54681 No. xxx / October 2009 No. 120 / August 2009 CLIMATE POLICY PROCESSES, LOCAL INSTITUTIONS, AND ADAPTATION ACTIONS: MECHANISMS OF TRANSLATION AND INFLUENCE This paper focuses on the experience of the national-level adaptation planning efforts and the lessons that can be derived for more effective adaptation from an examination of local governance of development and natural resources. After examining national level adaptation plans, particularly the NAPAs, the paper analyzes the range of institutional instruments and relationships visible in contemporary decentralization reforms. The analysis derives four important lessons for adaptation planning, with special attention to the articulation between local and national level adaptation processes. The paper underlines a) the diversity of local institutions and b) adaptation strategies, and identifies factors that promote c) greater accountability and d) greater equity in national/local relationships. 1. Introduction conversations have drawn upon the fine-grained scholarly work on adaptation. Over the past few years, research on climate change has made clear the lasting impact of ongoing climate shifts One explanation for this gap may be attributed, of course, and the need for greater attention to adaptation to climate to the two different worlds in which policy and scholarly change (O'Neil and Oppenheimer 2002). Greenhouse gas worlds are alleged to exist (Lomas 2000). But part of the emissions, particularly for carbon dioxide, will lead to reason likely also lies in the fact that existing writings on climate change that will be "largely irreversible 1000 years climate adaptation have not adequately emphasized the after emissions stop" (Friedlingstein and Solomon 2005, need to synthesize, compare, and frame available Solomon et al. 2009: 1704, but see NRC 2005). The urgency empirical knowledge about adaptation in ways that of preparing to adapt to the effects of committed climate appeal to policy needs. change has led to an increasingly large body of work on historical and future adaptation strategies (Adger et al. On the other hand, there are many areas in which 2007). Yet, the state of the literature on adaptation remains emerging climate adaptation policies need to be informed remarkably sparse in comparison to that on climate by available empirical evidence. For example, it is unclear impacts and mitigation of emissions. that developing countries at risk from future climate impacts have developed adaptation strategies keeping Much of the available scholarly literature on adaptation implementation needs in view. Existing National has used a case-based approach to outline and describe Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) -- developed how social groups in different parts of the world have by more than forty least developed countries -- are for the adapted to climate and other environmental impacts most part a listing of prioritized adaptation needs and (Adger 1999, Batterbury and Forsythe 1999, Berkes and projects. They do not examine how to mobilize relevant Jolly 2001, Reid and Vogel 2006). The policy literature on actors and resources, how to coordinate adaptation efforts the subject, on the other hand, has focused primarily on across different agencies and sectors, how to locate the international agreements, policy initiatives, and funding planning and implementation efforts related to flows needed to facilitate adaptation. Some of this adaptation, or how to implement identified adaptation literature has also examined the national policies needed projects locally. to meet climate impacts. The existing literature has thus advanced the understanding of how people in specific This paper seeks to contribute toward efforts to translate locations have adapted to climate risks and at the same climate policy processes at the national level into local time contributed to filling the enormous gap that remains adaptation actions. There is an urgent need to understand to be met to address future climate impacts. national policies on adaptation through a local lens and Unfortunately, however, few ongoing policy through an analysis of the relationship between different levels of strategic implementation to ensure effective adaptation to climate risks. Because climate impacts vary future adaptation policies and how they can be translated locally and will continue to do so, adaptation to climate into local actions and outcomes. An examination of this impacts will also necessarily be locally variable. At the experience provides useful knowledge about how to same time, higher-level coordination of locally varying improve adaptation-related policy making. adaptive responses is also essential if adaptation efforts are to be broadly effective. Developing locally specific 2. The National Adaptation Programmes of Action strategies, articulated and coordinated through national The National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) policy mechanism, therefore, assumes paramount are the most prominent national-level effort to identify significance in the context of adaptation to climate risks priority areas in which adaptation to climate change is and impacts. The impact of the existing scholarship on necessary. As such, they are a useful basis for trying to adaptation can be enhanced through greater attention to understand how national level efforts to understand and effects that specific linkages across different levels of analyze adaptation needs have worked in practice. policy and decision making produce. Research on adaptation can thus usefully inform how different NAPAs were mandated at the 2001 Marrakesh Conference of mechanisms to articulate local actions and national the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on policies can be used to improve institutional and adaptive Climate Change (UNFCCC 2001). NAPAs highlight the capacities at the local level. highest priority areas