

1. CAS Data
Country:
CAS Year: FY2003

CAS Period: FY2003 – FY2006

CASCR Review Period: FY2003 – FY2006

Date of this review: December 4, 2006

2. Executive Summary

The FY03-06 CAS was fully aligned with Peru's 2002 National Agreement, which laid out a program centered on promoting competitiveness, social equity, and decentralization, and highly relevant in strategic terms. However, insufficient coordination between the sub-strategies for social equity and decentralization, and between the implementation of the programmatic, investment, and technical assistance components detracted from the CAS's instrumental relevance.

Midway through the implementation period, Peru had satisfied all the triggers for the high-case lending scenario, which resulted in a roughly one-quarter increase in the volume of lending over that contemplated originally. This robust lending effort was complemented by extensive AAA, which provided crucial inputs to Peru's reform efforts.

The outcome of the competitiveness objective was satisfactory, as Bank Group loans, AAA, and guarantees provided timely support for a successful program of economic growth and fiscal stabilization. IFC technical assistance played a large role in lowering the cost of doing business, at least with the region of the capital. However, progress toward the equitable growth objective was only moderately satisfactory, as a modest decline in poverty and significant gains in some basic service delivery such as health and water and sanitation were partly offset by a lack of improvement in educational quality. Meanwhile, while the legal framework on decentralization advanced considerably, few essential public functions were actually decentralized, and the initial commitment to combat corruption evaporated, with the result that Peru failed to improve on any major governance indicator. Achievement on the "institutionality" objective was, therefore, rated moderately unsatisfactory. On balance, IEG rates the overall outcome of the FY03-06 CAS as moderately satisfactory.

The Bank supplied timely, crucial, and large-scale support for Peru's stabilization and recovery, helping extract Peru from a deep economic crisis and producing tangible, if modest, poverty-reduction benefits. The decision to move from the base to the high-case lending scenario was timely and well-founded. However, coordination of the sub-strategies for equity and decentralization, and of investment and technical assistance with programmatic lending, left something to be desired. And the performance indicators utilized measured mainly outputs and processes, rather than outcomes, thereby providing a misleading measure of progress. The Bank's performance is rated moderately satisfactory.

The CASCR provided a workmanlike review of the CAS experience. However, reporting on the performance indicators identified in the FY03-06 CAS was incomplete, the discussion of the circumstances surrounding failure of the anti-corruption initiatives and the lessons for the Bank inadequate, the treatment of donor coordination superficial, and neither Bank performance nor outcome was rated. The presentation would also have benefited from significant additional editing.

CASCR Reviewed by:	Peer Reviewed by:	Group Manager
John H. Johnson	Jaime Jaramillo	Lily Chu, Acting Manager, IEGCR

3. CASCR Summary

Overview of CAS Relevance:

During the period leading up to the FY03-06 CAS, Peru was embroiled in a political scandal which ultimately compelled the President to resign, ushering in a transitional government until Alejandro Toledo was elected President in July 2001. The Toledo administration assumed power at the low-point of an economic recession combined with a legacy of eroded public institutions. Public administration suffered from poor accountability, inadequate policy coordination, and the absence of a coherent public sector pay and employment system. Organizational confusion, duplication of programs, and excessive centralization hindered Governmental performance and blunted efforts to fight poverty effectively.

Poverty is heavily concentrated in rural areas, where more than two-thirds of the population is poor. Over half of rural Peruvians are considered extremely poor, that is, living on less than \$1 a day. The incidence of poverty varies across regions. Poverty rates in the sierra (highlands) and selva (jungle) are nearly double that of coastal regions. More than half of the extremely poor population resides in the rural sierra, though it has less than a quarter of the national population. Indigenous peoples comprise an estimated 15 percent of the population, but have a poverty rate of 70 percent. Hence, stabilizing the economy, reviving sustained growth, and combating rising rates of poverty posed Peru's most pressing developmental challenges.

The Toledo Administration's priorities included (i) improving private sector competitiveness while generating new employment opportunities; (ii) promoting equity and social justice through improved access to quality health, education, culture, and basic services; and (iii) promoting an efficient, transparent, and decentralized state.

The FY03-06 CAS was fully aligned with these priorities, which also addressed fundamental development constraints. The goal of greater competitiveness was to be supported by interventions aimed at improving fiscal balances, strengthening debt management, accelerating the rescheduling of corporate debt, strengthening the financial sector, reducing administrative and logistical barriers to exports, promoting agricultural and mining development, addressing the infrastructure deficit, promoting greater trade openness, and development of a broader institutional framework to support competitiveness. The equitable development objective was supported by interventions to protect social service delivery during the decentralization process, incorporate poverty reduction components in most new projects, and provide a comprehensive analysis of social issues. "Institutionality", i.e., promoting democracy, the rule of law, and an efficient, transparent, and decentralized state was supported by the DECSAL series of programmatic loans, policy advice and technical assistance.

While the strategic relevance of the CAS was high, its focus on achieving widespread institutional change within a short period of time in a country just emerging from a political crisis proved to be unrealistic. Moreover, the heavy reliance on programmatic lending (about four-fifths of total new commitments during the CAS period of implementation), only weakly supported by timely investment lending and technical assistance, provided an instrumental mix which was not fully suited to the task.

The CAS did a creditable job of explaining how the different elements of the lending program and AAA supported each of the three pillars. In an Annex, it supplied over 40 qualitative and quantitative performance indicators for monitoring these pillars. However, for the most part, these indicators measured procedural milestones rather than development outcomes (e.g., achieving agreed budget execution levels, proportion of teachers receiving agreed incentives to teach in rural areas, etc.). Moreover, it remains unclear whether data on all these indicators was systematically collected, and, if so, in what way they affected program execution, since the CASCR reported on only a subset.

Overview of CAS Implementation:

The CAS was prepared when there was still uncertainty about the new government's policy direction. However, one year into the CAS period, the Bank determined that Peru had met the three triggers – revenue mobilization, debt management, and competitiveness and decentralization – required to qualify for the high-case lending scenario. Planned lending was raised from US\$920 million to over US\$1.2 billion for the four-year period (Annex Table 1), and the number of ongoing projects from 8 to 15. Most of this expanded lending took place via programmatic instruments which increased from four to seven, and which jointly accounted for nearly 80 percent of total new lending during this period. The CASCR notes that, while two series of adjustment loans provided a platform for dialogue around key decentralization and service delivery issues, they were not always mutually supportive. Because of delays in the social reform agenda, improvements in the quality and quantity of key decentralized services were largely impeded.

