Considering Trade Policies for Liquid Biofuels

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**Acronyms and Abbreviations**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAFTA</td>
<td>Central American Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Common Agricultural Policy</td>
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<td>CBI</td>
<td>Caribbean Basin Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO₂</td>
<td>carbon dioxide</td>
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<tr>
<td>EBA</td>
<td>Everything But Arms</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESMAP</td>
<td>Energy Sector Management Assistance Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>ETBE</td>
<td>ethyl tertiary-butyl ether</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAPRI</td>
<td>Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOB</td>
<td>free on board</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>fiscal year</td>
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<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<td>GHG</td>
<td>Greenhouse gas</td>
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<tr>
<td>GSP+</td>
<td>Generalized System of Preferences Plus</td>
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<tr>
<td>HS</td>
<td>Harmonized System</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTBE</td>
<td>methyl tertiary-butyl ether</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NExBTL</td>
<td>next generation biomass to liquids</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>research and development</td>
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<tr>
<td>RON</td>
<td>Research octane number</td>
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<tr>
<td>USDA</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Agriculture</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. EPA</td>
<td>U.S. Environmental Protection Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>WCO</td>
<td>World Customs Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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Units of Measure

$A$  Australian dollar
B    Thai bhat
Can$ Canadian dollar
°C   degrees Celsius
€    euro
R$   Brazilian real
RM   Malaysian ringgit
Rp   Indonesian rupiah
Rs   Indian rupees
SKr  Swedish kronor
Y    Chinese yuan
¥    Japanese yen

Note: For current costs and prices, exchange rates prevailing in April 2007 are used. For past costs and prices, the exchange rate prevailing at the time is used.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amber box</td>
<td>Amber box policies in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture are subject to careful review and reduction over time. Amber box policies include market price support, direct payments, and input subsidies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement on</td>
<td>Part of the Uruguay Round Agreement covering issues related to agriculture. Three pillars of this agreement are market access, export subsidies, and domestic subsidies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Anhydrous ethanol</td>
<td>Ethanol with sufficient water removed to make it suitable for blending with gasoline.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biodiesel</td>
<td>A diesel fuel, primarily alkyl (methyl or ethyl) esters (an organic compound with two oxygen atoms), that can be used in blends or in “neat” (pure) form in compression-ignition engines and produced from a range of biomass-derived feedstocks such as oilseeds, waste vegetable oils, cooking oil, animal fats, and trap grease.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biomass</td>
<td>Organic matter available on a renewable basis. Biomass includes all plants and their residues: forest and mill residues, agricultural crops and wastes, wood and wood wastes, animal wastes, livestock operation residues, aquatic plants, and fast-growing trees and plants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue box</td>
<td>Blue box policies in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture are exempt from reduction commitments. Examples include program payments received under production-limiting programs, if they are based on fixed area and yields, a fixed number of head of livestock, or 85 percent or less of base-level production.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B5, B20</td>
<td>Diesel-biodiesel blends containing, respectively, 5 percent and 20 percent biodiesel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cellulosic ethanol</td>
<td>Ethanol produced from cellulose, which includes a great variety of biomass such as forestry materials, agricultural residues, energy crops such as switch grass, and urban wastes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denatured ethanol</td>
<td>Ethanol that has been rendered toxic or undrinkable, for example, by the addition of gasoline.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E5, E10, E85</td>
<td>Ethanol-gasoline blends containing, respectively, 5 percent, 10 percent, and 85 percent anhydrous ethanol.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green box</td>
<td>Green box policies in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture are domestic support policies that are not subject to reduction commitments. These policies are assumed to have a minimal effect on trade and include such support as research, extension, food security stocks, disaster payments, and structural adjustment programs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>HS</td>
<td>Prefix for commodity numbering system used by the World Customs Organization in its Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydrous ethanol</td>
<td>Ethanol with about 95 percent purity, the balance being water. It is not suitable for blending with gasoline.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most favored nation status</td>
<td>An agreement between countries to extend the same trading privileges to each other that they extend to any other country. Treatment is granted if two countries are members of the World Trade Organization, or if most favored nation status is specified in an agreement between them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palm olein</td>
<td>The liquid fraction obtained by fractionation of palm oil after crystallization at controlled temperatures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tariff rate quota</td>
<td>A two-tier tariff where the tariff rate charged depends on the volume of imports. An in-quota tariff is charged on imports within the quota volume. A higher (over-quota) tariff is charged on imports in excess of the quota volume.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undenatured ethanol</td>
<td>Pure ethanol without foreign materials intentionally added.</td>
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Executive Summary

This report—which addresses the issues associated with trade in liquid biofuels—is a second Energy Sector Management Assistance Program report on biofuels, and part of a broader assessment of bioenergy undertaken by the World Bank. The report asks how liberalizing trade in liquid biofuels might affect biofuel production and consumption.

Bioenergy is playing an increasingly important role as an alternative and renewable source of energy. Bioenergy includes solid biomass, biogas, and liquid biofuels. Combustion of biomass residues for heat and power generation is commercially viable without government support in some applications. Liquid biofuels made from biomass are attracting growing interest worldwide, driven by concerns about energy security, climate change, and local environmental considerations and a desire to support domestic agriculture. The global liquid biofuel market today utilizes so-called first generation technologies and relies mainly on agricultural food or feed crops for feedstock. Second generation biofuels, still far from commercially viable, can open up many new opportunities because they can be sourced from a much wider variety of feedstocks, vastly expanding the potential for fuel production and for abating greenhouse gas emission. The timing of commercialization is uncertain, although some industry analysts indicate that the needed cost reductions may be achieved in the coming decade.

The two most important liquid biofuels today are ethanol and biodiesel, and they are of primary interest for transportation. Support policies for these two biofuels fall into two general categories: (1) policies to replace consumption of petroleum fuels through such programs as mandating of biofuel use and comparative reductions in fuel taxes for biofuel; and (2) policies to stimulate biofuel production domestically through—for example—producer subsidies, import tariffs to protect local producers and direct government support for all biofuels to local production, and research to develop new or improved technologies. Some policies reduce trade directly and are obvious subjects of this report. Other policies do not reduce trade directly but may have indirect distorting effects on trade.

Focusing primarily on ethanol and biodiesel, the report takes a time horizon of the next 5 to 10 years. It outlines the important link between agriculture and biofuels, reviews past and present government policies for agriculture and for biofuels, and considers how these policies might affect the world biofuel market. The report highlights the links between the markets for oil, biofuels, feedstocks, and the by-products of biofuel processing. It reviews existing studies, examining the likely consequences of much larger biofuel production and trade liberalization of biofuels and their feedstocks. It concludes with policy considerations.
Current commercial feedstocks for biofuels are predominantly agricultural crops. Ethanol is made from sugarcane, sugar beets, maize, wheat, cassava, and other starches. Biodiesel is produced from rapeseed oil, soybean oil, waste oil, and, increasingly, palm oil. The physical properties of biodiesel depend on the feedstock and the extent of further downstream processing. Biodiesel manufactured using traditional methods (reacting an oil with an alcohol) can have cold climate and other performance problems. The world’s leading ethanol producers are Brazil (from sugarcane) and the United States (from maize). The world’s leading biodiesel producer is Germany (from rapeseed oil). Because biodiesel has historically been more costly than ethanol, the biodiesel market is much smaller. A number of industrial and developing countries have instituted programs to promote biofuel production and consumption, setting targets—some mandatory—for increasing the contribution of biofuels to their transport fuel supplies. In the future, second generation biofuels could use agricultural residues and other feedstocks that are not used as food or feed.

Feedstock costs comprise more than half the costs of producing both ethanol and biodiesel. Despite remarkable reductions in production costs over the years in Brazil, the United States, and elsewhere, biofuels to date have been marginally economic under favorable conditions (high world oil prices and low feedstock prices) and only in a handful of circumstances, such as Brazil in 2004 and 2005. More generally, biofuels have not been commercially viable without significant government support, even though the two leading producers of biofuels—Brazil and the United States—are among the world’s most efficient producers of biofuel feedstocks. As a result, all biofuel markets have been supported by government protection policies. Trade in biofuels is limited, although it is growing.

Direct and indirect policy-induced price distortions greatly affect the financial attractiveness of ethanol and biodiesel production and trade. These price distortions are large, and the forward and backward links with other price-distorted markets (for example, sugar) are strong. Any effect on feedstock prices arising from agricultural or biofuel policies has an immediate effect upon the economics of biofuel production. Agricultural policies in industrial countries have tended to depress crop prices internationally—making, for example, ethanol from sugarcane more attractive in financial terms than in economic terms. Further complicating the analysis, the major feedstocks are primarily used as human foods and animal feed, and the by-products of biofuel manufacture play a significant role in biofuel economics. It has also been suggested that increasing diversion of a crop to the biofuel market is beginning to link that crop’s price to the world petroleum market. These observations suggest that policy analysis should use economic values rather than rely only on financial or commercial prices, and that economic analysis needs to consider multiple markets in which many related prices are distorted by domestic and foreign government policies.

Impediments to biofuel trade include high import tariffs, largely on ethanol, and technical barriers to trade. The latter may be legitimate and even welfare enhancing, but they reduce the volume of trade. Arguably the greatest technical barrier in the coming years could be certification of biofuels for environmental sustainability, prompted by concerns about burning and clearing of rain forests to plant palm and soybeans (both feedstocks for biodiesel) in Southeast Asia and Latin America.

If policies that are potentially market distorting but not trade distorting—such as consumption mandates and fuel excise tax reductions for all biofuels—are maintained, liberalizing biofuel trade is likely to increase demand for biofuels by reducing prices in previously protected markets. However,
massive growth of biofuel production based on current technologies would face several challenges, including limits on the amount of unutilized land that can be brought into production economically and potential water shortages that may contain expansion. Efficient producers of biofuels with scope for expansion (such as Brazil) will benefit, whereas those currently enjoying preferential treatment (such as the Caribbean countries) will lose their trading opportunities. An immediate effect of trade liberalization is estimated to be an increase in feedstock prices and a fall in by-product prices on the world market. More generally, biofuel and agricultural trade liberalization is expected to increase world prices of agricultural commodities. Higher feedstock prices in turn could slow the growth of the global biofuel market. Biofuel production growth has already begun to change the price relationships among various agricultural commodities. With a greater share of maize and other markets characterized by inelastic demand (through biofuel mandates, among others), increased price variability and market volatility are expected.

Higher food prices will benefit producers and harm consumers. Net sellers of food, including many of the poor engaged in agriculture in developing countries, will benefit. The welfare of urban workers and net buyers of food generally will decline. Most evidence suggests that poor farming households in rural areas are net buyers of food, even though they also produce agricultural crops. Because maize is the staple food in a number of developing countries, rapidly rising maize prices are a particular concern. Prices are expected to rise more steeply for the food products developing countries import than for the commodities they export. The poorest countries—very few of which export products on which there are currently high tariffs—would generally be worse off. Lowering tariffs in developing countries could partially mitigate these adverse effects by lowering prices of imported food items and creating opportunities for regional trade. One possible exception to the above price trend is oilseeds and oilseed products, on which some major oilseed producers assess export taxes. Removal of the export taxes may prompt a large supply response and a fall in world prices, and greater exports of biodiesel feedstocks, rather than biodiesel, to industrial countries.

Biofuel trade liberalization would increase competition, which should in turn help improve efficiency, bring down costs, and enable the world’s most efficient producers to expand their market share. Removal of high tariffs would bring down prices in highly protected markets, although world biofuel prices may rise. That said, removing border restrictions for biofuels while continuing the agricultural and biofuel policies that distort biofuel markets could prolong those distortions, as additional markets for subsidized agricultural outputs and biofuels would be created. The greatest welfare gains might be realized with the full range of trade reforms carried out simultaneously. Failing that, trade in ethanol and biodiesel might be liberalized as a first step. Such a move could also force governments to address openly the question (and the costs) of what objectives their biofuel support policies are actually pursuing.
Bioenergy is playing an increasingly important role as an alternative and renewable source of energy. Bioenergy includes solid biomass, biogas, and liquid biofuels. Combustion of biomass residues for heat and power generation is commercially viable without government support in some applications. Liquid biofuels made from biomass are attracting growing interest worldwide. The global liquid biofuel market today utilizes so-called first generation technologies and relies mainly on agricultural crops for feedstock. Second generation biofuels, still far from commercially viable, can open up many new opportunities because they can be sourced from a much wider variety of feedstocks, vastly expanding the potential for fuel production and for abating greenhouse gas (GHG) emission. The timing of commercialization is uncertain, although the needed cost reductions may be achieved in the coming decade.

This report—which focuses on the issues associated with trade in liquid biofuels—is a second Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP) report on biofuels, and part of a broader assessment of bioenergy undertaken by the World Bank. Three principal factors drive the growing interest in liquid biofuels:

- Concerns about energy security
- Environmental considerations that focus on GHG emissions, primarily in industrial countries, and on tailpipe emissions in developing countries that have relatively lenient vehicle emission and fuel quality standards
- A desire to support and protect domestic agriculture against the backdrop of negotiations for agricultural trade liberalization in international organizations and treaties

The two most important liquid biofuels today are ethanol and biodiesel, and they are of primary interest for transportation. Support policies for these two biofuels fall into two general categories: (1) policies to replace consumption of petroleum fuels with such programs as mandated biofuel use and comparative reductions in fuel tax for biofuel; and (2) policies to stimulate biofuel production domestically through—for example—producer subsidies, import tariffs to protect local producers and direct government support for all biofuels to local production, and research to develop new or improved technologies. Some policies distort trade directly and are thus obvious subjects of this report. Other policies do not distort trade directly but may affect it indirectly.

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1 With energy, as with food, important policy distinctions are made between security and self-sufficiency. See chapter 2, footnote 4.
2 Any policy that subsidizes or mandates, and thereby increases, consumption of a product generates new trade (all else being equal); in that sense, all government support is trade distorting. Traditionally, a policy has been labeled trade distorting if it has an anti-trade bias or reduces trading opportunities for others in the global trading system (for example, domestic subsidies benefiting only domestic production, import tariffs and other import restrictions, export subsidies, and export taxes). This report uses the phrase “nontrade distorting” to describe policies that do not create an anti-trade bias or reduce global trading opportunities for some.
The previous ESMAP report on biofuels (ESMAP 2005) found the economics of biofuel production and consumption to be site- and situation-specific, suggesting scope for welfare gains from specialization and trade. This report examines how liberalizing trade in liquid biofuels might affect biofuel production and consumption. The report focuses on ethanol and biodiesel over a time horizon of the next 5 to 10 years. The report does not attempt to assess the effect of policy changes on emerging technologies or new (not yet commercially proven) feedstocks such as cellulosic ethanol, as they are unlikely to become sufficiently competitive commercially within a decade to have a significant impact on international trade in biofuels. The report also does not cover direct use of plant oils in engines because of their limited application, or consider specific environmental effects of trade liberalization.

The report begins by outlining the important link between agriculture and biofuels. It then covers past and present government policies for both agriculture and biofuels, and considers how these policies might affect the world biofuel market. The report highlights the links between the markets for oil, biofuels, feedstocks, and the by-products of biofuel processing; then reviews previous studies examining the likely consequences of increased biofuel production and of trade liberalization. It concludes with policy considerations for liberalizing trade in biofuels.

Current commercial feedstocks for ethanol are sugarcane, sugar beets, maize, wheat, cassava, and other starches; in the future, cellulosic ethanol made from energy crops, forest and agricultural residues, and municipal solid waste could open up opportunities around the world, including in countries not suited for ethanol production today. Biodiesel is produced from rapeseed oil, soybean oil, waste oil, and, increasingly, palm oil. Second generation biofuels based on thermochemical processes can use virtually all forms of biomass to make diesel, gasoline, and ethanol.

Ethanol is a chemical compound, but biodiesel is a mixture of many compounds and its physical properties vary. Depending on the feedstock and the extent of further downstream processing, biodiesel manufactured using traditional methods (reacting an oil with an alcohol) can have cold climate and other performance problems, making biodiesel more suitable for use in low-percentage blends. The world’s leading producers of ethanol and their primary feedstocks are Brazil (from sugarcane) and the United States (from maize). The two countries also dominate sugar and maize exports, respectively. The world’s leading biodiesel producer is Germany (from rapeseed oil). Because biodiesel has historically been more costly than ethanol, the biodiesel market is much smaller. A number of other countries have instituted programs to promote biofuel production and consumption. Argentina, Australia, Canada, China, Colombia, European Union (EU) member states, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand have all adopted targets—some mandatory—for increasing the contribution of biofuels to their transport fuel supplies.

Feedstocks typically account for more than half of the production costs of liquid biofuels. Despite remarkable reductions in production costs over the years in Brazil, the United States, and elsewhere, biofuels to date have been only marginally economic under favorable conditions (high world oil prices and low feedstock prices) and only in a handful of circumstances, as in Brazil in 2004 and 2005. More generally, biofuels have not been commercially viable without significant government support, even though the two leading biofuel markets are also two of the most efficient producers of biofuel feedstocks (net of subsidies, Brazil is the world’s lowest cost...
producer of sugarcane, and the United States is one of the lowest cost producers of maize). Consequently, all biofuel markets have been supported by government protection policies. Only about one-tenth of the biofuels produced and sold are internationally traded, and Brazil accounts for about half of the exports. There is little trade of biodiesel, although it is growing.

Direct and indirect policy-induced price distortions greatly affect the financial attractiveness of ethanol and biodiesel production and trade. The resulting price distortions are large, and the forward and backward links with other price-distorted markets are strong. This suggests that policy analysis should use economic values rather than relying only on financial or market prices, and that economic analysis needs to approximate general equilibrium considerations across multiple markets in which many related prices are distorted by domestic and foreign government policies. Financial price relationships for biofuels generally should be viewed with some skepticism, and, for policy purposes, attention should be paid to those economic values for which distortions have been accounted. ESMAP (2005) details a framework for economic analysis.

There are other applications of bioenergy—notably combustion of solid biomass for heat and power generation—that are commercially viable without government subsidies. However, there is a growing tendency to focus on liquid biofuels, and some have even come to use the word “bioenergy” to mean bioethanol and biodiesel. Against this trend, it is important to view the potential of liquid biofuels in a broader context that encompasses all forms of biomass as energy sources.

**Link between Agriculture and Biofuels**

Because feedstocks dominate the production costs of liquid biofuels, biofuels are closely linked to agriculture. Although ethanol from sugarcane in Brazil was the least-cost ethanol globally in much of the early 2000s, the economics became considerably more unfavorable following a surge in world sugar prices to 25-year highs in early 2006. Similarly, although ethanol from maize in the United States is generally more costly to produce than ethanol from sugarcane in Brazil, it was markedly cheaper in June 2000 when sugar prices in Brazil reached their peak while U.S. maize prices fell.

Agricultural policies affect the production, trade, and prices of agricultural commodities and thus are important determinants of biofuel feedstock costs and biofuel prices. Policies that distort agricultural trade are much more pervasive and substantial than trade-distorting policies for other goods such as manufactures. Historically, agricultural policies have tended to protect producers in industrial countries from imports from lower cost producers, while policies in developing countries have tended to tax producers. Some major oilseed-producing countries continue to assess high export taxes on oilseeds and oilseed products; Argentina, for example, levies a 27.5 percent export tax on soybeans and a 24 percent tax on soybean oil; it assesses low or no export taxes on biofuels. This export tax structure provides incentives to export biofuels rather than feedstocks. The highest protection is found in high-income Asia, Europe, and the United States. The European Union has used high tariffs to limit agricultural imports for most of the past 40 years, but is now shifting to direct payments that are decoupled from production decisions. The United States uses production subsidies and direct payments to agricultural producers. Although its overall support to agriculture is much smaller than that in high-income countries, Brazil provides low-interest loans to encourage expansion of agricultural exports and production. The value of total support to producers in the countries belonging to the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) was estimated at US$280 billion in 2005, compared to a total value for agricultural production (at farm gate) of US$837 billion in 2005 (OECD 2006b).

In countries where government provides support to agriculture, biofuel feedstocks are usually beneficiaries of the subsidies. Among major biofuel producers, maize and soybeans in the United States and sugar beets and rapeseed oil in the European Union are large recipients of government aid. The global sugar market is among the most distorted, with high protection and price supports to EU, U.S., and Japanese producers. These policies have been estimated to depress world sugar prices by up to 40 percent from the levels that would have prevailed under a free market (Mitchell 2004). Trade liberalization would increase world prices for sugar more than those for all the biofuel feedstocks currently being used commercially, which would have an adverse impact on ethanol economics.

Biofuel Policies

Some support policies for biofuels do not in themselves distort trade, such as biofuel mandates (for example, mandatory blending) and fuel tax reductions that do not distinguish between domestic and imported biofuels. Other policies—such as import tariffs and producer subsidies—clearly protect or subsidize domestic production at the expense of foreign-produced biofuels.

Fuel tax reductions are the most widely used of all the support measures for biofuels, and are used even now in Brazil. This fiscal instrument depends on the magnitude of excise taxes levied on petroleum fuels. Unlike industrial countries, many developing countries levy low taxes or even subsidize petroleum fuels. Countries with low or negative taxes on petroleum fuels would find it difficult to launch commercially viable biofuel markets because biofuels have historically required large tax reductions to compete with petroleum fuels. Tax reductions for ethanol in EU countries have been as high as US$0.84 per liter; such reductions are possible only because fuel taxes are high to begin with. The U.S. federal tax credit for ethanol is relatively low at US$0.135 per liter of ethanol blended, but a number of state governments offer additional tax reductions. Biodiesel has enjoyed comparable tax reductions, up to US$0.60 per liter of biodiesel blended in the European Union, US$0.28 per liter in Australia, and US$0.26 per liter in the United States. Among developing countries, Thailand provides significant fuel tax and fee reductions—as much as US$0.65 per liter in April 2006. In assessing these fuel tax reductions, note that fuel economy penalties associated with biofuel use amount to some 20 to 30 percent for ethanol and 5 to 10 percent for biodiesel; this means that the tax reductions per liter of petroleum fuel equivalent are even larger than the stated rates per liter of biofuel.

Some tax differentials may be justified to account for externalities that are not properly reflected in end-user prices, such as environmental externalities. Carbon market payments can serve as an imperfect proxy for the benefits of reducing GHG emissions. But even if 100 percent of the life-cycle GHG emissions of petroleum fuels are assumed to be offset by biofuels, a carbon dioxide equivalent price range for the foreseeable future of between US$8 and US$20 per tonne would give a benefit of only US$0.01 to US$0.07 per liter of biofuel (the upper end of the range for biodiesel). For U.S. ethanol made from maize, only one-fifth to one-third of petroleum GHG emissions have been estimated to be offset by biofuels use even under favorable circumstances, making the environmental benefits markedly smaller. For local air pollution
benefits, one set of rudimentary calculations for developing countries suggests that the incremental value of ethanol compared with gasoline may not be much higher than US$0.02 per liter, and US$0.08 for biodiesel (ESMAP 2005). These externality estimates are much smaller than the tax reductions currently given to biofuels. Biofuel feedstock production and biofuel processing may also carry environmental costs: water and air pollution, soil depletion, habitat loss, and potentially very large GHG emissions associated with the conversion of forests and grasslands to cropland.

Fuel tax reductions are typically granted to domestic and imported biofuels alike, in order to comply with World Trade Organization (WTO) principles that prohibit adjusting internal taxes and other internal charges to afford protection to domestic products. In the case of ethanol, however, these tax reductions are often offset by nearly equivalent import tariffs to prevent foreign producers from sharing in the tax reductions provided to domestic consumers. Border protection through high tariffs and quota restrictions is a fiscally inexpensive way of protecting domestic producers and is liberally used by governments. Ethanol enjoys much higher tariff rates than biodiesel. The European Union levies a specific import duty of €0.192 (US$0.26) per liter on undenatured ethanol and €0.102 (US$0.14) per liter on denatured ethanol; nevertheless, 101 developing countries enjoy duty-free access to the EU ethanol market. The United States levies a specific tariff of US$0.1427 per liter of ethanol in addition to a small ad valorem tariff. Some countries in the region enjoy various forms of duty-free access to the United States, and others take advantage of the “duty drawback” regulation. Australia has a specific import tariff of $A 0.38143 (US$0.31) per liter for both ethanol and biodiesel. Even Brazil levies a 20 percent ad valorem import tariff on ethanol, although it was lifted temporarily in February 2006 in the face of a looming ethanol shortage. Tariff rates on biodiesel in industrial countries are typically low (Australia and Canada being two exceptions). Ethanol is classified as an agricultural good and biodiesel as industrial. Ethanol’s agricultural classification affords countries that impose high tariff rates on ethanol more time to liberalize ethanol trade, protecting domestic producers longer.

There are also technical barriers to trade. They may be legitimate and even welfare enhancing, but they reduce the volume of trade. Arguably the greatest technical barrier in the coming years could be certification of biofuels for environmental sustainability, prompted by concerns about burning and clearing of rain forests to plant palm and soybeans (both feedstocks for biodiesel) in Southeast Asia and Latin America.

One form of government support given to biofuels seems appropriate. A legitimate role of government is to fund research and development (R&D) for activities that, because of their public good characteristics, are more likely to be undertaken if centrally financed. Although the private sector can and should be encouraged to undertake such work, R&D on biofuel technologies that can dramatically expand supply or reduce costs seems an appropriate area for governments to support. In developing countries, R&D could focus on technologies—for primary feedstock production, processing of biofuels, or equipment modifications for alternative uses (such as direct use of plant oils in stationary sources in remote areas with no electricity supply)—that are particularly suitable in their context. Studies of government subsidies for biofuels in industrial countries suggest that only a very small fraction of the aggregate subsidy is presently directed at R&D.
For biofuel trade to become significantly larger, much greater global production of biofuels is needed. The net effect of increased production of biofuels on a large scale will be higher food prices, which will benefit producers and harm consumers. The effects will be different both within and across countries. Within a given country, the welfare of urban workers will decline, but that of rural households—including farmers—will not necessarily rise uniformly. Most evidence suggests that poor farming households in rural areas are net buyers of food, even though they produce agricultural crops. Because maize is the staple food in a number of developing countries, rapidly rising maize prices are a particular concern.

Higher feedstock prices in turn could slow the growth of the global biofuel market. Growth in biofuel production has already begun to change the price relationships among various agricultural commodities. With a greater share of maize and other markets characterized by inelastic demand (through biofuel mandates, among others) which is also tied to the world oil market, and much smaller stocks of maize, soybeans, and other biofuel feedstocks, increased agricultural crop price variability and market volatility are expected.

The price correlation occurs not only between oil, biofuels, and their feedstocks, but also with other crops that are substitutes and with the by-products of those crops. Agricultural commodity prices are highly correlated because most cropland can be used to produce several different commodities, many commodities are substitutes in consumption, and agricultural commodities are internationally tradable. Consumers also substitute among commodities in direct and indirect response to prices. And increased production of biofuel by-products—such as oil meals and distillers grains, which are used as high-protein animal feed, and glycerine, which is used in pharmaceutical and personal care products—lower their prices and influence the production of not only biofuel feedstocks themselves but other crops that produce similar by-products.

Ramping up biofuel production will affect different farmers differently. A study of biodiesel found large differences in farmers’ income between biodiesel production from soybean oil and from palm oil. Soybeans yield nearly 80 percent by weight of soy meal, against 10 percent meal from palm. As a result, substantially higher soybean production for biodiesel would lead to a large surplus of meal and a large negative effect on soy meal prices, thereby reducing income to soybean farmers relative to that of palm growers (LMC International 2003).

By the same token, ramped-up biofuel production would have a major impact on land use and ecosystems. Another study modeled various scenarios aiming to blend 5 percent biofuels in gasoline and diesel worldwide by 2015 using agricultural crops. In terms of land requirements, the most efficient scheme was to derive the incremental ethanol supply from sugarcane in the center-south region of Brazil and biodiesel from palm oil. The land requirement for ethanol tripled if the incremental supply was produced from 50 percent cane and 50 percent maize from around the world. The land requirement for biodiesel quintupled if global use of other vegetable oils was made. In all cases, the amount of additional land required was substantial. If the new biofuel feedstock production areas were shared proportionally among all carbohydrates and oilseeds, the world would need an increase of more than 15 percent, or roughly 100 million hectares (LMC International 2006). Because this study did not take water requirements into account, the actual incremental land required may be even greater.
Increasing biofuel production from a particular crop could also link that crop’s prices to petroleum fuel prices. For the foreseeable future, biofuel production will remain small relative to petroleum fuel production, and biofuels largely will continue to be price takers rather than drivers of transportation fuel prices. One study suggests that diverting more than about 10 percent of a given crop to the biofuel market could link the price movement of that crop to the world petroleum market (LMC International 2006). Thus, large-scale production of biofuel would not protect consumers against high petroleum prices for long, because feedstock prices would rise and reduce the price gap between petroleum and biofuel. As such, biofuels are unlikely to become the answer to high crude oil prices.

However, if biofuels were to displace a mere 1 to 2 percent of global crude oil supply (2 to 7 percent of transport fuel demand), they might moderate future petroleum price increases. Many factors influence whether such a level of net displacement would occur. Because of the large global potential to produce cellulose, there is much interest in accelerating the development of the required technologies. The U.S. government targets halving the production cost of cellulosic ethanol by 2012, which would require rapid advances in technology.

**Impact of Trade Liberalization**

Production and trade policies for biofuels and for agriculture cannot be easily separated. WTO negotiations have taken a comprehensive view of what constitutes trade restrictions and offer a useful framework in which to consider trade policies. The WTO defines trade liberalization to include reducing import tariffs, import quota restrictions, export subsidies, and, significantly, domestic support (subsidies). Subsidies are defined in the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures to include not only direct payments to producers, but also reductions in taxes and other charges that reduce government revenues otherwise due.

No modeling of global biofuel trade liberalization has been conducted to date, but study findings on liberalizing world agricultural trade are informative. They have shown that the largest gain from liberalizing trade will come from removing border distortions. An estimated 75 percent of total agricultural support to OECD countries is provided by market access barriers and only 19 percent by domestic farm subsidies (Anderson, Martin, and Valenzuela 2006). Meanwhile, in developing countries, nearly all price support is through border restrictions.

Several studies have estimated the percentage of the total costs of global distortions in agriculture arising from import restrictions. The results range from about 80 percent to more than 90 percent (OECD 2006c; Diao, Somwaru, and Roe 2001; Anderson, Martin, and Valenzuela 2006). The benefits of reducing distortions go largely to industrial countries because they have the greatest distortions and largest economies. However, when measured as a share of national income, the benefits to developing countries are nearly double those of the industrial countries (van der Mensbrugghe and Beghin 2005).

A study examining removal of U.S. import tariffs on ethanol—keeping all other U.S. policy measures in place—estimates that tariff removal would increase world ethanol prices by

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2 In this regard, note that annual world oil consumption grew 1.7 percent in the last decade and is likely to maintain a comparable growth rate for the foreseeable future.
24 percent and raw sugar prices by 1.8 percent, and decrease maize prices by 1.5 percent, as less maize is channeled to the U.S. ethanol industry. In the United States, ethanol prices would fall by 14 percent; overall imports would triple; imports from the Caribbean, which currently enjoys duty-free access under the Caribbean Basin Initiative, would cease; and consumption would increase by 4 percent. In Brazil, ethanol consumption would decline by 3 percent, and net ethanol exports would increase by 64 percent (Elobeid and Tokgoz 2006).

As the above study illustrates, liberalizing biofuel trade is likely to increase demand for biofuels by reducing prices in previously protected markets, especially if the subsidies for consumption, mandates, or both are maintained. An immediate effect of trade liberalization would be similar to that of higher biofuel production: an increase in feedstock prices and a drop in by-product prices on the world market. Domestic biofuel prices in those markets that heavily protect domestic producers would fall. More generally, biofuel and agricultural trade liberalization is expected to increase world prices of agricultural commodities. Higher agricultural crop prices would benefit many of the poor engaged in agriculture in developing countries. However, food security in those developing countries that are net food importers would be negatively affected. Prices are expected to rise more steeply for the food products that developing countries import than for the commodities they export. The poorest countries, very few of whom export products on which there are currently high tariffs, would generally be worse off (FAO 2003). Lowering tariffs in developing countries could partially mitigate these adverse effects by lowering prices of imported food items and by creating opportunities for regional trade.

One possible exception to the above price trend is oilseeds and oilseed products, on which some major oilseed producers assess export taxes. Removal of the export taxes may prompt a large supply response, a fall in world prices, and greater exports of biodiesel feedstocks—rather than of biodiesel—to industrial countries. Some industry analysts posit that the most competitive structure for the EU biodiesel market might consist of large multi-feedstock facilities in EU countries with good inbound logistics (preferably located near a port) importing feedstocks. These facilities would combine scale, the ability to arbitrage among the various feedstocks and origins, and the ability to blend biodiesel fuels from different feedstocks to comply with EU fuel specifications and performance requirements.

**The Role of International Trade in Biofuels**

If biofuel production is economic, a producing country would presumably consume any additional biofuel production that the domestic market could absorb before exporting, since selling into the domestic market is almost universally more profitable than exporting. If production takes place even if not economic, then the net subsidies provided for biofuel production should approximate the externalities associated with environment and energy security from the point of view of maximizing public welfare. Any net subsidies above that level or any additional distortions to trade can reasonably be considered protectionism that reduces societal welfare.

It is important to distinguish between energy security and energy self-sufficiency in assessing whether current support for biofuel production makes optimal use of public funding. It is also necessary to recognize the global nature of some of the environmental effects of substituting biofuels for petroleum fuels in transportation. In many countries, a policy for energy security is equated with self-sufficiency. This in turn conveniently leads to protection of domestic agriculture in industrial countries, since many
view development of biofuels as a substitute for agricultural reforms required under international trade negotiations. But energy security objectives might be met by trading with a broad range of countries. Similarly, global environmental benefits can be achieved from production and energy substitution anywhere on the globe. The guiding principle should be to achieve reductions in GHG emissions at least cost in any sector anywhere. By the same token, ecologically harmful production pathways for biofuels anywhere defeat the purpose of importing biofuels for global environmental gains.