for adaptation interventions as seen by important stakeholders in the relevant countries: these include As a first step toward such a contribution, the paper relevant government ministries and departments, non- begins with an analysis of the National Adaptation government organizations, and scholars and research Programmes of Action (NAPAs). The NAPAs have now institutions engaged with climate change. They showcase the been completed by almost all the Least Developed existing international institutional framework through which Countries (LDCs). After emphasizing the main areas in nation states are developing adaptation plans (Huq and Reid which these Programmes fall short in terms of a practical 2004; Pielke 2005). Thus the experience of the NAPAs provides strategy to connect the local and the national, the paper an opportunity to develop more general lessons so that future examines how scholarly writings on decentralization of adaptation plans can serve the interests of those most development and natural resource governance have vulnerable to climate impacts. A few other countries have also addressed similar problems in connecting the national and undertaken national adaptation planning, but these efforts the local level. Policy-oriented scholarly work on have been prompted by analyses of adaptation needs at a decentralized development and natural resource country level rather than through a cross-country perspective. governance can usefully inform future adaptation efforts Further, actual implementation of adaptation projects has been because scholars and decision-makers interested in limited or non-existent in most cases. adaptation face similar conceptual and practical challenges. The NAPAs, in identifying priority areas for adaptation interventions, have tried to consider the local nature of Conservation and development projects are typically place adaptation as well as the need for external support in specific ­ differences in characteristics of locations, effective local adaptation. The local nature of adaptation therefore, demand locally specific planning, intervention, was recognized in the very design and process of crafting management, and governance. Differences between places the NAPAs. The ministries of environment and other in terms of their resource endowments, social and agencies that developed the Programmes did so in economic features, and political and cultural consultation with many local NGOs and institutions. characteristics mean that blueprint approaches to Based on these consultations, the NAPA planners development and conservation often miss the most collectively identified nearly 321 adaptation projects important opportunities for improvements in outcomes. according to the available NAPA documents (figure 1). In Analogously, approaches that adapt interventions to arguing for the need for additional support for adaptation, territorially specific and relevant requirements have a they also recognized the likelihood that future adaptation greater likelihood of being effective. challenges are likely to overwhelm local capacities of poorer groups who might bear a significant proportion of The chief elements of the ensuing argument can be the burden of climate impacts. summarized. Major paths through which national level plans influence local development and resource Figure 1 indicates that the largest number and proportion governance pass through different kinds of local of adaptation projects are focused on sectoral issues institutions. These institutions are used by governments, related to improvements in natural resources related donors, and NGOs in a variety of locations and ways to activities such as in agriculture, forestry, water, and in the pursue development and resource governance objectives. development of infrastructure ­ close to 75% of all The experience of these institutions and their relationship identified projects. Nearly all projects identified in the with national level policies forms a fertile source to inform NAPAs focus on rural areas: despite growing urbanization less than 5% of the projects focus on urban identified through the NAPA process in the least impacts of climate change or on urban adaptation issues. developed countries shows the substantial ground that still has to be covered by national planning processes on Although a detailed analysis of the projects in the NAPA adaptation. Not only do most projects not incorporate reports cannot be carried out given the limited available local communities and institutions in adaptation plans, information about them, it is still possible to make basic little evidence of consultation and coordination between comparisons that point to the ways the policy process has the local and national level can be seen in the descriptions worked in different countries. Most NAPA projects seem of the selected high-priority projects. to be aimed at building national governments' capacities rather than strengthening the capacity of local actors and The NAPAs constitute at best a beginning of the long institutions to undertake adaptation (Osman-Elasha and process through which national level planning for Downing 2007). Figure 1b shows that more than 85% of all adaptation will begin to be put into place and linked to priority projects as identified by the NAPAs pay little to local adaptation processes. In light of the early stage of no attention to local institutions. national and international planning on adaptation, it is critical to take into account two major lessons of our Figure 1: NAPA projects and their distribution analysis of national adaptation planning. Perhaps the most important lesson of the above analysis is that national planning for adaptation needs to be linked far more closely with local institutions than has been the case. To create and improve such linkages, it will be necessary first to identify and strengthen the local institutions that play a key role