vivo 86055 international Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in the Kivu Provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo: Insights from Former Combatants September 2013 Prof. Dr. Thomas Elbert Dr. Maggie Schauer Dr. Harald Hinkel Heike Riedke Dr. Anna Maedl Nina Winkler M.Sc. & M.A. Katharin Hermenau, M.Sc. Dr. Philip Lancaster Tobias Hecker, M.Sc. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20433 All rights reserved First published October 2013 www.logica-wb.net This report disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage discussion and exchange of ideas on gender and conflict related issues in Sub-Saharan Africa and is not a formal publication of the World Bank. The report carries the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. This report is edited by the Learning on Gender and Conflict in Africa (LOGiCA) Program of the World Bank within the Fragile States, Conflict and Social Development Department. This report has not undergone the review accorded to official World Bank publications. The findings, interpretations and conclusions herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, its Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. To request further information please contact ereessmith@worldbank.org LOGiCA. This is report is also available on the LOGiCA website: www.logica-wb.net. Cover and layout design: Duina Reyes-Bakovic Photos credits: Harald Hinkel and United Nations photo library Table of Contents Executive Summary.......................................................................................................................................... iii Abbreviations..................................................................................................................................................... 1 Acknowledgements........................................................................................................................................... 4 1. Introduction................................................................................................................................................... 5 2. Background.................................................................................................................................................... 6 2.1 Conceptual Background..........................................................................................................................6 2.2 Context and Problem Statement.............................................................................................................8 2.3 Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in the Eastern DRC........................................................................16 3. Study Design................................................................................................................................................ 21 3.1 Study Objective.....................................................................................................................................21 3.2 Interview Format and instruments........................................................................................................21 3.3 Sampling ..............................................................................................................................................21 3.4 Study Limitations..................................................................................................................................22 4. Study Participants’ Profile . .......................................................................................................................... 23 4.1 Age and Origin......................................................................................................................................23 4.2 Armed Groups and Forces.....................................................................................................................23 4.3 Education . ............................................................................................................................................23 4.4 Child Soldiers........................................................................................................................................24 4.5 Rank and Combat Experiences..............................................................................................................24 5. Reasons for Joining the First Armed Group.................................................................................................. 26 6. Substance Use and Abuse............................................................................................................................ 29 7. Traumatic Experiences and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder........................................................................... 32 8. Perpetrator Experiences and Self-Reported Violence . ................................................................................. 36 9. Appetitive Aggression in Ex-combatants...................................................................................................... 40 10. Ordered Violence against Civilians (Leadership Level)............................................................................... 42 11. Reported Opinions on Motives for Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in DRC ......................................... 46 12. Reported Reasons for the Most Brutal Forms of Rape . .............................................................................. 52 13. Sexual Violence Directed Against the Enemy’s Group................................................................................ 57 14. Strategic and Tactical Aspects of Sexual Violence....................................................................................... 60 14.1 Sexual Violence to Gain Political Attention (Strategic)........................................................................60 14.2 Sexual Violence as an Instrument of Control (Strategic and Tactical) .................................................61 14.3 Terror to Facilitate Lootings (Tactical) ..................................................................................................61 15. Summary .................................................................................................................................................. 63 16. Conclusions and Recommendations.......................................................................................................... 65 References....................................................................................................................................................... 67 i Annexes........................................................................................................................................................... 73 Annex 1. Brief discussion of ethnicity and tribal affiliations in respect to concepts of identity. ...................... 75 1. Controversial Terminology ......................................................................................................................75 2. The Role of Ethnic Tensions in Attacks on Civilians..................................................................................76 Annex 2. Profile of Armed Groups................................................................................................................... 78 I. Groups participating in the Goma Conference of 2008............................................................................78 II. Groups Created after the Goma Conference (“groupes réfractaires”) .....................................................84 III. Miscellaneous groups and bandits referred to by participants in the study . ........................................86 IV. Foreign Armed Groups ...........................................................................................................................86 Annex 3. Elements of Modus Operandi Related to Looting and Cannibalism................................................. 89 1. Stealing Food from Civilians....................................................................................................................89 2. Cannibalism . ..........................................................................................................................................89 Annex 4. Example of Ordered Mass Rape........................................................................................................ 90 Annex 5. Special Army Integration Attempts in DRC, an example from CNDP................................................. 92 Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in the Kivu Provinces of the DRC: ii Insights from Former Combatants EXECUTIVE SUMMARY of malfunctioning in populations that have suffered war Background and conflict (Schauer and Schauer, 2010), but are still The Kivu regions have a long history of occupations by largely neglected by humanitarian and development aid. colonial and other external armed forces, and intertribal Sexual violence has particularly dramatic consequences fighting. Following the Rwandan genocide in 1994, at for survivors’ psychosocial, intellectual, and economic least one million people fled to Eastern Zaire (today’s functioning, and impairs social and economic postwar Democratic Republic of Congo/DRC). In reaction to the recovery—at both individual and community level. creation of political and military organizations in Rwan- During war and conflict, two main types of rape can be dan refugee camps in the Kivu provinces close to the differentiated. The first type of rape is commonly used Rwandan borders, Rwandan and Ugandan armies entered in almost any war. The offences are personally planned the DRC in November 1996 along with, and in support and executed, either by single men or small groups. of, Laurent Desirée Kabila, launching the First Congo They are perceived as the “right of the victor” and are War, which formally ended in 1998. The Second Con- frequently tolerated by the superior authority. The sec- go War, also known as Africa’s Great War, was waged ond type of rape concerns an integral part of military from August 1998 to December 2002. This war was for- strategy. The widespread rape in the DRC has frequent- mally brought to an end with the signing of the Lusaka ly been described as resulting from such a strategy, or Peace Accord in 1999. In 2000, a UN mission, Mission as a “weapon of war”, used by diverse parties (Human de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en République dé- Rights Watch, 2002; Longombe, Claude, and Ruminjo, mocratique du Congo (MONUC), was deployed to the 2008; Omanyondo Ohambe, Bahananga Muhigwa, and DRC. Despite the significant UN presence, multiparty Wa Mamba, 2005). As such, this type of rape is used to elections held in 2006, the Goma peace agreements of intimidate and ultimately destroy the targeted group. It 2008 and 2009, and the signing of the “Peace, Security aims to destroy existing family structures, particularly in and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and the Re- societies with a strong patriarchal organization. gion” in February 2013, fighting among various armed groups (AG) and forces continues in Eastern DRC. Prior research on SGBV has almost exclusively focused on survivors. Increasingly, researchers and practitioners In order to conceptualize the character of Sexual and agree that to effectively address SGBV, a better under- Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) in the DRC global and standing of the underlying causes of SGBV, including local aspects need be taken into account: the context of why perpetrators commit SGBV, is required. However, violence perpetrated against civilians during any modern evidence-based research of the possible motives behind warfare, potential differences in sexual violence com- the use of sexual violence, as perpetrated by various AG pared to other conflicts, and the development of cruelty in the DRC, is scarce. and violence in individuals and groups. Psychological dimensions of the dynamics behind the Mass rape during armed conflict gained attention during extremely brutal forms of SGBV committed in the DRC the war in the former Yugoslavia (Henry, Ward, and Hir- also remain poorly understood. In preceding studies, re- shberg, 2004; Lindsey, 2002; Mezey, 1994; Weitsman, searchers found evidence that, on the individual level, 2008). Since then it has been studied retrospectively for perpetrating violence can be experienced as rewarding, major wars (such as World War II) and armed conflict even as fascinating and appetitive (Elbert, Weierstall, worldwide (Penn and Nardos, 2003). Though sexual vio- and Schauer, 2010). Hence, perpetrating violence has the lence in both times of war and peace is commonly under- potential to be a self-rewarding experience, subsequently reported, it is clear that mass rape is causing tremendous feeding a lust to commit more violence over time. And suffering in today’s armed conflicts. Stories emerging