There are two questions to be answered in assessing whether liberalizing trade in biofuels would improve economic welfare. First, is there a combination of potential biofuel-deficit and biofuel-surplus countries that might beneficially engage in international trade? Second, how do the existing subsidies in various countries measure up against current best estimates of potential environmental and other benefits? The report suggests that subsidies in a number of countries in the past have probably exceeded the value of potential environmental gains from fuel substitution.

The European Union, the United States, Japan, and perhaps a few other countries in Asia might fall into the category of potential biofuel or biofuel feedstock importers. Most developing countries are densely populated and do not have large tracts of underutilized lands that could be used for crops or biofuels. The potential exporters include some parts of Latin America—notably Brazil and, to a lesser extent, Argentina—and sub-Saharan Africa that have considerable surplus land that has not been brought into production. Vast rain forests in Indonesia are also suitable for palm cultivation. There is concern that additional production would occur via the clearing of rain forests and savannas in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Africa. Such new clearing would result in additional GHG emissions and the loss of both existing biodiversity and GHG sinks. Another concern is that water is not valued as energy in most countries. In those regions where water is projected to become increasingly scarce—including parts of Africa—water shortages may become a serious constraint on biofuel production, and this merits careful examination. Unused land in sub-Saharan Africa faces a number of obstacles before it can be profitably brought into production. These obstacles include poor infrastructure, underdeveloped financial markets, and a hostile investment climate due to (often inappropriate) government policies and poor governance.

If biofuels are not economic but some governments are prepared to offer large subsidies or mandate biofuel use, trade opportunities might arise for countries with duty-free access. Indeed, some transition economies are launching or planning to start biodiesel production with a view to exporting to the European Union. The financial viability of such trade obviously depends critically on the political decisions in the countries providing the subsidies.

Biofuel trade liberalization would increase competition, which should in turn help improve efficiency, bring down costs, and enable the world’s most efficient producers to expand their market share. Removal of high tariffs would bring down prices in highly protected markets and increase consumption. While efficient producers would gain, those developing countries with duty-free access to the EU and U.S. markets today might lose their trading opportunities altogether. On the other hand, removing border barriers to biofuel trade while continuing the agricultural and biofuel policies that distort biofuel markets could prolong and even worsen those distortions, as additional markets for subsidized agricultural outputs and biofuels would be created. These considerations
underscore the importance of dealing simultaneously with the full range of trade reforms defined broadly by the WTO. Failing that, trade in ethanol and biodiesel might be liberalized as a first step, which could also force governments to address openly the question (and the costs) of what objectives their biofuel support policies are actually pursuing.
1. Issues in Biofuels, Agriculture, and Trade

Bioenergy is playing an increasingly important role as an alternative and renewable source of energy. Bioenergy includes solid biomass, biogas, and liquid biofuels. Combustion of biomass residues for heat and power generation is commercially viable without government support in some applications. Liquid biofuels made from biomass are attracting growing interest worldwide. The global liquid biofuel market today utilizes so-called first generation technologies and relies mainly on agricultural crops for feedstock. Second generation biofuels, still far from commercially viable, can open up many new opportunities because they can be sourced from a much wider variety of feedstocks, vastly expanding the potential for fuel production and for abating greenhouse gas (GHG) emission. The timing of commercialization is uncertain, although some industry analysts predict that the needed cost reductions may be achieved in the coming decade.

This report—which focuses on the issues associated with trade in liquid biofuels—is a second ESMAP report on liquid biofuels and part of the World Bank’s broader assessment of bioenergy in general. The previous ESMAP report on biofuels (ESMAP 2005) found the economics of biofuel production and consumption to be site- and situation-specific, suggesting scope for welfare gains from specialization and trade. Recent surges in world oil prices, concerns about energy security, and concerns about climate change from GHG emissions have prompted industrial and developing countries alike to pursue avenues for substituting biofuels for petroleum fuels. One sector in which diversification beyond oil is particularly difficult is transport. Unlike heat and power generation, where natural gas, solid biomass, and such alternative sources as hydroelectric or geothermal power can be commercially viable, the shift from traditional liquid petroleum fuels for vehicles to either gaseous fuels or electricity may require costly modifications to vehicles, fuel distribution, or refueling infrastructure. Liquid biofuels are among the few alternatives that can be readily used by vehicles without significant modification in the existing infrastructure, and, for this reason, biofuels have been used primarily in the transport sector to date. Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, the European Union, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United States have all adopted targets—some mandatory—for increasing the contribution of biofuels to their transport fuel supplies.

All liquid biofuel markets to date have been supported by government protection policies that include one or more of the following market interventions: fuel tax reduction or exemption, mandatory blending, producer subsidies, high import tariffs, and financial incentive programs for users of biofuels such as lower taxes on vehicles designed for biofuels. International biofuel trade is thus beset with both domestic
and border distortions. The most frequently cited rationale for these support policies is energy security. In the long run, hydrocarbons are nonrenewable resources and will eventually be exhausted, requiring substitution with alternative sources. In the near term, governments fear scenarios that can lead to a marked or steady increase in world oil prices: disruptions to oil supply through weather conditions (such as Hurricane Katrina in 2005), political events (such as the Iranian Revolution which began in 1978, and more recently the events in Iraq and Nigeria), or unexpected infrastructure breakdown (Alaska in August 2006); higher than expected global demand growth without supply expansion to match; and policy decisions by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to limit supply (as illustrated by events in 1973–74). These energy security concerns have led to a desire for less dependence on petroleum, and, nearly universally, to greater self-sufficiency in fuel supply in the form of domestic production of biofuels.

Nearly all liquid biofuels are commercially manufactured from agricultural crops such as sugarcane, sugar beets, maize,1 cassava, wheat, barley, rapeseeds, soybeans, and palm. As a result, biofuel markets are inextricably linked to agriculture. Policies for biofuels affect agriculture and food production, and agricultural policies affect biofuel markets. This link to agriculture is one of the reasons why there has historically been strong government support for biofuels—a means of protecting domestic farmers. Some biofuel support programs have been started in response to low crop prices. The establishment of Proálcool in Brazil in 1975 has been described by some analysts as a way for the country to address sugar industry overcapacity more than a reaction to the energy crisis (Szmrecsánya and Moreira 1992). In India, overcapacity in sugar production and molasses were the initial motivation for the country’s ethanol program.

Thus, issues in the liberalization of international trade in liquid biofuels cannot be examined in isolation but must be studied in conjunction with related issues in agricultural trade. Crop growers will sell biofuel feedstocks to the higher priced of the two markets, agricultural crop or biofuel. Some agricultural products are close substitutes (such as vegetable oils), and some by-products can be manufactured from several different crops, only one of which may be used for biofuel manufacture. An increase in the production of a biofuel feedstock may depress the price of a by-product from another crop that competes on the same by-product market, potentially reducing overall production of the second crop. Traded and nontraded crops can be produced on the same land and use the same basic inputs. Studies since the 1960s have shown that aggregate agricultural supply response with respect to price is fairly inelastic, but individual supply responses are elastic and respond seasonally to changing price ratios among crops (Binswanger and others 1987). This means that policies for one commodity are readily transmitted into effects on other crops and into inputs—such as land, irrigation water, and fertilizers—that are used for several different crops. Because of crop substitutability, world biofuel trade will be affected not only by the biofuel feedstock market, but also by what happens in other crop markets.

This report examines policy issues associated with trade in liquid biofuels, posing the following questions:

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1 Throughout this report, the internationally accepted term “maize” is used instead of “corn,” the term used in the United States. “Corn syrup” is therefore written as “maize syrup,” “corn gluten” as “maize gluten,” and so on.
The report focuses on ethanol and biodiesel, the two most important liquid biofuels, and on commercially demonstrated production technologies for these fuels. It does not address biomethanol or straight plant oil as a fuel, or biogas. The report takes a time horizon of the next 5 to 10 years, and does not attempt to assess the impact of policy changes on emerging technologies or new (not yet commercially viable) feedstocks such as cellulosic ethanol, because these are unlikely to be commercialized within the time horizon considered to have a significant impact on international trade in biofuels. Similarly, no assessment is made of environmental externalities that are poorly accounted for or on specific environmental effects of trade liberalization.

This chapter begins with an overview of biofuel basics, the current economics of biofuels, and world consumption of gasoline and diesel (two primary petroleum fuels for which biofuels are substitutes). Following this is a discussion of the global distribution of biofuel production and consumption and the potential role of international trade in achieving efficiency and related objectives. Chapter 1 ends with a discussion of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and ongoing negotiations on agricultural and biofuel trade; this information is supplemented by appendix A. Chapter 2, supplemented by appendix B, details the interlinkages between biofuels and agriculture, and reviews trade reforms in agriculture and associated welfare gains, past and future. Chapter 3, supplemented by appendix C, describes government policies that affect important biofuel markets, discusses possible consequences of large expansion of biofuel consumption, and reviews in greater detail policy issues in biofuel trade including WTO negotiations. Chapter 4 concludes with policy lessons and recommendations.

Biofuel Basics

The two most widely used liquid biofuels are ethanol and plant oil–based biodiesel. Ethanol can wholly or partially substitute for gasoline, and biodiesel can substitute for petroleum diesel. So-called first generation biofuels are made from agricultural crops by means of sugar fermentation (for ethanol) and the reaction of methanol (or a higher alcohol) with a plant oil or animal fat. The two most widely used crops for ethanol production are sugarcane (Brazil, Colombia, India, Pakistan, Thailand) and maize (China, United States). Biodiesel is currently made on a commercial scale mainly from rapeseed (Europe) and soybeans (United States). Malaysia, the world’s second largest producer of palm oil, is emerging as a new biodiesel producer. There is limited production of biodiesel from animal fats and recycled waste oil, and there is little scope for expanding supply from these sources on a large scale. The United States is the largest producer of ethanol, producing slightly more than Brazil; Brazil is the world’s largest ethanol exporter. The leading manufacturer and consumer of biodiesel is the European Union. Biodiesel has historically been more costly to produce than ethanol, and the global production of biodiesel is much smaller than that of ethanol, but growing rapidly.

Biofuels are typically used in low-percentage blends—about 5 to 10 percent mixed into petroleum fuels—but can also be used “neat” (pure). Ethanol is dehydrated into a form called
anhydrous ethanol before it is blended into gasoline. Vehicles that are manufactured to run on pure ethanol can use hydrous ethanol, which contains about 4 to 5 percent water. Dehydration of hydrous ethanol into anhydrous ethanol adds to the cost and energy used in making the biofuel. Biofuel blends are designated by the amount of biofuel contained in conventional petroleum products. The letters “E” and “B” are used to designate ethanol-containing and biodiesel-containing fuels, respectively; thus, E10 designates a mixture of 10 percent ethanol and 90 percent gasoline. Gasohol is a gasoline blend containing at least 10 percent ethanol. Similarly, B100 represents pure biodiesel, B5 a blend containing 5 percent pure biodiesel and 95 percent petroleum diesel, and so on.

Biofuels have several potential environmental advantages. The most important perhaps is a reduction in life-cycle GHG emissions relative to petroleum fuels, since biofuels are derived from plants which convert carbon dioxide (CO₂) into carbohydrates in their growth. The degree of reduction varies markedly with feedstock and the production technology used. Figures from different studies are shown in tables 1.1 and 1.2 for ethanol and biodiesel, respectively. The tables give an indication of the degree of divergence of different study findings, with some studies even coming up with opposite signs for the same feedstock. There seems to be a consensus, however, that ethanol from maize in the United States does not give a significant benefit, and can even increase GHG emissions if coal is used.

### Table 1.1: Change in Life-Cycle GHG Emissions per Kilometer Traveled by Replacing Gasoline with Ethanol in Conventional Spark-Ignition Vehicles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feedstock</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>−47%</td>
<td>Armstrong and others 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar beet</td>
<td>North France</td>
<td>−35%; −56%a;</td>
<td>Armstrong and others 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize, E90</td>
<td>USA, 2015</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Delucchi 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize, E10</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>−1%</td>
<td>Wang, Saricks, and Santini 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize, E85</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>−14% to −19%c</td>
<td>Wang, Saricks, and Santini 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cellulose, E85</td>
<td>USA, 2005</td>
<td>−68% to −102%c</td>
<td>Wang, Saricks, and Santini 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molasses, E85</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>−51%; −24%d</td>
<td>Beer and others 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood waste, E85</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>−81%</td>
<td>Beer and others 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molasses, E10</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1%; 3%d</td>
<td>Beer and others 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar, hydrous ethanol</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>−87%; −95%a</td>
<td>Macedo and others 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar, anhydrous ethanol</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>−91%; −96%a</td>
<td>Macedo and others 2004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Percentage changes are for neat ethanol unless otherwise indicated. To ensure a common basis, only those studies that give emissions in grams per kilometer traveled are considered.

- a. Average.
- b. Best case.
- c. A range given in the study report.
- d. Different assumptions about credits for by-product.
- e. The first uses average values of energy and material consumption; the second represents best practice.
to generate electricity consumed during ethanol production. On the other hand, ethanol from sugarcane can yield significant GHG emission savings. It is important to note that none of the studies considered changes in land use patterns. For example, if peat land is burned to clear a rain forest to plant palm oil for biodiesel manufacture, there could easily be a net increase, rather than decrease, in life-cycle GHG emissions. Such possibilities are heightening concerns in the countries interested in importing biofuels or their feedstocks primarily to reduce GHG emissions, most notably in the European Union.

Another benefit of biofuel use is a reduction in the emissions of local pollutants at the tailpipe. Ethanol has the greatest air quality benefits where vehicle fleets are old, as is often the case in developing countries. It helps to reduce the exhaust emissions of carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons, especially in cold climates. Ethanol also has a very high blending octane number (which is a measure of a fuel’s resistance to self-ignition—or knocking—when mixed with air in an engine cylinder). It can replace octane-enhancing gasoline additives such as lead, and can dilute other blending components such as aromatics, both of which produce pollutants that can be harmful to human health. All biofuels are sulfur-free, an advantage given the worldwide move to reduce sulfur in petroleum fuels for environmental and public health benefits. Biodiesel reduces emissions of carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, and particulate matter, but can slightly increase emissions of nitrogen oxides (ESMAP 2005).

Ethanol is a simple molecule and, aside from impurities, its properties are independent of the feedstock from which it is made. It does have monoxide and hydrocarbons, especially in cold climates. Ethanol also has a very high blending octane number (which is a measure of a fuel’s resistance to self-ignition—or knocking—when mixed with air in an engine cylinder). It can replace octane-enhancing gasoline additives such as lead, and can dilute other blending components such as aromatics, both of which produce pollutants that can be harmful to human health. All biofuels are sulfur-free, an advantage given the worldwide move to reduce sulfur in petroleum fuels for environmental and public health benefits. Biodiesel reduces emissions of carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, and particulate matter, but can slightly increase emissions of nitrogen oxides (ESMAP 2005).
some drawbacks, however. Blending ethanol into gasoline at low levels increases the blend’s evaporative emissions. Higher evaporative emissions of hydrocarbons constituting gasoline can be damaging to the environment, especially if the gasoline contains light olefins (which are powerful ozone precursors), in cities where elevated ambient concentrations of ground-level ozone are a public health concern. Gasoline can be manufactured with low vapor pressure to offset the high blending vapor pressure of ethanol, but doing so increases the cost of gasoline production.

The impact of substituting gasoline with ethanol on vehicle fuel economy varies. As a broad generalization, a reduction in fuel economy of 20 to 30 percent can be taken as representative of study findings (ESMAP 2005). The energy content of ethanol is about a third lower than that of gasoline on a volume basis, but ethanol’s high octane number enables a higher engine compression ratio to be used in vehicles designed to run only on pure ethanol, which partially compensates for ethanol’s lower energy content. Vehicles designed to run on gasoline-ethanol blends and flex-fuel vehicles—vehicles capable of running on blends with varying ethanol content—do not have their engine compression ratios optimized for each ethanol-gasoline blend; consequently, their fuel efficiency is lower when running on high ethanol blends than in vehicles designed to run only on ethanol. In assessing prices of ethanol blended into gasoline, several factors need to be considered:

- A reduction in fuel economy of 20 to 30 percent
- Ethanol’s higher blending octane numbers
- The need, in some regions with tight gasoline quality specifications, to purchase more expensive base gasoline with low volatility to offset the higher blending vapor pressure of ethanol

Throughout this report, to approximate the per liter financial equivalency of gasoline and ethanol for consumers, the per liter price of ethanol is divided by 0.8 to arrive at the equivalent gasoline price—in this case, that of the premium grade to account partially for ethanol’s high octane. The divisor would be smaller for high blends used in flex-fuel vehicles capable of running on varying ratios of gasoline and ethanol (0.7 is typically used as a rule of thumb in Brazil against E20 to E25; the divisor would be even smaller when comparing it with pure gasoline). As for biodiesel, one of the most comprehensive reviews found that the impact on fuel economy of using biodiesel was a decrease of 0.9 to 2.1 percent for B20 and 4.6 to 10.6 percent for pure biodiesel (U.S. EPA 2002). Thus, the price of biodiesel would need to be about 5 to 10 percent lower than that of petroleum diesel on a per liter basis to be equivalent.

Any ethanol added to gasoline needs to be free of water; otherwise, a phase separation can occur between gasoline and water-ethanol. For this reason, anhydrous ethanol is used in a gasoline-ethanol blend. Anhydrous ethanol is transported separately to terminals to minimize contact with water and typically blended into gasoline just before loading into trucks by splash blending, a process that requires no special equipment or temperature control. Because ethanol absorbs water and impurities found in pipelines, it is best transported via a dedicated pipeline. This makes long-distance transport of ethanol—such as from the maize-growing U.S. Midwest to California—very expensive, since ordinary pipelines, which are the cheapest way to ship fuels long distances, cannot be used. Ethanol is instead transported by tanker truck or rail tank car. There is no pipeline transport of ethanol in the United States. Converting ethanol to ethyl tertiary-butyl ether (ETBE)—as is done in France and Spain, and proposed in Japan—enables fuel blending at the refinery gate and avoids these handling problems.
Ethanol is currently made from the fermentation of six-carbon sugar molecules. The lowest processing cost and most efficient pathway is to make ethanol from sugarcane, which yields not only six-carbon sugars without any further chemical reactions, but also bagasse as a residue during sugarcane crushing. Bagasse is burned for power generation, and enables sugar and ethanol plants to become self-sufficient in electricity and even have some surplus for sale. Sugar beets do not produce the equivalent of bagasse, and thus electricity has to be obtained externally. Molasses, a by-product of sugar production, typically obtains prices lower than equivalent sugar prices. Converting molasses to ethanol can be commercially attractive, enabling sugar processors to obtain higher revenues from molasses.

Conversion of other feedstocks (such as maize, wheat, and cassava) to ethanol requires that starch contained in these feedstocks first be converted to six-carbon sugars, which adds to the processing cost. These feedstocks do not produce residues that can be burned economically to generate power; and again, as with sugar beets, electricity has to be separately purchased or produced. Ethanol from maize produces a number of by-products depending on the type of milling plant used. So-called dry milling plants use a grinding process and make distillers dried grains which are used as cattle feed. Wet milling plants use a chemical extraction process and produce maize oil, maize gluten, and high fructose maize syrup. Both types of processing produce CO₂ which can be sold commercially. Sales of these by-products lower the overall cost of ethanol production. In the United States, about 80 percent of the maize used for ethanol production is processed by dry milling plants, and most new ethanol plants are dry mills.

Biodiesel is made by reacting methanol or ethanol with an oil; methanol is typically used because it is cheaper. Commercially used oils for biofuel production include rapeseed oil, soybean oil, palm oil, coconut oil, tallow, and waste cooking oil (sometimes called “yellow grease”). The bulk of biodiesel is made from vegetable oils. Historically, palm oil prices have been lower than those of other vegetable oils. Excluding recycled waste oil, palm oil is the lowest cost feedstock for producing biodiesel today, but these price relationships may change in the future if demand for palm oil rises (see chapter 3). The Philippines is launching a biofuel industry based on coconut oil, and several countries are experimenting with programs to produce biodiesel from Jatropha curcas and other plants that can survive on marginal land. Biodiesel is not a simple molecule, and its physical properties depend on the feedstock. As such, variation in the physical properties of biodiesel fuels is much greater than for ethanol.

One disadvantage of biodiesel is its greater tendency to form wax at low temperature and clog fuel filters, posing a technical challenge in cold climate countries and in winter application in temperate climate countries. Not all vegetable oils perform similarly as a biodiesel feedstock. Under cold weather conditions, biodiesel made from rapeseed oil outperforms that from palm, soybean, and other oils. There are tests to determine physical properties associated with cold temperature operability. The cloud point is one such measure of cold weather operability limits. The cloud point is the temperature at which a cloud of wax crystals first appears in a fuel sample that is cooled under specified conditions. Petroleum diesel may have a cloud point of −15 degrees Celsius (°C) to as low as −48°C, against a cloud point of −2°C for rapeseed-based biodiesel, 0°C for soy-based biodiesel, and 15°C for palm-based biodiesel. Work is under way to address these limitations of biodiesel fuel. The Malaysian Palm Oil Board is reported to have licensed its technology for making EU and U.S. winter specification–compliant biodiesel from palm oil to 3 of the 52 biodiesel plant license
holders, and the technology is planned to come on stream by mid-2007 (Reuters News 2006d).

An interesting development is commercialization of next generation biomass to liquid (NExBTL) renewable diesel by Neste Oil of Finland. NExBTL employs an entirely different production pathway to manufacture biodiesel from animal fats and plant oils. These feedstocks are not reacted with methanol to make esters (organic compounds containing two oxygen atoms), and NExBTL biodiesel does not contain any oxygen. Prized for its superior physical properties, NExBTL is a mixture of normal paraffins and isoparaffins (the most desirable components of petroleum diesel) with physical properties similar to those of synthetic diesel made from natural gas and coal. NExBTL has a cetane number of around 90—about double the minimum required in most countries—and its production process can be adjusted to achieve a cloud point from $-5^\circ C$ to $-30^\circ C$, thereby overcoming winter performance problems of conventional ester forms of biodiesel. Because the components of NExBTL are no different from those of petroleum diesel, there are no material compatibility issues (Rantanen and others 2005). Production will start in 2007, and a trial on public transport vehicles in the greater Helsinki area involving about 700 buses and 75 refuse trucks is expected to last from the autumn of 2007 to the end of 2010 (Nordic Business Report 2006).

Second generation biofuels can use a much greater variety of feedstocks, including agricultural and forest residues (including unused portions from such current feedstocks as maize and sugarcane—for example, maize stover and cane trash), energy crops (such as switch grass), and municipal wastes. Two primary pathways are being pursued. The first breaks down biomass components to make sugars for fermentation into (cellulosic) ethanol. Breakthroughs are needed to bring down the cost of transforming biomass components into sugars. The U.S. government targets halving the production cost of cellulosic ethanol by 2012; this would require rapid advances in technology. The second pathway involves heating biomass to a high temperature under controlled conditions to either form a liquid directly or a gaseous mixture that in turn is converted into liquids. The latter gasifies biomass into carbon monoxide and hydrogen, which is then converted into a wide array of chemicals, including gasoline and extremely high-quality diesel. The latter, called synthetic diesel, is commercially available today but made from natural gas and coal rather than biomass. The advantage of these synthetic liquid fuels—gasoline and diesel—is that they are completely compatible with the current fuel infrastructure and vehicle hardware. These second generation biofuels open up many new opportunities for energy production because of the vastly expanded scope for feedstocks. At the same time, they involve more complex processing technologies and are likely to require much larger economies of scale—and hence capital investment—compared to first generation biofuels.

**Economics of Biofuels**

Biofuels have historically been more expensive to produce than petroleum fuels, which is why every biofuel program implemented to date has required significant and ongoing government subsidies, mandates, or both. These policies often are paired with tariff protection to ensure that the incentives go only to local producers. The cheapest source of biofuel—based on explicit costs of production that reflect opportunity cost—has been ethanol produced from sugarcane in the center-south region of Brazil. The opportunity cost of a feedstock—in this case, the choice of using the cane to produce sugar instead—is a critical and often hidden factor in the economics of biofuel production. This is as true for biodiesel (for example, the cooking oil market versus the fuel market) as it is for ethanol. Thus, when the
demand for maize in the alternative market (such as food and the animal feed market) is low and, at the same time, the demand for sugar is high, ethanol produced from maize can be less costly than ethanol from sugarcane (this is discussed further in chapter 2). One recent example occurred in June 2000 when sugar prices in Brazil reached their peak. After adding freight charges, U.S. ethanol from maize shipped to Brazil was cheaper by US$0.02 per liter than ethanol made in Brazil (Gallagher and others 2006). The following paragraphs take the economics of ethanol produced from sugarcane as an illustration of the role that opportunity cost plays in biofuel markets.3

Even in Brazil, at the time the world’s lowest cost biofuel producer, feedstock costs accounted for 58 to 65 percent of the cost of ethanol production in mid-2005. In addition to feedstock costs, other explicit costs include the cost of the capital equipment required for production; the cost of chemicals, labor, and energy used in production; maintenance costs; and the (netted-out) value of the by-products of the production process. Because the majority of biofuel production costs are in feedstocks, the commercial viability of any biofuel is critically dependent on feedstock prices. In the case of ethanol in Brazil, the primary cost determinant is the cost of cane production and the opportunity cost posed by the alternative of producing sugar from that cane.

Brazil is the lowest cost producer of sugarcane in the world. Close to 100 countries around the world grow sugarcane, but none have been able to match Brazil’s sugarcane cost structure. The center-south region of Brazil, which accounts for 85 percent of the country’s cane production, is virtually unmatched in its productivity and low production costs. A number of factors contribute to low-cost and efficient manufacture of both sugar and ethanol in Brazil (ESMAP 2005):

- Cane cultivation is water intensive, but nearly all cane fields in this region are rain-fed, in contrast to irrigated sugar production in countries such as Australia and India.
- Sugarcane and other activities do not have to compete for land because there is still plenty of land in this region suitable for growing sugarcane that is not currently used for agriculture.
- Productivity in Brazil has been boosted by decades of research and commercial cultivation. For example, cane growers in Brazil use more than 500 commercial cane varieties that are resistant to many of the 40-odd crop diseases found in the country.
- Most distilleries in Brazil belong to sugar mill/distillery complexes, capable of changing the production ratio of sugar to ethanol. This capability enables plant owners to take advantage of fluctuations in the relative prices of sugar and ethanol, as well as benefit from the higher price that can be obtained by converting molasses into ethanol.
- Flex-fuel vehicles—introduced in March 2003 and capable of running on any mixture of hydrous ethanol and gasohol—have further increased the attractiveness of building hybrid sugar-ethanol complexes and allayed consumer fears about the consequences of potential ethanol shortages.

The financial cost of ethanol production in Brazil was estimated to be in the range of US$0.23 to US$0.29 per liter in mid-2005, corresponding to US$0.29 to US$0.41 per liter of gasoline equivalent (ESMAP 2005).4 The (net-of-tax)

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3 A more detailed discussion of various opportunity costs—including water, land, and labor—can be found in ESMAP (2005).
4 For gasoline equivalent prices, ethanol prices were divided by 0.7–0.8 in this set of calculations.
price—as opposed to the cost of production—of ethanol from sugarcane is determined by the opportunity cost of sugarcane, which is the higher of that achieved from selling into the ethanol or sugar market. World sugar prices reached 25-year highs in early 2006, causing the retail price of hydrous ethanol to exceed that of the gasoline equivalent in Brazil despite a large tax reduction, and prompted the government to reduce the required anhydrous ethanol content in gasohol from 25 percent to 20 percent in March. As the world sugar supply expanded in response and prices began to fall later in the year, the mandatory blending percentage was increased to 23 percent in November 2006.

At a given world sugar price, the corresponding ethanol price (or opportunity cost) can be computed. The results are shown in figure 1.1, where they are compared with northwest European unleaded premium gasoline prices (wholesale, net of tax). During the period covered—January 1990 to June 2007—world sugar and gasoline prices (net of tax) spanned a wide range, from US$113 to US$398 per tonne of sugar and US$0.08 to US$0.58 per liter of gasoline. The figure shows two prices for ethanol: on a per liter basis, and converted to gasoline equivalent assuming a fuel economy penalty of 20 percent. The scenario considered converts sugarcane, which can otherwise yield sugar and molasses, into ethanol, and assumes that molasses obtains 25 percent of sugar prices on a weight basis. The intention here is not to perform precise calculations—which would, among others, require historical world prices of molasses, product yields as a function of technology and sugarcane characteristics, and detailed information on opportunity costs.

Figure 1.1: Comparison of Gasoline Prices and Opportunity Costs of Ethanol

Sources: World Bank calculations, premium unleaded gasoline in northwest Europe from Energy Intelligence 2007, raw cane sugar prices from the International Sugar Organization.

Notes: Opportunity costs of ethanol are calculated based on the following parameters used to compute the equivalencies between sugar and ethanol in Brazil: 1.0495 kilograms of sucrose equivalent to 1 kilogram of sugar, and 1.8169 kilograms of sucrose equivalent to 1 liter of anhydrous ethanol. Sugarcane is assumed to yield 83 percent sugar and 17 percent molasses. Molasses prices are assumed to be equal to 25 percent of sugar prices on a weight basis, and the sucrose content of molasses is 55 percent that of sugar. Premium gasoline prices are northwest Europe monthly spot prices, barges, free on board (FOB) for premium unleaded. Sugar prices are raw, FOB, and stowed at greater Caribbean ports.
of production and transport costs for moving ethanol and gasoline to markets—but to illustrate patterns for the economics of ethanol production from sugarcane. The results show that, despite high world petroleum prices, soaring world sugar prices made it difficult for ethanol to be economic in 2006.

Figure 1.2 plots world sugar and premium gasoline prices in real terms (that is, adjusted for inflation) during the same time period against break-even gasoline prices (the ethanol, gasoline equivalent, line in figure 1.1); if the price of gasoline is above the break-even line (solid line in figure 1.2), domestic production and consumption of ethanol is economic. During the period covered and again assuming a fuel economy penalty of 20 percent, ethanol broke even only in a handful of months, half of them in 2005.

Environmental benefits of ethanol that are financially unaccounted for may shift the break-even line downward. Carbon market payments can serve as an imperfect proxy for the benefits of reducing GHG emissions. But a CO₂-equivalent price range, expected for the foreseeable future, of between US$8 and US$20 per tonne would generally provide only about US$0.01 to US$0.07 per liter of biofuel (the upper end of the range for biodiesel), even if 100 percent of the life-cycle GHG emissions of petroleum fuels are assumed to be offset by biofuels. For local air pollution benefits, one set of rudimentary calculations for developing countries suggests that the incremental value of ethanol compared to gasoline may not be much higher than US$0.02 per liter, and US$0.08 for biodiesel (ESMAP 2005). Biofuel feedstock production and biofuel processing may also carry environmental costs, including water and air pollution, soil depletion, habitat loss, and potentially very large GHG emissions associated with the conversion of forests to cropland.

Figure 1.2: Comparative Economics of Sugar versus Ethanol Sale

![Graph showing the comparative prices of sugar and gasoline for ethanol economics.]

Sources: World Bank calculations, premium unleaded gasoline in northwest Europe from Energy Intelligence 2007, raw cane sugar prices from the International Sugar Organization.

Notes: For assumptions made in the calculations, see the notes to figure 1.1. Dollars are 2007 US$. 
The foregoing discussion suggests that accounting for environmental externalities might shift the break-even line in figure 1.2 by a few cents per liter for ethanol, but would not alter the overall conclusion. As such, figure 1.2 raises questions about the economics of Brazil’s longstanding ethanol program. Brazil is a special case because of its enormous market power in sugar. Although about half of Brazil’s cane has been diverted to the ethanol sector in recent years, Brazil still accounts for about 30 percent of world sugar exports. Thus, switching from ethanol to sugar and exporting the additional sugar could lower world sugar prices, just as diverting more sugarcane production to ethanol production could raise world sugar prices further. In fact, as chapter 2 shows, the collapse of the hydrous ethanol market in Brazil before the launch of flex-fuel vehicles, and the subsequent increase in sugar exports, led to a decline in world sugar prices in the late 1990s and early 2000s (as evident in figure 1.1). Brazil is not in a position to increase sugar production at the expense of ethanol except on a limited basis because of limited sugar milling capacity. The ethanol industry has adopted hybrid mill-distillery configurations capable of adjusting ethanol/sugar percentages within a 20 percent band (40/60 to 60/40 ethanol/sugar), and views sugar and ethanol as joint products. This enables the industry to diversify its product portfolio and mitigate some of the risks of the sugar and ethanol markets. Also, making ethanol at a hybrid mill-distillery complex means that the proportion of molasses in the feedstock not converted to sugar and still fetching sugar-equivalent prices via ethanol is higher, thereby improving economics (although surges in world prices of molasses in early 2006 affected these economics).

Figure 1.2 suggests that the split between sugar and ethanol in Brazil may not have been optimal, and that, historically, too much cane may have been diverted to ethanol. Had the ethanol and sugar industries been left entirely to market forces, less ethanol might have been produced and more sugar exported, until international sugar prices came down to a level that would make ethanol production economic. This argument would apply only to Brazil. All other countries are effectively price followers in the world sugar market, and the economics of ethanol production would be determined by the solid line in figure 1.2. Another consideration for Brazil is that, as the world’s largest exporter of both ethanol and sugar, the export-parity prices of these two commodities affect the country’s ethanol economics. Since 2002, which includes a period of very high ethanol prices in the United States (in 2006), ethanol has been more profitable than sugar about half the time.

