Urban Fragility and Violence in Africa
A Cross-Country Analysis

Social, Urban, Rural and Resilience Global Practice - Africa Region
The World Bank, Washington, DC

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### Acronyms

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender-based Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSURR</td>
<td>Social, Urban, Rural and Resilience Global Practice, World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RoC</td>
<td>Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WDR</td>
<td>World Development Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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Acknowledgments

This document constitutes the main output of the grant “Connecting the Dots: Integrating Information Systems in Citizen Security and Urban Planning”, work coordinated and led by Paula A. Rossiasco (Social Development Specialist, GSURR) and implemented in two sequential phases. The first phase provided a series of country level analysis in Nigeria, Republic of Congo and Republic of South Sudan, produced by a team of World Bank experts and external consultants as follows:

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Introduction

Africa is facing unprecedented rates of urbanization, driven largely by constricting rural economies and the expectation that cities are more inclusive, productive, and integrated spaces. Currently, over a quarter of the 100 fastest-growing cities in the world are in Africa.¹ Migration to urban areas is expected to give citizens better access to higher per capita incomes, increased employment levels, competitiveness and productivity, improved living conditions, and better integration to the national territorial economy.

However, this promise is yet to be fulfilled in many African cities. Hampered by low levels of institutional and infrastructural capacity, the continent’s cities struggle to absorb the growing number of migrants: “The pace of urbanization, together with its sheer scale . . . is likely to stress national and urban institutions in many developing countries to their breaking point.”² Many of these cities exhibit a mix of low institutional capacity rising violence and growing instability, inequitable development and access to services, insecure land tenure, weak institutions and inadequate livelihood opportunities, which could be characterized as urban fragility.³

More often than not, the urbanization process is poorly managed, resulting in inequitable, exclusionary and fragmented cities and increased risk of violence. Certain cities exhibit some of the lowest rates of economic growth in the continent. In fact, it is Africa’s constricting urban economies, not the abundance of urban economic opportunities, which drive urban migration.⁴ Consequently, the majority of migrants find themselves in slums, where government presence is weak, donor reach is constricted, and social mobility is low. Without adequate economic development and urban planning to accommodate the population growth, poverty in cities and especially in slums is particularly dire. According to experts, in many countries the poorest 20 percent in urban slums have worse development indicators than the poorest 20 percent in rural areas.⁵ Additionally, many of the urban residents, compared to their rural counterparts, are much more vulnerable to economic and environmental shocks, not to mention the lack of human security, as they exhibit greater dependence on cash income and markets, as well as more exposure to pollution, poor

³ According to the World Development Report 2011, fragility and fragile situations are defined as those “periods when states or institutions lack the capacity, accountability, or legitimacy to mediate relations between citizens groups and between citizens and the state, making them vulnerable to violence”. The same report points out that to determine if a country is fragile, the World Bank and other institutions have used measures of institutional weakness such as the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) frameworks. For more details see: World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development: World Bank.
⁴ On the other hand, the concept of urban fragility refers to a particular form of fragility experienced by dwellers in urban areas of Africa directly related to unequal access to services and a strong sense of abandonment by the State and state actors. Urban fragility mutates into an experienced “every day fragility”. For more details see: Commins, Stephen (2011), “Urban Fragility and Security in Africa”, Africa Security Briefs, Washington, DC: 1.
sanitation, and water shortages. An additional risk factor is Africa’s youth bulge. Africa’s growing cities host a largely young, poor and marginalized population facing low access to basic services. This setup creates the potential for a contested space, in which urban crime and violence can flourish.

The World Development Report, ‘Conflict, Security and Development’ (WDR 2011), which examines the cost of intra-state violence, notes that countries and sub-national areas with the weakest institutional legitimacy and governance are the most vulnerable to violence and instability and the least able to respond to internal and external stresses. Unmanaged growth of cities increasingly challenges stability of countries: The WDR 2011 identified the urban arena as a crucible within which so-called new threats – indices of chronic fragility and cyclical violence – have come to define the challenges of fragile and conflicted states. The WDR emphasizes the importance of institution building, especially regarding security, access to justice and job provision: “to break cycles of insecurity and reduce the risk of their recurrence, national reformers and their international partners need to build the legitimate institutions that can provide a sustained level of citizen security, justice, and jobs.”

Cities are indeed, key ecosystems for improved access to socio-economic opportunities, inclusion and social mobility.

People in fragile urban areas in Africa experience highly unequal access to services, ‘differently governed’ (although not ‘ungoverned’) spaces, and a strong sense of abandonment (or predation) by the state and state actors, making them more vulnerable to a series of risks including crime and violence. This amounts to an experience of ‘everyday fragility’, which affects several aspects of daily life of citizens in urban areas. As aforementioned, the security of residents of underserved urban areas is more threatened by disasters, such as fires, mudslides, local flooding or waste exposure, and is more exposed to crime and violence. In those urban areas, where states, markets, and social institutions fail to provide basic security, justice, and economic opportunities for citizens, criminal activities and city conflicts can escalate. Such a negative spiral risks compromising forms of public authority and human security. The strategic and political significance of cities implies that uncontrolled urban violence may, contribute to weaknesses of a state.

Indeed, crime and interpersonal violence in cities are a growing problem in the region, restricting the developmental potential of cities. Recent data suggests that in the last decade violence in the region is less anchored in traditional forms of conflict, and more related to criminal violence, violent extremism, and other forms of civil unrest. While violence data in Africa is still sparse, the WHO, based on simulated projections, was able to map some disconcerting trends: In 2012, the Africa region is estimated to have the second highest rate of homicide worldwide with an estimate of 98,081 victims of homicide. This adds up to an overall rate of 10.9 per 100,000 populations. Death is one of most severe consequences of violence, which then incurs wider social and economic costs, due to societal fear, which constricts economic activity, the costs of increased security, and loss of the victim’s economic contribution: “areas experiencing comparatively high rates of conflict-

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related and homicidal violence tend to experience declining levels of progress in relation to both human development as measured by poverty, income and the achievement of specific MDG goals. Both governments and donors have provided a limited number of developmental responses to urban fragility and violence with most efforts, particularly on the Government side which focuses primarily on securitization approaches. The absence of an analytical framework for the region that connects drivers or urban fragility and violence with developmental dynamics, is a contributing factor of urban fragility, and within it, urban violence, which tends to be understood as “normal” given the overall fragility of many African States, and the technical constraints for the development of long-term, inclusive and sustainable urban development strategies.

Given the urbanization trends in the region — characterized by increasing levels of inequality and weak institutional systems capable of delivering security, justice and jobs — urban violence as a manifestation of urban fragility will persist unless governments and donors prioritize it through a series of policy reforms and developmental responses. Urbanization trends are set to continue, underscoring the importance of addressing crime and violence in cities as part of a broader development strategy. Indeed, the presence and size of informal settlements such as Camp Luka in Kinshasa, Kibera in Nairobi, Kanu in Abuja, and the “Jesus is our Saviour” settlement in Lagos is increasing, with a growing number of citizens living in areas that fall outside the control of formal and traditional forms of authority and exercise high levels of self-governance. In Sub-Saharan Africa, 200 million people were living in slums in 2010, nearly 62 percent of the region’s urban population, according to estimates by UN-Habitat. Presence of the State in these areas is limited and, too often, the governments respond to urban violence through securitization. However, security solutions alone will not address the multi-faceted drivers of urban crime: “Approaching urban fragility solely as a security problem often leads to short-term instruments that are disconnected from underlying causes of insecurity and fragility... attention must be given to delivering services to meet [a population’s] immediate needs while strengthening public institutions over the longer term to ensure sustainability and equitable coverage.”

Understanding the dynamic interplaying between urban violence and fragility and a countries’ economic potential will be key to boosting development in most African countries. As a first step to tackle this challenge, the Africa unit of the Social, Urban, Rural and Resilience Global Practice undertook a comparative research process, which identifies common trends across Sub-Saharan Africa in order to facilitate the identification of mechanisms through which urban fragility and violence prevention could be further integrated into the development process of African countries. Research and pilot activities were undertaken in one country of each of the three sub-regions in the continent, namely West Africa (Nigeria), Central Africa (Republic of Congo) and East Africa (South Sudan). These

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13 Robert Muggah, (May 2012) Researching the Urban Dilemma: Urbanization, Poverty and Violence, IDRC.
three countries are experiencing different political, economic and social processes. In all countries, the analytical work focused on understanding dynamics of crime and violence in selected urban areas and existing institutional (formal and informal) responses to crime and violence, so as to further the World Bank understanding on how to best address urban fragility and foster local resilience while putting the building blocks to define an urban fragility agenda in the Sub-Saharan African region. This report gives an overview of this multi-country study.

This report includes four main sections. The first section provides an analytical overview of urban fragility, and in particular, urban crime and violence in the Africa Region. The second section covers the multi-country study, including its objectives, methodologies, and a profile of the countries covered by it, followed by the main findings of the study in terms of forms of violence that were most frequently reported, key risk factors for crime and violence found across all countries, and local responses to crime and violence by a series of actors, including the government. The third section proposes a series of areas in which World Bank support could address urban crime and violence risk factors, impacts and responses. The fourth section summarizes the main conclusions of the study.
The African continent is one of the regions experiencing faster urbanization, and the unmanaged nature of rapid urbanization leads to every day fragility for a considerable part of urban residents. Rural to urban migration is the main driver of urbanization, due to an increase in rural population density, vagaries of weather producing both droughts and floods and the driver that the fastest growing sectors of the national economy are usually mainly urban based. The majority of newcomers live in rented accommodation in slums, where the government is unsupportive and donor projects are few, making it hard for families to graduate out of poverty. Some obtain low paid employment, and some serve as casual laborers in the transport and service sectors. Unlike the situation in rural areas, where a range of survival strategies is often available, cash is required for urban survival, and as a result levels of indebtedness are high.