increasingly more brutal forms of SGBV trigger positive from the Eastern DRC, for example, have spurred inter- feedback cues, and perpetrators crave the positive feel- national outcry. Although not exclusively, wartime rape ings attached to committing violence. mostly affects girls and women, causing them lifelong physical and psychological suffering (Watts and Zimmer- Another factor that must be considered in developing an man, 2002). Mental health problems are a major source explanation for SGBV is the incidence and effect of sub- iii stance use or abuse. Some studies have found that sub- cent of those interviewed had changed from one AG to stance use or abuse which seems to heighten the level of another at least once. While the educational background aggression and brutality among combatants is a method of interviewees is weak overall (average number of years for combatants to cope with their own trauma-related of education is 5 and 29 percent are illiterate), at least 14 symptoms (Gear, 2002; Odenwald and others, 2009). At percent of interviewees spent 10 years or more in school. the same time, drugs lower the threshold for committing The majority (64 percent) started as child soldiers under violent offenses. the age of 18. More than half of all interviewees reported to have been forced to join an AG in the first place; lev- Objectives els of forced recruitment are the highest for CNDP and FDLR. For those who had not been physically forced Motivations behind the extreme brutality used in many into recruitment, there are multiple reasons for their re- cases of rape in the context of armed conflict in the DRC cruitment, including self-defense or peer pressure. Po- remains poorly understood and under-researched. This litical motivations are high on the agenda of those who study has been conducted in partnership with the NGO joined a group that believes it has a political legitimacy vivo international, to determine individual motivations, for its actions, such as FDLR. Participants ranged from as well as strategic or tactical aspects of gender-based former supporters to colonels: 5 percent supporters, 53 violence of different armed groups and their leadership. percent soldiers, 22 percent non-commissioned officers, The key research questions for the study are: (i) Why and 20 percent officers. Alcohol and marijuana were the is the violence directed against women and girls so ex- main substances consumed or abused and consumption ceedingly brutal/cruel? (ii) What motivates combatants rates reported exceeded 50 percent. Traditional local to perpetrate the most brutal forms of gender-based vio- drugs were also used. lence? (iii) Is gender-based violence employed strategi- cally by any of the investigated armed groups? Do hier- archies, incentives, punishments or direct orders play a Key findings role? (iv) If gender-based violence is employed strategi- Ex-combatants reported extreme levels of exposure to cally by any of the investigated armed groups, what are traumatic events. Almost all had witnessed killings, the strategic and / or tactical goals? and (v) How do indi- physical assaults, and had been physically assaulted vidual motivational and strategic factors interact to per- themselves. Reports on traumatic events also provide petrate gender-based violence? The results of the study evidence of the strict command chain within the AG, as will contribute to the development of programs which many ex-combatants reported being coerced by threat aim to break the ongoing cycles of violence. of death or injury. Out of 23 traumatic event types, 90 percent of the participants had experienced more than Methodology 10 different traumatic event types, and 58 percent more than 15. Almost one quarter exhibited clinical symptoms A total of 213 ex-combatants were interviewed, either in severe enough to qualify for diagnosis of Post-Traumat- the United Nation’s Disarmament, Demobilisation and ic Stress Disorder (PTSD) with its related disability for Reintegration/Resettlement and Reintegration (DDR/RR) proper psycho-social functioning, and would require camp, or at the Equipe d’Education et d’Encadrement specialized psychological treatment. des Traumatisés de Nyiragongo (ETN) Center, a rein- tegration center for war-affected youth, dealing with Almost all participants reported having been a perpetra- Congolese former child soldiers and ex-combatants. All tor of violence and committed armed physical assaults. interviewees recently left their AG. International clinical One quarter took part in the massacres of civilians and experts carried out structured interviews with the help of 66 percent had witnessed such events. Furthermore, at interpreters from the DRC. This effective collaboration least 1 out of 10 reported having perpetrated sexual vio- with MONUSCO in Goma made this study possible. lence, 8 percent reported having eaten human flesh, and one quarter had observed others eating human flesh. Profile of ex-combatants interviewed Reasons given for the brutal forms of violence perpetrat- Ex-combatants interviewed belonged to 16 different AG ed include revenge, wanting to harm the enemy, punish- or forces including, among others, Forces Démocra- ment, or unspecified reasons (such as during lootings), tiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), Maï-Maï with significant differences between AG. In general, par- groups, Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple ticipants had little or no concept of what constitutes a (CNDP), Patriotes Resistants Congolais (PARECO), and civilian, or made no distinction between armed enemies a small sample from the national army. Close to 40 per- and a population affiliated to them. Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in the Kivu Provinces of the DRC: iv Insights from Former Combatants A significant proportion of former combatants reported they had been violated. A further important motivation high levels of appetitive aggression. They reported en- for excessive sexual violence offered by our respondents joying fighting and liking to see their victims suffer, goes beyond individual motives. They suggested that feeling satisfaction when harming others (44 percent), the intention in these cases is to harm “the enemy” as having an urge to fight (35 percent), and finding it diffi- a group. It is important to keep in mind that combatants cult to resist being aggressive (40 percent). These former and soldiers in this study make no clear distinction be- combatants clearly not only became used to violence, tween combatants and civilians, but rather identify who but over time came to enjoy it and developed a need to is “with us or against us.” Hence, civilians associated be increasingly cruel. Almost 1 out of 10 ex-combatants with the enemy are not perceived as civilians but as en- described combat and attacking others as sexually arous- emies. ing. Furthermore, former higher ranking ex-combatants reported more frequently that it is difficult to stop fight- Conclusions ing once is starts. They not only fought other combatants A number of inter-related reasons for violence commit- or attacked civilians to achieve specific aims, but also ted by combatants and soldiers were identified. Central for the pleasure of a man-hunt, which includes injuring is the human potential for developing a pleasurable per- enemies and victims. ception when perpetrating violence, an act that becomes High numbers of former combatants reported having re- rewarding in itself and reinforces on its own violent be- ceived orders to commit violence against civilians, with havior under lawless circumstances, in concert with the almost 9 out of 10 respondents having received orders concept of ‘appetitive aggression’. Many former com- to loot civilians, 8 out of 10 to attack settlements, and batants reported that they perceive perpetrating violence 6 out of 10 to burn houses. Overall 13 percent reported as arousing and fascinating and the experience of living that they had received orders to rape. The Maï-Maï and in a violent environment such as in an AG may increase PARECO officers reported more frequently than soldiers the level of appetitive aggression. Appetitive aggression to have received orders to rape, and CNDP and FDLR in this sense appears to be adaptive in combat and re- soldiers reported to have received such orders more of- warding for combatants (Elbert and others, 2010). This ten than officers. is also confirmed by the observed clear relationship be- tween higher ranks and increased levels of this form of When asked about their explanations and opinions about aggressive behavior. the causes for SGBV in Eastern DRC, the most common opinions given by ex-combatants are that: (i) combat- The violent context fosters sexual violence, supported by ants get out of control (82 percent); (ii) it happens when individual motivations such as the need to fulfill sexual combatants are in small groups – gang rape (55 percent); desire. In addition, there are underlying strategic (e.g., (iii) because of frustration (54 percent); and (iv) revenge gain of political attention), tactical (e.g., facilitating loot- (41 percent). Furthermore, about one-third agreed that ings), as well as overlapping strategic and tactical (e.g., the absence of a wife, proving manhood, and having the control of civilians) aspects of SGBV in Eastern DRC. opportunity to commit a violent act without punishment It is unclear to what extent these reasons are put forward from the leadership are reasons for SGBV. Overall, more as justification for brutal sexual excess. The FDLR, than one quarter agreed that violence against women CNDP, and Maï-Maï ex-combatants often reported that happens, because combatants / soldiers are ordered to do sexual violence happens because soldiers are ordered it. The lowest level of agreement to this statement was to do it. In addition, a sizeable proportion reported that found amongst former Forces Armées de la République the absence of punishment was a reason for perpetrating Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) soldiers (11 percent) SGBV. Thus, explicit and implicit orders for sexual vio- and former PARECO combatants (15 percent). Thirty lence seem to be common throughout the AG in Eastern percent of former Maï-Maï fighters and 43 percent of DRC. both former FDLR and CNDP combatants agreed with the statement. Furthermore, ex-combatants were not only perpetrators of violent acts, they were also victims of violence them- Concerning the most brutal forms of sexual violence, selves, resulting in one quarter of former combatants such as gang rapes, the insertion of objects, burnings, suffering from PTSD. At least 1 in 10 ex-combatants re- mutilations, and killings, ex-combatants identified nu- ported having been sexually assaulted/raped in their AG merous reasons. Among these, the use of marijuana was (frequently by their own commanders). The possible ef- frequently cited as a factor. Other responses were the re- fects of simultaneously being a survivor and perpetrator sistance of the victim or the desire to silence them after of sexual violence require further exploration. v In summary, individual motives of perpetrating SGBV following a needs assessment. In addition, specific are closely interrelated with tactical and strategic mo- criteria for exclusion should be included in those tives of armed groups which reinforce each other. programs that facilitate reintegration of former com- batants into the national army. For example, former Recommendations combatants suffering from PTSD or appetitive ag- gression should not be reintegrated into a national Obviously, ending the period of conflict, violence and army. insecurity in Eastern DRC would contribute tremen- dously to addressing the high levels of ongoing SGBV. ØØ Break the cycles of violent behavior of former This requires, among others, addressing the social and combatants. Develop approaches to reinstate social economic drivers of conflict and instability which are norms of nonviolent interaction for former combat- historically deep-rooted, and driven by a complex mix ants impaired by trauma-related disorders such as of political, security, social and economic factors (World PTSD or aggressive patterns of behavior. These ap- Bank, 2013). proaches should provide former combatants with tools to remain calm in stressful situations, to plan Also, it is widely recognized that SGBV is a complex and follow-up on realistic goals for the future as problem requiring an integrated and multi-sectoral re- well as to initiate and sustain non-violent relation- sponse, even more so in a fragile environment with ships. These approaches would combine therapy tar- ongoing conflict, such as in Eastern DRC. Responses geting symptoms of post-traumatic stress, as well as to violence against women need to address, among oth- tendencies towards violent behavior. As Ms. Zainab ers: health sector including physical and mental health Hawa Bangura, UN Special Representative of the issues, the criminal-justice sector, economic empower- Secretary-General on Sexual Violence, states there ment, community