Ethanol economics should be more favorable in petroleum-importing, sugar-exporting, landlocked areas, or in any other situation where transportation costs for imports are high and there are indigenous sources of biofuel feedstocks that can be grown at reasonable costs. Export-parity prices of sugar are lower than world prices by the cost of transporting sugar to the nearest external market; correspondingly, domestic gasoline prices are higher than world prices by the cost of importing gasoline into the country.

For illustrative purposes, consider the case of a country for which the cost of taking sugar to the nearest port is US$100 per tonne and the cost of importing gasoline is US$150 per tonne (US$0.1125 per liter). Under these

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5 In economic terms, analysts should use the “marginal export revenue” rather than the market price for sugar (that is, the “average” export revenue) in calculating both the trade-off between sugar and ethanol production in Brazil and the economic cost of producing ethanol in Brazil.

6 US$100 per tonne is the approximate cost to transport sugar from Zambia to the nearest port.
assumptions, the break-even line shifts to that in figure 1.3, and more than half of the data points lie above the break-even line. Of the 114 months when ethanol was economic, 99 were between September 1998 and June 2007. This would suggest that high world petroleum prices would indeed be favorable for ethanol. However, even in this more favorable case, ethanol was not economic in February and March 2006 when world sugar prices soared.

The foregoing discussion does not consider the cost of sugar production, which, as stated earlier, represents more than half the financial cost of producing ethanol. If the local cost of sugar production is US$250 per tonne—which makes the producer relatively low cost in global terms—the break-even line becomes that shown in figure 1.4. Most of the data points that fall above the break-even line are from April 2004 or later.

Table 1.3 summarizes the economics of domestic ethanol production for domestic sale at varying costs of sugar production. Based on costs of production in 2004 to mid-2005, only Australia, Brazil, and Thailand were able to produce sugar at US$200 per tonne or lower. Combined, they accounted for 27 percent of world sugar production. Another 23 percent was produced at between US$200 and US$300; the remaining 50 percent was produced by high-cost producers, at mostly US$400 per tonne or higher (ESMAP 2005). The number of landlocked areas with very high transport costs that are also highly efficient producers of sugarcane is limited.

The economics of biodiesel production and consumption are comparable to those of ethanol in a number of respects. The opportunity cost of feedstocks used to produce biodiesel is the higher of biodiesel or vegetable

![Figure 1.3: Viability of Ethanol for Highly Efficient Producers in Landlocked Areas](image-url)

**Sources:** World Bank calculations, premium unleaded gasoline in northwest Europe from Energy Intelligence 2007, raw cane sugar prices from the International Sugar Organization.

**Notes:** For assumptions made in the calculations, see the notes to figure 1.1. Dollars are 2007 US$. 
oil prices in the international market. A liter of vegetable oil produces approximately a liter of biodiesel. In figure 1.5, world prices for the last dozen years of several vegetable oils that are feedstocks for biodiesel are compared with diesel prices in northwest Europe. In addition to the feedstock cost, the plant-gate price needs to reflect the capital cost recovery for biodiesel plant construction and operating costs, including the purchase cost of methanol. By-product sale revenues (with glycerine being the most important by-product) are subtracted from costs, and a normal profit margin is added to arrive at the plant-gate cost of biodiesel. This calculated biodiesel break-even price should be compared to that of petroleum diesel, taking into account the fuel economy penalty associated with using biodiesel and the environmental benefits from reducing environmental externalities, regardless of whether the actual fuel prices capture these or not. Figure 1.5 shows that, even in the face

Table 1.3: Economics of Ethanol Production for Domestic Sale in Landlocked Areas, Calendar Years 1990–2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domestic sugar production cost per tonne</th>
<th>US$200</th>
<th>US$250</th>
<th>US$300</th>
<th>US$350</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of months in 1990–2006 when ethanol production would have been economic</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of months in 2004–06 when ethanol production would have been economic</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: For assumptions made in the calculations, see the notes to figure 1.1.
of rising diesel prices, biodiesel has remained relatively expensive: biodiesel feedstock costs have generally been higher than petroleum diesel prices. One notable exception is palm oil since early 2005, although the cost advantage of palm oil has disappeared in 2007.

Biofuel by-product prices can have a large impact on biofuel economics. If biofuel by-products cannot be absorbed easily by the market, their prices may collapse and adversely affect producers of biofuels and of products that compete with biofuel by-products. The impact of biofuel production on by-product prices is discussed in more detail in chapters 2 and 3.

**Gasoline and Diesel Consumption**

The potential size of the world biofuel market and trade is derived from the market for gasoline and diesel. Worldwide gasoline and diesel consumption in the transport sector in 2004 (the most recent year for which global data are available) was 1.2 trillion liters and 0.76 trillion liters, respectively. The United States constituted 43 percent of total world demand for gasoline, the European Union 13 percent, Japan 5.2 percent, and China 5.2 percent. The European Union consumed 27 percent of automotive diesel, followed by the United States at 20 percent, China at 6.5 percent, Japan at 4.4 percent, and Brazil at 4.1 percent (IEA 2006). The percentage figures for consumption of motor gasoline and automotive diesel in 2004 in major regions of the world are plotted in figure 1.6.

These consumption statistics, together with the potential for economic expansion of domestic biofuel production, indicate that the largest potential importers of biofuels are the United States and the European Union, followed by...
Figure 1.6: World Motor Gasoline Consumption and World Automotive Diesel Consumption in 2004

Source: IEA 2006.
Note: OECD North America includes Mexico.

Japan. Substituting 5 percent of world gasoline and diesel consumption in 2004 would have required about 73 billion liters of ethanol (assuming an overall fuel economy penalty of 20 percent) and 40 billion liters of biodiesel (assuming a fuel economy penalty of 5 percent). Global production of biofuels was estimated in early 2006 to be more than 35 billion liters (European Commission 2006a), or less than one-third of what would have been needed to displace 5 percent of world gasoline and diesel fuel consumption in the transport sector.7

WTO Negotiations on Agriculture

This chapter concludes with a brief overview of WTO negotiations, and particularly the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (hereafter “the Agreement on Agriculture”). Anything that subsidizes or mandates—and thereby increases—consumption of a product generates new trade, everything else being equal; in that sense, all government support is trade distorting. Traditionally, a policy has been labeled trade distorting if it has an anti-trade bias or reduces trading opportunities for others in the global trading system (such as domestic subsidies benefiting only domestic production, import tariffs and other import restrictions, export subsidies, and export taxes). This report uses the phrase “nontrade distorting” to describe policies that do not create an anti-trade bias or reduce global trading opportunities for some. Policies that distort agricultural trade remain much more pervasive and substantial than trade-distorting policies in other goods and services. The Agreement on Agriculture is directly relevant to biofuel trade because ethanol is classified as an agricultural good by the World Customs Organization (WCO), and the Agreement on Agriculture bases its product coverage on WCO classifications. Further, virtually all commercial feedstocks for biofuel production are agricultural crops at present. Tariffs on agricultural goods remain substantially higher than those on manufactured goods almost everywhere in the world. The global trade-weighted average tariff

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7 These comparisons do not take into account additional energy needed to grow and harvest crops, manufacture biofuels, and transport them to markets. The effective displacement rate would be lower than 5 percent as a result.
for agricultural products in 2001 was more than three times the average for all merchandise trade, with almost every country having higher tariffs for agricultural goods than for other goods (CBO 2005). The Agreement on Agriculture under the WTO concerns not only border distortions but also trade-distorting forms of domestic support; as such, it provides a useful framework for considering policy questions for biofuel trade.

The WTO has 150 members, the majority of which are developing countries, including 32 least-developed countries. The Agreement on Agriculture was negotiated during the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the predecessor to the WTO; it entered into force with the establishment of the WTO on January 1, 1995. The Agreement on Agriculture has a provision for its own review and renewal, and renegotiation has been under way for some years. The long-term objective of the Agreement on Agriculture is “to establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system.” It recognizes that reform agreements must look beyond import access restrictions and touch upon all measures affecting trade in agriculture, including domestic agricultural policies and the subsidization of agricultural exports. Negotiations are taking place in three areas: reducing domestic support, increasing market access, and reducing export subsidies (WTO 2007).

**Domestic Support**

In its Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, the WTO defines a subsidy as

- a financial contribution by the government whereby it transfers funds or liabilities (such as grants and loans) or there is a potential to do so (as in loan guarantees), forgoes revenue otherwise due (as with tax reduction and credits), purchases goods or provides goods and services other than for general infrastructure, or entrusts a nongovernmental body to conduct any one of the above activities and in doing so confers a benefit;
- any form of income or price support other than that provided through tariffs.

Although WTO negotiations use these definitions in the context of determining whether a subsidy discriminates between domestic and imported goods in favor of the former and thereby distorts trade, they are useful for considering subsidies in general.

The first pillar of the Agreement on Agriculture aims to reduce these subsidies. The subsidies are divided into three categories or “boxes”:

- **Amber box**—subsidies that are considered trade distorting and that governments have agreed to reduce but not eliminate
- **Blue box**—subsidies that can be increased without limit, provided payments are linked to production-limiting programs
- **Green box**—subsidies that are considered minimally or nontrade distorting and not subject to annual limits.

These are described in greater detail in appendix A.

**Market Access**

Market access refers to the reduction of tariff and nontariff barriers to trade. Ethanol generally encounters much greater tariff barriers than biodiesel. Commodity classifications affect maximum tariff rates that can be imposed in world trade agreements, as well as the pace at which trade liberalization occurs. Classification of ethanol as an agricultural good gives more flexibility to governments to protect their domestic producers through high tariffs and other border restrictions.
**Export Subsidies**

The Agreement on Agriculture required developed8 countries to reduce export subsidies by at least 35 percent by value or 21 percent by volume over five years to 2000. At present, export subsidies are not a trade policy concern for biofuels.

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8 There are no WTO definitions of developed and developing countries. Members identify themselves as developed or developing, although the decision of a member to make use of provisions for developing countries can be challenged. The WTO uses the same classification as the United Nations for least-developed countries, characterized by low income, weak human assets, and economic vulnerability. In this report, “developed countries” is used in the context of GATT and WTO negotiations; in all other contexts, “high-income countries” is used in referring to industrial countries.
2. Agriculture and Biofuels

As stated in chapter 1, ethanol and biodiesel are generally produced from agricultural crops, and feedstock typically accounts for more than half of the production costs. Ethanol, which has the largest market share among biofuels, is produced from starch (cereals) or sugar crops (cane and beets); biodiesel is produced mainly from plant oils (such as rapeseed, soybean oil, and, more recently, palm oil), some animal fats (tallow), and recycled waste cooking oil.

Brazil is the lowest cost producer of ethanol from sugarcane and is estimated to have produced ethanol at US$0.23 to US$0.29 per liter in mid-2005 and much lower in 2003–04. During the same period, the United States produced ethanol from maize at US$0.27 to US$0.29 per liter. However, feedstock prices have increased—substantially in the case of maize—since these estimates were made. Maize prices rose sharply in 2006, gaining 57 percent in one year and another 6 percent in the first quarter of 2007. Raw cane sugar prices rose from an annual average of US$185 per tonne in 2004 to US$218 in 2005, US$326 in 2006, and US$235 during the first quarter of 2007. Thanks to bumper crops in 2006–07 leading to a projected world surplus of more than 7 million tonnes (with world consumption of about 146 million tonnes), sugar prices are falling and are expected to remain low for the foreseeable future. Energy prices, which affect the cost of ethanol production in the United States, have also risen, and the Brazilian real has appreciated substantially since 2003. All these events—particularly the crop price increases—have led to a sizable increase in production costs in U.S. dollars. These illustrative figures highlight the close association between feedstocks and biofuels and their effects on biofuel economics.

Link between Biofuels and Agriculture

In examining the linkage between feedstocks and biofuels, it quickly becomes evident that associations between biofuel feedstocks and other crops must also be taken into account. An increase in biofuel production will lead to increased demand for feedstock crops, and is likely to increase all food and feed prices (but lower by-product prices), at least in the short run. Agricultural commodity prices are highly correlated because cropland can be used to produce different commodities, many commodities are substitutes in consumption, and agricultural commodities are internationally

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1 OECD (2006b) estimated the cost of ethanol production from sugarcane in Brazil at US$0.22 per liter and of ethanol production from maize in the United States at US$0.29 per liter in 2004. ESMAP (2005) reported the financial cost of ethanol production in Brazil in mid-2005 (at the exchange rate of R$2.40 = US$1.00) to be US$0.23 to US$0.29 per liter, with the range largely reflecting the difference in sugar production costs in different regions. OECD (2006b) estimated biodiesel production costs to be US$0.61 per liter in the EU-15 and US$0.55 per liter in the United States in 2004.
traded and have a single price after allowing for transportation and quality differences. For example, wheat, maize, and soybeans can all be grown in the same areas in the United States, and land is commonly shifted from one crop to another from one year to the next in response to market signals, especially in transition areas where both crops are grown. In Brazil, sugarcane and soybeans can also be grown on the same lands. As a result, prices and production of all of these crops are linked via international markets.

Consumers also substitute among commodities in response to prices either directly—between food grains such as wheat and rice, for example—or indirectly when livestock and poultry are fed different rations of maize, soybean meal, and wheat in response to market prices. The degree of direct substitution varies among countries and regions, and there are still some consumers who are reluctant to switch, but this is slowly changing as more consumers enjoy a more diversified diet. The complexity of interactions among different crops can be illustrated with an example linking rapeseed-based biodiesel, wheat, soybeans, and tapioca. In Western Europe, rapeseed meal will increasingly compete with soybean meal because of rising production of rapeseed for biodiesel manufacture. Countering this effect, a 2006 U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) report stated that soybean meal could benefit from the anticipated limited global wheat supply in the 2006–07 harvest season; on the other hand, tapioca, normally used in combination with soybean meal, was in tight supply, partially offsetting what could otherwise be higher demand for soybean meal from reduced wheat supplies (USDA 2006h).

Processed food products provide yet another link between commodities when alternative sweeteners such as sugar or maize syrup are used to make soft drinks or processed foods. Thus, higher sugar prices arising from diversion of sugarcane to ethanol in Brazil will lead to increased use of high fructose maize syrup in several countries and, eventually, to higher maize prices in the United States.

These relationships are reflected in the correlation coefficients of annual prices shown in table 2.1 for agricultural commodities commonly used for biofuel feedstocks. The table shows that, on average, if sugar prices rise by 1 percent, maize prices will rise by 0.61 percent. The correlation coefficients are predictably highest for annual crops such as maize, wheat, and soybeans, which can be easily substituted; and lowest for sugar or palm oil, which are produced from perennial crops and are more difficult

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>Sugar</th>
<th>Maize</th>
<th>Soybeans</th>
<th>Palm oil</th>
<th>Wheat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soybeans</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palm oil</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1: Correlation Coefficients for Prices of Crops Used to Produce Biofuels, 1960–2006

Source: World Bank staff estimates.
to switch than annual crops. All correlation coefficients shown in table 2.1 are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Because of the high correlation among agricultural commodity prices, an increase in the use of any agricultural commodity for biofuel production will affect all commodities after adjustments in demand and supply, leading to competition between agricultural commodities for biofuels and those for food and feed.

Biofuel manufacture produces by-products that have economic value as animal feeds, foods, and fertilizers. For example, to produce ethanol from maize, only the starch in maize is used; the remaining 30 percent of the maize kernel is used to produce other products such as vitamins, food and feed additives, and CO₂. When produced in large quantities, these by-products can affect the prices of other agricultural commodities and alter the price relationship among commodities.

There are two processes used to produce ethanol from maize—wet milling and dry milling—each of which produces different by-products. Dry milling accounts for about 80 percent of U.S. ethanol production and produces a high-protein animal feed by-product called distillers grains. Distillers grains are fed to beef and dairy cattle and compete with other high-protein feeds such as soybean meal. Wet milling produces maize oil, high-protein animal and poultry feeds, vitamins, and CO₂ as by-products.

The by-products of biodiesel production are meal from the crushing of oilseeds to make oil, and glycerine from the transesterification process to convert the oil to biodiesel. The meal yield varies from a world average of 78 percent for soybeans to 10 percent for palm (LMC International 2003). Glycerine is used in pharmaceuticals, food and beverages, personal care products, plastics, and foams.

The United States and Brazil are the world’s largest exporters of maize and sugar, respectively. The United States accounts for about two-thirds of world maize exports (68 percent in 2005–06), and Brazil accounts for about one-third of world sugar exports (38 percent in 2005). The rapid increase in ethanol production in these countries has contributed to the recent rise in maize and sugar prices by increasing total demand for these crops and diverting production from traditional food and feed uses. World sugar prices more than doubled from an average of US$155 per tonne during 2002–04 to US$326 per tonne in 2006, in part because of three years of poor crop performance in Brazil, India, and Thailand. The steep rise in world market prices at the end of 2005 and the first half of 2006 has encouraged a strong production response, which—combined with ideal weather conditions around the globe—has led to an estimated increase of 13 million tonnes in world sugar output in 2006–07 to reach 161 million tonnes (Dow Jones Commodities Service 2007d) and falling sugar prices. The impact of the U.S. ethanol program on the world maize market since 2006 has been considerable. Despite three successive years of good maize harvests, maize prices rose 64 percent between January 2006 and March 2007. More than half of the increase in global demand is due to use of maize for ethanol production in the United States. The increased consumption will cause world ending-year stocks to decline by mid-2007 to the lowest levels since 1973 when measured relative to
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consumption, exerting further upward pressure on maize prices.

Somewhat offsetting the increase in demand for maize and sugar for ethanol production are government policies that encourage overproduction of these commodities. The United States has a range of support policies for maize, and the European Union and the United States have policies that encourage sugar overproduction and depress international prices. The global sugar market is one of the most distorted of agricultural markets, and world prices are estimated to have been depressed by up to 40 percent from the levels that would have prevailed under a free market (Mitchell 2004).2 Producers in the European Union currently receive triple the historical average world sugar market price—although reforms are under way that will reduce this to “only” twice the historical world market average—while producers in the United States receive about double the historical average world market price. These various policies have slowed the growth of world market imports and encouraged Brazil to divert its sugarcane to ethanol production and away from sugar exports.

Agricultural Policies

Agricultural policies affect the production, trade, and prices of agricultural commodities and thus are important determinants of biofuel feedstock costs. Historically, agricultural policies have tended to protect producers in industrial countries from imports from lower cost producers, while policies in developing countries have tended to tax exports to fund government budgets. As incomes increase, the pressures for agricultural protection also seem to increase; the highest protection is now found in high-income Asia, the European Union, and the United States. Benefits of government support tend to be capitalized into land values, benefiting landowners.

Policies in Brazil and the United States affect domestic prices of sugar and maize and thereby influence ethanol’s profitability; EU policies for oilseeds are similarly important. In addition, EU policies on sugar have an effect on world market prices and Brazil’s export opportunity costs for sugar.

This section briefly examines the agricultural policies of Brazil, the United States, and the European Union—three leading biofuel producers—and their effect on biofuel feedstock prices in order to better understand the links between agricultural commodities and biofuels. More details on EU and U.S. agricultural policies are given in appendix B.

Brazil

Brazil is the world’s largest and lowest cost sugarcane producer, with 428 million tonnes of production in the 2006–07 harvest and a forecasted 480 million tonnes in 2007–08 (USDA 2007k). About half of this sugarcane is used to produce fuel ethanol; the other half is used to produce sugar. Ethanol prices in the country tend to increase and become more volatile during the December–April inter-harvest period. Sugarcane production has been increasing at an annual rate of 3.4 percent since 1990, compared with an annual increase of 20 percent in sugar exports. The more rapid growth of sugar exports has been due to shifts of cane from ethanol to sugar as Brazil liberalized controls and reduced subsidies on ethanol production. Further increases in exports will depend on sugar and ethanol prices as well as government policy.

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2 This estimate is based on a partial equilibrium analysis whereby only the sugar sector is liberalized. If the entire agricultural sector is liberalized globally, the impact on sugar prices would be much smaller. One study found a price increase of about 3 percent (Anderson, Martin, and van der Mensbrugghe 2006).
The ability to shift production between these alternative uses allows Brazil to satisfy domestic demand for sugar and ethanol, and still supply one-third of the world’s sugar imports and one-half of the world’s ethanol imports. Seemingly unlimited land to expand sugarcane production—at least tripling current production, according to some estimates (Valdes 2006)—all but guarantees that Brazil will be a dominant player in both of these markets for decades to come. Prior to the 1990s, Brazil produced sugar and ethanol under strict government controls that limited exports to surpluses not needed in the subsidized domestic market.

Brazil embarked on a national fuel ethanol program in response to the oil price shock of the early 1970s. Supply controls and price-setting mechanisms were set up to guarantee the supply of ethanol and sugar to the domestic market and keep the price of ethanol at levels acceptable to motorists. Credit guarantees and low-interest loans were provided to construct distilleries to produce the alcohol. The domestic prices of sugar and gasoline were set in line with the ethanol price. Exports were restricted until domestic requirements were met, and prices were controlled so that consumers were insulated from world prices of sugar and fuels. Domestic sugar prices in particular were kept well below world market levels. Under this controlled environment, dedicated cars fueled by hydrous ethanol accounted for more than 90 percent of total car sales in the mid-1980s.

Controlled low domestic prices for sugar contributed to the pressures for policy reform that began in 1990 with the liberalizing of the sugar export market and the ending of sugar price controls. The government-decreed producer prices for sugarcane were eliminated in February 1999. Policy liberalization led to a surge in sugar exports and a further shift away from ethanol production. At its peak in the 1970s, more than 80 percent of Brazil’s sugarcane was used for ethanol production; this proportion fell to just 30 percent in 1990. This massive shift led to an increase in sugar exports from 1.5 million tonnes in 1990 to 19.1 million tonnes in 2004 (35 percent of world exports) and to a decline in world sugar prices.3

Agriculture underwent liberalization in the 1990s, but these policies have been partially reversed in recent years. Underlying factors for policy reversal include lower international grain prices, the continuing appreciation of the Brazilian real relative to the U.S. dollar, and higher production costs. The Brazilian soybean sector—targeted for biodiesel production—has faced adverse effects from a drought in nearly half the soybean-producing states and from soybean rust (a serious disease that can destroy up to 80 percent of a crop if left untreated). The net result has been rising production costs, poor credit availability to farmers, and declining soybean area (USDA 2007c). In response, the government has dramatically increased support to agriculture. This support has come mostly in the form of subsidized credit for production, marketing, and investment at long-term interest rates that are about half of commercial rates. These programs vary by crop, region, and producer size. Soybean producers have benefited from a line of credit at preferential rates. Exporters benefit from a program that entitles them to cash advances from the Bank of Brazil (USDA 2005a).

The sugar industry receives sugarcane input loans (AE Brazil 2006) and state-specific assistance. For example, Rio Cana in Rio Janeiro has been in place since 2001 to help revitalize the state’s sugarcane output. In the 2005–06

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harvest season, interest rates on Bank of Brazil loans for the state’s independent sugarcane producers averaged about 4 percent for rural families and 8.75 percent for other small producers; these rates were reduced to 2 percent starting in March 2006, against Brazil’s base (overnight) Selic interest rate of 17.25 percent. The state also cut the interstate and intercity tax imposed on sugar and ethanol by a large margin, to 2 percent (Dow Jones Commodities Service 2006).

European Union

The European Union introduced the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in 1958 to provide fixed agricultural prices above world market levels to protect farmers in the then six member countries, which generally had higher production costs than other world market producers. Despite substantial reform in the 1990s, these policies still exist and provide very high domestic support to EU producers. According to the OECD (2006b), the European Union’s producer support estimate was 34 percent during 2003–05, of which 50 percent was market price support.

The CAP is a supranational and domestically oriented farm policy for EU member countries and has had a historically heavy influence on EU crop production patterns. The CAP is based on three principles:

- A unified market in which there is a free flow of agricultural commodities within the European Union
- Product preference in the internal market over foreign imports through common customs tariffs
- Financial solidarity through common financing of agricultural programs

The CAP’s main policy instruments include agricultural price supports, direct payments to farmers, supply controls, and border measures (USDA 2006c). Domestic price supports have been the traditional backbone of CAP farm support, with prices for major commodities such as grains, oilseeds, dairy products, beef and veal, and sugar depending on the EU price support system.

Major reform packages have significantly modified the CAP over the last 15 years. The first reform, adopted in 1992, began the process of shifting farm support from prices to direct payments by reducing support prices, creating direct payments based on historical yields, and introducing new supply control measures. In addition, per hectare payments are made to certain crop producers based on average historical yields. Producers of grains, oilseeds, and protein crops are eligible for direct payments if they remove a specified percentage of their area from production. Producers also receive a separate set-aside payment for the areas removed. The area of subsidized oilseed production is limited by the terms of the 1992 U.S.-EU Blair House Agreement, and oilseed producers (except for small producers) are required to set aside a minimum of 10 percent of their land to qualify for payments. The Blair House Agreement limits output from oilseeds planted on set-aside land for nonfood purposes (such as industrial and energy, including biodiesel) to 1 million tonnes of soybean meal equivalent a year, if the use of the biomass is guaranteed either by a contract or by the farmer. Because nonfood crops are permitted on set-aside land, this policy has encouraged oilseed production for biodiesel manufacture on set-aside land.

The 2003 CAP reform decoupled income support from production. In particular, crops that were eligible for direct payments only under the nonfood regime on set-aside areas may now be cultivated on any area without loss of income support. In addition, the reform introduced special assistance for energy crops.
A premium of €45 (US$61) per hectare is paid, for a maximum guaranteed area of 1.5 million hectares (expanded to 2 million hectares beginning in 2007). If applications exceed the budgetary ceiling, the premium will be reduced proportionally. In 2005, rapeseed intended for use as biodiesel feedstock was grown on 1.8 million hectares, including 0.9 million hectares of set aside. An estimated 0.5 million hectares received the energy crop payment of €45 a hectare (CRS 2006b).

Sugar is made from sugar beets in the European Union, a much more costly production process than that from sugarcane. The EU sugar industry is supported through a mixture of price supports, import quotas, and supply controls. CAP support of sugar is restricted to production within a quota, which raises sugar prices for consumers. Intervention buying of raw or white sugar supports the price of the raw commodity. Imports to the European Union are effectively blocked by high tariffs. However, there is duty-free access within a quota for raw sugar from former African, Caribbean, and Pacific colonies, and duty-free imports of raw sugar are phased in for least-developed countries until 2009 under the Everything-But-Arms (EBA) trade agreement. After 2009, the least-developed countries will have quota-free and duty-free access.

EU sugar policy reform was agreed in November 2005 and began to be implemented in 2006. The reform reduces the guaranteed price for white sugar by 36 percent over four years beginning in mid-2006. EU farmers have been compensated for 64.2 percent of the price cut, on average, through a decoupled payment. Intervention prices will be replaced by reference prices. Thus prices, instead of being supported directly, are supported through a private storage system that will act as a safety net, allowing sugar supplies to be withheld when market prices fall below the reference price (European Commission 2005b). The reforms also limit subsidized exports to the levels agreed in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture and will entail a reduction of exports of 4 to 5 million tonnes a year from recent levels. These reforms are expected to increase world sugar prices as the European Union reduces sugar production and exports and increases imports.

**United States**

The United States introduced commodity policies during World War I and price supports in the 1930s. These policies have had a range of objectives over the years including price and income support, production control, food aid, export promotion, and environmental protection. According to recent OECD estimates, 17 percent of the value of commodity production at the farm gate was provided by domestic support policies. This includes 20 percent of maize production, 30 percent of wheat production, 18 percent of oilseed production, and 57 percent of sugar production at the U.S. farm gate during 2002–04 (OECD 2005).

U.S. government support to commodity producers is provided under farm legislation that typically extends for five years. The most recent of these farm bills was signed in 2002 and expires in 2007. It provides direct government income support to eligible commodity producers, mainly through three programs: direct payments, counter-cyclical payments, and the marketing loan program. In addition, subsidized crop and revenue insurance is provided to assist farmers with risk management. Commodity producers also receive benefits from government programs promoting trade liberalization and food aid. Specific programs apply to individual crops.

**Direct payments** are fixed payments made annually to farmers who participate in the government program. Decoupled from production, these payments are made regardless of the level of production or which of the eligible
crops (maize, soybeans, other oilseeds, sorghum, barley, oats, wheat, upland cotton, rice, peanuts) are grown. **Counter-cyclical payments** are available to farmers whenever the effective price of the eligible crop is less than the target price. The **marketing assistance loan program** provides nonrecourse loans to eligible producers, with the farm’s program crop used as collateral.

The United States has a variety of government policies that support domestic producers of maize and prevent world market price signals from being transmitted to farmers (OECD 2006a), even though the United States is among the lowest cost producers of maize net of subsidies. These policies encourage maize farmers to produce even when world market prices are depressed and keep global maize stocks high and prices low. Removing all import tariffs and farm support programs would result in an estimated increase in average world maize prices of 5.7 percent and an increase in maize trade of 4.5 percent (Fabiosa and others 2003). This relatively small impact on prices and trade is due to the fact that much of the land devoted to maize production would likely remain dedicated to maize even without government policies, thereby maintaining supply levels. The main impact would be a drop in farm land prices.

In the United States, incorporated family farms receive the bulk of government farm payments. Program payments tend to be capitalized into the value of farm land, and most of the benefits accrue ultimately to the largest farm landowners, with little of the benefits going to small farmers (IPC 2005). Government subsidies distort market incentives; this was illustrated in 1999 and 2000 when a shift in land use from maize to soybeans occurred in response to government policies, while opposite signals were being given by comparative market prices (CRS 2000). The U.S. policies on renewable fuels are not designated as agricultural policies, but they have much the same effect. Mandates on renewable fuel use, tax incentives to blenders, and tariffs on imports increase the demand for ethanol and biodiesel and increase prices of feedstocks such as maize and soybean oil.

**Effects of Biofuel Production on Agricultural Commodities**

The impact of increased production of biofuels on agricultural commodity prices has been examined by the USDA, Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI), and OECD (USDA 2007a, FAPRI 2007, OECD 2006a). The estimated effects vary due to the different assumptions used and scenarios analyzed, but the general conclusions are that prices of the agricultural commodities used to produce biofuels would rise sharply, while prices of commodities and products that compete with by-products of biofuel production would decline. The former include maize, sugar, and vegetable oils; the latter, soybean meal and substitutes. In addition, prices of meat from animals relying on maize for feed and for which there is limited scope for substitution—hogs and poultry—will rise more than in the absence of biofuel market expansion. Most other agricultural commodities would see moderate price increases as the production of biofuels increases and, in the process, draws land and other inputs away from these commodities. These results clearly depend on the assumed or projected level of biofuel production.

**Impact of U.S. Biofuel Program**

The USDA carried out its study in October–December 2006, by which time the impact of the U.S. ethanol program on world maize prices was evident. The study showed that earlier projections might have underestimated the impact of global biofuel programs (see, for example, USDA 2006a). The study’s agricultural baseline projection focused especially on the
U.S. biofuel market and assumed that the tax credits available to ethanol and biodiesel blenders and the ethanol import tariff would remain in effect through 2016. In the study’s scenario, crude oil prices (more precisely, refiner acquisition cost) first fall from US$59 a barrel in 2006 to US$57.5 in 2008, after which they rise gradually to US$73 a barrel by 2016. U.S. ethanol production quickly surpasses the target set by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 of 7.5 billion gallons (28 billion liters) of ethanol use by 2012 and reaches 12 billion gallons (45 billion liters) by 2016, with the sharpest increase in production occurring by 2009–10. The leveling off of production in the last several years of the projection period reflects the saturation of the ethanol additive market: above a certain percentage, there is bound to be a sizable price discount for ethanol relative to gasoline due to ethanol’s lower energy content. Twelve billion gallons (45 billion liters) represent less than 8 percent of annual gasoline demand by volume by 2016, and even less in gasoline equivalent amounts. U.S. biodiesel production is projected to rise to 700 million gallons (2.7 billion liters) by 2011–12. Production levels off after 2011 as higher soybean oil prices reduce profitability. At 700 million gallons, biodiesel will comprise less than 2 percent of U.S. highway diesel fuel use.

In the United States, the ending stocks for maize fall sharply, and the stock-to-use ratio falls from 17.5 percent in 2005–06 to 4.5 percent in 2009–10, after which it rises gradually to 5.7 percent in 2016–17. Increased demand for maize to produce ethanol raises the price paid to maize farmers to US$3.75 a bushel by 2009–10—about twice the price paid in late 2004—after which the farm-gate price is forecast to fall gradually to US$3.30 by the end of the forecast period. The maize price increase between 2005 and 2016 is still nearly double the rate of inflation, although this is in part because of back-to-back large crops of maize (and also soybeans) in the United States in 2004 and 2005. Higher maize prices provide incentives to increase maize acreage at the expense of soybean plantings. Other sources of land for increased maize plantings include cropland used as pasture, reduced fallow, acreage returning to production from the expiring Conservation Reserve Program contracts, and shifts from other crops such as cotton.

Higher maize prices also support wheat prices by encouraging increased feed wheat use. Farm-gate wheat prices rise from US$3.42 per bushel in 2005–06 to US$4.35 in 2010–11 (nearly double the rate of inflation) and to US$4.55 in 2014–15 before leveling off. Except for the last year of the forecast period, wheat prices increase at a higher rate than inflation. The soybean stock-to-use ratio declines steadily from 15.6 percent in 2005–06 to 7.4 percent in 2016–17, while farm-gate soybean prices increase 29 percent in nominal terms between 2005 and 2009—more than double the rate of inflation—after which they fall gradually. In real terms, soybean prices rise until 2012, after which they fall. Increased coproduction of distillers grains replaces some direct maize use in livestock feed as well as soybean meal in some animal rations. Soybean meal prices in real terms rise until 2009–10 and then fall significantly. Distillers grains are less suitable in rations for hogs and poultry; the latter will continue to require (now more expensive) maize, pushing up pork and poultry prices. Crop price increases are not sufficient to lead to a significant overall increase in cropland planted to major crops: the planted acreage for eight major crops increases by less than 2 percent between 2005 and 2016. When all food items are considered, U.S. food prices rise more slowly than the consumer price index (as they have done historically).

