Report No. PID8175 Project Name India-Mumbai Urban Transport (@) Region South Asia Regional Office Sector Urban Transport Project ID INPE50668 Borrower(s) GOVERNMENT OF INDIA Implementing Agency Address MUMBAI METROPOLITAN REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY Address: Bandra-Kurla Complex, Bandra (E), Mumbai - 400051. Contact Person: Mr. U. P. S. Madan, Project Director, MUTP. Tel: 91-22-6591235 Fax: 91-22-6591264 Email: upsmadan@vsnl.net Mumbai Rail Vikas Corporation Limited Address: 2nd Floor, Churchgate Station Building, Mumbai - 400020. Contact Person: Mr A. K. Varma, Managing Director Tel: 91-22-2080015 Fax: 91-22-2096972 Email: mdmrvc@vsnl.net Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai Address: Mahapalika Marg, Fort, Mumbai - 400020. Contact Person: Mr Gautam Chatterjee Tel: 91-22-2620149 Fax: 91-22-2626437 Email: TBA Environment Category A Date PID Prepared January 16, 2002 Projected Appraisal Date March 1, 2002 Projected Board Date June 18, 2002 1. Country and Sector Background Although urbanization in India is still at a low level, urban population has reached 280 million. India's cities are increasingly becoming the engine of national economic growth. The share of urban GDP over national total has grown from 50% in the early 1990s to 60% in 2000. Growing opportunities in cities will continue to induce rural to urban migration. The process is accompanied by a gradual shift of poverty from rural to urban areas. About 100 million urban residents representing 35% of the total urban population live below the national poverty line, and many of them suffer from lack of basic infrastructure services. For decades, urban development has received much less policy attention than rural development. Due to inadequate investment and inefficient service delivery by the public sector, the provision of urban infrastructure services has lagged far behind the growing demand. Urban infrastructure bottlenecks are increasingly becoming a critical constraint to further urban economic growth and faster poverty reduction. In fact, the deficiency of urban infrastructure services seriously degrades the quality of life presumably for all urban residents, but the urban poor suffer the most as they are least capable of accessing the services. Closing the gap between rising service demand and shortfalls in investment and meeting the basic needs of the poor requires tremendous amount of funding. However, institutional capacity for most cities is inadequate for effectively mobilizing resources and efficiently managing urban infrastructure development. Most urban infrastructure services, including urban transport, electricity, and water and sanitation, are provided by the local governments and parastatal agencies, and funded mainly through budgetary allocation with poor cost recovery. This arrangement has proved to be extremely ineffective for meeting the growing needs. Developing institutional capacity that would adapt to the rapid urban dynamics and improving public sector management to address the urban infrastructure issues is one of the most challenging tasks for urban India. MMR may have the most difficult infrastructure problems in urban India. It is not only the largest city in India, but also one of the world's largest and most crowded cities. MMR has a population of 14 million and an area of 1,467 sq. km. Its population is estimated to grow to 22 million by 2011. As the commercial and financial center of India, MMR generates about 5% of national GDP and contributes to over one-third of India's tax revenues. However, the provision of urban infrastructure services, especially urban transport, has been lagging so far behind the growing demand that capacity constraint is at crisis levels. This seriously hampers local economic growth and erodes quality of life. Land use and transport systemMMR's land use and transport system is largely shaped by the region's geographical feature. The central city of Mumbai lies on a 18 km long peninsula with varying width from 4.75 km in the northern part to 1.3 km at the southern tip of the island where the CBD is located. It has an area of 438 sq. km and a population of 10 million. During the last decade, MMR has experienced an average population growth of 3.1% per year, and much of the growth is distributed in the suburban areas in the north. While the distribution of job locations also tends to be more and more dispersed, the Mumbai CBD nonetheless remains a dominant employment center. The urban transport network is linear along the peninsula. The two national rail lines serving Mumbai (CR and WR) which also provide suburban commuter rail services, and the three largely at-grade urban arterial roads that run through the crowded urban built-up areas, are the backbones of MMR's transport system. Cross road links are less developed. The streets in most part of Mumbai city are old and narrow, and their capacity is seriously reduced by lack of appropriate traffic management including parking management. On the demand side, car ownership has increased at over 5% a year since 1986. Rapid motorization and inadequate road infrastructure provision and management have caused serious road congestion and air pollution.Public transport plays a dominant role in MMR. The suburban rail services carry a total of almost 6 million passengers per day. The bus services within Mumbai Municipality are provided by a public company, BEST, and carry over 4.5 million passengers per day, 60% of whom make transfer to rail. Rail and bus services both combined carry 88% of the region's motorized personal trips. Despite -2 - their crucial role, public transport in Mumbai faces