/Gjilan, Pristina/Prishtine, and Prizren), to drug and weapons trade and immigrant smuggling (Pec/Peja and Prizren). Focus group participants at all sites expressed great concern about the rapid criminalization of Kosovo’s economy and the inability of UNMIK and KFOR to control this problem.

**International support for groups that promote inclusion and bridging social capital**

The international community has viewed Kosovo’s emerging public interest-oriented groups as the connective tissue that will link representative local institutions to broader societal needs. These groups have also been seen as an important counterweight to the conservative force of the place-based groups, the divisive presence of identity-based groups, and the criminal power of some self-interested groups.

UNMIK provided tangible support to these public interest-oriented groups, many of which applied for recognition as NGOs,66 as long as their views and activities were not in conflict with UNMIK’s mandate. Support by UNMIK’s regional offices included: (i) technical assistance to projects carried out by new groups; (ii) preparation of needs assessments, as a way to involve local NGOs in the programming of assistance services (Gnjilane/Gjilan); and (iii) planning of discussion sessions with parents and teachers, aimed at the formation of parent-teacher associations (Pec/Peja). In addition, UNMIK supported projects aimed at increasing the number of NGOs working with and created by minority groups (Prizren). Efforts to support such public interest-oriented groups varied, depending on the conditions at each site. In Prizren, for example, such efforts built on the city’s strong economic and cultural tradition; while in Pec/Peja, they were based on the relative success and stability of the co-management system and the municipal government.

**The traditional Kosovar family: an analysis of bonding social capital**

The assessment found that the exclusion from state structures, the conflict, and the associated loss of housing in the 1990s had the effect of reversing the trend among Kosovar Albanians in the 1970s and 1980s toward forming nuclear families and integrating into state structures. Focus group participants,

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66 There is some concern that international NGOs are constraining the growth and capacity-building efforts of local NGOs, particularly when they hire the most experienced and well-trained staff of local organizations.
including village elders, repeatedly noted that the reemergence of the “Kosovo-type” patrilocal extended family during the crisis was a strategy for adapting to economic scarcity and threats to survival. Young people, in particular, stated their desire for these families to break into nuclear units as soon as economic and security conditions permit.  

It is of paramount importance to understand these aspirations, as some analysts have linked traditionalist families, as well as individual extremists operating under the guise of “honor” and “manliness,” to the escalation of violence, leading to crisis, in the late 1990s. However, focus group participants also told many stories of Albanian men who hid their weapons to avoid being drawn into the violent traditions of reprisal and retaliation, and most expressed the hope that these kinds of traditions would soon belong to the past.

The Kosovo-type family

The Kosovo-type family is structured according to a virilocal rule of post-marital residence. In rural areas, most marriages are arranged, since young women and men grow up only with their patrilinear relatives and have limited opportunities to meet a marriage partner. Upon marriage, the bride moves in with her new husband’s family. In urban areas, the woman may live with her parents-in-law. In rural areas, she may also live with her husband’s brothers and their wives (fratistic principle). The wife, always a kin-outsider, will eternally be called nuse (“bride”), while her children will belong “by their blood” to their father’s family. Therefore, in cases where a woman returns to her own family—as in divorce or widowhood—the children will, if tradition is obeyed, remain with her husband’s family.

A nuse establishes herself in her husband’s family through her children, behavior, and labor contribution to the household. Particularly in rural areas, where there are few alternatives for acquiring prestige, a nuse tends to reproduce traditional ideas of conformity much more than the unmarried sisters of her husband and daughters of her in-laws. Unmarried living at the place of their birth, among their male relatives, tend to be much more rebellious. Yet, even young rebellious women live in a world separated from their brothers. “We do not know what they are up to, and we don’t really want to know,” said a 23 year-old unmarried woman who strongly hopes for more equal rights in employment and education.

Tradition and gender: women at risk

With the escalation of the conflict, and what some consider to be the gradual return of the local patriarchal traditions subsumed under the term kanun, the situation of women has deteriorated. In particular, a recent UNICEF report indicates that trafficking of Albanian women and girls increased as a result of the war displacement and the exacerbation of this phenomenon in neighboring countries. A few respondents indicated a rise in the number of kidnappings, especially in Urosevac/Ferizaj and Vitina/Viti.

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67 Some also noted that international efforts, such as last winter’s Winterization Program, have inadvertently reinforced extended families by offering aid to families that would take in homeless family members.
68 See Judah (2000).
69 Cases were encountered in Pristina/Prishtine and Prizren where the mother returned to her parents and left the children with her husband’s family after she became a widow as a result of the recent conflict.
70 Reineck (1991) describes the prestige system and conflicts associated with young women moving into an established household, and how this accounts for their reproducing traditional values. Also see Backer (1983), for an elaboration of how networks and alliances beyond the patrilinear family are maintained through women’s less visible kin relationships and friendships with other women.
71 The assessment’s findings from the focus groups tend to confirm Reineck’s (1991) interpretations.
72 For a discussion of kanun, see La Cava and Nanetti (2000) and Schwandner-Sievers (1999).
and its links with prostitution\textsuperscript{74} in both Kosovo (particularly in Gnjilane/Gjilan\textsuperscript{75}) and other European countries, with Italy receiving the majority of the Kosovar prostitutes.\textsuperscript{76} Women activists spoke of kidnappings in the refugee camps during the war, where the victims were as young as 13 years of age. One respondent suggested a pattern of rural weddings where the bride finds herself part of a European prostitution ring after she marries a man who has legal residency in a Western European country.\textsuperscript{77} Given this new set of problems, the Center for the Protection of Women and Children has shifted its focus from reproductive health to issues related to violence, and now works with victims of kidnapping, trafficking, and rape. In addition, the Center provide assistance to women and children who have suffered from domestic violence, which is reported on the rise given the constrained housing situation.

At the same time, given the traditional structure of the Kosovar society, especially in rural areas, another important source of risk for women is the death or disappearance of a husband, father, or other male relative.

**Village political representation**

The patrilinear social order creates territorial units based on groups of male kin and solidarity groups who tend to be brothers, sons, fathers, and cousins. The type of social order thus produces an overlap of territorial and kinship principles, which is particularly reflected in local naming patterns. A village might carry the name of the founder, who would also be the forefather of its most powerful patrilineage. The village council reflects this kinship system by proportional representation. The more powerful patrilineages, based on the number of households in the village, will be represented by more than one member. Those families with the longest history of residence in the village are the strongest because they have split into many units over time (see Box 3).

\textsuperscript{74} Some respondents also linked the rise in prostitution with the KFOR/military presence.
\textsuperscript{75} Gnjilane/Gjilan is also the entry point for heroin into Kosovo. See ICG (2000b).
\textsuperscript{76} Interview with representatives of an Italian NGO focusing on the protection of women and children.
\textsuperscript{77} Interview with UNMIK official, Gnjilane/Gjilan, March 2000.
\textsuperscript{78} UNFPA/IOM (2000).
Box 3. Village Political Representation

There are 24 different patronyms in the village of Pirane, where 2,310 inhabitants live in 231 Kosovo-type (extended) families and 500 European-type (nuclear) families. Research has shown that extended families develop and break up in generational circles, and that nuclear and extended families coexist as part of this pattern of social order. The proportional kinship representation in the village council does not, in this case, correspond to political affiliations because this village was thoroughly allied with the LDK. In contrast, the village of Cernice has five patronyms for 310 families, each averaging 7 members, and the 9 seats on the Albanian village council—which exists in parallel with the Serb village council—are split between LDK and PDK. The largest patrilineage has three of these posts, one with LDK, one with PDK, and one held by the representative of the communal council (bashkesia lokale). Two other patrilineages each have two council seats, representing both parties and the Mother Theresa Society. Two less powerful patrilineages each have one member on the council, one with LDK and the other with PDK.

From family to nation?

The patrilineage as a system of order gives Kosovar Albanians a broad national identity as members of one of the few founding fis, or patrilinear tribes. When Albanians meet for the first time, they are usually able to identify each other according to this descent system, as well as through marriage, neighborhood and friendship relations, and place of birth. In this way, all of Kosovo can seem like a village. The Albanian members of the assessment team would trace such common relations with anyone they encountered during the survey work, and—in cases of meetings with Turks and Muslim Slavs—this sometimes expanded beyond the ethnic community because of marriage relationships. At the same time, other linkages, including inter-ethnic relationships, exist because of common experiences of work and education before the period of the parallel system. Many older respondents have good memories of those times.

Traditions of intra- and inter-community conflict resolution

During the time of the survey, Albanians in many villages were celebrating a 10-year anniversary of intra-community appeasement. This appeasement had begun in 1990, when Albanian students at Pristina/Prishtine University approached the ethnography professor Anton Cetta for advice on how to properly—i.e., according to rural customary traditions—settle Albanian blood feuds for the sake of development and national cohesion in the face of increasing Serb hegemony. That same year, Professor Cetta, along with students and clergymen, organized feud reconciliation rituals on a mass scale all over Kosovo, using the kanun concept of “binding promise” (bese-lidhje), i.e., of ritually swearing off family feuds in front of witnesses (see Box 4).

Such rituals have historically been performed among Albanians to establish internal cohesion in the face of an external threat. In fact, these reconciliation initiatives may have provided the parallel state

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80 Some explain the assumed absence of community spirit among Kosovar Albanians by their loyalty to the nation rather than to neighborhoods and community, while the latter is seen as more typical of the Serbs.
81 Detailed reports of these anniversary events appeared in local Kosovar newspapers such as Koha Ditore and Bta Sot during the research period.
82 For detailed information, we are grateful to Dr. Michael Stewart, Anthropology Department, University College London, and to Lala Meredith-Vula, London, who photographed these mass rituals.
83 For a detailed interpretation of besa, see Schwandner-Sievers (1999).
84 For a detailed interpretation of besa, see Schwandner-Sievers (1999).
For example, the Mother Theresa Society, created in 1990 (with Professor Cetta as a founding member) and organized on the patrilinear kinship principle, became the Albanian national health and social assistance organization under the parallel system. The Society had 44 branches, 636 sub-branches, and 92 clinics in villages and cities all over Kosovo. In Cernice (see Box 4), one seat on the village council went to this organization. The Society was also used to channel international donations from Caritas, the Red Cross, and other organizations, and to collect information on disease and epidemics. It seems likely that the Society coordinated these distribution and accumulation processes with the village councils; i.e., through proportional patrilinear kinship structures.

**Box 4. Blood Appeasement Councils**

Blood appeasement councils already existed before Professor Cetta’s initiative, and still existed in the villages of Cernice and Pirane at the time of the assessment. In Cernice, the council acted twice during the past 10 years to prevent the escalation of conflicts, one involving a case of jealousy between two Albanian men over a young woman, and the other a disagreement over boundaries of adjacent private land. In the latter case, an Albanian occupied the land of a Serb neighbor, and the appeasement council required him to leave the land. This incident took place in 1989, before the segregation between Serbs and Albanians, and helped to prevent inter-ethnic community conflict. Despite the success of this mechanism, however, members of the village council say that *kanun* is not the appropriate means to bring back justice, and that they await the establishment of the formal rule of law.

**Coping strategies: generating family income**

In many parts of Kosovo, the number of men of working age in a family determines the family’s capacity for survival, and male participants in focus groups emphasized the responsibility they felt in this regard. In rural areas, in particular, men generate the family’s income, although many men and women would like to see a broader employment market with similar opportunities for women. While some young women expressed pride in devoting themselves to childcare, housekeeping, and needlework, others have started small enterprises. For example, women in Llukare, a village near Pristina/Prishtine that suffered little war damage, are maintaining a chicken farm and keeping bees for honey production.

As already noted, rural extended families also depend on remittances from one to three male family members living abroad. An individual asylum seeker abroad might be able to send only DM 100 or 150 a month, but this important contribution to the income of the extended family allows other men in the family to continue agricultural, local trading, or other income-generating activities while caring for aging parents. Any surplus cash might be invested in the education of younger family members, with priority given to boys. Such dependencies are a major reason why younger family members, particularly young women in rural areas, want to have their own nuclear home and family and escape extended family life (see Box 5).

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85 There is a great need for further research on this issue. See, for example, Haegemas (2000).
Box 5. Albanian Cultural Proverbs about Money

Albanian sayings clarify who has the power and makes decisions in a family, particularly in cases where resources are limited and a decision needs to be made on who receives education:

- The one who has money makes the rules;
- Something of someone else never becomes yours;
- The money – the music.

Migrants from Kosovo go to Switzerland and Germany, and to a lesser extent to Italy, Slovenia, Sweden, Denmark, and Croatia. Only when a man has migrated with his own nuclear family, or has founded a family abroad, do the remittances to the extended family back home become endangered. Many families fear the loss of their remittances due to the return of a large number of Kosovar migrants from Germany and Switzerland; while others have family members who will be returning with a pension. For example, the patriarch of an extended family in Pirane receives a pension of DM 230 a month from Germany because he lost some fingers in a factory accident. His entire 11-member family is living on this income. In Prizren, a family of 20, headed by two elderly brothers and including all their sons and sons’ families, is living on a monthly pension of DM 1000, which one of them receives from working for 20 years in a German factory. Other families have difficulty receiving their pensions from abroad because the banks in Kosovo do not functioning properly. Most are confident, however, that their claims to these pensions will eventually be fulfilled. In contrast, those who have claims on Yugoslav pensions are less optimistic and are very vulnerable.

Remittances and pensions from abroad have become more important since the war, which interrupted planting and harvesting cycles and enabled the widespread theft and destruction of tools. In pre-war times, farmers often produced small surpluses, which were sold at local markets, for example, in Pirane. A farmer from Cernice who is living in one house with his four adult brothers and their families said, “We always were a family collective, a private agricultural co-operative, if you wish.” They used to grow vegetables, tobacco, wheat, maize, and clover for fodder. However, all their agricultural tools were stolen during the war and have not yet been retrieved, and they had no 1999 harvest. In many cases, fields are not worked because they are mined, or people fear they are mined, as in Rugova, Pirane, and villages near Malisevo/Malisheve.

In addition to equipment, farmers lack seeds and fertilizer, livestock, and credit to finance the acquisition of these basic means of production. Agricultural tools and machinery seem to have been systematically destroyed on a large scale, and livestock systematically confiscated all over Kosovo by Serb military or paramilitary forces, even in villages that suffered little other damage. This has been especially disastrous for families living from livestock farming, such as a family in Dragobil that owned 320 sheep, 10 cows, and 600 chicken before the war, of which almost all were taken. In rare cases where livestock could be retrieved, there is danger of starvation because, as one farmer in Pirane said, “there is no food aid for cattle,” and no stored fodder from the previous autumn. Many farmers emphasized the urgent need for seeds, or credit for seeds and tools, so they can start sowing in time to have a 2000 harvest and not have depend on humanitarian aid for another year.

At the time of the assessment, humanitarian aid and other international support were allocated on the municipal basis. Thus, completely destroyed villages, such as those on the road between Prizren and the Drenica region, were in danger of insufficient aid even if the municipal center, in this case Prizren, was comparatively well off. Despite direct inquiries, we could find no signs of barter in such villages, although there was an explicit demand for cash. Some women said they would not mind selling their jewelry or land for cash; however, all their jewelry had been stolen, and there were no purchasers for land.
Rural public sector employees such as teachers, members of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), and policemen are usually part of an extended family and contribute to effective income generation through their diversification of labor. Teachers complained, however, that their income is usually not enough for them to support even a nuclear family. Where there is no income from another family member, teachers also pursue other income-generating activities. For example, a village teacher might also be a farmer or a trader (e.g., selling cigarettes in Cernice); and in the city, a translator for the international community, a driver, or a journalist. The need of teachers to pursue multiple occupations is seen as a major constraint to quality education. Many would agree with another teacher in Cernice who emphasized the value of work (see Box 6), saying he is lucky to be able to physically work as a farmer, and that he is teaching for patriotic reasons because “the basis of each state is education.”

Box 6. Albanian Cultural Values Regarding Work

Work has high symbolic and materialistic value. When people talk about men, other regions in Kosovo, or other nationalities, they always assess them in terms of their (assumed) industrial capacity. “Ai eshte punetore,” “he is a worker,” meaning “he is a hard worker,” is the highest praise for a person; and “they are workers” is the highest praise for a nation or its representatives. Focus group participants explained that this evaluation depends less on the type of work a man performs (he might be an intellectual or a seasonal migrant worker) than on his willingness to work and his capacity to generate income, sustain a family, and build a house. Therefore, his reputation as a worker determines his consideration in rural marriage politics.

Many village and city entrepreneurs, such as garage owners, mechanics, construction workers, brick producers, grocers, bakers, mill owners, and dairy processors also suffered loss or destruction of equipment and means of production, notably in Dragobil, Cernice, Pirane, and Rugova. Only those with access to remittances or credit have been able to restart their businesses at a time where there is a high demand for services. Many of these small-scale entrepreneurs are in local reconstruction work. In Malisevo/Malisheve, the owner of a wood processing business expressed the need for credit to expand his door and window production business. Many focus group participants complained that because of lack of credit and equipment, commercial and construction goods that could easily be locally produced are instead imported from neighboring states. In some villages, men have started to (illegally) sell local products for construction work, such as timber from mountain forests (Rugova mountains near Pec/Peja) or sand from a river (near Prizren), in desperate attempts to generate cash income.

Many rural respondents said they envy urban residents because they have access to a wide range of employment options, especially with the international community (UNMIK, NGOs, etc.), and the chance to earn extraordinary amounts of money. In the cities, many have found work as drivers, translators, and administrators and are often paid ten times as much as civil servants (teachers, police, doctors, etc.). Rural respondents also said they envy city residents because both men and women have employment opportunities, and their families tend to be smaller. In Gnjilane/Gjilan and Malisevo/Malisheve, young adult women were found to contribute to their family income along with men, as long as they were—as sisters and daughters—employed in family-owned shops or the local administration. Upon marriage, however, their role tends to change and their work becomes more housebound. Although city families tend to have fewer children and the extended family structure is less common, old age security is achieved through viri- and patrilocal marriage rules in the city as well as the village. These principles guarantee that one son and his nuclear family will always remain in the house or flat of his parents and provide for them. Brothers abroad will contribute to this family’s living expenses.

Some types of urban employment—in education, journalism, business, trading, restaurants, shop keeping, and craftsmanship (silver work is particularly prominent in Prizren and Gnjilane/Gjilan)—are as important now as before the conflict, although entrepreneurs now have more freedom than they did under the Serb-dominated local administration. There are also more jobs for Albanians in state-owned companies such as electric utilities and railroads, and in textile, battery, pharmaceutics, and metallurgic
factories—jobs that were lost to Serbs during the 1990s. It is the Romas and Muslim Slavs who have now been losing jobs. Most income for city families, however, now comes from new employment opportunities. Government and nongovernment administration, translation and driving services, and rentals of flats and houses to foreigners are income-generating options that have come with the international presence. At the same time, prices for these type of services have risen enormously. Predominantly in the capital, interviewees expressed concern about the how the foreign presence has distorted the local economy and created dependencies by employing such high numbers of people, particularly those with English language proficiency. Other highly qualified people, such as some university professors, have felt disadvantaged and frustrated, and have largely withdrawn from engaging in contemporary society.

**Trust and participation in local institutions**

Structured questionnaires (see Annex II D) with focus group participants were conducted to take a crude measurement of two key variables—trust and participation, which comprise two of the multidimensional notions of social capital.\(^{86}\) The focus was on the level of trust in local institutions such as village councils and municipal administrations; and the level of participation in different types of associations. The data indicate that: (i) there is a lack of trust among people beyond the extended family system, which is one of the key impediments to the growth of inclusive local institutions; and (ii) the effectiveness of civil society organizations is constrained by lack of participation.

