NUMBER 88 O EDPrecis m Operations Evaluation Department May 1995 Learning from Narmada The Sardar Sarovar projects on the assessed the projects on the basis of the tion, was a historic achievement. If Narmada River in western India, and completion reports. Once key uncer- it can be implemented satisfactorily the World Bank's role in supporting tainties are resolved, OED will under- it will improve the quality of life them until 1993, have sparked world- take its own fact-finding work to re-es- for millions of very poor people. wide controversy. The projects are de- timate project costs and benefits and- signed to bring irrigation to almost after several years-to produce an im- Opinions on the projects 2 million hectares of arid land, in what pact evaluation. Meanwhile, this would be the largest such system in Pricis outlines the salient findings Critiques of the Sardar Sarovar the world. They promise drinking wa- of evaluations completed thus far, the projects by local and international ter for 30 million people in drought- lessons they yield for development nongovernmental organizations prone areas, and electricity for agricul- decision making, and the effects that (NGOs), academics, and the media ture, cities, and industry. But they the Narmada experience has had are diverse and extensive. They threaten the livelihoods of more than upon the Bank. have focused mainly on the dis- 140,000 people in the areas to be placement of small farmers and flooded by the Sardar Sarovar dam and The Sardar Sarovar projects tribal groups, but also on the treat- to be affected by the building of canals. were conceived as the first in a se- ment of environmental issues and, And they may have negative environ- ries of some 30 projects designed to in the case of some critics, on the mental consequences. develop the Narmada basin, which basic development model that the is India's last large unexploited re- projects are seen to symbolize. An independent review, commis- source for hydropower and irriga- Some NGCs have expressed con- sioned by the Bank and completed in tion. The Bank's support for the cern about the safety of the dam June 1992, found that the resettlement scheme took the form of a ten-year (Box 2). All agree on the need to and environmental aspects of the Dam and Power Project (credit properly resettle and compensate projects were not being handled in ac- 1552/loan 2497) and a companion people adversely affected by the cordance with Bank policies. Respond- three-year Water Delivery and projects. According to some, such ing to the review, the Bank made its Drainage Project (credit 1553). Both as Narmada Bachao Andolan, there continuing support for the dam con- projects were processed in parallel has not been a single satisfactory tingent on the borrower's achievement and approved in 1985. (Box 1.) resettlement in the Narmada val- of performance standards for resettle- ley. Others, such as Arch-Vahini, ment and economic rehabilitation of The basic rationale for the find significant progress being displaced people, and for environmen- projects is sound. After ten years of made, where "oustees" have tal protection. But in March 1993 the negotiation, arrangements for shar- agreed to move, and indeed be- Bank canceled the remainder of its loan ing and using water by the four lieve that the projects have been a for the project at the request of the In- benefiting states-Gujarat, Madhya vehicle for significant improve- dian authorities. Project construction Pradesh (MP), Maharashtra, and ments in resettlement and rehabili- is proceeding with other funds. Rajasthan-were defined by the tation (R&R) in India. Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal As for any project at the completion (NWDT) in 1979. The comprehen- Independent review of Bank loan disbursements, the Bank sive basin development and man- has issued completion reports on the agement plan, based on binding Public concern about the envi- Sardar Sarovar projects. The Bank's agreements for water allocation ronmental and resettlement aspects independent Operations Evaluation among the states and institutional of the projects led the President of Department (OED) has provisionally arrangements for program execu- the Bank to commission the first Resettlement and rehabilitation Box 1: Project benefits and costs Benefits: The Sardar Sarovar Costs: Construction costs are es- Ieethenk rfin To comply projects seek to provide: timated as $5.2 billion in 1992 US dollars. As designed, the reservoir with its own guidelines on R&R and Irrigation water for about 1.8 mil- will submerge 38,000 ha of land at on the treatment of tribal peoples. lion hectares (ha), directly benefiting full water level. It will fully or 800,000 families in severely drought- partly cover 245 villages that are preparation of R&R plans or state prone areas, mainly in Gujarat but home to 41,000 families (80 percent government policies for implement- also in Rajasthan. in Madhya Pradesh, 11 percent in ing the provisions of the NWDT, and Gujarat, and 9 percent in the resettlement components of the * Domestic, municipal, and indus- Maharashtra). As well as their projects were inadequately ap- trial water for about 30 million land, the people affected by the praised. The projects did not meet consumers, in areas where malnutri- reservoir will lose a number of im- the needs of tribal people whose tion and unsafe domestic water portant cultural sites. Canal con- land