The investment project portfolio experienced widespread implementation delays, which the CASCR attributes to a variety of factors: the high learning curve faced as the portfolio was being expanded, Peru's restraints on fiscal spending during this period, the complexity of project design, political instability, and, in some cases, low borrower ownership. The low disbursements from investment projects hampered the Bank's ability to follow up on the reform initiatives supported by the adjustment operations, according to the CASCR. This may also account for the modest increase observed in the share of projects at risk.

An extensive program of AAA was also delivered, including studies on constraints to growth, pension reform, decentralization, poverty, external trade, procurement, social issues, financial sector restructuring, environmental issues in the mining sector, and debt management. This analytical work provided an important input in developing the policy agenda for the lending portfolio. During the recent political transition, 33 thematic notes were provided to the incoming administration, which helped shape the discussions surrounding the new CAS. However, nearly a third of planned studies (9 of 32) were eventually dropped for reasons the CASCR does not make clear. Particularly unfortunate was the discontinuation of the indigenous peoples study, given that engaging the indigenous more closely in national economic and social life remains a key development constraint.

Overview of Achievement by Objective:

The CAS had three main objectives, which echoed the priorities defined in Peru's National Agreement of July 2002, namely:

- **Improving Competitiveness** – improving the competitiveness of the private sector and generating new employment opportunities, for which the CAS performance indicators were: (i) raising tax revenue to at least 11.9 percent of GDP; (ii) raising non-traditional export growth; (iii) lowering overheads for export businesses; (iv) reducing travel times for residents in low-income neighborhoods to their places of work; (v) engaging 10 producer groups in produce marketing agreements; (vi) reducing tariffs on rehabilitated roads; (vii) increasing the proportion of the road network maintained under private contract paid for with decentralized funds; (ix) establishing three agricultural extension programs with farmer participation; (x) improving natural resource management on 30,000 hectares of land; (xi) achieving adoption of new technologies sufficient to raise farmer real incomes by at least 30 percent; (xii) reducing farmer travel times; (xiii) expanding internet access in rural areas; (xiv) reducing rural enterprise overheads and transaction costs; and (xv) improving supervision at the bank and corporate level.
- **Promoting Equity and Social Justice** – providing all Peruvians with access to quality health, education, cultural, and basic services, for which the CAS set as performance indicators:

(i) achieving targeted spending execution for six protected social programs; (ii) raising the proportion of rural teachers receiving incentives to remain in rural areas; (iii) improving user perception of the quality and transparency of public services by 20 percent; (iv) increasing the number of social programs applying poverty targeting; (v) expanding mother and child insurance coverage; (vi) streamlining environmental health programs according to agreed plans; (vii) establishing minimum certification standards for all primary and pre-school teachers; (viii) training 7,500 bilingual teachers; (ix) improving access to water for 650,000 rural dwellers; (x) training 2,500 communities in hygiene education; (xi) reducing auto deaths and injuries within targeted areas; (xii) decreasing respiratory disease in targeted areas; and (xiii) increasing the share of the population with access to potable water.

- **“Institutionality”** – promoting democracy, the rule of law, and an efficient, transparent, and decentralized state, for which the CAS set as performance indicators: (i) increasing the proportion of sub-national governments adopting the Integrated Financial Management System (SIAF); (ii) increasing the proportion of provinces with budgets determined with community participation; (iii) increasing citizen oversight of key programs to reduce corruption; (iv) improving sub-national fiscal management; (v) increasing the number of municipalities audited annually and equipped with debt reduction plans; (vi) establishing 3 decentralized judicial districts; (vii) increasing public approval of the judiciary to at least 30 percent; (viii) expanding property rights programs in 3 major urban centers; (ix) adopting a legal framework for a National Cadastral System; (x) adopting regulations for fiscal transfers to regions and municipalities; (xi) implementing actions to decentralize the health and transport ministries; (xii) introducing results-based development strategies into 30 Sierra municipal districts; and (xiii) converting one-third of all health posts to public-community co-management.

Overall achievement is assessed to be *Moderately Satisfactory*. The rationale for the rating of each objective is detailed below:

Achievement of CAS Objectives			
Objectives	CASCR Rating	IEG Rating	Explanation / Comments
Improving Competitiveness	Unrated	Satisfactory	<p>Programmatic lending, IFC technical assistance, and MIGA loan guarantees were the primary instruments of Bank Group support for this objective. Peru’s economy experienced a significant revival, growing at over 5 percent annually in real terms. Revenue mobilization improved from 12.5 percent of GDP in 2002 to an estimated 15 percent in 2005, and net foreign direct investment inflow expanded by 40 percent in 2005, mainly in the mining and hydrocarbon sectors benefited by the international commodity boom. Non-traditional export growth accelerated to 20 percent annually, increasing its share of total exports. However, Bank-supported reform of the tax structure failed to materialize.</p> <p>Business overhead has been lowered through an IFC Technical Assistance Facility to the Municipality of Lima. As a result of the simplifications that went into effect in the beginning of 2006, permits that formerly required 60 days to process are now finished in three days. Business owners formerly needed to visit government offices 11 times on average during the process, but now only have to go once or twice. While previously a single process was required for</p>

			<p>all companies, now risk categories help the municipality differentiate services. As a result, the cost for undertaking these processes for small and medium enterprises has fallen by over half. While the municipality processed on average about 1000 licenses for commercial activities per year previous to the reforms, they processed over 5000 in the first seven months of 2006. A "Toolkit for the Simplification of Municipal Procedures" was developed out of this experience to extend these results to other provincial municipalities, which in turn can influence district municipalities to follow suit.</p> <p>A partial IBRD guarantee of US\$200 million to promote private investment in Peru's infrastructure, approved in early 2005, has three projects in its pipeline, none of which has yet received final approval.</p> <p>In terms of results, Government investment in public infrastructure remained low during this period, at less than 1 percent of GDP, and attracted little involvement by the private sector, according to the new Country Partnership Strategy (CPS). At about 30 percent of GDP, the stock of productive infrastructure continues to lag the Latin American average (40-50 percent of GDP) by a wide margin, and is particularly inadequate in the transport, electricity, and water sectors.</p> <p>Only a quarter of rural households currently have access to passable roads and less than one in 10 rural towns have public phones. With less than 40 percent coverage in rural areas, Peru has one of the lowest rural electrification rates in Latin America. Only two-thirds have access to sanitation. Lack of transport infrastructure continues to keep small rural producers from reaching markets.</p> <p>Less than a third of the tertiary road network was rehabilitated over the past decade. Only one quarter of all roads were considered in good condition as of 2005.</p> <p>Nor did natural resource management improve. According to the CPS, the impact of mining and other resource-extractive industries remains a major environmental concern. The development of a framework for the environmental sector has been strongly resisted by sectors that perceive environmental protection as an obstacle to economic growth. Environmental damage continues to have a high economic cost, estimated at around 3.7 percent of GDP, higher than in other countries with similar income levels. By contrast, public and private environmental expenditures during the CAS period averaged about a quarter of a percent of GDP, low by international standards. This lack of financial support continued to aggravate Peru's weak institutional capacity for environmental management.</p>
<p>Promoting Equity and Social</p>	<p>Unrated</p>	<p>Moderately Satisfactory</p>	<p>A recent IEG evaluation of the Fourth Programmatic Social Reform Loan (PSRL), the last in a series of programmatic</p>