development (promoting equitable is a need to also “mentally disarm former combat- access to resources for women and men), prevention of ants“. violence (e.g., through formal and informal education), and advocacy at the community, national and interna- ØØ Safeguard against (re-)recruitment. Strengthen tional levels. Any effective response must combine en- information, sensitization, and awareness activities forcing laws and prosecuting perpetrators to break the to prevent (re)-recruitment of combatants and vio- cycle of impunity, while addressing the individual and lence. Educate at-risk populations (including par- societal wounds, and working to prevent a normalization ents and the wider community) about the negative and recurrence of sexual violence. consequences of joining an AG, including inform- ing them of the use of false propaganda by many The following recommendations are related to the find- AG. Former combatants could speak out publicly ings of this study and focus especially on the perpetrator about their traumatic experiences, including sexual side of SGBV. violence within AG. These efforts should include, among others, the national government of the DRC, ØØ Address the impunity issue. Strengthen the judi- as well as local government, international actors and cial system in the DRC to apprehend and prosecute development partners, local communities, violent perpetrators and to effectively implement the 2006 actors, and victims’ associations and representa- Law on Sexual Violence, which broadened the defi- tives. nition of sexual assault and toughened punishment for convicted offenders. Successfully prosecuting ØØ Dismantle the perception of civilians as “enemy”. cases of high level perpetrators would send strong Support programs focused on rebuilding trust within signals to state and non-state armed combatants. In communities and between communities and the state addition, develop improved mechanisms to collect to address intercommunity hatred and build/restore (forensic) evidence of SGBV to facilitate interna- social cohesion through broad based community de- tional, regional and national efforts to prosecute velopment programs. At the same time, reconsider perpetrators. current civilian protection programming in light of the findings that all civilians are perceived as en- ØØ Include screening mechanisms for mental health emies if not collaborating with AG perpetrators. issues in reintegration programs. Reintegration programs for ex-combatants, either into the nation- ØØ Include men in programs addressing SGBV. al army, or as civilians into society, should screen Increase understanding at the international, regional, former combatants for trauma symptomatology, in- national and community level for the need to cluding PTSD. Programs should provide treatment include men in programs addressing SGBV. These Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in the Kivu Provinces of the DRC: vi Insights from Former Combatants programs must acknowledge men’s multiple roles as DRC, such as strengthening their legal capacity perpetrators as highlighted through this study, but also and property rights, improving their access to land as witnesses to SGBV, victims of sexual violence, and economic resources, building their human capital service providers (e.g., health workers, police, through education and skills development, easing peace-keepers and other workers in demobilization their overall workloads, and channeling resources and reintegration initiatives), decision-makers and to them in the agricultural sector. In addition, policymakers, and change agents. Including men in these efforts should include sensitization against programs addressing SGBV is especially important SGBV among AG, as well as improving discipline for prevention. and attitudes with regards to civilians, especially vis-à-vis women, and strengthening implementation ØØ Support SGBV prevention. This will require of a code of conduct among the FARDC regarding broader actions to raise the status of women in the SGBV. vii Abbreviations AAS Appetitive Aggression Scale AG Armed Groups ADF Allied Democratic Forces AFDL Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre ALIR Armée de Libération du Rwanda ANC Armée Nationale Congolaise AN-Imboneza Armée Nationale-Imboneza APCLS Armée de Peuple pour un Congo Libre et Souverain APR Armée Patriotique Rwandaise BCC Behavioral Change Communication CBR Centre de Brassage et de Recyclage CMDP Conseil Militaire pour la Défense du Peuple CNDP Congrés National pour la Défense du Peuple CNKi Comité National du Kivu CPCS Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies CRAP Commandos de Recherche et d’Action en Profondeur CTO Centre de Transit et Orientation D & R Demobilisation and Reintegration DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration DDRRR Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration DRC Democratic Republic of Congo DSM Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders ETN Equipe d’Education et d’Encadrement des Traumatisés de Nyiragongo EUSEC Mission de conseil et d’assistance de l’Union européenne en matière de réforme du secteur de la sécurité en République démocratique du Congo (RDC) (“EUSEC RD Congo”) FAC Forces Armées Congolaises 1 FAG Foreign Armed Group(s) FAR Forces Armées Rwandaises FARDC Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo FDD Forces de Défense de la Démocratie (Burundi) FDLR /FOCA Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda / Forces combattants Abacunguzi FDN Force de Défense Nationale FIB Force Intervention Brigade FNL Forces Nationales pour la Libération FPC Front des Patriotes pour le Changement FPLC Force Populaire de la Libération du Congo (of Thomas Lubanga in Ituri) FPLC Forces Patriotique pour la Libération du Congo (of Gad(i) in N-Kivu) FRF Forces Républicaines Fédéralistes GBV Gender-Based Violence GLR Great Lakes Region GoDRC Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo ICC International Criminal Court LNC Logistique Non Conventionnelle LRA Lord’s Resistance Army MDRP Multi Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program MLC Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo) MONUC Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo MONUSCO Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo NALU National Army for the Liberation of Uganda NCL Non Conventionnel Logistics NCO Non-Commissioned Officer NDC Nduma défense du Congo NGO Non Gouvernemental Organization PALIR Peuple en Arme pour la Libération du Rwanda 2 PARECO/FAP Patriotes Résistants Congolais / Forces Armées Populaire PNDDR Programme Nationale de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinsertion D.R.Congo PNC Police Nationale Congolaise PSS-I Symptom Scale-Interview PTSD Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder RCD Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie RDF Rwandan Defence Force RDR Rassemblement pour le Retour des Réfugiés et de la Démocratie au Rwanda RPR Rassemblement Populaire Rwandais RPA Rwandan Patriotic Army RPF Rwandan Patriotic Front RUD Ralliement pour l’Unité et la Démocratie Urunana SD Standard Deviation SGBV Sexual and Gender-Based Violence SMI Structure Militaire d’Intégration SNPC Synergie Nationale pour la Paix et la Concorde SSR Security Sector Reform STAREC Stabilisation and Reconstruction of Former Armed Conflict Areas in Eastern Congo TDRP Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Program UNSC United Nations Security Council UPC Union des Patriotes Congolais 3 Acknowledgements T his research would have been impossible without the Hervé Hesse (DDR/RR MONUSCO), Patrick Cyrille support of key disarmament, demobilization and re- Garba (DDR/RR MONUSCO), Christine Kagemulo integration professionals, as well as skilled interpret- Rwezaura (DDR/RR MONUSCO), and Pascal Badiban- ers and many people of goodwill. ga Zagabe (ETN Goma). We thank Pia Peeters (World Bank, Africa Region Post We also thank our outstanding interpreters, Roger Conflict and Social Development Practice Group) for the Buhendwa Zashurwa, Flory Barhimanya Kahisa, and initiative, support, and guidance she offered in drafting Ben Ombeni Cigolo. and carrying out the project. We are deeply indebted to all of the above. We hope that Our work received invaluable support and guidance our research may contribute to a better understanding of from Mass Walimba Katangira (DDR/RR MONUSCO), sexual and gender-based violence in the Democratic Re- the late Gregory Alex (Gromo) (DDR/RR MONUSCO), public of Congo (DRC). 4 1 Introduction M otivations behind the extreme brutality used in tegic and / or tactical goals? and (v) How do individual many cases of rape in the context of armed con- motivational and strategic factors interact to perpetrate flict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) gender-based violence? The results of the study will remains poorly understood and under-researched. This contribute to the development of programs which aim to study has been conducted in partnership with the NGO break the ongoing cycles of violence. vivo international, to determine individual motivations, as well as strategic or tactical aspects of sexual violence The following chapter discusses the context, including of different armed groups and their leadership. The key conceptual background, existing literature on the subject research questions for the study are: (i) Why is the vio- of SGBV, the history of AG violence in the affected re- lence directed against women and girls so exceedingly gion, and factors that may have contributed to the current brutal/cruel? (ii) What motivates combatants to perpe- situation, in which rape and other forms of violent sexual trate the most brutal forms of gender-based violence? behavior seem endemic. Chapter 3 describes the research (iii) Is gender-based violence employed strategically by methodology. The main body of the study discusses the any of the investigated armed groups? Do hierarchies, findings from semi-structured interviews administered incentives, punishments or direct orders play a role? (iv) by a team of clinical psychologists for this study. The If gender-based violence is employed strategically by last two chapters summarize the main findings of the any of the investigated armed groups, what are the stra- study, followed by recommendations. 5 2 Background Some sources suggest that apparently indiscriminate vi- 2.1 Conceptual Background olence against civilians, including mass rape and sexual The particular character of sexual and gender-based vi- torture, are neither an exception nor a side effect in these olence (SGBV) in the Democratic Republic of Congo so-called “new wars” (Kaldor, 2004) or “complex politi- (DRC) must be understood in the context of violence cal emergencies” (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1999) perpetrated against civilians during any armed conflict but, rather, the modus operandi by which armed conflicts are fought. Terror has become an essential part of con- as well as in comparison to sexual violence in other con- flict strategy. Against this backdrop, this study analyzes flicts and in the larger context of violence in general. The to what extent SGBV is used intentionally as a means term SGBV as it is used here includes rape, mass rape, of warfare in the Eastern DRC, and to what extent it is gender-based torture, and any other act of violence of a instrumental to the tactical or strategic objectives of par- sexual or gender-based nature that appears to be closely ticular AG. associated with the armed conflict in the DRC. SGBV in the DRC must also be understood in the context of While humanitarian disasters caused by indiscriminate seemingly indiscriminate violence perpetrated among a violence are usually readily apparent and widely agreed confusing array of armed groups (AG) whose identities to be a direct result of violent conflict, conflict-resolution and loyalties shift and change with bewildering speed. scholars have tried to explore the conditions under which This paper examines individual motivations and external this violence emerges and is sustained, as well as the causes of SGBV using data from a series of interviews purposes it might serve. For instance, Weinstein argues with suspected perpetrators conducted in the DRC in that violence is used in “opportunistic rebellions” to gain 2011. The paper will also discuss contextual conditions access to easily transportable natural resources such as that may have an influence on the incidence and severity gold, coltan, diamonds, or timber. Here combatants are of SGBV in the Eastern DRC. not concerned with gaining sympathy or support from the population; instead, they use indiscriminate violence 2.1.1 Indiscriminate Violence simply because it is the easiest and most cost-effective way of controlling civilian populations that might inter- Between 2000 and 2009, 12 major armed conflicts oc- fere or be in the way (Kalyvas, 2006; Penn and Nardos, curred on the African continent alone. During the same 2003; Weinstein, 2007). On the other hand, Kalyvas decade 30 major armed conflicts were recorded