**Trust**

Data on the degree of trust in local institutions were analyzed according to the variables of age, gender, and location. For all types of respondents, trust did not rise above 34 percent. Adults (N=455) were slightly more trusting (31.9 percent) than younger respondents (N=445; 27 percent); women (N=490) were noticeably more trusting (33.3 percent) than men (N=410; 24.9 percent); and trust in rural areas (N=485) was slightly higher (30.5 percent) than in urban areas (N=415; 28.2 percent).

The level of trust also differed across the five sites. The all-rural site of Malisevo/Malishevo (N=115), with its remaining parallel system, traditional village councils, and almost total lack of outside assistance, had the highest degree of trust in its local institutions (49.6 percent). The other four sites, all mixtures of rural and urban locations, showed much lower levels of institutional trust. In Gnjilane/Gjilan (N=200), where a parallel system met the needs of the segregated minority population, trust was higher (26.5 percent) than in Pristina/Prishtine (N=210; 20.5 percent), where it was the lowest of the five sites. Pec/Peja (N=120), where the co-management system functioned smoothly, there was a somewhat higher level of trust (34.2 percent) than in Prizren (N=255; 27.8 percent), where the system was incomplete.

Respondents also had varying views of the different types of local institutions. In urban locations, up to 77.8 percent of respondents no longer recognized the existence of neighborhood-level institutions such as the quasi-formal *bashkesia lokale*—that is, they said the question was not applicable—and only 11.2 percent trusted them where they were recognized. The *bashkesia lokale* was said to be non-operative by 40.6 percent of respondents, while about one in four (24.5 percent) said they trusted it. In relative terms, the three most trusted local institutions were the village council (35.0 percent), the municipal administration (40.0 percent), and political parties (40.6 percent). While it was difficult to determine the level of trust in particular parties, or the degree to which views about municipal administration may have been influenced by the ongoing debate on the upcoming local elections, it seems likely from these

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86 The notion of social capital encompasses interpersonal trust, community values, political behavior, and associational behavior. More refined measurements of social capital are composed of indexes rather single variables.
findings that people had a cautious appreciation of the co-management system and its aspirations for stability.

**Participation**

Participation levels were low for all types of associations. Adults were found to participate marginally more (19.8 percent) than younger respondents (15.2 percent), and males (20.7 percent) to participate more than females (14.8 percent). These findings are not surprising considering the traditional family structure, in which male views predominate and male social behavior determines the political positioning of the family to the outside world. Low participation was confirmed by the fact that almost half of all respondents (47.3 percent of adults, 44.8 percent of young adults) said the question was not applicable. Less than a third of males (30.5 percent), however, gave that response, compared to almost double that number (59.1 percent) for females. Participants overwhelmingly believed that associations do not exist, although many said they would provide important opportunities. Some respondents explained that this was due to the destructive effect of the crisis on network activities beyond the immediate family, and the need to focus on other priorities during the post-conflict period.

The greatest difference in participation was between rural and urban locations (11.4 and 24.7 percent). All-rural Malisevo/Malisheve has the lowest level of participation (8.1 percent) of the five sites, with three out of four respondents (76.1 percent) saying the question was not applicable. In Gnjilane/Gjilan, participation was also very low (9.4 percent), most likely because of the ongoing ethnic conflict and high population turnover, but only one in three respondents there (36.6 percent) said associations do not exist. At the other three sites, where sizeable numbers of IDPs have moved into the cities, overall levels of participation appeared very comparable (Pristina/Prishtine, 23.2 percent; Pec/Peja 25.0 percent; Prizren 21.0 percent). Participation in charitable (27.3 percent), educational (21.6 percent), recreational (21.7 percent), and political (15.0 percent) associations was found to be higher than in religious associations (6.7 percent). These findings imply, among other things, that the parallel education system created a legacy of lasting connection between charitable and educational institutions and families.
IV. SOCIAL ASSESSMENT

This chapter is a micro-level analysis of how the population of Kosovo was affected by the conflict, with a particular focus on the education and security sectors. These sectors were considered priority areas of concern by the respondents, and little was known about the interaction between citizens and local institutions in these sectors. Like the assessment of formal and informal institutions, this chapter is based mainly on results of interviews and group discussions conducted at the five representative sites, supplemented by interviews with local officials and representatives of civil society groups. The chapter first considers the experiences and perceptions of the population with regard to (i) housing destruction and displacement, and housing reconstruction; (ii) security (landmines, criminality), justice, and inter-ethnic coexistence; and (iii) problems of education (cost to families, social exclusion, lack of resources). It then presents the respondents’ perceptions of which members of society comprise the most vulnerable groups (those without family, women living without men, the poor and unemployed, orphans, widows, pensioners, the ill and traumatized, IDPs, returnees), and of specific ways in which they are vulnerable. The third part of the analysis, based on interviews and group discussions as well as secondary sources, considers the situation of minorities—Serbs, Roma s, Turks, and Muslim Slavs, including Gorani.

Perceptions of Displacement and Housing Destruction and Reconstruction

The following section briefly summarizes respondents’ perceptions regarding displacement and housing, in order to set the context for understanding the rest of the social assessment.

House destruction and displacement

Most focus group participants reported having experienced at least temporary displacement during the conflict, and seeking refuge in Albania, Montenegro, Macedonia, Turkey, Western Europe, or the United States. Others, particularly girls and old men, spent time hiding in forests. The residents of entire villages, including Cernice, Llukare, and Pirane, were sent to the border. Women speak in detail about how individual men were selected and beaten, executed, or imprisoned. In Pirane, respondents told the assessment team how they were used as human shields by the Serb forces, until members of the Turk minority in the village of Mamushe guided them to the frontier. In Gnjilane/Gjilan, an Albanian shopkeeper was protected from paramilitary forces by his Serb neighbor, while in Prizren, Serbs reportedly pointed out where their Albanian neighbors were hiding. There are also stories of systematic killings of people from villages that were KLA strongholds. In Pristina/Prishtine, men spoke about hiding their weapons instead of fighting, to prevent the assassination of women and children in retaliation.

In Pristina/Prishtine, some families stayed in their flats during the war, and had to keep their children calm behind blacken windows for more than two months. A number of rural inhabitants spent the time hiding in towns (Llukare near Pristina/Prishtine). Like many others in difficult housing circumstances, they complained about the lack of space and privacy, especially where some members of the family, particularly adolescents, were traumatized. Families who stayed during the war in

87 In the health sector, for example, a number of assessment have been undertaken by UNFPA/IOM, Spiegel and Salama and others.

88 Initially the assessment also aimed to consider the housing sector, but this sector was being assessed by a number of other agencies (UNHCR, IMG, etc.), so the focus shifted to respondent perceptions.
Pristina/Prishtine, as well as in Gnjilane/Gjilan, where there was almost no destruction of housing, had to carry cards with the date of birth and number of their children, which some called their “Jewish star.”

Most people returned to the houses or flats they had left behind. Almost always they found them looted, and sometimes saw their Serb neighbors in visible possession of a tractor, children’s toys (Cernice), or checkbook (Pristina/Prishtine). Most of these neighbors have now either left or are protected, with their stolen goods, by KFOR patrols (Cernice) for the sake of peaceful coexistence. In most cases, particularly in rural areas, returnees found their houses burned, which had enormous symbolic significance (see Box 7).

Box 7. Albanian Cultural Symbol of the House

The destruction of a house is symbolically significant in a social order where territorial and kinship principles overlap. A house simultaneously means the entire family and its integrity, and a huge house is understood as a display of prestige. Kosovar Albanian extended families often organize their nuclear member families according to “floors” or “roofs.” A large multi-floor country house may have several floors, one occupied by the parents and their unmarried children, and the others by each of their married sons and their families. An extended family might also split up into different houses joined by a courtyard. The Albanians’ withdrawal into the parallel system in the 1990s saw the reinforcement of such family cohesion, while remittances over the years enabled families to build such large houses. Thus, burning houses (particularly “roofs”) is not only based on envy. (Some respondents suspected their Serb neighbors were envious of the large Albanian remittances.) It also constitutes a comprehensive attack on a family’s integrity, particularly if a man has spent a lifetime working abroad and sacrificing for his family. This is exemplified in the story of an unmarried IDP woman (Gnjilane/Gjilan): “My father did not see me or my sisters and brothers grow up because he worked in Switzerland to build this house, which they burned completely. It was all in vain …. My sisters and brothers and I want to work to give my father back this house.”

Reconstruction

The 1999/2000 winterization program for villages provided owners of houses suffering category 4 destruction (i.e., still repairable) with roofing and rebuilding material on the condition that they take in neighbors who had completely lost their own houses (category 5 destruction). Most neighbors were relatives, but strangers from other villages were also taken in (Cernice). In Pirane, many Albanian villagers had spent the previous winter with 20 or more persons living in one makeshift repaired house, often only in one room. In the spring of 2000, many still lived in tents provided by the international community, or were just returning from camps in FYR Macedonia or Albania. Others were just returning to rebuild their houses, having spent the winter with relatives in nearby cities.

There is an enormous will to repair destroyed houses. All over Kosovo, people are taking advantage of international reconstruction aid, or working on their own or with help of relatives and neighbors, to regain lost space and a basic standard of housing. Some families with category 5 destroyed houses complained about not receiving support to rebuild their houses, and some have started to do so entirely with private means (Pirane). Mainly in cities, there is unauthorized construction, and municipalities are struggling to reassert the legitimacy of city planning (Pec/Peja, Pristina/Prishtine), at a time when people see reconstruction as more important than regulations.

89 The levels of housing destruction range from the lowest (1) to the highest (5).
Perceptions of Security, Inter-ethnic Coexistence, and Justice

The post-conflict environment faced by many minorities is characterized by restricted freedom of movement and limited access to employment and services, not to mention harassment and violence (see Chapter IV, section on the situation of minorities). Yet, Albanian respondents emphasized that they are not in favor of continued inter-ethnic violence or of taking extra-legal actions to secure justice. Rather, they feel an urgent need for a justice system that prosecutes violent offenders from all ethnic communities (see Box 8).

Box 8. Justice and Inter-ethnic Village Coexistence

In Cernice, which has population that is one-quarter Serb and three-quarters Albanian, separated from each other by a KFOR checkpoint, an Albanian mechanic claims that a Serb mechanic stole his machinery. In this village, almost every Albanian house was burned, tractors and other agricultural equipment stolen, fields mined, and livestock killed. The Serb neighbors have returned about 10 percent of Albanian belongings, claiming they had safeguarded them when the Albanians were refugees. However, the Albanians do not believe this. A Serb army commander from Gnjilane/Gjilan told the Albanian men that most of the damage was done by their Serb neighbors on the “bloody night” of February 20, 1999, and the Albanians believe that 40 former paramilitaries are still living on the Serb side. The Albanians handed in a list of stolen goods to the local KFOR commander who, lacking a juridical mandate, was not able to help. The mechanic said, “I will be the first to take the Serb mechanic to court as soon as that is possible.” The Albanians want juridical prosecution: “Criminals of war who are responsible for massacres, or arson, must be arrested … others can live with us.”

Many Albanians are still traumatized by the deterioration during the 1990s of good relations with their Serb neighbors. Some spoke about their children playing together. Teachers spoke about their former Serb colleagues having suddenly started to ignore them. Parents recalled the daily fears of sending their children to Albanian parallel schools, worrying they might be questioned by Serb policemen (Pristina/Prishtine, Llukare). Women remembered having to stand in line for milk or bread while their Serb neighbors were favored (Gnjilane/Gjilan). Pregnant women were harassed when seeking medical assistance in a hospital (Malisevo/Malisheve). Young men had to keep a low profile so as not to be beaten up or taken into custody. During the conflict, men in city neighborhoods and villages organized guards to warn their families to flee or hide from approaching paramilitaries, in most cases (where there was no village involvement in KLA fighting, as in Pirane or Dragobil) without hope of any defense. This organized defense was the only indication of self-regulation that the assessment team could find. At the time of the assessment, the majority of people were enjoying a new feeling of security, credited to the presence of international troops. And in neighborhoods or villages where Serbs have left, security is always related to this fact: “We feel free now to move,” or, “we feel safe now that the shkijet have gone” (see Box 9).

Box 9. Serb and Albanian Mutual Designations

Shkijet is the Albanians’ derogatory term for Serbs. Some explained that it derives from the original unbiased designation “schismatics,” i.e., those of Eastern Orthodox Christianity. Serbs use shiptar for Albanians with a no less derogatory flavor. This derives originally from the Albanian self-designation shqiptar, which popular etymology relates to shqiponje, “eagle” (as in the Albanian national flag), but has been linguistically related to shqiptoj, “to speak clearly.”
Ethnic homogeneity in one’s village or city quarter is seen as a guarantee of security, and, correspondingly, many respondents believe troubles are more likely to occur where there are still Serbs in the neighborhood. Thus, Cernice, with its mixed population, is the only place where fear persists within the village rather than against outsiders. The fear has increased recently, with Albanian inhabitants noticing that more Serbs, probably IDPs from Gnjilane/Gjilan, have moved into the Serb part of the village. Travel through the region, where a number of homogenous Serb villages are situated, is also seen as a security risk. In villages near Montenegro, far from the nearest KFOR protection post, there is great fear of Serb paramilitaries or provocateurs crossing the border.

In summary, it seems more appropriate to speak of ethnic fear rather than ethnic hatred among most Kosovars, the majority of whom are not radical or extremists. Nonetheless, these fears continue to perpetuate inter-ethnic distrust.

**Threats to security**

Responses to questions about threats to local security highlight the fact that there might be more inter-ethnic fear than hatred in Kosovo, which could have implications for the development of inclusive institutions. In addition to inter-ethnic fears, many rural respondents named landmines as a threat, while urban respondents more often mentioned criminality (see Table 8).
### Table 8. Threats to Security
(multiple identification was possible)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threats in order of priority</th>
<th>Percentage/number of groups (out of 40)</th>
<th>Urban/rural breakdown</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>60% (26 groups)</td>
<td>12 urban 14 rural</td>
<td>This threat was understood mostly as conditional: “if they were present, if they would come back, if KFOR would not be there, now feeling secure only because they have gone.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines</td>
<td>47.5% (19 groups)</td>
<td>4 urban /15 rural</td>
<td>Rural dominance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminality</td>
<td>42.5% (17 groups)</td>
<td>12 urban /5 rural</td>
<td>Urban dominance, except no fears in Gnjilane/Gjilan because of curfew.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No dangers</td>
<td>2.5% (1 group)</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Pec/Peja, urban adult men.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Landmines**

All villagers expressed concern about landmines, and many know children and young men who have been injured or killed by them. Livestock have been killed as well. Avoidance was seen as the only possible protection strategy. In Dragobil, where landmines have been cleared from the schoolyard, parents warn their children not to leave the main street or the school grounds. In all villages, children are warned not to enter uninhabited areas with widely dispersed rocks and bushes. When an unexploded ordnance or mine is discovered, the local village or local KPC is notified. These local officials pass the information on to the closest KFOR post, which informs a mine clearance command.

**Criminality**

There are also fears about increased criminality, particularly in the major cities and areas bordering Albania and Montenegro. Though the vast majority of respondents say security has increased compared to the period before the conflict, young women in Pristina/Prishtine, Pec/Peja, and Prizren feel more threatened, particularly because of the danger of kidnapping. Respondents at almost all sites said they were aware of this danger. Young women take precautions such as traveling in groups or with male family members, and only during the daytime. In Prizren, unmarried women seek the protection of their brothers, and assume they will be even better protected after marriage, when most of their duties will be in the house. Adult women in Prizren explained that the protection is better the larger the family, although young women still prefer a small nuclear family.

The increase in post-war crime was originally attributed to the vacuum of state power, police negligence, and the lack of rule of law. The fear now, however, is of new crime such as drug trafficking, car theft, kidnapping, and murderous assaults—crimes that used to be considered outside the society, perpetuated by gangs crossing the border from Albania, extremists (including returnees), remaining Serbs or Roma, or Serb provocateurs from Montenegro (Pec/Peja). Some also attribute the rising crime rate to poverty and youth unemployment in post-conflict Kosovo. Adult men involved in cross-border trading,
particularly in Gnjilane/Gjilan, Prizren, and Pec/Peja mentioned custom crimes, corruption, and “the mafia” as obstacles to trade. Particularly in Prizren, men would like to see more cooperation between the international forces and Albanian police, and want the Albanian police to be more powerful and active. Some feel the international forces cannot be trusted to protect them from crime, either because it is too difficult or because they ignore the problem. On the other hand, in Prizren, calling the local police for help against criminals can bring revenge by the criminals, and armed former KLA fighters fill the vacuum of police power. Participants noted an incident in which the KLA turned some killers over to UNMIK, but they were released soon afterward because of the weakness of the justice system. In another incident, 300 Serb houses were burned in Prizren after the war without any intervention from these local security forces.

**Whom to trust for support?**

Most respondents said that in the case of security problems, they would turn to the international forces; i.e., KFOR and UNMIK police. Residents of Gnjilane/Gjilan city and the nearby village of Cernice are very grateful for the security provided by curfew restrictions and KFOR patrols.

Attitudes toward the KPC, many of whom are former KLA fighters, are rather ambiguous. They are not trusted (Pec/Peja); trusted “only under KFOR command” (Gnjilane/Gjilan); or considered not to have “sufficient competence to maintain law and order” or as “not the real power” because they were “demilitarized.” Others see KPC as capable of fighting local and small-scale crime and asked that it receive more cooperation from the international forces (Prizren, Pec/Peja). In places such as Malisevo/Malisheve, where the KLA had been very active, adult men do not trust any Albanian forces but only international forces, while adult women, young women, and young men expressed trust only or primarily in the KPC. In Pec/Peja and Gnjilane/Gjilan, women said KPC troops would understand them better than KFOR troops because KPC understands their language and culture. Rural women generally trust the village council, brothers, other male family members, and neighbors in cases of emergency.

**Inter-ethnic coexistence**

In cases where respondents suffered great losses only recently, as in Rugova or Dragobil, even asking for their perceptions on future inter-ethnic coexistence seemed inappropriate. In other cases, interviewees refused to answer the question, saying: “Just give us one or two years before considering this. How many years, or generations, did it take France and Germany to become friends again after the war?” Interviewers felt it was particularly difficult to approach men with this question. Therefore, seven groups were omitted from questions on perspectives of inter-ethnic coexistence.

Other groups were divided as to whether future inter-ethnic coexistence is possible. In cases where the group was about equally split, it was counted in both categories. In cases where one person’s opinion differed from that of the group, that individual’s opinion was not included in the following table. In three cases of group interviews, one strong or radical personality dominated, so differing opinions of more moderate members were most likely suppressed. This was the case with young women in Dragobile (Malisevo/Malisheve), young women in Gnjilane/Gjilan, and adult women in Pristina/Prishtine, where one rather radical woman dominated the group opinions.

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90 It should be noted that kidnapping was a major concern across Kosovo during the immediate post-conflict period. Since then, according to some of our reviewers, concern about this issue has began to wane.
Table 9. Attitudes Toward Future Inter-ethnic Coexistence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes</th>
<th>Number of groups (out of 33)</th>
<th>Type of group and remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If there was justice and prosecution of war crimes, we could live with anyone who is not a criminal.</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Urban dominance, both sexes, old and young, plus complete multi-ethnic village of Cernice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possible, after one generation, with time.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Urban young women; adult men both rural and urban.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult; Serb attitude toward Albanians must change.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>All types of groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not ever with the Serbs, but with members of the other ethnic minorities (especially Turks, Muslim Slavs, Gorani), as long as they were not involved in war crimes. There were frequent disputes about whether Roma sided with the Serbs.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Prizren entirely represented except adult men; only one group thought coexistence with Turks imaginable (young women in Dragobil).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not possible to ever live with Serbs again.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Dragobil and Malishevo/Malisevo entirely represented.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is also interesting to note that a survey conducted across Kosovo by the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology at the University of Pristina/Prishtine had similar findings, with 48 percent of the respondents in favor of “minorities having all human and civic rights.”