The above results for the U.S. domestic market are important for international trade and
food prices because the United States remains the world’s largest exporter of maize and wheat throughout the projection period, and of soybeans in 2006–08. Rapid expansion in global production of biofuels changes the price relationships among various agricultural commodities in the next three to four years. The U.S. share of world maize trade falls from 60–70 percent to 55–60 percent. Ethanol demand is expected to be inelastic in the range of prices projected in the study. With a greater share of the maize market captured by inelastic demand that is also tied to the world oil market and much smaller stock levels in the United States, the study forecasts increased price volatility, especially in response to weather variability. Global expansion of biodiesel will result in prices of vegetable oils rising more than those of oilseeds and protein meals.

Rising prices of maize—and potentially of cassava, which is also an ethanol feedstock—would be a concern for the world’s poor, most of whom are net food purchasers. Maize is the preferred staple food of more than 1.2 billion people in Latin America and Africa (Global Crop Diversity Trust 2006). Cassava provides one-third of the caloric needs in sub-Saharan Africa and is the primary staple for more than 200 million poor people. It is also a reserve when other crops fail. A study at the University of Minnesota estimated that, for every percentage increase in the real prices of staple foods, the number of food-insecure people in the world would rise by more than 16 million (Runge and Senauer 2007).

The USDA study also examined the impact of ending fuel blenders’ credits and the ethanol import tariff. In this alternative scenario, prices of maize, soybeans, soybean oil, and soybean meal fall by 6 to 9 percent by the end of the forecast period relative to the baseline case. Maize planting acreage declines, soybean planting acreage increases, and maize ending stocks, U.S. maize and soybean exports, domestic food use of soybean oil, and domestic feed use of maize all rise at the expense of biofuel use of maize and soybean oil.

**FAPRI Assessment of Global Biofuel Production**

FAPRI considered only one scenario and incorporated the most likely assumptions into its baseline projection. Although there are no counterfactuals to show the effect of increased biofuel production, the FAPRI modeling results are included here to show the expected growth of biofuels and the overall projected path for agricultural prices to 2016. This study also shows that FAPRI’s earlier studies underestimated the impact of the development of the global biofuel market (see FAPRI 2006). An important difference between the FAPRI and USDA analyses is the future crude oil price trend: the USDA assumed an initial fall followed by a rise to US$73 a barrel by 2016, whereas FAPRI assumed a gradual decline to US$51 a barrel by the same terminal year. As with the USDA study, the FAPRI analysis projects that U.S. ethanol production will expand much more rapidly than mandated by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, surpassing 7.5 billion gallons (28 billion liters) before 2008 and 12 billion gallons (45 billion liters) by 2010, after which production plateaus. There is no appreciable increase in the production of ethanol in India and China. China becomes a net importer of ethanol in 2009. Between 2006 and 2016, India’s ethanol imports increase by 65 percent, Japanese imports increase by 76 percent, U.S. imports halve, and EU imports more than triple. Brazilian ethanol production increases by 58 percent, consumption by 63 percent (because of the increased number of flex-fuel cars), and exports by 35 percent. EU biodiesel production grows slowly because of increasing vegetable oil prices, stagnant crude oil prices, and the gradual phase-down of fuel tax exemption for biofuels in Germany. The use of renewable fuels in the
European Union is not expected to achieve the goal of a 5.75 percent share of renewable fuels by 2010 (see chapter 3 for more detail on these biofuel policies). World ethanol prices (taken as Brazilian anhydrous ethanol prices) in nominal terms gradually fall from US$0.48 a liter in 2006 to US$0.36 a liter in 2016. In the United States, ethanol prices fall from US$0.68 a liter in 2006 to US$0.42 a liter in 2016.

In agricultural trade, the United States exports much more maize—19 percent more in 2016–17—than in the USDA projection, despite having the same harvested acreage and ethanol production between the two studies. U.S. maize ending stocks are also higher in the FAPRI study. Nominal world maize prices (represented as free on board [FOB] in the U.S. Gulf Coast) rise slightly from US$159 per tonne in 2006–07 to US$163 per tonne in 2007–08. They remain at that level until 2010–11 when they begin to fall gradually, reaching US$152 per tonne in 2016–17. Although not exactly comparable, the USDA projection sees nominal farm-gate maize prices rising by 10 percent during the same period. World sugar prices fall by 13 percent between 2006–07 and 2007–08, after which they rise back to the 2006–07 level by 2009–10 and rise another 12 percent by the terminal year; in real terms, world sugar prices fall. FOB wheat prices in the U.S. Gulf Coast fall from 2006–07 to 2008–09, after which they rise gradually but do not recover to the level in the initial year; in real terms, they fall by more than 20 percent.

World soybean production falls in 2007–08 as U.S. soybean acreage shifts to maize for ethanol, and then continues on an upward trend thereafter. Brazil surpasses the United States as the world’s largest soybean producer in 2014–15. Consumption in Argentina (the world’s third largest producer and exporter) and Brazil rises, but more slowly than production, resulting in growing exports and in fact a doubling of Brazilian soybean exports (but less than in the USDA study). U.S. soybean exports fall. Soybean prices increase in real terms until 2009–10, after which they fall in both nominal and real terms. By the terminal year, real soybean prices are 17 percent lower than in the initial year. Soybean meal prices fall substantially—14 percent in nominal terms and 31 percent in real terms. Driven by biofuel demand, world edible oil prices remain strong in the first three years of the projection period. Soybean oil prices in particular soar, more than doubling the price gap between soybean oil and palm oil in 2008–10 compared to that in the initial year. Argentina and Brazil, despite their own domestic biodiesel programs, continue to dominate world soybean oil trade, accounting for 89 percent of total net exports in the terminal year. Palm oil remains the lowest cost edible oil. Canada dominates rapeseed oil trade, accounting for 92 percent of world trade by the terminal year. Rapeseed oil prices rise in real terms during the first three years, after which they fall. Nominal rapeseed oil prices rise only 3 percent during the projection period.

**OECD’s Two Biofuel Scenarios**

The OECD study explored two biofuel scenarios relative to the base case projection that assumed biofuel production would remain constant at 2004 levels. The first scenario assumed the growth of biofuel quantities in line with officially stated national goals on biofuel use in countries with biofuel targets or goals. Nominal crude oil prices were assumed to peak at US$46 per barrel in 2005 and then to decline to US$34 per barrel in 2014 in this scenario and the base case. The second scenario allowed biofuel profitability to determine biofuel production under the assumption of constant crude oil prices of US$60 per barrel from 2005 to 2014. The baseline projection for these scenarios is relatively constant nominal prices for agricultural commodities through 2014. Wheat prices, for example, are projected to decline slightly
from 2005–06 to 2014–15, while rice prices are projected to rise about 8 percent over the forecast period.

In the first scenario, the prices and trade of most commodities are affected. Relative to the baseline projection, vegetable oil prices rise by 15 percent, while oilseed meal prices fall by 6 percent. Sugar prices rise by 60 percent because of reduced exports from Brazil and increased ethanol production from sugar beets in the European Union. The effects are mostly confined to the commodities that are used as feedstock for biofuel production. For example, wheat prices are projected to rise only 4 percent compared with the baseline projection. Sustained higher crude oil prices in the second scenario affect both the cost of agricultural production and the profitability of biofuel production. High crude oil prices encourage biofuel production but increase the cost of agricultural production, which raises feedstock prices and lessens the profitability of biofuel production. The impact on agricultural commodity prices relative to the baseline is substantial, with nearly all commodity prices affected. Wheat prices are projected to rise about 15 percent, while maize and oilseed prices are projected to rise about 20 percent in nominal terms. Sugar prices have the largest increase of about 85 percent as more sugarcane in Brazil and more sugar beets in the European Union are used for ethanol production.

**Recent Developments**

Rapidly growing demand for rapeseed oil in Europe has already shifted the price relationship between rapeseed and sunflower oil. Sunflower oil was once the most expensive vegetable oil in Europe, and rapeseed oil one of the cheapest. Rising biodiesel demand has altered this relationship, and currently rapeseed oil is trading about US$150 per tonne above sunflower oil.

As a result, there is increasing demand for sunflower oil, which is considered a higher quality oil, and imports into the European Union are growing (USDA 2006h).

One casualty of rapid growth in biodiesel demand is the glycerine manufacturing sector. Every kilogram of biodiesel produces about 0.1 kilogram of glycerine. Glycerine prices have dropped by two-thirds in the last five years, and market analysts anticipate downward pressure on glycerine prices to last for the next few years (EnergyResource 2006). Falling glycerine prices would adversely affect the economics of biodiesel production. Given these market conditions, glycerine manufacturers are searching for new applications for glycerine.

**Effects of Agricultural Trade Liberalization**

Studies examining the impact of agricultural trade liberalization offer useful insights for the biofuel sector for a number of reasons. First, biofuel feedstocks today are agricultural commodities, and trade liberalization in agriculture would affect their production and prices. Second, because biofuel trade is limited today, there are few studies of the impact of biofuel trade liberalization, but some of the conclusions from studies on global agricultural trade liberalization may be applicable to biofuel. The welfare effect of higher agricultural commodity prices resulting from trade liberalization would be one such example, as higher biofuel production (which could be one outcome of biofuel trade liberalization) is expected to raise agricultural crop prices.

There are similarities as well as important differences between agricultural and biofuel trade liberalization. In a number of OECD countries, government support for sugar and biofuels is alike in that they benefit from both border protection and producer subsidies. This package of support measures is unlike that for
cotton, which enjoys producer support but no border protection. Biofuels are also afforded consumption subsidies, mainly through tax reductions, and, increasingly, consumption mandates. Consumption mandates as a means of government support have no parallel among agricultural crops. Upon liberalization, production and trade patterns of agricultural crops would shift, and overall consumption might even rise. In the case of biofuels, however, absent further cost reductions, both production and consumption might decline sharply if all forms of government support, and especially consumption mandates, were eliminated. In this sense, the welfare gains from liberalization of biofuel trade depend on border protection, subsidies, and consumption mandates. This section of the report assumes that the current protectionist policies for biofuels will continue, and attempts to draw inferences for the impact of reducing trade-distorting policies (narrowly defined as those that create an anti-trade bias or reduce global trading opportunities for some).

According to studies of the impact of agricultural trade liberalization, reduced support to agriculture and liberalized trade would provide large welfare gains to both industrial and developing countries. The value of total support to producers in OECD countries was estimated at US$280 billion in 2005 compared to total global trade of agricultural products of US$837 billion (OECD 2006b). The level of producer support fell from 37 percent of farm receipts in 1986–88 to 29 percent in 2003–05 (OECD 2006b); that reduced level of support was first reached in 1995–97, just after the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture was signed, and has changed little since then. The Agreement on Agriculture was signed in 1994 amid high hopes for reforms in agriculture. It required most member countries to make specific policy changes in domestic price supports, market access, and export subsidies. Its main achievement was to include agriculture within the rules and disciplines of the multilateral trading system. The agreement did not achieve the reforms hoped for because of the wide flexibility afforded in its implementation and the high level of support during the base period of 1986–88 from which future reforms were measured (Ingco and Nash 2004). The Doha Round, launched in November 2001, has encountered the same opposition to reforms in agriculture as in the Uruguay Round, and the Doha WTO negotiations were suspended in July 2006.

Potential gains from a successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round were estimated to reach US$270 billion annually, with most of the gains projected to come from agriculture through savings from lower government price supports and lower consumer food prices (World Bank 1994). The largest gains were expected to go to the countries with the highest agricultural protection (EU member states, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Norway, and Switzerland). Developing countries were expected to benefit primarily from lower tariffs on manufactured items and expanded exports of textiles and agricultural goods.

The gains from the Uruguay Round reforms have been less than expected, especially in agriculture, because the actual reforms were not as extensive as expected. Developing countries have not been able to significantly increase exports of agricultural commodities to industrial countries because tariffs have remained high and quotas on imports have limited market access. However, tariffs in developing countries have declined for both manufactures and agriculture, which has increased export opportunities among developing countries. According to one study (Aksoy and Beghin 2005), the average tariff in developing countries declined from 22.9 to 18.4 percent for agricultural products and from 16.1 to 11.4 percent for manufactured products from 1995 to 2000.
Until the 1990s, industrial countries generally protected agriculture, while developing countries generally taxed it either directly or indirectly (Krueger, Schiff, and Valdes 1992). Taxes on agricultural commodities focused primarily on exports as a convenient source of revenue, which also helped keep domestic prices low. This pattern began to change with reforms in developing countries. Governments moved away from taxing agriculture while liberalizing trade in manufactured goods more rapidly than in agriculture, thereby affording greater relative protection to the latter. These changes have come about through eliminating import restrictions and lowering tariffs on manufactured products, devaluing exchange rates, abandoning multiple exchange rate systems that penalized agriculture, and eliminating export taxes. Meanwhile, reforms in most industrial countries have been modest despite the Agreement on Agriculture. Increasing incentives for agricultural production in many developing countries without lowering incentives in industrial countries has led to overproduction and price declines for many agricultural commodities.

An important exception to the above development in export tax policy is the oilseed sector. Some major oilseed exporters impose high export taxes to this day—oilseeds, meals, and oils in Argentina (see appendix C for more on export taxes in Argentina), crude palm oil in Malaysia, and sunflower seeds in Russia and Ukraine. If trade were liberalized and these export taxes eliminated, it is possible that there would be a strong supply response, and increased trade and lower prices.

Argentina, the world’s second largest exporter of grains after the United States, also imposes high export taxes on grains including maize. Argentina and Malaysia levy low or no export taxes on biofuels, giving incentives to export biofuels rather than biofuel feedstocks. One potential impact of these differentiated export taxes is on the location of investments in biodiesel. Some industry analysts examining the biodiesel market in Europe suggest that, in the absence of export tax differentiation, the most competitive market structure might consist of large multi-feedstock facilities in EU countries with good inbound logistics (preferably located near a port) importing feedstocks. These facilities would combine scale, the ability to arbitrage among the various feedstocks and origins, and the ability to blend biodiesel fuels from different feedstocks to comply with EU fuel specifications and performance requirements. However, export tax differentials in favor of biodiesel in surplus countries might result in biodiesel plants being built for export in these countries rather than in Europe.

About two-thirds of agricultural support to OECD countries is provided through higher prices associated with border barriers, while one-third is provided by direct subsidies (OECD 2006b). In developing countries, nearly all support is through border barriers. Most of the costs of global agricultural distortions are accounted for by a small number of commodities. Rice and beef alone are responsible for the bulk of costs, with sugar (an ethanol feedstock), oilseeds (biodiesel feedstocks), and other livestock products (oil meals and distillers grains being by-products of biofuel manufacture) accounting for another quarter (Anderson, de Gorter, and Martin 2005). Because the bulk of support provided by non-OECD countries is through border distortions, border protection comprises an even greater proportion of the overall costs of trade distortions when global statistics are compiled. Modeling by one group estimates that 93 percent of the total costs of global distortions arose from import tariffs, while domestic support and export subsidies accounted for an estimated 5 and 2 percent,
respectively (Anderson, Martin, and Valenzuela 2006; Hertel and Keeney 2006).

The impact of the Agreement on Agriculture on agricultural prices appears to have been minimal, and most agricultural prices continued to decline from the highs of 1994–95 until 2001 when the global economy emerged from recession. The Asian financial crisis of 1997 contributed to the price declines by reducing incomes and commodity demand in the most affected countries and leading to currency devaluations in major commodity-exporting countries such as Brazil. Prices finally began to recover in 2002 and have since increased in the wake of normal cyclical trends, lower supplies of agricultural products due to higher crude oil and fertilizer prices, and strong import demand from rapidly growing developing countries such as China (see figure 2.1). Changes in stockholding patterns by major commodity exporters and importers are expected to lead to increased price volatility in the future as smaller supplies of stocks are available to buffer a production shortfall (Mitchell and Le Vallée 2005).

Despite disappointing gains from reforms undertaken as part of the Agreement on Agriculture, the potential benefits of agricultural trade liberalization are estimated to be large. Recent work has shown that if all countries remove distortions (border and domestic) in agriculture, the global gains in 2015 would amount to US$265 billion—nearly 70 percent of the gains from full reform of trade of goods. The benefits of reducing distortions go largely to industrial countries because they have the greatest distortions and largest economies. However, when measured as a share of gross domestic product, the benefits to developing countries are nearly double those of the industrial countries (Anderson, Martin, and van der Mensbrugghe 2006).

The welfare gains from agricultural trade liberalization depend on the baseline used in the computation, among other factors. For example, higher energy prices and recent biofuels policies that encourage or mandate consumption have raised the level of agricultural prices in international markets and some domestic markets. Adjusting the baseline accordingly will change the projection of the world economy. How this will affect the estimated welfare gains from agricultural reforms depends on what is assumed about policy responses to fuel and fuel-related price hikes. If there are no changes in ad valorem tariffs on agricultural products, and they are the only means of farm support, then protection levels and their welfare costs will change little. But if farm support is only in the form of deficiency payments, the rise in market prices will lead to a decline in payments from the treasury and hence a fall in the welfare cost of such programs.

The above qualifications notwithstanding, the studies of the benefits of agricultural trade liberalization suggest that reforms in biofuel trade would likely reduce ethanol and biodiesel prices in countries with high protection such as the United States and EU member states, and increase incomes of countries that export these biofuels such as Brazil. The magnitude of these gains cannot be inferred from the studies on agricultural trade liberalization; these estimates will need to come from additional studies.
The effect on welfare distribution is another important outcome of agricultural trade liberalization, and there are several useful studies on the subject. A study of sub-Saharan African countries estimated that reducing average tariffs from 40 percent to 10 percent would entail a real income loss of 35 percent for urban employers; urban workers who receive trade rents (typically those in protected industries) would lose 41 percent, but rural farmers would receive an income gain of 20 percent. Because rural farmers significantly outnumber affected urban workers and employers, trade liberalization would have an overall positive effect on welfare (Bannister and Thugge 2001).

Krivonos and Olarreaga (2006) found that a 10 percent increase in world sugar prices would lead to a total income gain of US$5 billion (in 2002 dollars) for Brazilian workers, or 1.04 percent of gross domestic product, and a decline in the poverty rate of 1.5 percentage points. In the sugar growing and processing sectors as well as other sectors, wages would increase in percentage terms with increasing education. Among those already employed in these sectors, households at the top of the income distribution would experience larger income gains than other income categories due to higher wages. Significantly, households at the bottom of the income distribution would experience proportionally larger income gains because many would move out of unemployment.

The poor can be adversely affected by agricultural trade liberalization because prices of most agricultural commodities are likely to increase. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, liberalization of trade in sugar is expected to increase world sugar prices by as much as 40 percent. Those countries that are already integrated into international markets and possess good infrastructure are likely to benefit, but rising agricultural commodity prices could have a negative effect on food security in developing countries that are net food importers. Prices are expected to rise more steeply for the food products that developing countries import than for the commodities they export. The least-developed countries, very few of whom export temperate-zone or competing products on which there are currently high tariffs, would generally be worse off (FAO 2003). In all cases, there are intra-country variations in addition to differences across countries. Net buyers of food, including farmworkers, will be adversely affected by rising food prices; the negative effects are not confined to urban areas only.

Developing countries would benefit from lowering their own tariffs on agricultural goods. These tariffs tend to be especially high on essential food items. To varying degrees, lower tariffs would offset increases in world food prices following agricultural trade liberalization and would let developing countries increase their trade with each other. Reciprocal tariff reductions are needed for this to happen, and would create local trade opportunities.

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4 Food security exists when all people at all times have physical, social, and economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. Food security is usually discussed with reference to the three foundational pillars of availability, access and utilization. The self-sufficiency dimension concerns ensuring food availability through domestic production, rather than through domestic production and trade.
3. Biofuel Policy and Trade Issues

Chapter 2 explored interlinkages between biofuels and agriculture, and discussed past and ongoing trade barriers in agriculture and the benefits of removing them. This chapter explores conditions that would increase the potential benefits from trade in biofuels. It begins by reviewing the current status of biofuel policies in the large industrial economies and in the developing economies with current or potential major production of biofuels. The chapter then considers how these policies might affect biofuel trade. It summarizes studies that have examined likely consequences of increasing trade and biofuel consumption, and concludes with policy questions that may be negotiated in the coming years under the auspices of the WTO.

Current Policies for Biofuels That Affect World Biofuel Markets

All countries with sizable biofuel markets have adopted policies to promote both domestic biofuel production and substitution of biofuels for petroleum fuels in consumption. Among such policies are the following:

- Fuel tax reductions for biofuels relative to taxes on petroleum products
- Mandatory blending or biofuel consumption requirements
- Import tariffs or quotas on biofuels, paired with preferential waivers of tariffs and quotas for certain countries, largely intended to restrict access to benefits from biofuel promotion policies to domestic producers and favored countries
- Price supports targeted at increasing biofuel production
- Production-linked producer payments and tax credits
- Investment incentives such as grants, loans and loan guarantees, and tax-related incentives (tax holidays, accelerated depreciation, tax reductions)
- Funding for research and development (R&D) targeted at increasing biofuel supplies
- Downstream subsidies for vehicles designed to run on high-blend biofuels and for biofuel storage facilities targeted at the infrastructure of fuel production and consumption

Some support policies for biofuels stimulate consumption and do not in themselves distort trade (except to the extent that they may artificially stimulate it); two examples are biofuel mandates and fuel tax reductions that do not distinguish between domestic and imported biofuels. Other policies—such as import tariffs and producer subsidies—clearly protect or subsidize domestic production at the expense of foreign-produced biofuels.

Fuel tax reductions are the most widely used support measure. This instrument critically depends on the presence and magnitude of excise taxes levied on petroleum fuels. There is an important difference between industrial and developing countries. All industrial countries tax
the consumption of petroleum fuels, and many levy taxes at rates higher than those commonly found in developing countries. Some developing countries, on the other hand, tax little or even subsidize petroleum fuel consumption. In 2005, total fuel price subsidies amounted to nearly US$10 billion in India and Indonesia, both net importers of oil (ESMAP 2006). Such differences in policy traditions influence the kinds of biofuel promotion policies that individual countries can and do pursue, as the following discussion explicates.

Countries providing price subsidies to petroleum fuels are not in a position to use fuel tax reduction as a primary policy device for promoting biofuel substitution in consumption. Further, the tax rate levied on diesel—which is used economy-wide in goods and public passenger transport, and the price of which many governments want to keep low—is often low compared with the tax rate on gasoline. That said, some developing countries levy high fuel taxes, primarily for revenue generation. One analysis shows that taxes on petroleum products are a critical source of government revenue for low-income countries (Bacon 2001). In fact, taxing fuel is one of the easiest ways to obtain revenue: collecting fuel taxes is relatively straightforward, and the consumption of fuels as a group is relatively price inelastic and income elastic, ensuring buoyant revenue as income rises and tax rates are increased. Tax rates on gasoline, generally viewed as a fuel of the rich, tend to be the highest; reducing tax rates on ethanol, a gasoline substitute, could raise fiscal as well as equity concerns.

Important trade issues that are being negotiated under the WTO include reducing border tariffs, import quota restrictions, producer subsidies, and any incentives offered only to local producers that continue to promote domestic production at the expense of international trade. In WTO parlance, these policies fall under market access and domestic support—concepts discussed in chapter 2 in the context of agricultural policies.

In the following sections of this chapter, biofuel policies are reviewed within the above general framework for the major biofuel markets. The European Union, the United States, and Brazil are covered at some length because these are the largest biofuel markets. The materials on EU and U.S. policies are supplemented by additional information in appendix C. The biofuel policies of India and Malaysia are also discussed in this chapter. India is pursuing both ethanol and biodiesel; its ethanol mandate policy, which was reversed in 2004 in the face of an ethanol shortage on the domestic market, offers interesting observations. Malaysia, a major producer of both petroleum crude oil and palm oil, is aggressively pursuing biodiesel production for both exports and domestic consumption and has recently introduced a blending mandate.

Argentina, Australia, Canada, China, Colombia, Indonesia, Japan, and Thailand are reviewed in appendix C. Argentina and Colombia have both mandated biofuel consumption. Australia and Canada have no mandates, but have set national targets for ethanol consumption; Canada is also considering introducing a blending mandate. China is the world’s third largest ethanol producer and is expected to become a major player in the global biofuel market. Indonesia, like Malaysia, is a major producer of palm oil, and the government has set ambitious targets for biodiesel production and domestic consumption. Japan has no prospect of becoming a significant biofuel producer in the near to medium term and has shown considerable interest in biofuel imports. Thailand, like Brazil, is a low-cost sugar producer and is pursuing ethanol and biodiesel; the difficulties Thailand has encountered in launching an ethanol industry are worth noting.
Trade data and details for fuel ethanol are incomplete or nonexistent because no distinction is usually made between fuel ethanol and other end uses of alcohols used in liquors or chemicals. Data are available for ethanol production and trade for all uses, but fuel ethanol can be a small fraction of a country’s total consumption, as in India. For these reasons, this report does not attempt to provide quantitative information on fuel ethanol trade (the volume of internationally traded biodiesel is negligible at this time).

**European Union**

The European Union produces biodiesel from rapeseed, sunflower, and soybean oil; and ethanol from sugar beets, wheat, and barley. It is the world’s largest biodiesel producer; its annual production surged from 1.9 million tonnes in 2004 to 3.2 million tonnes (about 3.6 billion liters) in 2005 (EBB 2007a). EU ethanol production is smaller, although increasing—0.5 billion liters in 2004, 0.9 billion liters in 2005, and 1.6 billion liters in 2006 (Ebio 2007). Increased use of soybeans, including imported soybeans, in biodiesel manufacture is expected in Germany, Portugal, and Spain in the coming years (USDA 2006h).

According to the European Commission (2006a), domestically manufactured biodiesel becomes economic at crude oil prices of about €60 a barrel; domestic ethanol becomes economic at crude oil prices of €90 a barrel. These economics have historically prompted large tax incentives in countries with active biofuel programs. Under article 16 of the European Union’s Energy Tax Directive, EU member states may exempt or reduce excise taxes on biofuels (EU 2003b). Member states have notified tax reductions on the order of €0.3 to €0.6 (US$0.41 to US$0.81) per liter of biofuel. These tax incentives must take into account changing raw material prices to avoid overcompensating biofuel producers (European Commission 2006b). The latter principle is intended to avoid the possibility of large windfalls accruing to biofuel manufacturers in times of high world petroleum prices and low feedstock prices. In accordance with this principle, Germany raised the excise tax on biodiesel from zero to €0.09 (US$0.12) per liter beginning in August 2006.

The European Union issued a Biofuels Directive in 2003, requiring member states to set national indicative targets to ensure that a minimum proportion of biofuels and other renewable fuels is placed on their markets. A reference target value, calculated on the basis of energy content, for end 2005 was set at 2 percent of all gasoline and diesel for transportation purposes, and 5.75 percent by end 2010 (EU 2003a). The 2005 target was not met, and recent assessments suggest that the 2010 indicative target is also unlikely to be achieved. Nevertheless, EU energy ministers agreed in February 2007 to increase the share of biofuels used in transport to 10 percent by 2020.

The European Commission issued “An EU Strategy for Biofuels” in February 2006 (European Commission 2006a). The strategy specifically addressed enhancing trade opportunities and supporting biofuel industries in developing countries. Trade enhancement measures include assessing the benefits and costs of putting forward a proposal for separate nomenclature codes for biofuels, not worsening access conditions for imported bioethanol, pursuing a balanced approach in trade negotiations with ethanol-producing countries and regions, and proposing amendments to the biodiesel standards to facilitate the use of a wider range of vegetable oils for biodiesel production.

The strategy also stresses the importance of optimizing GHG benefits for the expenditure made, avoiding environmental damage linked to
the production of biofuels and their feedstocks, and ensuring that the use of biofuels does not give rise to environmental or technical problems. The annex to the strategy points out that additional production using, for example, virgin savanna in Brazil could cancel out GHG benefits for decades. It also highlights increased pressure on rain forests as the main general negative effect of biofuel feedstock expansion. The decision of the government of the Netherlands to cut the subsidy for “green electricity” produced from palm oil (all of which is imported) has been reported to be driven in part by the negative publicity on the sustainability of palm production in Indonesia and Malaysia (USDA 2006h). The Committee on Industry, Research, and Energy of the European Parliament in October 2006 called for an EU-wide ban on the use of biofuels derived from palm oil. The Dutch government is developing environmental sustainability criteria for the use of biomass, which will also be used as criteria for granting government subsidies. Additionally, the European Union is working on possible certification. In response to pressure from the European food industry, major soybean traders in July 2006 declared a two-year moratorium on purchasing soybeans from areas cleared after July 24 in the Amazon forest zone, including soybeans grown on legally cleared land. The moratorium agreement includes an element to ensure traceability of soybeans and to avoid sourcing from farms that are involved in deforestation (USDA 2006k).

Austria, Lithuania, and Slovenia have mandatory biofuel blending requirements; the mandate is for new fuel marketers only in Austria. Germany and the Netherlands have introduced mandatory blending in 2007. The Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation in the United Kingdom requires oil companies to blend 2.5 percent biofuel in motor fuel by 2008 and 5 percent in 2010–11. In Germany, B100 lost its tax-exempt status in August 2006. The tax will increase annually by €0.06 (US$0.08) a liter until 2011. In 2012, biodiesel will be taxed at €0.45 (US$0.61) a liter, which is €0.02 a liter lower than the tax on petroleum diesel. This tax policy change is reported to have led to a sharp decline in the sales of biodiesel and a 30 to 40 percent reduction in output by the biodiesel industry (Financial Times 2007).

The top three biodiesel producers in the European Union in 2006 were Germany, France, and Italy; the top three EU ethanol producers were Germany, Spain, and France. Germany is by far the largest manufacturer of biofuel; its biodiesel production in 2006 is estimated to be quadruple that of France, the second largest biodiesel manufacturer. The biofuel policies of the three leading producers of biodiesel and ethanol are reviewed in appendix C.

Biodiesel imports into the European Union are subject to a (relatively low) ad valorem duty of 6.5 percent. In practice, major vegetable oil producers (including Argentina, Indonesia, and Malaysia) are covered under the Generalized System of Preference and have duty-free access to the European Union. A recent development is imports of rapeseeds from Russia and Ukraine for biodiesel manufacture. As for ethanol, a specific import duty of €0.192 (US$0.26 as of April 2007) per liter is levied on undenatured ethanol and €0.102 (US$0.14) per liter on denatured ethanol. In Germany, fuel ethanol imports are eligible to receive the tax concession on fuel ethanol (100 percent of gasoline excise tax) only if the ethanol is imported undenatured. Between 2002 and 2004, 93 percent of ethanol imported into the European Union (for all uses) was undenatured. As explained in appendix C, 101 developing countries enjoy unlimited duty-free access for ethanol exports to the European Union; significantly, Brazil is not among them. In 2004, 55 percent of ethanol imported was free of import duties (European Commission 2006a).
For the reasons described in chapter 1, only biodiesel made largely from rapeseed oil meets the biodiesel standard EN 14214. Rapeseed biodiesel complies with the standard even if blended with a small amount—for example, 25 percent—of biodiesel made from other oils such as soybean or palm (European Commission 2005a). In the 2006 “EU Strategy for Biofuels,” the European Commission proposed an amendment to EN 14214 to facilitate the use of a wider range of vegetable oils, to the extent feasible without significant ill effects on fuel performance and respecting the sustainability standards. The commission will also examine the limits placed on biofuels in petroleum fuels set out in the Fuel Quality Directive—for example, the current maximum limit of 5 percent on biodiesel blended into petroleum diesel fuel—with a view to enabling greater use of biofuels.

**United States**

About 90 percent of U.S. ethanol is made from maize. The remaining 10 percent is produced largely from grain sorghum (CRS 2006a). In crop year (September–August) 2005–06, 14 percent of maize was converted to fuel ethanol (USDA 2007a). Biodiesel is made predominantly from soybeans. As with Brazil, there has been steady progress in improving efficiency: thanks to improved hybrid maize varieties and more efficient ethanol plants, one bushel of maize now yields 2.8 gallons (10.6 liters) of ethanol, up from 2.5 gallons (9.5 liters) several years ago (Automotive World 2006). Approximately 30 percent of gasoline sold in the United States contains ethanol, and ethanol constituted nearly 4 percent of total U.S. gasoline supplies by volume (less than 3 percent by energy content) in 2006. Fuel ethanol demand rose from 15.3 billion liters in 2005 to 20.4 billion liters in 2006, against domestic production of 14.8 billion and 18.4 billion liters, respectively (RFA 2007). U.S. biodiesel production tripled in two successive years to 0.28 billion liters in 2005 and an estimated 0.95 billion liters in 2006.

Much of the growth in the production of ethanol from maize is due to government incentive programs, first begun in 1978. By 1980, 25 states had exempted ethanol from all or part of their gasoline excise taxes (U.S. National Alcohol Fuels Commission 1981). Legislation has also been passed to give income tax credits and loan guarantees to small ethanol producers. Additional information is provided in appendix C, and a detailed description of past and present incentives can be found in a report by Koplow (2006).

In January 2005, the federal ethanol tax incentive was extended through December 31, 2010, at a rate of US$0.51 per gallon (US$0.135 per liter) of ethanol blended; a federal excise tax credit was also granted to biodiesel blenders. The credit amounted to US$1.00 per gallon (US$0.26 per liter) of biodiesel made from agricultural products and US$0.50 per gallon (US$0.13 per liter) of biodiesel made from other feedstocks such as recycled oils. This tax credit is largely responsible for the surge in production of biodiesel and growth of production capacity. The federal excise taxes on motor gasoline and diesel are US$0.184 and US$0.244 per gallon (US$0.049 and US$0.064 per liter), respectively.