in adaptation to climate variability and change. It will also be necessary to facilitate stronger connections across sectors in which adaptation is planned, and between national and local institutions involved in planning and implementation. Indeed, without closer linkages between national and local institutions, national efforts to plan for adaptation are likely not to facilitate adaptation at the local level where it matters most for the lives of poor and vulnerable peoples. Effective adaptation will require that national plans incorporate local knowledge and histories of adaptation into future efforts. A second important lesson of the NAPAs concerns the need for adaptation planning to be more closely integrated with ongoing development and natural resource management plans. Such plans are already working through many different kinds of local institutions in different parts of the world. Ignoring the lessons of existing development and resource governance policies, especially as such lessons are pertinent to adaptation interventions, will be to reinvent the wheel. As the reality of climate change is recognized more widely, the need to integrate adaptation to climate change into development and conservation projects will become more urgent ­ coordination among these diverse functions of local The NAPAs have paid minimal attention to local institutions and the mechanisms through which such coordination can be achieved will also therefore become institutions or to the relationship between local and higher level institutions ­ even for projects that are focused on more important. To protect the interests of the poorest and agriculture, water, forest management, fisheries, small most vulnerable populations, the role of local institutions in adaptation is undeniable ­ this important role is one scale infrastructure, and capacity building at the local level. This lack of attention to the implementation of major reason the linkages of local institutions and the effects of different kinds of linkages needs to be adaptation projects at the local level is in evidence despite the fact that the NAPA process required widespread considered more fully and frontally. consultations with NGOs and other civil society actors. This analysis of the information on high-priority projects 3. Decentralized Governance of Natural Resources national plans. The formal relationships and local-central and Development: Institutions and Influences partnerships sometimes successfully extend the capacity of governments to manage resources sustainably and The most recent efforts to decentralize natural resource equitably. At other times, they are ineffective in both these governance have been going on at least since the mid objectives, and they may even undermine local 1980s (Agrawal and Ribot 1999). Beginning in this period, institutions. The variations in the outcomes of different decentralization attracted widespread attention as a policy decentralization reforms provide a rich tableau of choice and a solution to the problems confronting state-led experiences to be analyzed in relation to adaptation centralized attempts to conserve the environment. There is policies. In reviewing the different arenas in which certainly debate over the scope, extent, and depth of the decentralization reforms have occurred, we are interested reforms that have occurred since the late 1980s. Positions less in establishing the determinants of success and failure adopted by the participants in this debate range from ­ and more interested to understand the means through those for whom nothing much has changed (Ribot 1999, which local actions and collective outcomes are connected Wunsch 2001) to those who see the world of governance to to central policies and institutions. have undergone a major transformation (Bardhan 2002, Campbell 2003, Noel 1999, Rosenau 1999). Much of the The available literature on decentralization reforms debate's heat may be explained by variations in the related to resource governance outlines how governments regional and territorial focus of the reforms that are have globally sought to influence local outcomes in studied and the natural resources that are the focus of fisheries, forestry, irrigation, and range management. Four attention. But it is also true that governments in many major conclusions, thematically relevant to climate countries have demonstrated at least some commitment to adaptation policies, can be drawn from examining how decentralized management. This commitment to local-central articulation has occurred in relation to decentralization covers most natural resources that play decentralized resource governance: an important role in the day-to-day subsistence of many · Diversity of local actors and decision makers: poor people: forests, coastal and inshore fisheries, Decentralization reforms have transferred decision rangelands, and irrigation water among them. making authority to, and relied upon a number of different kinds of decision makers at different levels Nonetheless, there is great diversity in the nature of of decision making to implement reforms; decentralization reforms across locations. There are · Diversity in mechanisms of local-central variations in the extent and nature of decentralization of articulation: There is also a large variety of resource governance and development interventions. The institutional, informational, and financial mechanisms local actors that gain decision making powers differ. The through which to create durable relationships actions domains in which they can make decisions are between local and higher level organizational dissimilar from one case to another. And, certainly, the structures ­ these have different implications for local reasons for decentralization reforms are often distinctive institutional capacity; in relation to a given context. · Institutional relationships and local autonomy: Decentralization initiatives