

# IEG ICR Review

Independent Evaluation Group

|                         |   |                                |                            |
|-------------------------|---|--------------------------------|----------------------------|
| <b>1. Project Data:</b> |   | <b>Date Posted:</b> 11/25/2015 |                            |
| <b>Country:</b>         | Cote d'Ivoire   |                                |                            |
| <b>Project ID:</b>      | P111290   | <b>Appraisal</b>               | <b>Actual</b>              |
| <b>Project Name:</b>    | Ivory Coast Protected Area Project  | <b>Project Costs (US\$M):</b>  | 2.54      2.34             |
| <b>L/C Number:</b>      |   | <b>Loan/Credit (US\$M):</b>    | 2.54      2.34             |
| <b>Sector Board:</b>    | Environment   | <b>Cofinancing (US\$M):</b>    | -      -                   |
| <b>Cofinanciers:</b>    | -   | <b>Board Approval Date:</b>    | 04/30/2009                 |
|                         |   | <b>Closing Date:</b>           | 11/30/2013      12/31/2014 |
| <b>Sector(s):</b>       | Public administration- Agriculture; fishing and forestry (50%); Forestry (50%)                              |                                |                            |
| <b>Theme(s):</b>        | Biodiversity (60%); Environmental policies and institutions (30%); Participation and civic engagement (10%) |                                |                            |
| <b>Prepared by:</b>     | <b>Reviewed by:</b>   | <b>ICR Review Coordinator:</b> | <b>Group:</b>              |
| Keith Robert A. Oblitas | John R. Eriksson  | Christopher David Nelson       | IEGPS1                     |

## 2. Project Objectives and Components:

### a. Objectives:

**To improve the sustainable management of the fauna and habitat of Comoe National Park .**

(Source: Global Environment Facility Grant Agreement, July 21. 2009)

(The PAD has identical wording)

### b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?

No

### c. Components:

The Protected Area Project's (PARC) components were:

1. Institutional, Financial and Technical strengthening for protected area management and oversight (Estimated GEF project costs at appraisal: US\$1.02 million; actual GEF project costs at completion: US\$ 0.89).

(a) Capacity building through training and equipment for the Office Ivoirien des Parcs et Reserves (OIPR) in the north-east of the country (which contains the Comoe National Park). Staff would be trained in participatory conservation methods, technical knowledge, procurement and financial management; and

(b) Support to the development and operations of the Fondation Parcs et Reserves de la Cote d'Ivoire (FPRCI), an autonomous Foundation legally independent from Government, to be in charge of raising funds for the national parks. Training was in fundraising, financial and asset management, and communications.

2. Management planning and implementation for the Comoe National Park.

(Estimated GEF project costs at appraisal: US\$1.0 million; actual GEF project costs at completion (US\$0.73 million).

Updating and implementing the Comoe Park Management Plan, including training, participatory involvement of communities in Plan preparation and implementation; and biodiversity Impact Monitoring by OIPR staff and communities using air as well as ground transects to identify poachers and animal concentrations.

### 3. Support to Park communities

(Estimated GEF project costs at appraisal: US\$0.27 million; actual GEF project costs at completion: US\$0.18 million).

Support to the park fringe communities through awareness campaigns, biodiversity training, and land management contracts.

### 4. Project Management and Results Monitoring

Estimated GEF project costs at appraisal: US\$0.25 million; actual GEF project costs at completion: US\$0.37).

Recruitment and retention of a project manager, procurement specialist, and an accountant. Some OIPR staff, including an M&E specialist, would join the team funded by Government.

## **d. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates:**

Costs and Financing. Total project costs (GEF financing only as the ICR does not provide costs by component for other sources) were estimated at appraisal as \$2.54 million, and actual costs at completion of the Protected Area Project (PARC) were \$2.34 million, 92 percent of the appraisal estimate. The GEF Grant was for \$2.54 million, of which \$2.34 million was disbursed. Government's contribution (for recurrent costs and salaries) was planned to be \$7.6 million, but actual expenditures were \$5.17 million.

