44089 Working Paper No. 3 October 2007 Ex-combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left, how they fared Copyright © 2007 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20433 All rights reserved Manufactured in the United States of America First published October 2007 This Working Papers Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage discussion and exchange of ideas on demobilization, reintegration and related security issues in the Great Lakes region. Papers in this series are not formal publications of the World Bank. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The series is edited by the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) in the Sustainable Development Department in the Africa Region of the World Bank. This paper has not undergone the review accorded to official World Bank publications. The findings, interpretations and conclusions herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/ World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or its Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. To request copies of the paper or for more information on the series, please contact the MDRP Secretariat. Papers are also available on the MDRP website: www.mdrp.org. E-mail: info@mdrp.org Photos by: Bruno Donat and Harald Hinkel Working Paper No.3 October 2007 Ex-combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left, how they fared Peter Uvin Table of Contents Table of Contents i Abbreviations 1 Introduction 3 Part 1: A Profile of Ex-Combatants 3 I. At what age did they join? 4 II. Why they joined the war 4 A. Insecurity and Anger 5 B. Ideology 5 C. Misery and the need for an income 6 D. Force 7 E. Career and Prestige 9 III. Why they left 12 Part 2: After Demobilization 12 I. The Economic Picture 12 A. The Child Soldiers 13 B. Demobilized ex-combatants in Ngozi Province (Busiga and Ruhororo) 14 C. Demobilized combatants in Nyanza-Lac 16 D. Demobilized in the city 17 E. The plight of the self-demobilized 20 II. Social Reinsertion 20 A. Child soldiers 21 B. Demobilized soldiers 25 Part 3: Conclusions 28 Part 4: Annexes 32 Part 5: Bibliography Ex-Combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left, how they fared I Abbreviations Abbreviations CNDD — Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie (National Council for the Defense of Democracy) DDR — Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration FAB — Forces Armées du Burundi (Armed Forces of Burundi) FBU — Franc Burundais (Burundian Franc) FDD — Forces de Defense Nationales (National Defense Force) FDN — Forces pour la défense de la démocratie (Forces for the Defense of Democracy) FNL — Forces de libération nationale (National Liberation Forces) IDP — Internally displaced persons GP — Gardiens de la paix IPA — International Peace Academy MC — Militants-combattants MDRP — Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program NGO — Non-Governmental Organization PMPA — Partis et Mouvements Politiques Armés (Armed Political Parties and Movements) PNDRR — Programme National de démobilisation, réinsertion et réintégration - National Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration Program SE/CNDRR — Secrétariat exécutif de la Commission nationale de démobilisation, réinsertion et réintégration (Executive Secretariat of the National Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration Comission) SNES — Structure nationale pour les enfants soldats (National Structure for Child Soldiers) Ex-Combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left, how they fared i Introduction Introduction This report presents some findings about ex-combatants Burundi. More generally, this area was almost entirely that are derived from a wider study on masculinity and depopulated during the war. It has seen enormous return youth, partly sponsored by the World Bank’s Multi- movements in the last few years, in part because it is a Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program more economically rich and diverse area than the two (MDRP).1 This study involved almost 400 Burundians Northern communes. Bujumbura was chosen because from all walks of life, with whom I had lengthy it is the country’s major city. I worked mainly in two conversations about questions of development, peace, of its poorest neighborhoods: Kamenge and Musaga, the future, their plans for themselves and their children, which have been for more than a decade, since the and just life in general. Among those interviewed, there ethnic cleansing that hit Bujumbura, mono-ethnically were 63 ex-combatants. I pulled these results out and Hutu and Tutsi respectively. I also interviewed some present them here separately in an attempt to gain a ex-combatants in other neighborhoods, mainly in an better understanding of who these people are and how attempt to talk to some demobilized former Burundian their return to their communities has proceeded. This Army (FAB) officers as well as some self-demobilized report will focus mainly on the “reintegration” part ex-FNL rebels. I interviewed ex-combatants from the of the DDR program—not the “DD” parts, which had FAB, CNDD/FDD (the party currently in power), taken place (or not) long before I arrived. Evidently, CNDD-Nyangoma (the wing of the founder of the this is a small sample of the entire MDRP target group CNDD, mostly strong in the south of the country), of more than 20,000 ex-combatants nationwide. The Kaze-FDD (another split-off of the CNDD), and the results presented here, thus, are mainly indicative of the FNL (still fighting during the interviews, so I only talked specific places I worked in; more substantial research is to self-demobilized from this group). required to test their validity on a larger scale. Burundi’s PNDRR (Programme National de This research took place in three rural communes— démobilisation, réinsertion et réintégration - National Busiga and Ruhororo in the Northern Ngozi province Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration and Nyanza-Lac in the South—and throughout the city Program) began in March 2004, and is executed by of Bujumbura. I had chosen Busiga because it was a the Secrétariat exécutif de la Commission nationale de commune that had been little touched by the war: there démobilisation, réinsertion et réintégration - Executive were almost no pogroms there in 1993, no IDP camps, Secretariat of the National Demobilization, Reinsertion, few refugees. The situation could not be more different and Reintegration Comission (SE/CNDRR). This was in Ruhororo, a mere 10 miles down the road. There had the result of years of difficult negotiation by the parties been a lot of internal violence in this commune in 1993, to the Pretoria agreement, assisted by a small Bank team and one of the largest IDP camps had formed there right (for a history of the steps and challenges, see Alusala away. At the time of my research, it was still there, maybe 2005). It is a nation-wide program designed to help with the largest in all of Burundi, and I did a lot of interviews the demobilization of up to 55,000 ex-combatants. in that camp. Nyanza-Lac, finally, is the commune with the highest number of repatriated refugees in The child soldier segment (i.e., dealing with all combatants aged 18 and below at the time of 1 Detailed comments have been received from Leanne Bayer, Joseph Bigirumwami, Kim Howe, Phil demobilization) began in 2003. It was managed by UNICEF and the Structure nationale pour les enfants Lancaster, Estella Malayika, Ingo Wiederhofer, Kees Kingma, and foremost Adrien Tuyaga, my main research assistant and intellectual companion in writing this paper. I thank all of them. I also got help from Madjior Solness Dingamadji in the Bujumbura office of the World Bank, as well as from Sigrun soldats - National Structure for Child Soldiers (SNES) Aasland in the Bank office in Washington DC. I presented these results to a workshop in Bujumbura organized by CENAP and the North-South Institute in Dec. 2006, as well as a presentation at the World Bank in Jan. 2007. I thank all those who participated for their comments. As usual, all of this engages only me, and all errors are mine only. Ex-Combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left, how they fared 1 Introduction and sub-contracted much of the execution to ten understand how people in post-conflict Burundi—and provincial partners—NGOs, church agencies, etc. This foremost young people, and especially young men— UNICEF-managed program provided support to 3,015 live their lives, what they dream of, what problems child soldiers and was completed in June 2006. Since they encounter and what opportunities they see, and then, child soldier programming has been incorporated how they relate to each other. In so doing, I happened to within the SE/CNDRR, which is undertaking continued talk to many ex-combatants. The following will give the follow-up of existing beneficiaries and supporting the reader an idea of their lives. demobilization and reintegration of children associated with the FNL. Annex 1 lists key data for all 63 ex-combatants I interviewed. Annex 2 discusses the qualities of my The adult demobilization program consists of two sample. Generally, the ex-combatants I spoke to are parts. In a first phase, immediately after demobilization, rather representative in age, political movement, ex-combatants receive reinsertion payments. These educational level, and gender of the national PNDRR payments vary by rank, with anyone above the rank cohort. I slightly over-sampled on child soldiers and, in of corporal receiving more than FBU 600,000; the Kamenge, on self-demobilized soldiers. Generally, the minimum is FBU 566,000 per person (paid in 4 fit of my sample is better for rural than for urban areas. cash installments over 10 months). At the end of this period—and this is just starting now for most of the country—the demobilized receive reintegration assistance in the form of training, equipment, and other inputs to support the development of a livelihood or an income generating activity, for a value of 600,000 FBU. Training is provided by accredited educational and training institutions and support to develop income generating opportunities is provided through NGOs subcontracted by the government. There are possibilities for health care for people with serious needs and specialized assistance for handicapped and infirm soldiers. Smaller programs are also in place for Gardiens de la Paix (GP—local militias working for the army, in charge of self-defense in their communities) and militants-combattants (MC—those supporting rebels but not part of their formal troops). By the summer of 2006, the operations for the latter two groups were finished: 18,709 GP and 9,674 MC had received what are called “allocations de reconnaissance de service”—one-time recognition of service allowances. The program will also support the demobilization and reintegration of FNL combatants when a formal peace agreement is reached. It must be noted that the research on which this report draws was not designed to be an evaluation of the MDRP or PNDRR programs. For that reason, there may be gaps here—issues any program manager would have liked to see addressed but which I did not deal with in my conversations. My general aim was simply to 2 Ex-Combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left, how they fared A Profile of Ex-Combatants: Part 1 Part 1: A Profile of Ex-Combatants many of them are afraid and in hiding (people told me I. At what age did they there were “thousands” of them, but I possess no more specific figures). They do not receive benefits from the join? DDR program as they were not formally registered as ex-combatants, and, indeed, many even well-informed The child soldiers I interviewed joined at ages 9-14. Burundians are not aware of their existence. Many of the adult ex-combatants were recruited at the same age. In other words, the only thing that set child To conclude the discussion of age: my sample indicates soldiers apart from their adult colleagues is that they had three major trends. First, there is no doubt that the war in not yet turned 19 or more. The average age of joining Burundi was fought with children. With the exception of for the two ex-FAB’s is 12.5 years; for the 4 ex-CNDD/ the FAB career soldiers and a few CNDD (all factions) FDD’s, it is 11. soldiers in Nyanza-Lac, the large majority of people recruited during the war, for all armed groups, were For the demobilized (adult) soldiers, there is more minors when they were recruited, and many were very, variation. Some were career FAB soldiers: they had all very young. Admittedly, I interviewed only one ex- joined in their early 20s, long before the war. The age CNDD officer—a chef de police in one of my Northern of those who were recruited during the war was much communes. I presume that most of the CNDD officers lower. More than half were children as well: on the have been integrated in the army or the police, and average they were 16 when recruited by the FAB; 13 by hence do not appear in a study of demobilized soldiers. the CNDD/FDD; and 14 by the FNL. The ones recruited Adding them in would have also increased the average in Bujumbura city, with one exception, were all minors age of CNDD soldiers recruited during the war. (average age 17 at age of recruitment). The same holds for the self-demobilized soldiers from all three the main Second, in my sample, a greater proportion of young parties to the war. Only two out of 21 were adults when men who were very young when they were recruited they joined: for the others, the average age was 14.4 were from the city. Experts tell me that the majority years. A few were still minors when they quit their of those who were very young at recruitment were military outfits as well. rural (although they may have ended up in the city afterwards), so my urban interview sample may not be I should explain here what I mean by self-demobilized entirely representative. Most urban youth in my sample soldiers. They are combatants from all of the main armed were recruited soon after leaving school because of the movements—in my sample: FAB, CNDD/FDD and war (a result also found by Taylor 2006: 5, and which FNL—who quit their troops before being demobilized. also holds in the countryside), and/or after fleeing. Sometimes they did so with acknowledgment of their superior (they were blatantly going crazy or had suffered Third, with two exceptions all the self-demobilized enough, and they got some pants, a T-shirt, and a 1,000 started as child soldiers. They stayed for many years francs bill and were told to make themselves scarce) in their respective military outfits: as much as 10 years, but more often they simply ran away, without warning and quite a few in the 5-8 year range; only two of the 21 anyone. From a military perspective, that makes them in my sample stayed less than 3 years. In my sample, all deserters. They feared they might be imprisoned or they actually spent on the average as many if not slightly killed or forced to re-enlist. As a result, until this day, more years fighting than did the officially recognized Ex-Combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left, how they fared 3 Part 1: A Profile of Ex-Combatants ex-combatants. For many of them, their only mistake is A. Insecurity and anger that they had enough of killing and dying before they were allowed to by their superiors. This argumentation presents ex-combatants as joining against their will, essentially forced by circumstances. Not surprisingly, all these ex-combatants (with the It is not ideology that drove them, but insecurity, fear, exception of FAB career soldiers) have low educational and anger at the killings of those close to them (see too levels and carry with them a legacy of low educational Lancaster 2006: 