<p>Justice</p>			<p>loans utilized to support this objective, concluded that scant evidence had been provided to demonstrate that either the antipoverty focus of public expenditure or access by the poor to basic education had improved. Progress toward greater beneficiary empowerment in the design and implementation of social programs was did occur, although such participation largely excluded the most vulnerable and the indigenous.</p> <p>Bank support for Peru's economic recovery contributed to the decrease in the incidence of absolute poverty from 24.2 percent in 2002 to 19.2 percent in 2004, and of total poverty from 53.8 to 51.6 percent.</p> <p>Health indicators also improved markedly. A Bank Rural Health Project helped raise key outcomes in eight of the poorest regions in the country. For example, the number of deaths before 12 months dropped from 33 to 22 percent, while the percentage of deliveries attended by a skilled professional rose from 58 to 68.4 percent. Health coverage of the poor increased significantly to over 9 million affiliates, including nearly 4 million mother and children. Thirty-five percent of all primary health centers are now locally co-managed, exceeding the performance goal.</p> <p>However, overall, access to public services such as health care, education, and social protection remained low among the poor, among indigenous groups, and in rural areas, according to the CPS, and the level of expenditure devoted to social assistance remained among the lowest in Latin America, amounting to only 0.7 percent of GDP.</p> <p>According to the CASCR, Bank support for reform of the educational system was ineffective. As a result, the inequality of achievement across students from different social classes, ethnic background and geographical place remained extreme. Recent data showed that secondary students, on average, demonstrated no learning or critical skills. The educational system still lacks both performance standards and accountability for these results. High turnover in ministries and resistance from vested interests, such as teacher unions, blocked meaningful reform. Consequently, implementation of the Bank's Rural Education Project was severely hampered.</p> <p>An Urban Property Rights Project did facilitate issuance of over one million titles to around 5 million of the urban poor, enabling them to gain increased access to credit.</p> <p>Finally, the National Lima Water Company Project improved water availability from an average of 11.5 hours per day in 1995 to 20.4 hours in 2002, and increased coverage within the capital from 75 to 88 percent of residents. The water company's efficiency and financial sustainability were also significantly improved.</p>
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<p>“Institution-ality”</p>	<p>Unrated</p>	<p>Moderately Un-satisfactory</p>	<p>The main Bank instruments of support were the PSRL and DECSAL programmatic loans which, as noted in the CASCR, were not well coordinated.</p> <p>The Bank supported passage of a constitutional amendment and follow-on legislation detailing the terms of decentralization. An important piece of this legislation was the Fiscal Responsibility Law setting strict limits on local spending and transfers. However, according to the CASCR, this law was not always adhered to. Regional governments are now elected, rather than appointed, as was true previously. Fiscal consolidation has been supported by an expansion of revenues through tax policy, administrative reforms at the regional and local levels, introduction of a system of tax sharing, and curbs on the amount of revenue shared so as to protect Peru’s overall fiscal sustainability. Peru also advanced fiscal management via implementation of an integrated financial management reporting system (SIAF), budgetary reclassification, and the introduction of some monitoring and evaluation.</p> <p>Vested interests, bureaucratic resistance, and failure in the social reform agenda slowed devolution of key public functions to a crawl. While sub-national entities accounted for about a third of all public expenditure by the end of the CAS period, transfer of functions was limited to parts of the food, social, and rural infrastructure programs. The far larger education and health networks remained under central administration. Sub-national governments in Peru continued to have almost no tax bases of their own, and remained highly dependent on transfers from the central government</p> <p>Decentralization of rural roads management did take place, and has been successful in building institutional capacity, involving communities, and ensuring adequate levels of road maintenance.</p> <p>The sub-objective of intensifying the attack on corruption was not achieved. Process measures, such as strengthening the Governmental Procurement Council, starting e-procurement, and rolling out SIAF contributed to greater transparency on public spending, where Peru received a score on the 2006 Open Budget Index of 77 on a scale of 100, which measures the quantity of public information on central government budgetary and financial activities.</p> <p>According to the CPS, some change in the judicial system was also achieved, notably in creating a system of commercial courts to reduce processing times and heighten perceptions of fairness in handling business disputes. However, no comparable progress was made in reforming the civil and criminal justice systems, which continued to suffer from widespread corruption, inaccessibility, inefficiency, and lack of accountability. As a consequence,</p>
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			<p>a proposed judicial reform project did not materialize.</p> <p>In broader terms, Peru either failed to make headway, or actually regressed during this period, on all major Bank governance indicators.</p>
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Comments on Bank Performance:

Peru's basic institutions had been severely weakened during the period preceding CAS implementation, which posed special challenges for the Country Team. In the initial years of the CAS, the Bank provided timely support when Peru lacked broad access to external finance. In retrospect, the decision to move from the base to the high-case lending scenario was risky, but ultimately well-justified by subsequent developments. The accompanying AAA provided extensive, useful, if not always timely advice (e.g., the CEM on trade was issued in the third year of the CAS, even though negotiations on a series of trade agreements had begun earlier).

Several concerns about the Bank's performance should also be noted. First, the two DPL series supporting social service reform and decentralization were not well coordinated. Secondly, the investment program provided tardy follow-up to the important institutional changes supported by the programmatic loans. And, thirdly, performance indicators focused excessively on processes and outputs, rather than outcomes and results. Judging from the CASCR, collection of trend data on these indicators was spotty.

IEG-MIGA notes that MIGA has not issued any new guarantees in Peru since FY02. During the FY03-FY06 period, MIGA guarantees for four financial projects and one tourism project were cancelled. However, the guarantees for two high profile projects remained active.

IEG-MIGA conducted an ex-post evaluation of one infrastructure project, and reviewed the environmental and social effects of a second. These two evaluated projects were found to have supported the overall CAS objectives. MIGA played an important role in lowering the perception of political risks, and offered the right type of risk mitigating instruments to meet client needs. Additionally, MIGA influenced the application of environmental and social standards in the mining sector. However, MIGA involvement did not address the sustainability of a concession agreement in one project, nor ensure that the project had the intended impact on Peru's private sector development. IEG-MIGA found that the concession did not lead to lower prices for users and actually had the effect of restricting competition in the sector. Overall, the development outcome of this project was rated as partially unsatisfactory.