world- (2006) argues that even rebellions with ideological agen- wide by the Stockholm International Peace Research das may use indiscriminate violence to deter the popula- Institute (Harbom and Wallensteen, 2010). An authori- tion from collaborating with enemy combatants. tative study comparing civilian and military death rates in all wars and civil conflicts during the last half of the 2.1.2 Rape during Armed Conflict as a Global 20th century cited a figure of just under 41 million dead Phenomenon (Leitenberg, 2006: Table 2). Leitenberg estimates num- bers of civilian deaths by conflict, and makes clear that Mass rape during armed conflict gained recent attention certain types of conflict generate extraordinarily high during the war in the former Yugoslavia (Henry, Ward, ratios of civilian to military deaths (Leitenberg, 2006: and Hirshberg, 2004; Lindsey, 2002; Mezey, 1994; 86−89). Often, violence against civilians appears to be Weitsman, 2008). Since this conflict it has been studied committed at random—without discriminating enemies retrospectively for major wars (such as World War II) and armed conflict worldwide (Penn and Nardos, 2003). from civilians or other clear criteria affecting the deci- sion to harm. In other words, anyone could be a target. Between 1991–2003 Green (2004) listed 24 armed con- The random character of indiscriminate violence magni- flicts in which girls and women were raped on a mass fies the feeling of terror experienced by those affected. scale (Wood, 2009). Though sexual violence in both In most recent conflicts in Africa, leaders of warring fac- times of war and times of peace is commonly under- tions largely rely on irregular forces, forced recruitment, reported (Watts and Zimmerman, 2002) and epidemio- and the use of terror to gain and maintain control over logical studies remain rare, it is clear that mass rape is both civilian populations and their own fighting forces. causing tremendous suffering in today’s armed conflicts; 6 stories emerging from the Eastern DRC, for example, ethnic group” (UNSC, 2008). This statement reflects the have spurred international outcry. Although not exclu- wide consensus among scholars and human rights activ- sively, wartime rape mostly affects girls and women, ists that rape during armed conflict is neither a side effect causing them lifelong physical and psychological suffer- of, nor an adjunct to large-scale violence, but an inherent ing. In addition to the damage to its individual victims, part of it that calls for collective, determined action. rape often destroys families and larger social networks as well as individual economic capacities (Turshen, 2001). But labeling rape as a weapon presumes that mass rape Although still largely neglected by emergency and hu- is systematic, deliberate, and serves one or more specific manitarian aid interventions, mental health problems purposes. There is, however, little evidence-based re- are a major source of malfunctioning in populations that search to support this presumption. have suffered war and conflict (Schauer and Schauer, Skjelsbaek (2001) suggests specific intentions behind 2010). Sexual violence has particularly dramatic con- mass rape and explicitly cites the infliction of trauma sequences for survivors’ psychosocial, intellectual, and and psychological damage as one important objective economic functioning, and impairs social and economic of this practice. Reports from the Sierra Leone Truth postwar recovery—both on individual and community Commission (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of levels. Sexual violence destroys the social fabric and Sierra Leone, 2004) and research on the former Yugosla- economic basis of entire regions and displaces masses via (Mezey, 1994; Warburton, 1993) conclude that mass of people on a continuous basis (Schalinski, Elbert, and rape during conflicts in these places followed distinct Schauer, 2011). patterns and served strategic purposes. Salzman (1998) Since 2000 the United Nations (UN) have paid increas- alleges that the Serb army followed a written plan, the ing attention to sexual violence related to armed conflict. RAM plan, that spelled out the use of rape to “cleanse” In particular, the UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 Bosnia-Herzegovina along ethnic lines. (UNSC, 2000) and 1820 on Women, Peace and Security: In the same vein, widespread rape in the DRC has fre- Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (UNSC, 2008) state quently been described as a weapon of war used by di- that armed conflict exposes women to increased levels of verse parties (Human Rights Watch, 2002; Longombe, rape and is a major threat to women’s physical integrity Claude, and Ruminjo, 2008; Omanyondo Ohambe, Bah- and human rights. The United Nations Security Council ananga Muhigwa, and Wa Mamba, 2005). (UNSC) particularly condemned the widespread rape of girls and women during recent conflicts in Afghanistan, But evidence-based research of the possible motives be- Burundi, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan, and the DRC. It hind the use of sexual violence, as perpetrated by various has implicated both state and non-state AG as perpetra- AGs in the DRC, is rare. Reasons for the brutal levels tors of rape and sexual abuse (UN, 2004). of SGBV in the DRC have not been fully investigated; therefore, attempts to explain it often rely on untested During war and conflict, two main types of rape can be assumptions and speculation. Research in this field is differentiated. The first type of rape is commonly used in needed but, for reasons that should become clear in this almost any war. The offences are personally planned and report, is difficult to conduct. executed, either by single men or small groups. They are perceived as the “right of the victor” and are frequently Current assumptions about root causes of the extreme tolerated by the superior authority. The second type levels of SGBV in the DRC remain controversial as well. of rape concerns an integral part of the military strat- On the one hand, perpetrators are portrayed as subhuman egy. The widespread rape in the DRC has frequently monsters whose behavior simply cannot be understood. been described as resulting from such a strategy, or as On the other hand, it has been suggested that leaders of a “weapon of war”, used by diverse parties (Human AG either give direct orders to perpetuate SGBV or at Rights Watch, 2002; Longombe, Claude, and Ruminjo, least see the SGBV committed by their combatants as 2008; Omanyondo Ohambe, Bahananga Muhigwa, and a means to achieve strategic and/or tactical goals—and, Wa Mamba, 2005). As such, this type of rape is used to thus, a “weapon of war.” Since there is little evidence to intimidate and ultimately destroy the targeted group. It substantiate whether SGBV is committed at the whim of aims to destroy existing family structures, particularly in individuals or within a larger strategic plan, both ideas societies with a strong patriarchal organization. continue to stand as untested assumptions. The UNSC condemns the use of rape as a “weapon of 2.1.3 Potential Motives of Sexual Violence warfare” (UN, 2000) and describes it as a “tactic of war to humiliate, dominate, instill fear in, disperse and/or A number of reasons behind the use of SGBV in the DRC forcibly relocate civilian members of a community or have been postulated. For example, one explanation is 7 that the leaders of AGs have become increasingly aware violence once it has been experienced as pleasant. of international norms against indiscriminate violence (war crimes and crimes against humanity), and thus use A further factor that must be considered in developing rape deliberately to spur outrage and thus gain interna- an explanation of SGBV is the incidence and effect of tional political attention. Alternatively, SGBV perpetrat- substance use or abuse. Some studies have found that ed by AG in the DRC could be a deliberate communica- substance use or abuse seems to heighten the level of tion strategy to deter the international community from aggression and brutality among combatants, and is at the supporting military actions directed against these AG by same time a method for combatants to cope with their demonstrating that they hold civilians hostage. Further, own trauma-related symptoms (Gear, 2002; Odenwald it is possible that each AG that uses systematic rape does and others, 2009). The nature of substance use among so to emasculate opposing factions or simply terrorize combatants in the DRC must therefore be investigated as civilians. Unfortunately, each of these hypotheses needs part of any research into SGBV. testing to avoid attributing incorrect motives to actors In a previous study of AG conducted by vivo inter- who may have other aims in mind. Suffice it to say that national (Haer and others, in press), it was noted that the possible strategic motives of SGBV, particularly at many combatants reported being rewarded within their the leadership level, remain unclear. group for participating in violent acts. Reward systems Also unclear is the motivation of individual combatants are complex and might vary from one AG to the other who perpetrate SGBV. Most of the research currently or even from commander to commander, but there were available has focused on survivors of SGBV, yet their consistent reports of combatants receiving extra food, testimonies rarely permit insight into the perpetrators’ money, non-medical drugs (for example, marijuana), minds. Faced with the compelling need to intervene on sexual access to women (or men), and spiritual objects behalf of survivors, there is an obvious need for better (for example, holy water) for being particularly brutal. evidence-based research to understand the motivations But these findings were not conclusive, and these phe- behind SGBV in the DRC. nomena remain poorly understood. The psychological dimensions of the dynamics behind 2.2 Context and Problem Statement the brutal SGBV committed in the DRC also remain poorly understood. In preceding studies vivo interna- Sexual violence in the DRC is embedded in complex tional found preliminary evidence that, on the individ- contextual factors. First, for more than two decades the ual level, perpetrating violence can be experienced as Great Lakes Region has been the scene of insurgen- rewarding, even as fascinating and appetitive (Elbert, cies, rebellions, genocide, civil war, and international Weierstall, and Schauer, 2010). Vivo’s studies in the DRC wars that have directly affected security in the Eastern (Weierstall and others, in press), Uganda (Weierstall and DRC. The fighting has continued with varying degrees others, 2012), and Rwanda (Weierstall and others, 2011) of intensity since 1996. For the past decade, much of this highlight how perpetrators of violence might experience fighting has been between poorly controlled domestic an urge to repeatedly assault defenseless others. The AG, but has often included elements of foreign armed suffering and struggling of the victim, his or her blood, groups (FAG) who have, since the end of the Rwandan wounds, and vocalization, as well as the aggressive act Genocide, actively undermined all attempts to calm the itself, provide the perpetrator with context-dependent security situation. Second, while this conflict is often un- sets of learned and inborn positive feedback cues, and derstood as a struggle for political power, it is fuelled thus incite further acts of brutality. Hence, perpetrating by a secondary struggle for the control over natural violence has the potential to be a highly self-rewarding resources that takes place within a context of extreme experience, subsequently feeding a lust to commit more poverty affecting the mass of civilians and rank-and-file violence over time. Increasingly more brutal forms of fighters. Third, the adverse effect of this underlying pov- SGBV then trigger positive feedback cues, and perpetra- erty is magnified by poor governance, manifested in the tors crave the positive feelings attached to committing absence of public administration and public service de- violence. Perpetrators in this context might seek to sat- livery, especially in remote areas of the country. For ex- isfy an inner urge to commit further gruesome forms of ample, survivors of SGBV have severely limited access violence and to kill. On the basis of available research, to basic public services, such as health care and justice. perpetrating (sexual) violence might be regarded as an In fact, there is no functioning judicial system in most addiction-like phenomenon. Consistent with this hypoth- of the country. This creates a permissive environment esis, a preliminary explanation can be developed around within which combatants, whether government soldiers the difficulties associated with trying to disengage from or AG fighters, can perpetrate SBGV or other violence 8 against civilians with virtual impunity. Fourth, both AG cultural norms, and the accepted perceptions of people in and government forces often attack civilians rather than the Kivu regions differ substantially