A number of development agencies, while not in formal parallel financing with GEF, provided funds or financed activities related to PARC's objectives. German aid from GTZ and KfW totalling \$15.9 million, primarily funded capitalization of the Endowment Funds (section 4) set up for Comoe, and later for Tai National Park, and also supported some conservation activities. The World Wildlife Fund separately financed activities related to project objectives or broader park management issues, providing a contribution of \$3.1 million. Japan financed with \$2.62 million their own activities associated with Cote d'Ivoire's forest conservation program. The International Union for Conservation of Nature provided about \$70,000 financing for training and the updating of the Comoe National Park Management Plan. An intended contribution from the Wild Chimpanzee Foundation did not materialize.

PARC was also to be supported by the IDA financed Rural Land Management and Community Infrastructure Development Project which was to finance the project's alternative livelihood micro-projects through earmarked parallel IDA financing of \$1.2 million. But this became unavailable as the project was closed early (Section 3b).

Project Duration and Restructuring. The project was approved on April 30, 2009 and was intended to close on November 30, 2013, an implementation period of 4 ½ years. Actual closure was on December 31, 2014, following a 13 month extension. This was provided to compensate for implementation breaks during post-conflict interruptions in 2011, and to make up for delays in 2013 due to late provision of the treasury budget. The extension was part of a restructuring of the project which included reallocation between disbursement categories, and significant adjustment of the Monitorable Indicators, primarily to substitute some indicators (which were seen as unmeasurable or providing little information), by more defined indicators without changing their respective monitoring intentions.

## **3. Relevance of Objectives & Design:**

### **a. Relevance of Objectives:**

Cote d'Ivoire has the highest level of biodiversity in West Africa and the largest intact ecosystems of Guinean forest and Sudanian savanna. Protecting Cote d'Ivoire's habitat, and flora and fauna is thus a strategically important need for the Global Environment, for Cote d'Ivoire, and as an international ecological treasure. Yet inadequate funding for protection of Cote d'Ivoire's eight national Parks (where most of the nation's protected species are found) left these resources vulnerable to poaching, farming, cattle grazing and human settlement.

The need for protective action has been recognized for some time. The Bank and other partners had been engaged with Government since 1995, and this had led to issuance by Government in 2000 of a National Protected Area Management Program. In 2002 a new law allowed for creation of the Office Ivoirien des Parcs et Reserves (OIPR), to be in charge of the nation's parks and reserves. And in 2003, the Fondation Parcs et Reserves de la Cote d'Ivoire (FPRCI), an independent foundation which was to be in charge of raising funds for the parks and reserves. Protected area preservation also falls within the Bank's general strategy.

The project was consistent with the broader tenets of the Bank's Interim Strategy Note (FY08-09), in particular the Note's emphasis on livelihood support and provision of basic services. The Country Partnership Strategy was at concept stage in mid-2015, before issuance of the ICR. but the ICR advises that the framework, amongst other thrusts, emphasizes inclusive growth, human capital, and a greater strategic role for Cote d'Ivoire in regional development. Thus, the project tackled an urgent ecological need, which was well recognized by both Government and the Bank. PARC's Relevance of Objectives was High.

#### **b. Relevance of Design:**

In most key institutional and technical areas, PARC's design was well suited to achieving its objectives. The project was a balanced combination of institutional and human capacity development with particularly strong community involvement in villages proximate to the Comoe National Park. Villagers were to be involved in monitoring against poaching and cattle herding, the two most direct threats to the Park's ecosystem and biodiversity. Contracts for monitoring and other park maintenance activities would be awarded to villagers, and there was also provision for welfare improving micro-projects providing incomes and alternative employment for the villagers. Design restricted the project to one park (although this was by far the largest of Cote d'Ivoire's national parks), which was appropriate given that the project's park management approach would be piloting much that was new to the country, and it would be best to test the approach with focused effort before expanding. The institutional arrangements - (i) using the existing government agency for park management (OIPR) as the base institution; (ii) building capacity of a private foundation (FPRCI) responsible for raising funds for park management; and (iii) creating a small project coordination unit to orchestrate project activities including a Framework Agreement between OIPR and FPRCI - proved to be workable. Also, the decentralization of park management responsibilities to the relevant regional administration of OIPR and a field-based project coordination unit, provided for a more hands-on implementation.