The Energy Policy Act of 2005 contained a Renewable Fuels Standard requiring a minimum of 7.5 billion gallons (28 billion liters) of renewable fuels to be used annually in gasoline by 2012. The act also gave additional incentives for cellulosic ethanol, extended the biodiesel fuel excise tax credit through 2008, and authorized a US$0.10 per gallon (US$0.026 per liter) income tax credit to small biodiesel producers (U.S. Congress 2005). In April 2007, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA) announced the implementation details, whereby a specified percentage of the total volume of...
gasoline a company produces or imports must be produced from renewable sources. The percentage is 4.02 in 2007 and increases every year (U.S. EPA 2007). Looking to the future, the Twenty in Ten initiative promoted by President Bush aims to reduce gasoline use by 20 percent within 10 years by increasing the use of renewable and alternative transportation fuels to the equivalent of 35 billion gallons (132 billion liters) of ethanol a year by 2017.

At the state level, 38 states have introduced incentive schemes, including either producer payments or excise tax reductions. These include mandating government agencies to use biofuels; mandating biofuel use statewide; and providing grants, production tax credits, and other forms of subsides to the state’s biofuel industry. Most renewable fuel standard laws mandating biofuel consumption were approved in 2006. The states that have passed legislation include (in chronological order) Minnesota, Hawaii, Washington, Montana, Iowa, Louisiana, and Missouri. Some states require minimal state production of biofuels before the mandate becomes effective. Minnesota (ethanol and biodiesel) and Hawaii (ethanol) are the only states at present where biofuel standards are already in effect (see appendix C for more detail).

There are other incentives given to biofuel plants. They include accelerated depreciation for the plants, capital grants, loan guarantees, subsidized loans, credit-grant hybrids, regulatory exemptions (environmental impact assessment waiver in Minnesota for ethanol plants less than a certain size, use of eminent domain in Nebraska), and support for land used (for example, reduced property tax rate on ethanol facilities in the state of Washington). There are also incentives given downstream of biofuel production, that is, vehicles and refueling stations. They include tax reductions, tax credits, immediate expensing rather than depreciation over years, and grants (Koplow 2006). Koplow (2006) estimated the aggregate subsidy (federal and state combined) to amount to US$5.1 billion for ethanol and US$0.38 billion for biodiesel in 2006. Nearly all of the aggregate subsidy for biodiesel and about half that for ethanol is in the form of the excise tax credit. When expressed in terms of outlay equivalent to take this into account, the aggregate subsidies are US$8.7 billion for ethanol and US$0.48 billion for biodiesel. Averaged over 2006–12, annualized aggregate subsidies total US$6.3 billion ($8.7 billion in outlay equivalent) for ethanol and US$1.7 billion ($2.3 billion in outlay equivalent) for biodiesel. Per gallon of biofuel, the aggregate subsidies in 2006 are US$1.05 (US$0.28 per liter) for ethanol and US$1.54 (US$0.41 per liter) for biodiesel, rising to US$1.38 (US$0.36 per liter) and US$1.96 (US$0.52 per liter) in outlay equivalent, respectively. The volumetric excise tax credits given by the federal government constitute about half of the aggregate subsidy. A side-by-side comparison of federal tax incentives given to ethanol versus petroleum in the United States was undertaken by the U.S. General Accounting Office (now the U.S. Government Accountability Office) at the request of Congress and reported on in 2000. The comparison found that, on a per liter basis, tax incentives given to ethanol were significantly larger (ESMAP 2005).

Ethanol imports, including ethanol imported directly from Brazil, are taxed at a specific rate of US$0.1427 per liter and also carry an ad valorem import tariff of 2.5 percent for undenatured and 1.9 percent for denatured ethanol (20 percent for countries that do not have a most favored nation status, now called normal trade relations, with the United States). The specific tariff was instituted in the 1980s to prevent foreign producers from benefiting from the fuel excise tax incentive for ethanol. It was intended to be a temporary tariff, but it has been revised and extended several times. The current tax credit, which was scheduled to expire in
Biofuel Policy and Trade Issues

September 2007, has been extended to January 2009. According to the U.S. International Trade Commission, the total volume of undenatured and denatured ethanol imported into the United States surged from 0.8 billion liters in 2005 to 2.7 billion liters in 2006 (USITC 2007). In 2006, the United States bought 1.77 billion liters of ethanol directly from Brazil, or 52 percent of the record 3.4 billion liters of ethanol Brazil shipped out, according to the Brazilian agricultural ministry. The United States also bought 475 million liters of Brazilian ethanol via the Caribbean, accounting for another 14 percent of Brazilian exports (Dow Jones Commodities Service 2007c).

Under the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), countries in Central America and the Caribbean have had duty-free access to the United States since 1989 for ethanol produced from at least 50 percent local feedstocks. If the local feedstock content is lower, limitations apply, but duty-free ethanol is permitted up to 7 percent of total U.S. ethanol consumption for ethanol containing no local feedstock. The upper limit would have amounted to 1.4 billion liters in 2006. This duty-free access has historically prompted hydrous ethanol produced in Brazil and Europe to be shipped to dehydration plants in CBI countries for re-export to the United States. Costa Rica, El Salvador, Jamaica, and, more recently, Trinidad and Tobago have built and operate dehydration plants for this purpose. The U.S.-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) does not increase overall access to the U.S. ethanol market (see appendix C for more detail). The CBI countries accounted for nearly 50 percent of all ethanol imported into the United States in 2005, but their contribution fell to 22 percent in 2006. Brazil accounted for 46 percent in 2004, 34 percent in 2005, and a record 63 percent in 2006 (USITC 2007). Mexico and Canada can also export biofuels to the United States duty free under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

Against a backdrop of sharply rising ethanol prices in summer 2006, there were growing but unsuccessful calls to eliminate the US$0.1427 per liter import tariff on ethanol. A loophole referred to as a manufacturer’s drawback allows duty-free imports of ethanol even from countries outside the CBI, NAFTA, and CAFTA regions. Specifically, an oil marketer can import ethanol as a blending component to manufacture gasoline and “draw back” on the duty paid when exporting a like commodity within two years. Jet fuel is considered a like commodity and is considered exported when it is used to fill the fuel tanks of an aircraft in the United States destined for an international route. This has allowed oil marketers to add ethanol to jet fuel and recover the import duty paid on ethanol. Some reports estimate that the amount of tariff that is ultimately not paid could exceed two-thirds of the total amount due (Energy Washington Week 2006a).

Biodiesel carries a much lower import tariff rate with only an ad valorem charge of 1.9 percent. There is growing concern that some traders are abusing the US$1 per gallon tax credit by importing biodiesel, blending it with a trace of petroleum diesel fuel, collecting the blender’s tax credit, and then exporting the resulting blend (Energy Washington Week 2006b). The European Biodiesel Board lodged a complaint with the European Commission in March 2007, stating that biodiesel imported into the United States is being spiked with as little as 0.1 percent petroleum diesel, benefiting from the blending tax credit, and exported to Europe at a significant price discount; the amount entering Europe was estimated to be 30,000 tonnes in January 2007 (EBB 2007b). The U.S. National Biodiesel Board issued a statement in April 2007, announcing its intention to pursue legislation, regulatory rulemaking, or both that would make clear that biodiesel involved in re-exporting transactions would not be eligible for the tax credit (NBB 2007).
With an ethanol industry dating from the 1930s, Brazil vies with the United States for global leadership in ethanol production and is the world’s largest ethanol exporter. Brazil produced 17.5 billion liters of ethanol and exported 20 percent in the 2006–07 harvest season (Dow Jones International News 2007a). Blending of 5 percent anhydrous ethanol in gasoline was first authorized in 1931 and mandated in 1938. The National Alcohol Program, Proálcool, was launched in 1975. Under Proálcool, the government provided price guarantees, price subsidies, public loans, and state-guaranteed private bank loans to processors and growers. Ethanol and gasoline prices in Brazil were liberalized between 1997 and 1999 (ESMAP 2005). There are no direct production subsidies for ethanol today, but the industry benefits from both an ethanol mandate and tax reduction, as well as financing provided for stockholding during the inter-harvest periods. As described in chapter 2, the government has been reviving support to agriculture in recent years, and some assistance—but not price support—is being provided to the sugar industry at both the federal and state levels. Brazil’s ethanol production decisions affect the country’s sugar exports which, at one-third of global sugar trade, influence international sugar prices.

Pure gasoline is not available for sale in Brazil. Fuel purchasers can buy either hydrous ethanol or gasoline containing 20 to 25 percent anhydrous ethanol. The blending mandate was 25 percent until March 2006, lowered to 20 percent on account of rising world sugar prices, and increased in November 2006 to 23 percent in response to falling sugar prices. In light of the global sugar surplus, the government is expected to raise the mandated level to 25 percent in June 2007. Flex-fuel vehicles, capable of running on any mixture of hydrous ethanol and the gasoline-ethanol blend, were launched in March 2003 and reached the 2-million mark in mid-2006. They give car owners the option of buying the cheaper (on an energy-equivalent basis) of the two fuels. There is a small tax reduction for the purchase of flex-fuel cars and cars dedicated to run on hydrous ethanol. In 2006, flex-fuel vehicles accounted for 78 percent of all new car sales (ANFAVEA 2007). Nearly all of Brazil’s 32,000 filling stations sell hydrous ethanol (USDA 2006b).

Brazil achieved self-sufficiency in petroleum oil supply in 2006, to which its ethanol program contributed. Petrobras, Brazil’s national oil company, plans to increase its ethanol exports from 320 million liters in 2006 to 850 million liters in 2007. The investment plan includes building pipeline infrastructure to transport ethanol from producing regions to ports. Petrobras’s 2007–11 investment program includes exporting 3.5 billion liters of fuel ethanol annually (BNAmericas Oil & Gas News 2006).

The biodiesel industry in Brazil began production in 2005. The coordinator for the National Biodiesel Program reported in early 2007 that a total of 24 biodiesel plants would be operational by the end of the year with a combined annual production capacity of 1.3 billion liters (Global Insight Daily Analysis 2007). The program requires 2 percent biodiesel in diesel by 2008 and 5 percent by 2013. This would require 800 million liters of biodiesel by 2008 and approximately 2.4 billion liters by 2013 (Dow Jones International News 2007c).

The government is looking to the country’s soybean production as an important feedstock for its biodiesel program in the near term. Soybeans account for much of Brazil’s oilseed production; soybean production doubled between 1993 and 2002. As discussed in chapter 2, the soybean industry has suffered from three years of adverse conditions, but in
the coming decade, production is expected to rise by more than 60 percent. In the long term, there are other crop possibilities for biodiesel, including palm oil and oil from castor beans (USDA 2006e).

There are concerns among biodiesel producers that Brazilian biodiesel will not be able to compete with biodiesel from Argentina. Petrobras has developed an alternative biomass-based diesel substitute called H-Bio. H-Bio is produced through a process called hydrogenation at petroleum refineries and differs from methyl-ester-based biodiesel: H-Bio is obtained by hydrogenating a mixture of vegetable oil with a petroleum diesel fraction.

The primary incentive given to promote ethanol in recent years has been a tax reduction for ethanol consumption. Since pure gasoline is not sold, a meaningful distinction in the tax rates between gasoline and anhydrous ethanol cannot be made. Hydrous ethanol enjoys a significant tax reduction compared with gasohol. Several states, including São Paulo—which accounts for 85 percent of ethanol production and more than half of hydrous ethanol consumption—have lower state sales tax rates for hydrous ethanol. A couple of other taxes are lower for hydrous ethanol, resulting in an effective tax difference of R$0.81 (US$0.30 at the time) per liter in June 2005 (ESMAP 2005). A separate assessment estimated the tax reduction in São Paulo in October 2005 to be R$0.80 per liter (US$0.36 at the then-prevailing exchange rate) (USDA 2006b).

The import tariff on ethanol from countries outside of Mercosur—a duty-free trade bloc consisting of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay—was lowered in steps from 22.5 percent in 2001 to 20 percent in 2004. Brazil levies an import tariff of 20 percent on ethanol, which is occasionally lifted in response to fears of a domestic shortage. For example, in February 2006, as world sugar prices surged and prospects of an ethanol shortage loomed, the Brazilian government lowered the tariff rate to 0 percent temporarily.

**India**

India’s government has been pursuing biofuel programs for some time in an effort to reduce dependence on imported petroleum oil, which makes up two-thirds of demand. Because food security is a national priority, the government does not promote biofuel production from grain sources or edible oils. By regulation, ethanol cannot be produced directly from sugarcane, although India is a major sugar producer. In March 2007, the state government of Bihar amended its Sugarcane Act to produce ethanol from sugarcane juice. Ethanol is produced from molasses, which helps minimize the impact of the ethanol program on sugar prices, but cross-subsidization between sugar and molasses is an issue. The government encourages biodiesel production from nonedible oils grown on marginal land so as to avoid competition with food production.

Blending 5 percent ethanol into gasoline was mandated in nine sugar-growing states and four union territories in January 2003. To promote the use of ethanol-blended fuel, an excise duty concession of Rs 0.75 per liter for E5 was announced in the Union Budget 2002–03, corresponding to Rs 15 (US$0.31 at the time) per liter of ethanol. Supply shortages forced India to become the largest importer of ethanol from Brazil in 2004–05. In response to higher than anticipated ethanol prices, the government issued a gazette notification in October 2004 making ethanol blending optional, contingent on the delivery price of ethanol at a given location being comparable to the import-parity price of gasoline. Three states stopped selling ethanol in December 2004. The government announced that 5 percent blending would be mandatory from October 2006 in 20 of India’s 28 states,
requiring about 600 million liters of ethanol in total, but the implementation deadline has been postponed several times. Production of fuel ethanol fell from 180 million liters in 2002–03 to 90 million liters in 2003–04 and to 20 million liters in 2004–05, before rising to 200 million liters in 2005–06. Subsidized loans of up to a maximum of 40 percent of the project cost are available for establishing ethanol production facilities from the Sugar Development Fund held by the government, but there is no direct financial assistance for the production or marketing of ethanol (USDA 2006i).

After being a net importer for the last two years, India became a net sugar exporter in 2005–06, but concerns about domestic supply shortages prompted the government to ban sugar exports from June 22, 2006, to January 22, 2007. The sugar sector is one of the most controlled agribusiness sectors in the country. The government establishes a minimum support price for sugarcane every year—Rs 802.5 (US$19) per tonne in 2006–07—and some sugarcane-growing states mandate a higher minimum price for cane (“state-advised prices”), as high as Rs 1,320 (US$31) per tonne in 2006–07 (USDA 2007I). Agriculture in India, including the sugar industry, benefits from subsidies given to power, water, and fertilizers. On the whole, India does not possess comparative advantage in sugarcane production: the country faces agricultural water shortages, and sugarcane cultivation is water intensive. Without government export incentives, Indian sugar is said to be uncompetitive in the international market (USDA 2007I).

The purchase price of ethanol has been an issue. The price of ethanol sold to oil marketing companies was fixed in May 2005 at Rs 18.75 (US$0.43 at the time) per liter. Negotiations on increasing the ethanol price became gridlocked in August 2006, with ethanol manufacturers asking a new price of Rs 27.83 (US$0.60) per liter; the matter was referred to the agriculture and petroleum ministries (Business Standard 2006). In November 2006, a price of Rs 21.50 (US$0.48) per liter of ethanol was offered to, and accepted by, the Indian Oil Corporation, corresponding to US$0.60 per liter of gasoline equivalent. This price was considerably above premium gasoline prices in the Arab Gulf (US$0.38) in October 2006.

Due to high sugar prices and good weather conditions at the time of planting, sugarcane production rose by 12 percent to a record 315 million tonnes in 2006–07. Domestic prices fell below production costs in response, creating a crisis for the sugar industry. One way to reduce the surplus would be to divert cane to ethanol production, but the agreed price of Rs 21.50 (US$0.21) a liter was considered too low by many cane growers. One industry estimate suggested in April 2007 that the ethanol blending program was running at only 30 to 40 percent of the target (Reuters News 2007).

The International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics in Andhra Pradesh has been engaged for some years in R&D to develop high-sugar sweet sorghum varieties particularly suited for ethanol production, and technology for converting sweet sorghum into ethanol. The institute has formed a public-private partnership with Rusni Distillery to set up an ethanol plant with a daily capacity of 40,000 liters using sorghum varieties it has developed. Sweet sorghum can be grown with much less water than sugarcane. The institute is sharing its technical know-how with the Philippines, and Rusni Distillery is participating in an ethanol project based on sweet sorghum in Uganda (Manila Bulletin 2006). The first commercial production of ethanol from sweet sorghum started in June 2007 (Business Standard 2007).

India is also actively promoting fuel switching from petroleum diesel to biodiesel. A national mission on biodiesel has been proposed.
The Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas announced a biodiesel purchase policy in October 2005, under which petroleum marketing companies are required to purchase biodiesel at Rs 25 per liter (US$0.56 a liter at the time) through 20 select purchase centers, beginning January 2006. Biodiesel manufacturers protest that the purchase price is not commercially viable, given that the cost of biodiesel production from Jatropha curcus seeds is Rs 30–40 (US$0.67–0.89 at the time) per liter (Financial Times Asia Africa Intelligence Wire 2006). The purchase price is reviewed every six months and is currently Rs 26.5 (US$0.65) per liter (USDA 2007p). Industry sources recently estimated that the biodiesel production cost ranged between Rs 35 and Rs 45 (US$0.86–US$1.10) per liter (USDA 2007p). Rs 35 to Rs 45 is significantly higher than international prices of diesel. One attraction of Jatropha curcus is that it can grow on marginal land with little rainfall, but experience to date seems to suggest that the plant does not grow well under marginal conditions in any commercial sense. The advantages of relying on Jatropha curcus—and similar plants that are said to be drought resistant—are not yet clear.

The Ministry of New and Renewable Energy suggested a range of fiscal incentives on the October 2006 draft National Policy on Biofuels. The proposed incentives reportedly include excise duty exemption to biofuels in pure and blended form up to a certain percentage, customs and excise duty exemption for manufacturing plants and machinery used for processing oilseeds for biodiesel production, excise duty exemption for biodiesel blended with petroleum diesel (similar to the concessions given to ethanol blended into gasoline), and establishment of a national biofuel development board to set a minimum support price for nonedible plant oilseeds used as biodiesel feedstocks (Press Trust of India Limited 2006).

India’s first commercial launch of biodiesel occurred in December 2005 in Maharashtra, derived from karanja seeds. In February 2006, UK petroleum company BP announced that it was launching a US$9.4 million, 10-year project on biodiesel from Jatropha curcus in the state of Andhra Pradesh. Cleancities Biodiesel India is expected to start operating what will be India’s largest export-oriented biodiesel manufacturing plant by July 2007, using mostly imported feedstock. The plant’s initial output capacity will be 250,000 tonnes, to be doubled to 500,000 tonnes in 2008 (Dow Jones Commodities Service 2007b).

India imposes high import tariffs on agricultural commodities, including vegetable oils, and biofuels. In fiscal year (FY) 2006–07, the Central Board of Excise and Customs lists the customs tariff rate on undenatured ethanol (2207.10)1 as 182 percent, that on denatured ethanol (2207.20) as 30 percent, and that on biodiesel (3824.90) as 12.5 percent (CBEC 2006). A June 2007 USDA report lists total existing import duties on denatured ethanol, undenatured ethanol, and biodiesel as 198.96, 59.08, and 36.82 percent of the landed value (USDA 2007p). These percentages are very high and appear to include other taxes. A recent government report states that ethanol imports for potable purposes are levied a customs duty of 150 percent, but the customs duty for ethanol imports for use by the chemical and petroleum industries is 10 percent (Planning Commission 2006). The import tariff on raw sugar consists of a 60 percent ad valorem duty

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1 These code designations are explained later in this chapter, under the heading “WTO Issues for Biofuels.”
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and a “countervailing” duty of Rs 850 (US$20) per tonne in lieu of local taxes and fees imposed on domestic sugar (USDA 2006d). Concerned about rising domestic sugar prices at the time, the government lifted import duties on sugar from June 23 to September 30, 2006 (USDA 2007l). The government also lowered the tariff rate on crude palm oil from 80 percent to 70 percent in August 2006 (Business Times 2006), to 60 percent in January 2007, and to 50 percent in April 2007 (Dow Jones Commodities Service 2007e).

Malaysia

Historically, Malaysia has been the world’s largest palm oil producer, although it is now being overtaken by Indonesia. Malaysia is a net exporter of petroleum crude oil, with petroleum consumption about 60 percent of production in 2005. Malaysia subsidizes the domestic price of certain petroleum products. In 2005, despite several price increases, the total subsidy borne by the government increased to RM 6.6 billion (US$1.7 billion). Domestic petroleum fuel prices were last raised in February 2006, but remain below parity with international prices (ESMAP 2006).

Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Badawi in his 2006 budget speech announced a range of biofuel initiatives, including the introduction of B5 on a pilot basis; the development of biodiesel fuel specifications; construction of three palm oil biodiesel plants with a total annual capacity of 180,000 tonnes, principally for export; and tabling of a biofuel act in the parliament in 2006. The first commercial-scale biodiesel plant went into production in June 2006. By mid-2007, 20 new biodiesel plants were expected to be in production in Malaysia (Platts Oilgram News 2006), but these construction plans have fallen considerably behind schedule. Concerned about the availability of crude palm oil for the food and oleochemicals sectors, the government suspended new licenses in July 2006, by which time 52 manufacturing licenses had been granted by the government. The government estimated in 2006 that annual biodiesel production capacity would increase to 1.2 million tonnes in 2007; most of the produced biodiesel would be exported (AFX Asia 2006b). As of April 2007, six plants with a combined annual capacity of 300,000 tonnes were operational, and another plant with an annual capacity of 100,000 tonnes was scheduled to come on stream by June (USDA 2007m). As figure 1.5 shows, palm oil prices have been rising sharply in recent months, slowing the growth of the biodiesel industry.

In April 2007, the parliament passed a biofuels industry bill, requiring blending of palm olein (the liquid fraction obtained by fractionation of palm oil after crystallization at controlled temperatures) in petroleum diesel. Referred to as Envo Diesel, B5 in this act is a mixture containing not a fatty acid methyl ester formed by reacting methanol with a plant oil, but palm olein (USDA 2007m) and petroleum diesel. While blending palm oil directly reduces the fuel cost by avoiding transesterification, vehicle manufacturers have expressed fears that the fuel may have lower oxidation stability; consequently, the life of fuel injectors and injection pumps may be shortened. In September 2006, the Malaysian Automotive Association, which represents almost all local auto distributors, reportedly expressed unease about blending unesterified palm oil into petroleum diesel. The association cited concerns about potentially more frequent breakdowns and repairs, which in turn would affect vehicle warranties (AFX Asia 2006a).

The government’s fuel pricing policy poses a challenge to the domestic biodiesel market in the near term. Nevertheless, Malaysia, like Indonesia, is in a position to become an important exporter of biodiesel. The Indonesian and Malaysian governments jointly announced
in July 2006 that each would commit 6 million tonnes annually of crude palm oil for biodiesel manufacture. The commitment, which stopped short of an official mandate, represents about 40 percent of each country’s respective annual production of crude palm oil. Some industry analysts have expressed concerned that this and similar moves for increasing biodiesel production could make palm oil too expensive for both food and fuel (Reuters News 2006b).

In response to growing concerns about adverse environmental effects of expanding palm oil plantation into rain forests, some 185 private sector companies and industry groups—including Malaysian and Indonesian palm oil associations—have formed the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil, which is now formulating sustainability criteria and certification procedures.

**Potential Benefits of Biofuel Trade**

For the consumption of biofuels to be economic, marginal costs of production should be comparable to, or lower than, those of their substitutes—petroleum fuels—after accounting for differences in their respective externalities. Until recently, this condition was seldom satisfied for ethanol and practically never satisfied for biodiesel. In 2005, ethanol from sugar in Brazil was competitive at the economic margin with petroleum fuel; but in 2007, higher sugar prices eroded Brazilian ethanol’s margin of competitiveness with petroleum products. Biofuel economics has its own built-in, self-limiting brakes. For example, as Brazil’s ethanol production from sugarcane increases, the supply of sugar on international markets declines and thereby raises the price of sugar. The rising price of sugar will induce sugarcane to be redirected back into sugar production and away from ethanol. The supply response to soaring world sugar prices in late 2005—early 2006 is a good illustration. Similarly, as U.S. ethanol production from maize feedstock increases, the supply of maize in international markets eventually declines and raises the price of maize. Meanwhile, ethanol production from maize increases the supply of by-products in the market, causing their prices to decline and hurting the overall margin received from ethanol production. These factors provide natural brakes on the economics of ethanol. Indeed, Ethanol Africa, which is planning South Africa’s first commercial ethanol plant based on maize, stated in February 2007 that high grain prices were making it difficult to raise funding for its plant (Financial Times 2007).

So far, the margin of competitiveness for biofuels has been narrow. The small competitive margin has important implications for the tradability of ethanol and explains why only a tenth of global biofuels produced and sold in the world are internationally traded, half of which is Brazilian ethanol (USDA 2006n). It is easy to show a large number of countries where local costs of biofuel production would be higher than import-parity prices for biofuels and for equivalent petroleum fuels. But it is difficult to find countries that are potential large exporters of ethanol or other biofuels (Brazil being a recent exception).

Some countries suffer from exceptionally high insurance and freight costs for all goods including liquid fuels. Landlocked countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, for example, cannot have large sea-going tankers arriving at their borders. Besides the higher per kilometer costs of shipping fuels by rail or road, they also face political problems and uncertainty posed by traversing other national jurisdictions. Even the countries on the coast of Africa face high insurance and freight charges because of low shipping volumes and irregular shipments, poor on-loading and off-loading infrastructure, and poor inland capacity for handling shipments. Brazil has long suffered from poor port and inland transport infrastructure, further raising
import-parity and lowering export-parity prices at inland markets (Espadas 1994). Emerging soybean producer and potential biodiesel competitor Argentina suffers similarly high “pre-FOB” costs (Nardi 2006).

Countries with high insurance and freight costs have in place one natural advantage for import substitution of biofuels (as was discussed regarding figures 1.3 and 1.4). The same factors suggest they are unlikely to be able to compete in biofuel exports—except with respect to adjacent landlocked countries. The unresolved issue is the extent to which these same high transport costs feed back into costs for domestically produced biofuels—so high, in fact, as to overwhelm the seemingly large natural import protection afforded biofuels in that country.

In analyzing the impact of biofuel production and trade, it helps to distinguish between the issues of quantitative versus pricing effects. Some governments express the hope that biofuels could develop into cheaper alternatives to petroleum fuels on a large scale. This is not likely for a long time. For the foreseeable future, biofuel production will remain a small fraction of total petroleum fuel production, and, as a result, biofuels largely will continue to be price takers in the market rather than drivers of transportation fuel prices. This means that average biofuel prices on a petroleum-equivalent basis will not be significantly lower than those of petroleum over the long run on the international market—particularly as countries try to force biofuel production to higher levels. As the production of biofuel feedstocks increases, the marginal cost of supply increases as well because of limitations of suitable lands and available water, among other causes. Given the existing stocks of land and the expected feedstock yields per hectare far into the future, the economic scale of production of biofuels will remain a small percentage of global transport fuel consumption for some time to come.

Biofuels may be price takers, but they may still be able to influence world petroleum prices if they can contribute to sufficient additional marginal supply. For example, if—after adjusting for fuel efficiency differences and incremental energy used in biofuel production—biofuels could meet 3 percent of global gasoline and diesel fuel demand, or 1.5 percent by volume of total oil consumption, this would amount to about 1 million barrels per day of petroleum oil. While such substitution would not reduce world petroleum consumption in absolute terms, which has been growing at 1.6 percent annually during the last decade, it would moderate petroleum demand growth and petroleum price increases, everything else being equal.

An important remaining issue is that of security of supply of biofuels. Trade in biofuels will not develop as an alternative to trade in petroleum fuels if biofuel supply poses comparable insecurity issues to that of petroleum supply. Importing countries are concerned about such things as geographical distribution of exporting countries. If regions with low production costs are concentrated primarily in one or two countries, it may be difficult for biofuel trade to take off, even if the potential exporting countries have plentiful land suitable for biofuel production. For example, Japan, which is ill suited for biofuel production and is interested in biofuels for their GHG emission reduction benefits, worries that Brazil is now the only obvious large exporter and views reliance on one exporting country as potentially compromising security of supply.

The effects of biofuel trade liberalization are closely linked to the economics of biofuel production relative to petroleum prices and to the related overall size of the biofuel market in the future. In the short run, trade liberalization would enable a few low-cost producers to expand their market share, while high-cost producers that currently are given preferential
trade agreements (for example, CBI countries) could lose their market share entirely. This could help reduce overall subsidies provided to biofuels, increasing welfare globally.

**Potential Impact of Biofuel Market Growth and Trade Liberalization**

There are few studies examining the effects of biofuel trade liberalization. Two recently published papers investigate the impact of liberalizing ethanol trade between Brazil and the United States. The findings of the two studies show some differences, but both point to increasing trade between the two countries following liberalization.

The first study found that removal of the U.S. import tariffs on ethanol from Brazil would reduce ethanol production in the United States, reduce ethanol consumption in Brazil and increase its consumption in the United States, increase ethanol exports from Brazil to the United States, lower ethanol prices in the United States, and raise world ethanol prices. Predictably, it would also eliminate ethanol trade between the Caribbean and the United States through the CBI (Elobeid and Tokgoz 2006). In the first scenario, the study assumed that the U.S. government’s domestic biofuel policy would remain in place, including the federal tax credit of US$0.51 per gallon, but that the specific import tariff of US$0.54 per gallon would be eliminated (with all other support measures remaining in place). Between 2006 and 2015, elimination of the tariff results, on average, in an increase of 24 percent in world ethanol prices, an increase of 1.8 percent in world sugar prices, and a decline of 1.5 percent in world maize prices (because less maize in the United States is diverted to the ethanol market). In the United States, ethanol production declines by 7 percent, but consumption increases by 4 percent. Net imports triple, and domestic ethanol prices fall by 14 percent. In Brazil, ethanol production increases by 9 percent but domestic consumption falls by 3 percent, and net exports rise by 64 percent.

In the second scenario, the study assumed that the federal tax credit of US$0.51 per gallon would be eliminated in addition to the removal of import tariffs. In that case, U.S. consumption of both ethanol and gasoline would fall relative to the base case (which has both the import tariffs and tax credit for ethanol blenders in place). U.S. ethanol prices; world ethanol, sugar, and maize prices; Brazilian ethanol production; and net Brazilian exports of ethanol would all be lower than in the first scenario.

The second study focused on a comparison of sugar-ethanol processing in Brazil with the U.S. maize-ethanol industry. A time-series analysis of data for the last 30 years, including historical market prices and exchange rates, was carried out to compare dry mills, wet mills, and distilleries. The study also examined the possibility of dry mills using high-starch maize—which was found to reduce ethanol production costs by nearly US$0.03 per liter—and the benefits and costs of cogeneration of biomass power—which would reduce ethanol production costs by a further US$0.02 per liter. The study compared the processing cost effects of changing commodity prices and exchange rates with today’s technology with a view to assessing the direction of trade in the absence of tariffs on ethanol. The study found that there was no trend in cost advantage between ethanol from maize in the United States and ethanol from sugar in Brazil, but that there would be seasonal patterns of advantage. These periods of advantage would

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2 The study assumed an ethanol yield of 2.8 gallons of ethanol per bushel of maize, which is current; but 76.1 liters per tonne of sugarcane, against the yield of 79.4 liters of anhydrous ethanol per tonne of sugarcane in the 2004-05 crop season in Brazil.
last several years. Ethanol from sugarcane was favored half the time. The study also computed the break-even price of petroleum oil above which E85 used in vehicles optimized for E85 with a fuel economy penalty of 15 percent would be competitive. It found that the break-even price was US$35 per barrel of oil in 2000, rising to US$55 per barrel when maize prices increased to US$3.40 per bushel in spring 2004, and returning to US$40 per barrel after maize prices fell later in 2004 (Gallagher and others 2006).

Another study examined the impact in 2010 on the world sugar and ethanol markets posed by Brazil’s requiring blending of 8 percent ethanol in diesel fuel beginning in 2006. World ethanol prices rise by 0.9 percent, and sugar prices rise by 3.5 percent. In Brazil, ethanol consumption increases by 16 percent, ethanol exports fall by 3 percent, sugar exports fall by 2.9 percent, ethanol prices rise by 4.7 percent, and sugar prices rise by 5.5 percent (Koizumi and Yanagishima 2005).

To gain an understanding of how the world oilseeds market might be affected by growth in demand for biofuel, a 2003 study examined one effect of an initial increase in demand for vegetable oils (LMC International 2003). The study considered soy, rapeseed, sunflower, and palm oils, and assumed that they were, for the purpose of the study, entirely substitutable. The study used historical supply and demand elasticities with respect to price for oils as well as by-products to arrive at the equilibrium response. The oilseed’s world average extraction rates for meal and oil differ considerably (see table 3.1). These differences have a large impact on oilseed producers.

The study found that vegetable oil prices increased, but meal prices declined, because of surplus production. An interesting finding, consistent with the extraction rates shown in table 3.1, is that, for an increase of 5.8 percent in the price of vegetable oil, palm growers receive 5.0 percent more, but soybean growers receive only 0.8 percent more. The study assumed that the net income of an oilseed grower was the volume-weighted average of the increase in the price of vegetable oil and the decrease in the price of meal. Because soybean growers produce much more meal relative to oil than other oilseed growers, their earnings increase the least. This finding would suggest that, for the purpose of aiding farmers, mounting a biofuel program based on soybeans would be much less efficient than that for other oilseed growers with higher oil extraction rates.