15 for child soldiers, as well as Taylor attainment. However, this legacy is less dramatic than 2006: 6). They joined the war because there was a may appear at first. The differences with non-combatant war—they did not create it, but reacted to it. civilians their age are generally not enormous (see too Tatoui-Cherif 2006: 25), for the large majority of poor people in Burundi suffered from low access to education • 19 years old in Ruhororo IDP camp: “After during the war. At the same time, our general interviews multiple rebel attacks on the site, I followed the clearly reveal that education is only useful if one reaches regular army when I was 14, because the young at least 10th grade. Whether one has 4 years of education people were not killed, but were taken hostage by the while others have 6 years does not really make that much rebels. I decided that life here was too hard, and that of a difference to an ordinary Burundian’s life—you one risked to die at any moment. Joining the FAB remain on the farm or in the informal sector regardless. was, for me, a way to escape.” The individual economic benefits of education only kick in if people reach the high school diploma, or at • 26 year old, Kamenge: “I decided to fight least tenth grade, when the doors to the civil service because my family and I and my neighborhood and the private sector open. That may also explain why suffered a lot. We were often attacked and ill-treated enrolling in education has not been not a choice many by the army. Then we fled to Congo, and there too we demobilized soldiers, young or adult, have made. had many problems every day, so I decided to join the front.” II. Why they joined the • 23 year old barber, Kamenge: “I fled the fighting and killing here in Bujumbura to go live with the family of my father’s second wife in the interior and war there, there were problems too so I decided to follow a group of friends to Kibira forest [where the CNDD/ Eight of our 63 ex-combatant interviewees were FAB FDD had its headquarters] to be recruited, hoping career soldiers, who had on average 15-20 years in the for more security in an armed group compared to a army behind them. They evidently did not join the army village. I had no choice, it was like a refuge for me, because of the war. We will thus not discuss them in this but there was of course also the ethnic aspect.” section. All other ex-combatants we interviewed joined during the war. What did they tell us about their reasons • 21 year old unemployed man, Kamenge: “My for joining? parents both died during counter operations by the FAB in 1999. It happened while we were fleeing. We heard four types of arguments from ex-combatants as After my period of mourning, I decided to join the to why they went to fight during Burundi’s civil war. The rebellion (FNL) and fight back. (…) It was the anger three most important ones, more or less equally frequent, of the death of my parents that got me recruited, but are: insecurity and anger; an ideological agenda; and once there, there were promises that we would be poverty. Far behind, a fourth answer was offered as well, better off after the war.” namely force. The attractiveness of a military career was mentioned by only 1 out of 63 persons, and many more 2 Lancaster 2006: 9 synthesizes the causes of child recruitment into government forces as investigated by himself in 2002: “poverty, displacement, loss of people told us the opposite2. parents, hunger, search for status, peer pressure, and desire for revenge were all cited as common causes of voluntary recruitment for all categories of child soldiers.” Most of this is found back in this research, with the exception of 4 Ex-Combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left, how they fared search for status and peer pressure A Profile of Ex-Combatants: Part 1 In rural areas, these people often joined later, towards • 56 year old farmer from Nyanza-Lac, joined the end of the 1990s. In urban areas, however, this was CNDD/FDD: “after the assassination of the not the case. Why the difference? After all, people in President, it was clear to me that there was no many rural areas were hit by waves of violence very security for the president, so we needed to create it. early as well. Ruhororo’s IDP camp itself, for example, Most of them came from different provinces in the came into being right away in late 1993—even before country. Most knew the war of 1972, people then people had to flee from Kamenge and the other city were killed without process: they just were taken to neighborhoods. Why, then, did those in Ruhororo camp the slaughterhouse. They wanted to avoid that this join so late and those in the city so much earlier? The happens again: this time they would not be carried explanation seems likely to be a combination of factors: away to the slaughterhouse passively—they would a) in the city, a general sense of insecurity had already die fighting instead. They came from all milieus: those who had studied and those who had not. It was begin growing since the early 1990s, with widespread mostly Hutu, who were persecuted.” ethnic propaganda and rising tensions since the launch of democracy and multi-partyism; b) people in the city • 17 year old girl, FNL self-demob: “I joined are more easily recruited, as they are closer together the FNL out of ideology. I saw that my community and as political leaders, who organize and finance the suffered a lot; it was the target of all malheurs and I recruiting, typically live in Bujumbura city; and c) couldn’t tolerate so much injustice, I felt like a slave young people in the city often feel they have less to lose, in my own country.” as they are often unemployed, unmarried, with nothing to lose. C. Misery and the need for an B. Ideology income These are people who went to a fight because they A sizeable group explains their participation in the believed in the cause. Many of them are older and war by simple income reasons. They wanted to escape joined early. In my interviews, they mainly come from misery, or, more precisely, earn an income (see Taylor, Nyanza-Lac and from Bujumbura city and province, Samii and Mvukiyehe 2006: 10 for a good discussion). and they are exclusively Hutu. They fought because The large majority of those who explicitly told us they they were willing to sacrifice their lives—and the lives joined for the money had joined the FAB—the only of others—for the cause. This holds also for children belligerent who actually paid salaries, at least in theory, (see too Lancaster 2006: 14) The FNL soldiers we as well as provided some health care, pensions etc. Most talked to, for example, all shared an extremely deep of them are urban as well. commitment to the cause: a combination of pro-Hutu ideology, religion, and discipline that seems steps above • Unemployed man in his mid-20s from Musaga, the other fighting forces. This may explain in part their ex-FAB: “My father died and my mother had no holding out for so long, against such odds. Note that work. She could not pay our school fees or our food. two of the three female ex-combatants I spoke to were I got myself recruited in the army to survive and earn self-demobilized FNL combatants who told me they some money.” joined voluntarily, because they shared this agenda—if “voluntary” is a term one can use for girls who were 12 • 31 year old unemployed man from Musaga, and 13 years old when they joined. ex-FAB: “I left school and I had a job as rabatteur de bus. In 1996 friends came to see me and told • 28 year old farmer from Busiga, joined CNDD/ me they were hiring in the army. I did not hesitate FDD: “The communal administration persecuted because I hoped to earn more but I was disappointed people, and for that reason, I and many others joined because not only did I earn nothing but also I became the rebels” handicapped at the right hand.” Ex-Combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left, how they fared 5 Part 1: A Profile of Ex-Combatants • 35 years old unemployed man from Bwiza, and ended up having two children with my husband ex-FAB: “From 1993 to 1995 it was civil war here who was also in the maquis.” and I passed my time in the neighborhood with the other young people of my generation, doing security • 23 year old barman in Musaga: “while I was rounds at night, talking during the day, and drinking visiting my sister in Kayogoro during the holidays and smoking [PU: this means he belonged to the (I am from Rutana), I was abducted by the CNDD/ infamous gangs of killers that ravaged the city for FDD.” years]. In 1995, I registered for a technical school in accounting, but I had trouble paying the fees, so in One young man who spent 6 years with the FNL told 1996 I took and passed the recruitment exam for the us this in-between story: army and was recruited as a low-rank officer. Me, I joined the army to earn money, it was not at all for • 20 year old mason’s aide, interviewed in Bwiza: ideological reasons. That is even the response I wrote “At night in the village I participated in the FNL down in the questionnaire they gave me before they sensitization meetings and also in their ravitaillement. hired me.” One day while I participated in a ravitaillement with a group of other youth, the chefs showed us arms and This argument also finds some support in the quantitative ordered us take them, that these were from now on data. Taking out the child soldiers, the largest cohort ours, and that we had to learn to fight like the others. of ex-combatants by far (15 persons) is composed of It was a bit forced, but I was in agreement with the people who made it to 6th grade, and in all likelihood ideology of the liberation of Hutu.” failed to make it to secondary school. For thousands of youth in Burundi, at that point, the doors to a better All the cases of forced recruitment in my sample are future close brutally, and it seems not surprising that on the rebel side. This does not mean that force was there is a spike in enrollment at this moment of closure absent in the behavior of the FAB, but only that it does and desperation. not show up in our interviews. What does show up in many interviews with non-combatants is that they were D. Force forced to work for the FAB: bring water, cut wood, carry munitions and supplies, scout and spy, etc. Many people Force—people being abducted, forced to join—was consider this one of the evils of the war they remember mentioned surprisingly rarely, given the general and want to talk about, always with much anger. association between force and child soldier recruitment that has come into being in scholarly and policy • 22 year old farmer from Nyanza-Lac: “during discussions (see Lancaster 2006; Taylor, Samii and the war, you couldn’t exercise any activity. They Mvukiyehe 2006: 7 for other studies that confirm this). took all the strong young men to transport munitions Three persons in our sample claimed they were forced for the military of the FAB, but we did not get to to join: a woman interviewed in Nyanza-Lac (now go through the system of demobilization whether married to another ex-combatant), a young man, and a through UNICEF or another organization; it is the child soldier, taken at night, together with his brother, at military themselves who sent us away for they no the age of 9. In our sample, all these forced recruitments longer needed us.” were by the CNDD/FDD. • 25 year old cook from Musaga; lived in an IDP • 28 year old woman in Nyanza-Lac, ex CNDD/ camp for much of the war: “sometimes we were FDD: “I did not go voluntarily into the maquis: I was forced by the military to carry their munitions. If we forced to follow them when they attacked my native refused we were beaten without mercy.” colline. If not, I would not have wanted a military career. I was maltreated and almost died. Luckily, It seems clear that the FAB did use force in getting God protected me because afterwards they obliged people (especially youth) to work for it, but it did not us to undergo military training. I got used to that life typically recruit these people as full-time soldiers: it 6 Ex-Combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left, how they fared A Profile of Ex-Combatants: Part 1 kept them mostly outside. The rebels seemed to have is also a clear ethnic connotation to this issue. Tutsi followed a different strategy in this respect. generally did see the army as their protector, and hence doing tasks for the army, even if not entirely voluntary, It is interesting to compare these results with Lancaster’s was not as deeply resented as was the case for those (2006: 11-12) results from his interviews with FAB Hutu who were obliged to do so. Maybe I spoke to more child soldiers in 2002: Hutu than did Lancaster. The children saw the Army as their best hope of E. Career and prestige survival. As cycles of panic and flight separated families across the country, a number of children had In the general literature on child soldiering, it is often no other choice but to beg protection from the Army. argued that young men join rebel movements because of It must be understood here that as the state was torn the machismo, the social prestige they derive from it. In apart, the only institution still functioning reasonably my interviews, only one single person—a 30 ear old ex- effectively was the Army. Consequently, it frequently CNDD unemployed urban man—said he joined because found itself filling a rather large vacuum. he considered being a soldier a desirable or prestigious thing to do. Many more people explicitly told us the It is difficult to understand the level of vulnerability opposite, namely that they did not desire that career if one does not at least grasp the basic elements of life path. For example in Burundi. Most Burundians live from the produce of very small farms. Both ethnic groups lived on • 32 year old farmer in Nyanza Lac: “my father the small holdings of a few hectares scattered far died during the early war and I joined the troops that and wide through mountainous terrain with only fought the army, something I’d never have thought of foot paths linking them. Lacking castles or fortified during my youth.” towns, the safest place to be during unsettled times was a military position, and the best way to be let in • 28 year old street shoe seller, Kamenge: was to provide a service. The army’s need for porters, “Before, I did not want to become a guerilla.” servants, scouts, and spies created space for children needing protection and food. • 25 year old rabatteur de bus, Kamenge: “Before the election and the death of Ndadaye, my father had My results in part confirm this analysis: many children wanted for me to join the army, but I didn’t want did work for the FAB, while others joined to find to.” security and/or income. However, the general tone of Lancaster’s argument is more positive than mine. In my Hence, the notion that soldiering attracts young men interviews, I heard many more people complain about because it is a glamorous, masculine job is not borne out the services they had to provide to the FAB, whereas by our conversations3. Lancaster suggests these relations were more voluntary, mutually beneficial. There can be many reasons for The story is very different for the 8 ex-FAB we spoke that difference. It may be that, once the war is over, to who had joined the army before the war. A military people in their interviews with me prefer to recall the career was clearly something people were proud of past in different terms, presenting themselves more as during the 1970s and 1980s. Most of these people had unwilling victims; or, conversely, that while the war was a high educational level—much higher than the people ongoing and they still were part of the FAB, the people recruited during the war, and also much higher than interviewed by Lancaster preferred to err at the side of their own parents: these men had clearly been upwardly safety and present things in a positive manner. There mobile in their own lives (confirmed by Taylor 2006: 3 data). 