**The call for justice**

Today in Kosovo, despite OSCE and UMIK efforts to create a multi-ethnic judiciary, most of the judges are Albanian, the majority of whom have had their skills erode over the last ten years, when they were excluded from the profession. According to the Bar Human Rights Committee of England and Wales (BHRC), this situation creates the potential for human rights abuses. The committee expressed concern that local Kosovar Albanian judges may not be able to adjudicate fairly, given that judges are regularly intimidated and bribed. The committee recommended that international judges preside over ethnically mixed benches, and that there be strong international control over qualification of judges and courtroom procedures.

During group discussions, most Kosovars were able to envisage a multi-ethnic future as long as individual war crimes were prosecuted. Some opinions on this issue are presented in Box 10.

**Box 10. Opinions on a Multi-ethnic Future**

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See ICG (2000b).

Koha Ditore (2000).

Bar Human Rights Committee (2000).
From focus groups:

No country in the world is exempt from multi-ethnicity. The criminals who have committed atrocities must leave. No matter your nationality, you must be a human being, you must be tolerant.
(female high school student, Pristina/Prishtine)

There is no place for criminals in our everyday life ... they must be taken to court ... a pluralist society does not integrate criminals ... many of those are still here because of KFOR protection. (young adult woman, Gnjilane/Gjilan)

I hope these devils the Serbs will never come back. (adult woman, Pirane)

We want to forget the past and move on from here ... we suffered so much in the past but we cannot continue living in the past. (adult woman, Gnjilane/Gjilan)

From interviews:

Despite all of this, due to the Islamic principle of tolerance, we are for cooperation with innocent Serbs, but the criminals should be taken to the court and punished appropriately. Aside from them, we do not see any reason why Serbs should not live in Kosovo and enjoy all the same rights as other minorities. (Albanian religious leader)

During the bombing I talked about peace, love, life, unification of people; I did not approve of threatening and murder ... Today the situation is not encouraging even for Albanians. It is necessary to go after the people who committed the crimes, irrespective of whether they are Albanians or Serbs. Innocent people should not suffer, but humanity must rule. (Serb religious leader)

The silent majority of citizens here support reconciliation. (UNMIK official)

Responsibility for killings in post-conflict Kosovo

Although internationals and locals differ on who is responsible for recent attacks, killings, and arson directed at non-Albanian Kosovars (see Box 11), there seems to be a consensus on the adverse impacts of these crimes with respect to the prospects for inter-ethnic coexistence and the legitimacy of local political institutions. Some respondents felt that the systematic nature of the crimes indicate high-level political involvement, while others believed that the violence is the result of individual or local initiatives beyond the control of the central authorities.94

Box 11. Opinions on Who is Responsible for Violence

- Local, frustrated Albanians who take their private revenge as part of Albanian tradition (KPC official, members of the international community, some Albanians).
- Prominent black-shirted KLA military police acting with or without orders and also involved in intimidation policies (ICG, 2000c).

94 See ICG (2000b). The assessment team also had the impression that the promotion of ethnic pluralism by the international actors was beginning to change attitudes among the Kosovars.
Eighty percent of the killings have an extremist political rational, 20 to 25 percent are part of kanun-based revenge killings (interviewee in Gnjilane/Gjilan).
- Contract killers paid from outside the country (internationals in Pristina/Prishtine).
- Extremists from outside; criminals from Albania; returnees who became more radical while outside the country (families in Prizren).
- Anonymous violence from outsiders and Albanian extremists rather than from neighbors or mafia (Serb parish priest).
- Northern Albanians illegally wearing KLA uniforms (local hypothesis cited by ICG (2000c).

**Perceptions of Education**

For the Albanians, classes had a late start in 1991-1992, at the beginning of the enforcement period. When they commenced in January 1992, after a four-month delay, high school and university students headed for makeshift classrooms in private houses, shops, attics, and cellars. This was the beginning of the parallel education system in Kosovo after Albanians refused to accept the nationalized Serb curriculum and Serbs denied them access to schools.95

The parallel schooling continued until the conflict, with almost all primary school buildings shared between the two communities in separate shifts. The Albanian respondents complained, however, that the same amount of teaching time was allocated to 100 Serb children as to 500 Albanian children. Additionally, for 9 years Albanian students were not allowed to use the gymnasium (Cernice).

After the conflict, the Albanians immediately reappropriated all school buildings that had not been destroyed, and reconstructed most of the others with international assistance. Decisions by displaced Albanian families to return to their homes were closely connected with opportunities for schooling.

Almost all the Albanian focus group respondents had one or more family members attending school or university, and many of the younger respondents were themselves in school or university. A number of young women not attending school expressed a strong feeling of being disadvantaged compared to male family members. Most respondents, young and adult alike, saw a good education as the key to future employment, although some young people noted the generally poor employment prospects because “everyone first employs their own cousin” (Cernice). Some said the young average age of Kosovars makes it important that local and international efforts give priority to improving the education system.

A notable feature of Kosovo Albanian schools, de facto still separate from those of other ethnic groups, is that they all employ a “pedagogue” whose job is not to teach but to respond to particular social and psychological problems of students, and to act as a mediator between staff and students. Pedagogues are organized in a professional network. Random interviews with pedagogues showed a high awareness of the problems of exclusion and the limited chances for females in rural areas; and of learning difficulties of traumatized children, along with a need for information on how to cope with this problem.

**Changes and continuities**

95 Kostovicova (1999).
All Albanian respondents noted a fundamental improvement in the education system compared to the period before the conflict, and related this to the reappropriation of school buildings and the end of the parallel system. They emphasized that current problems must be seen in this light. As one respondent expressed it, “We have better problems today” (Pec/Peja).

Perceptions about education and security were varied. One respondent pointed out that “before the war we had everything but no security, now we have security but no text books” (Dragobil), while others said that kidnappings have occurred on school grounds (Pristina/Prishtine), and that the presence of minorities is a threat to children traveling to school (Cernice). However, all agreed that the current situation is better than the pre-conflict “apartheid” system, and that there are no longer threats or fears relating to ethnic exclusion for Albanians. They explained, for example, that children no longer have to hide their schoolbooks and bags, or hold writing paper on their legs, because they can again attend proper schools with desks and chairs. There are no fears of transgressions by Serb police against Albanian students or teachers, nor is there a need for guards at locations where parallel schooling took place. In Pec/Peja, the current ethnic segregation is blamed on the behavior of the Serbs during the 1990s. In Gnjilane/Gjilan, however, students say that their school director allowed Serbs to come back to school, but that almost all the young Serbs have left.

Another difference between past and present is concern about the funding of education. While the parallel system was funded largely by the diaspora, today the education system faces a shortage of resources despite international assistance. While Albanians are grateful for international assistance in reconstructing and equipping buildings (some have received new computer laboratories), international interest seems to have waned after the refugees returned to their villages and started to rebuild their houses. In Dragobil and Pirane, some respondents emphasized the village’s strong identification with the school. In Cernice, students said that classroom reconstruction and donations of new tables and chairs have had a positive effect on students’ motivation and the quality of teaching. Yet, in spite of improvements in the physical conditions for schooling, urban youth, especially in Pristina/Prishtine, complained about the poor and outdated quality of education and the authoritarian teaching style. An UNMIK education specialist in Pec/Peja was also concerned about the pervasive physical punishment in the schools, which highlights the urgent need for teacher retraining. In addition, the assessment team found few parent-teacher associations throughout Kosovo, which are needed to exert a positive effect on the democratization and modernization of the school system.

Current problems

Current problems in the education sector include the high cost of schooling, limitations of access, lack of commitment on the part of teachers, and the quality of teaching.

Costs of schooling

All respondents related a family’s inability to afford school to financial hardship and lack of cash income. Particularly in rural areas, travel (see Box 12) and schooling costs (including the cost of outside food for the children during the day) emerged as a major problem after the conflict. Some families cannot afford books, or even the clothing children need for school (Pirane, Malisevo/Malisheve, Pec/Peja), although some books are distributed via humanitarian aid (Gnjilane/Gjilan).

Box 12. Travel Costs for Schooling
• In Pirane, it costs DM 2 per day per child to go travel to secondary school in Prizren; a father of three school-age children has to pay DM 6 per day; teachers earn DM 200 per month, and many village teachers cannot afford to send their own children for secondary education.

• In Pec/Peja, a man with 4 children sends three sons to secondary school each day, costing DM 4 per day for each. He only manages because he borrows money privately.

• From Rugova mountain villages, it costs DM 1.50 to take the bus 15 km to secondary school in Pec/Peja, costing DM 3 per day per child. Even primary schools can be many kilometers away, and classes are repeatedly missed because of poor weather conditions.

Some families cope with the problem of travel costs by leaving minor children with relatives in the city (Pirane, Prizren). Others pay for lodging for their children, or have extended periods of internal displacement in a city where there are better schools than in their home village (Rugova, Pec/Peja). Some respondents noted the need for grants for talented but disadvantaged students from rural areas (Dragobil).

Limitations of access

Students from villages are particularly disadvantaged because they have to work in the fields in addition to attending school (Cernice). Their disadvantage is compounded by the fact that many adults in rural areas are illiterate, although this problem is being addressed by local activities such as adult literacy courses run by the Motrat Qiriazi. In cities, some children stay out of school to sell cigarettes on the streets because, as some explained, their fathers do not have a job (Pristina/Prishtine, Pec/Peja).

Children living in multi-ethnic areas are at particular risk. Albanian children from Cernice have to travel through a region with Serb villages to attend secondary school in Gnjilane/Gjilan, which respondents said was the reason some have withdrawn from school. However, Serb children in multi-ethnic areas have the same problem; they also would like to attend secondary education in the city but their movements and access are restricted for security reasons. The Ashkaelia children of Kosovo Polje/Fushe Kosove depend entirely on internal community teaching, and Ashkaelia leaders bitterly complained about the children of that minority group not being considered by the official education system.

In Pristina/Prishtine and Malishevo/Malisheve, respondents spoke about the learning difficulties of traumatized children, and their need for special services to facilitate their resocialization.

Poverty and lack of security mean that in rural areas, boys are favored over girls when families decide who is to be educated (see Box 13), while in the cities, there is less gender difference in access to education. The exclusion of girls in rural areas seems to have increased compared to the pre-conflict period, when more girls than boys were educated because many boys and young men were “mobilized” – i.e., required to emigrate to help maintain their families at home. This situation, combined with the lack of access to higher education under the parallel system, has resulted in a shortage of qualified professionals in Kosovo. “It is, for example, quite impossible to find a 30-year-old engineer,” complained the director of the Prizren Chamber of Commerce.

Box 13. Limitations and Aspirations of Young Rural Women

96 The Ashkaelia are one the three Roma groups found in Kosovo. See section on minorities, below.
Young women in Dragobil, Cernice, and Rugova feel particularly disadvantaged compared to boys in being denied secondary education, mainly because of security reasons and lack of money. As a young woman from Dragobile said, “Brothers can go to secondary school even if they are stupid, but very clever girls stay at home all day.” A Rugova girl, determined to continue her schooling, will live with relatives in Pec/Peja. She regrets having missed a year of school because of the conflict and destruction. In Cernice and Dragobile, young women complained of being limited to the house, yard, or village grounds because of lack of money and the difficult security situation. They said their parents would let them continue their studies if they could afford it, because their exclusion is not a question of *katundar* (village) mentality. They also want to be able to find employment.

**Commitment of teachers**

Insufficient salaries force teachers to split their time between teaching and other occupations. “They have to think of their family’s daily bread rather than the quality of teaching” (Gnjilane/Gjilan). English teachers can make much more money translating than teaching. Village teachers work in agriculture and find other ways to increase their income. In addition, the commitment of rural teachers is affected by high travel costs, which can take up to a third of their salary. As a result, there has been a decrease in the number of teachers in post-conflict Kosovo, and those who remain suffer from a lack of motivation.

At Pristina/Prishtine University, both professors and students are frustrated at not being able to participate in the new English-speaking employment market created by the internationals. “It is not necessarily the most intelligent who can express themselves well in English. But they will get the job,” said the director of the Sociology/Philosophy Department, adding that local capacity is overlooked by the internationals. There were also indications of low university salaries, especially when compared to those offered by the international community, leading to low motivation among the professors.

**Teaching quality and equipment**

Many respondents spoke of the need for reform and reorganization of curricula, and of the need for vocational training. The parallel system had been unable to provide practical training or illustrative material, so entire subjects (chemistry, physics, sports, and anything vocational) had not been taught, leaving students with the impression that education is too boring and theoretical to prepare them for life. Cernice girls said the subjects were “just examples” that could not be translated into reality. Teachers, parents, and students all complained about the lack of laboratories, computers, and technical equipment for teaching purposes. While much equipment was destroyed or stolen during the conflict (Cernice), in most cases inventories and buildings are simply very old—“everything is 30 years old” (Pec/Peja)—although some schools have received special aid packages or copy machines. They also noted the lack of wood for heat.

Respondents also emphasized the need for “European standards” in education, and women praised the transparent new teaching methods and inclusion of parents in kindergarten education, which were implemented as a condition of reconstruction support by international donors (Pristina/Prishtine).

Students at Pristina/Prishtine University pointed to inconsistencies between secondary and tertiary education, and Pristina/Prishtine school children added that the quality of teaching has decreased since the pre-conflict period, that teachers are not well adapted to the new situation, and that classes are overcrowded. Some related the lost idealism of teachers to the fact that the common national enemy—
which inspired a feeling of national cohesion and duty—has been defeated. Others, however, warned “school should not be a place for politicization” (Cernice.). In some places, the curriculum contains highly nationalist material.

Other problems

Some schools are built near major roads, which, in the case of Pirane and Dragobil, divide the village. There are no crossing devices such as traffic lights, tunnels, or bridges; nor are there any road barriers. In Pirane, there have been several major accidents in which village children have been killed—seven at once in the most recent accident.

Perceptions of Vulnerable Groups, and of Why They Are Vulnerable

There was a broad consensus among Albanian respondents as to which groups are the most vulnerable, both in their villages and neighborhoods and in Kosovo in general. Respondents in the 40 focus groups were asked to name as many vulnerable groups as they could think of (each focus group was counted only once in each category). The results, given in Table 10, clearly show that Kosovars still see the family as the greatest guarantee of security, and view those without family as the most vulnerable members of society. In particular, the most vulnerable are women who have lost men, children without fathers and brothers, the elderly without children, the ill and handicapped without family to care for them, and others without men to sustain them by means of their work. Vulnerability due to poverty, unemployment, and lost shelter, however, always affects an entire family. Although respondents were not asked about vulnerability in specific geographic areas, some nevertheless mentioned the great loss of life and housing destruction in the Drenica region, Dakovica/Gjakove municipality, and the villages of Pirane and Dragobil, and noted that under such circumstances, there is little chance of any village solidarity beyond the family. Respondents in Prizen also noted that 104 orphaned children are living in the nearby village of Lupishte (Has). The specific attributes of the groups listed in Table 10 are included in Annex III, tables 1-8.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most vulnerable group</th>
<th>Percentage/Number of groups (out of 40)</th>
<th>Type of group</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Those without family, particularly without men</td>
<td>95% (38 groups)</td>
<td>Any</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elderly</td>
<td>57.5% (23 groups)</td>
<td>Any</td>
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<tr>
<td>Those who lost shelter and property</td>
<td>55% (22 groups)</td>
<td>Any</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployed or poor</td>
<td>42.5% (17 groups)</td>
<td>Any</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handicapped or invalids</td>
<td>37.5% (15 groups)</td>
<td>Men and women, old and young, 10 urban and 5 rural</td>
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<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>15% (6 groups)</td>
<td>3 rural and 2 urban women, 1 urban young men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>12.5% (5 groups)</td>
<td>4 rural, 1 urban, women only</td>
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Women’s views of the limitations of family solidarity

While men feel responsible for women and children, and one women’s group explicitly acknowledged the weight of this responsibility on men, women are much more conscious of the limitations of family solidarity and of the vulnerabilities that come with exclusion from the larger society. Young women from an extended family in Pirane, for example, expressed concern about the mother who, when her husband died, had to return to her natal home and leave her children behind because she was “not of the same blood as the family.” It was also women who emphasized the dangers to youth from unemployment and criminality; the vulnerability of the elderly, sick and handicapped, and who expressed the need of these people for social services—all of which grew out of an understanding of the limits of family solidarity. This seems to confirm earlier observations that women are a source of bridging social capital in Kosovo; that even in survival situations, when the extended family is assumed to be primary, they are conscious of the situation of others, and often act as mediators and networkers between traditional structures and outside people and groups.

The vulnerabilities of women

One issue that did not emerge from focus group discussions is the degree to which the extended family can be a source of danger to women. Widows forced to leave the home of their dead husband’s family can lose not only their children, but also their land, thus increasing their vulnerability and isolation. Many of these widows are young, traumatized, unaware of their legal rights, often without documentation, and with no income-generating skills, particularly in rural areas. In the few cases where widows have joined together to start small-scale businesses, they have been strongly criticized by men in the community for not spending enough time mourning their husbands. This powerless, isolated group has received little support from international organizations, although their numbers have been estimated at 10,000 or more.

Kosovo also has a high percentage of women who were raped during the conflict—about 4 percent of the female population has reported being raped, and actual numbers are probably much higher. These women are unlikely to receive rape or trauma counseling; instead, they often become a source of shame for their families, and as a result may not be allowed to finish their education or work.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sick and traumatized</td>
<td>10% (4 groups)</td>
<td>3 women, 1 men, both rural and urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combination</td>
<td>10% (4 groups)</td>
<td>Any</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>2.5% (1 group)</td>
<td>Urban women (Gnjilane/Gjilan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Those with very large families</td>
<td>2.5% (1 group)</td>
<td>Rural young men (Pirane)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

97 UNIFEM (2000) reports “an alarming level of evictions” of young widows from the homes of their husband’s families.
98 See, for example, Backer (1983).
100 EWD (1999).
101 Four percent of Kosovar Albanian women and girls reported having been raped by Serb troops, as part of a deliberate effort to demoralize the population. See UNIFEM (2000).
outside the home—even though education and economic opportunities are widely recognized by international organizations, and by women themselves, as among their most important needs in terms of their own safety and well-being.\textsuperscript{102} Again, women living in extended families in rural areas are more vulnerable in this regard. In some villages along the Albanian border, for example, girls can be sold in marriage for up to DM 20,000 before they reach high school age, so the decision to send a girl to high school has tremendous financial implications for the family. In addition, women living in extended families are at increased risk for violence at the hands of not only their husbands, but also the husband’s mother, sisters, and brothers’ wives.\textsuperscript{103}

\textsuperscript{102} UNIFEM (2000).
\textsuperscript{103} UNIFEM (2000).
**The vulnerabilities of IDPs**

While there is little reliable information on the total number of IDPs in Kosovo, it is clear that they comprise a large portion of the population and are concentrated in cities such as Pristina/Prishtine, Prizren, and Pec/Peja. According to interviews with IDPs, many have not returned because their homes have not been repaired, services such as education are not available, or they are not able to access their farmland due to landmines. Others do not want to forego occupational programs run by NGOs or leave behind small businesses that they started during their displacement; or they are waiting for incentives such as small loans to buy livestock or building materials. Some have also indicated the desire to escape certain traditions. War widows, for example, may not want to return because of the social and economic vulnerability associated with their new status. And some men indicated that they do not want to become embroiled in traditions such as feuding.

Most rural IDPs living in cities remain unregistered, although some are registered in their villages and go there to claim humanitarian aid (Rugova). Some live with relatives, in the homes of relatives who are abroad, or in collective centers. Others live in flats, houses, or construction grounds that once belonged to Serbs. In some cases, Serbs have sold their property and have bought other property in a Serb enclave or in Serbia proper; in most cases, however, the property has simply been abandoned. At a construction site in Pristina/Prishtine, food aid is regularly delivered by an Arab humanitarian organization, and distributed by a self-organized council to the heads of families; but there are problems associated with water and sanitation and criminality. In addition, many urbanites blame the IDPs, the majority of whom come from rural areas, for the decline in public cleanliness and order. This animosity adds to the insecurity of the IDPs, many of whom fear an uncertain future.