There were nevertheless some weaknesses. First, PARC's financing plan relied for one component - the alternative livelihoods micro-projects, an important element in the community involvement strategy - on financing by another Bank project - the Rural Land Management and Community Infrastructure Development Project. This project performed unsatisfactorily and closed early, leaving a financing void. Reliance upon another project to finance a key project component was a risky strategy. And second, there were inconsistencies in the Results Framework and between the framework and the design of M&E. Also, monitorable Indicators were in some cases impractical to measure, and in others had limited informative value (section 10). PARC's Relevance of Design was Modest.

#### **4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy):**

The ultimate success of PARC's objective to *improve the sustainable management of the fauna and habitat in Comoe National Park* can be assessed from changes in bio-indicators and in the financial and management capacity of the institutions involved.

As concerns bio-indicators, the primary data sources are aerial surveys done in 2010 and 2014, and transect monitoring (observations along lines through different parts of the park for prevalence of a species or action). Data reported from surveillance patrols was also used. Measurements were used to create and compare changes over time such as frequency of poaching, changes in livestock numbers, and population density of bio-species.

Changes in fauna and habitat are limited at this stage. Most directly, they comprise measured increases in the populations in the park of three bio-indicator species. Results vary considerably: The Hartebeest population grew by 40 percent, and the Kobs population increased by 130 percent. But Buffalo declined by 13 percent. These results are not unanimously conclusive but increases in wild mammals would be consistent with other indicators. Another direct result was the almost total elimination of livestock grazing in the park - using transect monitoring, detected presence of livestock was found to be 28 "indices" (observations) per 10 km at the beginning of the project and fell to 0.3 indices by closure. Another important change was in the incidences of poaching, which fell by 74 percent.

Although no "controls" are available, PARC activities can be expected to have been the dominant influence on the changes above - Influencing factors included increased OIPR staffing and improved technologies, improved surveillance, village awareness campaigns, community engagement in planning, and management, improved equipment and infrastructure, and strong support from local government and traditional authorities. Some 125 communities (against a target of 70) had at least some engagement in park activities. There was some paid work as well in opening and maintaining surveillance tracks. Most of these activities reached or exceeded targeted achievements. The percentage area of the park that came under surveillance (zero at project commencement) reached 80 percent, compared with the targeted percentage of 70 percent.

Financially and managerially, Comoe National Park is much improved. The most dramatic development was the major capitalization of FPRCI due in particular to strong performance in soliciting contributions from development agencies.

The target for funds mobilized was \$3.5 million. Actual funds raised were \$41.2 million, 12 times the target. More generally, management of both OIPR and FPRCI was strengthened through implementing the project, supported by an intensive training program. Training in participatory park management was provided to 24 OIPR staff (the target was 26), and provision of 25 training modules for 122 staff (number as targeted) including staff from other OIPR zones.

The most comprehensive measure of the effectiveness of Comoe National Park's management is the Management Effectiveness Tracking Tool (METT) - GEF's standard multi-criteria rating system. The METT showed improvements in law enforcement, demarcation, participatory planning, biomonitoring, research, awareness training, and community engagement. Comoe Park's METT score reached 70, as targeted, from a baseline situation estimated retroactively at 35.

As referred to earlier, one intended project activity - financing micro-projects to enhance livelihoods in villages around the Park - failed. The intention was to augment incentives for villagers to support the project, but the decision to have this sub-component financed by another project, which was then closed early due to poor performance, left the sub-project without finance. Alternative financing was not found and OIPR was only able to do three pilot sub-projects. At project completion, the French development agency, AFD, agreed to take up the livelihoods program.