3 Lancaster 2006: 9 synthesizes the causes of child recruitment into government forces as investigated by himself in 2002: “poverty, displacement, loss of parents, hunger, search for status, peer pressure, and desire for revenge were This difference relates to a core dynamic of Burundi’s all cited as common causes of voluntary recruitment for all categories of child soldiers.” Most of this is found back in this research, with the exception of search for status and peer pressure. Ex-Combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left, how they fared 7 Part 1: A Profile of Ex-Combatants history. Indeed, in Burundi, as in many other countries, access to power and privilege. the army has been a crucial political, economic and social actor since shortly after independence. As so often, the This was the case from the highest levels to the lowest accidents of colonialism created institutional legacies levels. It is hard to imagine that people whose names are that were to influence political dynamics for decades feared in Burundi— foremost Buyoya in this day and to come. In Burundi, one of these accidents resides age, but also his predecessors Bagaza and Micombero, in the composition of the upper echelons of the army. and the many other senior military men who held During colonization, Tutsi were treated as superior by enormous power in the army and the state for decades— the colonial power: they got better access to education, all started as regular rural boys, herding cows in the which in turn allowed them access to positions within the hills, running barefoot to little rural schools, imbued state. Most of these positions accrued to Ganwa (royal in the local traditions of Burundi’s countryside. It was princes, considered by many an ethnic group apart) and their entry into the army that brought them farther than high-caste Tutsi, i.e. those with close links to the royal their wildest dreams, to worlds of power and privilege, court and its administration. There were also lower- of travel and consumption their parents could not even caste Tutsi—mostly Tutsi-Hima, herders from remoter envisage. provinces such as Bururi, Makamba and Mwaro—in Burundi. Historically, they could not give cows to the All the older FAB officers we spoke to fit this trajectory. King nor propose their daughters for marriage to the Interestingly, about half of them indicated that the Princes. They were Tutsi, but those at the court looked choice to become a military was made because they down on them. A large proportion of them, finding the failed at school—the army was still a second best, then, doors to the administration closed of to them by the compared to further studies. See for example the answer disdain of their higher-caste fellow Tutsi, ended up in of an old, demobilized officer living in Bujumbura, to the national army—a less prestigious choice, but still my social mobility question: a major step up for rural boys. The 1966 coup d’Etat by Nicombero which overthrew the monarchy and Yes, people change constantly of social category. the feeble democratic system then existing was thus a A young student who gets to go to university, and dramatic reversal of power within the Tutsi community, a university graduate who gets his first job, both as the previously inferior, rural Tutsi-Hima suddenly change social category. There are also those who became the rulers of the nation. Indeed, continuing fail at school and end up back in the field with intra-Tutsi enmities and fights for power determined a their parents. Among them some manage to enter lot of Burundi’s political evolution from them on. in the army or the police, or to do a small trade. And thus started a period of a few decades in which As much as a military career was a desirable one for almost the entire top of the army—and of the nation’s young Tutsi men before the war—and very much in political system—was composed of former farm demand on the marriage market—this changed during boys from Bururi. We forget what a dramatic change the war. Suddenly, being a career soldier meant an this was. It was by no means a continuation of a pre- enormous risk of being shot to pieces, of suffering badly colonial situation of Tutsi-dominated monarchy, as in the field, of being involved in brutal human rights some would have it. Not only was the King gone, and abuses. with him the entire system of monarchical values and administrators that held the country together—but also The fact that nobody told me of the prestige associated was the country governed by an entirely new group of with a military career runs counter to the scholarly young military men who had grown up on the farm and literature on soldiering in Africa. After all, the argument made it to stunning positions of power and privilege. goes, in societies where, because of widespread poverty For all of them, the army was the key mechanism for and social exclusion, young men find it very hard to their ascendance: not only was it the institution that achieve manhood, to live according to the expectations maintained control over the territory, but also it was of masculinity, joining armed groups is one way they their entry into this army that brought them personally can recapture a sense of prestige, of machismo, of 8 Ex-Combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left, how they fared A Profile of Ex-Combatants: Part 1 masculinity. Burundian men do not display any less there are some who revolt and decide to go and of a sense of masculinity than other men anywhere fight, while others revolt and seek to flee the in the world. Yet, they did not tell me about this in country forever, and others resign themselves and the conversations. It is true that this sort of argument turn to God and pray all day, and others still work is maybe not what they like to present to a stranger. harder than they ever did before simply to survive It may not be clear even to themselves to what extent and feed their families. All of them seek a solution masculinity played a role, or they may not be proud of to the same problems, but with different attitudes, it. This factor, then, may be part of the complex mix of different ways to affirm themselves. So, Peter, I unconscious motives that brought young men to join, think masculinity is a very moving target. It’s a especially for those who chose soldiering as a way out funny thing, this masculinity. of unemployment and poverty, but it seems unlikely, by itself, to have a strong explanatory value. One final remark. As said earlier, I did not interview any demobilized CNDD/FDD officers. This is in all Yet recent literature on masculinity does exactly that: likelihood because they have overwhelmingly been it generalizes far beyond what is acceptable. Even if integrated in the new army (FDN) and the police. For authors add occasional words like “many” or “some’ these young men, who were more educated than the to their statements, and even if they at times make large majority of the ordinary rebel recruits, joining reference to positive dynamics, they still end up making the CNDD/FDD may well have turned out to be an general statements in which there seems to exist only excellent long-term career move. This quote of a 30 one type of masculinity that seems to systematically years old ex-CNDD/FDD soldier, with one year of lead to one type of violent, sexually predatory behavior4. university education, who is now chef de police in a Nothing could be further from the truth. In Burundi, too, rural town, is illustrative: the large majority of young men face pretty much the same problems in terms of frustrated masculinity; yet, “as you can see, I am living very well. I have ultimately, only a small minority among them (less than a nice house and all the women are interested 3%) joined an armed movement during the war. The in me. I am one of only five people here in this large majority of them chose so many paths during those commune who can drink more than one primus tough years. What part of young men’s behavior, then, is without having to steal the money. I do not want explained by masculinity? a job in the local administration [we had asked him what he would do if he were to be communal I recall here a conversation with Adrien Tuyaga, one of administrator-PU]: his job is too insecure. Me, I my colleagues, after I had told him about the concept of will move up in grade and get a nice desk job in masculinity. the city in a few years.” I think that masculinity is a general phenomenon that is common in our society. Yet, in its expression, its perception, its identity, its interpretation, when III. Why they left you seek it, when you grant it, when it is given to you, it is a very individual thing. By instinct Why did soldiers demobilize? Of those with whom I of survival in the broadest sense, you adapt it to discussed this question, about two-thirds demobilized your personality, your direct context, your family voluntarily and one-third against their will. Those environment and responsibilities, etc. who did not want to demobilize were obliged to do so foremost because of their age (this includes many of Take a village where you find the same security, the FAB career soldiers); insubordination and lack of economic and social situation, with the same studies were mentioned as well. needs, the same frustrations. But in that village, • 50 year old career ex-FAB, now farmer in 4 See Barker & Ricardo 2007 for an example. This article is truly excellent, Ruhororo: “I did not want to demobilize, for the idea based on deep and original insights. Yet, at the same time, it presents a picture of almost unrelenting violence and exploitation of and by young men, as if no other modalities of social identity and interaction exist for young men. Ex-Combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left, how they fared 9 Part 1: A Profile of Ex-Combatants of getting used to another type of life was hard after • 36 year old farmer in Nyanza-Lac: “I used to 25 years in service. I was demobilized against my be a farmer, but since I am demobilized I cannot will because of age.” do it anymore for I am infirm as a result of having been shot; my left side is paralyzed and I cannot do • 30 year old ex-CNDD, now farmer and mason activities anymore that demand physical labor. That in Nyanza-Lac: “I was demobilized because I had is also why I was demobilized. I asked for it and put done no studies; if not, I always dreamt of a military myself on the list.” career.” • 38 year old farmer, Nyanza-Lac, former CNDD- Nyangoma, imprisoned for years in Tanzania: • 26 year old ex-FAB, now farmer in Ruhororo: “I joined voluntarily and left because we were “I am still young and I still have enough strength to successful, and I could go back to work the fields fight in the army. I was demobilized because, when I again.” took one glass too many, I fought with other soldiers or I insulted someone who provoked me, even if it • 32 year old ex-CNDD farmer: “After the was my superior.” ceasefire, when we were in the cantonment camp, we talked with our friends, and started realizing that The answers of those who requested to be demobilized all that had been promised to us were utopias—that fall into four groups. Some of them were tired of it would never be possible to give to all combatants the war, simply wanted to return to regular life, stop what had been promised to them. We told ourselves fighting and moving around and constantly being that we fought for the authorities who have a higher afraid. A second group was sick or wounded, and could educational level than we do. I saw that even if I not go on anymore in any case—they were forced by wasn’t demobilized, I would not get a major gain circumstances. A third group argued that they had won: from it. So I asked for the demobilization.” their goal for joining had been achieved, and now it was time to return to regular life. Those answers came I also received 16 answers from the self-demobilized from the group that had joined for ideological reasons as to why they made their decision to quit. The largest in the first place. A last group, finally, was angry at the category of explanations of their quitting their outfits military structures they were part of: they left because revolve around sickness and injury; a large number were they had not been paid, they were treated badly, they felt angry at the military structures they were part of; the others were afraid and found the life of constant battle threatened by internal purges, etc. and deprivation too hard. In short, they left for the exact same reasons the officially demobilized did—they only • 33 year old ex-FAB taxi-vélo, Ruhororo: “I had the misfortune of doing so too early, usually without wanted to leave my military career. In fact, I wanted permission of their superiors—and as a result, from their to do it for a long time, but because desertion own perspective, after years of suffering, they are the is forbidden, I prayed to the kind God that the ones who missed out on the pay-out . opportunity to leave would present itself one day. I have experienced the horrors that take place on In conclusion, two-thirds of the demobilized combatants the battle field, because I ought to have been killed told us they wanted to leave, and few of them mentioned many times from confrontations with the rebels (two money as the key factor. All the self-demobilized, by brothers have been killed). I would like to try another definition, had already voted with their feet: they, too, life than a military career.” had clearly not wanted to remain combatants. All in all, then, only a small proportion of ex-combatants • 28 year old driver, Kamenge, ex-CNDD/FDD: were demobilized against their will. Does this imply “I volunteered to be demobilized in April 2003. I felt that we did not really need a DDR program, for most tired; my body had gotten too many physical and soldiers would have demobilized in any case? It is hard moral shocks.” to answer this question, for it requires us to construct 10 Ex-Combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left, how they fared A Profile of Ex-Combatants: Part 1 counter-factual scenarios about people’s motives and actions. DDR programs can be considered as means to buy time for peace to produce its beneficial effects. They are not social service programs, or development projects, but simply conflict reduction tools during a transition from war to peace. What DDR programs really do is not to entice combatants to abandon the soldiering career path—for most would do so regardless, and the whole process is in any case deeply dependent on peace agreements—but rather to make their transition to a new life more successful by increasing their income and stabilizing their new livelihood. This, then, might lower their temptation to return to their former profession, or simply to terrorize their neighbors and communities in search of survival. This is what the MDRP sets out to achieve. This implies that DDR programs must be evaluated not only by how many people they demobilized—for that indicator is likely to far over-state impact—but by how successful they were in creating worthwhile economic opportunities for all ex-combatants5. It is only if this is the case that the communities these ex-combatants return to are safer. In this respect, there are still serious challenges remaining for the Burundian DDR program. This is what we now turn to. 5 I personally believe that this judgment should include the self-demobilized soldiers, for their unwillingness to live peacefully in a new post-war economy can have a profoundly destabilizing impact on political stability—as is