formidable problems. Passengers of trains as well as buses suffer from overcrowding. Rail passenger congestion is at crisis levels. Moreover, the squatter settlement development near and on the rail right-of-way seriously reduces train speeds, increases commuter time, stress and tension, and hampers track maintenance work. With growing car ownership, road congestion seriously deteriorates the quality of bus operations. Increased use of diesel based vehicles, intermediate public transport and personal motorized vehicles has caused increasing and high levels of air and noise pollution. Financially, both suburban rail services and BEST bus services are unable to achieve full cost recovery despite overcrowding. The rail services still require financial support for capital investment. This is partly due to the fact that suburban rail fares in Mumbai are among the lowest in the world on a passenger-km basis. BEST's bus operating costs cannot be covered by fare revenues, and are cross-subsidized by revenues from its electricity distribution business. With staff-bus ratio at 10, labor costs are a big contributing factor to the high operating costs. InstitutionsIt is not uncommon for a mega-city like Mumbai that many institutions are involved in urban transport. The central issue is that the responsibilities assigned to different agencies do not seem to respond to the changing needs effectively, and the mechanism for multi-agency coordination is weak. Responsibilities for the general direction of urban development and urban transport rests with the State Government of Maharashtra through MMRDA, a regional agency under the Department of Urban Development. While agency like MMRDA is generally required for planning and coordinating land use and transport development in a metropolitan area, MMRDA has little influence on the planning and provision of suburban rail services, which rest with India Railways. The allocation of resources for rail services are subject to the approval of the Central Planning Commission. The two zonal railways, WR and CR, operate within the MMR as independent agencies with separate lines, separate policies and without significant service integration. This arrangement has seriously limited the institutions' capability for user responsiveness, which holds the key to the functioning of an urban transport system. (The situation has recently started to change with the establishment of MRVC, jointly owned by IR and GOM, for planning and implementing suburban rail improvement projects.) Road planning and construction is the responsibility of GOM's Public Works Department (PWD) while maintenance rests with MCGM. The planning and implementation of traffic management schemes is a responsibility of MCGM, but it has little technical capacity for this increasingly important task. Land acquisition, resettlement and rehabilitation (R&R)Due to scarcity of land, almost every infrastructure improvement activity in MMR involves acquisition of land and consequent displacement of people, primarily squatters, from their habitat and livelihood. Land acquisition is time consuming and difficult. In the case of rail services, squatters have at several locations built huts within the safety zone of the railway tracks. As a result, trains are forced to operate at reduced speed impacting adversely the journey time and asset utilization and creating tensions between commuters and squatters. The closeness of squatter shelters imposes safety risk, especially for children. According to crude estimates, accidents occurred on rail tracks claim three lives and more injuries a day, with most victims being children. While R&R actions are necessary for additional rail tracking, they can help, if designed properly, reduce rail accident fatalities and injuries and improve the living condition of the - 3 - squatters.There has been no state R&R policy on urban infrastructure and institutional capacity for handling R&R issues is very weak. Lack of consultations and involvement of affected persons in the planning and implementation of R&R has been considered a key factor for R&R failure in the past. This situation has changed significantly during project preparation in the last two years, thanks to the relationship established between the PAPs and the NGOs including women's organizations. IR has developed a working relationship with SPARC and the Slum Dwellers Federation in the orderly resettlement of a substantial number of people. Both SPARC and the Slum Dwellers Federation have a long standing relationship of trust with squatters on the railway lines which has enhanced their capacity to consult with and organize the PAPs for relocation.Government strategyA Comprehensive Transport Study (CTS) was carried out in 1994 under the auspices of MMRDA. The objective was to develop a coherent transport sector strategy linked with a rational land use plan. The key strategic recommendations of CTS include: (a) to increase the capacity of the transport system to meet present and future demands; (b) manage all modes within the transport system to increase efficiency and to ensure best use of facilities; (c) ensure adequate levels of accessibility to transport services in the outer, expanding areas of MMR; (d) put road based public transport at priority over private vehicles; (e) improve the safety of the transport system; and (f) achieve the objectives with due regard to environmental and social aspects and availability of resources. GOM and IR have accepted the general guidelines of the CTS strategy, although the institutional mechanisms need to be developed for implementing the integrated policies require development. CTS also evaluated and recommended a number of investment and policy actions for implementation. The priority actions include: (a) suburban rail capacity expansion; (b) East-West connectivity; (c) parking controls; (d) traffic safety; and (e) traffic demand management. These actions became the basis for the definition and design of the components of this project. 