**The vulnerabilities of returnees**

A large number of Kosovar Albanians who were in European countries as refugees or asylum seekers, or were under various temporary protection arrangements, are being repatriated. Between June and September 2000, for example, the province received 41,500 Kosovar Albanian returnees. This has created enormous pressure on the housing, education, health, and employment sectors. In addition, this process is causing great concern for many families who have come to depend on remittances for their survival (see Chapter V, Diaspora Assessment). Serbs, Romas, and other ethnic groups also figure in the ethnic caseload of many European countries, albeit in smaller numbers. Given the protection issues associated with these groups, European governments are being urged not to send them back until conditions in the province are more favorable. Some members of these groups registered as ethnic Albanians during the crisis to gain favorable asylum status. Finally, UNHCR estimates a total of 180,000 and 30,000 IDPs from Kosovo in Serbia and Montenegro, respectively, with the majority of them having left the province after the establishment of UNMIK.

**The Situation of Minorities**

As noted in Chapter II, almost half of Kosovo’s pre-war minority population of 347,000 (1991 census) fled the province over the last 18 months. According to the sixth joint UNHCR/OSCE report on

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104 According to WFP/FAO estimates, during the winter of 1999-2000, 200,000 IDPs were registered for food assistance in Pristina/Prishtine.

105 UNHCR/OSCE (2000c).
minorities, the situation for most of the remaining minority population remains precarious. Although serious crime rates have gone down, ethnically motivated attacks and intimidation continue across the province. As a result, minorities face serious restrictions on their freedom of movement, and in access to employment and social services such as health care and education—a process of exclusion that is making Kosovar minorities socially and economically vulnerable. Based on the limited (and sometimes contradictory) information available on these groups, and on interviews with members of the Serb, Roma, Muslim Slav, and Turkish communities, the assessment team attempted to map the different types and degrees of vulnerability, and the prospects of each group for coexistence and reconciliation with the majority Albanian population. Key findings are the following:

- The Serbs can be considered less economically vulnerable than other groups because they do have some access to land and livestock, and to payments, albeit irregular and small, from Belgrade. Yet, most cannot rely on an extended family network or remittance income, as the Albanians did during and after the recent crisis. More important, however, they have suffered the worst revenge attacks and displacement, and those who remain face severe restrictions on their freedom of movement, which has resulted in the development of a parallel administration. Hence, this group faces the most difficult challenge with respect to coexistence and reconciliation with the majority Albanian population.

- The Romas are the most socially excluded and economically vulnerable population. They have suffered widespread violence and displacement, and were already a disadvantaged and poor group before the war, with little access to land, livestock, or formal employment. Moreover, unlike the Serbs, they do not seem to have access to payments such as pension and social assistance from the Yugoslav government. Yet, their prospects for coexistence with the Albanians, if not for social and economic inclusion, are relatively better than for the Serbs.

- The Muslim Slavs are less socially and economically vulnerable than either the Serbs or the Romas. They were a relatively prosperous group before the war, with high levels of educational attainment and entrepreneurial activity. At the same time, they have suffered from some ethnically motivated violence and exclusion due to their linguistic ties with the Serbs. This is especially true for the Gorani, who seem to experience more social exclusion than other Muslim Slavs. Nonetheless, Muslim Slavs have good prospects for coexistence and economic integration, given their religious ties with the Albanian population.

- The Turks are the least vulnerable minority group in Kosovo because of their close cultural ties with the Albanian population and their entrepreneurial skills. They have suffered fewer revenge attacks and little displacement. Prospects for economic and social inclusion are the best for this minority group.

In conclusion, it is important to bear in mind that even if the political environment stabilizes, for the majority of Kosovar minorities, not knowing the Albanian language will remain a significant barrier to reintegration. The situation of each group is discussed in more detail below.

**Serbs**

Kosovo’s pre-war Serb population of approximately 195,000 (1991 census) was concentrated in four areas: (i) the northwest region, bordering on Serbia and including Kosovska Mitrovica/Mitrovicë;

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106 UNHCR/OSCE (2000c).

107 According to ICG (2000c), the Serb majority areas north of Kosovska Mitrovica/Mitrovice (Leposavic/Leposaviq, Zubin Potok, and Zvecane) were joined to Kosovo in 1957 by the Serbian republican authorities to increase the number of Serbs in the province.
(ii) the relatively fertile eastern and central regions, including Kosovo Polje/Fushe Kosove, Urosevac/Ferizaj, and Gnjilane/Gjilan; (iii) the isolated southern municipality of Strpce/Shterpce; and (iv) other parts of the province, including Prizren, Orahovac/Rahovec and villages surrounding Pec/Peja. More than half of this population had settled in the eastern and central regions.108

The population had a livelihood pattern similar to that of the Albanians, with the following differences: (i) the Serbs had larger land holdings per person due to the smaller size of their families (five compared to ten for the Albanian population); (ii) the size of cash income per person was the same for Serbs and Albanians, but the source was different (public sector employment for the Serbs and remittances for the Albanians); and (iii) the Serbs enjoyed a lower level of kinship and intra-community support than the Albanians.109

Although it is generally assumed that Serbs involved in criminal acts left with the withdrawing Yugoslav forces, the assumption of collective guilt persists. In this climate, the entire remaining Serb population is considered a target for the radical members of the Kosovar Albanian community. There are many cases of vulnerable elderly Serbs falling victim to violence. The result has been a massive exodus to Serbia and Montenegro and the creation of mono-ethnic enclaves within Kosovo. Almost half the pre-war population is estimated to have left the province by September 1999.110

Two aspects of this migration pattern need to be emphasized. First, the majority of those leaving the province are young and able, while those who remain are largely the vulnerable elderly, disabled, and single-parent families. Second, as noted in Chapter II, the predominant pattern of internal migration is urban to rural, given that rural areas offer better security conditions and access to agriculture and livestock production. In contrast to the Albanian population, which as a result of the conflict has become more urbanized, the percentage of the Serb population living in rural areas has increased from 60 to 80 percent.111 This urban to rural migration and the creation of enclaves has resulted in the geographic redistribution of the population described in Chapter II.

In addition to massive displacement, the security situation has also had a significant impact on the livelihood patterns of the remaining Serb population. In most urban and other ethnically heterogeneous areas, where they have been reduced to a few families, many Serbs are unable to leave their homes, have little access to income, and require KFOR protection and humanitarian assistance. In rural and other ethnically homogeneous areas, the situation is somewhat better, especially where the Serbs have access to agricultural and livestock production. Serb farmers have been able to plant and harvest (in many cases with the assistance of KFOR protection), but their limited access to mills, markets, and employment has resulted in reduced income. Yet, this isolation is not complete, with markets in northwestern Kosovo, Serbia, and Montenegro being accessible to some Serbs but often requiring KFOR escorts. Such escorts also make it possible for Serbs to collect pensions and other payments from the Yugoslav authorities.112 Only in the northwestern part of the province do Serbs not face severe security restrictions and are able to access employment and cash transfers easily. But this region suffers from the depressed, sanction-affected economy of Serbia.113

108 WFP/UNHCR (1999b).
109 WFP/UNHCR (1999b).
110 WFP/UNHCR (1999b).
111 WFP/UNHCR (1999b).
112 WFP/UNHCR (1999b).
113 ICG (2000c).
With respect to the provision of social services, UNMIK seems to be pursuing a policy of coexistence rather than multi-ethnicity. In the education sector, for example, Serbs and Albanians have different curricula and are, in most cases, taught in separate schools. In the health sector, parallel facilities are being set up, with many enclaves now having access to primary health care provided by someone of their own ethnicity. Other communities benefit from mobile clinics and transportation to health care providers. Although cash transfer programs have not yet begun, parallel delivery channels seem to be inevitable.

In interviews with the social assessment team, Serbs in Gnjilane/Gjilan expressed frustration with the need to live under KFOR protection, even needing escorts to and from their jobs with the international community. They also require such protection to access health care in Serbia. In villages, respondents indicated that snipers continue to shoot at them when they work their fields, even though KFOR troops are nearby. Under these circumstances, many families send their children to Serbia. Others become radicalized and develop closer ties with Serbia, relying exclusively on Belgrade radio stations and newspapers for their information. The most immediate concerns of most Serb respondents were “freedom, food, and jobs.”

Serb political participation in the JIAS include the Serb National Council (SNC), which has observer status on the Interim Administrative Council (IAC), along with four representatives on the Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC).

**Romas**

Following the UNHCR/OSCE reports on minorities in Kosovo, this assessment uses Roma as an inclusive term, clarifying where reference is made to the specific communities: Roma, Ashkaelia, and Egyptian. The “ethnic Romas” identify themselves as Roma, speak the Romany language, as well as Albanian and/or Serbo-Croat, and have links with Roma communities in other countries. The Ashkaelia, however, speak Albanian and identify themselves as Albanian, even though they are treated as different by ethnic Albanians. The Egyptians also distance themselves from the ethnic Romas and speak Albanian but claim that their ancestors came from India via Egypt. The Kosovar Albanians consider this third group to be Roma or Ashkaelia; a separate ethnic identity was created for them ten years ago by the Belgrade authorities to create the appearance of a multi-ethnic rather than an Albanian-dominated Kosovo. Nevertheless, the Egyptians want to be seen as Albanian. Both the Ashkaelia and Egyptians are Muslims, while the ethnic Romas can be Orthodox (such as the Cergari Romas), Catholic, or Muslim.

Roma communities are concentrated in the eastern (Urosevac/Ferizaj) and southwestern (Pec/Peja, Dakovica/Gjakove, and Prizren) parts of Kosovo. As noted in Chapter II, there is little agreement on the size of these communities before or after the conflict, given the complicated nature of

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114 World Bank (2000e).
115 According to WFP/UNHCR (1999b), decisions regarding emigration are multi-faceted, with security being the primary concern. Access to food seems to be secondary.
116 According to Polansky (2000), the ethnic Romas of Kosovo are one of the few Roma communities in Europe to have maintained their Hindu caste system.
117 According to OSCE (2000b), linguistic analysis has lead most experts to agree that the Roma descended from the northwestern areas of the Indian subcontinent.
118 UNHCR/OSCE (2000c).
their ethnic designation. The 1991 Yugoslav census estimates 43,000, but this number is believed to be low, given the boycott by many Ashkaelia and Egyptian communities. One Roma expert has estimated 150,000 Romas living across 300 communities before the conflict.\textsuperscript{119} Finally, UNHCR estimates the number of Romas displaced from Kosovo to Serbia and Montenegro to be between 40-50,000, with the majority leaving the province after the arrival of UNMIK. A number of displaced Romas are also living in Germany, Italy, and other countries.\textsuperscript{120}

As with Roma populations in other parts of Europe, Kosovo’s Romas have been a poor and marginalized group,\textsuperscript{121} with limited access to land, livestock, and formal employment. They have traditionally earned their living as casual laborers, mostly in agriculture, and as itinerant traders. In addition, between 10 and 20 percent of Kosovar Romas\textsuperscript{122} receive remittance income from relatives abroad, compared to about half the Albanian population.\textsuperscript{123}

Albanians believe that some Roma populations, especially the ethnic Romas, collaborated with the Serbs and took part in the destruction and looting of Albanian property. These perceptions have led to attacks against and displacement of thousands of Kosovar Romas, both within and outside the province. However, it is important to note that the majority of those remaining are believed to be innocent, especially the more “Albanian” Ashkaelia and Egyptians.\textsuperscript{124} Nonetheless, even members of these groups are likely to encounter hostility outside of areas where they are personally known. Given this situation, Romas have called for prosecution of those guilty of criminal behavior, in the hope of putting an end to the collective guilt of the group.\textsuperscript{125}

The increased intolerance and reduced need for casual labor after the conflict have resulted in reduced incomes for all Roma groups. Security conditions and employment opportunities for the Ashkaelia and Egyptians may improve with economic development in the province, given their traditional links with the Albanian community and their ability to speak Albanian. As many ethnic Romas are viewed as collaborators with the Serbs, however, their situation is not expected to improve in the immediate future, and they will likely require continued KFOR protection and humanitarian assistance.\textsuperscript{126}

The demarcation within the Roma population has also led to demands for political representation within JIAS along ethno-linguistic lines. Until recently, the KTC had one seat for all Roma communities and the representative was an ethnic Roma. Now, an additional seat has been created for the Ashkaelia and Egyptian communities but they cannot agree on who should occupy the seat, insisting they are two distinct communities and should not have to share the seat.

\textit{Muslim Slavs}

\textsuperscript{119}Polansky (2000).
\textsuperscript{120}European Roma Rights Center (2000)
\textsuperscript{121}According to World Bank (2000d), there are certain aspects of Roma culture and living conditions that “reinforce stereotypes and contribute to a vicious circle of isolation and marginalization.” For example, the “closed nature of their communities and resistance to assimilation breed misunderstanding and mistrust.”
\textsuperscript{122}WFP (1999).
\textsuperscript{123}WFP (1999).
\textsuperscript{124}A Roma interviewee in Prizren explained that coexistence was made possible in that southern town through contributions to the KLA before the war and the KPC after the war.
\textsuperscript{125}“Proposed Declaration from the Humanitarian Roundtable,” handout (2000).
\textsuperscript{126}WFP (1999).
This group, also referred to as Bosniacs, consists of the Slavic-speaking Muslims who constituted the “Muslim Nationality” within the former SFRY. Muslim Slavs, similar to the Muslim inhabitants of Bosnia, refer to their dialect of the Serbo-Croat language as Bosnian. The Gorani (see below) of the Gora Region and the Torbesh of the Zupa/Xhupa region can also be considered Muslim Slavs.127

In 1991, there were 57,000128 Muslim Slavs in Kosovo, constituting the third largest ethnic group after the Albanians and the Serbs. The group was relatively prosperous, with many working as administrators, businessmen, and farmers. During and after the war, more than half of them fled the province, with about 40 percent leaving during the air strikes and another 15 percent after the deployment of NATO forces.129 Most went to Novi Pazar (Serbia), Sarajevo (Bosnia), and parts of Macedonia.130 In addition, according to OSCE, about 20,000 Muslim Slavs are in Western Europe, registered as Kosovar Albanians refugees.

Of the remaining population, estimated at 47,000,131 a large number reside in the municipality of Prizren. According to interviews with community members, many Muslim Slavs now work in or run restaurants and reconstruction businesses. Others have attempted to rebuild their destroyed livestock businesses—70 percent of Muslim Slav-owned livestock was lost during the war.

Muslim Slavs find themselves caught between the Albanians, with whom they share their religion, and the Serbs, with whom they share their language. Before the war, because of these linguistic links, their children went to Serb schools and did not learn Albanian. Now, not knowing Albanian severely limits their prospects for public and private sector employment, especially when they are mistaken for Serbs. Yet, like some Romas, all Muslim Slav respondents stressed the fact that they feel secure with Albanians who know them personally.132

Gorani

The Gorani can also be considered Muslim Slavs but they speak a Slavic language closer to Macedonian and inhabit a clearly defined geographic area, the Gora region of Dragas/ Dragash municipality. In addition, most of them learned Serbian in school. According to the 1991 census, there were 20,000 Gorani in this municipality.133 Since the end of the war, fearing Albanian reprisals, their number has been reduced to about 12,000 in all of Kosovo.134

The Gorani were considered a relatively prosperous group (similar to other Muslim Slavs), who diversified out of forestry, farming, and livestock production into small business and public administration, primarily at the professional level.135

Historically, the Gorani have had good relations with their Albanian neighbors. More recently, however, a number of factors have reversed this general trend: (i) their linguistic ties to the Serb population, (ii) their employment within the former Serb administration, and (iii) their ability to operate their

127 UNHCR/OSCE (2000c).
128 1991 census.
129 WFP (1999).
130 According to UNHCR/OSCE (2000c), most Muslim Slavs claim ancestry from the Sanjzak region of Serbia, which includes Novi Pazar, Bosnia and parts of Macedonia.
131 UNHCR/OSCE (2000a).
132 Interviews with members of the Muslim Slav community in Prizren and Pec/Peja, April 2000.
133 ICG (1999h).
134 UNHCR/OSCE (2000a).
135 WFP/UNHCR (December 11, 1999b).
businesses during the conflict, which Albanians consider indicative of collaboration with the former Serb regime.¹³⁶

Since the end of the war, most Goranis employed in the public sector have lost their jobs and many of their business are now closed. In addition, those living close to the border with Albania suffer from cattle raids, highlighting the need for improved border security.¹³⁷ And a large number are internally displaced to their home villages in the Gora region from other parts of Kosovo. If the security and employment situation does not improve, they are likely to leave for other parts of the former Yugoslavia or join their relatives in other European countries.

¹³⁶ WFP/UNHCR (December 11, 1999b).
¹³⁷ The importance of cross-border cooperation between Albania and Kosovo was discussed in the first report of the Social Development Initiative for South Eastern Europe series, on the impact of Kosovar refugees on Albanian society (Barjaba and La Cava, 2000). The report noted that social and cultural ties can be built, and tensions thereby reduced, by promoting the development of natural trade linkages between border towns. The refugee crisis, in fact, catalyzed spontaneous movement in that direction. For example, the Gorani in Albania’s northern Kukes district funded, out of their own resources, construction of a road connecting 20 Gorani villages in eastern Albania, southwestern Kosovo, and FYR Macedonia. The World Bank has also helped finance reconstruction of a road linking northeast Albanian with the Kosovar town of Dakovica/Gjakove, bringing both areas out of the isolation they had suffered since Kosovo and Albania were divided.
Turks

Most of the Turks in Kosovo speak Turkish, practice Islam, and maintain close ties with Turkey. The 1974 Yugoslav constitution recognized the Turks as a nationality with the right to maintain their language and culture. In 1989, however, the administrative use of the language in Turkish minority areas was discontinued.

Currently, UNHCR/OSCE estimate about 20,000\textsuperscript{138} Turks (up from 11,000 in 1991\textsuperscript{139}) in Kosovo, with about 12,000 in the city of Prizren, and about 5,000 in the village of Mamusa/Mamushë.\textsuperscript{140} Turks also live in Pristina/Prishtine, Kosovska Mitrovica/Mitrovice, Gnjilane/Gjilan (in the village of Dobrcane/Miresh), and Vucitrn/Vushtrri. Traditionally, Turks have been active in arts, crafts, and trading (especially with Turkey) in urban areas. More recently, they have also found employment in factories and engineering. The community also participates actively in civil society organizations such as cultural associations and chambers of commerce.

The Turks have closer ties to the Albanians than any other ethnic group. Because of these ties and links with Turkey, a member of NATO, the Serbs targeted them during the recent conflict. However, in most cases, their homes were not destroyed and they did not suffer widespread displacement. But they did suffer some security incidents with the return of the Albanian refugees, especially at the hands of those who did not know them personally. During interviews with the assessment team, some respondents indicated that they feel uncomfortable speaking the Turkish language outside of Prizren, although within the city, their children continue to be educated in their mother tongue.

The major area of concern for most Turks seems to be lack of employment, particularly factory jobs. Many hope to benefit from future Turkish investment in the province, although the current business environment is not favorable. In addition, they are concerned about UNMIK not recognizing Turkish as one of the official languages of Kosovo, prompting the community not to participate in the recent registration and elections.

Ideas of Local Populations Regarding Their Own Development

This final section of the social assessment is a forward-looking consideration of how Kosovar Albanians and minorities perceive their own immediate needs and their prospects for development over the next three to five years. The results show a continuing sense of vulnerability in the present but optimism about the future, and particularly a determination to avoid relying on international assistance. However, both male and female respondents expressed the need for specific types of international assistance—including micro-credit and job training—to make this self-reliance possible. These findings have implications for the design of future assistance programs by the international community (see Chapter VI, Conclusions).