was to be inundated or of supply cause a wide array of struction will take about 4 percent people whose land was to be affected endemic diseases. of the canal command area or by the building of canals. Bank ef- 74,000 ha, and thus affect the land forts to compensate for the lack of * Power generation capacity of owned by a further 68,000 families, an adequate appraisal helped bring 1,450 megawatts (MW) and distribu- About 24,000 of the canal-affected about some improvements, but this tion of hydroelectric energy to families stand to lose more than a "incremental aproach" to the task Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, and fourth of their land, and about Maharashtra. The project. would 2,000 of them will lose more than of R&R failed to achieve all the substantially impro%e the hydrother- half. Forest land will be inundated, mal mix of India's Western Regional rates of sedimentation in the river grid (who.e installed capacity was are likely to change, and, in the The IR found the borrower to be 12,000 MW in 1990). Using hNdro- medium to long term, the reduced in breach of the provisions of the power rather than coal to generate flow of river water into the Gulf of NWDT and the Bank's legal agree- 1,450 MW avoids 3.2 million tons of Kharbat is expected to reduce the ments. It noted that lack of adequate carbon dioxide emissions each year. yield of artisanal fisheries, baseline information on the people dto be affected made it impossible to prepare effective resettlement plans, ever independent review of a committed itself to completing and that the people to be affected Bank-supported project under the project with other sources had not been adequately consulted implementation. The review panel of funds, and it affirmed its con- or informed of their resettlement op- was headed by Bradford Morse. tinuing commitment to the R&R tions and rehabilitation packages. Published in June 1992, the indepen- and environmental standards It also noted institutional weak- dent review (IR) strongly criticized embedded in its agreements nesses, poor implementation, par- the Bank and borrower for paying with the Bank. ticularly in MP, and inadequate inadequate attention to resettlement links between dam construction and rehabilitation and to environ- Developments since 1992: and R&R implementation. mental protection. (See Sardar two evaluations compared Sarovar: The Report of the Independent The concluding chapter of the IR Review. Ottawa, Canada: Resource Three years after the IR was stated: "There is a need to consider Futures International, June 1992.) published, in March 1995, the [the projects] in the social and envi- Bank's South Asia Region issued ronmental context of the Narmada Responding to the IR, in Septem- completion reports (PCRs) on the valley as a whole, to consult, informn, ber 1992 the Bank set standards of Narmada projects. These evalua- and involve the people affected by performance for its continuing sup- tion reports by operational staff the projects... The opposition, espe- port of the dam project (the delivery take up the concerns raised by the cially in the submergence area, has and drainage project had already IR, outline the actions taken since ripened into hostility. So long as this been completed in July 1992). An the IR was published, and pin- hostility endures, progress will be action plan, developed by the Bank point some Outstanding questions. impossible except as a result of unac- in consultation with the Indian au- Each report contains a section ceptable means." thorities, was reviewed and en- contributed by the borrower that dorsed by the Bank's executive di- notes points of disagreement PCR: The PCR finds that "A long rectors. In March 1993, however, the with the Bank. The following learning process led to what can now Indian government requested the paragraphs compare the findings be considered a reasonably well Bank to cancel the remainder of its of the IR with those of the structured program." Each state pro- loan for the project. The government completion reports. gressively improved its R&R policy; May 1995 the most liberal was that of Gujarat, PCR: After the IR the Indian gov- followed by Maharashtra and MP. emient (August 1993) issued a cor- 'Box 2: Dam safety At the closure of the Bank's loan dis- prehensive environmental overview bursements, implementation ap- for the project, together with studies The government of Gujarat peared to be satisfactory in Gujarat on the upstream and downstream established a Dam Review Panel but less so in Maharashtra and MP. impacts and a preliminary environ- in June 1981, made up of five na- The PCR recognizes the Bank's fail- mental impact assessment for the irri- tional and two expatriate ex- ure to follow its guidelines at ap- gation command area. The govern- perts, to ensure the adequacy of praisal, but also records the Bank's ment made concerted efforts on sev- the foundation and the overall large efforts to redress the situation eral environmental fronts, including design safety of the main dam during implementation. It acknowl- compensatory afforestation (expected and its appurtenances. The panel edges the complexity of R&R and to be completed before the dam is accepted the layout, design, and the efforts made by both Bank and filled), catchment area treatment wimentens consltans borrower to adopt satisfactory (underway and expected to be cnire the adequa th policy, plans, and links between