sometimes reduce local But all decentralization reforms have at least one common autonomy and at other times enhance it ­ the specific goal: to create mechanisms that establish formal linkages political effect is usually driven by institutional between central governments and localities. These relationships encoded in decentralization policies; mechanisms can link central authorities to localities in two and finally, ways: They can create new types of relationships between central agencies and existing local institutions. Thus, for · Institutional relationships and equity: The nature of example, decentralization initiatives related to improved accountability relationships, information sharing, and governance often channel different kinds of support to levels of access to institutions have a key role to play existing rural councils or local governments. Similarly, the in shaping whether decentralization relationships will Joint Forest Management program in India often selected lead to more or less equitable outcomes. local forest management committees and recognized them formally as partners. But central authorities can also 3.1 Diversity of local actors and decision makers: establish connections with localities by founding new Local governance of natural resource management is institutional structures. characterized by the involvement of a great number of actors whose interests differ. The differences in the Decentralization reforms have led to highly variable interests of local actors is on the one hand a function of the outcomes ­ some intended, others unintended. They have level at which decentralized decision making occurs: sometimes reinforced existing inequalities and social village or community, district, provincial, or regional. heterogeneities and at other times undermined them. They Similarly, the identity of the local actors and the domain of sometimes strengthen local autonomy, and at others lead their functioning ­ private, civic, and public ­ also to stronger integration of local units of governance into obviously shapes their interests, particularly at the local level. At the local level, the chief concern of this paper, water management institutions in favor of new water decentralization may lead to greater decision making management structures. 2 responsibilities on the part of community councils, local governments, non-government organizations, This strategy has both advantages and cooperatives, resource user committees in different disadvantages. Traditional institutions are generally better sectors, and in some cases, even private market-based connected to local populations, work to represent local organizations. At higher levels, decentralization reforms interests and concerns, and mediate between external tends to confer greater powers and responsibilities for interventions and local communities. At the same time decision making typically for public rather than civic or these institutions have limited ability to change existing private agencies and actors ­ whether these are elected rules for allocating water or mobilizing large-scale bodies or line agencies of central ministries and support. They are also less relevant in helping allocate departments. water or maintain irrigation structures in areas close to formal administrative centers. Finally, they are not very The diversity of local decision makers who gain authority effective in repairing large-scale damages or undertaking to make decisions as a result of decentralization is preventive measures to reduce problems resulting from instructive for adaptation processes in the first instance flooding or droughts. This is because large scale action because it indicates that there is no single best solution to requires coordination and resources beyond what is enhance local capacities to undertake adaptation. But an available to local traditional institutions. examination of the interests and relative strengths of decision makers in different domains also indicates that In contrast, new water users' associations and groups as the goals of decentralization reforms often shape choices established by the World Bank assisted projects seek local about appropriate partnerships at the local level and at the involvement on a more equitable basis instead of favoring same time influence the degree of local flexibility in landowners in upper catchments of valleys and rivers. decision making. They also enjoy forma recognition and the capacity to change rules formally. However, they are not well Formal vs informal institutions connected to communities or households, nor do they Creating new civil society institutions or public enjoy the same legitimacy as do tribal leaders and organizations to allocate resources, for example, can help institutional structures. sidestep existing unequal political relationships in a given context and thereby help improve equity in resource Deconcentration vs. devolution allocation through local organizations. But this may occur Similar tradeoffs between effectiveness, at the expense of the effectiveness of the local representativeness, and democratic functioning mark the organization. The contrasting strengths of different kinds decision to decentralize powers to elected local of civil society institutions around irrigation in Yemen governments vs. local administrative bodies. The common illustrate this point (Agrawal and Perrin 2009). distinction that is often drawn in the large literature on decentralization between devolution and deconcentration Spate and masque irrigation are the two main forms of (or political/democratic vs. administrative irrigation in Yemeni highlands. 