#### Summary of Efficacy

Taking the project overall, notwithstanding some shortfalls, the project achieved its objectives. Comoe National Park management improved considerably, and first results show increased presence of several bio-indicator species, virtual elimination of cattle grazing, and reduced threat from poachers. The improved technical capabilities of OIPR field and managerial staff, improved management in both OIPR and FPRCI, and the financial strength being created by FPRCI's capitalization, provide good prospects for the sustainable management of fauna and habitat in Cote d'Ivoire's largest park. PARC's Efficacy was Substantial.

#### 5. Efficiency:

An economic rate of return was not calculated at appraisal or in the ICR. The ICR suggests that the institutional, environmental, and capacity building long-term benefits would be difficult to quantify. Hence, efficiency was assessed through cost-effectiveness measures. The project met most implementation targets while project costs were 8 percent less than appraisal estimates. And funds raised by FPRCI were over 10 times the appraisal targets.

The ICR contains a commentary that Comoe National Park's management costs are significantly lower than average costs of other protected areas in Africa, but the calculation and comparative data supporting this comment is not clear. Nevertheless, low cost operations for the Comoe Park are likely, based on its operational approach, amongst these: (i) use of low-cost community based contracts for O&M, biomonitoring and patrolling; (ii) use of NGOs for awareness campaigns; (iii) limited physical infrastructure; (iv) primary use of OIPR staff rather than consultants; (v) field-based training to reduce transport costs; and (vi) for patrolling, complementary use of personnel from other sources (army, former rebels). The one significant inefficiency was the 13 month extension of the original 4 ½ year project period. But a 5 ½ year project period could be considered not an excessive duration given that the project had to introduce a new, participatory form of park management without prior experience; and that there were post-election security related interruptions in implementation during 2011. The Efficiency of PARC was Substantial.

#### a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR)/Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation :

|              | Rate Available? | Point Value | Coverage/Scope* |
|--------------|-----------------|-------------|-----------------|
| Appraisal    | No              |             |                 |
| ICR estimate | No              |             |                 |

\* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

#### 6. Outcome:

The Protected Area Project's objectives were Highly relevant as it tackled the rapid degeneration of biodiversity in Cote d'Ivoire - the country with the highest biodiversity in West Africa. PARC was at the forefront of Cote d'Ivoire's strategy to halt the degeneration of its national parks and reserves. The project's design could have been better in some respects, notably in its reliance on another project, which closed early, for financing of one of its components - livelihood micro-projects. Relevance of Design was Modest. Nevertheless, the project achieved its principal focus to

develop a new approach to Park management, and was innovative in the type of community involvement and in the establishment of an effective institution to collect funds for future management. The new approach was efficient as investment and recurrent costs of the park were low. Both PARC's Efficacy and Efficiency were Substantial. The overall Outcome of the project was Satisfactory.

**a. Outcome Rating:** Satisfactory

## **7. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating:**

The two main uncertainties relate to continued funding of Comoe National Park's recurrent costs, and the continuation of the community engagement strategy. Continued availability of funds for managing the Park appears likely. For the present, Government is funding operating costs through a regular budget line. But as FPRCI's endowment builds, financing options through the Foundation's interest earnings will increase. For 2015, FPRCI is expected to provide for recurrent expenditures, amounts of US\$ 600,000 to Comoe National Park and US\$ 800,000 to another park - Tai National Park - from endowment fund investments. Thus, funding from FPRCI's endowment is feasible, and funds from user fees may also be possible. Moreover, FPRCI's revenues will become larger over time, but this could be eroded if FPRCI is expected to finance recurrent costs in other parks and reserves before its capital base has sufficiently developed.

Concerning the community engagement strategy, ongoing initiatives - such as the commencement of the micro-project program funded through French development aid - will tend to strengthen the program - but the strategy as a whole will need continued policy support. This is likely as communities have been supportive in Park management. They would advocate for continued Government support, and such pressures could be sufficient for maintaining OIPR's community involvement services.

Both the continuation of funding and of community involvement for the Comoe National Park are achievable and within OIPR's and FPRCI's capabilities; and FPRCI's financial strength should grow over time. PARC's Risk to Development Outcome is Moderate.