The Energy Information Administration of the U.S. Department of Energy carried out a study analyzing the near- and mid-term potential price and supply effects of the Fuels Security Act of 2005, which was similar in content to the 2005 Energy Bill. The average price increase for gasoline between 2006 and 2025 resulting from adopting the Fuels Security Act of 2005 was calculated to be US$0.8 per gallon (US$0.2 per liter). The ethanol content in gasoline would rise and peak at 5 percent in 2012, after which it would fall because of increasing use of cellulosic bioethanol, which receives extra credit (U.S. EIA 2005) (see appendix C for how cellulosic ethanol is treated in the 2005 Energy Bill).

A study by LMC International conducted in 2006 examined the impact of substituting biofuels for

| Table 3.1: Worldwide Average Extraction Rates by Weight (Percent) |
|---------------------|--------|--------|
| Oilseed             | Meal   | Oil    |
| Soybeans            | 78     | 18     |
| Rapeseed            | 60     | 39     |
| Sunflower           | 47     | 41     |
| Palm                | 10     | 90     |

5 percent of gasoline and diesel fuel demand worldwide by 2015. The study, which took fuel economy differences into account, first examined whether biofuel production has had effects on crop prices. An analysis of correlations between monthly world prices of feedstocks for biofuels and Brent crude oil between 1994 and 2006 found that prices of sugar and molasses were highly correlated with those of Brent, with a correlation coefficient of 80 percent and more than 90 percent, respectively. The study suggests that a share of 10 percent of global demand derived from biofuel might be the threshold above which a positive association between fuel and commodity prices starts to emerge—ethanol in 2005 accounted for about 15 percent of world sugarcane demand and about 45 percent of world molasses demand. This would suggest that the decision by Indonesia and Malaysia to set aside 40 percent of their total palm oil production for biodiesel would be expected to lead to a strong link between palm oil and crude oil prices. Conversely, palm oil analysts in January 2007 speculated that falling petroleum crude oil prices might exert downward pressure on palm oil prices, in part by casting doubts on the feasibility of biodiesel, after the “psychological level” of US$60 a barrel was broken in futures trading (Dow Jones Commodities Service 2007a).

In examining the prospects of blending 5 percent biofuels, the LMC study analyzed several scenarios for additional supply to meet this goal:

1. Sugarcane produced in the center-south region of Brazil alone will supply the required additional amount for ethanol.
2. Sugarcane worldwide will supply the required additional ethanol.
3. Sugarcane worldwide will supply 50 percent, and maize worldwide will supply 50 percent, of the required additional ethanol.
4. Carbohydrates (maize, wheat, barley, cassava, sugarcane, and sugar beets) worldwide will supply the required additional ethanol.
5. Palm oil produced in Indonesia alone will supply the required additional biodiesel.
6. Palm oil worldwide will supply the required additional biodiesel.
7. Oilseeds (rapeseed, soybean, palm, and sunflower oil) worldwide will supply the required additional biodiesel.

The study showed that if the entire world supply of carbohydrates were converted to ethanol today, the maximum potential share of ethanol in gasoline would be only 40 percent. For oilseeds, even a 10 percent blend of biodiesel with petroleum diesel would not be achievable. The study found that to achieve a 5 percent blend, by far the most efficient pathways were sugarcane to ethanol in the center-south region of Brazil and palm oil to biodiesel, in terms of additional hectares required (see table 3.2). Using carbohydrates and oilseeds worldwide to make the two biofuels would require an additional 100 million hectares of land, or an increase of more than 15 percent. The amount of land required to make biodiesel from palm oil around the world is only marginally greater than that required for biodiesel from palm oil in Indonesia. The figures for biodiesel illustrate the high biodiesel yield per hectare of land when using palm oil compared with other oilseeds. In practice, relying only on Brazil and Indonesia would result in major inroads into grazing areas in Brazil, pushing ranches further into the cerrado—the country’s vast tropical savanna ecoregion—and to large-scale encroachment on tropical rain forest areas of Kalimantan in Indonesia, with potentially significant effects on biodiversity as well as net changes in GHG emissions.

The above study did not give consideration to the water implications of area expansion. If Brazilian sugarcane and Southeast Asian oil palm are chosen to meet global biofuel needs, there will be little or no additional demand for irrigation water. If feedstocks are grown around the world,
a greater area of land than that indicated in table 3.2 may be required.

**WTO Issues for Biofuels**

Chapter 2 and the description of biofuel policies in this chapter show that industrial countries are in a position to provide greater subsidies to domestic biofuel producers—both for the production of the feedstocks and for the manufacture of biofuels themselves—than developing countries. This has created a large domestic biofuel industry that may not be able to compete with imports of petroleum fuels and biofuels, necessitating high tariffs on the latter while providing tax reductions on the domestic market. If the current policies continue, this may adversely affect developing countries that have comparative advantage in biofuel production and export.

As explained in chapter 2, removing border restrictions yields considerable welfare gains. For biofuels, maximum applied ad valorem tariffs for harmonized system (HS) 2207.10 (undenatured ethanol) and HS 2207.20 (denatured ethanol) have been reported as 300 and 125 percent, respectively, against 30 percent for HS 3824.90 (biodiesel) (Steenblik 2005c). Specific tariffs for biodiesel can be higher than 30 percent of the border value when converted to an ad valorem tariff equivalent, as the discussion of Australia in appendix C shows.

Agricultural goods tend to enjoy greater protection than industrial goods. Importantly, once a good is afforded protection, it is easier to prevent reform if the good is classified as an agricultural commodity and trade negotiations fall under the Agreement on Agriculture. Ethanol, but not biodiesel, falls under this agreement. Ethanol is included in the WCO’s HS chapter 22, and annex 1 to the Agreement on Agriculture states that HS chapters 1 through 24 are covered by the agreement. Biodiesel, on the other hand, falls under chapter 38, which is excluded from consideration under the agreement. The rationale for classifying ethanol under agriculture is that, undenatured, it can be imbibed. Support given to biodiesel manufacture may fall under governments’ commitments under the Agreement on Agriculture if the subsidies can be shown to reach the farmer directly. One example is if the biodiesel manufacturer is required to offer a minimum guaranteed price to the farmer. Indirect benefits to agriculture as a result of increased demand for biodiesel—from such government interventions as biodiesel

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**Table 3.2: Land Required for Biofuel Production (Million Hectares)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Biofuel</th>
<th>Feedstock</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>5% blend</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethanol</td>
<td>Sugarcane</td>
<td>Brazil (center-south)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethanol</td>
<td>Sugarcane</td>
<td>World</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethanol</td>
<td>Cane/maize</td>
<td>World</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethanol</td>
<td>Carbohydrates</td>
<td>World</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biodiesel</td>
<td>Palm oil</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biodiesel</td>
<td>Palm oil</td>
<td>World</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biodiesel</td>
<td>Oilseeds</td>
<td>World</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

mandates or fuel excise tax exemptions—are not considered agricultural subsidies. Although ethanol is classified as an agricultural good, it remains to be seen how subsidies provided for ethanol production will be reported to the WTO (that is, as agricultural subsidies or non-agricultural subsidies).

To increase market access more rapidly, some have proposed that ethanol be reclassified as an industrial good or an environmental good. The latter is a relatively new concept that is still being formulated, and is unlikely to affect market access for ethanol in the near to medium term. But because this proposal has received some attention, it is covered in some detail in appendix A. The Doha Ministerial Declaration of 2001 specifically refers to environmental goods and services as an area that could be targeted for faster liberalization. The declaration also has a paragraph on the desirability of increasing market access for non-agricultural products, highlighting products of export interest to developing countries—which biofuels could very well be.

In practice, reclassification is unlikely to have near-term policy consequences. The WCO Council considers amendments in four-year cycles. The most recently completed review occurred in June 2004, with the amendments implemented on January 1, 2007. Amendments under the next review cycle are not scheduled for implementation until 2012 (Steenblik 2005b). Waiting for reclassification with a view to quickening the pace of liberalization thus does not seem practical in the near term. More importantly, reclassification is not a requirement for liberalizing market access. Being classified as an agricultural product does not bind the good to high tariff rates, nor is reclassification necessary to take a good out of annex 1 of the Agreement on Agriculture (which spells out which products are included under the agreement). However, classifying ethanol as an agricultural good does enable governments to protect domestic producers longer, and, in the extreme, declare ethanol a sensitive or special product (see appendix A) to shield it further from external pressure for liberalization.

One policy question falling under the rubric of environmental goods is whether distinctions should be made on the basis of process and production methods. Such distinctions would make administration more complex, but there is already growing pressure and interest in examining the environmental impact of individual crop and crop-based energy production pathways. Although not related to WTO negotiations, the Dutch government’s statement that palm oil will likely be excluded from future subsidies for renewable projects and the soybean traders’ moratorium on the purchase of soybeans grown on newly cleared rain forests in Brazil (mentioned earlier in this chapter) are indicative of this growing trend.

Article III, National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation, in GATT 1947, states that internal taxes and other internal charges, and laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions, should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production.

Article 3 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures prohibits “subsidies contingent, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon the use of domestic over imported goods,” including production subsidies contingent on use of domestically grown feedstocks (WTO 2007). These principles ensure equal treatment of biofuels and their feedstocks from around the world on any given domestic market.
Although they have not been challenged under WTO commitments, some subsidies and mandates are reserved explicitly for in-state production. For example, the provincial government of Manitoba in Canada provides a reduction in the gasoline tax of Can$0.025 per liter for gasohol containing a 10 percent blend of ethanol produced and sold in Manitoba, and exempts biodiesel produced in the province from both the retail sales tax and the automotive fuel tax (Manitoba Government 2003 and 2006). In June 2006, the Louisiana State Legislature in the United States passed a bill that requires 2 percent by volume of the total gasoline sold in the state to be ethanol from domestically grown feedstock or other biomass once a certain domestic ethanol production target is reached (Louisiana State Legislature 2006). Interestingly, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 1988 that tax credits given only to in-state manufactured ethanol violated the commerce clause of the federal constitution. More specifically, the case heard by the Supreme Court involved a challenge mounted by an Indiana firm against an Ohio statute. The statute gave a tax credit against the Ohio motor vehicle fuel sales tax for each gallon of ethanol sold (as a component of gasohol) by fuel dealers, but only if the ethanol was produced in Ohio or, if produced in another state, to the extent that the state granted similar tax advantages to ethanol produced in Ohio. At the time, Indiana had no ethanol tax exemption, and hence the ethanol produced in Indiana was not eligible for the Ohio tax credit (FindLaw undated).

Aside from possibly a handful of exceptions such as those discussed above, fuel tax reduction and exemption—an instrument of nearly all governments implementing biofuel programs—are not trade distorting because they do not discriminate on the basis of origin. The fiscal instruments that can be used within the bounds of WTO rules to protect domestic producers are import tariffs. Import tariffs are the easiest policy instrument to employ because, unlike other forms of support, they do not require a budgetary allocation. Fuel tax reduction and exemption may have to be debated by the parliament because they will entail a loss of government revenue. By contrast, imposing high import tariffs may not entail any budgetary loss. Because they are not subject to budgetary debate and scrutiny, high tariffs, which distort trade significantly, tend to be readily imposed for goods that governments wish to protect.

One question in the context of the Agreement on Agriculture is whether the current agricultural support for biofuels or their feedstocks belongs to the amber box or the green box. To be eligible for green box payments, certain criteria must be met. Under all circumstances, subsidies must be publicly funded, not involve transfers from consumers, and not have the effect of providing price support to producers. In addition, the government support must meet specific policy criteria, the relevant one of which for biofuels is described in annex 2, paragraph 12, to the Agreement on Agriculture. That paragraph covers payments under environmental programs. Payments must be part of a clearly defined government environmental or conservation program and must fulfill specific conditions, including those related to production methods or inputs. Payments must be limited to the extra costs or loss of income arising from compliance with the program (WTO 2007).

It seems difficult to regard subsidies given to promote biofuel production as offsetting the extra cost or loss of income involved in complying with an environmental program. For example, as described in appendix C, the U.S. government does not consider that the Bioenergy Program of the Commodity Credit Corporation met any of the policy-specific criteria in the green box. Citing annex 3, paragraph 7, of the Agreement on Agriculture, which states that “measures directed at agricultural processors shall be included [in the Aggregate Measure of
Support] to the extent that such measures benefit the producers of the basic agricultural products,” the USDA suggested that the Bioenergy Program could be viewed as an amber box subsidy (USDA 2006l). This statement also suggests that the USDA regards subsidies for ethanol production as agricultural subsidies.

Trade in biodiesel is extremely small at present. There are no large tariff barriers in major current and future biodiesel consumers and potential importers, including the United States and the European Union which levy high tariffs on ethanol. Arguably the greatest impediment to biodiesel trade in the coming years could be technical barriers to trade in the form of certification for environmental sustainability.

Another policy area involves technical barriers to trade. Fuel specifications can constitute such barriers. In December 2001, the American Society of Testing and Materials issued a specification (D 6751) for biodiesel fuel, to be used in a blend with petroleum diesel. Biodiesel defined by this specification is registered with the U.S. EPA as a fuel and a fuel additive. Major engine companies operating in the United States have adopted D 6751 for warranty purposes. German authorities issued a provisional specification for fatty acid methyl ester under DIN 51606. In 2003, DIN 51606 was replaced by EN 14214 of Europe’s Committee for Standardization upon its publication, for biodiesel to be used pure as well as in a blend. The European specifications have more stringent limits for sulfur and water. The iodine number in EN 14214 effectively excludes pure biodiesel derived from soybean oil or sunflower oil, but Spain has raised the limit for the iodine number to permit greater use of soy-derived as well as domestic sunflower-derived biodiesel. Additional work is needed for wider application of the EN 14214 specifications and associated test methods. For example, test method EN 14103 for determining the ester content required by EN 14214 is not applicable if the carbon number is 14 or lower. This means that the test cannot be used for biodiesel derived from coconut oil or palm oil (JPEC 2005).

The European fuel specifications currently allow blending of up to 5 percent ethanol and 15 percent ethers (oxygen-containing organic compounds for which ethanol is one possible feedstock) in gasoline, and up to 5 percent biodiesel in petroleum diesel. As mentioned earlier, raising these limits is currently under consideration to expand the use of biofuels. In the United States, blending 10 percent ethanol in gasoline is common. The U.S. EPA has said that it would consider E20 to be a new fuel, and the state of Minnesota would need to obtain an EPA waiver before implementing its E20 mandate in 2013 (see appendix C) (NMMA 2006). As in Europe, blending biodiesel up to 5 percent is considered permissible.

Technical barriers to trade are likely to be more important for biodiesel than ethanol. Unlike ethanol, biodiesel is a mixture of different size molecules with varying levels of unsaturation. The composition of a given biodiesel fuel, and the molecular structure of each ester comprising the fuel, depends on the feedstock (and the process conditions to a lesser extent); the amounts of contaminants left in the biodiesel fuel depend on the production process. It is relatively easy to make biodiesel, but it is difficult to make on-spec biodiesel. Ensuring fuel quality consistency presents a much greater challenge for biodiesel than ethanol, especially for biodiesel made at small-scale, simple-technology facilities. The European Union has historically channeled efforts to establishing standards based on data obtained from biodiesel made from rapeseed oil, whereas the United States has concentrated on biodiesel from soybean oil. Biodiesel from rapeseed is more suited to the European climate from the point of view of wax formation at low temperature,
although biodiesel from other vegetable oils such as soybeans and palm can be mixed with rapeseed diesel at low percentages without causing vehicle performance problems. The existing specifications and test methods are considered insufficient for protecting advanced engines used to meet the most stringent emission standards in industrial countries. For this reason, the world’s major auto manufacturers, in their most recent proposed revision for the World Wide Fuel Charter in August 2005, continue to recommend against permitting biodiesel in the most advanced fuel specification category (Methanol Institute and International Fuel Quality Center 2006). More work is needed for developing test methods and specifications that are applicable to a larger pool of biodiesel fuels made from a variety of feedstocks and for ensuring compatibility with modern diesel engines.
4. Conclusions

For much of the world, interest in biofuel trade liberalization is driven by a more general interest in the potential for biofuels to substitute for petroleum products in transportation applications. As pointed out in chapter 1, this more general interest targets three primary objectives:

- Concerns about energy security arising from increasing world petroleum prices and the prospect of eventual depletion of petroleum
- Environmental considerations that motivate governments to seek ways of curbing rising GHG emissions overall and especially from the transport sector, and, to a lesser extent, reducing tailpipe emissions of harmful pollutants
- A desire to support domestic agriculture in the face of international negotiations to liberalize agricultural trade

Although these objectives are not shared equally by all countries, together they explain much of the motivation for the biofuel policies overviewed in chapter 3 and interact with the agricultural production and policy issues discussed in chapter 2. This chapter begins by addressing the three objectives before turning to the implications for biofuel trade policy.

**Energy Security**

The first objective may call for diversity of supply, and, in particular, identifying energy suppliers other than major petroleum oil exporters. In nearly all countries, the objective of increasing energy security has been more narrowly focused and is synonymous with independence from imported energy and with self-sufficiency; this excludes trade as an alternative for meeting the above broader objective. Previous chapters showed that biofuels are likely to play only a small role in volumetric terms in replacing petroleum fuels in transportation on a global basis in the foreseeable future. Present and projected input-output relationships among the land, water, and other resources available globally suggest substitution for petroleum transportation fuels on the order of a few percentage points. Given projected growth in demand for transportation fuels, this level of substitution will not reduce overall petroleum fuel consumption below current levels but, rather, will moderate the growth in demand for those fuels.

It helps to differentiate between volumetric effects on self-sufficiency versus those on future petroleum price increases. In this latter sense, biofuel production provides some potential for helping ameliorate future price increases for petroleum and its products. Given the tight supply situation that has led to large price increases since 2004 on the world petroleum market, an even marginal increase in supply would be expected to lower fuel prices. While this potential for relative impact on price increases is worth mentioning, it does not mean that petroleum prices will not continue to remain...
high or even increase into the future as overall global demand continues to grow.

Some countries see biofuels as a way to secure cheaper fuels. Indonesia, for example, aims to substitute biodiesel for 10 percent of petroleum diesel with the aim of reducing or eliminating the diesel price subsidy. The basis for this approach seems questionable. First, biofuels have required—and will, for the foreseeable future, continue to require—significant subsidies. As such, it is difficult to see how biofuels can help reduce fuel price subsidies. Second, biofuels are nearly perfect substitutes for petroleum fuels and require essentially no additional infrastructure or infrastructure modification for transport and distribution (with the exception of pipeline transport and blending of ethanol). Under these circumstances, it would be difficult to maintain a sizable price difference between biofuels and petroleum fuels for long, except in landlocked or isolated areas or very small economies. In an open market, prices of biofuels and petroleum fuels would equilibrate, after allowing for transportation and differences in quality and fuel economy differences. Third, growing demand for biofuels exerts upward pressure on feedstock prices—as recent world price movements of maize and palm oil have shown—again making it difficult to maintain sizable price differences with petroleum products in favor of biofuels.

In terms of national prospects for meeting the more narrowly defined self-sufficiency objective, biofuel production is likely to make only a small contribution in most countries. Brazil recently passed the self-sufficiency margin by combining domestic petroleum production with ethanol production. But Brazil is exceptionally well endowed for the purpose of ethanol production, and few countries can match these natural endowments. Indonesia has substantial potential to be a major supplier of biodiesel from palm oil, but its domestic policies underprice transport fuels in the domestic market and work against the objective of self-sufficiency. There are also serious environmental concerns about expansion of palm plantation in Indonesia. As for countries with limited or no petroleum production potential, chances of achieving self-sufficiency in transportation fuels from investing in biofuel production are highly unlikely. Most petroleum-importing countries will be left with the option of importing biofuels from what is expected, in the near term, to be a small number of exporters of relatively small volumes of biofuel (with Brazil’s current ethanol export prospects being a possible exception). A combination of policies to reduce petroleum consumption should be implemented together with policies for biofuels to achieve the objective of reducing dependence on imported energy. Policies to reduce energy consumption should include sending correct market signals to consumers by reflecting international fuel prices, incentives for energy efficiency improvement, and demand management.

**Environmental Sustainability**

The environmental objective that provides part of the interest in biofuel production and consumption also confronts issues related to agricultural policy, to choice of feedstock crops by different countries, and to limitations in feedstock production capacities within existing agricultural operations. Theoretically, biofuels are renewable, but their potential for reducing life-cycle GHG emissions varies markedly, as shown in tables 1.1 and 1.2. There are also local environmental effects associated with biofuel production and use that can be, but are not always, positive. As such, the environmental benefits of biofuels should not be assumed but need to be examined on an individual basis.

Studies indicate that some feedstock and ethanol production pathways provide net environmental benefits. An example of such benefits is ethanol produced from sugarcane in Brazil, especially when net GHG impacts are accounted for.
Conclusions

and assuming no change in land use. But other cases—such as ethanol produced from sugarcane under irrigated conditions in water-scarce India—would have lower environmental benefits.

Water is going to be an increasingly scarce resource due to competition from urban areas and, in many places, due to climate variability. In most countries, water is not valued as energy. Where water is projected to become increasingly scarce, including in parts of Africa, water shortages may become a serious constraint on biofuel production and should be carefully examined. Similarly, greater maize production in the United States for ethanol could increase the size and intensity of the “dead zone” in the Gulf of Mexico that is attributed to agricultural runoff (fertilizer and pesticides) from maize farms. And any ethanol production in the United States from maize is acknowledged to have much smaller benefits in the reduction of life-cycle GHG emission compared with ethanol from sugarcane in Brazil, and could even result in a net increase in GHG emissions if electricity from coal is used. On the other hand, the European Commission questions if there will be benefits in the reduction of GHG emissions from additional ethanol production in Brazil if cane areas are expanded by clearing virgin savanna.

Similarly, biodiesel produced from tropical plant oils that come from expanding palm oil plantations into rain forests—notably in Indonesia—raises serious questions about the loss of biodiversity and potential benefits regarding life-cycle GHG emissions. Indonesia becomes the world’s third largest emitter of CO$_2$ after the United States and China when emissions from burning peat land (in part to expand palm oil plantation) and other forest fires are considered; it is 21st when these emissions are not included (WSJ 2006, Energy Economist 2007). The two-year moratorium by soybean traders on the purchase of soybeans from newly cleared rain forests in Brazil may foreshadow the impact of environmental concerns on world agricultural and biofuel markets. Global environmental benefits such as net GHG reductions need to be verified for each feedstock, production pathway, and location; and the negative environmental effects occurring at regional, national, and local levels from the feedstock production process also should not be ignored. These considerations raise questions about classifying all bioethanol and biodiesel as environmental goods.

A careful consideration of environmental effects is particularly important to level the playing field. High petroleum oil prices are spurring not only efforts at making biofuels commercially viable—the most significant and potentially promising being pursuing technical breakthroughs to dramatically reduce costs of second generation biofuel production. The same high oil prices are also driving investments and R&D efforts toward the production of other liquid fuels, such as coal to liquids, gas to liquids, oil from tar sands, and shale oil. Most of these alternative liquid fuels are economic and commercially viable at US$60 per barrel of crude oil, but uncertainties about future oil prices have kept commercial development in check. Production of liquid fuels from tar sands and shale oil has large and adverse ecological consequences, both local and global. For example, if tar sands are included, Canada may be home to the world’s largest petroleum reserves, but tar sands lie under Canada’s boreal forests. Tar sand production entails strip mining, and extracting oil is extremely energy and water intensive, requiring 2 to 5 liters of water for every liter of oil and leaving vast quantities of contaminated tailings. If tar sand output reaches more than 3 million barrels a day by 2015, Canada’s GHG emissions could double between 2004 and 2015, according to figures released by the Canadian government (Petroleum Economist 2006). But in the absence of properly accounting
for these environmental externalities, tar sands may look attractive, and production costs could be lower than those for biofuels.

The foregoing discussions highlight interactions among different economic forces, and also between the energy security and environmental objectives outlined above. High oil prices offer the potential to commercialize a range of alternative energy sources, not just biofuels. The benchmark price may shift over the medium to long term as these alternative energy sources are developed on a large scale. For example, Canada plans to triple oil production from tar sands in the next 10 to 15 years, adding another 2 million barrels of oil a day to the supply chain. Environmental concerns are having increasing effects on commercial production, driving R&D efforts at environmental sustainability of production methods for all energy sources. The pace of technological breakthroughs in terms of both cost of production and environmental sustainability of production methods for all energy sources—the relative commercial viability of different substitutes for conventional petroleum oil—is difficult to forecast. As a general observation, diversifying supply can help hedge against escalating oil prices. Experience suggests that an efficient way to promote supply diversification is to establish and enforce a clear, stable, and transparent regulatory framework including environmental regulations; establish hard sunset clauses for financial assistance and other protection measures (such as import tariffs) provided by government so that an infant industry does not remain in its infancy for decades to come; and properly account for environmental externalities through fiscal and other means.

**Support for Domestic Agriculture**

With regard to the third objective, some have argued that biofuel production objectives largely amount to disguised support for domestic farmers. National biofuel agendas indeed provide appreciable scope for increasing the demand for various agricultural commodities (maize and sugar in particular) that receive large subsidies in a number of countries. With feedstocks constituting more than half the production costs for biofuels, the link between biofuels policy and agricultural policy (and, increasingly, the links between petroleum prices and agricultural prices) cannot be ignored in discussing biofuel policy.

These same links bring into further question the arguments from some quarters that subsidies for biofuel production should be considered green box environmental payments within the WTO. If government expenditures were being made to compensate farmers and ethanol producers for costs borne directly in support of otherwise uncompensated environmental improvements (such as soil erosion prevention), then the green box argument could hold some sway. However, this is not the case with any of the feedstocks receiving current government support, as was discussed in chapter 3. The preceding discussion on the environmental impact of biofuels also cautions that environmental benefits of biofuels cannot always be assumed. Lastly, large producer subsidies for biofuels are likely to be provided predominantly in industrial countries. Permitting their continuation would discriminate against developing countries which are not in a budgetary position to offer them, while slowing trade reform negotiations and entrenching protection.

**Synthesis of Analysis**

There are circumstances in which energy security and environmental concerns can be better addressed by other forms of bioenergy. Some forms of bioenergy, such as biomass for heat and electricity generation, have been demonstrated to be commercially viable without subsidies. Although biofuels appear to
be attracting more attention at the moment, perhaps in response to U.S. and EU biofuel policy developments, they need to be viewed in a context that encompasses all forms of bioenergy. Thus, it might be more productive in many developing countries to channel efforts toward developing other forms of bioenergy rather than liquid biofuels.

What answers then does the present study provide for the questions posed in chapter 1:

- What border and domestic distortions protect biofuel manufacturers, including feedstock growers, today?
- How would biofuel trade be affected by agricultural reform?
- How would removing restrictions on international trade of biofuels affect the global biofuel industry and other commodity prices?
- What are the policy lessons from the analysis?

**Supporting Domestic Biofuel Industry**

This report outlines a broad array of measures supporting biofeedstock and biofuel production, including fuel tax reduction or exemption, mandatory blending, high import tariffs, government purchase policy for biofuels, production subsidies, investment subsidies, and financial user incentive programs such as lower taxes on vehicles designed for biofuels. Industrial countries have a greater capacity to apply policies that constitute either budget expenditures or public revenue reductions than do developing countries. Consequently, industrial countries tend to be better positioned to use policy interventions to affect biofuel supply and demand. The economics of biofuel production underscore this distinction: no biofuel pathway and product combination provides a low-risk and profitable investment without some kind of government fiscal support at this point in time.

Only a handful of developing countries would be in a position to provide the magnitude of tax exemptions granted in the European Union, not least because many developing countries levy low fuel taxes, especially on diesel. In granting tax exemptions, the European Union has publicly stated a principle of not overcompensating biofuel producers and applying it during the latter half of 2006. Other countries grant tax exemptions even in times of favorable biofuel economics (as in the United States in summer 2006). Certain tax differences may be justified to capture poorly accounted for environmental externalities, but even where such externalities exist, they are much smaller than the tax reductions typically offered. At the least, consideration should be given to moving away from a fixed subsidy to a sliding scale subsidy that changes with a measure of profitability.

Many factors need to be considered in setting tax rates on fuels. Taxes on transport fuels typically seek to satisfy multiple objectives, including the following:

- Raising government revenue for general (nontransport) expenditure purposes
- Allocating resources efficiently to and within the transport sector
- Financing road provision and maintenance
- Reducing congestion
- Reducing the environmental externalities of road transport
- Redistributing income

Correcting for environmental externalities is one of the several objectives of fuel taxation. As such, there is no reason to waive fuel taxation altogether. The challenge of meeting the various objectives is especially difficult in low-income countries, where fewer policy instruments are available. Tax rates on goods that have external costs should be adjusted upward to reduce their consumption to a social optimum. Environmental externalities should be corrected for by taxing
polluting goods, not by subsidizing nonpolluting alternatives (see Gwilliam and others 2001). One type of government support given to biofuels seems appropriate. A legitimate role of government is to fund R&D for activities that, because of their public good characteristics, are more likely to be undertaken if centrally financed. Although the private sector can and should be encouraged to undertake such work, research on emerging biofuel technologies that can dramatically expand supply or reduce costs seems an appropriate area for governments to support. R&D in developing countries could focus on technologies that are particularly suitable in their context, such as for primary feedstock production, processing of biofuels, or equipment modifications for alternative uses (for example, direct use of plant oils in stationary sources in remote areas with no electricity supply). An analysis of U.S. government subsidies for biofuels found that only a small fraction was for funding R&D (Koplow 2006); similar findings are reported for the European Union (Kutas and Lindberg forthcoming).

**Interactions among Different Markets**

Financial returns to biofuel manufacture are very much affected by feedstock and by-product prices, which themselves are largely determined by agricultural policy regimes. For example, when the amount of a given feedstock used for biofuel manufacture exceeds a certain threshold, its market price becomes increasingly affected by world oil prices; this is a new and emerging trend discussed in chapter 3. Excluding feedstock costs, conversion of sugarcane to ethanol is the least-cost route because sugarcane immediately yields six-carbon sugars that can be fermented into ethanol, and cane crushing leaves bagasse, which can be used to generate heat and power. However, studies have shown that policy reforms affecting sugar will increase world sugar prices. Similarly, the limited studies of biofuel trade reform that have been carried out point to increasing world prices of both biofuels and crops used in their production following tariff removal, provided mandates, consumption subsidies, or both remain. These increases would reduce the economic attractiveness of biofuel use. For example, there have been many announcements targeting palm oil in Asia. In particular, a joint announcement by Malaysia and Indonesia committing what amounts to 40 percent of palm oil production to biodiesel has made analysts fear that palm oil prices could rise above soybean oil prices and in fact make palm oil too expensive for both fuel and food. A similar reversal of vegetable oil price relationships has already occurred in Europe, making rapeseed oil considerably more expensive than sunflower oil in recent years. No detailed modeling has yet been done on second-order effects (examining the impact of increased demand for a particular feedstock on the prices of by-products and other crops that are substitutes), the combined effect of agricultural and biofuel trade reform, and links to the world petroleum market. Doing so would give a better understanding of the likely consequences of greater biofuel production and greater trade.

The fuel ethanol market is much larger than that for biodiesel and has been the subject of more research on the impact of policy change. Biodiesel has been less economical to produce. Much of the biodiesel production in Europe has arisen from EU policy that allowed set-aside land to be used for nonfood crop production, resulting in increased planting of rapeseed. At

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1 Publications that address issues related to public and private R&D policies in agriculture include those by Byerlee and Echeverria (2002), Evenson (2001), and Roseboom (2003).
the same time, biodiesel has not been subject to the level of trade protection facing ethanol and, thus, would be unlikely to be as heavily affected by trade liberalization.

**Technical Barriers to Trade**

There are technical barriers to trade. Some may be legitimate and even welfare enhancing, but they impede trade. The topic receiving the greatest attention at the moment is ensuring environmental sustainability of biofuel production, as witnessed by a call for an EU-wide ban on palm oil from Southeast Asia.

Work is under way in the European Union as well as by associations such as the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil to draft sustainability criteria and certification procedures. However, only effectively enforced worldwide certification may have a reasonable chance of making a difference in terms of global environmental sustainability. Selective certification that leaves some biofuels uncertified could give the appearance of sustainable production to some, while allowing the practice of unsustainable production for other consumers. In the worst case, even if a majority of biofuels is certified, considerable environmental damage may still be incurred depending on the manner in which uncertified biofuels are produced. This would argue for rapidly building a consensus on what would be a realistic way forward to ensure global environmental sustainability.

In addition, unlike ethanol, biodiesel properties and performance vary depending on the feedstock, and some feedstocks (such as rapeseed) make biodiesel that is inherently more suitable for cold climate applications than others (such as palm). The United States and the European Union have issued biodiesel specifications and associated test methods, but more work is needed. The existing specifications and test methods are inadequate even for biodiesel fuels made from domestic feedstocks (for which these specifications are intended). As suggested in chapter 3, some test methods cannot be used for biodiesel fuels made from certain feedstocks.

**Enhancing Biofuel Trade**

For both ethanol and biodiesel, the core policy issues affecting the potential for beneficial trade are

1. import barriers,
2. the agricultural policy regimes (including domestic support and market access) affecting feedstocks,
3. tax reduction and production subsidies affecting biofuels themselves.

If biofuels are economic, nearly all countries would presumably consume biofuels on the domestic market first—at least to the point that can be fully utilized by the existing vehicle fleet—before exporting, since selling into the domestic market is almost always more profitable than exporting. An exception would be countries with surplus supply. Brazil is one such example and would thus benefit from trade liberalization, as one study described in chapter 3 showed.