1 The basic principle for decentralization) often turns on whether the local actors allocating water is that landowners located upstream in a empowered through reforms are elected governments or wadi irrigate their lands before those located downstream. administrative branches of central ministries and Tribal structures and decision makers are often departments. However, the real question in the effective responsible for managing the allocation of water. These decentralization of decision making powers may be not so structures are well connected to other local institutions, much whether it is elected or administrative bodies that but less so with higher-level or central institutional partner with central bodies but whether decentralization arrangements and decision makers. A number of recent reforms allow newly empowered local actors to exercise irrigation projects have opted to establish new water the power they are supposed to have gained. users' associations and groups. Two different World Bank- assisted projects, for example, have sought to improve Two examples illustrate this variation. An early effort to spate irrigation and soil and groundwater conservation by decentralize forest governance in India occurred in bypassing the sheikhs and other decision makers in tribal Kumaon in 1931 when local residents resisted the efforts of the colonial government to convert the region's forests into state-owned resources. As a result of local protests, the central government agreed to permit the formation of 1 Under spate irrigation, elementary stone or earthen bunds together with diversion canals are used to divert flood waters 2 The specific projects are the Groundwater and Soil Conservation from riverbeds or valleys (wadis) into fields. Runoff can also be Project (number P074413, for US$ 40 million, 2004-11 and the harvested from small surfaces and diverted by gravity directly Irrigation Improvement project (number P062714 for US$ 21.3 onto fields using ditches (masques). million, 2001-08). elected forest councils in each village in the region. More power brokers at the local level are often well connected to than 3000 such councils exist today, and each has the local populations, but may not be interested in pursuing authority to manage small plots of forests close to their more equitable resource allocation. Elected local village (Agrawal 2005). They have effectively limited governments enjoy greater legitimacy, and where deforestation in the region, and also met many of the elections are fair and competitive they may also be more demands of local users for different subsistence products accountable to their constituents. But without broad from forests (Somanathan 2009). participation, effective decision making powers, and capacity to implement reforms, they will turn out to be The decentralization reforms in the forest sector in much ineffective. Similarly, NGOs typically enjoy legitimacy and of East and West Africa stand in contrast (Ribot 2002: 17- local support but even the best functioning NGOs remain 25). Referring to decentralization of resource governance unaccountable to local populations. as "fettered reforms" Ribot outlines how the extent of local decision making powers is greatly limited in many The above discussion suggests that to overcome the gaps countries. In Mali, for example, elected local governments in capacity, legitimacy, and accountability, partnerships have the rights to make decisions related to forests, but with local actors have to be chosen with attention to the they do not have much forest over which to make specific advantages they confer and building multi-actors decisions. In Senegal, although local governments are partnerships may be key to address adaptation needs at elected, they are still upwardly accountable to higher level the local level. Adaptation policies aiming to create forest authorities. The Ugandan case is similar as that of effective partnerships will need to work with a variety of Mali ­ elected local governments have substantial powers local actors, and use the strengths of different actors to to make decisions, but virtually no forests (Ribot et al. promote specific goals related to design and 2006). implementation of adaptation projects, participation of and accountability to local users, and monitoring and Sectoral administrative bodies ­ for example, local units of sanctioning related to implementation. the forest department ­ on the other hand have substantial decision making powers in all the above countries (India, 3.2 Diversity in mechanisms of local-central Mali, Senegal, and Uganda) regarding forests. They are articulation: empowered to make decisions about where, what, how Studies of decentralized resource governance also much, and how to harvest, and whether to allocate any document the many different ways in which central benefits to local populations. In addition, they are also policies articulate with and integrate existing and new often responsible for monitoring whether forests are being local institutions into decentralization policies and legal used in accordance with existing laws and have the frameworks. The above discussion of the diversity of local capacity to impose sanctions on users that break laws. actors suggested that there are no blueprint approaches to decentralization reforms upon which policy makers In some countries, governments and international donors interested in effective adaptation can draw so as to make have taken recourse to non-government organizations adaptation widely effective. All the goals of (NGOs) to make decentralization more effective. NGOs decentralization ­ whether it is improving local capacity, are often able to provide substantial managerial inputs promoting efficient implementation, promoting the into decentralization efforts, promote participation, and legitimacy of new or traditional institutions, integrating gain local support (Utting 1999). But few NGOs are locally local institutions better in administrative processes, accountable to those on whose behalf they act, and it can increasing the accountability of decision makers to their be difficult to identify legitimate and effective NGOs from constituents, or enhancing