2. Objectives To facilitate urban economic growth and improve quality of life by fostering the development of an environmentally and financially sustainable urban transport system including effective institutions in the Mumbai Metropolitan Region (MMR). 3. Rationale for Bank's Involvement The Bank has had extensive dialogue with the GOM and IR throughout project preparation. The Bank was able to assist in (i) project preparation by arranging PPF and PHRD funding, (ii) by providing significant level of technical assistance to define and assist supervise several studies to evaluate options, prioritize components, prepare designs and so forth, (iii) by stimulating the institutional and policy reform process, (iv) by ensuring that social concerns in R&R and environmental policy were adequately addressed; and (v) by encouraging a comprehensive rather than piece-meal approach. Specifically, the value added by the Bank included:n Strategy Formulation: The formulation of transport strategy in a mega-city such as Mumbai is a complex matter. The GOM is aware that it is not possible to meet the unrestrained demands of all categories of transport system user or to meet the full aspirations of all NGO's (which in themselves do not necessarily provide a consistent policy direction). Compromises and trade-off are necessary. The international experience of - 4 - the Bank has been valuable in assisting GOM in the selection of appropriate strategies and in supporting the GOM in their promotion.fn Policy Assistance: The Bank has assisted the GOM in arriving at the basic policy decisions (such as creation of MRVC and creation of the TMU in BMC) which are necessary for the establishment of an improved transport system in MMR.fn Technical Assistance: The Bank has assisted the project preparation agencies (MMRDA and Railway Planning Unit) in all stages of the project preparation activity. Advice and assistance have been offered and accepted from the stage of the CTS to the present component design stage. The Bank, through its preparation missions, has participated in the preparation of the necessary study and design TORs and has assisted in the review of the various outputs. Since many of the components are new in concept to Mumbai, the Bank has been able to bring an international and state of the art perspective to technical aspects.nf International experience: Through its engagement in this project, the Bank has been and will continue to be able to share with GOM ideas and successful experience from cities like Mexico City and Bangkok in particular in the reduction of vehicular emissions.n R&R: The value added of Bank support for the R&R components include (i) advice and assistance on the formal adoption of an urban R&R policy by GOM, probably the first in India, and which may serve as an example for other states; (ii) ensuring that the voice of project-affected families and their opportunity to participate in project benefits has been heard; (iii) advice on the provision of an R&R model for implementing badly needed infrastructure projects in Mumbai; and (iv) advice on establishing a sustainable capacity for undertaking future R&R activities in Mumbai and possibly in other cities in the future. 4. Description The main components of the project along with their costs are listed below. 1) Rail Transport Component: The component aims to improve capacity and performance of the suburban railway system through establishment of a Mumbai Rail Vikas Corporation (MRVC), and procurement of new rolling stock, upgrading existing rolling stock, increasing track capacity, improving signaling, electrical and telecommunication systems. 2) Road-based Transport Component:The component seeks to strengthen the capacity of the Municipal Corporation for Greater Mumbai (MCGM) for traffic management, policy and regulation, and support specific investments in traffic management, traffic signals, east-west connecting roads and rail grade separations. 3) Resettlement &Rehabilitation Component:The main investment under this component would include the construction or purchase of about 19,000 tenments (225 sq.ft each) to resettle those displaced by the main investment components. In addition, about 5,000 transit houses will also be built under this component to provide transit accommodation as an interim measures to those resettled on emergency situations in response to the Bombay High Court's intervention and railway safety policy. The other expenses under this components include the acquisition of limited amount land for civil works, reconstruction of some of the basic civic amenities to the left over population/host population and payment of compensation for economic losses and other rehabilitation benefits. The technical assistance under this component would include financing of the consultancies for baseline surveys, preparation implementation Plans (IPs), supervision consultants, NGO support for implementation, training of staff/NGOs, etc. Rail Transport component Road Transport component -5- Resettlement and Rehabilitation component. PPF repayment 5. Financing Total ( US$m) IBRD 463.6 IDA 80.8 Total Project Cost 942.4 6. Implementation A Project Management Unit (PMU) has been established in MMRDA, mainly to handle the preparation and implementation of all R&R activities along with the coordination