the completed on time), and preservation donignd teaqand fe pace of dam construction and the of cultural sites and protection of iactors and the integrity of the progress of R&R. wildlife. Bank staff note that in main dam, spi]lwavs, intake and early 1995 the government issued outlet works, and other struc- By May 1994, Bank staff report, an environmental assessment tures. In 1994, howe%er, a 1100 about 6,600 of the 41,000 families to covering all environmental aspects vear flood caused heav damage be affected by the reservoir had been of the project. to the incomplete stifing basin. resettled and economically rehabili- Thi has now been repaired. tated in a satisfactory manner. Out The PCR notes that "consultants of some 24,000 families who stood to recruited to assist the borrower be- lose more than 25 percent of their leve the remaining environmental land to the construction of canals, matters do not pose serious threats to Hydrology about 10,000 had been compensated either the environment or local resi- and economically rehabilitated, dents, except in the estuary down- Independent review: "Significant though on terms inferior to those stream of the dam where some fish- discrepancies in the hydrological that are now being considered by ing communities may need R&R and data and analyses show that the the Gujarat government. water may need to be released for en- projects will not perform as vironmental control at a later stage." planned... .A comprehensive evalua- Environment tion is needed, including a complete The PCR argues the need to safe- systems analysis." Independent review: The projects guard the environment downstream disregarded the environmental by maintaining adequate water re- PCR: After the IR was published regulations of both India and the leases from the dam from the start, the borrower's Central Water Com- Bank, most of which had been in rather than risking committing too mission and a Bank consultant re- place for at least a decade. (By 1992, much water to irrigation and then viewed and confirmed the adequacy seven years after project approval, having to withdraw water supplies of the hydrology data that underlie neither the Bank's legal require- from farmers if environmental prob- project planning. But a 1994 review ments nor the conditions attached to lems develop downstream. by an independent team of experts the Ministry of Environment and appointed by the government of In- Forests' 1987 environmental clear- Health dia could not reach a firm conclu- ance had been met.) The review sion on likely river flows and rec- criticized the projects' disjointed, Independent review: "The threat ommended a re-examination of piecemeal approach to environmen- of malaria is serious, projects have "dependable water availability." tal planning: "The 'pari passu' prin- been designed without appropriate ciple for doing environmental stud- safeguards..." The PCR supports the contention ies as construction proceeds under- that the river flows are adequately mines the prospect for achieving en- PCR: The Gujarat Health Depart- understood. But it argues that in vironmental protection." The IR ment has prepared an action plan for view of the ways farmers wil prob- found that lack of basic data and surveillance and control of malaria. ably use irrigation water, plus the consultation with affected people But sound engineering practice will need to maintain water releases to made it very difficult to anticipate be needed to limit canal seepage, wa- safeguard the environment down- and mitigate environmental im- ter logging, and pools stream of the dam, plus the uncer- pacts. It expressed strong concerns of all kinds, and the incidence of tainty about whether the Narmada about the projects' possible environ- waterborne diseases will need to be Sagar dam upstream of the Sardar mental consequences. closely monitored. Sarovar dam will be built on sched- eED Pr3is ule, not enough water will be avail- sional ratings of the Narrada pro- To rate the Banks performance, able to irrigate all the planned com- jects are shown in the table. To reach OED took account of the Bank's fail- mand area. On this basis the PCR these ratings, OED took account of: ure to follow its own guidelines on: recommends a gradual "stepwise" expansion of irrigation in the com- the delayed but substantial involuntary resettlement-at mand area. In any case, it notes, it progress on physical structures; appraisal, little or no consultation would be more economic to irrigate with affected villagers, no estab- more intensively. * the improved R&R policies lished state resettlement policies, and adopted by the states, and the pro- inadequate baseline data for The borrower's view is that water gress being made in resettlement; responsible planning; requirements have been properly es- timated and that if water is scarce, the link between construction and indigenous peoples-only Gujarat farmers will be encouraged to give progress on resettlement; had studies, and no acceptable pro- preference to monsoon crops and re- posals for resettlement or training; duce areas sown in the dry season; the view of independent consult- reducing the canal command area ants that significant environmental environment-preparation stud- would contradict the project's prime damage has not occurred and is ies were too general, and the projects goal of improving social welfare and unlikely to occur, provided monitor- were approved without the