**a. Risk to Development Outcome Rating :** Moderate

## **8. Assessment of Bank Performance:**

### **a. Quality at entry:**

The project was well designed in its overall structure, and the technical quality of its design details was good, reflecting both the Bank's long engagement with Government in environmental conservation (since 1995), and a team skilled in the specializations required for biodiversity and park management. A short preparation period (5 months between the Concept Review and Board Approval) may have contributed to inconsistencies between the results framework and the design of M&E - some monitorable indicators were not clear or not measurable. Also, an external evaluation survey concluded that there had been insufficient local level consultation with social groups, local authorities and government (ICR page 21). This appears, however, to have not unduly affected the generally successful engagement and contracting with local communities for park maintenance and surveillance that the project experienced. The main preparation shortfall was the decision to fund the other aspect of community outreach - the community micro-project livelihood program - through another project, which was subsequently terminated leaving the livelihood program unfunded. Reliance on another project was an avoidable risk. However, strong technical preparation formed a platform for a largely successful project implementation, and PARC's Quality at Entry is rated Moderately Satisfactory.

**Quality-at-Entry Rating:** Moderately Satisfactory

### **b. Quality of supervision:**

Supervision was regular, with missions about every 6 to 9 months, and the team contained the technical specializations to guide a project introducing relatively new concepts and activities (the last TTL was, for instance, a specialist in park management). At the beginning of the project a fiduciary team provided intensive financial management and procurement support to the project implementers. The Mid-Term-Review was a particularly thorough exercise, setting the project up for accelerated implementation and higher quality execution. The overall quality of Bank Supervision was Satisfactory.

|  |                         |
|--|-------------------------|
| <b>Quality of Supervision Rating :</b>   | Satisfactory            |
| <b>Overall Bank Performance Rating :</b> | Moderately Satisfactory |

## **9. Assessment of Borrower Performance:**

### **a. Government Performance:**

The Government had developed a workable strategy for preserving the ecology and biodiversity of Cote d'Ivoire's protected areas and reserves, and had established FPRCI as the foundation for mobilizing external funds for funding the operational and maintenance costs of the park. Government also helped resolve OIPR staffing shortages through assisting OIPR in hiring of forestry interns and former rebels for surveillance. On the other hand, provision of counterpart funds was below planned amounts, necessitating stringent cost cutting by OIPR. Thus, Government provided \$ 5.2 million to OIPR and FPRCI combined over the project period, but this was about 30 percent lower than the planned amount at appraisal of \$7.6 million. The ICR (page 9) comments that the shortfall "impacted at times the scale of surveillance operations in the Comoe National Park but OIPR managed to overcome generally these challenges by adjustments in planning and securing additional support." The shortfall in Government counterpart funds was also contrary to a covenant in PARC's Grant Agreement where Government committed to provide \$1.76 million annually to OIPR. Nevertheless, given that the project was implemented despite these financial constraints (although the principal credit for operating within the constraints was OIPR, and its accessing of other funding sources), and that in other respects Government was mostly effective in its support to OIPR and FPRCI, Government Performance is rated in the satisfactory range at Moderately Satisfactory.

|                                      |                         |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| <b>Government Performance Rating</b> | Moderately Satisfactory |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------------|

### **b. Implementing Agency Performance:**

OIPR's performance was Satisfactory. It progressively improved its performance over the project period, and provided effective support. Financial management and procurement were in general satisfactory, and were eventually mainstreamed into OIPR's overall operations. There were no safeguard issues. The agency was flexible and adaptable in learning from its experience and in facing new situations. This included OIPR's finding solutions to the counterpart funds shortfall, through cost-cutting or soliciting funds from the donor community. Despite such constraints, OIPR succeeded in attaining or surpassing its project targets.

FPRCI's performance was Highly Satisfactory. It operated as intended, there were no fiduciary or procurement issues, and fund raising greatly exceeded expectations. The Foundation could assume over time a greater role in management of the country's parks, as already being done for the Tai Park.