and monitoring of the transport investment program. The PMU is being headed by a Project Director with the rank of Secretary drawn from the Indian Administrative Service cadre and will report to the Commissioner, MMRDA. The Project Director will have full financial, administrative and technical powers delegated to him from GOM and other implementing agencies for implementation of the R&R components. The PMU will, in turn, work closely with the Project Implementing Agencies (MRVC, MCGM, PWD, BEST etc). The Project Director is being assisted by a team of five Joint Project Directors responsible for (a) Housing and Procurement; (b) Finance; (c) Social Development/Land Acquisition; (d) Legal; and (e) Environment.The PMU staff are working in partnership with NGOs and NSDF and will be supplemented by management and communication consultants in the implementation of R&R program. In the process of relocating about 4,000 affected families during the project preparation, the PMU has demonstrated its capacity to handle the R&R program for this project. An Independent Monitoring Panel (IMP) will be established at the start of the project made up of eminent citizens from Mumbai in the fields of law, administration, journalism and the environment. The main responsibility of IMP would be to ensure that the Bank's policies of social and environmental safeguard policies are safeguarded, monitor the implementation progress of resettlement and environmental management programs. The IMP would operate and interact at the level of steering committee and will be funded from the budget of PMU. AgencyBroad responsibilities / accountabilitiesMMRDAOverall project co-ordination of road, rail, R&R, and environmental (implementation of EMPs) components; procurement and implementation pertaining to the all R&R aspects and for the non-rail components in association with the concerned agencies like MCGM, PWD, BEST and Traffic Police (as detailed below). Will also control flow of funds for all R&R and non-rail related works, supplies and services.MRVCAll railway related procurement, implementation and payments - rolling stock and kits, other equipment and works, TA and consultant servicesMCGMATC procurement, implementation and further design studies; procurement, construction and supervision of ROBs and pedestrian grade separators; procurement and implementation of SATIS and Dadar - Mahim traffic management schemes; procurement of TA consultants for TMU and Road Maintenance Management studies; strengthening air quality monitoring and enable public disclosure of informationPWDProcurement, implementation and quality control of road works pertaining to Jogeshwari - Vikroli and Santacruz - Chembur roads.BESTProcurement and implementing the studies for preparing business plans and bus specifications; institutional strengthening and procurement of buses.RTO/TC's office - 6 - 7. Sustainability R&R: Development of the transport system on a continuous and sustained basis will require a policy and institutional framework for effective handling of R&R and minimizing future encroachment of rail and road right of way. The project aims to leave behind the institutional capacity, efficiency delivery mechanism and enhance NGOs capabilities and skills to address the adverse impacts associated with urban infrastructure projects. The tested approach and methodologies will serve as a model for other cities and to tackle the large scale resettlement associated with urban infrastructure projects. 8. Lessons learned from past operations in the country/sector The Bank has participated in the financing of one urban transport project in (then) Bombay - the Bombay Urban Transport Project (BUTP) 1976. The key lessons from BUTP, as well as from other transport and related projects in India, have been incorporated in design of the presently proposed project:fn Preparation: BUTP was slow to commence disbursement. To overcome this problem, for MUTP, it is envisaged that most (about two-thirds in value terms) of project infrastructure components will be at final design stage with tender documents completed and available prior to project appraisal.fn Contracting: Projects have suffered in India from the use of small and financially weak contractors that have taken long periods to implement projects and often at a low standard of execution. Current MUTP components will be packaged in a way which permits a blend of international and national competitive bidding with clear post or pre-qualification criteria. To the extent possible appropriate quality assurance, audit and supervision will be used either through consultants or through the agencies. n Completion: Bank projects in India have often extended well beyond the proposed completion date due to delays in completion of contracts arising from decision procedures, inability to acquire properties or land necessary for the works and delays arising from small contracts and thus cumbersome procurement procedures (see above). It has been clearly indicated to Mumbai authorities during project preparation that extensions to project implementation periods will not be agreed. To overcome this past deficiency (i) it will be entrusted to the High Level Steering Committee (HLSC) to ensure that decisions are not unduly delayed, (ii) it will be a condition of negotiations that the majority of works are ready for bidding at the outset of the project, and (iii) it has been agreed that before any civil works contract for any component is let, R&R issues will have been resolved.fn Counterpart Funding: Past implementation has also suffered from delays in provision of counterpart funding. Detailed funding requirements will be reviewed