Worldwide, total cropland has been relatively stable. Some parts of Latin America—notably Brazil and, to a lesser extent, Argentina—and sub-Saharan Africa have surplus land that has not been brought into production. Vast rain forests in Indonesia are also suitable for palm cultivation, but environmental concerns would need to be addressed for massive expansion in biofuel production to be sustainable. Most developing countries are densely populated and do not have large tracts of underutilized lands that could be used for crops or biofuels. Before unutilized land in sub-Saharan Africa can be profitably brought into production, several obstacles must be overcome, including poor infrastructure, underdeveloped financial markets, and a hostile investment climate deriving from
(often inappropriate) government policies and poor governance.

If biofuels are not economic but some governments are prepared to offer considerable price subsidies, trade opportunities might arise for countries with duty-free access. Indeed, some countries in Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union republics are launching or planning to start biodiesel production with a view to exporting to the European Union. The financial viability of such trade obviously depends on political decisions in the countries providing large subsidies. The sustainability of such trade is uncertain.

In general, lowering trade barriers increases global welfare in the long run. Biofuel trade is no exception. Reducing border barriers to biofuel trade would increase competition, which should in turn help improve efficiency, bring down costs, and enable the world’s most efficient producers to expand their market share. As the study on U.S.-Brazil ethanol trade cited in chapter 3 shows, removal of high tariffs would bring down prices in highly protected markets and increase consumption.

There is an important difference between ethanol and biodiesel trade. Quality and quality consistency are far more likely to be an issue with biodiesel than with ethanol. It may make more sense for Europe, for example, to import biodiesel feedstocks than biodiesel. Removal by major oilseed producers of differentiated export taxes that are currently in favor of biodiesel may increase feedstock trade, provided that there are no barriers in importing countries. Ethanol, on the other hand, is more likely to be exported as a finished product, but it encounters high border tariffs in major potential importers. Sugarcane degrades rapidly and is clearly unsuited for export. In some circumstances, it might make more economic sense to import grains and process them into ethanol near consumption centers.

There is one caveat concerning the benefits of reducing and eventually eliminating border barriers. If biofuels continue to require very large subsidies, lowering their import tariffs may merely serve to enlarge an industry that cannot stand on its own, and make future adjustments even more painful should subsidies be substantially curtailed or withdrawn. Biofuel trade liberalization coupled with continued agricultural and biofuel policies that distort markets for biofuels could prolong and even worsen those distortions, as additional markets for subsidized agricultural outputs and biofuels would be created. The three sets of policies listed on the previous page are closely interwoven, and the theory of second best (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956–57) suggests that it would not necessarily improve overall welfare to address biofuel trade separately from other distortions affecting biofuels and biofuel feedstocks.

The general conclusion that emerges from the body of literature currently in existence on agricultural and biofuels policies is that trade liberalization for biofuels should ideally be considered part of the broader set of issues in the Doha Round of trade negotiations. To do otherwise would benefit consumers in highly protected countries and some interests (for example, ethanol and feedstock producers in Brazil and Pakistan, and those countries where certain commodity prices switch from being export parity to import parity as a result), but would not necessarily move the world closer to resolution of broader issues affecting the biofuel market. On the other hand, reform must start somewhere—even if in piecemeal fashion—if a program of reform is ultimately to be achieved. Beginning the overall trade liberalization process with ethanol and biodiesel presents the advantage of forcing governments to address openly the question (and the costs) of what objectives their biofuel support policies are actually pursuing.
Appendix A. Issues in Agriculture and Environment under the WTO

The Agreement on Agriculture was negotiated during the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and entered into force with the establishment of the World Trade Organization on January 1, 1995. Its implementation period was six years for developed countries. Developing countries were given the flexibility to implement their reductions in trade restrictions and other specific commitments over a period of up to 10 years. Least-developed countries were effectively exempted from subsidy and tariff reductions. The agreement did not achieve the reforms hoped for, and the launch of the Doha Round in November 2001 was seen as an opportunity to strengthen the disciplines of the Agreement on Agriculture and focus on issues of importance to developing countries under the Doha Development Agenda. Unfortunately, the Doha Round has encountered the same opposition to reforms in agriculture as the Uruguay Round. WTO Director General Pascal Lamy suspended the Doha WTO negotiations in July 2006 when they failed to reach agreement on the issues of domestic support and market access for agriculture.

The agreement’s long-term objective is “to establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system.” The agreement recognizes that reform agreements must look beyond import access restrictions and touch upon all measures affecting trade in agriculture, including domestic agricultural policies and the subsidization of agricultural exports. The Agreement on Agriculture is especially relevant for ethanol, which is currently classified as an agricultural good under the WCO’s Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System.

Three Pillars in the Agreement on Agriculture

The Agreement on Agriculture has three main areas for negotiation: reducing domestic support, increasing market access, and reducing export subsidies.

Domestic Support

The first pillar aims to reduce domestic subsidies. The subsidies are divided into three categories or “boxes.”

- The amber box contains domestic subsidies that are deemed to distort trade and that governments have agreed to reduce but not eliminate. The reductions are based on a formula called the Aggregate Measure of Support, accompanied by a minimum threshold below which spending on domestic

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1 There are no WTO definitions of developed and developing countries. Members identify themselves as developed or developing, although the decision of a member to make use of provisions for developing countries can be challenged. The WTO uses the same classification as the United Nations for least-developed countries, characterized by low income, weak human assets, and economic vulnerability.
subsidies does not need to be included in the support calculations. With more than half the world total, the European Union provides the largest amount of amber box support as measured by dollar value, with the United States a distant second and Japan a distant third (CBO 2005).

- The blue box contains subsidies that can be increased without limit, provided payments are linked to production-limiting programs. The level of payment is based on fixed areas and yields, or per head of livestock. Very few developing countries have programs that can be classified under the blue box category.

- Green box policies are those that are expected to have a minimal or no impact on trade and are not subject to annual limits. Green box payments include those for environmental programs, pest and disease control, infrastructure development, domestic food aid (purchased at market prices), and income insurance and emergency programs; along with direct payments to producers, provided they are decoupled from current production levels. The bulk of domestic support provided by the United States and Japan falls into the green box (CBO 2005).

It is not clear whether subsidies for biofuel feedstock production (or biofuel production itself if farmers can be shown to benefit directly from the subsidies, and for ethanol if WTO members notify subsidies for ethanol as agricultural subsidies) can be classified as green box policies.

**Export Subsidies**

The Agreement on Agriculture required developed countries to reduce export subsidies by at least 35 percent by value or 21 percent by volume over five years to 2000. The European Union is by far the dominant provider of export subsidies, providing 85 to 90 percent of the world’s total (CBO 2005).

**Other Provisions**

Several provisions permit greater protection of certain commodities or by certain countries under the agreement. They include special and differential treatment, special products, and sensitive products. No products have been explicitly classified as sensitive or special to date, but these classifications are due to be made once decisions on modalities are finalized. Negotiations have included how many tariff lines developed countries will be allowed to categorize as sensitive and their treatment, including tariff reductions and tariff quota expansions.

*Special and differential treatment* allows exports from developing countries to receive preferential access to developed markets without having to accord the same treatment in their domestic markets. It recognizes that developing countries face greater difficulties in world trade, and thus should be granted greater flexibility in moving toward a market-based system. Numerous developing countries enjoy preferential access to the European Union for ethanol and sugar.

*Special products* can be claimed by developing countries only. This mechanism was created to protect and promote food production, livelihood security, and rural development. Developing countries can designate a certain number of products that would be exempt from tariff reduction requirements and other disciplines.

*Sensitive products* can be claimed by developed countries to continue protection of particular...
agricultural products for political, social, or cultural reasons. Sensitive products receive less rigorous disciplines in relation to tariff and domestic support reductions. In exchange, tariff rate quotas on the products are expanded. The European Union is currently asking for 8 percent of product lines to be deemed sensitive and given special levels of protection, against 1 percent proposed by the United States. Declaring ethanol a sensitive product would enable a country to protect its domestic ethanol industry longer.

Environmental Goods and Services

The Doha Ministerial Declaration of 2001 specifically referred to environmental goods and services as an area that could be targeted for faster liberalization. WTO members agreed to negotiate “the reduction or, as appropriate, elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to environmental goods and services” with a view to enhancing the mutual supportiveness of trade and environment (WTO 2006, paragraph 31 [iii]). The declaration did not attempt to define what constitutes environmental goods and services; there is, as yet, no agreed definition for these nor agreed criteria for their classification. Negotiations on environmental goods have been assigned to the Non-Agricultural Market Access Negotiating Group, which could be interpreted to mean that environmental goods are non-agricultural products. Negotiations on environmental services have been assigned to the Committee on Trade and Environment meeting in special sessions. This committee is the main body where debate relevant to the present discussion occurs.

It is not clear whether agricultural goods could qualify as environmental goods, or whether only industrial goods (such as pollution-reduction equipment) could. Those wishing to protect domestic ethanol producers against cheaper imports would argue against classifying ethanol as an environmental good, while those who stand to benefit from liberalized trade would argue the reverse.

Although the WTO has not formulated a definition, other international organizations have proposed definitions for the environmental industry. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development defined environmentally preferable products as those that cause significantly less environmental harm at some stage of their life cycle (production/processing, consumption, waste disposal) than alternative products that serve the same purposes, or products the production and sale of which contribute significantly to the preservation of the environment (UNCTAD 1995).

An informal working group meeting under the auspices of the OECD and the Statistical Office of the European Communities defined the environmental goods and services industry as consisting of activities that “include those that measure, prevent, limit, minimize or correct environmental damage to water, air and soil, as well as problems related to waste, noise and ecosystems” (OECD/Eurostat 1999). These definitions have been referred to in the WTO negotiations.

There is less common understanding of environmental goods than environmental services. OECD and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) independently developed lists of environmental goods. Their objectives and procedures for generating the lists were

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2 APEC members are Australia, Canada, Chile, China, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, Thailand, the United States, and Vietnam.
different. OECD’s list was intended to be illustrative; APEC’s aim was to obtain more favorable tariff treatment for environmental goods. Consequently, the APEC list was confined primarily to goods that could be readily distinguished by customs agents and treated differently for tariff purposes. APEC’s list focuses more on end-of-pipe pollution control and monitoring equipment. These differences notwithstanding, the two lists have helped frame WTO negotiations. On the basis of three broad categories used by OECD for its list—pollution management, resources management, and cleaner technologies and products—the lists contain a large number of goods under pollution management, and some under resources management including renewable energy. The items on OECD’s list under cleaner technologies and products do not appear on APEC’s list. Under renewable energy, OECD’s list, but not APEC’s, includes ethanol. Neither list contains biodiesel (Steenblick 2005a).

Discussions on definition and classification of environmental goods stalled long before the suspension of WTO negotiations in July 2006. Developing countries are concerned that negotiations have focused on high-technology products of little export interest to them. At a special negotiating session of the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment in July 2005, Brazil proposed classifying ethanol and biodiesel—as well as flex-fuel engines and vehicles—as environmental goods. Previously, both Canada and New Zealand had submitted lists of proposed environmental goods that included biodiesel.

Another issue is whether distinctions should be made on the basis of process and production methods. Requiring that a good be produced in an environmentally sustainable manner seems consistent with the spirit of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, whereby increased trade resulting from liberalization is expected to promote both environmental protection and economic development (paragraph 31). It is also consistent with the definition of environmentally preferable products. However, such a distinction would make administration more complex.

A related question is whether ethanol for fuel use should be classified as a non-agricultural product. Under the Doha Ministerial Declaration, WTO members agree to the following regarding market access for non-agricultural products:

- Negotiations which shall aim, by modalities to be agreed, to reduce or as appropriate eliminate tariffs, including the reduction or elimination of tariff peaks, high tariffs, and tariff escalation, as well as non-tariff barriers, in particular on products of export interest to developing countries. Product coverage shall be comprehensive and without a priori exclusions. The negotiations shall take fully into account the special needs and interests of developing and least-developed country participants, including through less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments (WTO 2006, paragraph 16).

Biofuels are likely to be products of export interest to developing countries.

There are no large tariff barriers in major current and future biodiesel consumers and potential importers. As an industrial good, the tariffs that do apply to biodiesel may be tackled under paragraph 16 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration. Some countries are also proposing to classify biodiesel as an environmental good with a (long-term) objective of accelerating tariff reduction and elimination further.
Some of the first policies to protect agricultural producers were introduced in Europe in the 1800s, when, for example, sugar beet producers in Europe could not compete with lower cost sugar produced from cane outside of Europe. This led to high import duties on cane sugar from the Caribbean. Opposition to high protection dates back several centuries, and the English economist David Ricardo was one of the first to argue against Britain’s early 19th century agricultural protection, the so-called Corn Laws, which imposed high duties on wheat imports (Ricardo 1817). Since then, many countries have bowed to political pressure from farm groups or concerns over food security and provided direct or indirect support to domestic producers and protection from lower cost foreign producers. Often this support was intended as a temporary measure, but became permanent when prices remained low for a sustained period of time.

There are many different ways policies can be used to protect agricultural producers, as evident from the policies overviewed in this section.

OECD countries provide significant protection to domestic farmers in the form of high import tariffs and subsidies. The most recent figures from the OECD show that the amount its 30 members spent on domestic agriculture in 2005 was essentially unchanged from 2004 at US$280 billion. Subsidies accounted for close to one-third of farm incomes. EU aid to its farmers fell marginally from US$136 billion to US$134 billion, while Japanese farmers remained among the most protected. The producer support estimate—which measures the cost to taxpayers of subsidies and that to consumers of tariff barriers—was 32 percent in the European Union and 56 percent in Japan. The US$43 billion support given by the U.S. government represented 16 percent of receipts.

The two most important economies that have historically restricted biofuel trade to protect domestic farmers are the European Union and the United States. Their agricultural policies are described in this appendix.

**European Union**

The European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy dates to 1958. The stated objectives of the CAP are to increase agricultural productivity, ensure a fair standard of living for farmers, stabilize markets, guarantee regular food supplies, and ensure reasonable prices to
consumers. Domestic price supports are the historical backbone of CAP farm support, although price support has become less important for maintaining grain and beef farmers’ incomes under the CAP reforms. High domestic prices were maintained by price intervention and high external tariffs, whereby authorities buy surplus supplies of products when market prices threaten to fall below agreed intervention (minimum) prices. High tariffs limit imports of most price-supported commodities and allow the high internal market price set by EU authorities to be maintained. Farmers are guaranteed intervention prices for eligible agricultural products. This means that EU authorities will purchase, at the intervention price, unlimited excess products that meet minimum quality requirements and that cannot be sold on the market. The surplus commodities are then put into EU storage facilities or exported with subsidy. While less important from a budget perspective, exports of processed products that contain a portion of a CAP-supported commodity also receive an export subsidy, based on the proportion of the commodity in the product and the difference between the intervention price and the world price. Other mechanisms, such as consumer subsidies paid to encourage domestic consumption of such products as butter and skimmed milk powder, also support domestic prices.

Reforms of the CAP began in 1992, when supply controls were instituted through a mandatory, paid, set-aside program to limit production. These supply controls have been maintained through subsequent reforms. To be eligible for direct payments, producers of grains, oilseeds, or protein crops must remove a specified percentage of their area from production.

The second reform, Agenda 2000, began preparation for EU enlargement, and, like the first CAP reform, used direct payments to compensate farmers for half of the loss from new support price cuts. Agenda 2000 set the base rate for the required set-aside for arable crops at 10 percent. Producers with an area planted with these crops sufficient to produce no more than 92 tonnes of grain are classified as small producers and are exempt from the set-aside requirement. Supply control quotas have been in effect for the dairy and sugar sectors for nearly two decades.

The most recent reforms began as a mid-term review of Agenda 2000 and resulted in a third major set of reforms in June 2003 and April 2004. These latest reforms represent a degree of renationalization of farm policy, as each member state will have discretion over the timing and method of implementation. The 2003 reforms allow for decoupled payments—payments that do not affect production decisions—that vary by commodity. Called single farm payments, these decoupled payments are based on 2000–02 historical payments and replace the compensation payments begun by the 1992 reform. When member states implement the reforms, compliance with EU regulations regarding environment, animal welfare, and food quality and safety will be required to receive single farm payments. Moreover, land not farmed must be maintained in good agricultural condition. Coupled payments, which can differ by commodity and require planting a crop, are allowed to continue to reinforce environmental and economic goals in marginal areas. The CAP budget ceiling has been fixed from 2006 to 2013, and—if market support and direct payments combine to come within €300 million (US$405 million) of the budget ceiling—single farm payments will be reduced to stay within budget limits.

The 2003 reforms cut storage subsidies by 50 percent. Reforms have lowered the cost of the CAP to consumers, as intervention prices have been reduced. However, taxpayers now bear a larger share of the cost because more support is provided through direct payments.
Price supports remain a principal means of maintaining farm income. Compensation payments for price cuts generated by the 1992 reform began in 1994 and were increased for the price cuts of the Agenda 2000 reform. These compensation payments were established on a historical-yield basis for arable crops by farm, and farmers had to plant to receive the payment. In contrast, the payments specified in the 2003 reform will be made to farmers based on the average level of payments made during 2000–02 and no production is required. Direct payments currently account for about 35 percent of EU producer receipts and for an even higher percentage of net farmer income once input costs are subtracted from receipts.

In preferential trade agreements, such as those with former colonies and neighboring countries, the European Union satisfies consumer demand while protecting high domestic prices through import quotas and minimum import price requirements. The CAP also applies tariffs at EU borders so that imports cannot be sold domestically below the internal market prices set by the CAP. Although the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture called for more access to the EU market, market access to the European Union’s agricultural sector remains highly restricted. In addition, the European Union subsidizes agricultural exports to make domestic agricultural products competitive in world markets.

The CAP regime covers most grain produced by and imported into EU countries (bread wheat, barley, and maize). However, high prices for some grains indirectly raise the prices of unsupported grains, principally feed wheat. As with other commodities, grain support mechanisms include a mixture of price supports and supply controls, as described above. CAP reforms have affected the grain regime mainly by requiring grain farmers to remove a percentage of their arable cropland from production in order to receive direct (coupled) payments in compensation for reduced price supports. The 2003 reforms required a decoupled payment of at least 75 percent for arable crops. Since receipt of a decoupled payment does not require a crop to be planted or produced, farmers are free to plant whatever crop they want or to not plant at all. Durum wheat was allowed a 40 percent coupled payment in traditional areas, while support for durum in nontraditional areas was abolished. In addition, storage payments for grains were cut by 50 percent. Nevertheless, most EU grain prices will likely remain above world prices most of the time, requiring export subsidies to remain competitive on the world market (USDA 2006c).

**United States**

U.S. government support to commodity producers is provided under farm legislation, which typically extends for five years. The most recent of these farm bills was the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, which is scheduled to expire in 2007. The act provides direct government income support to eligible commodity producers, mainly through three programs: direct payments, counter-cyclical payments, and the marketing loan program. In addition, subsidized crop and revenue insurance is provided to assist farmers with risk management. Commodity producers also receive benefits from government programs promoting trade liberalization and food aid. Specific programs apply to individual crops.

**Direct payments** are fixed payments made annually to farmers who participate in the program. Decoupled from production, these payments are made regardless of the level of production or which of the eligible crops (maize, soybeans, other oilseeds, sorghum, barley, oats, wheat, upland cotton, rice, peanuts) are grown. The direct payment is calculated by multiplying the commodity payment rate by the farm’s
payment yield and 85 percent of the farm’s base acres. The maize payment rate is US$0.28 per bushel (US$11 per tonne). Payment yields are based on historical farm maize yields, and base acres depend on historical farm plantings.

Counter-cyclical payments are available to farmers whenever the effective price of maize is lower than the target price of US$2.60 per bushel (US$102 per tonne). The effective price is the sum of the direct payment rate and the larger of the national average farm price or the national average loan rate. The difference between the effective and target price is the counter-cyclical payment rate paid on a farm’s base acres and payment yields. Counter-cyclical payments are made to eligible farmers regardless of the level of production or which crops are grown on the farm. A farm’s payments are equal to the product of the counter-cyclical payment rate, the payment yield, and 85 percent of the farmer’s base acres.

The marketing assistance loan program provides nonrecourse loans (loans that limit the lender’s rights to the asset financed) to eligible producers, with the farm’s program crop used as collateral. The marketing loan for maize is US$1.98 per bushel (US$77 per tonne), and producers may settle the loan either by forfeiting the collateral to the Commodity Credit Corporation at maturity with no penalty or by repaying the loan. Producers may forgo taking out a loan and instead receive a loan deficiency payment equal to the difference between the posted county price and local loan rate on the quantity eligible for loan.

Commodity producers can also purchase subsidized crop or revenue insurance to manage these risks, and USDA’s Risk Management Agency pays a portion of contract premiums for producers’ insurance policies and some of the delivery and administrative costs of private insurance companies that sell these policies. In 2001, 74 percent of maize-planted areas were covered by crop or revenue insurance.

The USDA’s Foreign Agricultural Service promotes exports of U.S. feed grains under the Export Credit Guarantee Program and the Intermediate Export Credit Guarantee Program. These programs are used to underwrite credit extended by U.S. banks to approved foreign banks to pay for food and agricultural products sold to foreign buyers. The credit programs provide assurance to U.S. exporters that they will be paid. In addition, as part of U.S. food-aid programs, the USDA provides low-interest loans to qualified developing countries purchasing U.S. commodities.

Finally, under the 2002 Farm Act, producers can choose from a wide range of voluntary conservation and environmental programs designed to protect multiple resources. Land retirement programs—including the Conservation Reserve Program, Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program, Wetland Pilot Program, and Wetlands Reserve Program—remove land from production. Working lands programs, such as the Environmental Quality Incentives Program and the new Conservation Security Program, provide assistance on lands in production (USDA 2002).
Appendix C. Biofuel Policies in Different Countries

Biofuels are protected by a complex web of subsidies. This appendix gives more details on biofuel policies in the European Union and the United States. A significant portion of the materials on the European Union is drawn from Kutas and Lindberg (forthcoming). The appendix also provides information on biofuel policies in Argentina, Australia, Canada, China, Colombia, Indonesia, Japan, and Thailand.

European Union

The European Union produced 3.2 million tonnes of biodiesel in 2005 (EBB 2007a), mostly from rapeseed oil. The European Union produced approximately 1.6 billion liters of bioethanol in 2006, representing an increase of 71 percent from the previous year (Ebio 2007). Countries producing 500,000 tonnes or more of biodiesel in 2006 were Germany, France, and Italy; those producing 200 million liters or more of bioethanol in 2006 were Germany, Spain, and France.

As described in chapter 3, article 16 of the Energy Tax Directive permits member states to exempt or reduce excise taxes on biofuels. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, and the United Kingdom have notified the European Commission and received state aid approval for ethanol; France and Hungary have received state aid approval for ethyl tertiary-butyl ether; Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, and the United Kingdom have received state aid approval for biodiesel; Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Germany, Ireland, and Lithuania have received state aid approval for vegetable oils; and Sweden has received state aid approval for all so-called CO₂-neutral fuels.

Set-aside land accounts for about 10 percent of total EU farmland. In 2005, of the 7.0 million hectares of set-aside land, 836,000 were planted with feedstocks for biofuels. Farmers are compensated for setting aside land. Set-aside land planted with energy crops is not eligible for the €45 (US$61) per hectare payment under the Energy Crop Scheme introduced in 2003. However, sugar beets grown as a nonfood crop qualify for set-aside payments and energy crop aid, and are exempted from production quotas.

Several countries have mandatory blending requirements. In Austria, beginning in October 2005, those who enter the gasoline and diesel fuel market for the first time must have 2.5 percent biofuel, calculated on the basis of energy content. This percentage will rise to

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1 Aggregate EU biodiesel production in 2006 is not given here because different sources give different estimates, and the production figures from the European Biodiesel Board, which is the primary source of EU data for this report, were not available at the time of publication.
4.3 percent in October 2007 and 5.75 percent in October 2008. A description of biofuel policies in the top three biodiesel and bioethanol producers (Germany, France, Spain, and Italy) as well as Sweden—which in 2004 exceeded the biofuel consumption target set by the EU Biofuels Directive for 2005—is given next.

Germany has historically provided generous fuel excise tax concessions with no quantitative restrictions. Full excise tax exemption has been granted to biofuels and heating oils produced from biomass, whether sold pure or blended. Historical tax exemptions have amounted to €0.4704 (US$0.64) per liter of biodiesel and vegetable oil, and €0.6545 (US$0.88) per liter of ethanol and ETBE. The exemption must be adjusted if overcompensation is established. In August 2006, in response to falling world crude oil prices, the government introduced a fuel excise tax of €0.09 (US$0.12) per liter of biodiesel and straight vegetable oil for automotive use. Capital grants are also given for bioenergy. The government also funds R&D projects. Germany has maintained an end-user price advantage for biodiesel over petroleum diesel through combined exemption of fuel excise tax and ecological tax, which is €0.10 (US$0.14) per liter.

In October 2006, Germany issued new legislation requiring mandatory blending of biodiesel and bioethanol and gradually phasing out fuel tax reductions beginning in 2007. There are penalties for failing to meet the blending targets, which are set at 4.4 percent for biodiesel and 1.2 percent for ethanol in 2007 and rise over the coming years. By 2011, both biodiesel and straight vegetable oil will be taxed at €0.323 (US$0.44) per liter; in 2012, the tax rate will rise to €0.449 (US$0.61). Biogas and liquid biofuels produced using biomass-to-liquid technologies will continue to enjoy 100 percent tax exemption until 2015.

France is a major producer within the European Union of both biodiesel and ethanol. Ethanol, made from wheat and sugar beets, has historically been converted to ETBE before being blended into gasoline. The country’s biofuel industry was aided by the Biofuel Production Program, which has in the past provided capital grants. Fuel excise taxes are reduced by €0.33 (US$0.45) per liter for ethanol in ETBE or blended into gasoline and by €0.25 (US$0.34) per liter for biodiesel (USDA 2006j). These tax reductions are not automatically granted. Each year, the government establishes a quota for the maximum volume of biofuels that are given the tax relief. This annual adjustment is intended to take into account varying production costs and petroleum fuel prices, and to avoid possible overcompensation. A public tender system is used to allocate eligible biofuel production quantities to production units approved by the government. Production quotas will rise sharply in the coming years, doubling for biodiesel between 2006 and 2007 and doubling again between 2007 and 2009, and tripling for ethanol between 2006 and 2008. The government also imposes a tax on fuel distributors failing to meet a biofuel blending rate, set at 1.75 percent in 2006, 3.5 percent in 2007, 3.5 percent in 2008, 6.25 percent in 2009, and 7 percent in 2010 (USDA 2007n). No capital grant programs appear to be in place at present. The government funds R&D for biofuels. France has just set a target of 15 percent for the percentage of state-purchased flex-fuel vehicles in 2007, doubling to 30 percent in 2008. The country also plans to install 500 E85 pumps by September (Dow Jones International News 2007b).

Italy was the third largest biodiesel producer in the European Union in 2006, but it manufactures biodiesel mainly from imported vegetable oils. Italy grants tax exemption to biodiesel but limits the quantity of biodiesel that enjoys the exemption. The annual quota was increased from 125,000 tonnes to 300,000 tonnes in 2002, but reduced to 200,000 tonnes in 2005. The exemption
Appendix C. Biofuel Policies in Different Countries

amounts to €0.413 (US$0.56) per liter, subject to adjustment for overcompensation. Italy was also the fifth largest producer of ethanol in the European Union in 2006. According to the government, the reduction in the quota of biodiesel eligible for fuel tax exemption was to permit tax relief for ethanol which, unlike biodiesel, might use domestic feedstocks. In 2005, ethanol and ETBE were given a fuel excise tax reduction of €0.26 (US$0.35) and €0.25427 (US$0.34) per liter, respectively.

Spain was the European Union’s second largest producer of ethanol in 2006; this was made from wheat and barley. As in France, most of its ethanol is converted to ETBE. Full excise tax exemption is granted for biofuels until the end of 2012, amounting to €0.42 (US$0.57) per liter for ethanol and €0.29 (US$0.39) per liter for biodiesel. The government has provided other forms of assistance, although apparently in limited amounts: capital grants, a reduction of 0.5 percent in the interest rate for eligible projects, and a tax deduction for investments in tangible fixed assets that would use renewable sources.

Sweden is a large importer of ethanol in addition to being the fourth largest EU ethanol producer in 2006. It has limited biodiesel production. In 2004, biofuel use averaged 2.3 percent of all transportation fuel consumption, thus exceeding the 2 percent target set in the Biofuels Directive for end 2005. In 2005, Sweden was the only country in which direct gasoline-ethanol blends were produced and where ethanol consumption exceeded domestic ethanol production. Ethanol imported from Brazil accounted for 70 percent of total consumption in 2005, imported blended with 20 percent gasoline under an “other chemicals” tariff line and subject to a markedly lower tariff rate. Ethanol imported under the “other chemicals” tariff code could also benefit from Swedish tax relief for biofuels, as described below. In January 2006, tax relief was made available only for ethanol imported under the higher EU duty of €0.192 (US$0.26) a liter (USDA 2006g). This policy change was largely responsible for Brazilian ethanol imports into the European Union falling from about 300 million liters in 2005 to 233 million liters in 2006 (Dow Jones International News 2007b).

Swedish excise duties consist of an energy tax and a CO₂ tax. Once a fuel is deemed by the authorities to be CO₂-neutral, the CO₂ tax is waived. Biofuels have been classified as CO₂-neutral, and all biofuels, domestic and imported, are eligible for exemption from the CO₂ tax. The exemption applies until the end of 2007, subject to adjustment if overcompensation is established. The CO₂ tax is set at SKr 1.46 (US$0.21) per liter for gasoline and SKr 1.80 (US$0.26) per liter for diesel. In 2004, the government introduced a five-year program whereby CO₂-neutral fuels are exempt from both CO₂ and energy taxes. This tax measure, which was approved by the European Commission in March 2006, will increase the tax exemption to SKr 4.62 (US$0.68) per liter of ethanol and SKr 3.12 (US$0.46) per liter of biodiesel. Full tax exemption has historically been given to biofuels produced in pilot plants. Because ethanol technologies are considered sufficiently commercially proven, any ethanol pilot projects must first be approved by the European Commission to be eligible for the tax exemption. There appear to be no capital grants provided for biofuel manufacturing plants. Some funding has been provided for R&D.

The EU Strategy for Biofuels

“An EU Strategy for Biofuels,” issued in February 2006, sets out a strategic approach to support market growth of both first and second generation biofuels. The latter include lingo-cellulosic processing and conversion of biomass to liquid dimethyl ether and Fischer-Tropsch biodiesel. The strategy acknowledges both the
comparative advantage of developing countries in the production of biofuels and environmental and social concerns in the event of large-scale expansion of feedstock production. The latter include pressures on eco-sensitive areas such as rain forests (for palm plantation, for example); effects on soil fertility, water availability and quality, and pesticide use; potential dislocation of communities; and competition between biofuel and food production. The strategy presents seven policy axes, as follows:

- Stimulating demand for biofuels through national targets, favorable treatment to second generation biofuels, and promotion of public procurement of vehicles using high blends of biofuels
- Capturing environmental benefits including GHG emission reduction and ensuring sustainable cultivation of biofuel feedstocks
- Developing the production and distribution of biofuels by considering biofuels in national plans for rural development and ensuring no discrimination against biofuels
- Expanding feedstock supplies through incentive schemes, information campaigns for farmers and forest holders, studying legislation revision to facilitate authorization and approval processes for biofuel production, and monitoring the impact of biofuel demand on commodity and by-product prices
- Enhancing trade opportunities through assessing advantages, disadvantages, and legal implications of proposing separate nomenclature codes for biofuels; not worsening market access conditions for imported bioethanol; and pursuing a balanced approach
- Supporting developing countries by ensuring that support for the countries affected by the EU sugar reform can help develop bioethanol production, developing a coherent biofuels assistance package, and examining how best to assist in the development of biofuel programs that are environmentally and economically sustainable
- Supporting R&D

**Biofuel Import Tariffs**

Biodiesel imports into the European Union are subject to an ad valorem duty of 6.5 percent. An import duty of €0.192 (US$0.26) per liter is levied on undenatured ethanol, and €0.102 (US$0.14) per liter on denatured ethanol. Between 2002 and 2004, 93 percent of ethanol imported into the European Union was undenatured. In 2004, 55 percent of the ethanol imported was free of import duties. Until recently, Pakistan was the largest duty-free exporter. Pakistan lost its duty-free status in 2005, however, and is now subject to full import duties. Brazil exported even greater amounts to the European Union as a most favored nation exporter with no duty exemptions or reductions. Three categories of countries and Egypt and Norway enjoy an unlimited duty-free status with respect to ethanol.

- The Generalized System of Preferences Plus (GSP+) incentive scheme covers Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Georgia, Guatemala, Honduras, Moldova, Mongolia, Panama, Peru, Sri Lanka, and Venezuela, and grants them unlimited and duty-free access for denatured and undenatured ethanol. The scheme is in effect from January 1, 2006, to December 31, 2008.
- The Everything-But-Arms initiative covers 50 developing countries and grants unlimited duty-free access to denatured and undenatured ethanol.
- Under the Cotonou Agreement, all 79 African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries qualify for unlimited duty-free access for denatured and undenatured ethanol with the sole exception of South Africa. These countries include all the EBA countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific.
• Egypt has unlimited duty-free access under the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement, and Norway has been granted duty-free access under the system of tariff rate quotas.

In 2004, 45 percent of ethanol imported into the European Union was from GSP+ countries. Full import duties were levied on 36 percent of the total imports. Despite import duty concessions, African, Caribbean, and Pacific and EBA countries combined accounted for a mere 5.6 percent. If successfully completed, the ongoing negotiations on a free trade agreement between the European Union and Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay) could have a significant impact on ethanol imports from Brazil to Europe.