\textit{People’s perceptions of their immediate needs}

\textsuperscript{138} UNHCR/OSCE (2000a).
\textsuperscript{139} 1991 census.
\textsuperscript{140} UNHCR/OSCE (2000c).
The assessment team asked respondents to name the priority needs of their communities and their families. Most did not differentiate between the needs of the two. Many also included the needs of Kosovo in general, or their needs as individuals. The results show that Kosovar Albanians consider the economic development of Kosovo, the community, and the family to be of paramount importance. Employment and job opportunities were named the highest priority needs in both urban and rural areas, with men wanting credits to support their entrepreneurial ideas (see following section) and women, in contrast, wanting job training, particularly in dressmaking, hairdressing, English, and computer skills. In rural areas, male respondents most often mentioned micro-credit for the reacquisition of means of production (seeds, fertilizer, agricultural equipment, livestock) and the expansion of agricultural businesses. Both urban and rural women also wanted better social services (including for orphans, the elderly, and the traumatized), better health care (including maternity facilities in rural areas), food security, physical security (especially clearance of land mines), and cash allowance (see Annex III, Table 9). Women also wanted job opportunities for their sons so they would not have to work abroad.

**Entrepreneurial ideas and credit needs**

Respondents had well-developed entrepreneurial ideas suitable to local circumstances, including how much credit they require, how quickly they could pay the money back, and how many people they could employ (see Annex IV, Box 1). Some said explicitly that they want to repay the money quickly to avoid long-term debt, which would increase their feeling of vulnerability. Many others expressed a strong desire for information on what agencies to approach for credits, possible credit partners, credit application procedures, and relevant projects, as well as a desire for training on private sector issues such as how to determine supply and demand. And, in comments reminiscent of the socialist economy, four men asked explicitly for commercial laws and institutions to regulate the market, and for product control, as a precondition for development and private investment in Kosovo. Others requested guarantees of prices and sale (Cernice), or an analysis of demand in the employment market in order to direct education accordingly (Rugova).

The assessment team also found that Muslim Slav representatives in Prizren had a number of ideas for economic incentive programs to enable the return of Muslim Slav refugees and to help make Prizren “a locomotive for economic development in rural Kosovo” (see Annex IV, Box 2).
**Prospects for the future, and promoters of change**

Finally, respondents were asked how they conceive of their family’s and community’s future, and who they understand to be the promoters of change (see tables 11 and 12).

**Table 11. Prospects for the Future**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prospects, conditions</th>
<th>Number of groups (of 40)</th>
<th>Special remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Will generally improve, particularly in my community/village</td>
<td>19 groups</td>
<td>6 urban 3 rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depends on clarification of status of Kosovo, independence, integration into Europe,</td>
<td>9 groups</td>
<td>7 urban 2 rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rule of law, institution building, free elections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will personally improve (employment, expansion of business, creating family, education,</td>
<td>7 groups</td>
<td>5 female, 2 male, (5 young, 2 adult women’s groups)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>personal independence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will not improve if conditions do not change (general economy, security, political</td>
<td>6 groups</td>
<td>3 urban 3 rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>situation)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will improve in my village at least</td>
<td>5 groups</td>
<td>5 rural</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 12. Promoters of Change**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Promoters/actors/incentive</th>
<th>NUMBER OF GROUPS (OF 40)</th>
<th>Special remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combination of work and initiatives of Albanians and international support, particularly</td>
<td>14 groups</td>
<td>All types of groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>investment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Our own work,” particularly men’s capacity to work</td>
<td>13 groups</td>
<td>Women’s groups on men; men’s groups on themselves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International investment, credits, starting small economic activities</td>
<td>11 groups</td>
<td>10 men’s groups, 1 women’s group, both urban and rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanians only, Albanians cooperating with each other</td>
<td>4 groups</td>
<td>3 urban women’s groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International community only (‘coordinated plans”)</td>
<td>2 groups</td>
<td>Rural adult women, urban young men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth, students</td>
<td>2 groups</td>
<td>Urban young men, rural young women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anyone</td>
<td>1 group</td>
<td>Urban adult women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Through education</td>
<td>1 group</td>
<td>Rural young women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businessmen</td>
<td>1 group</td>
<td>Urban young men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village council</td>
<td>1 group</td>
<td>Rural adult women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents</td>
<td>1 group</td>
<td>Rural young women</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
V. DIASPORA ASSESSMENT

This chapter considers the situation of the Kosovar diaspora in Germany and Switzerland. In particular, the assessment focuses on: (i) the history of Kosovar Albanian migration to those countries, and the age, gender, family structure, and employment patterns of the migrant population; (ii) host country policies and assistance programs for the migrant community; (iii) Kosovar Albanian organizations and community relations in the host countries; (iv) criminality of Kosovar youth in host countries; (v) the role of migrants’ remittances in maintaining their families in Kosovo; (vi) host government pressures on migrants to return, and incentive programs for returnees; (vii) factors in migrants’ decisions to return and (viii) the expected impact of the repatriation of a large number of migrants. The field work for the assessment, carried out in Berlin, Frankfurt, Ludwigshafen, Zurich, Berne, and Geneva, consisted of interviews with host country officials, representatives of international organizations, migration experts, and leaders of the migrant communities in the two countries; as well as focus groups and community meetings in which migrants participated.

History and Demography

The Kosovar Albanian community is the second largest foreign group in both Germany and Switzerland, numbering 350,000-400,000 and 160,000, respectively. In Germany, their numbers are exceeded only by the Turks, and in Switzerland, by Italian nationals. These migrants came in three distinct waves: (i) a first wave in the late 1960s/early 1970s of Kosovar Albanian guest workers, most of whom were unskilled, poorly educated, and from the rural areas of Kosovo; (ii) a second wave, from 1989-1993 in Germany and 1981-1990 in Switzerland, consisting mostly of better-educated and skilled Kosovar Albanians from the urban areas of Kosovo, and young men seeking to avoid service in the Yugoslav army during the Balkan wars (1992-5); and (iii) a third wave of asylum-seekers and refugees from the 1998-1999 conflict in Kosovo, mixed in terms of education and origin. Table 13 illustrates these migration patterns, reporting statistics from FRY immigrants in Germany, about half of which are Kosovar Albanians.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Length of Stay in Germany, 1997</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 1 year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-4 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-6 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-8 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-15 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-20 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-25 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-30 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 years and more</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The migrants have tended to settle in urban areas of host countries. In Germany, where 97 percent of all foreigners live in the former West Germany, the Kosovar Albanians are concentrated in the major cities of four states: Baden-Wuerttemberg, Berlin, Hesse, and North Rhine-Westphalia. Kosovar

141 Swiss government statistics do not distinguish Kosovars from other citizens of FYR; while German government statistics only began to distinguish Kosovars from other citizens of FYR in August 1999. Other citizens of the former Yugoslavia—Croats, Bosnians, and Slovenes—are registered separately in both countries.
Albanians live all over Switzerland, with larger concentrations in the cantons of Zurich (more than 50,000), Geneva (10,000), Vaud (15,000), and Berne (5,000). Some live in the countryside, and many have found work in the two mountain regions of Berne and the Grisons. Migrants from the same Kosovar village or town tend to settle in the same place. In contrast to their residential resettlement patterns in host countries, though, most of the migrants come from rural (66 percent) rather than urban (34 percent) areas of Kosovo.

**Employment situation**

The employment situation for Kosovar Albanians is much more difficult in Germany than in Switzerland. In Germany, migrants have difficulty obtaining work permits, forcing many to work illegally. Civil war refugees and asylum-seekers may be granted a limited work permit, which allows them to be hired for a job provided there is no German national or foreigner with a more secure residency status who can perform the same job. A debate has emerged in German political circles about the need to extend work permits more freely to foreigners, which would help reduce the state’s burden of providing social assistance.

Most Kosovar Albanians cannot find work in the host countries in areas of their expertise. Instead, they tend to work in restaurants, construction, and agriculture, and, in Germany, as technical laborers and factory workers.

Unemployment among foreigners tends to be higher than among host country nationals; e.g., in 1998, the national unemployment rate in Germany was 10.5 percent, while the rate for all foreigners was 20.3 percent. In some cities, the rate for foreigners is even higher; e.g., about 30 percent in Berlin. The most recent data indicate that the unemployment rate for FRY citizens (including those from Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo) living in Germany is 14.2 percent. In 1998, the national unemployment rate in Switzerland was 2.5 percent, while the unemployment rate for foreigners was 7.5 percent.

In response to these employment difficulties, Kosovar Albanians in Germany and Switzerland have established restaurants, travel agencies, Albanian clubs, translation/interpretation bureaus, driving schools, small grocery stands, transport firms, and construction/engineering firms. The first Kosovar Albanian-owned businesses in Switzerland were travel agencies, followed by Albanian language newspapers, some started by the owners of the travel agencies.

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142 Leuenberger and Maillard (1999).
143 RIINVEST estimates (1999).
144 Interview, Barbara John, Commissioner for Foreigner Affairs, Berlin Senate, January 26, 2000.
145 Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fuer Auslaenderfragen (1999a).
147 For example, Kosovar Albanians in Zurich and Berlin own a number of pizzerias and Italian restaurants. There are also 180 Kosovar Albanian travel agencies in Germany.
**Population structure**

Given the migration patterns of the Kosovar Albanians, the diaspora tends to be predominantly young and male, due to the fact that political, educational, and economic migration has been a male-dominated phenomenon. This was shown clearly in Chapter II, which describes a migration-driven drop in male-female population ratios in Kosovo from 107 to 95 males per 100 females between 1991 and 2000.

Of the 737,204 FRY nationals in Germany, about half of which are Kosovar Albanians, 180,687 are children under 16 years of age. Of the total, 366,529 are single (mostly young men), and 293,439 are married. More than 55 percent of the diaspora population is between 18 and 35 years of age. Another 26.5 percent is between the ages of 0-17, while the remaining 17.7 percent of migrants are 36 and older.

Older families from the first migration wave tend to be larger, often with six to eight children. Migrants from the second wave appear to have an average of two to four children, while the youngest migrants have one or two. Interviews with youth indicate that many want to marry at an older age (women at 30 years of age, men at 25-26 years of age), work outside the home, and have fewer children. While modernization in family structures was apparent, some Kosovar Albanian youth and women felt the society—including families in the Diaspora—were reverting to more traditional ways because of the impact of the conflict.

Family and clan solidarity are very strong in the diaspora. However, the conflict and dispersion experiences appear to have had some adverse effects on some families; e.g., parent-youth misunderstandings, youth misbehavior, and criminality. Some described the Kosovar Albanian youth, as the “lost generation” in terms of education (particularly those who attended the parallel system), employment, and hope for a better future. Many families have yet to recover psychologically from the traumas of during the conflict, which they experienced either directly, or indirectly through family members in Kosovo.

**Host Country Policies and Assistance Programs**

Germany is at the forefront of a broader movement in the European Union (EU) to create more equitable burden-sharing by harmonizing asylum and refugee policies within five years, beginning with border controls. Legal immigration has been declining in recent years, and the number of asylum-seekers has dramatically decreased throughout the EU. Visa requirements are now more strict, while the time involved in legally processing asylum applicants has been shortened. In part, this is being done to curtail the high cost of German government assistance to foreigners, currently about DM 500 million per year to provide for refugees. At the same time, German citizenship laws have moved away from the requirement that an applicant have a German blood relative. Naturalizations among FRY citizens have accordingly increased, but are still quite low (2.4 percent of all naturalizations in 1997).

In Switzerland, the Kosovo crisis re-ignited the longstanding debate about the country’s asylum and refugee laws, with the far-right People’s Party capitalizing on negative public sentiment toward foreigners in general and the Kosovar Albanians in particular. A number of recent changes in Swiss laws have made conditions for the Kosovar Albanians more difficult, and could mean increasing restrictions on the inflow of refugees, asylum-seekers, and other migrants. Furthermore, Switzerland is looking to informally coordinate and harmonize its asylum policies with other EU member states.

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149 RIINVEST estimates (1999).
150 Focus group interviews in Germany and Switzerland, January-February 2000.
Both countries are struggling to deal with a number of issues related to foreigners, including racism, violent attacks, and socioeconomic discrimination against foreigners; criminality among foreigners; and threats to internal security from the importation of political movements and conflicts from their home countries. In this regard, more could be done in the area of integrating migrants into host country societies, and in educating the host country populace about the migrants and refugees, their society and culture. In addition, integrating migrants into host country institutions and societies could also help foster better community relations. Kosovar woman and youth, the two most socially isolated and marginalized groups, will require special attention.

In Germany, each state has a Commissioner of Foreigner Affairs office to deal with the economic, legal, and social affairs of foreigners living in their communities. These offices also provide counseling and social services for foreigners, and some repatriation assistance. In addition, some help to promote multi-culturalism, tolerance, and integration of foreigners into German society. In recent years, though, government social and legal assistance to both asylum-seekers and war refugees has been declining significantly, and conditions for foreigners are becoming increasingly less attractive; e.g., family reunification restrictions, a move toward involuntary repatriation, and so on. New policies have meant the curtailment of social benefits for Kosovars, particularly those who hold only a tolerance permit, the least secure type of residency permit.151

Similarly, the Swiss government provides a number of programs to assist foreigners, both directly and through NGOs, including education, training, counseling, social and legal services, and welfare and integration assistance. The Universite Populaire Albanaise (UPA) in Geneva aims specifically at providing the 10,000-member Albanian and Kosovar Albanian community with educational, social, cultural, and sport activities.

Other programs provide the Kosovar Albanians with repatriation assistance (see below).

**Role of NGOs in Assisting Kosovars**

Swiss NGOs play a key role in aiding Kosovar refugees and asylum-seekers who come to Switzerland. They also have an important advocacy role vis-à-vis governmental authorities, international organizations, and the general public. Swiss NGOs have gone a long way toward better informing the political and public debate in Switzerland over a wide array of issues impacting the Kosovar community, including issues related to foreigners, asylum and refugee laws, foreigner criminality, returnees, and integration into Swiss society.

There are a few German NGOs working actively with the Kosovar population living in Germany and in Kosovo/region, providing education, legal advice, medical services, emergency shelter and food, and psychological and trauma counseling. These NGOs recently formed an alliance to launch a Balkan initiative to foster greater tolerance and reconciliation. To date, these NGOs have played a limited role in Germany. With greater empowerment and support, they could help bridge the gap in governmental assistance programs, aid in the process of integrating migrants into Germany society, and assist in the smooth repatriation of refugees. They could also help better inform the public and political debate about foreigners in Germany.

Swiss governmental institutions and NGOs have employed Kosovars living in Switzerland--particularly those from the second migration wave--to help with the third wave of refugees and asylum-

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151 The tolerance permit is given to foreigners who are obligated to leave Germany but cannot yet return to their home countries for legal, political, or security reasons. The tolerance permit is a temporary suspension of deportation, and usually applies to civil war refugees.
seekers. These Kosovars provide assistance with legal, social, education, medical and other services. Second wave migrants speak both German/French and Albanian, and can communicate well with both sides. Further, they understand well the process of leaving Kosovo and settling in Switzerland. To date, German state and non-governmental organizations have made limited use of this valuable resource. Greater employment of second-wave Kosovar migrants could smooth the process of entry, return, migration and/or integration.

**Organizations and Community Relations in Host Countries**

Before the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, there were a number of Yugoslav local and community organizations in Germany. Since then, the all-Yugoslav organizations in Germany have fractured and closed, while new local and community organizations have been created along national, ethnic, and religious lines. Kosovar Albanians have established their own Albanian clubs, youth clubs, humanitarian organizations, and radio programs. The clubs are not drawn along family/clan lines, but appear to be for the general use of the community. Above the level of such organizations, there is no single nationwide representative or institution for the Kosovar Albanian community. This stands in contrast to the much larger and better-organized Turkish community living in Germany.

All major Kosovar Albanian political groups in Germany agree that Kosovo should be independent, though the recent conflict led to some serious divisions among the supporters of different factions. The LDK collected funds for the Fund for the Republic of Kosovo from 1992-1999, to which Kosovar Albanians voluntarily contributed 3 percent of their income to finance parallel education, humanitarian, social, and political structures in Kosovo. Contributions to the fund appear to have ceased shortly after the end of the conflict, although the German government recently asked that some money from the fund be used for reconstruction in Kosovo.\(^\text{152}\)

The KLA has also been active in Germany, raising money from the diaspora community through its *Motherland is Calling Fund*, established in 1998, and liaising with the German government. There are also three underground organizations working with the KLA in Germany, engaging in political and fundraising activities. Many volunteer fighters for the KLA came from the diaspora in Germany and Switzerland.

In Switzerland, both the KLA and LDK have been active politically, in fundraising, and to some extent, militarily. In July 1998, the Swiss government blocked the two accounts (3 percent fund run by the LDK, and the Motherland is Calling account run by the KLA) to which Kosovar Albanians had been sending their contributions.\(^\text{153}\) The KLA account in Switzerland was later closed by government authorities because they did not want the conflict financed from Swiss territory.\(^\text{154}\) The LDK’s 3 percent account remains open, and has, according to one source, an estimated SF 60-180 million in assets.\(^\text{155}\)

Relations among Kosovar Albanians who went to Germany and Switzerland during different migration waves have been mixed. For example, the oldest generation of migrants does not have much in common with the second wave, who were better-educated and tended to come from urban areas. Age gaps also play a role in community relations. However, there appear to be no major religious cleavages or tensions among Kosovar Albanian Christians and Muslims. Kosovar Albanians also tend to interact more with other ethnic Albanians from Albania, FRY Macedonia, and elsewhere.

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154 Interview, Sami Kurthesi, Berne, February 2000.
Youth Criminality in Host Countries

Kosovar youth are clearly a group at risk. They have unique needs which require specialized attention. Children and youth are among the most vulnerable and traumatized of Kosovars living in the Diaspora. In most cases, their education was disrupted or abruptly/pre-maturely halted. Many have been separated from their families and/or are unable to visit family members because of travel restrictions or long distances. They come to Europe psychologically traumatized by the war and flight from Kosovo. They possess few skills, are often alone, sometimes prohibited by law from working, and receiving limited social assistance. Under these circumstances, many have fallen into criminal activities.

In Germany, there are no official federal government statistics regarding crimes committed by Kosovar Albanians, although crime by young people appears to be a problem given their difficult living conditions. Kosovar Albanians acknowledge that many of the young men who went to Germany face a desperate situation.

In Switzerland, government officials estimate the crime rate among Kosovar youth to be 10 to 15 percent, with many of the crimes involving drugs.\textsuperscript{156} Federal government and canton-financed activities aim to keep youth from falling into criminal activities.

In both countries, many offenses involve violations of the residency law and other minor infractions. Most independent studies note the considerable media attention given to cases of criminality among Kosovar Albanian youth. All the studies point to the conditions (war trauma, living in uncertainty, separation from families, lack of education, employment, and money) under which Kosovar Albanian youth are living as factors contributing to criminal behavior.

German and Swiss authorities have began to repatriate a number of Kosovar Albanian criminals, which poses additional security issues in Kosovo. This group, especially the youth among them, will require special assistance to reintegrate into Kosovar society.

The Role of Remittances in Maintaining Families in Kosovo

There is no precise information regarding remittances from the Kosovar Albanian community in Germany and Switzerland. However, the amounts are substantial and have contributed to the survival and well-being of families in Kosovo, and indeed to the overall Kosovar economy. Remittances increased substantially as a result of the conflict, from 24.7 percent of domestic incomes to 45.1 percent after the war.\textsuperscript{157}

Estimates of the level of remittances vary by source. RIINVEST estimates that almost half of all families in Kosovo (46.8 percent) receive up to DM 3,000 per year, with 25.1 percent receiving DM 3,000-6,000 per year, 10 percent receiving DM 6,000-9,000 per year, and 17.2 percent receiving DM 9,000 or more per year. Total remittances from abroad have been estimated at DM 750-850 million per year.\textsuperscript{158} Kosovars living in the diaspora estimate average remittances of DM 500-1,000 per month during the 1990s, with some siphoned off by the Serbian police.\textsuperscript{159} In Kosovo, most of these funds have been used for housing (33.4 percent), transport (15.2 percent), and trade (12.5 percent).