4. Overall IEG Assessment

Outcome:	<i>Moderately Satisfactory</i>
Bank Performance:	<i>Moderately Satisfactory</i>

The Bank's timely lending and AAA facilitated the resuscitation of Peru's economy and provided useful guidance on coordinating macroeconomic, competitiveness, and export promotion strategies. Policy improvements in these areas, and the revival of international demand for Peru's key commodities, led to accelerated growth during this period, which, in turn, brought about modest reductions in the incidence of poverty, especially extreme poverty in rural areas (Objective One). However, targeted, Bank-supported interventions to achieve improved service delivery and decentralization (Objectives Two and Three) were piecemeal and uncoordinated, producing mostly process improvements except in health where significant positive results were achieved. The Government's failure to follow through on its commitment to intensify the attack on corruption should have received a more decided response from the Bank in terms of adjusting its terms of lending.

5. Assessment of CAS Completion Report

The CASCR provided a workmanlike review of the CAS experience, buttressed by insightful lessons. However, reporting on the 41 performance indicators identified in the FY03-06 CAS was incomplete, the discussion of the circumstances surrounding failure of the anti-corruption initiatives and the lessons for the Bank inadequate, the treatment of donor coordination superficial, and the absence of ratings for Bank performance and outcome regrettable. The report text and format would also have benefited from more extensive editing.

IEG-IFC has reviewed the draft (10/12/06) CAS Completion Report FY02-06 for Peru and finds the description of IFC's activities in general reasonable although somewhat limited.

In general, given that IFC operations respond to market demand, IFC does not provide the expected range for new IFC commitments for the CAS period and references for results assessments. However the CAS Progress Report (12/07/04) did provide planned IFC commitments for FY05 and the actual commitments in FY02-04. In fact, IFC actually surpassed the commitments expected for FY05.

In terms of financing instruments, part of the outstanding current exposure (about 6%) is in the form of guarantees and risk management products, which is a recent development.

IEG-MIGA notes that the CASCR did not include a comprehensive discussion of MIGA's activities and guarantee operations, even though the FY03-06 CAS acknowledged Peru's importance in MIGA's guarantee portfolio (i.e., the fourth-largest volume of exposure since the start of MIGA operations), and projected near-term growth in that portfolio, mostly in infrastructure projects. Given that no new guarantees materialized after FY02, the reasons behind this disappointing result would have merited some discussion.

6. Findings and Lessons

- Performance indicators need to focus more heavily on measures of results, rather than outputs or processes, so as to yield a more reliable measure of CAS outcomes.
- Portfolio management requires improved synchronization of programmatic and investment lending to ensure that complex institutional reforms receive timely and adequate follow-up.

The basic mechanisms the Bank has supported for involving the poor and indigenous groups in social service delivery needs rethinking.

Annex Table 1: Actual vs. Planned Lending

Annex Table 2: Analytical and Advisory Work: actual vs planned

Annex Table 3: IEG Project Ratings

Annex Table 4: Portfolio Status Indicators by Year

Annex Table 5: IBRD / IDA Net Disbursements and Charges

Annex Table 6: Net Aid Flows (net or gross, ODA or ODA+OOD, as relevant)

Annex Table 7: Economic and Social Indicators

Annex Table 8: Millennium Development Goals

Annex Table 1. Planned Case Base and Actual Lending for Peru, FY03-06

Planned FY	Projects	Status	Proposed IBRD/IDA	Actual IBRD/IDA
FY03				
	Rural Education	FY 03	52.5	52.5
	National Rural Water Supply and Sanitation	FY 03	50.0	50.0
	Programmatic Social Reform Loan II	FY 03	100.0	100.0
	Trade Facil. and Prod. Improv. T. A.	FY 03	15.0	20.0
	Social Reform TAL ¹	Slipped FY05	8.0	
	<i>Actual Subtotal</i>			222.5
	Additional Actual Projects			
	Lima Water Rehab Add'l Financing	FY 03		20.0
Subtotal FY03			225.5	242.5
FY04				
	LIMA Transport Project	FY 04	40.0	45.0
	Justice Services Improvement	FY 04	10.0	12.0
	Programmatic Social Reform III	FY 04	100.0	150.0
	Urban Property Rights	Slipped to FY06*	15.0	
	Sierra Rural Development	Slipped FY07	20.0	
	Agriculture Research and Extension APL Ph 2	Slipped FY05	50.0	
	<i>Actual Subtotal</i>			207.0
	Additional Actual Projects			
	Program. Decent. & Competitiveness	FY 04		150.0
Subtotal FY04			235.0	357.0
FY05				
	Regional Roads Decentralization	Slipped to FY06	50.0	
	Health APL, Ph 2	Slipped to FY07	30.0	
	Export Competitiveness and Trade Facilitation, Ph 2 (in CAS)	Not in the Program	50.0	
	Programmatic Reform For Growth II	FY 05	100.0	100.0
	Inst. Capacity for Decent. TAL ²	FY 05	10.0	8.8
	<i>Actual Subtotal</i>			108.8
	Additional Actual Projects			
	Vilcanota Valley Rehab & Mgmt Project	FY 05		5.0
	Programmatic Social Reform Loan IV	FY 05		100.0
	Account. F/ Decent. Soc. SCTR (CRL1)	FY 05		7.8
	Irrigation Sub-Sector Supplement	FY 05		10.3
	Agriculture Research and Extension APL Ph 2	FY 05		25.0
Subtotal FY05			240.0	256.9
FY06				
	Regional Transport Decentralization ³	FY 06	50.0	50.0
	Rural Education and Teacher Dev. APL ph 2	Dropped*	70.0	
	Programatic Reform for Growth II	FY08	100.0	
	<i>Actual Subtotal</i>			50.0
	Additional Actual Projects			
	Real Property Rights II	FY 06		25.0
	Third Progr. Decentral. & Compet. DPL	FY 06		150.0
	Rural Electrification	FY 06		50.0
	Regional Roads Decentralization	FY 06		50.0
Subtotal FY06			220.0	325.0
Total			920.5	1181.4
Projects Approved since the close of the CAS period				
FY07				
	SWAP Malaria Booster HSSP			5.0
Total			920.5	1186.4