United States

Total production of fuel ethanol in the United States in 2006 was 18.4 billion liters. In the absence of mandates (until recently), U.S. ethanol production has historically been responsive to feedstock prices, such as when ethanol production plummeted in mid-1996 in response to peak maize prices. As of May 2007, there were 118 ethanol plants in the United States, with a combined total annual capacity of 23 billion liters, up from 16.4 billion liters in January 2006. Another 24 billion liters worth of annual capacity was being added through plant construction and expansion. Of the existing plant capacity, 34 percent is farm owned; of the new planned capacity, only 12 percent will be farm owned (RFA 2007). This reversion to the ownership patterns of the 1980s for processing capacity has the potential to transfer some of the benefits of biofuel promotion policies from farmers to monopsonistic industrial interests, and to add new political dimensions to biofuel policy making in the United States. U.S. biodiesel production tripled to 75 million gallons (284 million liters) in 2005. As of January 2007, there were 105 biodiesel production plants with a combined annual capacity of 3.3 billion liters. Seventy-seven companies reported plants under construction that were scheduled to come on stream within 18 months with a combined additional annual capacity of 6.4 billion liters (NBB 2007).

Much of the growth in the production of ethanol from maize is due to government incentive programs, beginning with the Energy Tax Act of 1978. This act defined gasohol as a blend of gasoline with at least 10 percent alcohol by volume, excluding alcohol made from petroleum, natural gas, or coal. A federal excise tax exemption on gasohol equivalent to US$0.40 per gallon (US$0.11 per liter) of ethanol blended was granted. This reduced the cost of ethanol to about the wholesale price of gasoline. The tax exemption was a credit that fuel blenders received for using ethanol in gasoline. Federal excise tax exemption was supplemented by state tax incentives to ethanol producers. The tax exemption rose as high as US$0.60 per gallon (US$0.159 per liter) in the Tax Reform Act of 1984 before gradually falling to US$0.51 per gallon (US$0.135 per liter) by 2005.

Beginning in January 2005, the volumetric ethanol excise tax credit in the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 has extended the ethanol tax incentive through December 31, 2010, at a rate of US$0.51 per gallon (US$0.135 per liter) of ethanol blended. This tax credit is allowed on all bioethanol (and biomethanol) in ETBE or any other ether, or blended with gasoline or diesel, thus removing earlier restrictions on the percentages of ethanol that could be blended into gasoline (U.S. Congress 2004). The tax incentive does not recognize point of origin. To address concerns over Highway Trust Fund revenue losses, the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 replaced the excise tax exemption with an income tax credit.
The act also provided a federal excise tax credit to biodiesel blenders: US$1.00 per gallon (US$0.26 per liter) of biodiesel made from agricultural products and US$0.50 per gallon (US$0.13 per liter) of biodiesel made from other feedstocks such as recycled oils. The tax incentive was in effect between January 2005 and December 2006 (U.S. Congress 2004). This tax credit is largely responsible for the surge in the production of biodiesel and in the growth of production capacity.

The Energy Policy Act of 2005 contained a Renewable Fuels Standard requiring that a minimum of 7.5 billion gallons (28 billion liters) of renewable fuels be used annually in gasoline by 2012. The act created programs and incentives to encourage the production of cellulosic biofuels and fund research on conversion technology. To meet the Renewable Fuels Standard, the act counts every gallon of ethanol derived from nongrain sources (such as cellulose or waste) as 2.5 gallons (9.5 liters) of grain-based ethanol. Beginning in 2013, the act requires a minimum of 250 million gallons (about 1 billion liters) of cellulosic biofuels to be consumed, and aims to deliver the first 1 billion gallons (3.8 billion liters) in annual production of cellulosic biofuels by 2015 (U.S. Congress 2005).

The act eliminated the oxygenate mandate for reformulated gasoline. This mandate, which was provided in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, required wintertime use of oxygenated fuels in 39 non-attainment areas for carbon monoxide and year-round use of oxygenates in nine severe ozone non-attainment areas in 1995. These measures provided a boost to the maize-ethanol industry. The two principal oxygenated fuels used to meet the oxygenate mandate were ethanol and methyl tertiary-butyl ether (MTBE), with ethanol used primarily in the maize-growing Midwest and MTBE elsewhere. Concerns about groundwater contamination with MTBE have led a growing number of states to ban its future use. Elimination of the oxygenate mandate means that MTBE does not have to be replaced by ethanol. In summer 2006, most oil companies decided to phase out MTBE altogether, creating a severe shortage of ethanol; industry analysts regard this as a one-time adjustment.

In 2000, the USDA initiated the Bioenergy Program, administered by the Commodity Credit Corporation, to address crop surpluses and stimulate biofuel production. The program paid U.S. producers of ethanol and biodiesel to increase their production from eligible feedstocks in one fiscal year compared with the same time period in the previous year. The program’s goals are aimed at encouraging increased purchases of eligible feedstocks for the purpose of expanding production of, and to support new production capacity for, such bioenergy. Between FY 2003 and FY 2006, the program was funded at up to US$150 million a year. Eligible feedstocks were listed and had to be domestically produced (USDA 2004). The program was discontinued in June 2006.

At the state level, several states have adopted legislation mandating biofuel use, in addition to tax incentives. Most of the mandates were approved in 2006, some dependent on minimal state production of biofuels.

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2 The addition of oxygen to gasoline could reduce carbon monoxide and hydrocarbon emissions in old technology vehicles if the engine was tuned with a low air-to-fuel ratio. Gasoline vehicles manufactured in the United States since the early 1990s are equipped with oxygen sensors, which automatically adjust the fuel injection rate to achieve an optimal air-to-fuel ratio, and the environmental benefit of adding oxygenates to gasoline for these vehicles is very small.
Minnesota was the first state to implement an ethanol standard. Since 1997, state law has required all gasoline sold within the state to include 10 percent ethanol. Over the 17 years prior to the mandate, the state had forgone US$155 million in revenue because there was a blender’s credit of US$0.40 per gallon (US$0.106 per liter) of ethanol blended. In 2005, new legislation requiring a 20 percent ethanol standard by 2013 was signed. Through FY 2006, Minnesota has reportedly paid US$284 million to ethanol production plants in production subsidies. Although Minnesota is not the leading ethanol-producing state, it perhaps leads the nation in subsidies to ethanol (Koplow 2006). In September 2005, it became the first state to implement a biodiesel standard, requiring all diesel sold within the state to include 2 percent biodiesel.

In Hawaii, regulations call for at least 85 percent of gasoline sold in the state to contain 10 percent ethanol beginning in April 2006.

Washington approved legislation in March 2006 requiring 2 percent ethanol in gasoline and 2 percent biodiesel in diesel, with graduated increases in these requirements over future years, provided that certain supply and environmental conditions are met (Washington State Legislature 2006).

In May 2006, Montana approved a 10 percent requirement that takes effect when ethanol production in the state reaches 40 million gallons (151 million liters) (Montana State Legislature 2005).

Iowa in May 2006 approved legislation requiring that 10 percent of the motor fuel sold in the state contain biofuel by 2009, increasing to 25 percent by 2019. Small retailers are given a longer time period, beginning at 6 percent in 2009 and reaching 25 percent by 2021 (Iowa Legislature 2006).

Louisiana approved a bill in June 2006 that requires gasoline sold in the state to contain at least 2 percent ethanol manufactured from domestically grown feedstock or other biomass materials within six months of annualized domestic production reaching 50 million gallons (189 million liters), and similarly requires diesel sold in the state to contain at least 2 percent biodiesel manufactured from domestically grown feedstock within six months of annualized domestic production reaching 10 million gallons (38 million liters) (Louisiana State Legislature 2006). There are currently no ethanol or biodiesel manufacturing plants in Louisiana.

Missouri’s Renewable Fuel Standard, signed in July 2006, requires gasoline sold in the state to contain 10 percent ethanol by January 2008 (Missouri General Assembly 2006).

Several states have also launched initiatives to increase biofuel production. Pennsylvania in May 2006 announced a new initiative to inject 900 million gallons (3.4 billion liters) of locally produced biofuel or synthetic fuels into the state’s gasoline and diesel supplies over the next decade. In April 2006, Indiana passed the Biofuels Use and Production Credits Bill, extending tax credits for ethanol and biodiesel production and offering greater incentives to companies for production of renewable fuels in the state. In March 2006, Wisconsin issued an executive order under which all state agencies would have to use E10, E85, or biodiesel in their vehicle fleets as much as possible to cut down on petroleum-based gasoline by 20 percent by 2010 and by 50 percent by 2015. The order also mandates a reduction in the use of petroleum-based diesel fuel by 10 percent by 2010 and 25 percent by 2015. Earlier, in October 2005, California passed a law enabling public agencies to use vehicles that run on
biodiesel and biodiesel blends, and Indiana in April 2005 approved a bill that required renewable fuels, such as gasohol and ethanol, to be used in state-owned vehicles as much as possible.

A detailed estimate of aggregate subsidies for biofuels can be found in Koplow (2006). Estimates are given for 2006 and as an annualized value for 2006–12. Support for feedstock producers is prorated based on the share of crops used in the biofuels industry. Low and high estimates are computed, where the main difference is primarily the result of the incremental outlay equivalent value of a number of important tax breaks. The findings, given in table C.1, show that, in outlay equivalent, aggregate subsidies are the same order of magnitude as net-of-tax market prices of gasoline and diesel. Expressed in terms of tonnes of CO₂ equivalent saved, the high 2006 estimate for ethanol gave US$520 one to two orders of magnitude higher than market carbon prices.

Under the Caribbean Basin Initiative, countries in Central America and the Caribbean have had duty-free access to the United States since 1989. The U.S.-Central America Free Trade Agreement does not increase overall access to the U.S. ethanol market but simply establishes country-specific shares for El Salvador and Costa Rica within the existing CBI quota without increasing the overall quota size. Other CAFTA countries retain existing CBI benefits on ethanol. The country-specific shares for Costa Rica and El Salvador have the effect of limiting the overall CBI quota available to other Caribbean and Central American countries.

Argentina

In April 2006, the Argentine government passed a bill requiring that gasoline and diesel contain 5 percent biofuel by 2010. It also provides fiscal incentives via tax exemption for biofuels and other tax incentives. A number of firms—Repsol YFP, Mitsui Argentina, Terminal Puerto Rosario, Vicentín, Oil Fox, and Cargill—have announced plans to invest in biofuel plants.

Argentina is a leading low-cost producer of soybeans. The country’s soybean production as well as exports nearly tripled in the 10-year period between 1993 and 2002. Its maize production has also been rising sharply (USDA 2001). More than 95 percent of soybean production is exported. Oilseeds and oilseed products, as well as many other agricultural products, are assessed export taxes. Soybeans are assessed a 27.5 percent export tax (increased from 23.5 percent in January 2007), and producer prices are automatically

Table C.1: Total Annual U.S. Support to Ethanol and Biodiesel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Ethanol</th>
<th></th>
<th>Biodiesel</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>US$ per liter</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006–12</td>
<td>US$ per liter</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>US$ per liter of petroleum fuel equivalent</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006–12</td>
<td>US$ per liter of petroleum fuel equivalent</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Koplow 2006.
discounted by the same percentage, lowering the domestic soybean price. Meals and oils are assessed a 24 percent export tax (raised from 20 percent in January 2007), again lowering domestic prices by the same percentage. Biodiesel, in contrast, carries an export tax of 5 percent, giving incentives to export biodiesel rather than oilseeds or oilseed products. The export tax is eliminated if a biodiesel blend is exported. In March 2007, the European Biodiesel Board complained to the European Commission that these differential export taxes create a 19 to 24 percent incentive given to the Argentine biodiesel industry to process vegetable oils into biodiesel and export it (EBB 2007b). In December 2006, the government announced that Argentina would have the capacity to produce 2.5 million tonnes of biodiesel and ethanol by January 2010, of which nearly 1.7 million tonnes would be available for export (Dow Jones International News 2006b).

As of April 2007, 17 ethanol producers had produced 204 million liters of ethanol from sugarcane in the marketing year 2007, about half of which was for export and the remaining half for domestic consumption (USDA 2007i). Argentina is arguably the world’s lowest cost producer of maize. The government levies a 20 percent export tax on maize, but no tax on ethanol exports. As with biodiesel, this export tax structure provides an incentive to convert surplus maize to ethanol for export. Recent increases in world maize prices, however, have led to a sharp rise in maize exports, prompting the government to close the maize export registry in mid-November 2006 to ensure adequate supplies on the domestic market (USDA 2007f).

The government exercises tight control over domestic gasoline and diesel prices and has not permitted recent increases in international petroleum prices to be passed through to the domestic market. This is achieved largely through levying a high export tax on petroleum oil, 45 percent when international oil prices rise above US$45 a barrel. Domestic gasoline and diesel prices essentially remained unchanged between January 2004 and February 2006, when international gasoline prices (as measured in the U.S. Gulf Coast) rose by 55 percent and diesel prices by 85 percent (ESMAP 2006).

A pricing policy aimed at keeping domestic petroleum fuel prices low poses a challenge for launching a sustainable and viable domestic biofuel market.

Australia

Australia has set a target of increasing annual biofuel production to 350 million liters by 2010. Although the target was originally announced as part of the government’s 2001 election commitment, the country’s fuel ethanol program has encountered a number of obstacles, notably low consumer confidence (ESMAP 2005). Ethanol-blended gasoline has reportedly been sold mostly at independent outlets and less at the outlets of the four major oil companies (Courier Mail 2007). In May 2007, New South Wales became the first state to mandate 2 percent ethanol in gasoline effective from September 2007. Domestic fuel ethanol production rose by more than 50 percent from about 23 million liters in 2004–05 to 36 million liters by the end of June 2006. The government’s support for biofuel production has included more than $A 37 million (US$28 million) in capital grants, $A 52 million (US$39 million) in ethanol production grants, the introduction of an E10 label of assurance on all locally built vehicles, and, most importantly, fuel tax exemption (Platts Commodity News 2006). Ethanol produced is from wheat, waste starch, and molasses. Ethanol production based on sugarcane uses only the poorest grade molasses not suitable for crystal sugar production (USDA 2007j); this does not represent a large share of ethanol production. Most of the growth in ethanol production is expected from using sorghum
and winter cereals. Of concern is the possibility of a significant domestic grain shortage in the coming decade; prolonged periods of drought are not uncommon in Australia. Biodiesel became available in commercial quantities in 2006. One plant with an annual production capacity of 140 million liters uses palm oil imported from Indonesia and Malaysia.

In September 2002, the government announced that both gasoline and ethanol blended with gasoline would attract an excise tax rate of \$A 0.38143 (US$0.21 at the time, US$0.31 as of April 2007) per liter. Imported ethanol would attract customs duty at the same rate. A subsidy of \$A 0.38143 per liter would be provided to domestic ethanol producers, offsetting the excise tax and giving them a cost advantage equivalent to the import tariff on ethanol. The producer grant would be in effect until June 2011. In September 2003, the government similarly announced that both diesel and biodiesel locally manufactured for automotive use would attract an excise rate of \$A 0.38143 per liter. Imported biodiesel would attract customs duty at the same rate. Unlike ethanol, however, a subsidy of \$A 0.38143 per liter would be given until June 2011 for both the production and import of eligible biodiesel. Domestically produced biodiesel thus does not enjoy a tax advantage over imports. The grant will be progressively phased out from July 2011 to June 2015 (Australian Taxation Office 2006a and 2006b).

In December 2003, the government announced a new schedule for automotive fuel tax, based on energy content and comprising four fuel tax bands. Gasoline, diesel, and biodiesel belong to the high energy content band and would be taxed at \$A 0.38143 per liter; ethanol belongs to a mid-energy content band and would be taxed at \$A 0.25 (US$0.21) per liter. The final fuel tax rates in 2015 (net of grants) would be \$A 0.125 (US$0.10) per liter for fuel ethanol and \$A 0.191 (US$0.16) per liter for biodiesel—a 50 percent discount (Biofuels Taskforce 2005). The tax advantage on a per liter basis would be \$A 0.25643 (US$0.21) for ethanol relative to gasoline and \$A 0.19043 (US$0.16) for biodiesel relative to diesel.

Canada

Canada’s biofuel industry was established in the 1980s. Ethanol production in 2005 was 240 million liters. There is little production of biodiesel at present. Government support has been in the form of tax reductions and project financing (see Littman forthcoming for more detail).

In 1992, the federal government granted an excise tax exemption of Can$0.085 (US$0.07 using the 1992 exchange rate) per liter of ethanol made from biomass and used in gasoline. This was increased to Can$0.10 (US$0.09) per liter of ethanol blended in 1995. By the mid-1990s, several provincial governments had granted exemptions from their excise taxes for ethanol. Out of 13 provinces, 6 provide biofuel subsidies. Manitoba, Ontario, and Saskatchewan have mandatory blending requirements for ethanol in gasoline. Manitoba and Saskatchewan offer a provincial fuel tax reduction for ethanol produced in their own provinces. Quebec bases its tax credit on the price of West Texas Intermediate crude, reducing the tax credit to zero when the crude oil price reaches US$65 per barrel.

Between 1999 and 2005, the National Biomass Ethanol Program created a guaranteed repayable line of credit of Can$70 million (US$62 million). The program was extended in 2003 to end of March 2006, increasing the total credit limit to Can$135 million (US$120 million). The government announced an Ethanol Expansion Program in August 2003, in which it offered up to Can$100 million (US$89 million).
in repayable contributions toward the construction of fuel ethanol production facilities in Canada. In the two rounds under the Ethanol Expansion Program, a total of Can$124 million (US$110 million) was allocated.

The federal government’s Climate Change Action Plan 2000 included a target to enable 25 percent of Canada’s total gasoline supply to contain up to 10 percent ethanol. The plan increased the percentage of total gasoline supply containing 10 percent ethanol to a minimum of 35 percent. More recently, the government has expressed a desire for 5 percent of Canada’s transport fuel to be renewable. Gasoline and diesel consumption in 2005 was 38 billion and 16 billion liters, respectively. A 5 percent target would have required more than 1.9 billion liters of ethanol (taking into account ethanol’s lower energy content) and 0.8 billion liters of biodiesel, requiring an order of magnitude increase in biofuel production.

In December 2006, Environment Minister Rona Ambrose announced the government’s plan to pursue regulations under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act that would require blending of 5 percent ethanol in gasoline by 2010 and 2 percent biodiesel in diesel fuel and heating oil by 2012, subject to verification through testing that the blended biodiesel fuel is safe and effective for Canadian climate and conditions. She added that the regulations would take at least two years to develop and that the government would consult with provinces, territories, affected sectors, and other stakeholders on the regulations’ design and implementation. In the same month, the government also announced an investment of Can$345 million (US$300 million) to help producers capture new opportunities in biofuels. In addition, the budget for FY 2007 has allocated Can$2 billion (US$1.8 billion) over seven years to support the production of renewable fuels.

Canada imposes an import tariff of Can$0.0492 (US$0.043) per liter of ethanol from countries with most favored nation status (Can$0.1228 per liter otherwise). The corresponding tariff on biodiesel is Can$0.11 (US$0.10) per liter. There is no tariff on imports from countries with which Canada has a free trade agreement (such as NAFTA) or a special tariff treatment agreement (Commonwealth Caribbean Countries tariff treatment, Least Developed Country tariff treatment, General Preferential tariff treatment, Chile tariff, and Costa Rica tariff).

China

China is the second largest petroleum oil consumer in the world after the United States. It is a large crude oil producer but needs to import about 40 percent of the petroleum it consumes. The country’s net import status and concerns about rapidly growing demand for energy are driving the government to seek alternative indigenous sources of energy. China is the world’s third largest producer of fuel ethanol after the United States and Brazil, and, according to the government, 20 percent of all gasoline sold now contains ethanol. Biodiesel is still in the very early phases of testing and development.

To date, fuel ethanol has been made mostly from maize; other feedstocks include cassava, sugarcane, and, on a trial basis, sorghum. Fuel ethanol production in 2005 was 920,000 tonnes (about 1.2 billion liters); maize was used as a feedstock for 80 percent of fuel ethanol production (USDA 2006n). In 2007, three new ethanol plants were scheduled to come on stream, using mostly feedstocks other than maize. Nine provinces participate in the fuel ethanol program based on E10; five of these provinces are close to selling only E10 (USDA 2007o). Concerns for food security have led China to import Thai tapioca for ethanol production (Reuters News 2006a) and the
government to restrict production of ethanol from maize at the end of 2006. A draft 11th five-year plan, originally scheduled for introduction in December 2006 and prepared under the central planning agency National Development and Reform Commission, envisaged a variety of programs to expand fuel ethanol use. However, concerns over rising grain prices led the State Council not to approve the five-year plan for biofuel development (USDA 2007o). Ethanol exports surged from 138,000 tonnes in 2005 to 865,000 tonnes in 2006. Fearing domestic grain shortages, the government eliminated the rebate on the 13 percent value added tax in January 2007 (USDA 2007d).

Subsidies of Y 1,373 (US$172) per tonne of ethanol (US$0.14 per liter) are given to ethanol producers (USDA 2006n). Gasoline and diesel prices are controlled by the government and are set below world prices. Concerns about rising fuel prices have repeatedly delayed implementation of the government’s plan to introduce fuel excise taxes, precluding fuel excise tax reduction as a biofuel support measure. Incentives for ethanol are granted by exempting the 5 percent consumption tax on ethanol, guaranteeing a profit of Y 100 per tonne of ethanol (US$0.01 per liter) and setting the price of E10 at 91.11 percent of the shipping price of gasoline with a research octane number (RON) of 90 (USDA 2006n). In November 2006, the government announced further subsidies and tax breaks for both biofuel producers and farmers who grow feedstocks other than grains. The additional incentives for biofuel producers will be provided when world oil prices fall below a threshold level (Reuters News 2006e). In December 2006, the government announced that biodiesel made from animal fat or vegetable oil is not subject to consumption tax (Xinhua Business Weekly 2006). However, there are no national standards for automotive biofuel use, and the government’s focus is likely to remain on fuel ethanol (USDA 2007o). For the foreseeable future, the biofuel program in China will be determined by government policy rather than economics. China levies an import tariff of 30 percent on ethanol (USDA 2006n).

Colombia

Colombia is a net petroleum oil exporter, but its oil production has been declining steadily since 1999. The country exports about half of its crude oil production. Colombia is also an exporter of sugar. In September 2001, the government approved a law requiring cities with populations exceeding 500,000 to add 10 percent ethanol to gasoline beginning in 2006. Fuel ethanol is exempt from the value added tax and several other levies. Current ethanol production capacity is 1.1 million liters per day; five ethanol plants owned by major sugar producers supply an estimated 60 percent of the total needs to comply with the requirement to blend 10 percent ethanol into gasoline. Investments for the remaining 40 percent have not yet started (USDA 2007g).

The new requirements for use of ethanol are having a major impact on domestic sugar production and exports. Sugarcane needed for this purpose could reach the equivalent of half what is currently used for exports. Colombia’s sugar production fell by approximately 0.3 million tonnes to 2.4 million tonnes in marketing year 2005–06 due to diversion of sugarcane for ethanol production, and is expected to rise only slightly in 2006–07. Sugar exports correspondingly declined 20 percent to 988,000 tonnes, while imports reached 116,000 tonnes in 2005–06 (USDA 2007g).

The sugar industry enjoys protection from the government. A government decree issued in October 2003 exempts areas newly planted with sugarcane from taxes for the next 14 years. Sugarcane production receives credit from a government institution, which subsidizes the credit
by forgiving up to 40 percent of the principal. The government also provides support to sugar exports (USDA 2007g).

Colombia is the largest palm oil producer in Latin America, although its output is only 4 percent that of Malaysia. Biodiesel production is anticipated shortly. A plan announced in mid-2006 to construct a biodiesel plant indicated that the bulk of the biodiesel would be exported to Spain (Latin American News Digest 2006). In April 2007, Colombian state-owned petroleum company Ecopetrol, jointly with local palm oil producers, is reported to have announced that it would invest US$23 million in a new biodiesel plant. The plant, scheduled to come on stream in mid-2008, will have an annual production capacity of 100,000 tonnes of biodiesel, which will be blended into petroleum diesel at 2 percent (Latin American News Digest 2007). Colombia appears to impose an ad valorem tariff rate of 15 percent on ethanol and 10 percent on biodiesel (TIC 2006).

**Indonesia**

Although Indonesia is a major petroleum producer, it became a net petroleum oil importer for the first time in 2004. Domestic petroleum product prices have historically been considerably lower than international market prices, leading to widespread smuggling of subsidized fuels out of the country and increasing apparent consumption. The fuel subsidy bill in 2005 was close to US$10 billion. Although domestic fuel prices in 2005 more than doubled—and, for kerosene, tripled—they remain below international levels, posing a budgetary burden. Based on an assumed world crude oil price of US$57 per barrel, the government allocated Rp 54 trillion (US$6 billion) to fuel subsidies in 2006. The government is focusing on reducing demand and fuel switching to cope with the large fuel subsidy bill (ESMAP 2006).

One of the government’s strategies for reducing consumption of subsidized petroleum fuels is to switch to biofuels. Indonesia and Malaysia produce about 15 million tonnes of palm oil each and account for 85 percent of global production (USDA 2006m). Compared to Malaysia, Indonesia has considerable unutilized land left that is suited for growing palm. As such, it is in a position to become a leading biodiesel producer. In April 2006, the government issued regulations allowing blending of 10 percent ethanol in gasoline and 10 percent biodiesel in diesel fuel, effective from the previous month. In July 2006, the minister of energy and mineral resources announced that the country required an investment of Rp 200 trillion (US$22 billion) for biofuel production aimed at reducing subsidized petroleum product consumption by 10 percent by 2010. The minister also announced that Indonesia planned to build 11 biodiesel plants and that a special fund for the development of alternative energy would be used to pay for the plants (Agence France Presse 2006). In 2006, the government announced a plan to develop up to 1.8 million hectares of land for new palm oil plantations and to use the new production for biodiesel while maintaining the existing production for cooking oil. This plan has encountered difficulties in its implementation (USDA 2007e).

In January 2007, 67 agreements were signed by 52 foreign, local, and state-owned enterprises under the Joint Initiative for Biofuel Development. The contract values are estimated to be US$12.4 billion; the financing will be supported by the government’s bank interest subsidy program. However, many companies that signed agreements had no experience in biofuel production (USDA 2007r). Two firms were producing biodiesel from palm oil at that time and selling it to the state-owned oil company, Pertamina, for blending into petroleum diesel for local consumption. A few other firms were producing biodiesel on a small
scale for their own consumption. One facility under construction will have an annual capacity of 350,000 tonnes (USDA 2007e). Two firms were producing ethanol.

Indonesia’s subsidized domestic diesel price is likely to pose a challenge to establishing a commercially viable domestic biodiesel industry. Pertamina has recently announced that it will decrease the amount of biodiesel blended in petroleum diesel (sold at more than 200 filling stations) from 5 percent to 2.5 percent, and of ethanol in gasoline (sold at only two filling stations) from 5 percent to 3 percent (USDA 2007r). Indonesia could become a world leader in biodiesel exports, depending on the movement of world palm oil prices and how questions about the environmental sustainability of palm cultivation are addressed. According to announced plans for plant expansion and new construction, the annual capacity for biodiesel production could increase to nearly 2.5 million tonnes at the end of 2007, up from approximately 300,000 tonnes at the beginning of the year (USDA 2007b).

Japan

There is little production of biofuel in Japan. This may change if technologies for cellulosic ethanol and other alternative feedstocks become commercially viable. Japan’s interest in biofuels stems primarily from the government’s desire to reduce life-cycle GHG emissions in the transport sector to help meet Kyoto Protocol targets. In April 2005, the Japanese cabinet committed to consuming 500 million liters of crude equivalent of biofuel in FY 2010. In 2003, the government began allowing ethanol blending in gasoline at 3 percent, but biofuel consumption has remained negligibly small, in part because of a lack of fiscal incentives. It was reported in 2006 that the government would introduce a new tax incentive for blending ethanol into gasoline in FY 2007–08 (USDA 2006f). The country’s Quality Assurance Act was amended in March 2007 to permit blending up to 5 percent biodiesel in petroleum diesel.

The Ministry of Environment has set a long-term goal of achieving 10 percent biofuel in total automotive fuel consumption by 2030. To help meet this target, the ministry requires that all new gasoline-engined cars registered in Japan from 2010 be capable of running on E10, by which date 40 percent of all such vehicles on Japanese roads are to be E10 compatible.

Instead of blending ethanol, the Petroleum Association of Japan plans to blend ETBE, and set a target of using 360 million liters of ethanol (against total gasoline consumption of about 60 billion liters) to blend 7 percent ETBE in 20 percent of all gasoline by 2010. One advantage of this strategy is that ETBE can be blended at the refinery. The association will import ethanol and ETBE to this end. Japan levies high import duties on fuel ethanol. The import duty was 23.8 percent in FY 2006–07, and will decline each year until it is lowered to 10 percent in 2010. The import duty on crude oil is ¥0.16 a liter (US$0.23 a barrel) (USDA 2006f). The duty on biodiesel appears to be 4.6 percent (TIC 2006).

Thailand

Thailand produces enough crude oil and condensates to satisfy just one-quarter of its petroleum consumption. Rising petroleum prices have strengthened the government’s resolve to reduce dependence on imported petroleum oil. Ethanol in Thailand is made from molasses and cassava. Seven out of 45 approved ethanol plants are in operation, making ethanol mostly from molasses. Plant utilization is only about 50 to 60 percent, due to a surplus of ethanol.

Ten ethanol plants are under construction and are expected to come on stream in 2008. They will add another 1.6 million liters of ethanol
per day, of which 1.1 million liters will be from cassava (USDA 2007q).

The government actively promotes ethanol by maintaining a consistent price differential between E10 and gasoline of the same octane grade. The price difference more than compensates for the slightly lower fuel economy of E10, prompting E10 consumption to increase 23-fold in 2004 and 11-fold in 2005 (EPPO 2006). Consumption has been relatively flat since early 2006, with supply far exceeding demand by 2007 (Platts Oilgram Price Report 2007). Until February 2007, the price difference was B 1.5 (US$0.043) per liter for E10 and premium gasoline, both 95 RON. The price difference is achieved by lowering taxes and levies on E10, amounting to a difference of B 2.47 per liter of E10 in late April 2006—corresponding to B 24.7 (US$0.65) per liter of ethanol—a very large fiscal concession by any measure. In February and March 2007, faced with an ethanol surplus, the government increased the price difference three times in an attempt to make E10 more attractive, to B 2.5 (US$0.071) by mid-March. Earlier, the government had planned to phase out 95 RON gasoline in January 2007 and replace it entirely with 95 RON gasohol. However, concerns about compatibility of E10 with older vehicles prompted postponement of the phaseout date. The government has also announced that, as soon as the phaseout of 95 RON gasoline is complete, the price of gasohol will be raised by B 2.5 per liter (Thai News Service 2006).

Until February 2007, ethanol prices were negotiated among ethanol producers and petroleum companies and set for a few months at a time. Unlike in Brazil, ethanol producers purchase molasses, forfeiting the benefit of using bagasse for energy generation or adjusting the sugar-ethanol production split on the basis of relative market prices. Local molasses and cassava prices have risen sharply in recent years, making ethanol economics unfavorable. In 2006, domestic prices of molasses rose to B 4,000 (US$104) per tonne. Prices fell to B 2,500 (US$70) per tonne in 2007, and are expected to remain at that level in 2008 (USDA 2007h). One ethanol producer stopped plant operation in January 2006 on the grounds that the negotiated price in effect at the time was too low and that the company could no longer sustain financial losses (Dow Jones International News 2006a). In April 2006, a new price (exclusive of fuel taxes and fees) of B 23 (US$0.60) per liter was negotiated. This corresponded to US$0.75 per liter of gasoline equivalent, far in excess of the benchmark premium gasoline price in the region (Singapore) of US$0.51 per liter at the time. The price was subsequently renegotiated and raised to B 25.30 (US$0.66) per liter, or US$0.83 per liter of gasoline equivalent—double premium gasoline prices in Singapore of US$0.39 in October 2006. In February 2007, Thailand adopted a new ethanol pricing formula, pegging domestic prices to those on the Brazilian Commodity Exchange and including other components such as insurance and transportation costs. The new pricing policy was reported to have the effect of bringing down the price of ethanol from B 25.30 (US$0.71 at the exchange rate prevailing in February 2007) to B 19.33 (US$0.54) per liter (Platts Commodity News 2007).

In April 2007, the Energy Policy Management Committee agreed to mandate B2 beginning in April 2008. The government had earlier promoted a plan to expand palm oil plantation significantly to make biodiesel. The government withdrew this plan in October 2006, however, stating that against falling world crude oil prices, palm oil cost more than diesel on a volume basis, and it would not make economic sense to subsidize a palm-based biodiesel project started two years earlier and not taken up by farmers (Reuters News 2006c). The
committee will provide a refund—at a rate to be determined—to B2 manufacturers and offer additional incentives for B5. The government plans to expand palm plantation in Thailand and encourage plantation in Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar on a contract farming basis (USDA 2007q).

Although Thai sugarcane production is competitive, the government provides price support; at the beginning of 2006, this was B 800 (US$20) per tonne. There are two ethanol plants, based on sugarcane and molasses. Unlike Brazil, domestic sugarcane supplies are available only four months a year.

Thailand imposes a specific tariff of B 2.5 per liter on ethanol. The import tariff was waived in 2005 when inadequate local supply necessitated ethanol imports, but the waiver expired on January 31, 2006. An ad valorem import tariff of 5 percent is levied on biodiesel.
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**ENERGY POVERTY THEMATIC AREA**

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