attested by the fact that the large majority of self-demobilized we interviewed had been approached for recruitment during the preceding weeks by a number of actors. Ex-Combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left, how they fared 11 Part 2: After Demobilization Part 2: After Demobilization – which was the objective of the program. I. The Economic Picture In the IDP camp in Ruhororo, rather exceptionally, From an economic perspective, the cases of child UNICEF allowed the child soldiers to receive cash for soldiers, of demobilized adults in the North, in the South, themselves. I interviewed three child soldiers in that and in the capital, and of course of self-demobilized are place. Two of them (both 18 year old ex-FAB, both in very different, and so we will discuss them separately. economic category 26) seem to have done reasonably well with that. A. The child soldiers • “with the money I got from the demob program, Apart from one gardien de la paix, all 8 former child I started a boutique and it is still working well;” soldiers I interviewed received the funds—or, to be precise: their families did, as per international protocols • “with the money from demobilization program, on supporting the reintegration of former child soldiers. I bought goats and I am raising them. I also bought All except one were in the two poorest economic groups a bicycle to have a taxi-vélo, but someone stole it. I in their communities. However, none of them told us also bought a small piece of land.” that they were better off beforehand. This suggests, as did a study done by the World Bank in May 2006, that While these are too few cases to draw major conclusions these child soldiers–or more precisely the households from, this suggests that the program could have given in which they were integrated and from which they cash as well. The third person (ex-FAB as well, 19 years originated—are basically as badly or as well off as old) had major family emergencies that needed to be everyone else around them (Taouti-Cherif 2006: 7). addressed: The ex child soldiers we interviewed claim they that “My father is deceased. With the money from most of their demobilization allowance has been spent the program, I had to support my mother and on social expenditures for their families. This confirms my younger siblings; repair the house we all the logic of the set-up of the child soldier demobilization live in, which was in a pitiful state; and get one program, in which cash is not given to the child soldier of my brothers out of the hospital where he was himself; instead, the implementing agencies negotiate imprisoned for not paying his hospitalization fees. with the host families of the child soldiers on what the I have no plans for the future, because I have no allowance should be used for and the support is then money.” given in kind. The allowance was too small to make any of them better off, and the set-up (18 monthly payments To finish this discussion, then: most child soldiers are of 20$) favored social rather than individual or in the lower economic groups in which their families entrepreneurial investments. It is true that the program found themselves in before the war. The set-up of the also pays school or vocational training fees for those who program a) favored their reinsertion into their families, so desire, as well as some exceptional medical expenses and sought to achieve this by negotiating the use of their if required. In short, through this design, the level of well-being of the child soldiers and their families by and Throughout the research, we tried to categorize interviewees in three 6 economic groups—indigent (1), poor (2), and non-poor (3). This was based large became equal to that of others in the community on information obtained about number of farm animals, quality of the house, frequency of hiring labor, and presence of off-farm income sources. The judgments we made are necessarily imperfect, but they do provide a decent 12 Ex-Combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left, how they fared indication. After Demobilization: Part 2 allowance with their host families, and b) gave them a category of rural life. We have no reason to assume that small amount of money that made no major difference in this is the result of their better initial conditions. The their or their family’s situation. As a result, they did not only thing that sets these demobilized soldiers apart is suddenly and individually “fall into money” (contrary that they fell into a lot of money. to what is the case with some of the adult demobilized soldiers, as we will discuss below) and their economic All received what are by rural standards major financial situation reverted pretty much back to the situation ex packages upon demobilizing, and the large majority of ante quo. As most rural households fall into economic them invested this reinsertion money in off-farm income category 1 and 2 as well, this suggests that they are generation. Most of them had distinctly more resources neither richer nor poorer than their families and/or their –bikes, radios, animals, a boutique—that allowed them situation of departure. This can be considered either a to invest in off-agriculture opportunities, and plow part success (as program managers do) or a failure (as many of the profit back into the farm which was taken care of of the child soldiers do, as does Lancaster 2005: 30). by their wives. Many of these people seemed distinctly at ease with their lives, talking about dreams they had, The rationale for the difference between programs investments they intended to make, etc. It seems we can working for child soldiers and those catering to regular describe the demobilized soldiers in Ngozi as a new ex-combatants, respects the Cape Town principles on entrepreneurial middle class. assisting child soldiers, but, it seems to me, makes little sense. These young men are mostly 18 or 19 years old. They fought for years. They are not children in any Many of these people seemed distinctly at ease with meaning of the term: they have done more, seen more, their lives, talking about dreams they had, investments suffered more, and inflicted more pain than most of the they intended to make, etc. adults managing the program (see too Lancaster 2005: 31). Why, then, give them significantly less than what • 28 year old PMPA, self-identified as a trader: the adult ex-combatants receive, just because their “I am a business man. I import goods from other birthday is a few months earlier? Cannot a system of countries and sell them in Burundi’s cities. Although sliding scales be introduced—sliding in function of age I am educated as a teacher, I will not earn enough and/or in function of number of years of combat? Why in this profession. For that reason, I follow in my also not allow them to invest more in a single project? father’s footsteps as a businessman. I have seven goats.” To finish this discussion, then: the economic situation of the child soldiers has reverted pretty much back to • 28 years old ex-CNDD, married for 7 years, but the situation they left years earlier. Especially for urban demobilized only in 2005: ”During the harvest, I buy child soldiers, the resulting situation could be dire: the and stock food and sell later, waiting for prices to funds may not last long in the city as in rural areas and increase. If I have money, I go to Rwanda to import could be insufficient for productive investments in goods and sell them in Ngozi. My wife also does developing a livelihood. There is thus a real risk that farming (she has 8 goats as well). I have not had a some of these children could become part of the urban fixed job since demobilization.” world’s underclass. • 33 year old ex-FAB, Ruhororo IDP camp: “With the demobilization money, I have bought B. Demobilized ex-combatants additional land, and one cow and three goats to have in Ngozi Province (Busiga and fertilizer to enrich the earth. I already had 3 cows, and I hope that I will have enough fertilizer for all Ruhororo) my properties. Today, the number of goats I have is 8. Even before demobilization, I always saw my life in The story is surprisingly different for the 10 demobilized agriculture and animal husbandry, and I have always adults (4 CNDD and 6 FAB) we interviewed in Ngozi had the thirst to extend the property that my parents province. Out of the ten, 9 fell into the highest economic left for me. I will continue to improve my techniques Ex-Combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left, how they fared 13 Part 2: After Demobilization for husbandry and agriculture. If I am able to make a they received on non-productive activities, such as profit, I will invest in a small trade.” rebuilding houses, buying food, getting health care for family members, paying past hospital bills, etc. The last Note that these results are not to be expected throughout years have seen extremely unfavorable weather and very the Burundian territory, as we will see in the following bad harvests in northern Burundi, creating famine and pages. I think they are likely to be more representative of extreme poverty in many places. This made it hard for a) rural areas rather than urban ones, b) ex-combatants some ex-combatants to engage in profitable investments, who returned to the homes that were still in existence, although through no fault of the DDR program. and c) people who returned to the North and Center of the country—regions with similarly extreme population Finally, we met one person who represented the fears of density and stagnant agriculture. all development managers who manage cash programs (as opposed to in-kind), for he blatantly wasted the Note also that most of these people had not yet started money he received. While such persons evidently exist, to receive the inputs for their micro-project: the things they are a very small minority. they bought—land, animals, cases of Primus, bikes, boutiques—they did exclusively with the reinsertion • 26 year old ex-FAB, Ruhororo IDP camp: “The payments they had already received. Most of them money that I was given went first to help with the are still to obtain, at some point in the future, in-kind needs of my parents who live in extreme poverty. assistance (value of up to 600,000 francs) to use in an Also, I like to drink alcohol because it improves income-generating project. Hence, I expect that their my morale. I could not stop myself from drinking upwards economic movement will be further solidified. if I have the means for it. After having spent six years in the military, I am no longer able to adapt to Of course, there are always exceptions, and they are cultivation. I have gone there a few times, but I am very instructive. Some of the ex-FAB career soldiers— unable to hoe the earth Monday to Saturday. When I long-term, regular, career soldiers, that is, not new don’t go to the fields, I spend my time in the ligala to recruits during the civil war—felt they lost as a result of see if there is someone who will buy me a local beer, demobilization: they resented the loss of both the volume or if I can earn a little money to buy one for myself. and the predictability of their salaries. Their case, then, I had hoped to be able to make a project with the is one of people already being in the rural middle class, last installment (of the 600,000FBU), but there too, and becoming less secure following demobilization. things worked against my expectations because the Indeed, the houses they lived in where much better than money disappeared. I have nothing left today.” those of almost everyone around them—nice furniture, tiles, decorated walls, cushions. But they were palpably This person is the only ex-combatant in Ngozi whom we afraid of the future. put in the lowest economic category. We did not have the chance to figure out if he suffered from trauma. Second, not all demobilized, evidently, invested equally well, or had the same success with their investments. C. Demobilized combatants in Whether it is theft or disease or economic downturn or simply bad management, it is clear that investments can Nyanza-Lac and do fail, and hence ex-combatants can fall back to the situation they started from. In any market-based system, The collines where we were doing these interviews, as rural life in Burundi is, failure is always a possibility, like so many others in the province of Makamba, had and there is no way to avoid that (although better been almost totally empty of people during the last business training and the development of an insurance years of the war: everyone had fled either to IDP camps system might actually achieve a lot here). or abroad. Return waves only began in 2003 and are still ongoing: in each bureau de zone we passed, every Thirdly, some ex-combatants encountered urgent needs morning trucks disgorged new returnee families, their at home. As a result, they had to use part of the money meager possessions and starter kits all around them, 14 Ex-Combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left, how they fared After Demobilization: Part 2 their children looking wide-eyed at this new land that • 37 year old infirm man, ex CNDD-FDD: ”I is theirs. started a small commerce of palm oil with some of the funds from the demobilization.” Indeed, almost all the demobilized—especially the older ones—we spoke to in Nyanza-Lac had to invest • 28 year old female farmer, ex CNDD-FDD: most of their money in the basic establishment of their ”we bought a goat, and two parcels of land where we household. planted manioc. We kept some money and will soon start building our own house.” • 37 year old farmer, ex-CNDD: “I used the money to build a house for my wife and four • 42 year old sous-chef de colline, ex-CNDD- children. As we had to begin doing agriculture here FDD: “I bought a piece of land. I also opened a from scratch, I also used the rest to buy food for a restaurant in my house [this man is clearly proud of his spirit of entrepreneurship].” year.” In Nyanza-Lac, investments were often in farming— • 30 years old farmer, ex-CNDD-Nyangoma: unlike in Ngozi, where they were almost all in off-farm “yes, I got demob fees but I did not use them for income sources. In both cases, this reflects the dreams development purposes because I had nothing at all and aspirations of all people in these communities. In when I returned here. As you can see, I am not a child Nyanza-Lac, there is a general sense of the promise anymore and it is astonishing that I have married so of farming, especially palm oil and manioc, whereas recently. I used the money to construct my house and in Ngozi there is almost unanimity that only off-farm also to pay for the wedding. I don’t regret it because income can help a family move ahead. The demonstrates I know I used it for useful goals.” that demobilized are not wasting their money, but investing it exactly the way any person would if s/he • 32 year old farmer, ex-Kaze-FDD were to fall into money—not worse (but also, admittedly, Ndayirengurukiye: “With the first 300,000 francs, not better7). I had to take care of lots of material needs: house, food. Afterwards (90,000 francs every 3 months), In Nyanza-Lac, ex-combatants across the board I hired people to work in the fields to cultivate my complained much more bitterly than in Ngozi province land.” of the fact that the promised micro-project funds had not yet been disbursed. The following quotes speak for The demobilized soldiers who returned to Nyanza-Lac themselves: thus faced high start-up costs. They had to build houses and start agriculture from scratch, which means that • 47 year old farmer, Nyanza-Lac: “We their production and income for at least a year was far demobilized of our colline got together to think of below normal. For all these people, then, a much higher a joint activity and the main