WATER AND SANITATION PROGRAM: LEARNING NOTE 98432 Domestic Private Sector Participation Key findings Beyond One-Size-Fits-All: • There is no “magic bullet” approach to water utility PPPs in the Philippines. Lessons Learned from Eight Water Utility Different arrangements can lead to affordable, reliable, and clean water Public-Private Partnerships in the Philippines services, provided there is sufficient market size and willingness to pay. May 2015 • The foundations of success are laid by reaching a win-win arrangement, where the operator provides reliable services that consumers are willing WHY WATER PPPs? consumer willingness to pay, enabling to pay for. A good arrangement At a macro level, the Philippines has a sustainable cash flow, and facilitating is established by a shared made impressive progress in water service coverage expansion. The understanding of this objective, supply provision: Nationally, 92 percent private sector also brings technical clear roles, and a balancing of risks of individuals have access to improved and financial expertise to manage with rewards. water sources, and the number of water utilities in a more efficient and households with clean water piped sustainable manner. • “The art of the deal” matters more for directly to their premises has nearly success than the checklist of steps. The key concept is to achieve value-for-money doubled from 25 percent in 1990 to 43 FINDING THE WIN-WIN: and a win-win arrangement. This requires percent in 2012.1 However, within the ARRANGING A the goodwill of both parties throughout sphere of publicly financed networks, SUCCESSFUL PPP the life of the partnership, not just at the selection stage. Procurement details, as water systems piped into premises are What is the secret to arranging long as they are supported in law, should limited in coverage, and service delivery successful water PPPs in the be secondary to this objective. is irregular at best. Local goverment Philippines? To answer this question, units (LGUs) struggle to expand their the World Bank’s Water and Sanitation • PPPs can thrive in diverse geographies, utilities, leaving both rich and poor Program (WSP) examined eight water as long as service is focused on meeting the demand for which consumers are residents underserved. utility PPPs. These PPPs varied in willing to pay. contract type (e.g., concession, lease, Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) are management, build-operate-transfer • Pro-poor approaches are not yet one potential solution to accelerate for bulk water supply), procurement universal, though successful approaches have been implemented in Manila, access to piped water services, pathway (solicited vs. unsolicited), and Laguna, and Boracay. especially for the poor. In well-arranged legal basis. They also ranged in size, PPPs, private sector capital is mobilized from 700 connections in municipal areas for water system improvements and to over a million connections in one of expansion at a scale far larger than the Metro Manila concessions. Despite that available from public funds. Water these differences, all eight utilities (see services are more reliable as operators Table 1) found a way to remain viable are incentivized to match supply with while meeting performance standards. 1 WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme, 2014. Progress on Drinking Water and Sanitation: Update 2014. Geneva: World Health Organization. 2 Beyond One-Size-Fits-All Domestic Private Sector Participation Table 1. Summary of Water Utility PPP Case Studies Area Partners Connectionsa Arrangementb Procurementc Legal Basis Metro Public: Metropolitan Water-works & 1,129,497 Concession Solicited The National Water Crisis Act of Manila Sewerage System 1995 (Republic Act no. 8041) Private: Maynilad Water Services, Inc. Public: Metropolitan Water-works & 639,066 Concession Solicited The National Water Crisis Act of Sewerage System 1995 (Republic Act no. 8041) Private: Manila Water Company, Inc. Laguna Public: Provincial government 61,448 Concession Unsolicited 1991 Local Government Code Private: Laguna Water Corporation (under a (Republic Act no. 7160) joint venture agreement) Boracay, Public: Tourism Infrastructure and 5,531 Concession Unsolicited, The Tourism Act of 2009 Aklan Enterprises Zone Authority (TIEZA, (under a and subjected (Republic Act no. 9593); formerly Philippine Tourism Authority) joint venture to Swiss and the NEDA Guidelines Private: Boracay Island Water agreement) challenge on Joint Venture for Company Government Owned/Controlled Corporations Sta. Cruz, Public: Municipal government 3,911 Design-Build- Solicited 1991 Local Government Davao del Private: Sig Construction Lease/ Code Sur Affermage Tabuk City, Public: City government 3,600 Lease/ Solicited 1991 Local Government Kalinga Private: Calapan Affermage Code Waterworks Corporation Malasiqui, Public: Municipal government 2,419 Concession Unsolicited 1991 Local Government Pangasinan Private: Inpart Waterworks and Code Development Corp. Quezon Public: Provincial government 731 Management/ Unsolicited 1991 Local Government (Brgy. Private: Alfonso XII Water Operation and Code Alfonso Users’ Association Maintenance XIII), contract Palawan Norzagaray, Public: Water district N/A – PPP Build-Operate- Solicited The Government Bulacan Private: Phil Hydro/Maynilad for bulk water Transfer for Procurement Reform Act supply for bulk water of 2003 (Republic Act no. water districts supply 9184) a As of 2012 or 2013 b These contractual arrangements refer to PPP-type contracts invoking legal bases outside of the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). In addition, appropriate legal justifications were secured by the public sponsors to support their mandates in undertaking their respective projects. c The procurement methods used were justified based on the legal bases, and not on the BOT Law and its IRR. The PPP Center, a group that facilitates the coordination and monitoring of PPP programs in the Philippines, did not provide technical assistance to these projects. SPOTLIGHT: since the start of the concession period and serving as a MANILA WATER CONCESSIONS model for all similar water PPPs in the country. The story or the Manila water concessions is a remarkable narrative of turnaround in the provision of water and sanitation The Manila concessions both feature pro-poor mechanisms services over two decades, first in east Manila, and now in that provide differentiated level of services that are more west Manila. Both concessions have achieved world class affordable to base-of-the-pyramid customers and contribute performance, doubling the number of water connections significantly to concessionaire revenues. www.wsp.org Domestic Private Sector Participation Beyond One-Size-Fits-All 3 FOUR KEY DECISIONS Figure 1: Water PPPs succeed when services are provided on the basis of what consumers want and are willing to pay. Results from the eight case studies suggest that it is not so much who initiates a deal as much as it is how the deal is signed off and managed in the course of the PPP, including how financing flows from the public and private financing Reliable service sources. An LGU considering PPP in water supply needs to make four key decisions: Decision 1: What institutional arrangement is most appropriate? Timely tariff payments PPPs are not the only available institutional arrangement in Consumers Operator water service delivery. LGUs should weigh the decision to pursue a PPP against alternative options such as a water users’ association, water districts,2 or direct LGU management. Decision 3: How will the PPP be financed? Factors to consider include available resources, financing, The size of the necessary capital investment is not as and the technical capability of relevant stakeholders. important as whether there is sufficient willingness to pay for water services. If the demand for water is large enough, Decision 2: What do the consumers want? the piped water supply system can generate sufficient cash The demand for water dictates the sustainability of the water flow to enable the private operator or LGU to service a loan. services. Water utilities should provide services based on LGUs may be able to access loans from global and private what consumers want and are willing to pay for, so that the financial institutions that are willing to provide long-term loans operator is assured of cash flow as long as services provided amortized through tariff collections over five, 10, and even 20 meet the contractual obligations (Figure 1). years at affordable interest rates. If there is consensus on the need to improve services, the The funding portfolio and distribution of the investment costs LGU and other stakeholders need to consider two additional will impact the water tariff. Customers benefit most when issues: loan liabilities can be shared with the LGU from its Internal Revenue allocation and other revenue sources, and from 1. Not all levels of access are created equal. Although available grant funding as these will lower the required tariffs. most Filipinos today have access to at least Level 1 water (a communal point source away from premises), thereby Decision 4: What contractual arrangement is the most meeting the terms of the Millennium Development Goal sustainable for this situation? benchmarks, there are still considerable variations in the PPPs are long-term commitments, lasting between five to quality of services received. LGUs need to consider to what 30 years. As such, both the LGU and operator need to be extent they want to achieve universal access to 24/7 piped confident in the economic benefits of entering such a long- water services. term relationship. The contract defines the “rules of the game” both parties are required to observe. Successful PPP contracts 2. Equitable access to piped water services is expensive. specify, within the framework of Philippines Law, how If equitable access is an important priority, the LGU needs to next consider how best to leverage its limited financial • Responsibilities will be divided resources to piped water services in the shortest possible • Customers will be protected from arbitrary actions time. The project would usually require external financing to • Operator property rights will be protected cover capital investments in the millions of pesos range, an • Disagreements will be judiciously settled amount larger than most LGU-financed capital investments. • Tariffs will be rebased 2 Water districts are local corporate entities initiated by local governments that operate and maintain water supply systems in cities and