participation and local support those that are conduits for cash transfers. for new projects ­ depend on specific institutional and resource transfer mechanisms. The table below, based on a As part of the formal administrative apparatus, survey of nearly 50 cases of decentralized resource administrative bodies have greater decision-making governance related to forests, irrigation, rangelands, and powers than elected local governments or NGOs ­ but fisheries highlights the diversity of articulation they suffer in comparison with respect to their ability to mechanisms used by central governments to link local elicit participation, and in the extent to which they are actors with central decision makers. accountable to local populations. Chiefs and informal Table 2: Mechanisms to connect local institutions with higher level decision makers and policies Mechanisms to articulate local and central institutions Effects of mechanisms Information mechanisms -Improve transparency; Advice -Improve coordination; Audits -Provide local institutions and actors better knowledge for Mechanisms for reporting corruption making decisions; Activity reports -Increase accountability of decision makers Management plans Human resource and capacity building mechanisms -Increase ability to make decisions and carry out plans -Appointment of officials -improve quality of planning and implementation at local level -Performance monitoring -promote interactions among local institutions -Training -Education -Exchange programs Institutional change mechanisms -create accountability relations between decision makers at -Creation of new rules local level and their superiors as well as lower level -Authority to monitor, sanction, adjudicate constituents; Elections -Protect/improve resources and local governance strategies -Reduce free riding Financial mechanisms -Increase local autonomy -Accounting reports -Change dependency relationships -Funds transfers -Taxing authority Clearly, central governments have used a variety of Questions of agency relationships and the direction of mechanisms to connect local decision making bodies power flows are particularly important in the case of into formal mechanisms of rule. These include decentralized center-local relationships. Because technical, monetary, and other resource transfers, decentralization of natural resource governance has rules to integrate traditional or new institutions into fared poorly in many countries, a large number of legal frameworks, creation of incentive systems, shifts scholars have seen in decentralization a means for in accountability relations, changes in information modern states to create formal linkages that extend flows to affect monitoring and reporting, and projects of regulation and control over local accounting and audit mechanisms. populations and institutions. Samakande et al (2004), talking about irrigation in Zimbabwe, state that 3.3. Institutional relationships and local autonomy: smallholder irrigation is a "political tool to control the In an important paper on participation and poor masses" (2004: p.1075). Hoffman (2004) decentralization, Blair (2000) refers to the ideal of illustrates how the Nigerian federal government public accountability in decentralized democracies: extended its reach into localities through the creation Administrators should be accountable to elected of local governments. Meinzen-Dick and Raju (2002) officials who in turn should be accountable to the suggest that Indian decentralization does not result in public through elections. This ideal holds only autonomous government by local resource users in debatably even in western, long-standing the same way as in self-governing systems. Instead, democracies where the relationships between state involvement often constrains the institutional administrators and elected representatives as also autonomy of user groups. those between the voting public and elected politicians is beset with agency problems and Decentralization reforms constrain local autonomy information asymmetries. and capacity particularly when they are accompanied by upward forms of accountability. New forms of For effective adaptation, local identification of climate reporting outcomes and methods of monitoring risks and particularly for developing strategies to without effective delegation of decision-making address risks is essential as has already been capacities are one way to create such upward remarked. Effective planning for adaptation requires accountability. For example, Mongolia's 1994 land both sufficient capacity and autonomy ­ however law requires local governments to submit annual decentralization despite its name does not always Land Use Reports on progress to the central lead to greater local autonomy. government (Fernandez-Gimenez and Batbuyan 2004). The Government of Uganda devolved activities and powers, including developing and enforcing traditional management authorities (such as alek bylaws, collecting information, and participating in pasie, malimau pasie, maliamu kapa, panglima laut, the licensing process to Beach Management Units, sasi) and recognize local authorities and institutions, which are legally recognized by the 2003 Fish (Beach allowing for their adoption in local governance policy Management) Rules. Still, the local government (Siry 2006). Thornburn (2001) also notes that approves Beach Management Unit rules and the customary institutions in Indoneisa survived colonial central government monitors the annual performance government, national structures, and regional trade of BMUs. Maikhural et al (2000) further illustrate the networks; despite all of the different waves of ways in which decentralization reforms may include external actors, Kei people in the case study area have reporting requirements that ensure upward maintained their livelihoods and social structures. accountability and transfers of funds from localities to There are certainly