OIPR's generally satisfactory performance and the particularly strong performance of FPRCI lead in combination to an Implementing Agencies Performance of Satisfactory.

|   |                         |
|---|-------------------------|
| <b>Implementing Agency Performance Rating :</b> | Satisfactory            |
| <b>Overall Borrower Performance Rating :</b>    | Moderately Satisfactory |

## **10. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization:**

### **a. M&E Design:**

M&E was to be implemented by OIPR through a park-based unit, and the M&E director based in Abidjan. The unit would also be informed by data from OIPR's and FPRCI's technical and management staff. The Information to be monitored was aligned both to routine reporting for management information purposes, and information designed to assess the project's progress and results from a more qualitative perspective. The Monitorable Indicators were

extensive -nearly 20 - and ranged from bio-indicators such as trends in abundance of indicator species, to GEF's METT tracking tool for park management effectiveness. However, not all of the Results Framework was covered by the M&E system, and there were several cases where an indicator was not clear or not measurable. (At Mid-Term-Review most of these were replaced by more measurable indicators),

#### **b. M&E Implementation:**

The capacity and quality of M&E developed over time through accumulating experience as the work program developed. The restructuring at Mid-Term-Review included a thorough re-assessment of the Monitorable Indicators. About half of the Indicators were either revised, dropped, or replaced by a more measurable indicator. Monitoring included more complex measures such as bio-monitoring and assessing the quality of park management.

#### **c. M&E Utilization:**

MIS type data proved a useful management tool for following project progress. Technical and qualitative monitoring, developing over time, has informed project evaluation and decision making for future protected area projects. The project's M&E system has been adopted by OIPR for all of its parks. And the M&E approach has been adopted by Germany's GTZ, and by UNESCO.

In summary, the quality of M&E has improved over time, but not without deficiencies in a number of areas: In particular, there was a partial mis-match between the Results Framework, the monitorable indicators and M&E data collected; and the M&E Manual was issued late. Quality of M&E was Modest

**M&E Quality Rating:** Modest

## **11. Other Issues**

### **a. Safeguards:**

PARC was a Category B project and triggered two safeguards: Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4.01) and Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12). An Environmental and Social Impact Analysis and a Resettlement Policy Framework were prepared during project preparation. Both environmental and social safeguards were complied with. This included preparation of an environmental management implementation manual and training of staff in environmental screening and management for park roads and buildings. No resettlement actions were required. Participatory management and engagement of communities were consistent with guidelines in the Participatory Policy Framework.

### **b. Fiduciary Compliance:**

#### Financial Management

Financial reporting was regular and of acceptable quality. Audits were unqualified except for one, which commented on irregularities in reporting dates for evaluation of some goods and services that had been procured with counterpart funds (this was later explained and justified by the PCU). The Bank provided training and technical support to OIPR and FPRCI in both financial management and procurement.

#### Procurement

Procurement followed Bank procurement policy and there is no evidence of deviation from standard procedures. In most cases procurement targets were started and completed within the planned timeframe, but there were several inefficiencies. First, due to the perceived risk of procurement in a project involving multiple and field-based partners such as NGOs and community associations, the Bank had required a large proportion of procurement to be subject to prior review. This proved cumbersome for the borrower and Bank alike. Second, the location of procurement staff was never fully satisfactory. The first arrangement was to have procurement staff based in the field, but this was found to be inefficient and remote from supervision and training. Procurement and financial management was then transferred to Abidjan, but this caused delays due to the distance involved for signing. Finally, use of the Procurement Cycle Tracking System was cumbersome and also contributed to delays. Nevertheless, by PARC's completion, some 92 percent of the GEF grant had been disbursed, and most project targets had been met, indicating that the procurement system had been at least somewhat effective.

c. Unintended Impacts (positive or negative):

d. Other:

| 12. Ratings:                        | ICR                     | IEG Review              | Reason for Disagreement / Comments  |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|---|
| <b>Outcome:</b>                     | Satisfactory            | Satisfactory            |   |
| <b>Risk to Development Outcome:</b> | Moderate                | Moderate                |   |
| <b>Bank Performance:</b>            | Moderately Satisfactory | Moderately Satisfactory |   |
| <b>Borrower Performance:</b>        | Satisfactory            | Moderately Satisfactory | Shortfalls in Government's provision of counterpart funding, caused operational constraints and at times reduced surveillance activities. |
| <b>Quality of ICR:</b>              |                         | Satisfactory            |   |

**NOTES:**

- When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006.
- The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column could cross-reference other sections of the ICR Review, as appropriate.