municipalities. They are created on the basis of Presidential Decree No. 198 of 1973, also creating the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). www.wsp.org 4 Beyond One-Size-Fits-All Domestic Private Sector Participation Table 2. Demand Drivers for Increased Access to Improved Water Services Area Key Driver for Use of PPP Metro Manila (West Water crisis of 1995, declared by then-president Fidel Ramos. PPP target was set, reaching 24/7 water service and East) within six years and universal coverage for water within 11 years, while ensuring drinking water quality according to national standards at a pressure of 16 psi. Laguna Expensive yet poor quality water supply leading to severe water-related health issues in the cities of Cabuyao, Sta. Rosa, and Binan; these conditions prompted the then-governor to consider PPPs in 1998 and eventually close a deal in 2002. Boracay, Aklan Inadequate water and wastewater infrastructure that did not expand at the same rate as the area’s population, leading to noncompliance with environmental standards, cancellation of International Kiteboarding Event in 2008, and dwindling tourism. Sta. Cruz, Both LGUs have limited capacity to expand and experienced intermittent water supply, which prompted their Davao del Sur chief executives to look for innovative financing approaches. The LGU Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Tabuk City, Kalinga Program, financed by a World Bank loan in 2000, sought to work with LGUs to create viable models of PPP according to the principles of providing (a) services according to what consumers want and are willing to pay for, (b) commercial standards for utility management, and (c) the lowest appropriate level of management. Malasiqui, Pangasinan Poor service (one hour in the morning, and one hour in the afternoon) limited to mainly the poblacion of the town, despite the municipality’s affluent constituency; by 2000, the local government began seeking a private investor in recognition of its limited ability to improve and expand services. Quezon (Brgy. Alfonso Complete lack of a water supply system before 2004; local residents depended on shallow wells and water XIII), Palawan tankers that charged volumetrically for water of uncertain potability. Norzagaray, Bulacan Observed increasing content of manganese and iron in wells in the northern part of the municipality and drying up of wells in the southern part in 2008; estimates of developing alternative surface water by tapping the Angat River was beyond the affordability of the water district because it would have led to a doubling of the water tariffs at a time when it would be investing in expanding its supply network. Beyond establishing satisfactory written contractual terms, area’s beaches led to the cancellation of international tourism water PPPs in the Philippines have worked well when the private events that had been held annually in Boracay for nearly two investor is reasonably assured of his or her ability to mitigate decades. In other cases, the relevant public institution opted political risks, including the inevitable transitions in the political to pursue a PPP after assessing the consumer base’s desire environment. Additionally, including steep buy-out provisions and willingness to pay for higher levels of water services and drawing the coverage area boundaries to include a base (Table 2). Their communities demanded a safe and reliable of high volume institutional and commercial consumers helps water supply that met minimum performance standards such assure the long-term sustainability of the contract. as 24/7 service, sufficient water pressure (at least 3 meters in small towns; at least 7 psi in Manila), and drinking water CASE STUDY COMPARISON quality according to national standards. This section brings more clarity to Decisions 2-4 by drawing specific examples from the eight case studies. The contracts also had clear provisions on tariff setting and adjustment (e.g., indexed to inflation or to rising prices Demand Drivers (Decision 2) of major cost components, intermittent across the board Each of the eight investigated water PPPs was initiated increases, force majeure situations) as well as on risk sharing. because of a desperate need. For instance, in Metro Manila, the driver was the water crisis of 1995, declared by the then- Project Structure (Decision 3) president, who found it unacceptable for Manila to lag so far At a high level, water PPPs share a common structure behind other regional capitals. At the time, the Metropolitan (Figure 2). For the eight case studies, the public and private Waterworks and Sewerage System only supplied water for contracting parties are summarized in Table 1. Yet, as noted in an average of 16 hours a day to just two-thirds of Metro the previous section, how the PPP is arranged and managed Manila, while experiencing nearly 60 percent nonrevenue over its lifetime matters more than who initiates the deal. water. In another example, the beach community of Boracay Table 3 thus captures the different accountability mechanisms turned to PPP when massive sewage contamination on the employed for each PPP. www.wsp.org Domestic Private Sector Participation Beyond One-Size-Fits-All 5 Figure 2: Each investigated water utility PPP shares a common project structure, with