Africa is also over-represented at the top of the fragility index. The literature on state building, particularly fragile states building, frequently refers to the nature of the political settlement or settlements that underlies the formation of the state (or, better, nation state since identity is part of the glue that holds states together). What have been less studied are the complex factors that create “Urban political settlements”. As different populations move into cities and as different political interests compete for power, the existing political arrangements may become more contested and questioned. Yet, little attention has been given to the relationship between urbanization and fragility, and in particular, to urban violence as a consequence of this fragility.

Urban areas experience fragility to varying degrees and with differing dimensions. The new OECD report on fragile states outlines five interconnected and overlapping dimensions of urban fragility, which interact in a complex way, and result in a continuum of fragility: i) Crime and Violence ii) Justice; iii) Institutions; iv) Economic Foundations, and, v) Resilience. These different factors affecting urban fragility manifested to varying degrees in urban communities in Africa. The consequences include increasing levels of violence, highly unequal access to services, ‘differently governed’ spaces with varying forms of authority including institutional, traditional and informal, limited presence of the state and state actors and localized, poorly connected economic ecosystems. Insecure land tenure further encourages the proliferation of informal settlements, characterized by temporary structures that do not adequately protect occupants from the elements, informality in regards to livelihoods and access to basic services such as water and sanitation facilities, inadequate solid waste management, poor connectedness across different areas of the city; and higher exposure to flooding, landslides, fires and other local hazards. Hence, urban fragility touches multiple dimensions of the day-to-day life of citizens. Experts and practitioners describe this heightened, and multi-dimensional lack of human security as ‘everyday fragility’.

The governance challenges associated with administering increasingly complex urban systems present multiple problems, including the rise in crime and violence. Increasingly populated while underserved urban centers have the potential to aggravate

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conflict and prejudice. Xenophobic hostility towards other ethnic groups, "foreigners", extra-legal vigilante activities of "crime-fighting" and socio-economic struggles around issues of land and services emerge can be heightened in dense urban contexts. Social contextual factors, such as access to weapons, alcohol, and insecure public spaces, also play a role. Weak policy responses, executive and legislative, as well as poor urban planning, further aggravate everyday fragility. On one hand, cities can be places of great progress and increased human wealth; on the other, in those urban areas, where states, markets, and social institutions fail to provide basic security, justice, and economic opportunities for citizens, city conflicts can escalate. Such a negative spiral can further compromise forms of public authority and human security.

**Policy responses to date are still relatively weak, and urbanization trends outpace local government's ability to respond.** The trends regarding rapid urbanization, and with it the increased risk of urban fragility, have persisted over several decades. However, there remains a dearth of targeted research and policy guidance addressing the connections between urbanization and crime, violence and everyday fragility as linked to wider political, economic and social processes. The challenges are not confined to mega-cities, but are becoming frequent throughout much of Africa. Urban demographic shifts along with state-directed decentralization have outpaced the capacities of local government institutions to manage urban growth and provide services equitably. The growing proportion of underserved citizens may weaken local government's legitimacy. Urban power relations and social, economic and environmental trends will affect questions of national identity and political legitimacy. Urban centers, especially capitals and large cities, tend to be centers of competition for political power and resources, as well as battlegrounds for both official and unofficial definitions of national identity and state legitimacy power. Grievances around the lack of essential and basic services, coupled with increased insecurity, crime and corruption can contribute to different forms of fragility. Urban areas that are largely underserved and underrepresented can become differently governed and contested spaces.15

‘Differently governed’ cities can contain spaces that are relatively secure and those that are highly insecure. Some individuals and neighborhoods have situations that may be characterized as being ‘secure’, while other individuals and neighborhoods may be defined as fragile or insecure. These spaces may overlap for different groups, in different locations, or in different economic, social or political contexts. Within large ‘slums’ there are differences in access to services and livelihoods, as well as the relative threats of crime and violence. Violence is distributed unequally even in poor areas, which affects access to and utilization of basic services and transport systems. At the household level, a number of African countries report high levels of domestic violence.

**Interpersonal violence affects different population groups unequally, and often, women and children are particularly vulnerable. Sexual and gender based violence seem to be a particularly prevalent form of violence across Africa.** According to the WHO, 36.6% of women report experiencing physical and/or sexual violence by an intimate partner in their lives. Further, findings from the Violence Against Children Surveys conducted in Kenya, the Republic of Tanzania, Swaziland and Zimbabwe indicate that about 1 in 3 girls have experienced sexual abuse during their childhood, revealing a much higher rate of both childhood sexual and physical as well as emotional abuse than the global average rates. This

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15 The term 'ungoverned' implies that there are no governing authorities, but all spaces are 'governed', but not necessarily by state agencies or 'civil' society.
is especially troubling as violence against women, children, and the elderly tends to be underreported, which is partially explained by what is considered violence against women based on cultural norms and social stigmas.

**With a growing frequency, unmet expectations in quantity and quality of governance outputs across security, political, economic, and social sectors engender violence, which (especially when related to gang and militia activity) further increases fragility and insecurity.** Generally governments and development partners have not given adequate attention to issues around corruption, criminal justice and community policing. The lack of ability to address different forms of insecurity highlights the problems of institutional capacity, inter-organizational coordination and access to information.

**Further research and higher government capacity is needed to address urban violence.** Currently, across Sub-Saharan Africa, governments exhibit a limited ability to collect data on crime and violence in African countries, and, when data exists, a limited ability to effectively connect the data to policy responses. For example, the WHO indicates that there are substantial gaps in homicide data from the police and from civil ministries across the African continent: While 93 percent of the countries report having police data on the number of homicides, a majority of 70 percent of the countries fail to collect homicide data. Data on other types of violence, especially sexual violence and intimate partner violence, is also sparse: In Africa, only 52 percent of the counties report having conducted surveys on intimate partner violence, and only 33 percent have administered national surveys on child maltreatment.

**Responses to address crime and violence across the continent are just evolving, and to date, the few existing ones tend to have limited involvement of citizens.** Among the countries which had national action plans on crime and violence, national strategies tend to address the issues from the top policy level. Few countries actually take advantage of social and educational policy measures to mitigate key risk factors for violence from the bottom level (see table 1). In addition, mitigation measures are limited as well. Providing services and supports to victims of violence is as important to preventing further violence. Victims require medical, psycho-social as well as legal assistance to help reduce physical suffering as well as mental trauma. Conflict and high rates of violence have destructive effects on social norms and institutions regulating violence. Additionally, although research on traumatized population and violence trends is just starting, findings have indicated that long-lasting psychological scars are associated with increased violence: traumatized children, for example, have a higher disposition to violent behavior in adulthood. Across the African region, access to services designed to identify, refer, protect and support victims is extremely weak. Despite strong evidence suggesting the importance of mental care after victimization, only 15% of the African countries report any provision of mental health services for victims of violence. In terms of protective services, only 41% of African countries included in the WHO study have adult protective services, and only 15% have child protection services.

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16 Record homicide using the International Classification of Disease (ICD) external cause of injury code.
17 WHO (2015)
Table 1. Proportion of Countries Implementing Different Types of Programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Violence</th>
<th>Africa (n=27 countries)</th>
<th>Average (n=133 countries)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Child Maltreatment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Visiting</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parenting Education</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child Sexual Abuse Prevention</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Youth Violence</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-School Enrichment</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Skills/Social Development Programs</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bullying Prevention</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mentoring</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After-School Programs</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intimate Partner Violence</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dating Violence Prevention Programs</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Microfinance with Gender Equity Training</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social and Cultural Norm Exchange</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sexual Violence</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevention Programs for School and College</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving Physical Environments</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social and Cultural Norm Exchange</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Elder Abuse</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Awareness Campaigns</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Information Campaigns</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caregiver Support Programs</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential Care Policies</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Crime and violence have a negative impact on development, on the quality of life of citizens, and on the emergence of democratic processes. By incorporating the crime and violence agenda within the context of rapid urbanization into its operations and initiatives in the region, the World Bank can play a constructive, supportive role. Given that in Africa urban crime and violence affect the poor disproportionally, addressing them is also key to the achievement of the twin goals of ending poverty and sharing prosperity.

This report aims to further the World Bank’s understanding of the challenges of crime and violence within the context of urbanization in three Sub-Saharan African countries. It attempts to also present avenues to identify specific needs that can be addressed by Bank operations. These analyses offer opportunities to comprehend the dynamics of crime and violence at a multi-scalar level ranging from the regional, sub-regional, and national level and therefore, highlight the different geographies, context, and historical particularities of the countries in the Africa region. The selected three case studies (Nigeria, Republic of Congo (RoC) and South Sudan) form a body of knowledge that allows for comparative analyses of the crime and violence dynamics in Sub-Saharan Africa.

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Chapter 2: Multi-country Study on Urban Crime and Violence

2.1 Methodology and Definitions

This paper draws on three analytical reports, as well as the inputs from World Bank practitioners. The three studies relied on qualitative data collection in selected urban areas of the three mentioned countries (Useh and Okhor in Benin City, capital city of Edo State, Nigeria; Juba in South Sudan; and, Brazzaville, Mindouli, Kinkala and Gamboma in Republic of Congo). Overall, the research process relied mostly on qualitative research methodologies, which included focus group discussions, semi-structured interviews, both individual and in small groups and interviews with relevant stakeholders and policy makers. Research teams held meetings with representatives of Government agencies, such as the National and local Police, Ministry of Security and Youth Affairs; local and traditional rulers; as well as representatives of civil society organizations related to initiatives aimed and preventing crime and violence. In Nigeria, focus groups, key informant interviews as well as key stakeholder interviews were conducted in Useh and Okhor, two local communities in Benin City; South Sudan complemented this process with detailed quantitative analysis, a total of 124 households were randomly selected and interviewed during the household victimization survey; while in Republic of Congo, eight focus groups were conducted in Brazzaville, Mindouli, Kinkala and Gamboma, and a total of eighty people identified by local NGOs participated in the focus group discussion.