* Per Region's CASCR

1/ Renamed Accountability for Decentralization in the Social Sectors

2/ In CAS mentioned as Decentralization and Municipal Development

3/ In CASCR mentioned as Decentralized Rural Infr Investment

Sources: Peru CAS 2002; WB Business Warehouse as of 11/02/06

Annex 2. Planned and Actual Analytical and Advisory Work, FY03-06

Planned Product	Status
FY2002-2003 Microeconomic Constraints to Growth	Completed FY04
Indigenous Peoples Program	Completed FY01
FY 2003 PER Dissemination	Completed FY02
Pension System Restructuring: Options	Completed FY04
<i>Additional Analytical and Advisory Work:</i>	
PPIAF: Tariff Setting Capacity-OSITRAN	Completed FY03
Aguas Calientes: Urban Protect/Revit	Completed FY03
FY2003-2004 Privatization and Private Sector Participation: Issues and Options ¹	Completed FY06
Development Policy Review (DPR)	Dropped Per CASCR
Mining and Hydrocarbon Environmental, Social and Fiscal Management Issues	Completed FY05
Environmental Health	Completed FY06
Subnational Fiscal Policy and Management	Completed FY04
Corporate Restructuring Options (Regional)	Dropped Per CASCR
Rural Infrastructure Strategy	Completed FY05
Study on Malnutrition	Dropped Per CASCR
Poverty Vulnerability Assessment	Transformed into the poverty assessment of FY07 Per CASCR
FY 2004 Lima City Poverty Strategy	Completed FY05
Youth and Social Development (Regional)	Completed Per CASCR
Water and Sanitation Services: Strategies for Private Sector Participation	Per CASCR
FSA Update and Dissemination	Completed FY05
Health Outcomes and environmental Health: Issues and Options	Per CASCR
Economic Boom Preparedness (Regional)	Dropped Per CASCR
<i>Additional Analytical and Advisory Work:</i>	
CCGPP: Peru Country Assessment	Completed FY04
Investment Climate Assessment	Completed FY04
Sustainable Fisheries	Completed FY04
Peru ROSC	Completed FY04
Local Governance & Del of Svcs	Completed FY04
FY 2005 DPR Update and Dissemination	Dropped Per CASCR
Policy Note on Public Sector Management	Per CASCR
Tourism and Indigenous Groups	Dropped Per CASCR
Poverty Assessment	Completed FY05
Country Procurement Assessment Report (CPAR)	Completed FY05
Education Outcomes: Issues and Options	Completed FY06
<i>Additional Analytical and Advisory Work:</i>	
Country Economic Memorandum: Growth and Trade	Completed FY05
City Poverty Strategy	Completed FY05
FY 2006 Accountability in Social Sectors	Completed FY06
Policy Notes	Completed FY06
Financial Sector Assessment	Completed FY05
Debt Mgmt and Capital Mkt Dvpmnt	Completed FY06
<i>Additional Analytical and Advisory Work:</i>	
Evaluat & Design of Concessions	Completed FY06

Sources: CAS, CASPR, WB Business Warehouse tables 3.1 and 4.2 as of September 12, 2006

1/ Per Region CASCR Name changed to "Evaluation and Design of Concessions"

Annex Table 3A. Project rating for Peru, FY03-06

Project Name	Approval FY	Exit FY	IEG Outcome	IEG Sustainability	IEG ID Impact
Programmatic Social Reform Loan II	2003	2003	SATISFACTORY	LIKELY	MODEST
Urban Property Right	1999	2004	HIGHLY SATISFACTORY	LIKELY	SUBSTANTIAL
Sierra Natural Resources Management	1997	2004	SATISFACTORY	LIKELY	MODEST
Indigenous Peoples Development (LIL)	2000	2004	UNSATISFACTORY	UNLIKELY	NEGLIGIBLE
Programmatic Social Reform III	2004	2004	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	NON-EVALUABLE	SUBSTANTIAL
Program. Decent. & Competitiveness	2004	2004	SATISFACTORY	LIKELY	SUBSTANTIAL
Res. & Extension	2000	2005	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	LIKELY	MODEST
Programmatic Social Reform Loan IV	2005	2005	MODERATELY UNSATISFACTORY	LIKELY	SUBSTANTIAL

Annex Table 3B. IEG Project Rating for Peru and Comparators

Region	Total Evaluated (\$M)	Total Evaluated (No)	Outcome % Sat (\$)	Outcome % Sat (No)	Inst Dev Impact % Subst (\$)	Inst Dev Impact % Subst (No)	Sustainability % Likely (\$)	Sustainability % Likely (No)
Peru	592.2	8	83.0	75.0	74	50.0	99.8	85.7
LCR	19,663.1	198	74.7	80.8	53	57.7	71.8	79.4
Colombia	2,317.7	21	95.7	95.2	59	81.0	92.3	94.7
Ecuador	300.8	10	49.1	66.7	12	22.2	44.8	71.4
Egypt, Arab Rep	212.3	9	70.2	75.0	58	50.0	99.7	87.5
Morocco	476.4	15	81.8	86.7	11	26.7	100.0	100.0
Kazakhstan	113.9	5	98.8	80.0	89	60.0	98.8	80.0
Georgia	165.1	7	64.8	85.7	25	42.9	64.8	85.7
Moldova	66.0	6	83.9	80.0	84	80.0	78.4	75.0
Bank wide Average	61,307.3	911	82.1	78.7	58	54.9	82.9	79.1