different contracting parties, funding arrangements, and regulatory bodies. Contracting Parties Government Private operator (e.g., LGU, WD, GOCC) (Contracting party) (Contracting party) Outcome Reliable Loan repayment reporting water distribution Subsidy Funding Entities (e.g., Output-based aid) Subscription, tariff payment Long-term financing Feedback 3rd party funders and guarantor Targeted subsidies/ (e.g., LGUCC,GFI, PFI, equity) public contributions Consumers Regulators Technical assistance Performance monitoring & public disclosure Regulatory oversight Guarantee on LGU/WD payments, if any NWRB, DILG, Contract Administration Unit Contractual Arrangement (Decision 4) Risk Share The contracts for the eight case studies all specify the duration The share of private sector responsibility in PPP contracts of the PPP, the operator’s expected performance standards, can be viewed as falling along a fully public to fully private any exclusivity provisions, and responsibilities for asset continuum. Many of the risks associated with a water PPP investments, operations, and maintenance. The contracts can be grouped as: also specify tariff adjustment mechanisms. Taken as a whole, these factors contributed to the allocation of risk across the 1. Investment/financing risk contracting parties. Especially on tariff adjustment and risk 2. Design risk share, the contracting parties across the eight utilities reached 3. Construction risk different terms that would influence their overall success and 4. Operations and maintenance risk challenges encountered. 5. Market/commercial risk 6. Watershed protection risk Tariff Adjustment Approaches 7. Environmental risk The frequency and parameters of tariff adjustment range from 8. Force majeure risk monthly changes based on movements in the consumer 9. Service underperformance risk price index (e.g., in Sta. Cruz and Tabuk) to automatic adjustments any time the price of electricity increases by PPP project structures should strive to balance these risks more than 5 percent (e.g., in Malasiqui). In Laguna, the total with reward. For instance, in the Quezon management tariff automatically increases by 10 percent over the 25 years contract, given the small size of the system, it was of the concession period according to a schedule defined in important that the provincial government both bore some the contract, so long as the National Water Resources Board of the risks in the PPP and adequately oversaw the terms (NWRB) reviews and approves the final tariff. In Manila, tariffs of the contract. In contrast, the operators in the Metro are regularly adjusted based on movements of the consumer Manila concessions stood to gain due to a large consumer price index and foreign currency rate, and further reset every base. Those PPPs could therefore generally place more five years to take into consideration actual investments made risk on the operator, because they stood to gain a sizeable and approved investments moving forward. revenue stream. www.wsp.org 6 Beyond One-Size-Fits-All Domestic Private Sector Participation Nonetheless, contract provisions should be able to cover as the possibility of conflict of interest, particularly in regard far as possible unforeseen circumstances or force majeure to monitoring and enforcing the contract. For instance, in events that can potentially have a significant impact on Laguna, the provincial government does not have a regulatory the viability of a contract. For example, Maynilad (with unit and relies solely on the operator to provide technical and previous owners Benpres and Suez) became bankrupt as financial data. a consequence of the 1997 Asian financial crisis and was unable to fulfill its obligations in the contract.3 The public entities in Malasiqui, Tabuk, and Sta. Cruz also do not have a unit dedicated to monitoring and enforcing Conflict of Interest and Performance Monitoring the contract, which has hampered decision-making In Laguna and Boracay, the public contracting party is also processes and resulted in unverified technical and financial a shareholder in the joint venture company. This opens up data. Table 3. Approaches to Regulation of Financial Flows in PPP Project Structures Area Financial Flows Accountability Mechanisms Metro Manila (West • Concessionaire collects tariffs from consumers, pays • Regulation is contractually stipulated, and and East) concession fees to MWSS administered by MWSS Regulatory Office (RO) • Annual third-party administered Public Assessment of Water Services directly allows consumers to assess concessionaire Laguna • Provincial government and Manila Water both hold • Joint venture company is governed by a nine- shares of Laguna Water joint venture company, which member board, with three representing Provincial pays dividends to each owner Government of Laguna and six Manila Water, • Joint venture company collects tariffs from reflecting the ownership structure of the company consumers, and pays concession fees to the • Regulation is contractually stipulated, with tariffs provincial government submitted to the National Water Regulatory Board for review and approval Boracay, Aklan • TIEZA and Manila Water both hold shares of Boracay • Joint venture company is governed by board with Island Water joint venture company, which pays four members representing