\textsuperscript{156} Interview, Joerg Frieden, Federal Office for Refugees, Berne, February 2, 2000.
\textsuperscript{157} RIINVEST (1999c; 1999d).
\textsuperscript{158} RIINVEST (1999c; 1999d).
\textsuperscript{159} Interviews, Kosovar Albanian Diaspora, January 2000.
Official German data on FRY remittances suggest that remittances from Germany averaged DM 200-250 million per year for 1997-1998.\textsuperscript{160} RIINVEST estimates remittances from Germany to be DM 1,000-2,000 per year per family. Estimates from Switzerland suggest that the 160,000 Kosovar Albanians living in that country send up to SF 2,000 per month per family to Kosovo, with more coming from single men than from families.\textsuperscript{161} Other Kosovar Albanian and Swiss estimates put remittances at SF 500-1,000 per month.\textsuperscript{162}

Most diaspora contributions have gone through travel agencies (with a commission taken by the agencies), personal trips, and special couriers. It should be noted that since the fall of 1998, travel agencies in Germany were forbidden by law from handling remittances to Kosovo. Diaspora remittances are expected to decline from both Germany and Switzerland as more Kosovars are repatriated—with adverse consequences for the social welfare of many families in Kosovo.

**Host Government Pressures and Incentives to Return**

**Pressures to return**

In Germany, 60,000 Kosovar Albanians were obliged to return by end-March 2000. In addition, another 180,000 pre-war Kosovar Albanians will be obliged to return in the near future. The vast majority of this second group are asylum-seekers, some living in Germany as long as eight or nine years, whose requests for asylum were denied. German officials anticipate a difficult political debate about the future of this group.

\textsuperscript{160} Deutsche Bundesbank (1999).
\textsuperscript{161} Interview, Ueli Leuenberger, Director, Universite Populaire Albanaise, Geneva, February 14, 2000.
\textsuperscript{162} Interviews, Kosovar Albanians and Swiss Refugee Council, Switzerland, February 2000.
In the first phase of the Swiss returnee program, 18,480 Kosovar Albanians were returned to Kosovo by end-December 1999. In the second phase, Swiss authorities have stated that an additional 64,871 will be obliged to return in 2000, including those with temporary status, asylum-seekers, and war refugees. Table 14 illustrates the residency/legal status of those who must return in 2000.

Germany has made special allowances for several groups, including Serbs and Romas. They will not be forced to return, and government officials anticipate the need to provide ongoing social assistance to these groups. On the Swiss side, UNHCR has expressed concerns about Swiss government plans to return Serbs and Romas from Kosovo to FRY. At the time of this writing, it appears that they will not be forced to return. There are also ethnic Albanians from south Serbia living in Germany and Switzerland. No policy determination has been made yet regarding their return status.

Table 14. Residency/Legal Status of Kosovar Albanian Returnees from Switzerland, 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Persons with temporary status</th>
<th>16,618</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Persons whose asylum application is still with authorities</td>
<td>34,081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons whose administrative appeal is still with authorities</td>
<td>2,296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons whose asylum application has been legally rejected</td>
<td>6,206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons who were given a visa during the conflict in Kosovo</td>
<td>5,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>64,871</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Incentives to return

The German government accepted approximately 80 percent of the war refugees from Yugoslavia and its successor republics, and has spent a total of DM 17 billion to assist these refugees since the beginning of the Bosnian crisis. At a cost of DM 500 million per year, or about DM 1,500 per month per refugee, the German government is now attempting to reduce this burden by repatriating as many refugees as possible.

At the federal level, the German government provided assistance to Kosovar returnees under two programs: the Reintegration and Emigration Program for Asylum-Seekers (REAG), and the Government-Assisted Repatriation Program (GARP). Under REAG, the government provided for return flights and local transportation, luggage allowance (DM 150 per adult and DM 75 for children under 12 years old, with a maximum of DM 750 per family), and travel money (DM 150 per adult and DM 75 for children under 12 years of age, with a maximum of DM 750 per family). Under GARP, the government provided additional incentive funding for individuals and families, amounting to DM 450 per adult and DM 225 for children under the age of 12, with a maximum of DM 1,350 per family.

German state and city governments offer their own financial incentives and programs for Kosovar returnees. The Berlin state government, for example, provides financial and transportation assistance of DM 2,000 per person, with a maximum of DM 9,000 per family. The Berlin government also helps refugees and asylum-seekers with housing and medical arrangements.

Germany also has special government programs to assist Kosovar returnees in private sector activities. The Berlin Economic Development Agency is helping German and Berlin small and medium-sized enterprises to find investment opportunities in the reconstruction of Kosovo. The aim is to provide

an incentive for Kosovars to return to Kosovo, and especially to Prizren in the German sector, where the agency’s office will be located. The Hesse state government is creating a similar program for private sector development in Kosovo.

In addition, the German Investment and Development Agency (Deutsche Investitions und Entwicklungsgesellschaft, DEG) provides financial and consulting services to returnees looking to invest in their home countries, as well as startup subsidies and loans from the German federal government. DEG offers start-up subsidies for returnees of up to DM 18,000 to finance investment projects, and another DM 9,000 in founding subsidies for first-time purchase of tangible assets. The DEG also provides start-up loans of up to DM 300,000.

Switzerland, like Germany, has found it less expensive to provide a phased incentive return program for refugees and asylum-seekers than to pay for their stay in the country. The government spends about SF 1.5 billion per year on social and financial assistance for all asylum-seekers and refugees, or about SF 15,000 per person. The incentive program is front-loaded to provide the greatest benefits to those Kosovar Albanians willing to return as soon as possible; incentives and benefits are phased out the longer they remain in Switzerland. Incentive packages include financial, transportation, and material assistance (modular shelter kits).

In the first phase, Kosovar Albanians received more than 9,000 modular shelter kits (each valued at approximately DM 600), transportation assistance, and financial assistance amounting to SF 2,000 per adult and SF 100 per child. Families of up to 5 persons were entitled to choose 3 modules, families of 6 to 7 persons could choose 4 modules, families of 8-9 persons could choose 5 modules, and families of 10 or more could choose 6 modules. Families also have the option of selling their modules.

The second phase, which began in January 2000, provides transportation assistance of DM 1,200 for 1 to 3 persons and DM 1,800 for 4 or more persons. Financial incentive aid has been reduced by half compared to the first phase, to SF 1,000 per adult and SF 500 per child; and fewer module shelter kits are being offered. Families with up to 3 persons can choose 2 modules, while families with 4 or more persons can choose 3 modules.

The Swiss government is also making an effort to tie development and humanitarian aid to the return of Kosovar and other migrants. For example, the Swiss Directorate for Development and Cooperation (Direktion fuer Entwicklung und Zussamenarbeit, DEZA) targets development aid to countries to which migrants are returning. The objective is to reduce poverty and other reasons for migration to Switzerland. Switzerland has also joined the multilateral humanitarian relief operation FOCUS, created by the governments of Greece, Russia, and Austria to help the victims of conflict in all of FRY. Finally, the Swiss government is supporting a special workfare program to provide education and vocational and professional training for Kosovar Albanians, to help them find jobs on their return to Kosovo.

There are also nongovernmental Swiss organizations working with Kosovar returnees. Every Swiss canton has an advisory office for foreigners, to help them with administrative and legal matters, inform them of government policies, and so on. Asylum-Organization Zurich is one such organization that looks after the interests of refugees and asylum-seekers. It conducted a survey of Kosovar Albanian returnees, including the identification of specific constraints to returning, and recommendations for

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165 DEG (1999a).
168 Interview, Tanya Meier, Director, Workfare, Zurich, February 9, 2000.
addressing such constraints. Finally, the organization has played an advocacy role vis-à-vis the government, NGOs, and international organizations.

UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) are working with the German and Swiss governments to provide for the organized return of refugees to Kosovo. UNHCR monitors the safe and informed return of Kosovars. IOM has developed a series of projects to assist the return and reintegration of Kosovars, including transport assistance, look and see visits, direct assistance to returnees, Kosovar Albanian diaspora election voting process, a socio-demographic survey, and microenterprise development. IOM also has been working with European governments to ensure that harmonization of EU migration policies does not result in a restrictive “lowest common denominator” policy.

UNHCR is especially concerned about the vulnerability of Kosovar Albanian returnees from Switzerland, particularly with respect to housing, and has urged the government not to send people back during the winter months. In addition, UNHCR monitors the asylum/refugee policies advocated by the far-right Swiss People’s Party; makes known its concern about the government’s plans to return Serbs and Romas from Kosovo to FRY; and advocates the adoption of a more nuanced return policy vis-à-vis the Kosovar Albanians based on individual or family circumstances.

The International Social Service (ISS) would also like to see the Swiss government adopt a more differentiated policy with respect to Kosovar Albanian returnees. In addition, ISS is concerned that the return of large numbers of Kosovar Albanians could threaten the financial and economic situation in Kosovo, where so many have been dependent on remittances from abroad.

Factors Influencing Decisions to Return

There are a number of factors that weigh in favor of migrants returning to Kosovo, and a number of other factors that weigh in favor of them remaining in the host countries.

Factors in favor of returning to Kosovo

- **Family solidarity and strong attachment to Kosovo.** These two are clearly the main reasons that migrants want to return to Kosovo. Although many expressed a desire for conditions to improve before returning (see below), others want to return and contribute to the rebuilding of their society and homeland.

- **More restrictive host government policies.** Host government policies have become less hospitable toward Kosovar Albanians and other foreigners. The high cost of government assistance for foreigners; the “refugee fatigue” arising from the growing number of asylum-seekers and refugees; and changing social, economic, and employment conditions in host countries have contributed to the toughening of policies toward foreigners living in Germany and Switzerland.

- **Returnee incentive programs.** Many Kosovar Albanians have been quick to take advantage of returnee incentive programs. Most of those who returned during the early post-conflict period were relatively better-off, and tended to have homes, businesses, or jobs to return to. Those who do not return in 2000 will not be eligible for the incentive program.

- **Integration difficulties.** Kosovar Albanians face a multitude of difficulties integrating into host country societies. Host country governments have contributed to these difficulties by not, until very recently, differentiating Kosovar Albanians from other Yugoslav citizens; and by not having policies to promote the integration of foreigners. Moreover, the image of Kosovar Albanians in
host countries is quite negative, and there have been many incidences of discrimination and violence against them, particularly in Germany. The Kosovars, for their part, have not facilitated their own integration due to their fear of state institutions, stemming from their experiences in Yugoslavia; their very strong attachment to Kosovo; their relatively low living standards; their high unemployment rate; stressed family structures; language barriers; special concerns for girls and women; and lack of community organizations to help them integrate into host societies.

Factors in favor of remaining in host countries

- **Better conditions in host countries than in Kosovo.** Despite all of the difficulties Kosovar Albanians face in host countries, many are clearly better off living there. Most can count on a minimal level of existence in host countries that they may not find in Kosovo.

- **Older migrants more ambivalent about returning to Kosovo.** Kosovar Albanians who have been living in host countries for the past 10 to 30 years have built new lives for themselves and their families, and are reluctant to give up their hard-earned gains. They also recognize the importance of their contributions to the livelihood and survival of family members back home. Concern for their children’s future also factors into the decision to stay in the host country for as long as possible.

- **Children born or raised largely in host countries.** Many families have children who have been born or have spent most of their lives in host countries. They are, on the whole, reluctant to return to Kosovo. This has led to tensions within families about returning to Kosovo.

- **Conditions in Kosovo.** Migrants perceive three key constraints to returning to Kosovo: housing, jobs and security. Other factors include lack of a functioning court system, the need for a Kosovar Albanian civilian police force, lack of medical facilities, poor education system, unresolved property questions, and concerns about acceptance by Kosovars who remained in Kosovo. There are also constraints having to do with the business environment: lack of start-up capital, difficulty transporting products from abroad, unresolved property questions, need for political risk insurance, and inadequate infrastructure, especially road and transport facilities.
Expected Impact of the Repatriation

Although the repatriation of Kosovar Albanians from the three migration waves will have different impacts, it is clear that the overall decline in remittances will have a largely adverse effect on family incomes in Kosovo.

Many migrants from the first wave express a desire to return to Kosovo. These older Kosovars, many of whom began as unskilled laborers but developed skills and businesses, could bring these assets back into the country, along with knowledge of foreign languages and investment capital to establish businesses and create jobs. Some have expressed a desire to split their time and resources between the host country and Kosovo, by establishing two homes and investing in two businesses. At the same time, if the older generation returns to retire, that could place an additional burden on local social welfare and medical services. Their children, many of whom were born or raised largely in host countries, may not be willing to return with them.

Second wave migrants, many of whom were highly educated when they left Kosovo, would also bring new skills, knowledge of foreign languages and business practices, and investment capital. This group has a more modern mentality, and is oriented toward the market economy. Many in this group have also expressed a desire to set up a life in both places. The children from families of this group would likely return to Kosovo with their parents and provide a new infusion of well-educated and trained human capital. However, this group could place an additional burden on housing and job markets, and on education and medical resources.

The third wave of migrants, war refugees and asylum-seekers, left Kosovo in dire circumstances, and many have no homes or jobs to return to. However, they may have gained useful skills and training, and financial and material resources from host government programs. They will place additional demands on housing, jobs, medical care, and the education and social welfare systems.

Young males from this group, many with disrupted and inadequate education, will present a special challenge. Many are disoriented and traumatized by the war, and have suffered unemployment, separation from family members, discrimination, and poor living conditions in host countries. Many have fallen into criminal activities, and may continue to be involved in crime in Kosovo. New programs will be required to address the special needs of youth, especially the most disenfranchised among them.
VI. CONCLUSIONS

The main findings from the assessment indicate that appropriate policies, programs, and projects can assist with the development of social capital and reduction of inter-ethnic conflict.

**Local institutions need to be strengthened so that they are able to promote bridging social capital.** The joint management system in most municipalities was perceived to be too foreign-driven, and more efforts are needed to build and use local capacity. The assessment found co-management to be problematic. Although the approach was designed to create autonomy with devolution (local level decision-making and an engaged civil society), and to address such concerns as lack of democratic legitimacy and intolerance toward minorities, in fact local officials often perceived themselves to be playing a minor role in decision-making. As a result, there was a perception that foreign officials and NGOs controlled the fate of the province. On the other hand, there is also some indication of Kosovars disengaging and not taking on responsibility, which leads to a vicious circle of them being excluded and withdrawing.

These findings imply the need for a more systematic effort to develop local capacity in both the governmental and non-governmental sectors, building on the rich organizational and institutional experience gained during the self-management period. In addition, there is a need for programs to foster trust and consensus-building among foreign and local officials, and particularly between local civil society groups with a public interest orientation and the local administrations. With the newly elected governments in place and the humanitarian emergency in the past, international assistance should shift away from the direct management of activities (especially by international NGOs) toward enhancing the management skills of Kosovar individuals and existing NGOs and associations, and toward promoting the creation of new associations by building on existing informal networks with bridging potential. Ultimately, these local groups should create a mutually beneficial relationship with the relevant municipal departments, thus increasing opportunities for citizens’ participation in the decision-making process and in monitoring the effectiveness of public service delivery. Linking social capital can be created by scaling up local organizations and scaling down formal institutions to make them accessible and useful to citizens in general and marginalized groups in particular. Appropriate institutional development will, in addition, increase the benefits of investments in education (human capital) and infrastructure (physical capital). Establishing well-functioning parent-teacher associations, for example, may be a necessary complement to building schools and training teachers.  

**Municipalities, local (public interest-oriented) groups, and communities need to be supported to better address the needs of vulnerable and excluded segments within the Kosovar-Albanian population.** While extensive aid and increasingly more targeted assistance should reach the economically vulnerable groups, at the current time the social welfare policies do not address all the needs of the socially vulnerable and excluded groups within the Kosovar Albanian communities. Social Welfare Centers at the local level are targeting social protection based on criteria designed by the central UNMIK administration, and but they will need more discretionary powers and technical assistance to address different forms of vulnerability and exclusion, based on local circumstances and needs. Hence the focus should be not only on poverty reduction but also on social exclusion.

A comprehensive social protection approach should mainstream community-based social services that increase the community’s awareness of and participation in addressing girls’ education, the isolation of war widows, and female victims of violence. Special assistance for the traumatized and disabled, as

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well as other war-affected groups, was identified as a priority need, particularly by women respondents who need to be relieved of these excessive burdens on their families. Some of these services are being offered ad hoc by international, local NGOs, and by community development projects. In the future, however, successful results and best practices should be mainstreamed and scaled up to cover the entire spectrum of needs. In order to make this type of assistance both sustainable and cost effective, it is necessary to build adequate local capacity both within the Social Welfare Centers and the local NGOs, moving increasingly away from contracting international agencies for such purposes. International specialists’ role should be limited to providing technical assistance and capacity building to enhance existing local management skills, gender sensitivity, and participatory skills. They should not be directly involved in the social service delivery process.

Projects such as the World Bank’s community-based Social Service Delivery Project in Albania and the Early Child Care and Development approach developed by UNICEF and the World Bank in FYR of Macedonia could provide useful models for community mobilization and empowerment to address gender exclusion in a culturally acceptable way, particularly in the rural areas of Kosovo, which suffer from greater isolation.170

The needs of rapidly growing cities should be addressed. The macro analysis found that Kosovo has been undergoing a dramatic process of urbanization since the end of the Second World War, with the proportion of the urban population rising from about 20 percent in 1953 to 40 percent in 1991 to 50 percent in 2000. The populations of major urban centers grew rapidly during this period, and the populations of Pristina/Prishtine and Prizren almost doubled. Although there was a temporary reversal of this trend during the enforcement period, when the Kosovar Albanians fled to rural areas and to neighboring countries, urbanization has accelerated since the end of the conflict. This trend has not been significantly affected by the recent movement of Serbs to isolated rural enclaves in Gnjilane/Gjilan and Northern Kosovo. Indeed, if Kosovo follows the pattern of other Balkan states, the pace of urbanization will increase.

The rapid urbanization of this historically rural province has a number of implications. Cities lack the infrastructure, public services, administrative capacity, and economic structure to meet the needs of their populations. In particular, they suffer from insufficient water and sanitation, limited employment opportunities, and crime. In addition, cultural heritage sites in Prizren and other cities are being degraded. Assistance and policymaking efforts therefore need to focus on urban planning, services, infrastructure, job creation, and an appropriate public policy framework, to enable the development of a well-functioning and sustainable urban society.

Local characteristics and attributes should be taken into account in the design of sustainable development programs and projects. Kosovo is far from a homogeneous region. The assessment found a variety of regional, subregional, and local cultural, societal, and institutional issues that need to be considered when planning development interventions. For example, Prizren’s historical multi-ethnic and community-based traditions, coupled with current urban needs, would require projects to preserve the cultural heritage of the city, clean the river, improve basic traffic infrastructure, expand the number and mix of crafts, strengthen commercial businesses and community/women’s associations, increase hotel capacity, and halt illegal construction. All these activities could be pursued with strong citizen participation. On the other hand, while Pristina/Prishtine lacks these cultural and historical assets,

170 A World Bank grant of US$2 million implemented by UNICEF created, among other things, an Early Child Care and Development (ECCD) network of mothers at the village level in rural and isolated communities, benefiting during its first phase more than 5,000 families. The ECCD activities involved not only child care (pre-school education, child and mother health, etc.) but also awareness-raising, initially among young mothers and subsequently among their male relatives and community members, about issues such as domestic violence and greater community participation in improving social service delivery.
one of its major assets is its university, which has traditionally played a central role in providing intellectual and technical leadership in Kosovo. The University of Pristina/Prishtine could address urban issues by building professional networks and modernizing and expanding its programs in urban planning, public and business administration, and the social sciences. Overall, interventions could either be specifically designed to meet local circumstances (see Annex V for possible interventions of this kind) or, for Kosovo-wide programs, they should be adapted to better succeed in the various subregions.