Source: WB Business Warehouse tables 4a.5 and 4a.6 as of September 12, 2006

Annex Table 4. Portfolio Status Indicators by FY00-06

Country	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Peru							
# Proj	12	9	8	12	9	13	15
Net Comm Amt	1,139.0	515.6	415.6	558.1	286.1	417.8	515.8
# Prob Proj	1	1	1	1	0	2	3
% IPDO: Actual	8.3	11.1	12.5	8.3	0.0	15.4	20.0
# Pot Proj	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
% Potential	0	0	25	0	0	0	0
# Proj At Risk	1	1	3	1	0	2	3
% At Risk	8.3	11.1	37.5	8.3	0.0	15.4	20.0
Comm At Risk	150.0	27.0	83.0	5.0	0.0	102.5	103.8
% Commit at Risk	13.2	5.2	20.0	0.9	0.0	24.5	20.1
Colombia							
# Proj	26	20	22	20	16	18	17
Net Comm Amt	2,053.0	1,346.4	1,472.7	1,096.7	1,146.9	1,351.4	1,322.9
# Prob Proj	2	1	1	2	0	2	0
% IPDO: Actual	7.7	5.0	4.5	10.0	0.0	11.1	0.0
# Pot Proj	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
% Potential	0	0	9	0	0	0	0
# Proj At Risk	2	1	3	2	0	2	0
% At Risk	7.7	5.0	13.6	10.0	0.0	11.1	0.0
Comm At Risk	142.1	75.0	104.5	120.0	0.0	48.0	0.0
% Commit at Risk	6.9	5.6	7.1	10.9	0.0	3.6	0.0
Ecuador							
# Proj	15	10	12	10	9	8	7
Net Comm Amt	601.4	346.2	401.9	293.7	237.6	293.1	285.1
# Prob Proj	1	1	1	3	1	5	1
% IPDO: Actual	6.7	10.0	8.3	30.0	11.1	62.5	14.3
# Pot Proj	5	0	4	0	1	0	0
% Potential	33	0	33	0	11	0	0
# Proj At Risk	6	1	5	3	2	5	1
% At Risk	40.0	10.0	41.7	30.0	22.2	62.5	14.3
Comm At Risk	182.0	45.0	256.7	68.9	36.9	212.9	13.9
% Commit at Risk	30.3	13.0	63.9	23.4	15.5	72.6	4.9
Egypt Arab Rep							
# Proj	20	18	18	16	17	14	16
Net Comm Amt	1,448.0	1,083.0	1,012.0	763.8	1,014.1	1,085.5	1,795.1
# Prob Proj	4	1	4	2	3	1	1
% IPDO: Actual	20.0	5.6	22.2	12.5	17.6	7.1	6.3
# Pot Proj	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
% Potential	0	0	6	0	0	0	0
# Proj At Risk	4	1	5	2	3	1	1
% At Risk	20.0	5.6	27.8	12.5	17.6	7.1	6.3
Comm At Risk	536.0	15.0	347.2	123.7	16.4	15.0	15.0
% Commit at Risk	37.0	1.4	34.3	16.2	1.6	1.4	0.8

Country	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Morocco							
# Proj	20	19	18	16	12	10	12
Net Comm Amt	901.7	738.7	595.3	425.0	338.3	435.6	813.1
# Prob Proj	3	3	1	2	2	2	0
% IPDO: Actual	15.0	15.8	5.6	12.5	16.7	20.0	0.0
# Pot Proj	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
% Potential	0	5	0	0	0	0	0
# Proj At Risk	3	4	1	2	2	2	0
% At Risk	15.0	21.1	5.6	12.5	16.7	20.0	0.0
Comm At Risk	133.0	147.0	65.0	98.6	14.6	42.2	0.0
% Commit at Risk	14.8	19.9	10.9	23.2	4.3	9.7	0.0
Kazakhstan							
# Proj	14	13	9	8	7	7	9
Net Comm Amt	941.2	695.7	542.2	560.9	545.9	512.9	642.9
# Prob Proj	1	3	2	0	1	0	1
% IPDO: Actual	7.1	23.1	22.2	0.0	14.3	0.0	11.1
# Pot Proj	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
% Potential	7	0	0	0	0	0	11
# Proj At Risk	2	3	2	0	1	0	2
% At Risk	14.3	23.1	22.2	0.0	14.3	0.0	22.2
Comm At Risk	126.9	85.9	101.4	0.0	12.0	0.0	124.0
% Commit at Risk	13.5	12.3	18.7	0.0	2.2	0.0	19.3
Georgia							
# Proj	15	18	17	17	18	17	18
Net Comm Amt	310.9	348.5	326.2	301.7	344.8	328.8	290.4
# Prob Proj	1	0	3	1	3	0	2
% IPDO: Actual	6.7	0.0	17.6	5.9	16.7	0.0	11.1
# Pot Proj	0	0	1	0	1	0	0
% Potential	0	0	6	0	6	0	0
# Proj At Risk	1	0	4	1	4	0	2
% At Risk	6.7	0.0	23.5	5.9	22.2	0.0	11.1
Comm At Risk	20.0	0.0	106.8	15.0	82.1	0.0	55.7
% Commit at Risk	6.4	0.0	32.7	5.0	23.8	0.0	19.2
Moldova							
# Proj	10	9	8	11	12	10	13
Net Comm Amt	167.8	132.8	117.8	142.5	160.5	143.8	170.0
# Prob Proj	2	0	0	1	1	0	0
% IPDO: Actual	20.0	0.0	0.0	9.1	8.3	0.0	0.0
# Pot Proj	0	2	2	0	0	1	0
% Potential	0	22	25	0	0	10	0
# Proj At Risk	2	2	2	1	1	1	0
% At Risk	20.0	22.2	25.0	9.1	8.3	10.0	0.0
Comm At Risk	50.0	25.9	24.9	30.0	11.1	35.0	0.0
% Commit at Risk	29.8	19.5	21.1	21.1	6.9	24.3	0.0

Source: WB Business Warehouse Table 3a.4 as of September 11, 2006

Annex Table 5. IBRD/IDA Net Disbursements and Charges Summary Report for Peru (US\$)

Fiscal Year	Disb. Amt.	Repay Amt.	Net Amt.	Charges	Fees	Net Transfer
2003	143,733,389	157,411,408	-13,678,019	126,729,890	1,880,161	-142,288,070
2004	340,748,540	171,115,244	169,633,296	98,397,139	4,347,017	66,889,140
2005	232,468,951	204,759,479	27,709,472	87,806,186	2,397,856	-62,494,570
2006	193,734,420	214,852,470	-21,118,050	122,235,998	1,477,461	-144,831,509
Total (FY 04-06)	910,685,300	748,138,601	162,546,699	435,169,213	10,102,495	-282,725,009

Source: WB Loan Kiosk, Net Disbursements and Charges Report as of September 8, 2006

Annex Table 6. Total Net Disbursements of Official Development Assistance and Official Aid FY2000-20004 (US \$ Million)