and GOM/BMC budget allocations agreed during loan negotiations. Agreement will be sought from GOM/BMC/IR/MRVC for secure funds in subsequent annual budgets (TO BE EXPANDED DURING APPRAISAL).R&R: There is little experience in India with such large scale urban R&R for development projects using policies acceptable to the Bank. However, based on past project experience, the following lessons from the sector in general have been incorporated into the proposed project: n the R&R policy developed is acceptable both to the Bank and GOM; n Steering Committee and PMU have been established with sufficient authority and independence to by-pass cumbersome government procedures;n good R&R planning and implementation practice have been incorporated into the project design and implementation, including the importance of community involvement, use of NGOs, baseline surveys, coordination among agencies, inclusion of - 7- squatters and encroachers without legal title for R&R entitlements, careful design and monitoring and evaluation arrangements, and locating relocation housing as close to the place of the original housing as possible to minimize dislocation in employment and sources of income;f central role for NGOs in the preparation and implementation of R&R. These NGOs have long standing history of good relations with slum dwellers in the areas of housing and promoting saving groups.The Bank has participated in the financing of one urban transport project in (then) Bombay - the Bombay Urban Transport Project (BUTP) 1976. The key lessons from BUTP, as well as from other transport and related projects in India, have been incorporated in design of the presently proposed project:n Preparation: BUTP was slow to commence disbursement. To overcome this problem, for MUTP, it is envisaged that most (about two-thirds in value terms) of project infrastructure components will be at final design stage with tender documents completed and available prior to project appraisal.n Contracting: Projects have suffered in India from (i) the disaggregation of contracts into small contracts or separate works and (ii) the use of small and financially weak contractors that have taken long periods to implement projects and often at a low standard of execution. Current MUTP components will be packaged in a way which permits, to the maximum extent practical, International Competitive Bidding. Disaggregation of works into very small contracts will be limited.n Completion: Bank projects in India have often extended well beyond the proposed completion date due to delays in completion of contracts arising from decision procedures, inability to acquire properties or land necessary for the works and delays arising from small contracts and thus cumbersome procurement procedures (see above). It has been clearly indicated to Mumbai authorities during project preparation that extensions to project implementation periods will not be agreed. To overcome this past deficiency (i) it will be entrusted to the High Level Steering Committee (HLSC) to ensure that decisions are not unduly delayed, (ii) it will be a condition of negotiations that the majority of works are ready for bidding at the outset of the project, and (iii) it has been agreed that before any civil works contract for any component is let, R&R issues will have been resolved.n Counterpart Funding: Past implementation has also suffered from delays in provision of counterpart funding. Detailed funding requirements will be reviewed and GOM/BMC budget allocations agreed during loan negotiations. Agreement will be sought from GOM/BMC/IR/MRVC for secure funds in subsequent annual budgets (TO BE EXPANDED DURING PRE-APPRAISAL).R&R: There is little experience in India with such large scale urban R&R for development projects using policies acceptable to the Bank. However, based on past project experience, the following lessons from the sector in general have been incorporated into the proposed project: n the R&R policy developed is acceptable both to the Bank and GOM; n Steering Committee and PMMU have been established with sufficient authority and independence to by-pass cumbersome government procedures;n good R&R planning and implementation practice have been incorporated into the project design and implementation, including the importance of community involvement, use of NGOs, baseline surveys, coordination among agencies, recognition of those without property rights, careful design and monitoring and evaluation arrangements, and locating relocation housing as close to the place of the original housing as possible to minimize dislocation in employment and sources of income;f central role for NGOs in the preparation and implementation of R&R. These NGOs have long standing history of good relations with slum dwellers in the areas of housing and promoting saving - 8 - groups. 