successful examples as well in the center. The Indian Reserve Authority requires which decentralization leads to greater local capacity, village forest councils to submit proposals to received cooperation between local and central decision monetary payments for dead trees and outlines a makers, and improved local effectiveness. A process for the distribution of revenue from centrally certification program in the Philippines fisheries controlled auctions, ensuring that even locally sector illustrates how new mechanisms can promote generated revenue accrues to both district and central effectiveness. The Government of the Philippines government levels. addressed a lack of capacity, collaboration, and integration, limited financial sustainability, and weak State interventions often ignore traditionally law enforcement through a local government coordinated and regulated resource access, as both certification program (White et al 2006). The Thebaud and Batterbury (2001) and Singh et al (2005) Government of the Philippines promoted local document for pastures. Thebaud and Batterbury participation in coastal management and devolved (2001), following Scott (1999) write that state responsibilities to local governments through the 1991 "modernization projects" weaken traditional Local Government Code and the 1998 Fisheries Code, mechanisms. In Niger, pastoralists historically dug partially in response to donor and NGO support for their own water sources, which allowed for local Integrated Coastal Management. These new policies negotiation of pasture areas and limited the number created new institutional roles for both national and of animals that could graze within the area. When the local governments, resulting in an uncertain period of state introduced modern infrastructure, such as transition, where jurisdictional and legal permanent cement wells and deep tube wells, responsibility was often unclear. In response, the traditional systems of governance were undermined Government of the Philippines developed a coastal and a system of open access emerged. Similarly, resource management certification system to promote Singh et al (2005) showed how an external incentive strategies for local governments. Over 100 intervention of placing watering ponds in traditional local governments have now implemented this rainy season pasture ignored local, traditional certification system. Benchmarks for the first level of knowledge and undermined the local institutional certification include: baseline assessment conducted, system. In a review of SADC countries, Swatuck annual budget allocated, organizations for coastal (2005) demonstrates a similar process of state resource management formed and active, multi-year governments undermining existing cooperation and coastal resource management and shoreline plan conflict resolution mechanisms in the irrigation developed and adopted, and at least two best sector. Further, already empowered actors practices implemented. Provinces initially review dominated new institution, resulting in the certification and then it is reviewed by the replication of previous power relations. Department of Environment and Natural Resources and a multi-sector agency body. Certification is Two cases of decentralization policy from Indonesia's considered a seal of approval for local governments fisheries sector provide an example of how and a motivating factor in improving coastal government policies can both undermine and support resources management (White et al 2006). local institutions (Satria and Matsuda 2004; Siry 2006). The 1979 Village Administration Law eroded 3.4. Institutional relationships and local equity traditional institutions and management norms (Siry If accountability relationships are key in shaping the 2006) as did the New Order's Basic Provisions of balance of power between the center and the locality, Local Level Government Law (Satria and Matsuda and in allowing sufficient autonomy at the local level 2004). However, the 1999 Local Autonomy Law to ensure the development of plans that are encouraged traditional fishing community based responsive to local needs, the nature of local decentralization policies (Satria and Matsuda 2004). accountability relationships ­ particularly between Indonesia's laws now seek to support and revitalize decision making elite and office holders and their constituents are central to equity related outcomes of systems, faced a financial crisis following a reduction decentralization reforms. When local elite and in foreign aid and the collapse of the international rice decision makers are not locally accountable, the market. As a result, the NIA transferred management likelihood of elite takeover of resources and unequal authority to local level irrigation association groups. allocation of available resources increases The NIA awarded grants for larger repair work, substantially. supplied large machinery for repairs, and paid groups incentives for activities such as assuming Sarch's (2001) case study of Nigerian fisheries shows responsibility for cleaning canals. In addition, the how traditional institutions may perpetuate elite NIA implemented an incentive system in some capture of power and result in inequitable outcomes. irrigation systems to promote collection fee For example, while British colonial authorities did not compliance: irrigation associations may keep 2% of erode traditional systems everywhere, feudal tax irrigation fees if they collect 50% of the total invoices systems were legitimized and maintained to and 15% of the fees if they collect 90% of the fees. The strengthen the ability of colonial rulers to collect associations that received these types of assistance taxes. Mosse (2006) illustrates a similar situation for and incentive programs were considered three times irrigation in India, explaining how traditional water as active as the associations that did not receive these systems