Donors	Calendar Years				
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Australia	0.1	0.02	-	-	-
Austria	0.47	0.5	0.53	0.55	0.47
Belgium	2.77	2.3	6.35	6.45	9.58
Canada	8.75	9.47	7.86	11.05	14.24
Czech Republic	0.07	0.12	0.08	0.27	0.26
Denmark	1.94	1.85	2.12	-0.04	-1.21
Finland	1.2	1.37	1.6	1.62	2.04
France	6.26	3.16	4.85	8.96	12.78
Germany	33.97	24.17	24.32	24.28	19.74
Greece	0.27	0.14	0.01	0.01	-
Ireland	0.5	0.5	0.49	0.82	1.25
Italy	-17.75	-11.49	4.78	-9.03	6.26
Japan	191.68	156.52	119.58	104.9	89.8
Korea	1.8	0.75	0.98	2.09	3.06
Luxembourg	0.47	0.34	1.24	2.48	0.95
Netherlands	9.2	24.52	12.86	15.68	18.1
New Zealand	0.04	0.21	0.11	0.28	0.17
Norway	1.39	2.15	1.43	9.02	1.25
Poland	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01
Portugal	-	0.05	0.06	-	-
Slovak Republic	-	-	0.01	0.01	0.01
Spain	18.54	29.08	31.86	44.42	56.15
Sweden	3.69	2.68	3.94	3.48	4.55
Switzerland	6.43	8.93	10.91	15.7	20.04
Turkey	-	-	-	-	0.03
United Kingdom	10.41	7.47	84.43	2.68	5.26
United States	92.34	161.63	143.62	204.36	177.91
EC	24.1	21.38	16.08	41.65	13.62
GEF	0.83	0.45	1.9	4.82	3.73
IDB Sp.Fund	-11.12	-7.4	-6	-9.22	-9.7
IFAD	-2.24	-	-1.9	-2.02	-2.38
UNDP	-0.23	0.57	0.66	0.71	0.82
UNTA	1.95	2.09	2.19	2.54	2.38
UNICEF	1.18	0.97	0.97	0.91	1.23
WFP	3.86	1.33	2.11	1.86	1.23
Other UN	3.47	3.51	7.44	7.19	4.2
UNFPA	1.39	1.59	6.39	1.56	9.37
Other Bilateral Donors	0.55	0.43	1.32	0.83	0.62
DAC Countries, Total	372.67	425.57	462.95	447.67	439.33
Multilateral , Total	26.03	25.83	30.73	49.36	23.21
G7, Total	325.66	350.93	389.44	347.2	325.99
DAC EU Members, Total	71.94	86.64	179.44	102.36	135.92
Non-DAC Bilateral Donors, Total	2.44	1.32	2.4	3.21	3.99
ALL Donors, Total	401.14	452.72	496.08	500.24	466.53

Source: OECD Dac Online database, Table 2a. Destination of Official Development Assistance and Official Aid - Disbursements as of September 8, 2006

Annex 7. Economic and Social Indicators, 2000-20005

Series Name	Peru		Peru		Colombia		Ecuador		Egypt, Arab Rep		Morocco		Kazakhstan		Georgia		Moldova		
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	
Growth and Inflation																			
GDP growth (annual %)	2.9	0.2	4.9	4.0	4.8	6.7	3.9	3.3	4.6	4.0	3.6	3.6	10.2	6.4	6.2	6.2	6.2	6.2	6.2
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US\$)	2,050	1,970	2,020	2,150	2,360	2,610	2,193	1,995	1,867	1,357	1,390	1,390	1,862	895	567	1,720	1,720	1,720	1,720
GNI per capita, PPP (current international \$)	4,600	4,640	4,880	5,090	5,400	5,830	5,073	6,598	3,542	3,990	3,950	3,950	5,968	2,527	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5
GDP per capita growth (annual %)	1.3	-1.4	3.4	2.4	3.3	5.1	2.4	1.7	3.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	10.0	7.6	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)	10.3	10.2	10.3	10.1	10.1	9.4	10.1	13.1	8.1	15.9	15.2	15.2	8.3	20.0	23.9	23.9	23.9	23.9	23.9
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	29.9	29.5	29.7	30.1	29.9	32.8	30.3	31.7	29.1	35.2	30.8	30.8	38.8	24.7	23.6	23.6	23.6	23.6	23.6
Services, etc., value added (% of GDP)	59.8	60.3	60.0	59.8	60.0	57.8	59.6	55.2	62.8	48.9	54.0	54.0	53.0	55.3	52.5	52.5	52.5	52.5	52.5
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)	3.8	2	0.2	2.3	3.7	1.6	2.3	4.16	26.6	4.7	1.5	1.5	8.0	5.5	14.0	14.0	14.0	14.0	14.0
Composition of GDP (%)																			
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)	16.1	16.0	16.5	17.7	20.9	24.6	18.6	21.0	26.8	22.2	33.0	33.0	50.8	31.6	51.4	51.4	51.4	51.4	51.4
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)	18.0	17.7	17.4	17.7	18.3	19.4	18.1	20.9	29.3	25.4	38.3	38.3	45.8	45.0	79.9	79.9	79.9	79.9	79.9
Current account balance (% of GDP)	-2.9	-2.1	-1.9	-1.5	0.0	1.3	-1.2	-1.0	-1.0	1.8	2.6	2.6	-1.5	-8.0	-5.4	-5.4	-5.4	-5.4	-5.4
External debt (% of GNI)	55.5	52.4	50.9	50.9	48.0	..	51.5	43.6	72.7	33.7	50.7	50.7	76.0	49.1	96.9	96.9	96.9	96.9	96.9
Total debt service (% of GNI)	5.0	4.2	6.1	4.4	4.2	..	4.8	8.5	10.7	2.5	8.6	8.6	18.6	3.7	10.4	10.4	10.4	10.4	10.4
Export of Total Commodities (% of GDP) ¹	13.42	15.08	20.45	..	16.3	15.34	33.68	..	22.96	22.96	62.45	..	59.51	59.51	59.51	59.51	59.51
Gross domestic savings (% of GDP)	18.3	17.1	17.9	18.8	21.1	23.7	19.5	16.3	25.7	14.6	18.7	18.7	30.2	10.8	-6.2	-6.2	-6.2	-6.2	-6.2
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP)	20.3	18.7	17.7	17.8	-18.0	18.9	18.6	15.9	21.1	17.3	23.9	23.9	23.0	23.2	16.6	16.6	16.6	16.6	16.6
Fiscal Accounts (% of GDP)																			
Current revenue, including current grants (% of GDP) ²	14.9	14.4	14.4	14.9	15.1	15.4	14.9	13.7	24.8	26.4	25.4	25.4	24.0	15.6	32.7	32.7	32.7	32.7	32.7
Overall budget balance, including grants (% of GDP) ²	-2.8	-2.8	-2.1	-1.7	-1.2	-0.7	-1.9	-5.7	1.2	-2.8	-3.1	-3.1	1.9	-2.6	-0.9	-0.9	-0.9	-0.9	-0.9
Grants and other revenue (% of revenue)	20.4	15.4	16	13.4	11.6	..	15.36	19.5	20.1	12.8	19.6	19.6	19.6	19.6	19.6
Revenue, excluding grants (% of GDP)	17.7	16.9	16.6	17	17	..	17.04	71.1	16.4	12.9	27.6	27.6	27.6	27.6	27.6
Gross national expenditure (% of GDP)	101.9	101.7	100.9	100	97.4	94.8	99.45	599.6	102.5	103.1	105.2	105.2	95.1	113.4	128.6	128.6	128.6	128.6	128.6
Social Indicators																			
Health																			
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)	69.2	..	69.8	70.1	70.4	..	69.9	72.2	74.1	69.6	69.5	69.5	65.7	70.4	68.0	68.0	68.0	68.0	68.0
Immunization, DPT (% of children ages 12-23 months)	91.0	85.0	89.0	89.0	87.0	..	88.2	83.8	89.4	97.8	94.6	94.6	93.8	81	94.8	94.8	94.8	94.8	94.8
Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access)	63.0	..	63.0	86	89	70	73	73	72	94	68	68	68	68	68
Improved water source (% of population with access)	83.0	..	83.0	93	94	98	81	81	86	82	92	92	92	92	92
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	33.0	24.2	..	28.6	18.8	25.0	33.2	41.6	41.6	63.0	41.0	26.1	26.1	26.1	26.1	26.1
Education																			
School enrollment, primary (% gross)	59.9	60.6	58.3	57.6	60.5	..	59.4	37.4	72.4	13.0	57.1	57.1	26.6	43.9	46.3	46.3	46.3	46.3	46.3
School enrollment, primary (% gross)	121.3	119.9	118.4	115.8	113.9	..	117.9	110.8	116.8	100.4	101.4	101.4	104.4	95.9	95.5	95.5	95.5	95.5	95.5
School enrollment, secondary (% gross)	86.0	86.9	89.7	90.8	91.6	..	89.4	70.2	59.1	85.9	42.7	42.7	93.6	81.2	82.3	82.3	82.3	82.3	82.3
Population																			
Population, total (million)	26.0	26.4	26.8	27.2	27.6	28.0	27.0	43.87	12.76	70.62	28.88	28.88	14.94	4.59	4.24	4.24	4.24	4.24	4.24
Population growth (annual %)	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.4	1.9	1.5	1.5	0.2	-1.1	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3
Urban population (% of total)	71.6	71.8	72.0	72.2	72.4	72.6	72.1	71.9	61.5	42.7	56.9	56.9	56.8	52.5	46.4	46.4	46.4	46.4	46.4