The position of women must be strengthened through girls’ education, access to productive assets, job training, and security mechanisms that are sensitive to women’s needs. With regard to education, there is a need for grants for disadvantaged girls from rural areas, given the high cost of transportation and other cultural and material impediments. With regard to productive assets, rural women, widows in particular, asked for livestock to increase the food security of their households. With regard to job training, women respondents noted the importance of proceeding incrementally in developing professional roles so as not to provoke confrontations or be ostracized by their families or communities. Women have been well accepted as teachers, health care workers, and micro-entrepreneurs. With regard to security, there is a need for mechanisms and institutions such as women-staffed police stations, where women can feel safe denouncing gender-related violence.

A strong justice system and shared local programs can foster inter-ethnic trust and cooperation. The social assessment found that despite the widespread perception of ethnic hatred, and despite the climate of fear that the Serb ethnic cleansing and the Albanian retaliation have perpetuated, there are still seeds of tolerance between the two groups, which had coexisted more peacefully at the community level before 1989. Barriers to reestablishing that coexistence have to do mainly with security concerns such as threats, beatings, killings, and arson, which continue to be used by a small minority on both sides. However, based on focus group results, it is clear that a significant percentage of Albanians view such incidents as criminal acts, and would accept the idea of coexistence provided the offenders are prosecuted.

These results imply that the way forward on the issue of ethnic hatred is to establish a formal justice system, including laws, police, courts, and prisons, which would help to stabilize the society and enable it to heal without continuous violent disruptions. They also imply the need for quietly shared grassroots programs to facilitate dialogue and develop social and economic opportunities, all of which will help to reduce ethnic tensions and support the delicate process of healing. These types of low-profile interventions will be less susceptible to intimidation and violence by extremists than more visible attempts by the international community to foster reconciliation.

Minority vulnerability depends to a large degree on social exclusion, and programs are needed to address the effects, and where possible, the causes of these types of exclusion. The assessment found the most socially and economically vulnerable group in Kosovo to be the remaining Roma populations. The Serbs are also socially vulnerable due to the high degree of physical segregation they suffer; however, they are currently less economically vulnerable. The remaining minorities, Muslim Slavs and Turks, are relatively less excluded, well educated, and entrepreneurial. More importantly, they are not perceived as having been directly involved in the recent conflict.

These findings have several policy implications: (i) sectoral investments, ranging from education to health to infrastructure to agriculture, could ensure that minorities are included; (ii) projects in agriculture, community development and private sector development could have specific components that address the needs of minority groups; (iii) specific community-driven interventions for the Roma, Serb, Muslim Slav, and Gorani populations could be designed with strong participatory elements. Regarding the Gorani, in particular, the donor community could support local efforts to increase cross-border cooperation between Gorani villages in Kosovo and Albania.
The consideration of minority needs in policy, program, and project design will have important demonstrative effects. This could be particularly helpful for keeping these populations in Kosovo, and for creating a more receptive environment for returning refugees, while conditions will allow for return.

**More needs to be done to understand the economic and social vulnerability of minorities.** The Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) currently being implemented by the Bank will provide quantitative information on the Serb population, but the same cannot be done for the other minorities (Muslim Slavs, Romas, and Turks), given their small numbers and the high cost of sampling. A qualitative assessment of poverty recently undertaken by an interagency group on poverty does include Serb, Muslim Slav, and Roma populations. The results of this assessment are currently being finalized. The conclusions from this assessment and the preliminary findings of the qualitative poverty assessment indicate that poverty issues are indeed very different for minority populations and may not become apparent when they are assessed as part of a larger quantitative or qualitative assessment. Yet, this type of analysis is crucial to understanding social and economic exclusion, which will continue to be a central issue in socioeconomic development and reconciliation in Kosovo.

**Private sector development should address the requirements of local small and micro entrepreneurs.** Private sector development projects should take note of the needs expressed by male respondents throughout the five assessment sites for improved access to credit, and for training in market-related issues such as business planning and marketing strategies. Since family businesses have traditionally been stronger in Kosovo than in neighboring Balkan countries, and been the backbone of the Kosovar economy, strengthening local entrepreneurial potential is the best way to increase family security; job creation, in particular for youth; and general economic growth. Although a number of organizations are already involved in this area, more needs to be done to address the demand for such activities.

**The diaspora community is an important resource for investment and skills transfer, but incentives for their return are needed.** In order to make productive use of the financial and entrepreneurial resources of the diaspora, there is a need to create an enabling environment and incentives for Kosovar entrepreneurs and migrants still living abroad to invest in Kosovo. In particular, the following recommendations emerge from the assessment:
• Strengthen commercial banks in Kosovo to handle remittance flows.
• Establish small-scale political risk insurance for business owners.
• Provide more start-up micro/small business credits.
• Establish housing and mortgage credit facility.
• Facilitate “look and see” visits to Kosovo, so migrants can assess local conditions and make preparations for return.
• Create an enabling environment for foreign private sector investment in Kosovo, including international support for the foreign private sector.

The long-term trend toward a reduction in remittances needs consideration. With improving conditions in Kosovo, host governments are sending back increasing numbers of Kosovar Albanians, including those who have resided in Switzerland for almost a decade. This will result in a reduction in the amount of remittances from abroad, which have helped to support families, and indeed Kosovo as a whole, for many years. Also, many Kosovar Albanians who have lived in Germany and Switzerland for 20 to 30 years appear to have exhausted considerable personal resources during the recent conflict, e.g., many mortgaged their homes and properties to send money back to Kosovo. The Bank and the international donor community will need to take this key factor into account in formulating its assistance programs for Kosovo.

There is a need for a more gradual flow of returnees. Mass returns will place considerable stress on socioeconomic infrastructure in Kosovo. Host governments and international organizations should do more to rebuild socioeconomic infrastructure in advance of returns. Also, more needs to be done to ensure that returnees can go back to their towns of origin, thereby lessening the burden on such urban centers as Pristina/Prishtine. UNMIK, UNHCR, and other international organizations have noted the need for a more gradual flow of returnees. The situation for returnees from Germany is more critical because the government also wants the return of 180,000 Kosovar Albanians who came to Germany before the recent conflict.

Special programs for refugee return should be considered. The assessment found the need for programs to assist the refugees, illegal immigrants, and young men in returning to Kosovo, and to provide them with education, training, and other tangible resources. There will also be a need for increased social services (counseling and leisure activities for children and youth), and a need to compensate the loss of remittance income (training and employment).

Host governments have developed some innovative policies and programs for Kosovar Albanian returnees. Kosovar Albanians, NGOs, and international organizations all agreed on the need for more nuanced host government policies with respect to returnees, that take individual and family circumstances into account. Conditions in Kosovo must also be properly evaluated before mass returns take place. The assessment found a number of positive lessons from the experience of hosting governments, including:

• Linkage of humanitarian and development aid to returnee movements.
• Host government-supported vocational training, education programs, and internships for returnees.
• Job bourse for prospective returnees, whereby Kosovars living in Europe can compete for job openings in Kosovo.
• Modular/shelter kits for returnees.
ANNEX I

METHODOLOGY

Context, Rationale, and Research Questions

Societal institutions normally change through evolution, so the temporal dimension of their assessment uncovers the degree of continuity and change over certain period of time. But there are times when institutions change by abrupt transformation, in which case the assessment has to contend with a high degree of discontinuity with the past. This is the case in Kosovo, where transformation of its formal institutions is being brought about by the international community at the same time that civil society is undergoing post-conflict change. This context introduces the historical dimension into the assessment.

In historical terms, the almost decade-long experience of Serb-controlled and centrally managed local institutions represented a break with the previous period of local autonomy in Kosovo. Among the majority Albanian population, this experience produced an alternative system in which the parallel-informal institutions—that is, the political and administrative leadership acknowledged only by the Kosovar Albanians—and the civil society informal institutions—that is, the associations and groups of the Kosovar Albanians—were intertwined. Then, the traumatic events of the 1998-99 conflict, produced a second major institutional break, as well as disruptive cleavages in Kosovo’s civil society, leaving the international community largely responsible for reconstructing both.

In this context, the social and institutional assessment aims to be an exploratory and operational study that reaches back to investigate the pre-conflict socio-economic conditions and the forms and functions of social organization and local institutions in Kosovo. It then proceeds to assess them as they changed as a result of the conflict. At the same time, the study identifies post-conflict socioeconomic opportunities and constraints, and the emerging forms and functions of social organisations and institutions in Kosovo, and evaluates their present and future significance.

Two sets of research questions inform the assessment. To underline the context of deep and abrupt transformation in Kosovo, the questions are formulated as dichotomies representing the extremes of a spectrum of changes that may have occurred in the social and local institutional settings, respectively.

In the social setting, the assessment looked at the:

- resilience or breakdown of traditional kinship structures and functions;
- permanent or temporary emergence of vulnerable groups;
- urban or rural locations for new life opportunities;
- reconciliation or conflict among majority and minorities;

---

1 This period coincided with the fall of the Berlin wall, the collapse of the socialist economies in Eastern Europe, and the beginning of the disintegration of Yugoslavia.
disappearance or adaptation of traditional community-based\textsuperscript{2} groups;
emergence of or challenge from new community based groups;
funding or capacity building of community groups by external agencies and NGOs;

In the local institutional setting, the assessment looked at the:

partial retention or disappearance of the pre-conflict centralized system;
transformation or disappearance of the parallel institutional system;
significance or irrelevance of role and functions of the interim institutional system;
interaction or separation between the interim institutional system and informal societal institutions;
cooperation or conflict among political parties over local institutions and resources.

Research Design

For this exploratory study, the need was to formulate an inclusive research design that would: (i) capture the temporal and spatial dimensions centered on the events of the war; (ii) incorporate appropriate flexibility, particularly for the field work, in light of the probable constraining circumstances to be encountered; (iii) use the strengths of multiple methods, so the reliability of the findings would increase through their convergence; and (iv) cover the broad scope of the social and institutional assessment, spanning numerous and overlapping issues. The design was prepared in Washington and finalized during a testing phase in Kosovo in early March 2000.

Site Selection

Temporally, at the center was the conflict. Spatially, the selection process began with the mapping of the social cleavages created or aggravated by the conflict to a greater or lesser degree throughout Kosovo. The cumulative proxii indicator for the regional economies was their external orientation. A key consequence of the conflict, the presence of the international community, was included, as well as the information gathered during the pretest phase on the implementation of the interim administrative system. This led to a final set of selection criteria and the choice of five sites, once available manpower and time were factored in, with each site comprising an urban and a rural location, for a total of ten geographic locations. When the majority Serb area of Kosovska Mitrovica/Mitrovica became inaccessible, Malisevo/Malisheve was selected to take a closer look at the informal institutions.

Issue Selection

Document-based investigations of the disruption caused to people’s lives by the conflict and its aftermath led to the selection of three types of issues. First, household-centered issues such as livelihood strategies, shelter and displacement, and education. Second, group-centered

\textsuperscript{2} The term community is used throughout the report in its multiple meanings, covering: (i) community of place; e.g., neighbourhood or village; (ii) community of identity; e.g., ethnicity or religion; and (iii) community of interest; e.g., gender or charity.
issues such as the emergence of vulnerable groups of people and the new plight of minorities. Third, local institution-centered issues such as the composition and functionality of municipal administrations, the nature and role of village councils, and the viability of civil society groups expressing society’s social capital.

**Respondent Selection**

Given the broad range of household-centered issues, four types of respondents were identified, to report on the issues from different perspectives: adult males, adult females, young males, and young females. For the group-centered issues, four types of vulnerable groups (IDPs, war widows, returnees, traumatized children), and four types of minorities (Serbs, Roma and Ashkaelia, Turks, and Muslim Slavs) were identified. To articulate the local institutional issues, interviews were planned with two sets of respondents: UN and Kosovar members of the JIAS at both the regional and municipal levels; and a spectrum of representatives of civil society organizations, ranging from religious to business leaders and from charities to village councils and neighborhood organizations. In addition to specifically addressing their own set of issues, the various respondents were also asked their views on the other two sets of issues (see Annex II). Vulnerable group interviews were conducted at sites where the groups are present in large numbers.

**Studies Comprising the Social and Institutional Assessment**

The inclusive design has produced a research endeavor that benefits from the use of multiple methods, both qualitative and quantitative. Ultimately, the assessment comprises eight contributing studies.

- **Document and literature reviews.** Extensive review and assessment of the numerous documents produced by international agencies, including the World Bank, and of the substantial academic literature.
- **Pre and post-conflict macro-social analysis.** Analysis of demographic and socioeconomic change trends and of population spatial movements, making use of the 1991 census and of recent household surveys.
- **Diaspora study.** Field investigation of the impact of the Kosovar diaspora in Switzerland and Germany on the institutions and livelihoods of people in Kosovo.
- **Focus group interviews.** Purposely constructed sample of taped group interviews across the five sites, using a semi-structured discussion guide, with each age and gender-differentiated group or issue-centered group ranging from five to eight participants.
- **Structured interviews on trust and participation.** Close-ended questionnaires individually filled out by participants in the age and gender-differentiated focus groups.
- **Institutional interviews.** Purposely constructed sample of personal, open-ended interviews with interim administration officials at the regional and municipal levels, and with observers from international agencies.
- **Civil society and informal institution interviews.** Purposely constructed sample of personal, open-ended interviews with representatives of civil society organizations
and of informal institutions, including parallel institutions, as in Malisevo/Malisheve.

- Case studies of social capital. In-depth investigation of the presence, impact, and prospects of civil society organizations in two cities, Prizren and Pec/Peja.

Field Work and Analysis

Aside from the diaspora study in Switzerland and Germany, the field work took place in Kosovo under severe logistical and security conditions, as well as stringent time constraints, mainly during March and April 2000. Pre-testing of interview materials and finalizing of site and respondent choices occurred first. Security considerations prevented the pre-testing team from including majority Serb-inhabited Kosovska Mitrovica/Mitrovice among the five chosen sites. The decision was then made to select Malisevo/Malisheve, a site unofficially operating as a municipality through informal institutions.

In spite of the constraints, the final fieldwork produced most of what the research design had called for. A total of 40 age and gender-differentiated focus group interviews was carried out, involving 256 participants. Another 16 focus group interviews with vulnerable group respondents were also carried out, involving a total of 29 participants. Institutional interviews included 26 with JIAS officials, 27 with civil society representatives, and 9 with representatives of informal institutions. Finally, the diaspora interviews included 116 with host government officials, 9 with representatives of international organizations, 21 with migration experts, and 25 with community, business and organizational leaders. The team also conducted 13 focus group interviews with migrants, with three focusing on youth, women and those active in the private sector.

The qualitative analysis of open-ended personal interviews, importance rankings of issues and livelihood strategies, oral history accounts, and systematization of documentary information were integrated with the statistical analysis of census and household survey data and scores from the trust and participation interview data to produce the final report.
### Site³ and Location⁴ Selection Matrix for Household-Centered Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sites and locations (urban and rural)</th>
<th>Site and Location Selection Criteria</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>War damage (shelter)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pristina/Prishtine 1. Pristina/Prishtine 2. Llukare</td>
<td>Slight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pec/Peja 1. Pec/Peja 2. Rugova</td>
<td>Severe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prizren 1. Prizren 2. Pirane</td>
<td>Slight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malisevo/Malisheve 1. Malisevo/Malisheve 2. Dragobil</td>
<td>Severe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

³ A site is the subregional unit of analysis that includes both urban and rural locations.
⁴ A location is the specific place where field work was conducted.
### Respondent Selection Criteria for Household-Centered Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent</th>
<th>Respondent Selection Criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adult men (over 25 years of age)</td>
<td>Pensioner, unemployed, employed (day laborer, shop/restaurant employee, self-employed, professional, government employee, international community employee)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult women (over 25 years of age)</td>
<td>Pensioner, homemaker, unemployed, employed (shop/restaurant employee, self-employed, professional, government employee, international community employee)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young men (15-25 years of age)</td>
<td>Student (high school and university), primary education only, unemployed, employed (local and international), married, single</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young women (15-25 years of age)</td>
<td>Student (high school and university), primary education only, unemployed, employed (local and international), married, single</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Interviews for Group-Centered Issues

- Internally displaced persons (IDPs)
- War widows
- Returnees
- Serbs
- Romas
- Turks
- Muslim Slavs

Interviews for Institution-Centered Issues

- JIAS territorial and regional interviews
- JIAS municipal interviews
- Parallel/civil society interviews
- Informal/neighborhood groups interviews

Case Studies

- Bonding social capital and civil society in Pec/Peja
- Bridging social capital and the co-management system in Prizren
ANNEX IIA

LOCAL INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENT
(Interview Guide)

Explanation of “Social and Institutional Assessment.”

This part, Local Institutional Assessment, has a twofold focus:

- The formal co-management and interim local government system that is now being implemented (UNMIK and municipalities).
- The interaction between co-management and informal civil society networks (e.g., remnants of parallel system(s) and/or new parallel systems and groups).

The overall context is the impact of the war on civil society and its formal and informal local institutions.

Profile/status (implementation of the co-management system)

In this region/municipality, what is the status of the co-management and interim local government system?

Probes:

- degree to which co-management is in place.
- if system is still incomplete (e.g., people not appointed), why? Specific reasons for the delay; e.g., political power struggle among party groups.
- when is system likely to be completely in place?

Cooperation (the co-management approach implies the capacity of the various institutional actors to cooperate)

With reference to these first few months, how cooperative does the co-management system appear to be in this region/municipality?

Probes:

- specific examples of cooperation.
- specific examples of conflict over turf.
- examples of how specific individuals make/do not make a difference.

Efficiency (local institutions, like any others, have to produce results within the constraints of available resources)

How efficient is the co-management system in this region/municipality with regard to the policy issues on which our study focuses: loss of housing and the consequent displacement, loss of education, and security risks?
Probes:
- degree of technical capacity of departments (regional/municipal).
- degree of inputs from other organizations (e.g., NGOs, donors, technical assistance exchanges).
- selection of priorities: which ones?

Effectiveness (relevance to people)

To what extent does the co-management system of local government in this region/municipality connect with formal and informal networks within civil society?

Probes:
- interaction with remnants of the parallel system(s). Give specific examples.
- promotion of new initiatives (in partnership). Give examples of proposed projects.
- illegal/unacceptable behavior. In which cases? Give specific examples (e.g., illegal construction, takeover of public land, patronage).

Legitimacy (is the co-management system representative of different people?)

How well does the co-management system in this region/municipality represent all residents, including the minorities?

Probes:
- differentiate across minorities, as appropriate.
- constraints to incorporating minorities.
- role of UNMIK.

Prospects (looking at the short-term future)

What is likely to happen to co-management within a year?

Probes:
- will the co-management system be relevant/irrelevant?
- be effective/ineffective?
- be overtaken by political developments/stabilize?
- Why?
- What would you like to see happen to local government institutions in the next two years?
Introduce yourself (World Bank staff/consultant).

**Thanking for participation**

We are trying to learn about the social conditions of people’s lives in Kosovo today, after the war. We would like to understand how normal people (in contrast to “politicians”) perceive the current situation, and the future, for themselves and their family, and for Kosovo. For this reason, we are talking to people all over Kosovo—men and women, adults and youth, teachers, businessmen, and local officials.

We would like to have a group discussion on various aspects of how you and your family manage after the war. We would like to have everyone participate in the discussion because we feel that every one of you has something different and important to contribute.

We assure you that your identity will not be disclosed as the report will only present the general findings.

We will be happy to answer any question you may have now or during our discussion.