9. Program of Targeted Intervention (PTI) N 10. Environment Aspects (including any public consultation) Issues The Environmental Assessment process commenced in 1994 with the drafting of the ToR for a Sectoral Environmental Assessment Report. The EA process included the preparation of Sector-level Environmental Assessment (SLEA), Programmatic level Environmental Assessment (PLEA) and Micro-level Environmental Assessment (MLEA). SLEA was a strategic document, PLEAs were prepared for small generic sub-projects like flyovers, ROBs and RUBs, while MLEAs were prepared for larger sub-projects like road widening and extension. The study was undertaken by Montgomery Watson (formerly AIC Watson) -- between June 1995 and May 1997. The study resulted in several ouputs including a synthesized final report in 1998.Since 1998 the following development have taken place, which necessitated a "fresh look" at the environmental assessments: i) the design of the proposed project has undergone changes - certain sub-components were dropped and a few have been added; ii) the traffic and environmental baseline in Mumbai has undergone significant changes; and iii) the project has been classified as a "Corporate Risk Operation" in the Bank, thus putting it under a higher level of scrutiny internally in the Bank, as well as externally by NGOs and civil society. As a result, the following approach was adopted: a) updating of all PLEAs and MLEAs and preparation of MLEAs for all sub-components added after 1998; b) prepration of fresh EMPs for all sub-components earlier covered by PLEA; c) EMPs for all sub-components to be implemented in the first year of the project to be made available before project appraisal; d) the preparation of a Consolidated EA that takes into account the changed baseline since 1998 and presents a comprehensive overview of all environmental aspects of the project in one document; and e) public consultations following the disclosure of the draft Consolidated EA report, findings of which were incorporated in the final Consolidated EA report.The significant issues that emerged from the environmental analysis thus far relate to the following: 1. Appropirateness of the transport strategy -- The SLEA analyzed the different options proposed in the transport strategy for MMRDA, and concluded that the promotion of public transport plus demand management are environmentally the most desirable in the island city, and a recommended mix of initiatives including road expansion in the suburban areas. However, the state government in 1998 decided to construct several flyovers in the island city with the objective of easing traffic congestion, but which would also increase motorization. Based on task team's recommendation, the MMRDA commissioned a separate analysis to examine the environmental impacts of the flyover program. The study was inconclusive on the long-term downstream impacts, but in the short-term it predicted overall higher levels of air pollution. However, this did not change the selection of public transport plus demand management as the desirable option for the island city.2. Air Pollution (mainly PM10) -- Two-stroke motorcyles, 3-stroke taxis, buses and trucks are considered as the major transport sources of PM10. Poor enforcement of the Polluion Under Control (PUC) regulation for vehicles, lack of maintenance by vehicle owners (especially buses, trucks and motorcycles), inadequate inspection and maintenance (I/M) facilities and incentives, high sulfur diesel fuel and older engine technology (buses and trucks), were also cited as some of the causes for higher emissions of PM10. Government - 9- responses have been (i) introduction of CNG-fueled buses, (ii) introduction of low sulphur diesel fuel, (iii) stricter enforcement of the PUC program, (iv) introduction of four-stroke / CNG two-wheelers, and (v) phase-out of old taxis and buses.3. Noise Pollution The EA reports concluded that certain sensitive receptors will be impacted due to higher noise level as a result of increased traffic and also temporarily due to construction activities. In such cases appropriate mitigation measures need to be taken.4. Ecologically Sensitive Areas and Regulatory Aspects - The EA reports concluded that some of the sub-projects may impact on coastal areas or involve felling of mangroves / trees. In such cases, in addition to giving attention to the safeguard aspects, the relevant clearances from the government need to be taken. In case of resettlement, two transit sites were identified as being in violation of the Coastal Regulation Zone notification of the government. Environmental Restoration Plans were prepared for the same so that no permanent damage remains on the site after it is dismantled.5. Environmental Impacts of/at Resettlement Sites: Environmental management at the community level in the case of resettlement housing is being addressed under the purview of the RAP. Separate Community Environmental Management Plans (CEMPs) for resettlement housing have been prepared for each resettlement site. The primary objective of CEMP is to provide access to basic urban environmental infrastructure services through community initiative and participation, and alleviate the environmental health risks of the community. 6. Other Issues of (public) Concern: The public consultations brought forth the following critical issues: a) along with ensuring better movement of vehicular traffic, the project should also cater to the pedestrains by building more footpaths and improving safety; b) given the complex nature of the project, effective implementation of environmental management measures would be a challenge; and c) there is a need to strengthen the demand management aspects of the project; d) the project should not exacerbate the exisitng problems related to illegal quarrying in and around Mumbai; and e) it should be ensured that transit housing does not turn into permanent housing over time. 11. Contact Point: Task Manager A.K. Swaminathan The World Bank 1818 H Street, NW Washington D.C. 20433 New Delhi, India Tel: 5785+215 12. For information on other project related documents contact: The InfoShop The World Bank 1818 H Street, NW Washington, D.C. 20433 Telephone: (202) 458-5454 Fax: (202) 522-1500 Web: http:// www.worldbank.org/infoshop Note: This is information on an evolving project. Certain components may not be necessarily included in the final project. - 10 - This PID was processed by the InfoShop during the week ending March 8, 2002. - 11 -