neces- equity. As to the implementation of ing and remedial measures are sary government of India forest and physical works, the borrower still satisfactory; environmental clearances. envisages completing the Sardar Sarovar project by the year 2000. the progress being made in imple- OED also considered the Bank's Madhya Pradesh has begun building menting the environmental strenuous efforts, in light of the find- the Narmada Sagar dam and plans action plan. ings of the independent review, to complete it in due time. Bonds have been issued to raise funds; more will be issued to satisfy future Box 3: OED evaluation method financial needs. To evaluate the Bank's corn- benefits throughout its economic The projects today: OED's view pleted lending operations, OED life. To judge the '.u-tainabilitv ot evaluators look at seweral facetu- of beneftk. evaluators look at eight OED reviews the completion achievement, synthesized in three tactor;-government commitment: reports on all Bank lending opera- major ratings: outcome, sustain- the polic env'ronment, institu- tions, and arrives at provisional rat- ability of benefits, and institutional tional and managerial effecti%e- ings of operational performance development. ness; economic, technical. financial. ingsand environmental Viabilit-N, and based on the findings of these re- Outcomes. To assess outcomes, beneficiarY participation ports. (See Box 3.) For about 40 per- evaluators look at cent of completed investment opera- tions, it conducts performance au- Rance. the degree to which the process ot improving a dits, and at the audit stage under- the operation's goals accorded Lith COUntrv'sabilit to make effective takes its own field work and inter- the country and sectoral assistance use of its human, organizational, views. This work may lead OED to strategies and %ith Banks thematic and financial resource, Evaluators change its provisional rating of an goa6. assess the institutional de%elop- operation's performance. ment progress achieved, or ex- * Efficacy: the extent to w%hich the pected to be achie%ved, as a result Once key uncertainties affecting operation actually met its physical, Lt the operation implementation have been removed, macroeconomic, sectoral, and finan- OED plans to audit the economics of cial goals. Some operations na% fail on one the Sardar Sarovar projects. The au- dits will test the validity of the esti- Efficiency in relation to inputs; to still make worthwhile contribt- mates of social costs and benefits judge this requires a reassessment tions to de%elopment. that are included in the completion of costs and implementation times When benefits can be quantified, To judge the Bank's perforinance' reports and hence underlie OED's the re-estimated rate of return is in a completed operation, CED as- provisional performance ratings. also calculated. sesses the Bank't compliance %ith policy and operational guidelines Provisional performance ratings Sustainability MeaSUres the extent and its performance in project iden- to which an operation is likely to tification, appraisal, negotiation. Based on the facts and judgments maintain an acceptable level of net and superxision. presented in the PCR, OtD's provi-table._To_reach_ OED t acout fth_Bn'sfal May 1995 to ensure that R&R and environmen- tal standards would be met. And it OE's provisional ratings of the Narmada projects noted that through involvement in project appraisal and supervision, Sardar Sarovar Water delivery the Bank provided significant techni- dam and pouer and drainage cal support for the design and con- oucm calsuportforthedesgn nd on- OutomeMarginally satisfactory Marginally satisfactory struction of the civil works, for con- crete quality control and assurance, Institutional dam safety, and improved informa- development Modest tion systems. Looking ahead Sustainability Uncertain Bank The project has made substantial performance Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory progress in civil works. The PCRs expect benefits to accrue between 1995 and 2010, three years later than expected when the projects were ap- praised. But in OED's view, further most drought-prone, reaches of implement the R&R program is delays of two years or more in both the command area), and as to the weaker. An earlier assumption that the irrigation and energy generation height of the inlet for the irrigation most of the Madhya Pradesh fami- schedules seem likely. bypass tunnel (lowering the intake lies to be affected by the dam would benefit Gujarat's diversions would move to Gujarat seems un- It is not too late to make the projects a for irrigation, particularly in likely to be fulfilled, so that much successful development venture. Based drought years, but at the expense more land in MP may need to be on the facts and assumptions pre- of Madhya Pradesh's power gen- procured to compensate them-a sented in the Bank's project comple- eration rights). Uncertainties re- process that is likely to be cumber- tion reports, the projects would real- main about the financing arrange- some. Completion of R&R arrange- ize an economic return of more than ments for the overall development ments for the families affected by 10 percent when completed. This cal- and especially for the purchase of the dam will require strengthening culation takes account of the prob- turbine generators needed for the implementation capacity in both able costs of R&R and environmen- riverbed powerhouse. Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh. tal mitigation measures, and allows for a five-year delay in completion of Satisfactory R&R is key to success. Lessons the Narmada Sagar dam upstream. As the Indian authorities formally The data and assumptions used are reaffirmed in January 1994, dam Many aspects of the Narmada consistent with Indian experience in construction must be synchronized experience confirm findings and other projects, and in OED's view with the R&R program-which lessons from CED's evaluations of they do not overlook any major costs has encountered persistent diffi- other projects. The broad lesson is or benefits. culties. The rate of resettlement that the social dimensions of civil and rehabilitation has become the works projects need much more at- However, substantial uncertainties key to timely implementation of tention from both the Bank and its remain. The economic rate of return the civil works. In Gujarat, non- borrower governments. Unless estimate hinges on several key fac- governmental organizations have these aspects are mastered, the tors whose outcome is uncertain at been usefully involved in the R&R development enterprise itself will this early stage of project imple- program, but in the other two continue to be dogged by public mentation. It assumes that the hy- states, confrontation persists be- protests and may eventually drological parameters of the tween project authorities and local falter and fail. project are firm, that despite delays NGOs. Maharashtra has recently in completion of the scheme and adopted satisfactory policies on Large dams the associated cost escalations, the R&R, but about half the villages scheme will be fully funded and that are to be flooded are not coop- Large dams are an important completed, and that the comple- erating with the final counting of part of economic development. mentary Narmada Sagar dam up- people or with the administration They produce needed public stream will be built. Disputes exist of R&R arrangements. Madhya goods, including clean energy as to the final maximum water Pradesh's rehabilitation grant to and drinking water, and enjoy level in the reservoir (lowering the landless families and adult sons is economies of scale. They can be a water level would risk reducing less attractive than those of the principal source of water for irri- the water flowing to the furthest, other states, and its capacity to gated agriculture, which in many OED Pracis countries is vital to achieving here, both in advocacy and "Quality at entry" adequate supplies of food and in implementation. alleviating poverty. Evidence from hundreds of Experience also emphasizes projects reviewed by OED con- But investments in large dams that the role of government, espe- firms the importance of proper need to be prepared thoroughly, cially at the local level, is crucial. preparation of projects before appraised rigorously, and imple- OED's 1993 resettlement study they enter the portfolio. In the mented effectively. The design and showed that for resettlement pro- Narmada projects, adherence to execution of these projects must be grams to succeed, seven factors the Bank's guidelines at the outset sensitive to social and environ- need to be present: government could have avoided many of the mental considerations. Their effi- commitment; a strong implement- negative consequences of environ- cacy, efficiency, and sustainability ing agency; clear established poli- mental and R&R requirements, depend on participation and insti- cies and guidelines that ad- which should have been dealt tutional development to ensure ef- equately define eligibility for with during project preparation fective operation and maintenance resettlement assistance; compre- and appraisal. There are severe and good water management. hensive planning; a development limits to an incremental approach, program for resettlers that will especially when the goals set are Unfavorable experiences with help them re-establish their liveli- optimistic and the borrower's resettlement, and the attendant hood; community involvement in institutional base is weak. For public outcry, may lead govern- planning and implementing re- lumpy projects, and especially ments to eschew investments in settlement activities; realistic for projects that stretch the large-scale water storage. This estimates of resettlement costs, borrower's capacity, it almost al- would be unfortunate, as dams and adequate funding. Beyond ways costs more time and money can be selected and built so as to the project-by-project activities to compensate during project be technically, financially, and required, the Bank may need implementation for weaknesses in economically justified as well as to assist borrowers with institu- appraisal. This lesson is not yet socially and environmentally ben- tional development before they consistently applied. eficial. (See William Jones, The can deal adequately with resettle- World Bank and Irrigation, A World ment issues. Commitment Bank Operations Evaluation Study, Washington, DC, 1995, forthcom- In the Narmada projects the If a borrower is genuinely ing, and OED Pr6cis No. 52, Invol- Bank did not address the institu- committed to a task it will take untary Resettlement.) tional limitations for planning and the actions needed to accomplish carrying out R&R or-according it. The Bank cannot make up for a Resettlement to the Bank's completion report- government's lack