Participants in described methods (i.e. focus group discussions, semi structured interviews, etc.) were identified using community mapping and snowballing techniques. In Nigeria, a variety of individuals, ranging from women in the community to traditional leaders, contributed to the discussion. Research teams in RoC ensured that participants included groups of young men and women, between the ages of 18 and 30. In the case of South Sudan, where datasets related to crime and violence were available and contain an adequate number of data that would not compromise the validity of the conclusions of the study, the teams relied on available statistics to apply quantitative research methods. According to the data obtained, respondents of the household survey were between the age of 18 and 65, 44.3% of which were female. In addition, the South Sudan report’s author was granted access to national crime and violence focused datasets, as collected by the South Sudan National Police Services (SSNPS) and the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), which, while not comprehensive, did offer the opportunity for a national analysis of crime and violence that complimented the qualitative research.

It is important to clarify that the sample of individuals and communities covered by this study are not, and were not intended to be, representative at the city or national levels. Rather, the focus of the study was unveiling how citizens experience crime and violence in urban areas in Africa, and which mechanisms are available to them whenever they experience them. That said, findings of the analysis are aligned with those of larger, representative studies such as the WHO World Status Report on Violence Prevention, and literature on urban fragility, crime and violence. In this way, this analysis contributes to the debate by bringing some granularity to the understanding of these events and responses in the African context. Furthermore, it attempts to clarify the linkages that exist between these issues and the World Bank twin goals.
Conducting research, both qualitative and quantitative, on crime and violence remains a challenge in all three countries. The researchers not only needed to ask the sensitive questions in a careful way, but also needed to interpret the responses with extreme caution. While all three countries of study inherit rich ethnic diversity, ethnic issues did not appear to be prominent in the field study. Efforts were made to minimize the limitation and biases of the research. Research teams were trained on the use of research tools and on how to minimize personal biases. The South Sudan task team, for instance, held a training session for enumerators on conducting victimization survey prior to the field work, and female respondents were only interviewed by female enumerators in order to better manage the emotional feeling and victimization experience. In addition, before conducting the interviews, researchers obtained clear consent from respondents and clarified that respondents could terminate the interview at any moment they would need it.

As further detailed in later sections, this paper uses the terms crime, criminal violence and violence interchangeably as they are largely entwined in the views of people. These are, of course, different concepts. A crime is “an offence against a public law.” As such, what is considered a crime is the result of a political process, by which a society deemed a certain conduct unacceptable and against the law. Violence on the other hand is much broader, and refers to the use of force to harm another. It can further be qualified to include physical, psychological, sexual and interpersonal violence, and on a societal level, structural and political violence. Interpersonal violence is defined in this report as "the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against another person or against a group or community that results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development, or deprivation." However, the different terms were used by respondents in interviews and focus group discussions in an interchangeable way. This could be explained by the fact that there is limited knowledge of what is defined by the country's legal frameworks as crime, and most people rely on their social understandings of violent behavior to assess any given situation. In that way, what constitutes harm, force and damage to another varies largely across individuals, communities and countries according to different social constructs. Therefore, while for some people certain situations could be considered as violence or are widely recognized as crime, for others these situations are not associated with crime and violence.

### 2.2 Country profiles

Three countries were chosen to represent the various geographic regions of Africa: South Sudan in the East, Republic of Congo in Central Africa and Nigeria, in the West. Additionally, they represent a progression since conflict, and by extension different progressions in terms of governance and institution building: Nigeria, while a host to multiple organized and informal armed groups and increasingly embroiled in a crisis in the North, has nevertheless been relatively stable since the Biafra war; Republic of Congo has experienced relative peace
since 1999, and has progressed in institutional capacity since; South Sudan is still in the cycles of violence, and experiences high political and interpersonal violence coupled with very low institutional capacity.

Despite this diversity, the challenges were similar: rapid urbanization driven by declining rural economies, a youth bulge coupled with an economy struggling to absorb them, and weak institutions unable to mitigate conflict and provide human security equitably.

**South Sudan**

South Sudan is primarily a rural country with only 18% of the population living in urban areas, with a 5.0% annual rate of increased urbanization. Although crime and violence are prevalent and widespread in South Sudan, urban areas experience higher levels of crime such as robbery, assaults, and murders. Data suggests that violent crimes are concentrated in urban areas, and are frequently linked to extreme economic conditions, high levels of unemployment, and easy access to weapons. For example, murders in the capital city of Juba are frequently preceded by robbery or assaults. Other pervasive forms of violent crime in South Sudan, like cattle raiding, are more concentrated in rural states.

After decades of civil war against Sudan, South Sudan gained independence on July 9, 2011. With a population of about 10 million people, South Sudan has significant natural resources, including oil. Despite its rich natural resources and significant oil wealth, the country faces myriad problems including the legacy of a protracted civil war, weak institutions, low levels of human development emanating from a poor educational system, and high rates of crime. Since achieving independence, South Sudan has experienced high levels of poverty, increasing inequality, high unemployment levels, high population growth, and institutional inefficiencies coupled with continued political violence. South Sudan’s population is primarily young, undereducated and underemployed: Estimates show that South Sudan has the highest population growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, and one of the fastest growing populations in the world at an average of more than 4% per year since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

Level of violence in South Sudan is among the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, it was the 10th most violent country—measured by the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants—in 2012 with a homicide rate of 16.2 per 100,000 inhabitants. The homicide rate is significantly above the average for Sub-Saharan Africa (11.5 homicides per 100,000) and the threshold of 10 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, above which the World Health Organization (WHO) terms it a health epidemic. Much of its crime and violence appear to be concentrated in the center and northeastern states of the country. States situated in the western part of the country appear to have less crime and fewer violent crimes such as homicides as compared with, for example, Jonglei, which has very high levels of crime and violence.

The costs of crime and violence on South Sudan’s economy is substantial. The country study’s analysis reveals that crime and violence represent almost 4% of South Sudan’s total GDP.

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Republic of Congo

Republic of Congo is another post-conflict country. RoC, like South Sudan, is one of sub-Saharan Africa’s major oil producers, though manufacturing is another important component of RoC’s economy. As the other countries, RoC has been experiencing rapid urbanization. As of 2013 World Bank data, 64.53% of RoC’s population lives in cities, versus 35.47% in the countryside – almost the reverse of population distribution in 1960. Similarly to the other countries, 42.54% of RoC’s population is under the age of 15, pointing to the challenge of a growing youth bulge in a context of rapid urbanization.23

Corruption and relative instability contributed to slow development and continued poverty for much of the population. RoC was ranked 140 out of 187 countries on the 2014 UN Human Development Index.24 Freedom House considers the country not free, and ranked it very low on freedom, civil liberties and political rights; they point to political violence, pervasive corruption, especially in the extractive industry and the justice sector. In urban areas where the public judicial system dominates, institutional weaknesses and lack of technical capacity however hamper its effectiveness. For example, the judicial system offers few protections for business and property rights. In the rural areas, traditional courts still prevail, especially in cases regarding local property, inheritance and domestic abuse. Human Rights Organizations reports cases of excessive use of force by RoC’s security forces as well as point out the necessary improvements needed by the prison system in the country.25

In the RoC, crime and violence take multiple forms. Interlocutors report theft of property, to include armed robbery, using guns and knives. Crimes related to sorcery, including murder and assault are also committed. Interviewees further noted psychological and economic violence. Violence against women, including beatings, molestation and rape, is reportedly widespread. While rape, including marital rape, is illegal, this common crime is rarely reported or prosecuted.26 Interlocutors reported that adult males and minors in detention by security forces have also been subjected to excessive use of force.

Nigeria

Nigeria is Africa’s largest economy and most populous country in Africa. An accelerated economic growth due to important oil revenues of US$74 billion per annum have not been translated in better socio-economic conditions for most Nigerian citizens. Indeed, the human development index for Nigeria remains low: According to the 2014 UNDP Human Development Index, Nigeria ranked positioning 152 out of 187 countries, while 43.3% of the population is multi-dimensionally poor. Per consequence, more than half of Nigerians live on less than US$1 a day and four out of ten are unemployed. Paradoxically, the majority of Nigerians are economically worse off today than at independence- a consequence of multiple factors: corruption coupled with high oil income, a struggling agriculture economy, and

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increasing insecurity. Economic development and access to government services are unequal across the country, as the state has struggled to deliver public goods, including security, transportation, water, medical care, power and education, in an equitable fashion. For example, whilst 27% of the population in the south lives in poverty, this figure is at 72% in the north.

Nigeria ranks in the bottom third according to all aggregated good governance indicators, and scores in the bottom 10th percentile on Political Stability and Control of Corruption as well as the bottom 20th percentile on Rule of Law and Government Effectiveness. For example, Transparency International ranks Nigeria in the 16th percentile in its control of corruption and 11th percentile in its rule of law. Freedom House’s ranks Nigeria as partially free, and especially low rule of law score. Political interference, corruption, and a lack of funding, equipment and training negatively affect the judicial system. Still, Nigeria's judiciary has progressed both in terms of independence and professionalism. However, there are still reports of excessive of force by security forces while there are serious problems of trust on the police forces.

The country has been increasingly affected by instability, with a growing insurgent threat by Boko Haram, and recent economic downturn that resulted from a decline in oil prices. In addition to the Boko Haram insurgency, violent crime is a problem across Nigeria, which has experienced a steady increase in crimes against persons, armed robbery, and political violence, while trafficking of drugs and small arms is also on the rise. There are some regional variations in terms of crime. For example, abductions are especially common in the Niger Delta and the southeastern states of Abia, Imo, and Anambra.

Like the other two countries, Nigeria shares the troubling demographic challenges pertaining to urbanization and a youth bulge. Over the past three decades, many peasants have abandoned their farms in the rural areas in favor of cities and today about half of the population of Nigeria live in urban areas. Additionally, Nigeria exhibits restrained ability to provide adequate economic opportunity for its large youth bulge, failing to materialize its demographic dividend.