from, for example, attacking one another. This situation is complicated by western views. the fact that fighters and civilians are generally mixed to- Following is a brief description of the history of armed gether, particularly where AG are acting as local defense conflict in Eastern DRC, the Disarmament, Demobiliza- militias or where the Forces Armées de la République tion and Reintegration processes, and poverty in DRC. Démocratique du Congo (FARDC, the current name of the DRC army) units are stationed in settlements. In ei- 2.2.1 Armed Conflict in the Eastern DRC2 ther case, fighter’s families are often present within mili- tary deployment areas. Man, when perfected, is the best of animals. If, however, he be isolated from the law and justice, he is the worst of Though the primary purpose of this research is to con- all. (Aristotle, Politics, 1253a15) tribute to an understanding of why fighters inflict SGBV on civilians, it should be noted that fighters are also vic- The DRC and the greater Great Lakes Region of Central tims—both of violence and SGBV. The magnitude of the Africa suffer from continuing and widespread violence problem is unquestionable, as is its complexity. There is inflicted by a multitude of armed actors, rendering some little hope of understanding either individual or collec- areas inaccessible and forcibly displacing hundreds of tive motives behind the alarmingly high levels of SGBV thousands of people internally or to neighboring coun- in the DRC without attempting to position the behavior tries. In part because of the tribal or ethnic dimensions of within the host of external factors that might play a role present-day conflict, it is necessary to consider, however in determining it. briefly, the legacy of pre-colonial history. In our rush to look for the causes of today’s battles in recent political The challenge taken up in this research is to investigate or economic dynamics, we can easily forget that tribal the motives behind SGBV behaviors without abstracting tensions over land ownership, predatory behavior, and away from the actual social, political, economic, and his- slave raiding (Thomas, 1997: 704, Wrong, 2001: 43) can torical circumstances in which the behaviors are embed- be traced back more than a century. The history of war- ded. The main challenge is to isolate and identify causal time behavior sheds light on current accounts of human relations with reasonable accuracy. rights violations and eyewitness testimonies of recent skirmishes. Though one might be tempted to write this Recent research explores the foundations and cultural all off against the failure of politics to establish a fully causes of sexual violence (Muchukiwa, 2010), commu- functional institutional state in the DRC—a state with nity perceptions, and capacities to cope with it, as well institutions that might mitigate the effects of harmful as the role of judicial systems and the state. Numbers behavior—this would sidestep the problem of trying to of traditionally tolerated or sanctioned violent sexual interpret the behavior in ways that might allow effective practices are described, traditional punishments listed, intervention. and modern dynamics explored across varying ethnic or tribal backgrounds. It would also ignore some particularly gruesome ac- counts of the actions of the “Forces Publiques”—cre- A recent study conducted in Goma in the Eastern DRC ated by explorer Henry Morton Stanley and maintained (Promundo, Sonke Gender Justice Network, and IMAG- by King Leopold (“King of the Belgians”)—throughout ES, 2012) that focused on the prevalence and perceptions the king’s tenure as private owner of what was then of SGBV in the general population found that “more known as the Congo Free State, and the possibility that than a third of the men interviewed had imposed a form the Europeans set the example for some of the behav- of sexual violence,1 and more than three quarters of them ior we now deplore (Wrong, 2001: 46). Cruel practices express disturbing views about rape and women’s rights were reported by explorers such as Dr. Richard Kandt, […] The result shows that sexual violence is […] often a a psychiatrist who traveled the western shores area of reflection of patriarchal norms and myths about rape that Lake Kivu in 1901. Some of his most shocking accounts the majority of men accept and value to justify and make of violent behavioral patterns resemble descriptions rape normal and not to grant value to women. This gives men a sense of ownership of the female body.” It is im- portant to keep in mind that the social environment, the 2  In order to understand the history of armed conflict in Eastern DRC, as well as response from participants in the study, it is important to un- derstand the terminology commonly used related to ethnicity and tribal 1 Forty-eight percent in a partnership setting. affiliations, which are often controversial and sensitive 9 of the combat-linked behavior of today’s AG fighters. growing frustrations over contested land and citizenship Kandt also provides an early account of the presence rights, solidification of tribal and ethnic identity frames, of the Kinyarwanda-speaking populations (later labeled and continuing ineffective governance from the capital “Rwandophones”; Kinyarwanda in the understanding of (Stearns, 2011: 69−80). Then, following the Rwandan its own language is “the language and customs of the genocide in 1994, at least one million people fled to Rwandan people”, while in Swahili, the common trade Eastern Zaire (today’s DRC). Among the refugees were language of Eastern DRC, its understanding is limited to a large number of the genocide’s instigators, known as the language), inhabiting parts of present-day DRC. The the Interahamwe militia, along with the defeated Forces “Rwandophone” population increased significantly dur- Armées Rwandaises (FAR) and significant elements of ing the 1920s and 1930s as the Belgian colonial admin- the former governmental administration. The leaders of istration encouraged large-scale migration from Rwanda these groups used the refugee camps not only to hide and Uganda to the Kivus . from international justice, but also to regroup and mobi- lize the refugee populations and militarize parts of them. From 1964−65 there was a bloody war between Banyar- Refugees themselves, as well as the parts of the appara- wanda (meaning: “those who are Rwandan or “the Rwan- tus of international support to refugees, became instru- da people”), who were perceived as new immigrants to ments in the hands of the new leaders of these groups, Zaire (the DRC at the time), and the Hunde/Nyanga trib- who were in fact well-known figures of the defeated re- al groups, who believed their land and citizen rights were gime (Omaar, 2009). being threatened by the new arrivals () for the develop- ment of tribal/ethnic animosities (Annex 3). To protect Interahamwe was the name of the largest militia to be their rights as Zairian citizens and for self-defense, the implicated in the execution of the Rwandan genocide in Banyarwanda formed a movement named Kanyarwanda 1994. It was created around 1988, two years after Yoweri (Walimba, 2009: 13; Adelman and Suhrke, 1999: 57). Museveni had taken power in Uganda with strong sup- After a series of violent clashes that claimed numerous port from exiled Rwandan Tutsi (themselves refugees of victims, government troops were deployed to calm the the 1959 violence in Rwanda). After the military victory situation. This might mark the first armed conflict of this by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in July 1994, the type in the Kivu Provinces in the postcolonial era. It is large majority of the Interahamwe fled to the Eastern possible that the violence in the region today, as well as DRC (then Zaire) and to Western Tanzania, where they some of the particular characteristics of the present-day found they could not put down durable roots. As they at- modes of conflict, have their origins in intertribal con- tempted to reestablish themselves at the center of a mili- flicts of the relatively unstructured pre-colonial period tarized movement for an armed return to Rwanda, they and continue to reflect the salience of tribal identities and successively formed a series of organizations with a po- age-old competitions among them. It should also be re- litico-military character. The first of these was known as membered that the colonial occupation of the DRC was the Gouvernement en exile (GeE), which then morphed particularly brutal and did little to build trust between into the Rassemblement pour le Retour des Réfugiés et the government and citizens (Wrong, 2001; Hochschild, de la Démocratie au Rwanda (RDR) and then into Pe- 1998; Stearns, 2011; Davidson, 1992; Meredith, 2005). uple en Arme pour la Libération du Rwanda (PALIR). Later, parts of this group, who have been described as A 2010 UN analysis of serious violence in the DRC politically more extreme, moved toward Western Zaire, (UNHCHR Mapping Report, 2010) provides a fair ac- while others stayed in the East. Those in the East found- count of further recent historic developments of tribal ed the Armée de Libération du Rwanda (ALIR) in 1995 tensions in the Eastern DRC. Annex 3 provides excerpts and later split up into ALIR I (West) and ALIR II (East). from this report that are germane to a clearer understand- Parts of the group in the West founded the Forces dé- ing of ex-combatants’ statements referring to the driv- mocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) in 2000 ing tribal or ethnic motives behind armed conflict in the (Romkema, 2007) as a political organization,3 with the Kivu region. Forces Opérationnelles de Combat Abcunzi (FOCA) as To summarize relevant parts of the history of this con- their military wing. flict, one could say that the Kivu region has a long history of intertribal fighting, but first saw interethnic clashes in postcolonial times beginning in 1964, follow- 3  Debelle (2012: 22). In December 2002 the FDLR steering commit- ing a decade-long build-up of intertribal and interethnic tee, led by its president, Murwanashyaka, modified the text of the FDLR tensions (analogical to the genocide in Rwanda). These statutes to designate the rebellion a “liberation movement” instead of a tensions became more aggravated in 1989 as a result of “political-military organisation.” 10 All these groups were, and remain, largely dominated by as a community defense force), many of whom rose in Rwandan Hutu, while they increasingly have members spontaneous response to what was perceived as outside from other nationalities, mainly Congolese and Burundi- aggression against a state too weak to defend itself. an Hutu, and to a lesser extent, from other ethnic groups. Most of the Maï-Maï groups fought against the RCD- In 2004, a small number of armed combatants broke Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA, the name of the Rwan- away from the FDLR/FOCA to form the Rassemblement dan army between mid-1994 and 2002) alliance, though pour l’unité et démocratie (RUD-Urunana); its armed some were convinced to fight alongside the RCD-RPA. wing is the Armée National (AN-Imboneza). Another An estimated 25 AG were involved in the war. much smaller group, called “Soki” after the nickname of its creator,4 broke off from the RUD. Interestingly, most The key justification offered in defense of Rwandan of the political and military leaders of these groups are troop presence in the Eastern DRC was the continuing the same persons (Omaar, 2009; 2012). Many present- presence of the “Hutu militia” (most often labeled Ex- day members of these groups either did not take part in FAR/Interahamwe) and their threat to Rwandan security. the 1994 Rwandan genocide or were too young at the As the UN Mapping Report cited above explains, this time to be held accountable for their participation (that war went in several directions at once and fed a general- is, they could not be prosecuted in Rwandan court to- ized and lingering mistrust among the various tribes and day). Most Congolese civilians do not, however, make ethnicities inhabiting the Eastern DRC. One particular the above distinction, but call all of these predominantly aspect of the fighting may have been a result of the sim- Hutu groups “Interahamwe” or simply “Hutus” (Human ple consequences of small and lightly armed forces try- Rights Watch, 2002; Pratt and Werchick, 2004). None of ing to control vast territories with poor communications these groups refer to themselves as “Interahamwe.” 