Manila Water and one dividends to each owner from TIEZA, reflecting the ownership structure of the • Joint venture company collects tariffs from company consumers, while paying concession fees to TIEZA • Regulatory Office is established and reports directly to the TIEZA Board, which is overseen by the Department of Tourism Sta. Cruz, • Operator collects tariffs from consumers, pays lease • Contract Administration Unit is responsible for Davao del Sur fees to the LGU contract regulation and dispute resolution Tabuk City, Kalinga • Development Bank of the Philippines provides long- • Operators are responsible for reporting asset term loan to LGU conditions every five years • Operators responsible for reporting asset conditions every five years Malasiqui, • Operator collects tariffs from consumers, shares • Tariffs are submitted to the National Water Resources Pangasinan revenues with the LGU Board for review and approval Quezon (Brgy. • Operator collects tariffs from consumers, remits 80 • Tariffs are subject to public hearing and approved by Alfonso XIII), Palawan percent of net revenues to the LGU the provincial government • Land Bank of the Philippines/World Bank funded on- lending program that provides long-term loan to LGU Norzagaray, Bulacan • Water district collects tariffs from consumers and • Water district tariffs are submitted to LWUA for review royalties from the bulk water supplier, while paying a and approval tariff to the bulk water supplier and premium to the LGU Guarantee Corporation • LGU Guarantee Corporation guarantees the water district’s financial obligations 3 Maynilad inherited 90 percent of MWSS’ loans, mostly dollar-denominated. When the 1997 Asian financial crisis occurred, the peso devalued by 100 percent, making it doubly expensive to service these loans. www.wsp.org Domestic Private Sector Participation Beyond One-Size-Fits-All 7 Achievements since PPP Initiation Box 1. Promoting Pro-Poor Programs Although some of the PPPs have only been in effect for four Half of the case study utilities are implementing pro-poor years, the eight evaluated sites are achieving the following key programs. Manila, Laguna, and Boracay provide installment plans for connection charges. Boracay and Maynilad also offer outcome indicators: discounted tariffs for consumers with monthly consumption below a minimum bracket of 10 cu.m, while also providing • 24/7 water service a network of tap stands to poor communities. In a PPP arrangement, this can be set as a parameter in the bidding • Water availability ≥100 liters/capita/day documents, or as an incentive mechanism in structuring the • Water pressure ≥7 psi (0.48 bar) PPP transaction. • Drinking water quality according to Philippine National Standards • Working ratio >50 percent, assuring adequate revenue Contract Deviations generation to operator In some systems, contract deviations have left operators in • Collection efficiency >90 percent a vulnerable financial position. For instance, in Tabuk, there • Non-revenue water ≤20 percent were 580 connections in place upon water system handover • Number of staff per 1,000 connections within international as opposed to the 3,600 connections described in the lease benchmarks of 3 to 54 agreement. In Sta. Cruz, the operator has not been able to implement a contract-specified 10 percent tariff increase NATIONAL AGENCY ROLES every two years (to finance increases in the lease fee) due The case studies underscore the need to tailor each PPP to nonapproval by the LGU. The Manila concessionaires are based on the specific geography, market size, and utility currently in arbitration over disallowances of significant capital management type. LGUs that may want to pursue PPPs can expenditures and recovery of corporate income taxes from be paralyzed by the case-by-case nature of the transaction. the tariffs. Due to their roles in setting up the overall business environment, national government agencies can be critical supporters of Access to Finance LGUs seeking to close water supply PPP deals. Malasiqui faces financial challenges, mostly due to its small size. The operator is constrained from expansion due to the PPP Center limited availability and high cost of financing, as much of the The PPP Center’s mandate is to provide capacity building operator’s financing is from the informal market at exorbitant support to implementing agencies and local governments in interest rates with short payback period. all aspects of project preparation and development. Within this mandate, the PPP Center is positioned to facilitate deals, Cost Management including water PPPs at the local level. The Center can Quezon struggles with cost management. Some expenses connect LGUs seeking to enter PPPs with potential private are out of the operator’s control. For example, the town is not partners and link both parties to financing. The PPP Center connected to the grid and thus relies on diesel generators; is also well-positioned to champion “productization,” i.e., however, fuel costs are twice that of electricity. On the efficiently institutionalizing the process by which PPPs can be other hand, the operator pays a remittance to the provincial identified, negotiated, and concluded. government calculated as a percentage of net revenue. Because this payment is not a set amount, the