idea was this house proportion of the demobilization wages had to go into of the association [points to it]. We put together money to buy a parcel and construct a house, but our non-directly productive investments, which may explain disappointment is great that we cannot pursue the why they are in a lower economic category. They were trade activities we envisage. Now we have the house no different from the non-combatants in these collines and we don’t know what to do with it: rent it out, or in this respect: they had the same needs and did the same do some small trade, but to sell what if we have no things others did. money? (…) If we got the money, we could put a part into the association and develop a serious business, For some of them, there was still money left to invest: and put a part into our own personal activities. I would buy a piece of land to cultivate. (…) We 7 The fact that ex-combatants invest their funds in exactly what their neighbors were happy with the Demobilization Commission at invest in can be seen as a good sign—it demonstrates ex-combatants are not first, the training on reintegration, on AIDS, and the wasting their money—or as a bad sign: they are simply further saturating already saturated markets, failing to diversify. Clearly, better economic encadrement and training might have avoided some of that. Ex-Combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left, how they fared 15 Part 2: After Demobilization money we received every three months. But since may make it to the middle class then. everything has fallen apart. We don’t know what became of that Commission and what they think of us.” D. Demobilized in the city This category is mostly a more extreme version of the • 38 year old farmer: “We have been asking problems of Nyanza-Lac. Many of the non-officer ex- for the remaining money many times. We did so in combatants who return to the city face major costs of peace, but we are former soldiers and if our request a non-productive nature right away, while at the same is not satisfied, we will use forceful means.” time having few ways of earning money. They are from poor families in poor neighborhoods; they have • 25 year old farmer: (interviewed together with less schooling than the already low average around the previous): “I don’t want to use force, but if this them; and they lost the social networks which are so situation goes on for, like, five years, I’d lose hope important to progress in the city. They are truly in a and do anything. You can’t see others live well and tough situation. As a result, for them, even more than you yourself know you’re deprived of your rights.” for those in Nyanza-Lac, the tardiness of the micro- project is truly problematic to them. Many of them This stronger anger could be for either—or both—of complained bitterly about incurring debts while waiting two reasons. First, many of these people were generally for the micro-project. Add to this a much more generally politically more explicit than the ex-combatants we politically charged environment, and it is here that one interviewed elsewhere. They were often people who had finds by far some of the most critical and angry voices joined because of an explicit political agenda, and many about the DDR program. of them (all three quoted above, for example) were not CNDD/FDD supporters but rather CNDD (Nyangoma) or Kaze-FDD supporters. In other words, they may have Here are some longer quotes—one from an ex-FAB felt more at ease to criticize government policies as they soldier and two from ex-CNDD rebels—that give a identified less strongly with the party which controls good idea of the urban situation: national power. The second reason may be a follow-up from what we discussed so far: as most of them had had • Unemployed young man in Musaga: “Everyone to spend much more of their demobilization payments got 303,000 francs as 9 months of salary. In the army on constructing or upgrading their houses and on initial I touched about 3 times less for the same amount basic survival, they may have felt the absence of the of work. With the money I bought some personal micro-project funds much more keenly. things, for I had nothing personal in the army. Now the money is used and I am back at the starting point. Unlike in Ngozi province, the demobs we talked to in I do have hope, but not much.” Nyanza-Lac did not belong to the highest economic class. Whereas in Ngozi, 9 out of 10 demobilized ex- • 28 years old shoe seller, Kamenge: “I was a combatants were in the highest rural economic class 3, volunteer to be demobilized and I received my wages in Nyanza-Lac only 1 out of 12 was in that group. Ten but I still await the micro-project phase and I don’t were in the middle group (“poor”), and one in category know when that will be. The DDR program is good 1, the indigent. This suggests that in Nyanza-Lac, the but the problem is that the people who take care of it sum they received—just the reinsertion payments so work slowly and there are too many procedures. It is far, but not yet the reintegration assistance—was not already one year we wait for the micro-project. In the sufficient to make much a of a difference compared to meantime we become indebted, and when the project their neighbors (who often received reinstallation aid, money will come, instead of doing a project we will which our ex-combatants did not receive). At the same need to use it to pay off the debts. (…) The money I time, it does seem to protect ex-combatants against got during the first phase of the DDR program didn’t destitution. This may change when they get the micro- serve me for much because after all these years in the project funds and if they use these well: more of them army, there were many problems to solve at home, 16 Ex-Combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left, how they fared After Demobilization: Part 2 and we ourselves had nothing either: we needed to would buy a bike to do taxi-vélo, but also buy some buy clothes, a mattress, etc. It was a good program, chicken, and a stall to sell stuff along the road. My but the implementation is too slow and finally it will plan would then be to live off the money earned and not be profitable anymore for us beneficiaries. Now to be able to buy back my driver’s license (that will that I am not getting the wages anymore I need to cost me 30,000 francs8) and look for better work.” find myself the money for the rent of my place. For months I am looking for work, any work, but without There is a second, entirely different category of results. demobilized in the city of Bujumbura city, and it consists of former career FAB soldiers, often officers. • 28 year old driver, Kamenge: “I was a field They spent many more years in the army—decades, man, and towards the end I became garde de corps of sometimes—and have better educational levels. While a general (the same one who had recruited me). I also the ones I spoke to were all born in the interior, they assured the protection of many high officers who now had established residence in Bujumbura city by the occupy important places and who don’t do anything at time they were demobilized: these are all people who all for us and don’t even want to see us. When I think are upwardly mobile compared to their parents who of that, I look at my son who had fever this morning were herders and farmers in the collines. They are also and I can’t even buy him medicines (a neighbor much better off than the young ex-combatants we just helped me and gave me a tablet of paracetamol). In discussed: most of them fall in economic category 3 and any case he will never be a military: I will do all I can 4. Their situation is dual. From one perspective, like the to dissuade him of that. (…) I got the salaries of the first phase but I still wait for the second project phase. career ex-FAB soldiers we met in the interior, they are The DDR program is a good one, with its two phases. losing the security of a decent and stable salary. On the But the problem is that often with the money of the other hand, they possess much more financial, social first phase, when you come home, you are obliged to and human capital than all the other ex-combatants equip yourself (mattress, clothes, do some work on discussed so far; they tend to have houses, wives with a room in your family’s house, or rent a room). So salaried jobs, older children with university degrees, when the second project phase is delayed because of well-connected and wealthy friends. They seem mostly bureaucratic reasons and the people who manage the to have converted successfully to civilian life, with the project make a catastrophe out of it, you are obliged exception of a severely wounded man. to get into debt instead of doing a project; the longer it takes, the worse the situation becomes. (…) I will continue to demand my rights with the bosses who E. The plight of the self- are now in power because of our fight. Now that we demobilized won, we succeeded in our mission, and they pretend they forgot us but they know, the DDR program is The self-demobilized did not receive support from the money of the UN, it is not theirs. (…) You cannot anyone, except their families. This situation they by and imagine one day passed in the forest as a fighter, large share with their fellow urban youth, which is also what that represents in terms of suffering, of pain… not supported by any agency whatsoever. However, they and yet, in the field, during the “causeries morales” did spend much of their youth fighting and suffering they promised to never drop us. Now they are in the extraordinarily, and this makes them extremely bitter. government they need to find us work for the DDR They are as a group more feeling more excluded, more money is just enough to go home and not need to beg depressed, more hopeless than any other urban group the first days… It is them who make the lists, it is our we talked to—and that is saying a lot, as the level of movement which is in power, so they could at least plead for us…. If I got the money from the 2nd phase hopelessness and depression was higher in urban areas of DDR by Jan 2007, I would have to reimburse a than in rural ones. They are also angry—actually, it debt of 50,000 francs, which isn’t too bad, compared seems their anger is their defining identity feature. This to others who have to reimburse 18 months of rent! I holds for all the self-demobilized we met, whether from CNDD/FDD, FAB or FNL. 8 Note that a driver’s license legally cost 5,000 francs at the time, but everyone knows that the real price, i.e., after kickback, is 30,000 francs. Ex-Combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left, how they fared 17 Part 2: After Demobilization A few quotes will illustrate this. For evident reasons, I better. Our cause has succeeded, but we feel like kept all of these people without identifiers. Suffice it to useless heroes. Now it is time to share and we are say these are all below 26 years of age and all started as excluded from the list. I would advise the people in child soldiers, sometimes as young as age 11. They all live power to be very wise and attentive to the question of in neighborhoods of Bujumbura city or the immediately the self-demobilized. There is always one movement adjoining collines of Bujumbura rural. They are mostly out there and if this continues like this, why not go unemployed and amongst the very poorest people we there to seek what we did not get and to recuperate met. The quotes below include combatants from all our lost time? Now we know how it works and we three parties to the conflict. will not be had again. • I have no regrets about my military past, • With a group of friends in the same situation because we got what we wanted to get (peace and we went to plead our case to get also a registration power sharing). But I am very angry about one thing, number like all the others to be either reintegrated and that is that they are in power now because of or demobilized, but the response was negative: our our fighting and they forgot us, dropped us, even superiors would not even listen to us. (…) I don’t without a thank you like the others got (the formally know why I did not get any support from those who demobilized). (..) The people on whom I counted, made me work all these years (1996-2004) and now those for whom I worked all these years, now pretend they don’t even want to see me. The war has affected to forget us, to ignore us. (…) I find that I did a useless me too much, in every way: for me, it is about fear sacrifice for it is neither recognized nor recompensed. and disappointment, too many useless sacrifices. I look at young people my age who went to school, most of them are well off. (…) I am pleased with the peace and the cohabitation in my neighborhood, but • Of course I request the movement, which is it remains very fragile as long as there are people in now the government, to recognize me and to support our situation, with permanent anger: bad temptations me for I have suffered through more than 5 years out of despair can attract you as long as you feel of fighting, of suffering and of sacrifice, in order to yourself to suffer from injustice. For example, I arrive. They have promised to do it before and it is myself start to think that the sole solution for me is now time they do it. If I could just get indemnities still to take up arms and fight. It would be better than like the others, or simply a job. Now I pass my time the life I lead now. I did everything to claim what is here doing nothing, moving through the city, hoping due to me, I even went to see the General and they for a small opportunity that almost never comes. say “we will see.” It hurts when you see false lists, with young men who are inscribed because they are And it goes on and on like this. Clearly, their sense of family of a high ranking officer, who now receive being neglected, of having sacrificed themselves without demob funds without ever having fought, and we are recognition or compensation, is very strong. For many there, we see all of this…. of them, it seems to be the defining feature of their new identities. They receive no support at all: indeed, most • Now I am here, I do nothing, I look for work of them bitterly complain about not being seen by their without finding it, I feel very frustrated and I think it former commanders, or not being let into the building is unjust. I went to see my ex-commander who works or, if they do get in, of being rapidly dismissed. It is here in Bujumbura and he even refuses me to enter the humiliation of that treatment that seems to sting the the building. I have no hope at all today for receiving demob fees; maybe there is someone who gets them most—the denial of their combatant identities. in my place. (...) I live in the family house with my brothers and sisters and my mother and I contribute Not surprisingly, most self-demobilized have serious nothing but eat two meals a day. trouble with their reintegration. In a study of DDR in Sierra Leone, the study team argues “that reintegration of • I compare our situation and the one of young ex-combatants after the war in Sierra Leone is hindered… people who did not fight, their situation is today by a strong sense of grievance among young people 18 Ex-Combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left, how they fared After Demobilization: Part 2 who believe that they have not been fairly treated in the The plight of the self-demobilized could pose a threat [DDR].”9 This fits the idea observed in an IPA study that to the consolidation of peace. The majority of those we those “who perceive themselves as belonging…apart sampled were angry and frustrated, badly reintegrated in from the rest of society…have trouble reintegrating their communities. The level of threats they voiced was