**13. Lessons:**

The project's experience yields the following lessons of wider applicability (lessons 1 to 3 are from the ICR):

**1. Dependence on a separate funding source for financing a key activity presents risks .**

For example, in the case of PARC's sub-component for developing community micro-projects to improve livelihoods and enhance incentives for park protection, financing was to be provided by another Bank project. This project was terminated due to bad performance, leaving the micro-projects without a funding source. Financing as a component within PARC would have provided a safer source of funds for the micro-projects.

**2. The success of community engagement was enabled through a multi -faceted approach.**

The project involved multiple ways to engage communities in changing damaging practices to proactive management of the park. These included: awareness raising, co-opting local authorities such as local politicians and traditional village leaders, and contracting villagers for park maintenance and surveillance; and, in the original design, village livelihoods micro-projects. Sufficient ownership was achieved to influence a radical reduction in cattle grazing and significantly reduce poaching. Further, this multifaceted program to engage communities in park management and maintenance was still able to succeed without the livelihoods micro-projects, a standard element of many park management projects.

**3. In a post-conflict situation , to the extent feasible within the time pressures present , a detailed situational and risk analysis, and extensive consultation with stakeholders are important bases for project preparation .** The five-month preparation period left little time for more than rapid assessments and limited consultation. A lengthier preparation period would have provided more opportunity for consultations with communities and donors, assessing baselines and targets for monitorable indicators, learning from past project experience, and tailoring the design for more expeditious project implementation.

**4. Collecting funds through a dedicated non -Governmental Foundation can be a successful way of generating funds for the management of parks or similar environmental projects ..**

The Foundation for Parks and Reserves of Cote d'Ivoire (FPRCI), a private foundation dedicated to collecting funds for maintaining the Parks, attracted far greater financing than anticipated - well over the needs of Comoe Park.

**5. A project's logical framework, design, monitorable indicators and M&E need close linkage.**

There were some gaps in the linkages, until the Mid-Term-Review which revised about a third of the Indicators, and part of the M&E program.

**14. Assessment Recommended?**  Yes  No

**Why?** As part of a review of several protected area management projects to compare different approaches to park management and features conducive to success or failure, thereby deriving lessons from the diversity of experience between the projects examined.

**15. Comments on Quality of ICR:**

The report is strong in its informative, thoughtful, and generally well organized review, and is candid in discussion of issues. Material in the annexes - such as the time sequenced maps showing the changing densities of livestock, bio-indicator mammals, and human activity over time; the beneficiary survey results; and Government funding by year of FPRCI and OIPR - add to the understanding of ecological and financial changes over time.

There are several areas where the report could have been strengthened: (i) The Efficacy section (pages 15 to 18) could have been better structured around the two core elements of the project objectives - the sustainable management of the park; and the impact of this on the park's biodiversity. Much of the present "outcome" discussion could fit readily into the former, but the impact on biodiversity (or prospects for biodiversity) could have been expanded and consolidated by drawing together the various data leading to protection of biodiversity; (ii) the apparently very favorable comparison of management costs in Comoe with the higher average costs in other parks is reduced in value as the calculation is not entirely clear; and (iii) the lessons section could have been expanded to include, for instance, the basis for FPCR1's success, and the aspects of community involvement that were particularly significant to effective park management. Notwithstanding, in most respects, the analysis and discussion in the ICR form a persuasive diagnostic, and, overall, the Quality of the ICR is Satisfactory.

**a.Quality of ICR Rating:** Satisfactory