Nevertheless, Nigeria has also demonstrated strength and resilience by managing two simultaneous crisis effectively: Ebola and the Boko Haram insurgency for instance. When Ebola first entered the country, the Government managed to put in place all necessary controls to keep the disease from spreading. The response of the federal state to the Boko Haram insurgency, while not as timely or effective, has translated in recent months to the recovery of the territory controlled by the insurgents forcing them to retreat into remote areas, as well as to the recovery of hundreds of citizens being held captive by the group. While emergency responses are yet to reach the over 1.6 million citizens forcibly displaced by the

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29 http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results
31 Attoh.
conflict, the new administration has identified the control of the insurgency and the reconstruction of areas affected by conflict as key priorities. Nigeria has also prioritized addressing interpersonal violence. It designed a set of national action plans to address different types of violence, including interpersonal violence, youth violence, sexual violence, child maltreatment, intimate partner violence as well as elder abuse. In addition, Nigeria enacted federal laws to regulate civilian access to firearms and instated programs to reduce civilian firearm possession and use. However, national social and educational policies to reduce rate of violence are comparatively lagging. For example, currently, incentives provided for high-risk youth to complete schooling are weak.

The Nigeria study concentrated in the capital city of Edo State, Benin City including urban a peri-urban areas in that city (Okhoro and Useh). The research team found considerable differences between lived experiences of security and crime and violence in these communities. Many of these differences are due to the distinct compositions of the communities, and the fact that Useh is peri-urban—and at times almost rural—while Okhoro is urban. In Useh, crime and violence tend to be localized, while in Okhoro, although there are some areas that are more prone to crime and violence, security concerns are much more widely distributed geographically. Crimes typically cited in the surveyed communities included cultism, robbery/theft, and burglary.

2.3 Forms of violence most frequently reported

Despite of the different concepts on crime, violence and criminal violence, during the interaction with survey correspondents, respondents often reported on acts they considered violent based on their own cultural frameworks, regardless whether or not these acts were recognized as crimes or considered as violence. At other times, behaviors that can be considered both crimes and violent acts, such as child beating are just seen as normal behaviors socially accepted by individuals and communities. This is particularly the case for interpersonal violence. For example, some forms of gender based violence like wife-beating were not considered as violent behavior (or a crime for that matter).

Beyond these nuances, this section elaborates on the most common forms of violence in the countries part of the study.

Violence against Property, Personal Violence and Other Forms of Violence

Violence with a focus on property, such as burglary and robbery

One of the most common types of crime across the countries surveyed was theft of personal property. In the three countries respondents often underscored thefts, robberies, and burglary as serious areas of concern. Different from theft, which is defined as taking others’ property without their consent and without using threats or force, robbery and home burglary include the use of force and sometimes even weapons. Violence against personal property with or without the use of threat or forces are potentially a product of high inequality, weak protection of property, inadequate services regarding citizen security, and weak institutions.

According to surveyed respondents in South Sudan, home burglary is the most common type of crime in the researched communities (with 31% of the respondents in 2013 and 23% in 2014 who said they have been victims of crime), followed closely by theft and physical
assault. Other pervasive forms of violence against property in South Sudan, like cattle raiding, are more concentrated in rural states and are frequently ethnically motivated. Such incidents tend to increase intra-communal conflict and resulting in higher numbers of murdered and displaced people (OCHA 2013). In the RoC and Nigeria, surveyed interlocutors echoed petty theft, armed robbery and thuggery as main areas of concern in the community.

**Interpersonal violence, including homicide**

Interpersonal violence, such as physical abuse and homicide, can result in severe physical injuries, death and long lasting psychological consequences. High rate of homicides is an area of concern in South Sudan, as the country ranks among the most violent countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the homicide rate is significantly higher than the “epidemic threshold rate” of 10 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants established by WHO.

In Nigeria, kidnapping is a growing concern while murders were also cited as a common crime. Additionally, Nigeria respondents also cited cultism, which appears to be the most serious crime occurring in the studied areas. Cultist activities are conducted by gangs of young men who use juju (black magic) as part of their rituals, which largely involve fighting with other cultist gangs. The cults operate under mutual defense pacts; if a member of one cult picks a fight with or threatens a member of another cult, members of both groups are required to join in fighting in order to defend the honor and physical wellbeing of the members involved in the original dispute33. In this country, thuggery was also mentioned as a common type of crime. This involves intimidation and extortion and it is often used during election periods to influence electoral outcomes. Nigeria also noted crimes related to sorcery, including assault. In RoC, research findings also pointed out the use of substance abuse as characteristic of crime and violence dynamics in urban areas as well as crime related to sorcery, including murder and physical assault.

**Gender Based Violence (GBV)**

Defined as “any harmful act that is perpetrated against a person’s will, and that is based on socially ascribed (gender) differences between males and females,” gender-based violence is a serious concern in all three countries, and requires special attention and policy responses. Women and girls comprise an extremely vulnerable group, with deep cultural roots that have a severe negative impact on the health, wellbeing, and social inclusion. Although accurate data are largely unavailable, females appear to experience high levels of gender-based violence in all three countries. Focus group interviews revealed that women and girls in South Sudan consider sexual and gender-based violence to be one of the major problems they face. Additionally, it is important to note that males can also become victims of gender-based violence. More research could be beneficial to find out if these challenges are differ in rural and urban environments, and if victims in urban environments face additional challenges.

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33 Rotimi, Adewale. "Violence in the citadel: The menace of secret cults in the Nigerian universities." *Nordic Journal of African Studies* 14, no. 1 (2005): 79-98. According to Adewale, secret cults are defined “as a group of people whose activities are carried out in exclusive locations and unusual times without being exposed to the uninitiated”. In the Nigerian context these groups have associated with violent activities as part of the cult activity and operating in universities and education centers.

There are various ways in which violence against women is manifested:

**Rape**

Sexual violence including rape appears to be a common type of crime in all three countries of study. In South Sudan, rape statistically accounts for 5% of all of major crimes, despite the fact that rape is underreported. Similarly, in RoC, focus groups comprised solely of women, cited rape and domestic violence as primary concerns for women. In one female focus group, 100% of participants stated that they knew someone, who had been raped. Medical staff in the urban areas in Mindouli confirmed that by far the most common injuries requiring treatment are those associated with rape; while in Gamboma, medical staff at the local hospital estimates that three women each month access his clinic for services related to rape. Rape also tends to be an underreported crime, for multiple reasons, including the associated stigma and the insensitive and/or ineffective response of formal and informal justice institutions.

**Domestic Violence including Intimate Partner Violence**

Across all three countries, domestic violence was a recurring and grave problem – though in some countries, such as Nigeria and South Sudan, respondents did not consider domestic violence a criminal offense. Perpetrators of domestic violence identified during the country studies were predominantly male family members such as male relatives and husbands. In South Sudan, this is the most common form of violence experienced by married women. According to existing literature and study, close to 70% of those interviewed knew of a family member or a neighbor, who had been beaten by their husbands in the previous month; over 40% knew of males who had forced their wives to have sex in the previous month; and 80% knew of males who had gotten drunk and beat their wives. In RoC, women’s focus groups described beatings, molestation and rape occurring frequently between partners, and male respondents recognized that it was a serious concern. One NGO director recounted that women living ‘en concubinage’ disproportionately experience domestic violence. In a particular troubling reflection of the discriminatory status of women, most Nigerian respondents interviewed, including women, did not consider domestic violence (wife beating) to be a criminal offense, despite the fact that Nigeria’s penal code criminalizes it. Women frequently do not report domestic and sexual violence because they are afraid they will not be supported by their families and/or social institutions and may even suffer retaliation.

**Early Marriage**

Child brides is another serious concern, when examining violence against women. It compounds structural discrimination and aggravates vulnerability to domestic violence, as these girls are “disempowered, dependent on their husbands and deprived of their fundamental rights to health, education and safety.” Based on recent studies, South Sudanese girls under the age of 15 are forced into marriage, a practice with long cultural history. This

35 The South Sudan report draws on this study for the above mentioned GBV statistics: Scott, Jennifer; Averbach, Sarah; Merport Modest, Anna; Hacker, Michele; Cornish, Sarah; Spencer, Danielle; Murphy, Maureen and Parmar, Parveen (2013) “An assessment of gender inequitable norms and gender-based violence in South Sudan: a community-based participatory research approach.” *Conflict and Health* 7 (1): 4.
phenomenon is connected to girl’s limited access to secondary education, families’ need to access money or resources in exchange for marriage, and families’ assumptions that marriage is a means of “protecting” or “controlling” their daughters. While the other countries did not focus on early marriage, statistics outside the World Bank confirm that the phenomenon is present: In Nigeria, 43% of girls are married off before their 18th birthday and 17% are married before they turn 15, while in RoC, 6% are married before turning 15 and 33% are married before they turn 18.36

**Structural discrimination**

Compounding the first impact is the structural discrimination women face in terms of access to services, education, protection and justice. Thus, frequently, female victims of GBV are afraid to report the crime because of potential social and family consequences such as societal shunning in addition to not having safe and accessible confidential services available to them. This was common in all three countries, and linked to the patriarchal power structures. For example, married and often pregnant at a young age, young women throughout the RoC are less likely to complete the final year school examination, the *baccalauréat*, less likely to enter tertiary education, as a result, and less likely to find formal employment. The RoC remains a traditional society, reflected in gender roles. Women are more likely to assume household responsibilities for family, including child rearing, and 33% of women find themselves in charge of the household, without a husband or partner to rely on as a result of divorce, polygamy, widowhood, or abandonment. Widows can be treated particularly harshly throughout the RoC by the family of a dead spouse, sometimes finding herself and her children ejected from the family home.

The fact that women frequently do not receive justice or institutional support if the crimes are reported suggest that double and triple victimization is an important issue in all three countries. This double and, often triple victimization that women experience further inhibits their ability to live normal, productive lives subsequently.