of commitment the need to empower the borrower to a project or component, or for Resettlement of people dis- and executing agencies to take inadequate implementation capac- placed by projects supported by greater ownership of the R&R pro- ity, by imposing conditions on its the Bank has always been, and cess. The projects operated in a loans. Equally, the Bank's opera- still is, the responsibility of the difficult context, because while the tional directives to its staff are no borrower agency, but all projects government of India entered into substitute for staff commitment to that the Bank supports must con- financial arrangements with the effective implementation support, form to the Bank's guidelines Bank, the states were responsible rigorous monitoring, or timely use (see Box 4). for executing R&R policies. The al- of remedies. ternative of establishing a com- Evaluation lessons on resettle- mon authority to take charge of Need for clarity about roles ment have been drawn both by R&R was not considered under OED and a Bank-wide review of the NWDT award, because under The Bank should deliver neces- resettlement operations. These the Indian constitution R&R is a sary assistance to the borrower studies confirm that the Bank's state, not a federal, responsibility. without taking over responsibility guidelines are appropriate, but The Bank's involvement, the for projects and their results. An their findings emphasize that to evaluation in the independent re- internal review of lessons from the apply the guidelines consistently view, and a stronger civil society Narmada projects (May 1993) will require large shifts in pro- in India have induced significant identified a process by which "the cesses and skills within the Bank, shifts in social policies related to Bank.. was seen more and more as as well as institutional develop- infrastructure projects. Mastery the owner of, or at least the major ment in India and other develop- of R&R issues may yet emerge force guiding, the R&R aspects of ing countries. NGOs have an im- out of the current painful the projects... the Bank rather than portant continuing role to play Narmada experience, the borrower found itself tagged May 1995 as the non-performing party." Clearly the Bank should promptly Box 4; Resettlement: guidelines and recommendations investigate matters raised by NGOs, or other interested groups In 1980 the Bank became the first Satisfactory R&R is easier when or ndiiduls abut ngonginternational organization to estab- national policies are supportive. or individuals, about ongoing ls udlnso noutr e projects, and take them up with ls udlnso noutr e proect, ad tke hemup itsettlement in the projects it supports. *Detailed surveys, community the borrower as appropriate. The guidelines were broadened in consultation and participation, But it should not respond on the 1990 (Involuntary Resettlement, Opera- and effective planning are keys to borrower's behalf or substitute for tional Directive 4.30, June 1990). Both success. (See Resettlement and De- the borrower in implementation. the 1980 and 1990 guidelines call for: velopment, Washington DC: World Influence on the borrower 9 Adequate compensation for lost assets. OED's review of early experience Over the decade since the with resettlement projects were approved, Gujarat, Assistance with relocation and Maharashtra, and Madhya support during the transition period. An OED review of resettlement Pradesh have consistently im- components in 49 completed proved their policies with respect Assistance in re-establishing projects found Bank guidelines to resettlement and tribal peoples. former living standards. broadly appropriate but poorly Progress has been unequal across applied. It recommended: the states, but the adoption of the Gieie o h rtcino n lhs and" cuheaopstion h digenous people were first issued in - Give rigorous attention to "land for land"1982; updated guidelines, introduced minimizing the number of people principle, in place of cash compen- in 1991, require consultation with in- to be displaced by Bank-supported sation, which was usually inad- equate, is a fundamental change. Provision of at least two hectares Bank's resettlement review Ensure that people who of irrigated land to households stand to lose assets will be fairly whose homes are to be inundated, Prompted by the Narmada compensated. the treatment of landless people experience, the Bank reviewed the and sons (and, in Maharashtra, resettlement aspects of all projects Make much greater effort to daughters) over 18 years old as in- active in 1986-93. This review restore incomes; this calls for dependent households eligible for found that: better measurement of initial in- replacement land, and provision come levels and monitoring of housing plots and grants, are R&R should be considered during implementation. further major improvements in the right from the outset of project iden- compensation package. The need tification. a Ensure costs are realistically es- for complete enumeration of Mcmated and will be adequately oustes nd rope plnnig ha Moestredeigncandramticlly funded. (See OED Pr6cis No. 52, oustees and anningrhas lower the numbers needing R&R. Involuntary Resettlement.) been recognized, and the crucial importance of income restoration highlighted. Further, the government's decision to tie the cations of the Narmada experience lack of consultation with area resi- pace of dam construction to the resonated with recommendations dents. Initiatives now underway pace of resettlement-and evi- made by the Bank's Portfolio Man- as part of the Next Steps plan in- dence that this is indeed happen- agement Task Force (see Effective dude more systematic analysis of ing-represents a significant reor- Implementation: Key to Development how different constituencies will dering of priorities since the Impact, World Bank, November be affected by proposed new lend- projects were designed. 