were based around privileged access; extra types of assistance (Fujiie et al 2005). In contrast consequently, recent attempts to base water user to the example in Mexico, this Philippines case study associations on traditional institutions replicate provides strong support that government can inequalities and asymmetric power relations. Araral positively affect local associations through specific (2005) also documents how donors and governments interventions and policies. support systems based on patronage produced highly unequal outcomes "when they uncritically accept(ed) 4. Conclusion the primacy of irrigation bureaucracies, strengthened Our examination of the suite of mechanisms and the their capacities, and augmented these structures by range of outcomes related to the decentralized promoting farmer participation at tertiary canals" governance of resources and development suggests a (2005: p. 132). number of lessons to improve the efficacy of adaptation planning at the national level. Two central Another important case in point is how financial points towards which this paper has worked is to transfers occur and are handled locally. Fiscal highlight the need to promote the capacity of local decentralization or local authority to collect and institutions and improve the relationships between manage revenues can contribute to effective local and national level adaptation planning decentralization. At the same time, some case studies processes. illustrate how local political elites may capture financial resources. Rap (2007) illustrates the The analysis leads towards four key areas in which appropriation of funding following financial transfers local adaptation institutions and national adaptation to local water users' association in Mexico. Politically policies can be articulated for more effective influential individuals used the water users' adaptation: association as a political platform for political · Increase local capacity through appropriate campaigns, including using water users' association transfers of information, financial, and technical funds to finance campaigns. While the goals of water resources so that there is greater ability at the users' association included efficient, effective, and local level to plan for adaptation and to use local optimal output of service delivery, the appropriation and indigenous knowledge of historical of association resources resulted in a lack of funding adaptations to build towards future adaptive for basic water association activities and undermined strategies. This will also mean strengthening the association's accountability and legitimacy (Rap local capacities for planning, budgeting, 2007). implementation, and monitoring, and where feasible the ability to raise resources locally. In contrast to the example from Mexico which Capacity building also requires coordination suggests that local level financial management across a variety of local actors and decision resulted in less efficient and less equitable makers since no single blueprint solution for management of local natural resources, a case study partnering with a specific type of actor can from the Philippines illustrates how the central address the multiple needs for effective local government supported a successful irrigation transfer adaptation; through an incentive system (Fujiie et al 2005). In the · Empower communities and local governments Philippines, the National Irrigation Administration by increasing local autonomy so as to (NIA), the national administrator of irrigation decentralize adaptation planning and implementation effectively. This services, the chances of elite capture and abuse of recommendation has implications for the design power also increase. of monitoring and information sharing mechanisms, resource transfers, and the nature of The examination of existing efforts to decentralize accountability relationships. At least for natural resource governance provides concrete horizontal accountability, institutional information about the many different ways in which mechanisms to make local administrative bodies specific information, institutional, technical, and accountable to elected local governments will be reporting mechanisms can be used to link national more effective in improving participation and and local adaptation processes. Adaptation to climate making decision making responsive to local change may be new. But the articulation between needs; local and national adaptation processes can still be · Develop mechanisms for sharing information improved substantially by attending to the ways in among local decision makers in different sectors, which natural resource managers have sought to between general purpose local governments and make national resource policies locally responsive local between local and higher level governance and effective. arrangements, and across decision making. Without such information sharing, coordination This note was prepared for the IHDP meetings, Bonn, across different decision makers will prove Germany ­ April 27-30, 2009 and was written by Arun difficult, and there will also be greater Agrawal, University of Michigan, Nicolas Perrin, The opportunities for corruption; World Bank, Ashwini Chhatre, University of Illinois, · Improve accountability of local decision makers Urbana Champaign, Catherine Benson, University of Michigan, and Minna Kononen, The World Bank. to their constituents: Accountability relations are Additional copies can also be requested via e-mail: central to the balance of power between decision socialdev@worldbank.org makers and those on whose behalf they make decisions. When decision makers are not accountable downwardly to citizens and users of References: Adger, W. N. 1999. Social vulnerability to climate change and extremes in coastal Vietnam, World Development 27(2): 249­69 Adger, W.N., S. Agrawala, M.M.Q. 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