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http://www.girlsnotbrides.org/what-is-the-impact/
2.4 Common risk factors of crime and violence across countries

Nigeria, RoC and South Sudan all share several risk factors correlated with crime and violence. It is important to note that "Violence is not ‘caused’ by any one factor, but is the result of the accumulation of a variety of risk factors at different levels, and at different stages of the life cycle."\(^{37}\) Risk factors include individual, family, and community or social environments, and their interactions are often complex. Moreover equally important is the failing of protective factors or local resilience.\(^{38}\) The study identified the following as main risk factors for crime and violence:

**Inequality**

Increasing level of economic inequality is a risk factor for rising levels of crime and violence. It is important to note that “inequality and deprivation is not limited exclusively to income, but also lack of access to basic social services, lack of state protection, exposure to systematic corruption, and inefficiencies that most acutely affect the poor.”\(^{39}\) Data suggest that those excluded as a result of socioeconomic disparities, particularly young males from ethnically or racially disadvantaged groups, are frequently involved in serious violent behavior, as victims and perpetrators. All three countries exhibited a worrying level of inequality. South Sudan’s GINI coefficient of income inequality stood at 45.3 in 2009 (last available data), which ranks among the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa. In RoC, the GINI coefficient for disposable income declined between 2005 and 2011, and is now equivalent to 40.17, which is above countries with similar level of income.\(^{40}\) Nigeria’s GINI coefficient ranks at 39.79, but as aforementioned, the economic inequality is growing worse, and is often regionalized; in Nigeria: the percentage of Nigerians living in absolute poverty (earning less than a dollar a day) has increased to 61% over the past decade, compared with 55% in 2004.

Additionally, rapidly urbanizing spaces aggravate inequality and human insecurity. As aforementioned, Africa’s cities host highly deprived and volatile slums in the world, and the rights and property of their residence are not sufficiently protected. Poor urban residents are rarely have access to adequate services to satisfy human security in its broader sense, while also being more at risk to economic shocks and pollution. Research from across Sub-Saharan Africa and South and Southeast Asia point to a strong connection between “underlying conditions of poverty and inequality” and urban violence.\(^{41}\)

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\(^{38}\) Muggah (2012): 71

\(^{39}\) Muggah (2012): 45


\(^{41}\) Muggah (2012): 46
Institutional weaknesses, especially in the security sector & justices

The inability of state and local institutions to address urbanization challenges and to manage the legitimate use of force is a major contributing factor to urban violence. In many fragile states, “systems of law and order, ranging from the police, judiciary, penal systems and other forms of legal enforcement, are dysfunctional and considered illegitimate by the citizens who they are intended to serve.” Per consequence, this “capacity gaps in providing basic and accountable security services is a key determinant shaping urban violence.” The World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report underlines the importance of prioritizing institutional transformation of government entities charged with providing security, justice as well as jobs as “central to effectively linking security and development approaches.” Weak institutions, often compounded by low levels of legitimacy, and low government will, “feed wider alienation and mistrust of the police and government agencies,” thus contributing to fragility.

Governance is a major challenge across all three countries surveyed. The weakness of institutions at the forefront to the state’s response to crime and violence is of particular concern. This includes the lagging capacity in the municipal government as well as the security sector, which includes the police, military, prison complex and justice sector. Security and justice institutions provide the foundations for resilient societies and for providing sustainable, equitable access to justice. These are the institutions at the heart of the social contract with the state, which are crucial to economic growth. Corruption and ineffective performance negatively impact human security, economic growth and equity in a country.

42 Muggah (2012): 49
44 Commins: 4.
The South Sudan study provides a detailed analysis of the weaknesses of the country’s justice sector, including the judiciary, the penal system, and the police. A young country, still conflict-affected, South Sudan has suffered from limited capacity to deliver services to citizens. One manifestation of this is that the limited ability of the police force to control crime and violence contributes to higher levels of crime and violence. In addition to a relative low police to citizen ratio, the majority of South Sudanese police force is functionally illiterate. Consequently, many of SSNPS staff cannot fulfill basic safety and security duties. Capacity of the police remains low. In RoC, which enjoyed stability since the 2000s, the security sector is comparatively more developed. This was reflected in increased trust in the institutions among surveyed participants: Focus group participants often cited the security sector, particularly the police, as the most effective mechanism to prevent and deal with crime and violence. Recognizing both its shortcomings, and the importance of security institutions that are accountable, the RoC government ensures that personnel of the army, police and gendarmerie are subject to human rights and international humanitarian law training modules. In Nigeria, however, the Nigeria Police is perceived to exercise excessive force. Additionally, corruption further undermines the police. These perceived inefficiencies and corrupt acts of the police lowered citizens’ trust in the police: some Nigerian respondents stressed that they trusted traditional institutions over the police; others turned to vigilante groups and private security forces for help.

The justice system is the next structural component of the criminal justice system. In Nigeria, political interference, corruption, and a lack of funding, equipment and training negatively hamper judicial efficiency and service provision. Even though the Nigerian state has improved criminal justice delivery in recent years; problems such as long wait times for trials, political interference with judicial appointments and judicial decision-making, weak coordination among the various justice sector institutions continue. In South Sudan as well, the justice system suffers from delays in the process, insufficient human resource capacity to run the system efficiently, and problems of corruption. When institutions are corrupt, the poor appear to be more affected and their efforts to obtain access and justice through the formal justice system are often thwarted.

The third structural component of the criminal justice system is the prison/correctional system, which exhibited major shortcomings in all three countries. Prison systems embody all of the perceived and actual weaknesses of the police and justice systems. Long wait times in overcrowded prisons negatively affect the perceived legitimacy and effectiveness of the state’s justice system. As the youngest country most recently affected by conflict, South Sudan had the biggest capacity gap among the three countries: South Sudanese prison system faces enormous challenges in terms of capacity and infrastructure, which is aged and dilapidated. In general, there is no electricity and there are inadequate accommodations for inmates. At present, it is affected by problems ranging from undertrained prison officers, overcrowding, poor hygiene and sanitary conditions, and inefficient and ineffective correctional services. South Sudan has a large number of detainees in pre-trial detention, that is, those citizens who are in jail awaiting trial, and have not yet been convicted on anything. In RoC, prisoners had much less of a wait time: those arrested spend between 48 and 72 hours in the custody of security forces before the court process commences. However, prison conditions were cited

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as an area of concern, especially for imprisoned youth. Interlocutors maintain that boys as young as 13 have been imprisoned because juvenile facilities do not exist. Accusations of excessive use of force in RoC were highlighted as an area of concern, as they may negatively affect the trust in the social contract between government and its citizens. In Nigeria, detention conditions in many of the police stations and military facilities are often precarious including limited medical care medical care, sanitation facilities as well as food and water.

These weaknesses restrict citizens’ trust in their state and their access to justice. By their very nature, security sector institutions are at the forefront of a local government’s response to crime and violence. The WDR 2011 recognized the “importance of prioritizing the institutions that provide citizen security, justice (including control of corruption), and jobs [in order] to prevent a recurrence of violence and lay the basis for future reform.” When security institutions fail, vulnerable groups, such as the poor and women, are often victimized again by the lack to justice. In all three countries, citizens’ access to security institutions was diverse and non-consistent. In the youngest country, South Sudan, for example, most victims of the most common crime, burglary, do not seek redress from the state. Instead, the majority (64%) looked for help from local vigilante groups, followed by the traditional authority (16%). Such findings point to a lack of citizen confidence in the security institutions. While communities arrange informal or private solutions to the security crisis, private solutions, such as private security, vigilante groups and traditional authorities, present their own challenges. They rarely provide security in an equitable and accountable manner. Underperforming security institutions negatively affect social trust, resilience and economic activity in a community.

Simultaneously, reform of the security institutions can increase stability, human security and per consequence, economic growth. Problem oriented policing, that is responsive to community’s needs and informed by crime data has for example contributed to lowering high rates of violence.46

Growing Young Population

The World Bank intends to integrate youth at risk of perpetuating crime and violence in their citizen security and urban planning policy, particularly in post-conflict societies. This comes from a growing recognition that a disproportionate percent of the youth population is a risk factor for increased interpersonal violence rates, without an economy to absorb them. Of note is that, like with any of these risk factors, a young population alone is not necessarily linked with rising crime and violence, and instead interacts with various other risk factors, such as trauma, access to weapons, lack of social mobility and access to services. For example, restrained access to social services, employment and education may stress a household, negatively affecting on parenting skills, and potentially increasing exposure to violence at home, which is linked to increased crime rates. However, respondents in all three countries noted believed there was a link between lack of employment opportunities for their youth, and crime and violence trends. All three countries exhibit rapid population growth, without matching economic development: South Sudan is not only a young country; its demographics indicate that almost 75% of the population is under 30 years old. This is just under twice the

population growth of the region – 2.7% – and 12% higher than the next country. The existing “youth bulge” is increasing pressure on the already strained resources in South Sudan. According to the quantitative and qualitative data collected in the South Sudan study, young males are the largest victims and perpetrators in South Sudan. Simultaneously, 44% of Nigeria’s population is below the age of 14, while in RoC approximately 41% of the population is currently under the age of 14. 47

Furthermore, in all three countries, the majority of youth are both underemployed and undereducated. The large “youth bulge”, compounded by high levels of underemployment and low levels of educational persistence, correlates with criminal and violent activities. This further negatively affects the larger social network. For example, youth in RoC causes significant stresses on society: Young adult men and women remain tethered to the family home, unable to strike out for themselves as a result of unemployment, and parents are increasingly providing a financial safety net for their children, and sometimes their grandchildren, for longer than was the case previously. Without additional resources, the youth cohort may increasingly engage in delinquent and violent behavior, be lured into more organized criminal structures, and, in general, engage in collective violence through participation in non-state armed groups, militias, and gangs.