socially and psychologically.”10 These self-demobilized high. It seems urgent that some creative thinking takes youth, it seems to me, are deeply defined by their sense place around this issue. of exclusion and injustice done to them. Few of the self- demobilized we talked to have married since returning, What to do about this situation? The first step is to or have found a job; indeed, most of them have no plans recognize the problem. These people are mostly for the future. They display signs of depression and invisible to policy-makers. They are often among the alienation and lack of social reintegration poorest. They are afraid to be too visible, for they worry they could run into trouble with the law. So far, their sole strategy seems to have consisted of trying, individually There are some exceptions, and, unsurprisingly, these or in small groups, to get to their former superiors and are the ones with jobs. Two FAB self-demobilized are asking for money. But their former military superiors— security guards; one ex-CNDD had a mini-bakery; a many of whom are now in the army or the police, some female rural ex-combatant became chef de colline; of whom are fighting still (FNL)—neglect them and and, finally, one ex-FNL took up his studies again and close the door to them. In short, nobody speaks for them finished high school (admittedly he only did one year or supports them. in the FNL, the lowest of any of our self-demobilized, so he is not very representative). These people—all of It may be hard to formally include them in DDR them in economic category 2 or 3—did not display the programming. Military ethos, as well as management usual bitterness. They had moved on. But within our and targeting problems, militate against that solution— sample they were the exceptions. although it should still be considered. Maybe they should best be targeted in broader programs designed One could argue that, everywhere in the world, people for income generation in urban areas or for supporting who leave armies or rebels groups without permission the social inclusion of young people. Support, based on are deserters—in many places, the death sentence is the vulnerability and need, rather than ex-combatant status, answer to that. On the other hand, nobody should forget might in this case indeed be more likely to benefit that, with few exceptions, the self-demobilized we met true reintegration. There is generally a dearth of such were children when they were recruited. And now they programs in Bujumbura. Indeed, one of the major—and are totally discarded because they had the misfortune surprising—observations we made in our research of being too sick, too tired of it, too smart to continue is the profound neglect of the city of Bujumbura. acting as canon fodder. As Adrien Tuyaga observed well Reconstruction programs are more present in rural areas in a video JAMAA (a local youth organization) made on than in urban ones; projects and programs providing this subject: “we are punishing these self-demobilized micro-credit, associational support, job creation and children11. Their only fault is that they understood that training are almost totally absent from Bujumbura. the war is not for them, and that they returned without This is generally a dangerous situation, which ought the permission of their butchers.” to change. New programming ought to urgently come online for marginal urban youth, and efforts should be undertaken that self-demobilized young men are 9 Richards et al. 2003: 5. As we will see later, this holds—but, I believe, to a included in this. much lesser extent—for many of the demobilized child soldiers as well. 10 Hagman & Nielson 2002: 4. 11 Note that the use of the term “child soldier” here is different from the This will require some fine work with these young regular use. In DDR programs, the word ‘child’ refers to combatants under people. Much of their identity is currently tied up in a the age of 18 when they left. While many in my sample were young, they were often not children when they left. Note also that regulations state that sense of victimization. For them to reach some degree self-demobilized children can actually access the child soldier program, so of closure, then, may well require respecting—and for some of them the issue is more one of awareness raising than exclusion. For the majority of my interviewees who were more than 18 at self- demobilization, though, there was no venue for support. Ex-Combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left, how they fared 19 Part 2: After Demobilization addressing, modifying—their identities of exclusion. Bujumbura city center), none of these jobs was earning They will need to be treated with utmost respect, their past well. But all of these were young men working, morning not brushed under the table. It will take an organization, to evening, to support themselves. and people, sympathetic to their plight, to pull this dual mandate off. It will also take serious participation by the Re-reading the interviews with these eight young self-demobilized themselves to make this happen. men, and comparing them to the interviews we did with others of the same age but who had not fought, one observes few striking differences. They wanted to II. Social Reinsertion marry like other young men. They wanted their children to be educated like the overwhelming majority of others do. They made fine analyses of life around them. They A.Child soldiers worked hard. In our interviews, all the child soldiers except one had There was only one exception, one child soldier who returned to the original family home, except for one told us of his alienation: “The members of my family young man whose parents were deceased and who have no consideration for me anymore. I rarely confide had returned to the uncle he lived with during the myself in them. Twice I was imprisoned by the police, war, just before he joined. This mirrors the fact that and it is my paternal uncle who came to plead in my nationwide more than 90% of child soldiers live with favor.” This is a rural young man: he used to be a porter their biological families (see too Tatoui-Cherif 2006: for the FAB, and was officially demobilized. He was 21). This suggests that child soldiers have not become interviewed in the ligala, a place he clearly knew well. social outcasts, systematically rejected by their families and communities. There were few reprisals or violent Where does this general image of child soldiers as rejections. And the pleasure was both ways. Hear one criminals, then, come from? It may be a reflection of of them talk about his family: “I was a child soldier wider distrust, of anger at these young men who were and I left my parents and I was very anxious because I killers and whom people may know did bad things. thought that I would die one day and leave them in sorry Knowledgeable people tell me that in some communes, situation. It was a joy for me when I was demobilized there were cases of serious anger by people against the and I found my parents still living.” child soldiers receiving demob funds. The argument was: why would these young men, who were the most At the same time we are pleasantly surprised by this cruel and violent, get money—whereas the ones who very high rate of reintegration, there exists a significant stayed home, who suffered from the war, who helped image in the rural world of describing–or rather lumping their parents, get nothing? In our discussions, nobody together, dismissing—returned child soldiers as drunks, ever made such public outcries of anger, but it may petty criminals, or drug users, hanging out at the centre well be that the way child soldiers were systematically de negoce, wasting their money, and generally being described as little criminals had something to do with a dangerous. This stereotype was presented regularly, in basic unease among some members of the community small remarks here and there, never with proof but as a towards them. Or it may simply be a general instance sort of evident fact. Administrators and policemen, for of the imagery local communities tend to attach to example, routinely warned us of the child soldiers in marginal young men. these terms. Indeed, our general research revealed that Burundians Our interviews did not support this description. All generally refer to marginalized young people in eight UNICEF-supported child soldiers we talked to terms of banditry and prostitution. This whole area of were working: groom, woodworking, selling clothes in personal responsibility, success and failure, and social the city, farming, taxi-vélo, running a small boutique. marginalization is at the very heart of how Burundians With the exception of one (the orphan whose uncle had interpret their society. Very often, and almost always in made him foreman in a sizeable woodworking shop in urban areas, conversations contained references to the 20 Ex-Combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left, how they fared After Demobilization: Part 2 “centre de negoce” and the “ligala” and, for women, “prostitution.” These are the key words to describe B. Demobilized soldiers people who don’t live the way society values—“deviant” or “marginal” people, in sociological language. The The social reinsertion of adult ex-combatants is centre de negoce refers to a market area, often very generally quite good, it seems, although there are some small, where people come to buy and sell things. There hints of problems. The largest number of interviewees are often a slew of little bars there, maybe someone says that they are well treated by their neighbors and selling goat brochettes, a couple of boutiques and a few families: they do not mention any conflicts or problems artisan shops—bike and shoe repair, for example. Youth at all (see Taylor, Samii and Mvukiyehe 2006: 18 for the hangs out there, especially in the afternoon, both in the same results). As these were people who were often very countryside and in the city. Ligala is a Swahili word that critical about other issues, I see no reason to assume denotes a place to hang out. It could be a market place, or they were all lying about this one issue. any other public place where people tend to congregate. In the city, these are often places on the street sidewalk, Most of the adult ex-combatants we talked to had under a tree mostly, so there is some shade. It is a word retuned to their collines of birth, or, in the city, to their with a negative connotation—as is centre de negoce, neighborhoods of previous residence. This sample, when used in this way. There is an element of idleness then, suggests (subject to conformation by a more in it, of menace, of deviance. In Bujumbura, the term robust research) that there has not been a massive move ligala also has an association with the violent events of of demobilized soldiers to the city—a prevalent fear the beginning of the war: it is youth hanging out at ligala among many observers. As a result, ex-combatants lived that did the brutal killings during those awful years. The in places where people knew them, their families, their term “prostitution” is of course applied to women, and past lives. Moreover, three of the ex-combatants we met similarly denotes a fall from grace, a failure to live up had been elected in the conseil collinaire a year ago—a to expectations of productivity and chastity. All these, sure sign that they are not only well integrated but that then, are images used mainly for young people, and they actually have the respect of their communities. their power lies in their association with failure—lack of leading a productive, socially valued life. These are Many ex-combatants also returned to pretty much mono- the images that come to Burundians’ minds when they ethnic communities. The demobilized in Ruhororo camp, thing about marginal youth. It is these same terms that for example, which is a fully Tutsi IDP camp, were all were used when describing many child soldiers and ex-FAB. In Kamenge, an almost exclusively Hutu demobilized soldiers, because these young men are equal neighborhood, we only found CNDD/FDD and FNL marginal from the mainstream expectations of life. ex-combatants, whereas in Musaga all but one were ex- FAB. That helps their social reintegration as well: they A final point to be addressed here is the issue of jealousy. may be considered heroes in their communities. As a 16 Is there a strong sense of jealousy among people in the year old student told us admiringly: “the ex-combatants communities where the child soldiers return to about are my friends, and I consider them my big brothers. the benefits received by the latter? The Taouti-Cherif They liberated us, and I feel stronger than before, more report suggests that there may be (and recommends secure than before. It is a pity that after all they did, further research); occasional radio emissions document they are in this situation [of poverty].” The situation is cases of jealousy turned violent; Burundian and foreign harder for the self-demobilized, as they can at any time experts in Bujumbura unanimously told us this is a be denounced by neighbors with a grudge, and either major problem. Yet in our interviews, it never came imprisoned or re-captured. up. Admittedly, we did not ask questions specifically related to it, but nobody brought it up spontaneously Of the rural ex-combatants, only two–a child soldier either—not the child soldiers themselves and not the and an adult—told us about jealousy towards them in non-combatants in their neighborhoods. It is my sense the community; the others did not bring this up. In our that, by itself, the jealousy problem is much less severe hundreds of conversations with non-combatants, the than is often thought. demobilized were never once brought up as an economic Ex-Combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left, how they fared 21 Part 2: After Demobilization problem. Hence, like with the child soldiers, there seems Services and other parallel networks of power. Any to be no major social fact of jealousy towards former reading of Human Rights Watch reporting confirms that soldiers in rural Burundi. the Documentation does indeed subcontract to a small group of poor ex-combatants—evidently, exact data on That said, there are some problems as well. In the city, this are entirely absent. And everyone in Bujumbura is many of the demobilized are unemployed. Like other sure that many ex-combatants—again, totally impossible unemployed young men, they hang out together, doing to know how many—are informants. Some of my nothing much of the time, looking for little jobs, getting translators were afraid of talking to them, a palpable wasted at times, and being pretty unhappy about life. fear I had to respect. It is of course totally impossible to Not surprisingly, their neighbors often distrust them. get a sense of how many ex-combatants engage in this. There were some references by ex-combatants to the However, this does not contribute to social insertion of fact that people attributed crimes to them. ex-combatants, on all of whom may weigh the suspicion of being informers and potential killers. • 26 year unemployed self-demobilized: “Cohabitation here is quite good. People respect Another set of problems that are not addressed are each other but if people see you all the time in the psychological ones. A number of ex-soldiers spoke to us neighborhood their consideration for you changes. As about trauma. One ex-CNDD (Nyangoma) soldier told I and my ex-combatant friends see each other almost us that “as a result of the war, I have a hard heart, so that, every day (most of us have no work) people can even if I see ignoble acts before me to an exaggerated later on marginalize us and suspect us of everything degree, it does not touch my heart;” two ex-FAB told because