 networks: the proliferation of poorly controlled proxy groups and a tendency toward general anarchy. As such, The Congo Wars any control that existed was eroded under the pressures The creation of political and military organizations in the of combat fatigue, distance, and squabbles among lead- Rwandan refugee camps in the Kivu provinces close to ers. The more desperate conditions became, the more Rwandan borders presented a threat to the new Rwan- radical the methods used to try to establish and exert dan government and, indeed, were seen as the cause control— at every level. of continuing insecurity in Western Rwanda during the This war was formally brought to an end with the sign- months following the genocide. Frustrated by the lack ing of the Lusaka Peace Accord in 1999. In 2000 a UN of international action to stop cross-border raids being mission, Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies launched from refugee camps inside Zaire, the Rwandan en République Démocratique du Congo (MONUC), was and Ugandan armies entered the DRC in November 1996 deployed to the DRC. Initially, it only had an observer along with, and in support of, Laurent Desirée Kabila, mandate but evolved to become one of the largest UN and launched the First Congo War. By May 16, 1997, peacekeeping missions and now operates under very ro- the coalition had ousted President Mobutu Sese Seko bust Chapter 7 rules (use of military force authorized). from power, and the majority of Rwandan refugees in The UNSC created a new mission in May 2010 with the camps returned home, either voluntarily or by force. a stabilization mandate and named it the Mission de This war formally ended in 1998. l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation The Second Congo War, also known as Africa’s Great en République Démocratique du Congo (MONUSCO). War, was waged from August 1998 to December 2002. Despite significant UN presence, multiparty elections On August 2, 1998, the creation of a new rebel group, the held in 2006, and the Goma peace agreements of 2008 Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD, and 2009, fighting among various AG and forces con- the Rally for Congolese Democracy), was announced in tinues within the Eastern DRC. This conflict includes a Goma. It received support from Rwanda and Uganda, variety of AG with varying degrees of formal control. while the armed forces of Angola, Chad, Namibia, Su- In addition to the Congolese national army, FARDC, dan, and Zimbabwe supported the new central govern- there are a multitude of Maï-Maï groups, of which a ment in Kinshasa under President Laurent Kabila. Large- number have been organized under the umbrella of Pa- scale military operations generated the mushrooming of triotes Résistants Congolais/Forces Armées Populaire Maï-Maï resistance groups (militia who see themselves (PARECO/FAP), which consists of five tribal subgroups (Hutu, Hunde, Nande, Nyanga, and Tembo). The Con- grés National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP, a rebel 4  Col Sangano Musohoke alias Soki group established by renegade General Laurent Nkunda 11 in North Kivu out of the former Armée Nationale Con- ideas and the belief that there are conspiracies to elimi- golaise, ANC) and a similar group, the Forces Républic- nate their own group. Fear of genocide is generalized aines Fédéralistes (FRF, a Banyamulenge group in the and strongly felt across the entire Eastern DRC. A quick South Kivu), were both created to defend Rwandophone review of the collective rationale of each group breaks minority groups from attacks by other militias and gov- down as follows: ernment forces as well as from FAG from Rwanda (such ■■ The FDLR considers itself the only legitimate repre- as the FDLR/FOCA and its spin-offs), from Burundi sentative and defender of the rights of the majority Forces Nationales pour la Libération (FNL), and Forces of the population of Rwanda. They identify them- de Défense de la Démocratie (FDD). Finally, there are selves as Hutu. several Ugandan AG to be added into the mix: the Al- lied Democratic Forces (ADF); the National Army for ■■ The CNDP and FRF consider themselves the only the Liberation of Uganda (NALU); and the infamous legitimate representatives and defenders of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), also operating in South rights of the Banyarwanda (who identify themselves Sudan and the Central African Republic. If bandit gangs as both Tutsi and Hutu of North Kivu and the Ban- who exploit the disorder are included, as well as recogni- yamulenge (who identify themselves as Tutsi) of tion of the ties some of the more important AG have to South Kivu. national elites in the DRC, Uganda, or Rwanda, then a picture of general anarchy begins to emerge. ■■ Maï-Maï groups including the PARECO consider themselves the only serious and capable defenders In February 2013, the governments of the Great Lakes of their own tribal communities, identifying them- Region5 signed the “Peace, Security and Cooperation selves as ethnic Bantu tribes. Framework for the DRC and the Region”, affirming their commitment to work together, with the support of ■■ The Armée de Peuple pour un Congo Libre et Sou- the international community, to address common secu- verain (APCLS) consider themselves the only seri- rity and economic challenges. Under this agreement, ous and capable defenders of their own tribal com- the countries in the Great Lakes committed to refraining munity (the Hunde tribe). from interfering in other countries and agreed to neither ■■ The FARDC and Police Nationale Congolaise tolerate nor provide assistance or support of any kind to (PNC) are state actors with very diverse sets of self- armed groups. The DRC committed to preventing armed identification. groups from destabilizing neighboring countries. ■■ Bandits and others are small and largely unknown In 2013, the UNSC Resolution 2098 led to the deploy- groups that imitate AG and sometimes act under ment of a 3 000-strong (African) Force Intervention Bri- their names or use their modus operandi as a cover. gade (FIB), which for the first time, is equipped with an They are usually driven by economic interests or offensive mandate. In early June, patrolling of the FIB savagery. started patrolling in Goma and engaged in direct com- bat with M23 rebels in August 2013, in support of the ■■ Command and control mechanisms applied by AG FARDC. depend on their origin and history. While those with roots in a formal military tend to maintain relatively Rationale and Characteristics of AG 6 strict, often very harsh military discipline and an au- thoritative chain of command, other AG with roots There is strong anecdotal evidence drawn from years in local communities tend to have much less formal of direct observation that virtually all communities (in systems of discipline and command. The more mili- the area covered by this research) and tribal and/or eth- tarized groups may have formal codes of conduct nic entities perceive themselves as threatened by other and penal codes (Debelle, 2012; TAZ 7.7.2012), such groups. Their worldview is dominated by paranoid while those that were set up as territorial self-de- fense militias, usually based on tribal or ethnic iden- tities, tend to follow more traditional, warrior-like 5  Signatories to the February 2013 Framework: Angola, Burundi, the command-and-control mechanisms. Both tend to be Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Repub- harsh, violent, and cruel in their punishments, and lic of Congo, Rwanda, South Africa, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and may include use of same-sex sexual violence as a Zambia. Full text of the agreement can be found at: http://www.peaceau. method of punishment. Lacking formal structures, org/uploads/scanned-on-24022013-125543.pdf all discipline is dependent on the behavior of indi- 6  Annex 2. Profile of Armed Groups vidual commanders, and so punishment is often ar- 12 bitrary. Generally, there is no appeal and sentencing (Diagnostic Study of the LRA, 2010, World Bank). All is carried out quickly (Debelle, 2012). of the politico-military AG have ideologies articulated to some degree and most claim religious support of their All groups follow two main lines of recruitment: cause (“God is with us”). ■■ Quasi-voluntary. Engaging tribal/ethnic identity Most of them conduct systematic indoctrination and frames (Du Preez, 1980) to gain the support of civil- maintain internal intelligence structures that, among ian communities they claim to protect. This can be other things, monitor the political views of their mem- seen as only partially voluntary recruitment, as peer bers, including senior officers. They all take severe ac- pressure on individuals, families, and communities tion against any member suspected of treason. All seek/ is coercive and often set against the threat of attack maintain alliances with other AG and/or states across by other groups and forced recruitment. At times, borders and maintain at least rudimentary external intel- it may be simply a matter of the head of a family ligence cells. Some have elite troop units that are trained insisting that his sons or brothers also join the AG to undertake targeted commando operations, including he has chosen. cross-border operations and attacks against military tar- ■■ Forced recruitment. This is widespread and common. gets. The level of organization of politico-military AG Often the difference between forced and voluntary is generally more structured and more formal than an is difficult to perceive from the outside and is more AG without political components. The former tend to a matter of variation in the degree of coercion used. establish state like structures and run them accordingly. Depending on the situation, forced recruitment may They therefore represent a threat to states’ authority and thus to the security of the sub-region. Some have the key deliver half or even more of a given recruit intake. characteristics of terrorist groups insofar as they do not Forced recruitment may target particular individuals represent formally recognized states and tend to target or may be carried out on a larger scale through raids, civilians and perpetrate indiscriminate violence designed particularly on schools. The recruitment of children to undermine order. Therefore, they represent at least a is now considered a serious war crime—a label that potential threat to security beyond the sub-region if they does not seem to have limited recruitment so much should ever ally themselves with terrorist organizations as it has increased the lengths that recruiters will go with a global reach—which may already be happening in to avoid detection. Forced recruitment often hap- the case of the ADF-NALU and Al Shabab. pens at gunpoint and there are credible accounts of incidents in which the choice given to the subject 2.2.2 Disarmament, Demobilization, and was either to join or to die. In the case of refusal to Reintegration: History and Processes join, there is no hesitation to execute the subject on the spot. This aligns with the practice of executing Following massive international pressure, a series of deserters and subjecting recruits to harsh discipline agreements were signed by various regional parties. that can include torture or execution. The first of these was the Lusaka Cease Fire, signed in July−August 1999 by the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, Zim- Training and discipline are harsh in all groups. There are babwe, Angola, Namibia, and the MLC (Mouvement reports from many groups that “weak” recruits regularly pour la Libération du Congo (the RCD signed later). die due to the severity of training methods and living This agreement called for the creation of MONUC to conditions. support the ceasefire; the creation of a Joint Military Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Re- A key difference between AG is that those categorized integration; the opening of the Dialoque Intercongolaise; as politico-military tend to challenge state authorities, and an agreement to disarm the ex-FAR/Interahamwe. while the others do not—or at least do so only on a In 2002 further accords and agreements were signed in purely opportunistic basis (rational: because “the others Luanda and Pretoria and by October 5, 2002, Rwanda do so”, and thus offer the opportunity to gain more). had completed its troop withdrawal. However, the dis- Further, politico-military groups generally have political armament of the ex-FAR/Interahamwe by the Congolese wings, which in some cases, such as the FDLR, include government did not happen and their major allies, the global support networks reaching throughout the Rwan- Maï-Maï, remained in place. Their total combat force at dan diaspora, that conduct internal and external political the time may be estimated at 30-40.000 and thus repre- lobbying and mobilize external support. But the LRA, sented a real threat to regional security which would qualify by most measures as a politico- military AG rebelling against the Ugandan government, There have been several efforts to disarm and demobi- has no observable political wing and no external support lize the AG active in the DRC or to integrate them into 13 regular government forces. It is important to grasp the right to reintegration services that were either unrealistic significance of the dramatically different processes used or simply unlikely to be delivered within the parameters to achieve these ends, as seen from the perspective of ex- of the PNDDR once it started. Unmet expectations cre- combatants. The Multi Country Demobilization and Re- ated frustration among ex-combatants and helps to