We would like to thank you for your contribution to this work. Please kindly introduce yourself so that we can get to know each other.

1. **Livelihood Strategies**
   1a. What is your family or household living from at the moment?
      - Who lives together in your family/in your house?
      - Who is related as kin, and who is not?
        (For those who have “married in,” where do they come from?)
      - Who in your family is responsible for decisionmaking, such as distribution of income?

   **Probes: formal and informal contributions to family support**
      - what do you and your family live from?:
        - your own contribution
        - your spouses’ contribution
        - help from your grown children (how?)
        - help from your relatives in Kosovo (how?)
        - help from relatives who live in other countries (how?)
        - help from your friends (how?)
        - help from your neighbors (how?)
        - barter/informal exchanges/non-monetary mutual support (what type?)
        - do you have a garden, fields, animals? To what extend do you live from your own agricultural production?
        - humanitarian assistance (from whom and what type?)
1b. What did your family or household live from before the war?

1c. How did the composition of your family differ in comparison to now?

**Probes: formal and informal contributions to family support**

- your own contribution
- your spouses’ contribution
- help from your grown children (how?)
- who was responsible for decisionmaking, such as distribution family?
- help from your relatives in Kosovo (how?)
- help from relatives who live in other countries (how?)
- help from your friends (how?)
- help from your neighbors (how?)
- barter/informal exchanges/non-monetary mutual support (what type?)
- to what extent did you live from your own agricultural production or humanitarian assistance (from whom and what type?)


2a. Over the last two years, has your family lived in the same house/apartment?

**Probes: If answer is yes**

- how big is your house (haw many floors, rooms)?
- how many generations/nuclear families, live in this house, and where?
- how long did it take you to build your house?
- was there plans to extend your house, or space left for future generations?

**Probes: If answer is no**

- why? What happened?
- did anyone assist you in resolving this situation? Who and how? (explain type of assistance)
- were you satisfied with how this situation was resolved?

2b. Over the last two years, have most of your neighbors/members of your community lived in the same house/apartment? Who has been forced out and who has not?

**Probes: If answer is no**

- why? What happened?
- did anyone assist them in resolving this situation? Who and how? (explain type of assistance)
- were you satisfied with how this situation was resolved?

2c. Displacement situation: did you stay with your family when you had to leave?

3. **Security (justice)**

I would like to ask you about security, this being a subject particularly important to women and their children.
3a. Do you feel that your family is safe today?

**Probes:**
- at home
- in the neighborhood
- other areas of the village/town/city
- ethnic enclaves (protective enclaves)
- presence of UCK/TMK
- presence of international forces/police
- presence of Albanian police
- Serbs: protection from former Albanian friends?
- did you lose animals or acres?
- in case of problems, are there still people you can turn to who were part of the parallel system?

3a. Are there still physical dangers that you and your family have to be aware of?

**Probes:**
- mine fields/mines
- unexploded bombs
- presence of UCK/TMK
- have you come across criminality?

3b. What precautions, if any, do you/your family take to feel safer?

**Probes:**
- stay home after dark
- stay on the main roads
- keep children at home/out of school
- don’t travel alone in buses/cars

3c. If you/your family were to be harmed, whom would you ask for help? (Whom do you trust for support in case there is a problem?)

**Probes:**
- family members
- friends and neighbors
- civilian police
- KFOR
- UCK/TMK
- others

4. Education

4a. Are you/members of your family currently in school (primary, secondary and tertiary)?
4b. What are the main problems with schools/universities today?

*Probes:*
- safety
- travel and distance
- cost
- curriculum does not prepare for job market
- changing of subjects over the long term
- recognition of diplomas/satisfying certificates
- teachers and power/dependency (favors)
- teacher drain
- inadequate facility

4c. How are these problems different from the ones that existed before the war?

5. **Vulnerable People/Groups**

5a. Who in your village are the worst off?
Who are the most socially worst off people in Kosovo today?

*Probes:*
- IDPs (internally displaced persons); why?
- rural migrants (to urban areas)
- those without family members outside Kosovo
- returnees (repatriated from EU countries)
- war widows
- pensioners
- orphans
- minorities (Romas)
- young women without family support
- others

6. **Priority Needs**

6a. What are the three main needs facing you and your family today?

*Probes:*
- adequate income
- adequate and affordable shelter
- speedy assistance or credits in repairing windows, roofs, etc.
- security
- quality education
- adequate and affordable healthcare
- job opportunities for youth
- others

6b. What are the three main community needs facing your village/town/city today?
Probes:
- employment opportunities
- housing
- security
- education
- healthcare
- job opportunities for young women
- physical infrastructure (roads, utilities, etc.)
- others

7. Prospects (Next Three Years)
   
   7a. Where do you hope you and your family will be three years from now?
   
   7b. How do you see the conditions of your village/town/city change three years from now? Please indicate three main areas of change.
   
   7c. Who will be the promoters of such change?
   
   7d. How do you see the relations between different ethnic groups in Kosovo in the near and long-term future?

8. Institutional Evaluation
   
   8a. Have you or are you working for an international association?
   
   8b. Do you feel understood by people who come to ask you about your needs?
   
   8c. Do you see aid being distributed wrongly? What goes wrong and why?

   In closing, we would like to ask you to fill in two very brief forms concerning your trust in local institutions and participation in local associations.
DIASPORA ASSESSMENT
(Group Discussion Guide)

The large Kosovar Albanian diaspora community living in Germany and Switzerland has played and will continue to play a key role in the current and future economic, social and political development of Kosovo. As such, the diaspora study will form an important part of the forthcoming World Bank Social Assessment for Kosovo.

General Questions

1. What impact has the conflict had on you and your socioeconomic status, housing, and living conditions?
2. Do you want to stay in the host country or return to Kosovo? Why?
3. What are the constraints and incentives to staying in the host country versus returning to Kosovo?
4. What conditions/incentives are necessary for return to Kosovo?
5. What are your main concerns and problems?
6. What are the causes and impacts of these concerns and problems?
7. What are your coping strategies for dealing with the current situation?
8. What kinds of contributions have made to Kosovo (financial, goods, services)?
9. How have you made these contributions (formal, informal means, organizational)?
10. How is the community organized?
11. What linkages exist between “old” versus “new” diaspora communities and individuals?
12. What generational/attitudinal differences exist between the older and newer diaspora communities?
13. What linkages are there between the Kosovar and other diaspora communities; e.g., Turks, Muslim Slavs, etc?
14. Have host government refugee/immigrant organizations been helpful to the community? In what ways?
15. Where are you from in Kosovo (city/village/municipality)?
16. Where are you sending remittances? Through whom? How?
17. Are you still making voluntary contributions (in light of fact that UNMIK is now supporting local institutions)? If so, where are they going? To which political groups? To which place in Kosovo? To which sector?

Questions for Women

1. What are your main concerns and problems?
2. What are the causes and impacts of these concerns and problems?
3. What are your main roles and responsibilities?
4. How is your household organized? How would you characterize the family composition? What are the household dynamics and relations?
5. What are your occupations and skills?
6. How has your role and the family structure changed as a result of the conflict?
7. What access do you have to community resources?
8. Are there many women/single-headed households?
9. Who are the vulnerable women and children in the community?
Questions for Youth

1. What are your main roles and responsibilities?
2. What kind of education are you receiving?
3. What are your main concerns and problems?
4. What kinds of challenges and problems do you face in the host country?
5. What access do you have to community resources?
6. How has your role and the family structure changed as a result of the conflict?
7. Have youth become involved in illegal activities? (ask German and Swiss authorities)

Questions for Private Sector/Entrepreneurs

1. Do you have trade and investment activities with Kosovo?
2. What are the constraints and opportunities for trade and investment with Kosovo?
3. Which sectors are the diaspora most active in?
4. Would you be willing to return to Kosovo for a specific period of time to contribute your expertise?
5. How has the private sector contributed to Kosovo (e.g., two fundraising conferences held to raise money for Kosovo among diaspora business people)?
6. What is the average size and capitalization of Kosovar diaspora firms?
7. What role do you see the diaspora business sector playing the reconstruction of Kosovo?
8. What kinds of information have you received about donor-funded programs and opportunities to bid on reconstruction projects in Kosovo?
9. Would they be interested in contributing to World Bank-funded projects; e.g., community development, cultural heritage, etc.?
How much do you trust the following local institutions? *(Mark one box per line.)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 (not active)</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4 (very active)</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>0 (not applicable)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Street group</td>
<td>___</td>
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<td>___</td>
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<td>___</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Bashkesia lokale</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Town/village council</td>
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<td>4. Municipal administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Political parties</td>
<td>___</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**FORM B: PARTICIPATION IN ASSOCIATIONS**  
*(Social Assessment)*

How active are you in the following local associations? *(Mark one box per line.)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 (not active)</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4 (very active)</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>0 (not applicable)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Educational</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>___</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>___</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Recreational</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>___</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>___</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>___</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>___</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Charitable</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>___</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Work-related</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>___</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Table 1. Vulnerability of those without family, particularly without men

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of vulnerability</th>
<th>Specification</th>
<th>Number and character of groups mentioning this specification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VERY HIGH</td>
<td>Orphans, war orphans, semi-orphans (without fathers and brothers)</td>
<td>23 groups, any character</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>Those who lost members of their family during the war</td>
<td>9 group rural and 3 groups urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDIUM HIGH</td>
<td>War widows</td>
<td>9 groups, any</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
<td>Families that lost their men</td>
<td>6 groups, any</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDIUM LOW</td>
<td>Those, particularly women, with relatives imprisoned in Serbia</td>
<td>5 groups, rural dominated, particularly from the village of Llukar, where such a case exists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Young women without family, particularly male support</td>
<td>2 groups, urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Widows with little children</td>
<td>2 groups, urban and rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Those with only one man in the family</td>
<td>1 group, urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Widows who had to return to their natal family and leave their children with their in-laws</td>
<td>1 group, rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Widows who lost all family, including parents and children</td>
<td>1 group, urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Widows who have only daughters left</td>
<td>1 group, rural young men</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. Vulnerability of the elderly

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of vulnerability</th>
<th>Attributes</th>
<th>Number and character of groups mentioning these attributes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VERY HIGH</td>
<td>Elderly</td>
<td>23 groups, any</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>Elderly unable to work</td>
<td>12 groups, any</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
<td>Elderly without family, children, or other source of security</td>
<td>6 groups, urban; 1 rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Elderly unable to access their pension</td>
<td>3 groups, urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Elderly in need of medical care</td>
<td>1 group, urban</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Vulnerability of those who lost shelter and property

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of vulnerability</th>
<th>Attributes</th>
<th>Number and character of groups mentioning these attributes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VERY HIGH</td>
<td>Those who lost their house</td>
<td>22 groups, any</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDIUM HIGH</td>
<td>IDPs (loss of house leading to displacement)</td>
<td>8 groups, urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Those in rural areas</td>
<td>1 group, urban young women</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 4. Vulnerability of the unemployed and poor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of vulnerability</th>
<th>Attributes</th>
<th>Number and character of groups mentioning these attributes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>The unemployed and poor</td>
<td>17 groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Long-term unemployed and poor</td>
<td>3 groups, urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Those who depend entirely on humanitarian aid, in need of food aid</td>
<td>2 groups, rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Those who lost working equipment or whose means of production (sheep, land) were destroyed</td>
<td>2 groups, rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>The new poor, depending on social assistance</td>
<td>2 groups, urban and rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Those who lost income because of the conflict</td>
<td>1 group, rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Those with insufficient income, particularly teachers and farmers</td>
<td>1 group, rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Former KLA fighters at risk of becoming criminals</td>
<td>1 group, urban young men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Those who have had to changed their livelihood</td>
<td>1 group, rural young men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Villagers, disadvantaged in comparison with those living in cities (low wages)</td>
<td>1 group, urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>The very isolated, those living in the mountains</td>
<td>1 group, rural</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 5. Vulnerability of the handicapped, disabled, and war invalids

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of vulnerability</th>
<th>Attributes</th>
<th>Number and character of groups mentioning these attributes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>Handicapped and invalids</td>
<td>15 groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Particularly the blind</td>
<td>1 group, urban women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Particularly physically or mentally handicapped children, and those with learning disabilities</td>
<td>1 group, urban women</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 6. Vulnerability of women

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of vulnerability</th>
<th>Attributes</th>
<th>Number and character of groups mentioning these attributes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>6 groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Women and girls limited to the house</td>
<td>2 groups, rural women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Young women in danger of being kidnapped</td>
<td>1 group, urban young men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Women discriminated in the employment market</td>
<td>2 group, rural women and urban women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Women who work only in the household but have no ovens, washing machines, etc.</td>
<td>1 group, rural women</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7. Vulnerability of youth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of vulnerability</th>
<th>Attributes</th>
<th>Number and character of groups mentioning these attributes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>5 groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>3 groups, rural women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Incomplete education</td>
<td>2 groups, rural women; 1 group, urban women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Disoriented youth, at risk of criminality</td>
<td>1 group, urban women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Limited mobility</td>
<td>1 group, rural women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Unable to marry due to unemployment</td>
<td>1 group, rural women</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8. Vulnerability of the ill, traumatized, or other

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of vulnerability</th>
<th>Attributes</th>
<th>Number and character of groups mentioning these attributes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Traumatized</td>
<td>2 groups, urban women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Sick</td>
<td>1 group, rural young women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Alcoholic</td>
<td>1 group, rural men</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9. Priority needs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority needs</th>
<th>Area of reference (Kosovo, community, family, individual)</th>
<th>Percentage/Number of groups (out of 40)</th>
<th>Character of respondent groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employment, job opportunities</td>
<td>Family, community, Kosovo</td>
<td>82.5% (33 groups)</td>
<td>Equally urban and rural groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelter, construction support</td>
<td>Community, Kosovo</td>
<td>57.5% (23 groups)</td>
<td>Equally urban and rural; rural respondents concerned exclusively with community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment, credits, banks</td>
<td>Family</td>
<td>50.0% (20 groups)</td>
<td>Predominantly male groups, entrepreneurial ideas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social services, health care</td>
<td>Kosovo, community, family</td>
<td>45.0% (18 groups)</td>
<td>Mixed, many rural women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Kosovo, community</td>
<td>40.0% (16 groups)</td>
<td>Predominantly male groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure (roads and communication)</td>
<td>Community</td>
<td>37.5% (15 groups)</td>
<td>Predominantly rural groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adequate income</td>
<td>Kosovo, family</td>
<td>27.5% (11 groups)</td>
<td>Predominantly male groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education, training courses</td>
<td>Kosovo, individual</td>
<td>25.0% (10 groups)</td>
<td>For Kosovo, predominantly male groups; for individuals, 4 young women’s groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>Community, family</td>
<td>17.5% (7 groups)</td>
<td>Women’s groups only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrigation, sanitation</td>
<td>Community</td>
<td>7.5% (5 groups)</td>
<td>Rural groups only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Community</td>
<td>10.0% (4 groups)</td>
<td>Women’s groups only (3 urban/1 rural)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>Community, Individual</td>
<td>Diverse personal responses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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## ENTREPRENEURIAL IDEAS

### Box 1. Entrepreneurial ideas of Kosovar Albanians

- **Llukar.** Build a small fruit harvesting and processing factory for products such as hazelnuts, mushrooms, cranberries, with the additional benefit of keeping youth off the streets by engaging them in harvesting during the summer.
- **Llukar.** Build a textile factory to employ girls.
- **Llukar.** Expand an existing chicken farm to 240 chickens, yielding 190 eggs per day; employment of 4 persons; credit need approximately DM 78,000, to be repaid with interest in 3 to 5 years.
- **Prizren.** Build a yeast factory employing 50 to 100 people. Yeast is currently entirely imported into Kosovo, and 12 tons per week are consumed in Prizren alone; credit need approximately DM 200,000.
- **Pirane.** Build a factory to process dairy products; milk and yogurt are now entirely imported from Belgrade and FYR Macedonia; “if there were a factory to produce dairy products, we could all sell our milk to it, and it would create work.”
- **Pirane.** Set up a construction business, including wood processing for window and door construction; one villager asked an agency for a DM 40,000 credit but was refused because his calculations were considered to be overestimated.
- **Malishevo.** Build a factory producing metal strengthening mesh, to employ 20 people; the DM 120,000 credit would be returned within 2 years at 12 percent interest.
- **Rugova mountains.** Develop tourism and ecological projects.
- **Gjilane.** Update technology in textile and metals factories; increase capacity in cigarette factory.
- **Cernice.** Obtain short-term credits to replace stolen agricultural machinery, which farmers would share; also credits to buy sheep and goats, seeds, and fertilizer; and to build dairy-processing facilities and nail making factory (given current demand for construction materials; farmers do not want long-term debts).

### Box 2. Entrepreneurial ideas of Kosovar Muslim Slavs

- Mountain fruits and herb collection, particularly exploitation of healing plants in the ecologically pure mountain areas of southern Kosovo inhabited by Muslim Slavs. One concrete business idea involves a DM 400,000 credit to employ 700 people, and up to 1,000 during collection time, with an anticipated profit of DM 1 million after the first year. An application for credit has already been turned in to UNMIK through the Prizren administrative board.
- Development of tourism.
- Development of bee keeping and honey production.
- Renewal of pastoral and agricultural economy, with development of stock breeding (cattle) and meat production.
POSSIBLE INTERVENTIONS IN THE FIVE STUDY SITES

Prizren

• Urban development and community-based historical and cultural conservation. Projects to preserve the cultural heritage of the city, clean the river, improve basic traffic infrastructure, expand the number and mix of crafts, strengthen commercial businesses and community associations, increase hotel capacity, and halt illegal construction, building on the role of the Chamber of Commerce and professional and women’s associations.

• Craftsmanship pilot projects. Skill-targeted projects to recover lost craftsmanship in selected artisan sectors and invest in their business expansion.

• Minority-oriented pilot projects. Minority-targeted projects to promote entrepreneurial activities of Gorani, Turks, and Muslim Slavs in areas where each group is present in significant numbers, with particular emphasis on youth.

• Women-oriented pilot projects. Pilots to support the promising entrepreneurial and professional role of women in the city and at rural sites.

Pec/Peja

• Old market area development program. An integrated development program entailing the reconstruction of the destroyed market area, inclusive of infrastructure and services, and the redesigning of the surrounding residential community, with the participation of different groups in the planning process.

• Neighborhood planning. Use bashkesia lokale as models for pilot projects in Pec/Peja and in villages for the delivery of services and the redesign of neighborhood space.

• Local philanthropist-promoted pilot projects. Pilot projects that build on the philanthropy of wealthy individuals and families, leading to the development of bridging social capital.

• Minority-oriented pilot projects. Targeted projects in villages and neighborhoods where minorities are concentrated.

Pristina/Prishtine

• The engaged urban university program. Build communication and professional networks in the capital city to ameliorate the city’s problems by catalyzing effective municipal administration and modernizing and expanding the University of Pristina/Prishtine, including the addition of policy-oriented professional degrees in urban planning, public administration, small business development, and social sciences. Creation of connections with foreign universities that have adopted a similar model.

• Minority-oriented pilot projects. Targeted projects in neighborhoods and villages where minorities are concentrated.
\textit{Gjlan}

- \textbf{Minority-oriented pilot projects.} Pilot projects targeted to the Serb minority to develop market and other commercial services within their enclaves, to reduce their isolation and economic dependency.

- \textbf{Sectoral projects in education.} Projects that ensure access to education for minorities and facilitate dialogue through shared facilities, sports events, and internet exchanges.

\textit{Malisevo/Malisheve}

- \textbf{Young women-oriented pilot projects.} Targeted projects to improve opportunities for young women at risk of being denied education, building on the commitment of the local women’s associations.

- \textbf{Widows-oriented pilot projects.} Targeted projects to develop income-generating skills of widows, who are present in sizeable numbers at this rural site.
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