1992), and have been incorporated ing operations, and greater in- into the "Next Steps" action plan volvement of nongovernmental Influence on the Bank that the Bank is now implementing agencies in designing, preparing, to improve the management and implementing projects. The The Narmada projects have had of its portfolio. Bank is experimenting with new a far-reaching influence on the approaches in participatory devel- Bank's understanding of the diffi- Consultation and participation opment and identifying practices culties of achieving lasting devel- that can be applied widely in its opment, on its approaches to port- The independent review of the operations. Many projects in India folio management, and on its Narmada projects attributed much now have innovative and promis- openness to dialogue on policies of the mishandling of resettlement ing participatory elements. (See and projects. Several of the impli- and environmental questions to a Working with NGOs: A Practical OED Precis Guide to Operational Collaboration ties that the Bank has failed to ad- implementation, rather than assuming between the World Bank and Nongov- here to its operational policies and that problems will be solved once a ernmental Organizations, Opera- procedures in the design, ap- project is underway; tions Policy Department, Washing- praisal, and/or implementation of ton, DC: World Bank, March 1995.) its ongoing or new operations. The participatory design, piloting, panel consists of three highly and mid-term reviews may all help Skill mix qualified individuals appointed by to improve the performance of the executive directors; they come large projects. The mix of skills needed for de- from outside the Bank and are velopment financing is changing from different countries. (See Some directors expressed concern as participatory approaches are Ibrahim Shihata, The World Bank's that the R&R aspect of several projects mainstreamed and as awareness of Inspection Panel, New York: Ox- of the Sardar Sarovar generation may environmental issues grows. In the ford University Press, 1994.) be deeply deficient, though they recog- Narmada projects, the civil works nized the Bank's efforts to apply les- for the dam and irrigation system Discussion by CODE sons and come to grips with R&R is- were the main concern of Bank sues in newer operations. staff in project design and ap- The Committee on Development praisal, and continued to be so Effectiveness (CODE) of the Bank's Decisions: CODE, assisted by the during the early stages of imple- Board of executive directors discussed Bank's South Asia Region, will moni- mentation. Many OED evaluations the completion reports on the Sardar tor developments in the Narmada ba- suggest the need to ensure that Sarovar projects on April 28, 1995. sin. The committee will also use its projects are appraised by sociolo- Some members expressed concern monitoring capacity, through the full gists and anthropologists along that, although these projects were ap- Board, to ensure that Bank staff are with economists and engineers. proved a decade ago, the Bank still applying the lessons of Narmada to As part of the Next Steps plan the handles human and environmental other operations. It requested OED to Bank has begun to augment the aspects of development less success- re-examine the economics of the skills and status of its staff in insti- fully than engineering and economic Sardar Sarovar projects, and later to tution building, public sector man- aspects. Members emphasized the fol- prepare an impact evaluation, timing agement, and social sciences other lowing lessons: the work so as to ensure reliable re-es- than economics. timation of economic and social ben- e government "ownership" should efits and costs. In view of the wide- Inspection panel be assured, and social and environ- spread interest in the projects within mental assessments should be the development community, the com- Experience with the Narmada completed, before a loan agreement mittee requested preparation of this projects contributed to the Bank's is signed; Priis, while acknowledging that the decision to establish an indepen- projects are still in midstream and dent inspection panel. This panel, * staff should seek to discuss and re- that judgments about them may well established in September 1994, in- solve differences of opinion with bor- change after audit and again after im- vestigates claims by affected par- rowers as far as possible before project pact evaluation. pED Priis is produced by the Operations Evaluation Department of the World Bank to help disseminate recent evaluation findings to development professionals within and outside the World Bank. The views here are those of the Operations Evaluation staff and should not be attributed to the World Bank or its affiliated organizations. Please address comments and enquiries to the managing editor, Rachel Weaving, G-7137, World Bank, telephone 473-1719. Internet: rweaving@world bank.org May 1995