we have no work. On the other hand, we are us they were psychologically “hardened” by the war. after all leaders here in the community. We contribute Two persons—a self-demobilized man and a soldier, a lot to resolving conflicts, before they get to the both CNDD/FDD—told us they suffered from mental commune level.” illness. Two other ex-combatants also complained about how difficult it was to take up family life again • 23 year old rabatteur de bus: “There is peace after all these years as a fighter. But overwhelmingly, now and a quite good cohabitation but with our past, among the demobilized, people did not talk about socio- when you are always hanging out in the street and psychological problems12. people see you without work, if something happens you are always suspected. Whether they tell you or Note, however, that strictly none of the 63 persons I not, his is how it is. When you have new pants, people spoke to mentioned any major crimes during the war. think you stole it somewhere, and that hurts.” Like the Clinton policy on gay soldiers, I did not ask, and they did not tell. Given how widespread war crimes So, here again, is the image of young unemployed men were at all sides, clearly at least some of the people I as dangerous, likely criminals. Once again, I believe interviewed hid major elements of their past from me— that, while there are of course people for whom this is a as they possibly did from themselves. All of this is not correct analysis of actual facts, this is more of a general surprising, but it does remind me that I did obviously image that prevails about all marginal young men—that not capture all the depths and levels of the lives of my they are criminals, lazy, drunk, good for nothings. This interviewees. Some issues that are very private and/or image is sometimes true, but it is not the entire story painful escaped me. about young men’s lives, whether ex-combatants or not. The social reintegration of ex-combatants, then, is certainly not easy or perfect. There is initial fear by People fear these young ex-combatants for another neighbors. There is concern—not entirely unfounded— reason as well, although this was never said to me: it is about the behavior of ex-rebels, who have spent too widely believed that many of them are informants and many years in the bush using violence as their only part-time employees for dirty jobs for the Intelligence 12 This mirrors observations in Sierra Leone, where Stavrou [et al. 2003: 39 found that “contrary to expectations, ex-combatants displayed few psycho- 22 Ex-Combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left, how they fared social difficulties”. After Demobilization: Part 2 currency. There are clichés about all ex-soldiers being Re-reading the interviews in their entirety, I am struck, petty thieves. There is undoubtedly some jealousy out here too, by the few differences between the demobilized there. There are demobilized who are traumatized and do soldiers and their peers in their communities. They have not manage to meaningfully adapt themselves to society. the same dreams, face the same constraints, have the Other demobilized certainly have maintained often same attitudes, etc. In rural areas, they talk with the illegal and violent relations with the Documentation. same frequency and intensity about the same agriculture Many of these older and younger men are tough men, problems as do their neighbors, they make the same with a streak of violence, and it is understandable people analyses about rural life, and they have the same dreams fear them. for the future. As we said earlier, when they “fall in money,” they do the same things their non-combatant On the other hand, some are respected in their neighbors dream of doing. In urban areas, pretty much communities as liberators or as defenders. They have the same holds, although the variation is bigger: between seen more of the world, and they are proud of it. They demobilized ex-FAB officers and self-demobilized FNL are frequently asked to advice on local conflicts. Their youth, for example, there is a giant chasm, which makes voices are important when it comes to talking to other generalizations much harder if not impossible. But what youth who may think about joining armed groups—they I can say is that the ex-combatants pretty much talk and can credibly discourage them from doing so, or not! think and feel like—well, like their neighbors. As they tend to be a rather politicized bunch, they play visible local political roles: they are asked for All in all, then, this suggests that, for many of the ex- advice on political matters, or matters pertaining to the combatants, their prime identities are foremost those administration—and, having talked to some of these of farmer, trader, urban upper class or lower class, etc. guys, I imagine that they may well spout their advice The years of fighting were an interlude in their normal even if they are not asked first! Many of them are doing live paths, but not the defining characteristics of their economically well, and are part of the economic fabric life. But there are counter-dynamics as well, and people of their societies. Some of them are elected in conseils who fall at the other side of the equation. We already collinaires. observed that there is strong social capital and ongoing networks between ex-combatants wherever we went. The ex-combatants generally have a strong esprit de While this may be an emotional support to them, it is corps and personal relations among themselves. Both also potentially a social limitation. Second, among the in the urban neighborhoods and the rural collines, these child soldiers and the self-demobilized—two groups people blatantly know each other well and often hang of people on the average significantly younger than the out together: whenever we found one ex-combatant, we regular adult demobilized soldiers—a sense of injustice, often found a multitude! This social capital is surely of grievance, of suffering for nothing, of disrespect, something they value in life, but it can have drawbacks prevailed. It is also among the self-demobilized that as well. First, they may be overly identified as ex- we found many people without plans, depressed and combatants, always hanging out together, separate from angry. For them, it seems, their identities are profoundly other people, maintaining a different primary identity, enmeshed with having been soldiers. I suspect a which could harm their reintegration. Second, there is correlation between age and identity here: the older likely a certain degree of social control among them. In people more frequently had strong prior identities and interviews in an urban neighborhood, for example, we associated activities and networks. They were farmers, initially had to organize the interviews two-by-two, so husbands, etc. before the war, and they returned to that at least one other person could hear what the other this afterwards. This undoubtedly also applies to some was saying. Only after a day or so of working this way of the younger soldiers, too, but less so. For many of was enough confidence established for us to continue the young ones, the situation seems different. Having on a one-by-one basis. This reflected in large part initial become soldiers at a young age—having suffered a hard mistrust about us, outsiders, for sure, but also, to some life, seen and done awful things—defines who they are extent, social control between them. now. For most of them, this is mixed up with or made Ex-Combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left, how they fared 23 Part 2: After Demobilization worse by, a sense of neglect and disrespect. This group may present a much bigger risk for peace in Burundi. The main difference between ex-combatants everywhere and those who did not fight is a higher degree of politicization among the former. They talk more frequently, more easily, and more critically about politics —whether to laud the current government or to condemn it. They more often chose a political figure among those they admire. They talk more about local governance as well, and about justice, and about the war. In more than one-third of the conversations with ex- combatants, current national politics was spontaneously discussed—a far higher proportion than Burundians did on the average. And this occurred as much in rural as in urban areas. It isn‘t that they all say the same things—far from it: there are major divisions, both between Hutu and Tutsi and within these groups—but rather simply that they are more inclined to talk to us about blatantly political things. This seems to hold foremost for those combatants who fought at the Hutu side, whether it is to support or to criticize the current government. Indeed, many more ex-rebels spoke about politics to us than did ex-FAB— maybe a sign of the former feeling at ease talking about politics, feeling they are in the winning side, that they have the winds of history behind them. Note, however, that the majority of those ex-combatants who addressed current political matters voiced a negative opinion. Not unexpectedly, this includes all 6 the ex-FAB soldiers who spoke out, but also 17 more ex-rebels, from all movements. 24 Ex-Combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left, how they fared Conclusions: Part 3 Part 3: Conclusions Young men joined the war for different reasons. Some who very much define themselves by their exclusion joined for proactive reasons—ideology, a political and unrecognized suffering as well as 3 child soldiers. agenda: they did so exclusively at the side of the rebels. Among the remainder, the overwhelming majority of Others joined for reactive reasons—to earn money in people have plans—and thus, a sense of future. The the absence of other jobs or to defend themselves in DDR program, I am sure, has something to do with that. situations of insecurity. They were strongly represented Look at it this way. Among the self-demobilized, i.e., all at the side of the FAB, although they did exist at the people who received no DDR assistance, 60% have no rebel side as well. They often joined later, when the war plans, no sense of future; among the demobilized, only was already well underway. Force was used by both 15% or is in that situation. I believe there is good reason sides, but the rebels more frequently integrated these to attribute this difference to the DDR program. people into their structures, whereas the army left them outside its structure. A factor often discussed in the This brings me to question the requirement for in-kind general literature about soldiering—the attractiveness, support of the reintegration project assistance. Of course the machismo, of being a soldier—had as good as no there will be some people who will misuse cash, but a) importance. we cannot play paternal state for everyone just because some will do the wrong thing, and b) the in-kind nature The majority of them wanted to stop fighting. This of these programs is ultimately a partial sham in any was the case because they had suffered too much, had case, for two reasons. First, like with discussions about become wounded, or felt that they had won and it was the macro-economic impact of development assistance time to move back to normal life. The reasons the self- to countries, the fungibility issue is hard to avoid, i.e., demobilized gave were pretty much identical: a number people may simply use the aid to undertake investments of them, however, also spoke about internal purges and they would have made in any case. As a result, they save fights for power which they were fleeing. cash somewhere else. Second, and more frequent, is the fact that, like with food aid (another in-kind assistance), The DDR program in Burundi has worked rather well. people may receive the aid in kind and turn around and This can be seen clearly in my interviews. Most people sell it—monetize it, in other terms—once the donor express themselves with happiness about what they used has turned his heels. Field workers in the Burundian the funds for; they eagerly await the actual reintegration demobilization program told me they could pick out assistance. The biggest problem by far was the tardiness these people right away, and there are very many of them: in the implementation of the second part of the program, they are not interested in the details or the management but not the actual design of the program. This can also of the investment, but simply in getting as much “stuff” be observed indirectly. One of my standard questions as possible, so they can re-sell it soon afterwards. In with all interviewees was to inquire about the plans, the short, it is hard to assure that in-kind support really ends projects, of the interviewee. In my experience, people up supporting what project designers think it will. with no plans are systematically those who are worst off, or who perceive themselves to be worst off. They At the same time, there is a significant management cost often feel paralyzed. They do not think of the future, or associated with the in-kind nature of these programs. they do not think they have a future. Out of the 53 ex- Conversations with managers of such programs in combatants for whom I have the info, 35 have plans, and Burundi bring me to estimate this cost at approx. 20% 18 do not. The latter group includes 11 self-demobilized, of the value of the benefits distributed. My personal Ex-Combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left, how they fared 25 Part 3: Conclusions suggestion is that one would be better off simply who has 100,000 francs in his pocket to not satisfy these increasing the benefits by 20% and dropping the in-kind family needs. This holds in rural and in urban areas. nature. Vice versa, a demobilized who returns into a family that still has a decent house and can feed him, can invest all That said, the funds received so far did clearly not have his payments into some project—buying a video player the same impact on different groups of ex-combatants. and TV, for example, and creating a movie theater; or From our interviews and the quantitative data available buying an electrical shaver and opening a barbershop. to us, it seems the impact of the DDR funds so far A fortiori, an ex-FAB officer who returns to a home he depends on many variables. owns, a wife with a job, and children with university degrees is in a vastly better position still. Hence, the sort The first major distinction is urban vs. rural. The funds of family situation an ex-combatant returns to makes a went much further in rural areas than in urban ones. lot of difference in terms of his potential for economic Everything costs less in rural areas—housing, food, etc. reintegration, especially in the city where the costs of Social pressures or expectations are lower in rural areas living are high. too. At the same time, most of the people returning to rural areas move back into the family farm, either as a Age seems to be a variable underlying some of this, child of the home or, for those already married, as the or at least interacting with all the previous. As said, chef de menage. The impact of that is dual. First, they urban combatants in our sample tended to be younger do not need to pay rent—something which many urban and unmarried; more of the rural ones were older and demobs need to do. Second, there is immediate work for married. The latter generally did better: is it because them, and immediate income—not much, maybe, but a they have more assets—land, family members (i.e., basis to live on, which can then be complemented by labor to work the land), a house? Is it because, being some fresh off-farm income if one smartly invests one’s older, they have a greater sense of responsibility and demobilization payments. more maturity? Is it because, having being married but away from home, they have independent wives The second major variable is migratory situation. Indeed, who know how to support their families, for they have there is a major distinction between demobilized who done it for years already? Is it, at least for Nyanza-Lac return to families that stayed at home and those whose (where we found most of the older ones), because there families are themselves returnees, whether from abroad simply are more economic opportunities available? Is it (repatriated refugees) or from an IDP camp. Logically, a varying combination of all these factors? all those who returned to an already established family house had it easier than those who had to build The fifth variable is health. A significant proportion of their houses. As a result of our research design, this ex-combatants are handicapped as a result of the war; distinction largely coincided with an Ngozi vs. Nyanza- PNDRR estimates their number at more than 4,000. Lac one: in Nyanza-Lac, there simply are overwhelming They cannot use an arm or a leg anymore; they lost numbers of recent returnees (that is why we chose to a limb; they don’t hear anymore; they have mental do research there in the first place). As said earlier, illnesses. I encountered such ex-combatants in all the people in Nyanza-Lac do appreciate having the funds communes I worked in, rural and urban. Their situation to rebuild their houses and survive while the land is not is always much more difficult than their peers’, at yet producing, but it does mean they are not capable of whatever level of income, for they cannot easily work investing as much in productive activities. anymore. The PNDRR provides supplemental services to these people; I did not hear anything about it in my The third variable is economic situation of the families conversations, however. the demobs return to. In those families where there are major urgent needs—sick family members, people Finally, gender is in all likelihood an important factor imprisoned in the hospital, generalized extreme poverty, as well, but as I met only three women, two of which etc.