Sources: WB DDP Database as of September 13, 2006
1/ Data on total exported commodities came from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database as of September 13, 2006
2/ WB LAC, ECA, and MNA Regional Databases as of September 13, 2006

Annex Table 8. Peru – Millennium Development Goals

	1990	1994	1997	2000	2003	2004
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger						
Income share held by lowest 20%	3	..
Malnutrition prevalence, weight for age (% of children under 5)	8	7
Poverty gap at \$1 a day (PPP) (%)	1	2	3	9	4	..
Poverty headcount ratio at \$1 a day (PPP) (% of population)	2	9	9	18	13	..
Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line (% of population)	..	54	49
Prevalence of undernourishment (% of population)	19	..	12	12
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education						
Literacy rate, youth total (% of people ages 15-24)	94	97
Persistence to grade 5, total (% of cohort)	86	90	90
Primary completion rate, total (% of relevant age group)	90.3	102.8	100.5	99.5
School enrollment, primary (% net)	98	97	97
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women						
Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament (%)	6	..	11	11	18	18
Ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary education (%)	97.1	99.8	100.2
Ratio of young literate females to males (% ages 15-24)	95.1	97.8
Share of women employed in the nonagricultural sector (% of total nonagricultural employment)	29	31	33	33	37	37
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality						
Immunization, measles (% of children ages 12-23 months)	64	75	91	97	95	89
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	60	33	..	24
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000)	80	42	..	29
Goal 5: Improve maternal health						
Births attended by skilled health staff (% of total)	56.4	59.3	..	71.1
Maternal mortality ratio (modeled estimate, per 100,000 live births)	410
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases						
Children orphaned by HIV/AIDS
Contraceptive prevalence (% of women ages 15-49)	64	69
Incidence of tuberculosis (per 100,000 people)	393.7	178.4
Prevalence of HIV, female (% ages 15-24)
Prevalence of HIV, total (% of population ages 15-49)	1	1
Tuberculosis cases detected under DOTS (%)	93.7	86.7	80.6	83.1
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability						
CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita)	1	1	1.1	1.1	1	..
Forest area (% of land area)	55	54
GDP per unit of energy use (constant 2000 PPP \$ per kg of oil equivalent)	8	10	10	10	11	11
Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access)	52	63
Improved water source (% of population with access)	74	83
Nationally protected areas (% of total land area)	6.1	6.1
Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development						
Aid per capita (current US\$)	18.4	14.4	16	15.5	18.4	17.7
Debt service (PPG and IMF only, % of exports of G&S, excl. workers' remittances)	7	17	32	24	21	16
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 people)	26	35.2	83.8	115.2	175.6	222.9
Internet users (per 1,000 people)	0	0.1	4.1	30.8	104.9	116.8
Personal computers (per 1,000 people)	23.1	40.5	64.7	97.6
Total debt service (% of exports of goods, services and income)	11	18	36	26	21	17
Unemployment, youth female (% of female labor force ages 15-24)	19.7	18.9	13.6	13.6	20.7	20.7
Unemployment, youth male (% of male labor force ages 15-24)	12.6	14.7	12.6	13.7	17.6	17.6
Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15-24)	15.8	16.6	13	13.6	19.2	19.2
Other						
Fertility rate, total (births per woman)	3.9	..	3.2	3	2.8	2.8
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US\$)	770	1800	2370	2050	2150	2360
GNI, Atlas method (current US\$) (billions)	16.8	42.2	58.5	53.2	58.3	65
Gross capital formation (% of GDP)	16.5	22.2	24.1	20.2	18.8	18.5
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)	65.8	..	68.3	69.2	70.1	70.4
Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above)	87.7
Population, total (millions)	21.8	23.4	24.7	26	27.2	27.6
Trade (% of GDP)	29.6	28.9	32.7	34.1	35.4	39.2

Source: World Development Indicators database, April 2006

Note: Figures in italics refer to periods other than those specified.

Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; Target 1: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than one dollar a day; Target 2: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger

Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education; Target 3: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling

Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women; Target 4: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015

Goal 4: Reduce child mortality; Target 5: Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate

Goal 5: Improve maternal health; Target 6: Reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio

Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; Target 7: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS; Target 8: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases

Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability; Target 9: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources; Target 10: Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation; Target 11: By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers

Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development; Target 12: Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, nondiscriminatory trading and financial system

Includes a commitment to good governance, development and poverty reduction both nationally and internationally; Target 13: Address the special needs of the least developed countries; Target 14: Address the special needs of landlocked developing countries and small island developing States (through the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States and the outcome of the twenty-second special session of the General Assembly); Target 15: Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term; Target 16: In cooperation with developing countries, develop and implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth; Target 17: In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries; Target 18: In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information an