operator is Department of the Interior and Local Government incentivized to not focus on reducing costs. Perhaps due to As the oversight department for LGUs, DILG is mandated this, salaries make up 57 percent of the system’s operating to assist LGU administrations in delivering basic services, costs, with a staff to 1,000 connections ratio of 13.7, or 3 to including water. DILG can help by informally securing 4 times the international benchmark. the political commitment needed to pursue development 4 Achieved by most utilites except Tabuk and Quezon, Palawan www.wsp.org 8 Beyond One-Size-Fits-All Domestic Private Sector Participation Acknowledgments initiatives, including honoring PPP which PPPs are identified, negotiated, This learning note was prepared by contracts. DILG can also leverage and concluded within a framework of Aileen Castro with Vijay Jagannathan national grants to enhance the viability clear rules and responsibilities of the and Mariles Romero-Navarro (WSP). Thanks to public and private sector of water PPPs, and encourage LGUs operators, the LGU administration, representatives who shared their time in to improve water services through national government agencies, and explaining the history and performance selective award of its prestigious Seal water supply users, while fully leveraging of each case study water utility. Valuable of Good Governance award. current and future technologies. contributions were received from Eleazar Ricote (PPP Center), Almud Weitz, National Water Resources Board Under productization, the PPP Center, Jemima Sy, Iain Menzies, and Edkarl Galing (WSP). NWRB has a considerable body DILG, and NWRB will aim to lower of case law and data on privately barriers for local governments to supplied communities that, coupled enter into and stay engaged in win- About the Program with its mandate to oversee water win deals. Productization of services The Philippines Expanded Small Water service regulations, gives NWRB a focuses on structuring the sector’s Utilities Improvement and Financing unique opportunity to manage a virtual know-how, know-what, and know-who Technical Assistance Phase 2 (ESWIF2) is a three-year initiative that seeks to platform to share information with PPP for water PPPs on an online platform develop and implement new sector stakeholders, disclose performance for easy access. These agencies will approaches—“light-handed” regulation, data, and support dispute resolutions. act as connectors, facilitators, and technical support to small utilities on a lighthanded regulators. The PPP Center fee-basis by accredited service providers, MOVING FORWARD: can be the driving champion behind and access to credit trials—that promote PRODUCTIZATION OF GOOD the productization process, enabling systematic acceleration of water service provision in unserved areas. As part DEAL MAKING relevant sector stakeholders to learn of this project, WSP has developed The case study discussion highlights and apply the latest knowledge and a guidance note for the PPP Center the disparate ways in which water PPPs practices related to PPP. This knowledge of the Philippines on how PPPs can were established. The PPP experience includes expanding access to reliable be arranged and scaled successfully, also demonstrates that deal closures and sustainable water supply services based on an investigation of eight water are affected by significant gaps in based on willingness to pay, economic utilities across the country. WSP has also prepared snapshot two-page briefs that information and delays in receiving and environmental sustainability and summarize each case study for quick guidance from national government appropriate sharing of risks between reference. agencies, notably in terms of regulatory contracting parties. Also important is advice and support. To help bridge the how to customize PPP contracts to gap, the PPP Center, in partnership suit the specific needs of water supply Contact Us with DILG and NWRB, can help bridge customers in participating LGUs, while For more information please the gap through service productization. fulfilling national government standards email wspeap@worldbank.org Productization is defined as stream- with regard to quality, reliability and or visit www.wsp.org. lining the transaction process by environmental sustainability of water. The Water and Sanitation Program is a multi-donor partnership, part of the World Bank Group's Water Global Practice, supporting poor people in obtaining affordable, safe, and sustainable access to water and sanitation services. WSP’s donors include Australia, Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, and the World Bank. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed herein are entirely those of the author and should not be attributed to the World Bank or its affiliated organizations, or to members of the Board of Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. © 2015 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank. The PPP Center provides technical assistance to national government agencies (NGAs), government-owned-and-controlled corporations (GOCCs), state universities and colleges (SUCs), and local government units (LGUs) as well as to the private sector to help develop and implement critical infrastructure and other development projects.