ex- integration Program (MDRP, www.mdrp.org), operating plain some of the views and perceptions expressed in from 2002 to 2009, aimed at demobilizing combatants interviews in the next chapters. It also offers an idea why and reintegrating them into civilian life in the region. In some ex-combatants state that they have gone through DRC, the alternate choice for combatants was integra- numerous (up to five and more) D-processes, which tion into the regular Congolese army, the FARDC. This would have been impossible within only the PNDDR option was open only to Congolese nationals and was framework, which used biometric data to control access offered under the umbrella of a national Security Sec- to benefits in order to prevent double-dipping. tor Reform (SSR) process that was not supported by the MDRP. Foreign combatants were, with some exceptions, The PNDDR/Army integration program in the DRC repatriated by the UN to their countries of origin, where followed an integrated approach known as tronc com- reintegration assistance was provided by the respective mun. Local AG members who opted to integrate into the national programs, supported by the MDRP. The MDRP FARDC underwent a cantoned integration and training program included Angola, Burundi, the Central African process called brassage (et recyclage). To further com- Republic, the DRC, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda, plicate matters, in 2007, after a failed government mili- and Uganda and was intended to harmonize—to the de- tary crackdown on the CNDP, both command and rank- gree possible—DDR processes of all the countries in- and-file CNDP combatants entered the FARDC through volved. Today, ongoing Demobilization and Reintegra- a mediation-brokered bulk-army integration process tion (D&R) efforts are covered through single-country called mixage (Annex 5)7. After the breakdown of the D&R programs. mixage and subsequent return to severe armed confron- As mentioned above, in the past Congolese combatants tation with the FARDC (2008), a new peace initiative were offered the choice between demobilizing and rein- led to the launch of another, quite similar, process called tegrating into civilian life, with socio-economic support, “accelerated integration” (2009).. The process included or integration into the FARDC via different programs. PARECO Hutu from North and South Kivu, and some Before the onset of the Program national de Désarme- elements of Maï-Maï Kifuafua and Simba (Annex 2). In ment et reinsertion (PNDDR) in the DRC, there was a similar way, the South Kivu Tutsi AG (FRF) later in- an interim process put in place to deliver urgent DDR tegrated into the FARDC.8 In such processes, often no needs, known as the Désarmement Volontaire et Spon- option for demobilization was offered to the combatants tané (DSV). It delivered a disarmament certificate for (the PNDDR was ignored), which in many cases led to the surrender of firearms. Ex-combatants disarmed under “individual D&R”—perceived as desertion by the units the DSV were promised reintegration support under the that integrated the FARDC. forthcoming PNDDR—a promise often not kept. Some uncoordinated local DDR attempts, such as Demobiliza- tion by Default, also failed to deliver service. The rather confused initial approach is understandable against the 7  In 2006 military clashed led to a FARDC military build-up and a sub- backdrop of an urgently felt need to return to peace and sequent attempted crack-down on the CNDP, but without success. Finally, an agreement to integrate the CNDP forces into the FARDC was brokered to separate combatants from their weapons as a first with Rwandan assistance. The process was called “mixage”, with key ob- step. But the muddle of disarmament (often referred to jective given to immediately re-deploy mixed troops to forcefully disarm as “D1”) processes, often initiated without planned or FOCA forces. Widespread human rights abuses committed by these units funded reintegration services, generated a great deal of soon led to an international outcry, high pressure on the Government of confusion and resentment among former combatants. DRC and finally to the termination of these military operations. When se- Those who waited to be demobilized formally through nior FARDC command made public statements about re-deployment of the PNDDR received reintegration benefits while those all these troops into the “brassage” process in August 2007, an incident who disarmed before did not receive reintegration sup- sparked immediate return to armed clashes in between the two factions. port. In the general disorder of the day, promises were “Mixage” had failed and parties returned to war. For additional informa- tion, see http://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/drc1007/6.htm). made but not kept, often because the promises were made by people without the authority or responsibility to 8  Debelle (2012: 34). In January 2011 the FRF leadership accepted meet the expectations created. the offer to integrate into the Congolese army in exchange for the pro- motion of General Masunzu to the rank of the FARDC 10th Military Re- Many of those directly concerned perceived they had a gion (South Kivu). 14 After the Goma conference in January 2008, and in the for DDR, and continue to receive and provide them with course of and following the Programme Amani9 two im- standardized social and economic reintegration support portant new terms were coined to describe local Con- through national programs. golese AG: groupes résiduèls and groupes réfractaires. Under the Stabilization and Reconstruction of Former Groupes résiduèls are those groups that had signed Armed Conflict Areas in Eastern Congo (STAREC) pro- the Goma peace accord (January 2008) and just “had gram, coordinated by the UN and the GoDRC, the UNDP no opportunity to report” (which might also be read as was/is providing support to so-called non-eligible Con- “dragged their feet”) to the DDR process they had signed golese (as per the PNDDR)—that is, those who claim or up for Groupes réfractaires (Annex 2) are those created claimed membership in an AG but could not turn- in a after the Goma peace accord; the Government of the recognized weapon. DRC (GoDRC) considers them bandits without a cred- ible agenda and does not intend to talk with them. Basi- After the Joint Communiqué signed by the governments cally, these groups mirror the Goma conference groups of the DRC and Rwanda on November 7, 2007, aiming at and belong to two streams: the Kinyarwanda-speaking the eradication of the Rwandan AG in the DRC, national armed Tutsi of the North and South Kivu, with the limit- and international efforts to end the presence and exis- ed buy-in of the Congolese Hutu (together the “Rwanda- tence of these groups increased. The offer of voluntary phones”) and the “Bantu tribal concept block” militias, DDR and repatriation was joined by the threat of forced usually referred to as Maï-Maï groups, including militant disarmament by military operations. As the international Congolese Kinyarwanda-speaking Hutu. community supported this initiative vigorously, pressure on the AG, in particular the FDLR and RUD, increased Therefore, references to group-identity from the state- both on the ground and around the globe. In the DRC ments of ex-combatants interviewed for this study are in a phase of intensified sensitization of the Rwandan AG many cases linked to tribal or ethnic reasoning. This is a began and was complemented by legal action against the critical point to be considered when reading the chapters FAG leaders operating from bases in the Western world. below discussing motivations for violence, when men- tion is made of “the enemy.” This considerably raised the stress under which these groups operate on the ground—a stress to which the Foreign Armed Groups (FAG) ex-combatants interviewed below have been exposed to over the last few years. Their daily lives were lived Responsibility for the DDR(/RR)10 process for FAG in under threat of violent action against the AG to which the DRC remains largely with the United Nations De- they belonged, and targeted threat against their leaders partment for Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) mis- both in the DRC and abroad. Together, these stressors sions in the DRC (MONUC, later MONUSCO), as it worked to increase internal tensions within each group has from the beginning. The Congolese national DDR and significantly reduced the opportunities for rest and commission does not have the mandate for FAG, and recreation of any kind. As can be deduced from the in- the GoDRC does not have any adequately structured, terviews reported below, the prevailing climate within staffed, and budgeted entity to support or lead this ac- each FAG was one of suspicion, mistrust, treason, and tivity consistently. Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda do, changing alliances at all levels. This played out in fre- or did until recently actively sensitize AG members of quent redeployments and increasing supply and logistics their nationalities operating in the DRC (and elsewhere) problems. Keeping in mind that most fighting elements of these particular FAG were responsible for family members living with them, it is easily imaginable that 9  The Amani program was created following the Goma agreements they themselves were terrorized while using terror tac- of January 2008, to be used as framework for the disarmament, demo- tics against others. Given their origins in the Rwandan bilization and reintegration of the troops of the 22 armed groups, sig- Genocide and the prevalence of what might be termed a natories of the Goma agreements. During 15 month, only 3,200 were genocidal ideology, in which fear of elimination by oth- demobilized out of a reported 28,375 combatants, while re-recruitment ers is used to justify calls for preemptive elimination of and spoiling of the peace process was a permanent obstacle. By its end, those same others, it is not surprising that the behaviors the Government of DRC declared 12 local armed groups as no longer reported in this study were so common. existent and all others were considered ordinary criminals. For additional information, see See http://reliefweb.int/node/316586. International actors undertook and supported a number 10  DDRRR: Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Rehabilita- of peaceful efforts to solve the violent conflict. For ex- tion and Reintegration, also the denomination of a specialized unit ample, in spring 2005 the Roman Catholic organization within MONUSCO, also referred to as D2R3. Sant’Egidio facilitated negotiations with the political 15 and military leadership of the FDLR/FOCA in Rome and wealth. At least 71 percent of the population live below the subsequent Rome Declaration signed by FDLR pres- the line of absolute poverty (defined as less than $1 per ident Dr. Igance Murwanashyaka. The hope for an end day); about 73 percent lack access to a minimally ac- to violence raised by this initiative lasted a few months. ceptable daily food intake (compared to 33 percent of Two years later, after the failed attempt by the GoDRC all people living in Sub-Saharan Africa) (UNDP, 2008). to crack down on the CNDP by force, hopes were pinned The UN ranks the DRC as having the tenth-lowest aver- on the Goma conference, in which 22 Congolese (Kivu) age life expectancy (UN, 2007b) and its gross domestic AG participated. Among those politico-military AG seen product (GDP) is the third-lowest in the world. Such sta- as having a credible political agenda were the CNDP, the tistics mask enormous regional differences: all indicators FRF, and the umbrella group PARECO. All of them had are even lower for the Orientale and the North and South made political declarations and formulated key claims, Kivu provinces (UNDP, 2008). The human costs of the often focused on ethnic or tribal group interests. The ongoing violence in these provinces are enormous. CNDP had brought up its political agenda, the cahier de charge and had a website; PARECO had made public its As highlighted by a the recent Country Assistance Strat- Déclaration politique de la coalition des résistants patri- egy of the World Bank, poverty remains widespread and otes congolais; and the FDLR, which did not participate the country will not reach any of the Millennium Devel- in the Goma conference as it was not considered a Con- opment Goals (MDGs) by the 2015 (World Bank, 2013). golese AG, also had a rather well-developed website. With a 2011 per capita gross national income (GNI) of US$190, DRC’s population of approximately 71 million In the end, all attempts by international actors to make is among the poorest in the world. More than 71 percent progress toward a negotiated peace failed. Combatants— of the population lives under the US$1.25-a-day poverty who were seriously affected by misinformation, conspir- line (2006) and 14 percent of the poor in Sub-Saharan acy theories, and an incredible flow of rumors—were as Africa live in DRC. Poverty affect more people living in confused and frustrated as were international actors, and