**Education – Teaching prevention**

Countries had different responses to the challenge of youth. Republic of Congo emphasized civic youth education as well as vocational training. Education strategies can be focused in a wide variety of ways. The strongest evidence linked to long-term beneficial effects relies on training families on practicing healthy parenting skills. In the communities of the world where violence is perpetrated frequently, most perpetrators and victims are usually youth. Violent behaviors are learnt early on in life. As such, within a more pro-social family and community environment such lessons on violence can be prevented. Evidence collected in multiple countries in the world shows that educating parents on the promotion of healthy behaviors towards their children is key for building resilience and long lasting pro-social behaviors. As a complement to these, working with youth in high-risk settings with a history of violent behaviors and teaching them alternative ways to interpret potential threats or situations can contribute to interrupt violent events. There is some evidence that introducing curricula that addresses conflict-resolution strategies can be useful in reducing aggressive behaviors. Education strategies are important but need to be complemented with a wider variety of efforts addressing community-wide needs and focused on youth.

**Conflict Legacy**

Another important risk factor is the legacy of conflict, and its potential nefarious effects on crime and violence trends: “Legacies of armed conflict, political authoritarianism and repressive policing are also all routinely associated with the onset and persistence of urban violence.” 48 Conflict has destructive effects on social norms and institutions regulating violence. Additionally, research on traumatized population and violence trends is just starting, but findings indicate that long-lasting psychological scars are associated with

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48 Muggah (2012): VIII
increased violence: Traumatized children, for example, have a higher disposition to violent behavior in adulthood.\(^\text{49}\)

In the case of the three countries surveyed, all three had a history of violent conflict, but were at different stages of post-conflict state building. The most recently affected is South Sudan: Its historic war of independence and ongoing recent civil conflict are a risk factor for increased rates of crime and violence for multiple reasons. For one, South Sudan’s population has a high access to small arms and the knowledge of how to use them, contributing to the increasing rate of violence. Another important issue contributing to crime and violence in South Sudan is the high number of ex-combatants returning to civilian life in the society. In the case of South Sudan, the more than 34,000 combatants who returned to civilian life are struggling to integrate into local communities, despite DDR efforts.

Simultaneously, RoC was selected for this study because the country has made considerable gains in peace and stability since its conflict, and preventing recourse amongst vulnerable groups to crime and violence. Still, the report emphasized a lag in institutional capacity and infrastructure in areas that were particularly affected by the conflict. However, it should not be neglected that RoC also made impressive progress: Regarding its disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) efforts, RoC’s Reinsertion Commission for Ex-Combatants reports that ex-combatants are now well integrated into society and that their needs, such as unemployment, low education, mirror those of their counterparts, who did not engage in armed conflict. The Commission continues to maintain informal operations to with rebel leadership to ensure that ex-combatants remain outside the fray of potential conflict, but this mechanism is largely focused with maintaining a post-conflict peace.

Nigeria has been officially out of conflict since the end of the Biafra war over four decades ago. However, the country also faces serious challenges on instability: Nigeria is a host to multiple organized and informal armed groups, with Boko Haram being the most lethal and destabilizing. Due to Boko Haram violence Nigeria ranked fourth on the Global Terrorism Index in 2014, and experienced the three of the most lethal terrorist attacks of the previous year.\(^\text{50}\)

2.5 Mapping local response systems to Crime and Violence

While risk factors were similar across the countries, responses to the challenges were highly diverse across the countries and within them. Often, a community’s response to crime depends on the presence of the state, strength of traditional institutions, and in the face of relative lack of either, communities turned to vigilante groups or private security- both of which do not provide equitable access to justice. For example, the survey research in South Sudan found that even though citizens view the police as the main institution to deal with problems of insecurity, they don’t always rely on the police to deal with crime, especially when rapid police response was inaccessible. The most common crime in South Sudan was burglary, and 41% of the surveyed victims of housebreaking and burglary sought help from groups other than the police; 64% of those, who reported the crime did so to local vigilante groups followed by the traditional authority (16%).


The identity of the victim and the nature of the crime will impact, what avenues of redress, if any, the victim may seek. A woman subject to rape may not even report her crime to any of the institutions available, due to fear of further stigmatization and discrimination. For example, in RoC, medical information on rape were more informative, suggesting that many women did not report the crime, but did seek assistance from other sectors.

Thus, for policy makers and development experts designing a response to crime and violence, it is important to note that a community’s response varies and is highly localized and context dependent. Access to justice will depend on the victim’s gender, age, and socio-economic status; as well as each community’s institutional arrangements. As such, these responses differ within a city, within the country and between the countries. These localized coping mechanisms reinforce that any successful response to the challenges must be informed by the local context, and draw on local strengths in addition to addressing local gaps.

Local Coping Mechanisms

Nigeria exemplified the diversity of local coping structures within close geographic proximity: While Useh is organized largely around traditional structures, which dictates customs for transmitting information in the community; in Okhoro, strong overarching community structures do not exist. In Useh, information flows are concentrated through community networks that run up to the traditional leaders. Useh is peri-urban, not quite urban, and not quite rural. This transient nature and the relative homogenous population lent the traditional authorities enough authority to mediate conflict, as police access remained weak.

Traditional authorities

In many African countries, traditional authorities, or modernized versions thereof, play an important role in keeping the peace in localities. As such, victims of crime often turned to them. In Nigeria, the research team found different degrees of traditional governance, and by consequence, responses to crime and violence. Many of these differences are due to the distinct compositions of the communities. For example, Useh is organized largely around traditional structures, which take a primary role in responding to crime and violence. Useh is a peri-urban community in northwestern Benin City. While Useh is under the legal authority of Egor Local Government Area, in daily management and administration, traditional rulers are far more important. The community will take criminal concerns to the traditional leaders, the Enogie (who is appointed by the Oba of Benin, the traditional king of the Benin Kingdom) or the Odionweres (street elders). It is then the traditional leaders, who decide, of which crimes to inform the police. When violence is perceived to be criminal (e.g. murder), the Enogie and Odionweres typically refer the cases to the police immediately. Cases that are perceived to be civil in nature (e.g. disputes, fights, theft) are not typically referred to the police, but are instead handled by the traditional leaders.

Traditional authorities often hold significant legitimacy and are important institutions responding to the challenges of violence. However, not all groups may be well served by them. As customary law is often “developed in an era dominated by patriarchy, some of its norms
conflict with human rights norms guaranteeing equality between men and women.”

Women, children and migrant groups may experience discrimination, and thus experience double and even triple victimization.

**Private sector response**

A common response to rising crime and violence and the lack of a government response is the rise of a private security sector. South Sudan exemplifies this: There has been rapid growth of private security firms in recent years, mainly as a consequence of the limited capacity of state institutions like the SSNPS. However, private security is not an equitable solution to the challenges of crime and violence as such services are only available to citizens, who can afford it. Although private security organizations are somewhat effective in deterring crime in certain areas, it does not “solve” the crime problem; it simply pushes crime to other geographic areas. With such a private industry, questions of accountability, transparency and the respect for human rights are often a concern.

In Nigeria, researchers also found a more creative private sector response: In Benin City, the research team identified three separate community call-in phone lines that could be used to report crime into the system: the CrimeWatch phone-in line, the Benin City police's community line, and the DICT’s proposed call-in line. Such creative ways of leveraging technology and the private sector can be a good entryway for working within the community to address the problem of crime and violence.

**Vigilante groups**

Another common community response to the limited capacity of the police force, especially for those who cannot afford private security companies, is neighborhood watch groups or vigilante groups. These were present in many of the localities studied. In South Sudan, qualitative research found that vigilante groups play an important role in community responses to crime and violence. As aforementioned, housebreaking and burglary, which is the most prevalent crime in South Sudan according to official statistics, is also the crime for which victims seek the most help from vigilante groups. In Nigeria, researchers found several vigilante groups present. There, access to vigilante groups is dependent upon payment; only those streets, or groups of streets, that are able to pool financial resources to pay for vigilante protection can access the services. Communities also reported that vigilantes groups are also involved in criminal activities such as extortion, robberies and harassment.

Vigilante groups are rarely trained in human rights. The question of accountability is a further concern. It is questionable whether vigilante groups provide equitable access to justice for minorities such as women, juveniles and migrants.

**Police**

Of note is that in some localities, strong overarching community structures do not exist. This was the case in Okhoro, Nigeria. As a result, crimes are generally brought directly to the police, instead of communicated up the chain through the traditional authorities. Field

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http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/187
researchers described a noticeable lack of trust within Okhoro’s urban context, describing a situation where “everybody is a criminal.” On Okhoro, participants perceived police responsiveness generally to be good along the tarred main roads, where police are able to respond in a matter of minutes. However, police response is poor along peripheral, un-tarred roads, through which criminals are able to escape.

Civil society responses

Another community-based response is civil society organizations and NGOs working on some aspects of crime and violence, though most often from a prevention perspective. For example, researchers found preventative NGO activities regarding crime and violence in Brazzaville; these included engaging disadvantaged children and young adults and vulnerable women groups (such as sex workers for example). In RoC, NGOs were instrumental in establishing the National Network of Associations in the Fight against Sex-Specific Violence, which provides legal assistance as well as psychological and medical support.

While the challenges or rapid urbanization and weak institutions may be overarching, every community has a different resilience and governance profile. The diversity of response mechanisms points to the importance of accounting for the local context. In areas, such as Useh, Nigeria, where un-tarred roads hamper police response, better urban infrastructure may be an important entry points. In areas, with strong traditional governance structures, community engagement and cooperation with the state to allow for training of both the community police and traditional leaders may be better suited. Development intervention must take the local context into account in order to build strong communities, resilience and equitable access to justice.

Access to Responses

A community’s response to crime depends on the presence and access to state institutions, or strength of traditional institutions, and in the face of relative lack of either, communities turn to vigilante groups or private security. Access to any of these responses often depends on the gender, age and socio-economic status of the victims. The combination of any of these services differs from neighborhood to neighborhood, to city to city, to country to country.