—the funds they received went right away to address were self-demobilized, there is really nothing I can say these urgent needs: it is impossible for any Burundian about this. 26 Ex-Combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left, how they fared Conclusions: Part 3 One final remark. The administrative delays that are the posh neighborhoods while they are as unemployed taking place with the actual reintegration assistance and marginal as they were before? The sense of betrayal are temporary, but provoke a lot of unhappiness. For is palpable, especially in the deeply neglected poor some, such as many young men in the city, any delay urban neighborhoods—it is shared, for that matter, by has serious repercussions, as the support is absolutely combatants and non-combatants alike. But that is not required for them to have any hope to escape from the same as saying that their social reintegration is by total misery, and any delay puts them further into debt. itself problematic, or that the DDR program is badly In addition, these are often angry and cynical people, designed. That said, in terms of design suggestions, I who are well organized. They see their commanders think the program should try to find how to deal with a living a very good life, building houses and investing in business, while they themselves cannot even get few very tough problems: the issue of how to support the the little bit of money promised to them—after years reintegration of the self-demobilized; the issue of how to without salary, often—and they are just not in the mood eliminate the lengthy administrative delays in disbursing to be patient and wait for that administrative issues the promised reintegration support; and the issue of what to settle themselves, a year or two after they were options exist for better meeting the needs of urban and promised. They don’t trust it, they think they have been rural beneficiaries through assistance specialized to their had, once again, and they won’t patiently wait—and as a contexts. I realize these are tough issues, but it may be result, they have scared the hell out of the agencies that possible to work creatively on them. are running the DDR program as sub-contractors. As for the social reintegration, it seems to be conventional wisdom that, as the Peace-Building Commission wrote just a few months ago “Given the difficult socio- economic environment, reintegration of combatants into local communities will add to social tensions.” (2006: 9, referring to the Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Burundi, 21 November 2005, S/2005/728, p. 6) However, we did not find much evidence of this occurring. Evidently, there are tensions. But Burundians seem, in this and other respects, amazingly capable of accepting wayward sheep into the fold, of integrating people into the community. Most people, young and old, lived again where they used to live when they joined the war. The risk with ex-combatants is not so much that their presence will exacerbate social tensions, but that, given the continued poverty of the urban ex-combatants, they will easily be recruited again by any politician with designs to destabilize the peace. They will not by themselves cause war in Burundi—that has always come from above—but they can become willing participants. Interestingly, this unhappiness and this potential “recruitability” is certainly as big if not bigger at the victorious Hutu side than at the Tutsi side. Indeed, in places like Kamenge or Kanyosha, there are hundreds if not thousands of ex-combatants, including a great many self-demobilized ones, who feel excluded: after all these years of fighting, is this what they fought for—that the politicians build big villas in Ex-Combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left, how they fared 27 Part 4: Annexes Part 4: Annexes Annex1. Master table all ex-combatants interviewed To ensure maximum confidentiality, I have identified all interviews in the different communes of Bujumbura mairie as simply Bujumbura. Mar. Econ. recr. Recr. Commune Age Profession Educ. Milit. Stat. status year age Child Soldiers Busiga 18 1 Bicycle taxi /Farmer 0 1 CNDD/FDD 2001 13 Ruhororo 18 1 Boutique 3 2 FAB 1999 11 Ruhororo 18 1 Farmer 4 2 FAB Ruhororo 19 1 Farmer 1 1 FAB 2001 14 Nyanza-Lac 25 1 Farming/Barber 4 2 FAB (Gardien…) Bujumbura 19 1 Seller of clothes 3 2 FAB Bujumbura 18 1 Groom 5 1 CNDD/FDD 2000 12 Bujumbura 18 1 Woodworker 4 3 CNDD/FDD 1997 9 Bujumbura 19 1 Groom 5 2 CNDD/FDD 1998 10 Demobilized Busiga 28 2 Trade 13 3 CNDD/FDD Busiga 28 2 Farmer/Small Trade 5 3 CNDD/FDD 1994 16 Busiga 43 2 Farmer/boutique 6 3 CNDD/FDD Busiga 30 2 Farmer/Trade 6 3 FAB Ruhororo 47 2 Farming 6 3 FAB 1980 21 Ruhororo 50 2 Farming 6 3 FAB 1980 24 Ruhororo 26 1 Farming 4 1 FAB Ruhororo 33 2 Animals/Bicycle taxi 6 3 FAB Ruhororo 32 2 Shopkeeper/ Bicycle taxi 3 FAB Ruhororo 32 2 Farmer/Husbandry 6 3 CNDD/FDD 1994 21 Nyanza-Lac 37 2 0 1 CNDD/FDD 28 Ex-Combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left, how they fared Annexes: Part 4 Nyanza-Lac 30 2 Mason/farming 3 2 CNDD Nyanza-Lac 28 2 Farming 0 2 CNDD/FDD Nyanza-Lac 32 2 Farmer 6 2 Kaze-FDD 1997 23 Nyanza-Lac 47 2 Farming 6 2 CNDD 1994 35 Nyanza-Lac 52 2 Farming 3 2 CNDD 1994 40 Nyanza-Lac 38 2 Farming 3 2 CNDD 1995 27 Nyanza-Lac 25 2 Farming 5 2 Kaze-FDD 1995 13 Nyanza-Lac 56 2 Farming 6 1 CNDD 1994 44 Nyanza-Lac 42 2 Farming 5 3 CNDD/FDD 1999 35 CNDD/FDD Nyanza-Lac 34 2 Farming 2 Mil-Comb 1995 23 Bujumbura 31 1 Unemployed 3 2 FAB 1996 21 Bujumbura 1 Unemployed 1 FAB 1999 > 18 Bujumbura 52 2 Unemployed 9 2 FAB Bujumbura 36 2 Mechanic 13 2 FAB 1990 20 Bujumbura 56 2 Public secretary 13 3 FAB 1974 24 Bujumbura 55 2 Trader 15 4 FAB Bujumbura 47 2 Mechanic 12 4 FAB 1980 Bujumbura 51 2 Unemployed 10 4 FAB 1976 21 Bujumbura 28 1 Shoe seller 6 2 CNDD/FDD 1994 16 Bujumbura 28 div Unemployed 5 1 CNDD/FDD 1995 17 Bujumbura 28 1 Driver 7 1 CNDD/FDD 1995 17 Auto-demobilized Head of Local Busiga 33 2 6 2 CNDD/FDD Administration Bujumbura 17 1 Unemployed 1 FNL 2000 11 Bujumbura 26 2 Driver 8 2 CNDD/FDD 1996 16 Bujumbura 23 1 Barber 4 1 CNDD/FDD 1995 12 Bujumbura 25 1 Bus Conductor 6 1 CNDD/FDD 1994 13 Bujumbura 23 1 Barber 3 1 CNDD/FDD Bujumbura 27 1 Manager 13 1 CNDD/FDD 1996 17 Bujumbura 23 1 Bus Conductor 6 1 CNDD/FDD 1996 13 Bujumbura 27 div Unemployed 7 1 CNDD/FDD 1994 15 Bujumbura 22 2 Student 1 FNL 1997 13 Bujumbura 34 1 Unemployed 13 2 FAB 1996 24 Bujumbura 23 1 Bar server, farmer 4 2 CNDD/FDD 1998 15 Bujumbura 1 Unemployed FAB 16 Ex-Combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left, how they fared 29 Part 4: Annexes Bujumbura 23 1 Barber 1 CNDD/FDD 1996 13 Bujumbura 25 1 Security guard 9 2 FAB 1997 16 Bujumbura 24 1 Security guard 6 2 FAB 1998 16 Bujumbura 28 1 Store owner 10 3 CNDD/FDD 1995 17 Bujumbura 17 1 Unemployed 6 1 FNL 2002 13 Bujumbura 21 1 Mason aid 0 1 FNL 2000 15 Bujumbura 21 1 Unemployed 9 1 FNL 1999 14 Bujumbura 23 1 Unemployed 13 2 FNL 2002 19 Integrated Ruhororo 28 1 Chef de Poste 14 4 CNDD/FDD Bujumbura 28 2 Soldier 2 CNDD/FDD NA NA Italics are women Ec. = economic status, Mar. Stat. = Marriage status. 1= single; 2 =married from 1 = indigent to 4 = rich. Ed. = educational attainment, from 0 years to 17 Recr. Year = Recruitment year years for complete university studies Recr. Age = recruitment age Annex 2. Sampling Of the 63 ex-combatants interviewed, 6 lived in Busiga, 10 in Ruhororo, 12 in Nyanza-Lac, and 35 in Bujumbura city. Each commune I worked in is bigger than the previous one, and not surprisingly, I found and interviewed more ex- combatants in each successive commune as well. However, there is no denying that Bujumbura city is under-sampled, and so, to a lesser extent, is Nyanza-Lac. The total number of people demobilized by mid-Sept. 2006 (when I was doing my research) was 18,171 adults (incl. 494 women) and 3,015 children. The three provinces I worked in—Bujumbura mairie, Makamba, and Ngozi—belong to the top-5 largest provinces in terms of demobilization in Burundi (they occupy positions 2, 4 and 5 resp.; Bururi and Bubanza are the remaining ones). Child Demobi- Self- Inte- Total ex- Total demobs per combatants soldier lized demobilized Grated interviewed commune Busiga 1 4 1 0 6 103 Ruhororo 3 6 0 1 10 164 Nyanza-Lac 1 11 0 0 12 260 Kamenge 1 3 9 1 14 295 Musaga 1 4 5 0 10 302 Bwiza 2 1 0 0 3 102 Other Bujumb. 0 3 5 0 8 Total 8 33 20 2 63 Source: last column is PNDRR data, Nov. 14, 2006 30 Ex-Combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left, how they fared Annexes: Part 4 I interviewed 9 child soldiers, 32 demobilized soldiers, 2 who were integrated into either the police or the army, and 20 so-called self-demobilized (all except one in the capital city of Bujumbura). This over-samples on child soldiers. Also, the category of auto-demobilized in Bujumbura is probably over-sampled (I say probably because there are no data available on how many auto-demobilized there are, and thus I cannot be sure if by chance the proportions aren’t correct13). Child Demobilized Auto- Integrated Total PNDRR soldier demobilized demob. CNDD/FDD 4 11 9 2 26 7,050 CNDD 0 5 0 0 5 1,397 KAZE-FDD 0 2 0 0 2 364 FAB 5 14 4 0 23 8,173 FNL 0 0 6 0 6 283 Total 9 32 19 2 62 Last column = total demobilized by PNDRR on Sept. 15, 2006 Of my interview sample, 26 persons were CNDD/FDD, 5 from CNDD, and 2 from KAZE-FDD. There are four persons who just identified themselves as PMPA and I put those under CNDD/FDD, so I might be slightly off in these figures. Twenty-three of my interviewees were ex-FAB, and 6 ex-FNL (all self-demobilized, as only a few FNL- Icanzo soldiers had been formally demobilized at the time of my interviews). That said, while my interview sample may not be weighed correctly in function of the national distributions, I do strongly believe that I did get the stories of each category of ex-combatant right, for I have enough in-depth qualitative data, and they are sufficiently coherent, to be able to draw clear trends. In other words, I do have a decent sense of the general situation of demobilized soldiers, and the clear differences that exist between these people living in the North, the South, and the capital. Similarly, I do have a good sense of the specific problems faced by urban self-demobilized. And I can compare all these data with my overall data for the rest of the Burundian population living in these same places. Finally, 3 of the 63 interviewees are women. This, too, reflects the PNDRR proportion of 2.63% of all demobs being female. One is a demobilized woman who had been taken by force by the CNDD/FDD and married another rebel in Nyanza-Lac; the two others are self-demobilized FNL combatants who joined voluntarily (if this is a term one can use for girls who were 12 and 13 years old when they joined) and now live in Bujumbura rural. 13 Lancaster 2006: 6 observes but does not explain an interesting discrepancy in data. He writes that in 2002, the total number of child soldiers in Burundi was estimated at 14,000. By late 2005, UNICEF said it had demobilized all of them, i.e., about 3,000. Whence the difference? I would argue that part of the difference resides in the fact that there may well be thousands of self- demobilized children in Burundi. Ex-Combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left, how they fared 31 Part 5: Bibliography Part 5: Bibliography Alusala, Nelson. Disarmament and the Transition in Taouti-Cherif, Ratiba. Beneficiary Assessment of the Burundi: How Soon? Pretoria, Institute for Security Social and Economic Status of the «Child Soldier» Studies Occasional Paper 97, January 2005. www. Special Project Beneficiaries in Burundi. Washington issafrica.org/pubs/papers/97/Paper97.htm DC., MDRP, June 2006. Barker, Gary & Chrsitine Ricardo. Young Men and the Taylor, Gwendolyn. The Microfoundations of Civil Construction of Masculinity in Sub-Saharan Africa: War Participation. New York, New York University, Implications for HIV/AIDS. In: The Other Half of Unpublished manuscript, November 8, 2006 Gender. Men’s Issues in Development. Edited by Ian Bannon & Maria Correia. Washoington DC., World Taylor, Gwendolyn; Cyrus Samii and Eric Mvukiyehe. Bank, 2006: 159-194. Wartime and Post-Conflict Experiences in Burundi: an Individual Level Survey. Columbia University, paper presented at the APSA Conference, September 2006. Hagman, Lotta & Zoe Nielson. A Framework for Lasting Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of World Bank. Mission conjointe des partenaires du Former Combatants in Crisis Situations. New York, MDRP Rapport pays - Burundi. 20-22 septembre 2006. IPA Workshop Report. December 2002. Washington DC, 2006. Lancaster, Philip. Report of the Independent Review of the Special Project for Child Soldier Demobilization, Social Reintegration and Recruitment Prevention in Burundi. Washington DC, prepared for MDRP, Oct. 2005. Lancaster, Philip. Categories and Illusions: Child Soldiers in Burundi. Victoria, School of Child and Youth Care, University of Victoria; Draft manuscript, 2006. PBC (Peace Building Commission). Oct. 2006. Conference Room Paper for the Country Specific Meeting on Burundi. PBC/2/BUR/CRP.2 Richards, Paul et al. Where Have all the Young People Gone? Transitioning Ex-combatants Towards Community Reconstruction After the War in Sierra Leone. Case Study. 30 November 2003. Stavrou, A., Burton, P., Johnson, S., Peters, K. & Vincent, S.. NCDDR. Ex-combatants 2003 Tracer Study, Multi-Donor Trust Fund. Freetown, 2003 32 Ex-Combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left, how they fared MDRP Secretariat The World Bank 1818 H Street, NW MSN J11-1102 Washington, DC 20433 USA phone : + 1 (202) 473 3328 fax: +1 (202) 473 8229 email: info@mdrp.org www.mdrp.org