The graphic below visualizes the different responses to crime and violence that were found within countries, cities and between the countries:
These localized coping mechanisms reinforce that any successful response to the challenges must be informed by the local context, and draw on local strengths.

2.6 Beyond the security sector: mapping the government response

Often, governments address crime and violence from various angles, both nationally and internationally. Of course, security services are key. Additionally, national strategies to tackle urban violence can focus on prevention through education, or through a focus on reducing contributing factors, such as access to weapons, alcohol, or insecure spaces. Urban planning can integrate crime and violence data, and respond to local challenges, for example.

RoC, as an example, relies on a strategy of promoting civic and moral values, spearheaded by the High Commission for Civic Instruction and Moral Education; and combating violence against women, spearheaded by the Ministry for the Promotion of Women and the Integration of Women in Development, in coordination with the Ministry of Health. At the local level, RoC created citizens clubs based upon the tradition of mbongui, which now constitute an inter-generational space, where older members of the community can instruct and guide their more youthful counterparts towards strategies for harmonious co-existence through dialogue and debate.

However, all three country reports identified a lack of coordination, both among government agencies and stakeholders in charge of addressing and preventing crime and violence, as well as between the Government and civil society. Given the complexity and multidimensionality
of crime and violence, the design of policies and programs will benefit tremendously from comprehensive multispectral and multi-actor approaches, which involve coordination.

Such coordination can be encouraged through capacity building, as well as projects, which involve multi-sectorial approaches. These could include infrastructure projects, urban upgrading projects, and situational crime prevention activities. Coordination requires an invitation to have a dialogue around a common narrative regarding crime and violence.

### Community Mobilization and Networks – Examples from Central America

In countries with few data resources, community mobilization strategies can be an excellent tool to generate reliable information while involving the community directly in planning and setting municipal agendas aimed at solving problems related to crime, violence or many other outcomes. Through a World Bank funded project called Safer Municipalities, communities in three high violence urban settings in Honduras were contacted and involved in understanding crime location, crime dynamics and social vulnerabilities at the neighborhood level. Joint efforts with municipal authorities contributed to identifying types of crimes by location in neighborhoods as well as community resources and infrastructure. Further involvement with communities included capacity building efforts aimed at creating youth violence prevention plans emanating from the community and with the purpose of informing city government agendas. Community mobilization and involvement in a setting where few data sources existed allowed for the creation of more reliable diagnostics of the magnitude, distribution and dynamics of crime and violence. Furthermore, including the community in the design and proposal of youth violence prevention plans enhanced community involvement, awareness, and ownership of the programs. It also contributed to understand challenges that hamper prevention and control efforts. In settings where data are not easily available, engaging with the community can provide useful quantitative and qualitative information that can inform prevention and control strategies.

### Chapter 3: Possible areas for World Bank Support

#### Institutional Capacity Building

The three country studies identified serious shortcomings in the capacity of institutions that have the mandate of addressing crime and violence, and implement strategies for crime and violence prevention. Capacities of municipal and local institutions were also weak. The appearance of illegal non-state actors in the form of vigilante groups or other forms of non-state agencies, which were observed in all three countries, speak to the societal distrust or disillusionment regarding the state’s ability to address crime and violence. This is especially troubling, as WDR 2011 established that “coordination across justice agencies is critical to reduce impunity, and that effective linkages must exist between the police and other justice institutions, including the judiciary, public prosecutors, and prisons, to address crime and violence.”

The WDR further suggests that consolidation of and coordination among security services is a fundamental first step in institutional reforms to prevent violence.

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The police force is a critical component of this process. They are the first point of contact with the criminal justice system for citizens, and they are the visible presence of government policy. Strengthening their capacity and their respect for civil rights is important for any successful crime and violence prevention strategy. Such a process benefits from the engagement of civil society.

Additionally, local government is often at the forefront in the struggle against crime and violence. Municipal government officials are closest to the problems and concerns of citizens and are more attuned to their perceptions of insecurity. Municipal governments can assemble a wider range of actors, such as police, communities, civil society organizations, and others, to analyze, discuss, and design a mixed range of programs and interventions. Local governance projects can provide an entry point for specific crime and violence prevention activities with the participation of multiple sectors and actors.

**Better coordination inter-governmentally and with civil society actors**

Weak institutions and limited government reach often translate into lack of coordination between government agencies as well as with civil society. However the multiple and interlinked risk factors of crime and violence necessitate integrated, holistic efforts. Such coordination can be encouraged through capacity building, as well as projects, which involve multi-sectorial approaches. These could include infrastructure projects, urban upgrading projects, and situational crime prevention activities. Coordination requires an invitation to have a dialogue around a common narrative regarding crime and violence. Ministerial
perceptions on the scope of crime and violence may differ depending on their approach to the issue. A common narrative can facilitate prioritization and cross-agency cooperation.

Civil society can play a crucial way in addressing crime and violence especially in prevention as well as support services to victims.

**Addressing gender based violence**

Gender is often underestimated in policy design, and all three countries face an important challenge when it comes to combating gender related crime and violence. Challenges remain on gender disaggregated data collection on crime and violence as well as with access to justice for women. Disaggregated data for gender is a complex matter, due in part to the low report rates for GBV; thus, at times, the cost of investing into better data collection has to be weighed against the cost of addressing prevention and service provision policies. In the context of GBV, it is important to note that it is unclear to what extent these challenges differ in the urban context vis-à-vis the rural context, as all of these crimes occur in rural contexts as well. More research is needed to better understand how GBV differs in cities, and whether the changing social dynamics of urban areas, and the potential longer commutes affect GBV.

However, cities can be important hubs for service provision for large population, including women. Service provision includes a sensitive police response, access to the legal system and prevention of secondary or tertiary victimization in this process, and policies, which shield women from stigmatization. In addition to ensuring that the legal system provides equitable and fair justice to victims of gender violence, a focus on gender will strengthen the diagnostics of the problem and, as a result, improve targeting and better monitoring and evaluation of interventions. Policies focused on prevention could include educational promotion of behavior change. Gender policies ought to take into account gender dynamics, including the question of masculinity. Additionally, policies to mainstream GBV awareness in the justice system are important to prevent secondary and tertiary discrimination. Civil society engagement can be key here: engaging women organizations can ensure that women’s concerns are integrated in institutional reform. It also can slowly build trust between women and the security institutions. Civil society in the RoC were key in advocating for policies on GBV as well as in providing a network that helped victims to navigate the existing justice system, for example.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses by Civil Society</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Republic of Congo exemplifies, how a country can draw on civil society in addressing pressing matters of Crime and Violence: The Ministry for the Promotion of Women stressed its engagement with NGOs in the fight against violence against women, and several NGOs were instrumental in establishing the National Network of Associations in the Fight against Sex-Specific Violence. The network is particularly active in providing legal assistance to victims as they navigate the legal process, in addition to providing psychological and medical support.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

In short, with regards as GBV, there are clear opportunities and needs not only to mainstream gender aspects in urban projects but also to implement standalone projects that specifically address GBV, particularly prevention of GBV through promotion of behavioral change and provision of services to survivors. The matrix below details examples of both challenges and opportunities to address GBV in urban context. There are still many more options to be
explored in terms of operational interventions and this report aims only to open the door to have more structured discussions around this area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Challenge</th>
<th>Opportunity in Urban Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prevention</td>
<td>- Time and attention of targeted communities: Difficulties to reach communities and have them mobilize time for sensitization and community education</td>
<td>Use of ICT and mass media campaigns for broader access and reaching communities:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Urban areas offer opportunities for better access to cell phones (e.g. reporting and seeking support through hot lines)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Urban areas offer opportunities for better access to radio/TV as mechanisms for broader reach out to communities at risk or victims of GBV.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- These mechanisms are good alternatives to most onerous options such as in person community education.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Education system as an entry point to address GBV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Higher rate of children in schools, and concentration of schools present a good opportunity to use education as an entry point to address GBV.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of Services</td>
<td>- In principle urban areas present more opportunities to have better and more service provision. At the same time, there are challenges in terms of accessibility (e.g. security concerns, higher cost of services).</td>
<td>Examples in Africa are good cases on how to address the mentioned challenges (e.g. One Stop Center models; Panzi Hospital; and Heal My People gender-based violence program).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The mentioned examples address issues such as accessibility, several services provided (e.g. medical, mental health, safe houses, legal support, etc.), confidentiality for the victims, coordination at the institutional level and follow-up on cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Urban areas have also more diffuse entry points for service provision if compare to rural areas (i.e. women organizations).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- A big question is how to ensure follow up of survivors from rural areas, seeking support in cities, and then returning to their homes.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Improvement of crime and violence data collection and management information systems

Lack of reliable data on crime and violence limits effective policy action and response. To some extent, all three country studies identified the lack of data and reliable information on crime and violence as one of the main limitations for effective policy action and intervention in this area. Crime data collection was weak; dissemination across government agencies rare and policy responses were not grounded in data. Access to data helps policy makers design better policies and programs and, more important, to make evidence based decisions which will improve targeting and increase the impact of the interventions.

Limited data collection on crime and violence undermines the promotion of data driven policies and programs to address crime and violence. In the case of RoC and Nigeria, it was unclear to what extent the police and the governments were able to collect the data necessary for informed policy. Nigeria had some localized crime call-in lines, and crime watch television programs, which collect and disseminate data. These initiatives could be potential entry points for training in data collection and support in governmental coordination. Existing systems could be extended with a combination of trained helpdesk staff, digitization of historical data, new input mechanisms, and new output displays (e.g. maps and visualizations).

There is also room for multi-sectorial coordination with regards to data. Integrated policies designed to tackle crime and violence can be greatly informed by data obtained from sectors other than the police and the criminal justice system.
Youth Employment and Vocational training

Information and Institutional Coordination – The case of the observatories of crime in Latin America

Data collection gathered in a systematic, reliable, and timely manner is essential for properly designing policies, programs and interventions aimed at preventing crime and violence. Experiences at the municipal level in Latin America have shown that to have such reliable and timely information, institutional coordination is essential. The first such approach from Cali, Colombia, included mainstreaming violence prevention as a central municipal level policy. The objectives of the program included the strengthening of democratic institutions, community empowerment, priority needs assessment, and a communication strategy for promotion of peaceful conflict resolution. A key structure to monitor progress on these objectives was the creation of an information system that integrated data collected by several institutions. The main data collection efforts were focused on a reliable and timely measurement of homicide occurrences within the entire municipality. To do this institutional coordination was essential. Data were collected on a daily basis and reviewed weekly by a committee that included representatives from the police department, the public health service, the district attorney’s office, the ombudsman’s office, the National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences, and the department of transportation, under the coordination of an unit assigned by the mayor’s office. The different sources of information allowed for identification of duplicate data, missing data and improved overall quality. These data in turn were used by all the involved institutions to implement control or prevention programs. This same information contributed to evaluate policies such as the effect of alcohol restrictions and its influence in homicide as well as the effect of restrictions in the carrying of firearms and its association with homicide. The model has since been replicated in a variety of municipalities in more than 20 countries in Latin America and has provided useful information for evaluating policies, programs and interventions. Furthermore, data dissemination to the general public has improved accountability mechanisms. As the population can follow the changes in crime, municipal governments need to become more responsive to those trends. These models can be useful in many contexts independent of the size of municipalities and geographic location.

All three countries share increasingly young populations with relatively low educations, and an economy struggling to absorb the growing youth bulge. Youth are involved in crime and violence both as victims and perpetrators. According to WHO’s estimates, they suffer one of the highest homicide rate in Sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, evidence gathered in South Sudan showed youths, and especially young man, are both the largest victim group and the main perpetrators of crime and violence. If not addressed, the compounding factors such as low levels of education, high levels of unemployment, and lack of opportunities for social and recreational activities, will increase the risk of higher levels of crime and violence. All three countries would benefit from well-conceptualized and administered vocational training programs. There is room to build upon existing vocational and technical training for young men and women.

Mainstreaming Crime and Violence Prevention into Urban Upgrading

There is a strong link between urban infrastructure, public services, and crime and violence trends. Specifically, lights at night, access to roads, location and distribution of transport networks play an important role in terms of the reduction of victimization rate and effective police response. For example, the Nigeria study showed a link between urban design and crime. Interviewees linked poor quality of the roads to slow police responses and higher
crime rates. Respondents further underscored other factors such as lack of streetlights, security cameras and prevalence of dense brush in some areas. Surveyed participants noted that development projects frequently increase public safety, clearing brush (often a by-product of development projects) and increasing the density of the built environment have positive effects. A conscious evaluation of how urban upgrading affects citizen security can lower crime and violence. These can include conscious installation of street lighting, an emphasis on safe walking corridors and urban infrastructure that allows easy surveillance of pedestrian access areas. Further, holistic urban planning strategies including territorial organization and use of land are also key to crime and violence reduction. In the case of South Sudan, residents in areas where there is no territorial planning tended to be more exposed to crime and violence, and empirical evidence has shown that commercial and residential mixed areas are associated with less crime and violence compared to areas that are exclusively residential or commercial.

**Behavioral impact – The case of mass transport settings**

In urban settings, understanding the impact of services and infrastructure in relation to perceptions is very important. Evidence from Mexico and Colombia for example shows that in context or spaces where personal safety is perceived as a major issue, behaviors will change despite other environmental conditions set up for promoting citizens’ wellbeing. For example urban structures designed for promoting pedestrian safety (e.g. a pedestrian bridge) or controlling speed (e.g. traffic calming devices for motor vehicles) while useful for these purposes, can be rendered useless if citizens perceive them as places where their personal safety is compromised. Individuals will not cross a pedestrian bridge if they perceived they will be mugged there. Instead they will opt for crossing throughways exposing themselves to higher risks of injury because of their perceived (real or not) risk to their personal safety. In other cases individuals report that in neighborhoods that are unsafe, introducing traffic calming devices (designed for improving street safety by reducing motor vehicle speeds), can increase the risk of carjackings. For planning and prevention purposes, it is thus key to understand contexts beyond their primary objective. As such, when planning and developing transport infrastructures not only transport safety but also personal safety need to be well understood so that such investments get the use they are intended to provide for the population. This contextual information and understanding of behaviors is key for the proper implementation and effectiveness of interventions.
The World Bank has wide ranging experiences in all of these areas mentioned above. The table below outlines issues and options for World Bank engagement in crime and violence prevention:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Potential Interventions</th>
<th>Bank Instrument</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imperative of a multi-sectoral/stakeholder approach for crime and</td>
<td>Institutional Capacity Building</td>
<td>Improvement of crime and violence data collection and management information systems</td>
<td>Trust Fund - Technical Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>violence reduction</td>
<td></td>
<td>Capacity building for crime and violence prevention for National and State governments</td>
<td>WB Training course on crime and violence Prevention</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Capacity building for crime and violence prevention at the local level. This includes</td>
<td>Municipal-Urban Management/local Governance programs</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>the establishment of multi-sectoral groups to jointly plan both preventive and</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>responsive approaches</td>
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<tr>
<td>Physical-environment risk factors for crime and violence</td>
<td>Crime prevention through environmental</td>
<td>Integrated environmental design that incorporates crime prevention (e.g. street lighting</td>
<td>Slum upgrading project or urban management programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>design/ environmental crime prevention</td>
<td>and basic infrastructure to prevent offenders from committing crime</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic risk factors for crime and violence</td>
<td>Violence reduction/prevention programs</td>
<td>&quot;Sectoral Interventions&quot;: Range of local interventions based on local priorities\demand</td>
<td>Component in &quot;Sectoral Projects&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>through:</td>
<td>Range of local interventions based on local priorities</td>
<td>Community based violence prevention pilots in urban areas and CDD sub-projects</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community Based Violence Prevention</td>
<td></td>
<td>in rural areas</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employment/livelihoods</td>
<td>Strengthen vocational training/microenterprise programs/sites and employment creation</td>
<td>Employment/youth interventions (Public works programs) and Vocational training</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>through public works programs</td>
<td>programs</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>School based violence prevention programs</td>
<td>Education Sector Project(s)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusions

Incidents of crime and violence are prevalent in South Sudan, Nigeria and RoC. While the respondents of the three studies and the cases studies of the three particular countries are not fully representative of the crime and violence trend in urban Africa, the research findings have reflected and showcased the fragile status of African cities. As a continent that hosts more than a quarter of the 100 fastest-growing cities worldwide, Africa is extremely susceptible to urban crime and violence and urban fragility due to limited institutional and infrastructural capacity. Urbanization is inevitable in any developing region and is projected to continue its high rate of growth in Africa, with important implication and consequences on the overall urban development and life of city dwellers. Cities are key ecosystems, in which interventions can foster socio-economic opportunities, inclusion and social mobility. As such, and as highlighted by the 2011 World Development Report (WDR), cities are key areas for intervention in violence prevention efforts. Efforts aimed at understanding the dynamics of urban crime and violence in African cities, including causes and characteristics, provide entry points of informing development policy, so as to ensure inclusive, equitable and sustainable growth. Hence, this comparison of three countries is a step towards fostering an understanding of the challenges associated with increasing levels of urban crime within the context of rapid urbanization.

The multi-country analyses identified the subsequent risk factors associated with urban fragility in all three countries. Of note is that none of these risk factors by themselves led to increased crime and violence, and instead, each interacts with the other and the wider social context. Nevertheless, these factors were of note in the three countries surveyed:

- An increasing young population, coupled with low education and slow job growth;
- Rising inequality both in income and in access to services;
- Low institutional capacity to address the challenge of rapid, unmanaged urbanization and of increased violence;
- A serious presence of gender based violence;
- Corrosive legacy of conflict.

Despite the fact that the three countries share these challenges, their weaknesses and resilience manifest themselves in profoundly local ways. Researchers found different arrays of governance structures and coping mechanisms in each country, and often in different cities within the countries. Often, a community's response to crime depended on the presence of the state, or strength of traditional institutions, and in the face of relative lack of either, communities turned to vigilante groups or private security- both of which do not provide equitable access to justice. Access to any of these responses often depends on the socio-economic status of the victims, as well as their gender. As such, a community's response to crime varies within a state and between the countries. Development strategies must account for this highly localized context. These should include programs that support bottom-up state-society relations and community-based programs for violence prevention, employment, and associated service delivery, and access to local justice and dispute resolution. Simultaneously, declining productivity in rural areas drives Africa's rapid urbanization, pointing to the importance of situating the challenges within the country's national context. Addressing crime and violence will require a mixture of state and civil society, bottom-up and top-down approaches.
The WDR 2011 emphasized that countries and sub-national areas with the weakest institutional legitimacy and governance are the most vulnerable to violence and instability and the least able to respond to internal and external stresses. It also prioritizes the reform of institutions that provide citizen security, justice, and jobs as crucial in creating resilience to repeated cycles of violence, and further highlighted that cities are a crucible within which so-called new threats – indices of chronic fragility and cyclical violence. Crime and violence have a negative impact on development, on the quality of life of citizens, and on the emergence of democratic processes. By incorporating the crime and violence prevention agenda within the context of rapid urbanization into its operations and initiatives in the region, the World Bank can play a constructive, supportive role.

The three country studies point to some shared areas where the World Bank can play an important role in supporting crime and violence prevention:

- Improve capacity of the security sector both at the local and national government level;
- Improve the government's ability to collect crime data for informed policy responses;
- Assist the government with intergovernmental coordination regarding crime policies;
- Support and improve the physical environment in the communities in order to reduce the risks of crime and violence;
- Assist with both formal education and professional livelihood vocational training programs to reduce unemployment rate;
- Explore community-based approaches to reduce and prevent crime and violence;
- Assist with addressing gender based violence both with prevention responses and access to medical and mental services.
Bibliography


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