rural areas, where 75 percent of the population is poor often felt betrayed by “the politics.” There are cases re- compared to 61 percent in rural areas. Available data ported of fighters simply running away while engaged also shows that the poorest provinces in DRC are the in combat; they believed “the politics” was sacrificing Equateur, Bandundu, and South Kivu, in which poverty their lives. There was even a group participating in the is higher than 85 percent. The country’s poverty is more Goma conference whose name reflected this widespread than monetary. It includes a sense of exclusion, econom- feeling among the rank and file. They called themselves ic instability, and the inability to cope with uncertainties the Union des Jeunes Patriotes Sacrifies (“union of the and to project in the future. Poverty also is experienced young sacrificed patriots”). Again, this reflects the strong as the lack of economic opportunities and physical and feeling of isolation and fear of extinction connected to psychological insecurity (World Bank, 2013) ethnic or tribal identity mentioned above and seems an essential aspect of the background context contributing 2.3 Sexual and Gender-Based to the motivations reported by many ex-combatants. The fact that so many of them felt they simply had no choice Violence in the Eastern DRC is significant and is, we believe, directly affected by the dynamics of attempts to integrate AG into the FARDC as 2.3.1 Prevalence Rates of SGBV in the DRC part of the SSR agenda of the GoDRC. During the past years, many reports of women and girls, and some of men and boys, who have been raped have 2.2.3 Wealth and Poverty in Eastern DRC surfaced; SGBV has gained the attention of the mass me- In terms of natural resources, Eastern DRC is one of the dia, international nongovernmental organizations (IN- world’s richest areas. Vast amounts of metals including GOs), human rights’ groups, and scholars (Omanyondo tin, copper, manganese, and mineral fuels as well as pre- Ohambe and others, 2005; Pratt and Werchick, 2004, cious minerals and diamonds can be found there. Ac- HHI, 2010). There is no doubt that rape and sexual abuse cording to the U.S. Geological Survey, the DRC holds is widespread throughout the Eastern DRC and directly about 49 percent of the world’s known cobalt deposits linked to the armed conflict there. (UNDP, 2008). At the same time, state authority is weak, ineffective, or almost nonexistent in parts of the Eastern However, there is limited epidemiological data on the provinces. The formal economy is essentially destroyed number of victims of such crimes. A notable exception in many provinces. is a study by Johnson and others (2010), which finds that 40 percent of all women and 24 percent of all men in The general population benefits very little from this a random sample in Eastern DRC have been victims of 16 sexual violence. The authors describe 74 percent of the upon a sample of 492 cases in South Kivu: 27 percent cases of sexual violence against women and 65 percent were attributed to Interahamwe, 27 percent to the FDD, of the cases against men as conflict related. 20 percent to the RCD, 16 percent to Maï-Maï groups, 2 percent to the RPA, and 1 percent to the Banyamulenge Further, epidemiological data are limited to informa- militias. Additionally, 0.2 percent of all rape cases were tion on rape survivors who register with NGOs, health attributed to common criminals and almost 4 percent to centers, and hospitals. However, many have no or lim- unidentified AG. ited access to any such services or do not disclose the crime due to shame. Based on the statistics from two A study by Johnson and others (2010) that covered South specialized hospitals in the Kivus—the Panzi hospital and North Kivu and the Ituri District11 differentiates be- in South Kivu and the Heal Africa/Doctors on Call for tween male and female survivors as well as perpetrators. Service (DOCS) hospital in North Kivu—Pratt estimates They find that while most sexual violence perpetrated that between 1996 and 2003 “a minimum of tens of against women by male combatants was carried out by thousands” of women have been raped and/or sexually the Interhamwe militia,12 most of the violence perpe- mutilated (Pratt and Werchick, 2004). Malteser Inter- trated against males was done by the Patriotic Union of national registered 20,517 raped women in South Kivu Congolese (UPC, Union des Patriotes Congolais). They during the reporting period 2005–07 (Steiner and others, also find female UPC13 combatants to be the most fre- 2009). From June 2006 to June 2007, the United Nations quent combatant perpetrators of sexual violence against Children Fund (UNICEF) identified 12,867 survivors of men. The most frequent female combatant perpetrators sexual violence, of which 33 percent were children (UN, of sexual violence against women were reported to be 2007a). Harvard Humanitarian Initiative estimates that Maï-Maï. While Johnson and others surveyed civilians, 9,020 sexual violence survivors were treated at the Panzi our own study asks ex-combatants themselves whether Hospital in South Kivu between 2004 and 2008 (HHI, they have been victims and perpetrators of sexual vio- 2010). lence and attempts to investigate both motivation and Most reviewed articles and reports (Amnesty Interna- circumstance. tional, 2008; Human Rights Watch, 2002; Mezey, 1994; To draw a differentiated picture of the sexual violence Omanyondo Ohambe and others, 2005; Pratt and Wer- taking place in the DRC, it is also important to know that chick, 2004; UN, 2007a; Wakabi, 2008) agree that rape the crimes follow different patterns according to the vic- in the Eastern DRC is widespread, systematic, and used tims’ age. Malemo Kalisya and others (2011) compare as a weapon. But the published data cannot explain in sexually abused children and youth with adult survivors what way sexual violence is a weapon of war or substan- treated at Heal Africa hospital between 2006 and 2008. tiate the claim that it is systematic. They found that the majority of children and youth in It has been noted in virtually every investigation of rape their sample had been assaulted by civilian perpetrators in the Eastern DRC that all AG, and many state actors (81 percent of the cases), most of whom were known to and common criminals, rape and sexually abuse civil- the survivors’ families (74 percent). The picture is dif- ians (Amnesty International, 2008; Davis, 2009). From ferent for adult survivors. They only knew the perpetra- June 2006 to May 2007, the UN investigated 4,222 cases tor in 30 percent of the cases, and in 48 percent of the of rape of minors and were able to obtain information cases the perpetrators wore military uniform (which in on the perpetrators in 690 cases. Of the survivors, 66 the context of Eastern DRC does not necessarily mean percent were raped by “armed elements otherwise not that they were soldiers). But the number of both child further identified”, 29 percent were raped by common criminals, and 4.2 percent were raped by members of the FARDC or the PNC (UN, 2007a). Amnesty International 11  In 19 territories in the North and South Kivu provinces and the Ituri reported about 410 raped women seeking medical treat- District. ment in parts of Lubero (North Kivu). According to the report, 20 percent of these women reported to have been 12  Interahamwe do not exist since 1994, thus reference must be raped by the FARDC, 16 percent by Maï-Maï groups, made to the FDLR-FOCA. and 11 percent by the FDLR. The remaining 47 percent 13  The UPC was an AG in Ituri that got public attention due to the of rape cases were attributed to civilian perpetrators atrocities it committed, among others the killing of UN peacekeepers. (Amnesty International, 2008). Among the UPC’s most prominent leaders were Thomas Lubanga (tried at the International Criminal Court, ICC) and Bosco Ntaganda (at the time Omanyondo Ohambe and others (2005) provide the fol- of the writing of this report wanted by the ICC for war crimes while cur- lowing breakdown of the perpetrators of rape, based rent senior officer in the FARDC; meanwhile surrendered to the ICC). 17 and adult survivors suggests that SGBV perpetrated by well as in DRC in particular, there is limited research civilians also merits attention. that directly surveys alleged perpetrators who are mem- bers of AG government forces. As of today, there are The ability to identify specific groups as the main perpe- only two significant research projects that have involved trators of rape largely depends on the location where the interviews with this group. The first was conducted by data are gathered. Furthermore, a tendency of rapists to Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern (Nordic Africa pretend to be Interahamwe by using a few Kinyarwanda Institute and the University of Göteborg, Sweden). In words in the course of the attack as well as a tendency their research they surveyed active FARDC soldiers. The of survivors to identify perpetrators as Interahamwe has second is part of the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative’s been reported, even though the perpetrators are likely to ongoing research on sexual violence in DRC. This was belong to other groups (Solhjell, 2009). supervised by Jocelyn Kelly and surveyed active Maï- While there is a vast and fast-growing body of litera- Maï combatants. The relevant literature is listed in the ture on sexual violence in armed conflict in general, as box below. Literature on research directly surveying members of AG regarding sexual violence Research on the FARDC soldiers by Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern -- Eriksson Baaz, M., and Stern, M. (2008). Making Sense of Violence: Voices of Soldiers in the Congo (DRC). Journal of Modern African Studies, 46(1), 57 - 86. (Maria Eriksson Baaz and Stern, 2008) -- Eriksson Baaz, M., and Stern, M. (2009). Why Do Soldiers Rape? Masculinity, Violence, and Sexuality in the Armed Forces in the Congo (DRC). International Studies Quarterly, 53(2), 495-518. (Maria Eriksson Baaz and Stern, 2009) -- Eriksson Baaz, M., and Stern, M. (2010) The Complexity of Violence - A critical analysis of sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). and NordiskaAfrikainstitutet - The Nordic Africa Institute andSida (Vol. Ed.), Sida Working Paper on Gender based Violence. Stockholm: Sida. (Maria Eriksson Baaz and Stern, 2010) Involved / associated institutions: -- School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg, Sweden -- The Swedish Institute of International Affairs -- The Nordic Africa Institute -- The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) Research on Maï-Maï Combatants by Jocelyn Kelly -- Harvard Humanitarian Initiative (2009). Characterizing Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo - Profiles of Violence, Community Responses, and Implications for the Protection of Women. Cam- bridge, MA: Harvard Humanitarian Initiative. (Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2009) -- Kelly, J. (2010). Rape in War: Motives of Militia in DRC. Washington, D.C. : United States Institute of Peace. (Jocelyn Kelly, 2010) -- Kelly, J., and Van Rooyen, M. (2011). Militia in DRC speak about sexual violence. Forced Migration Review, 37, 30 - 31. (Jocelyn Kelly and VanRooyen, 2011) Involved / associated institutions: -- Harvard Humanitarian Initiative -- Open Society Institute -- United States Institute of Peace -- Centre d’Assistance Medico-Psychosociale (CAMPS) 18 2.3.2. Research involving FARDC soldiers that include forced penetration with objects, mutilation, and the most brutal forms of gang rape. These rapes are The study by Baaz and Stern took place from October either the result of the “craziness” described above or are 2005 to November 2006. Semi-structured group inter- used to humiliate the survivor and her community. views with active FARDC soldiers were carried out. The interviews were conducted with male and female soldiers In their research Baaz and Stern do not find evidence that in separate groups. Each group consisted of three or four rape is used in any strategic or systematic way. None of participants. The soldiers were interviewed in Kinshasa; the interviewees admitted their own involvement in any most had been to the east of the country within the pre- acts of sexual violence. It should be noted that only the FARDC soldiers were surveyed in this research. Find- ceding year. The interviews were tape recorded and later ings therefore cannot be generalized to other AG, with qualitatively analyzed. the limitation that army integration was ongoing at the Baaz and Stern point out that the reasons presented to time of this survey, and in this process AG had been in- them to explain sexual violence were both “contradicto- tegrated into the FARDC. The authors do not mention if ry and reductionist.” The main explanation put forward the units interviewed had already gone through this pro- was poverty. Soldiers in this study explained three links cess or not. The main finding—that soldiers distinguish between poverty and rape. between “normal” and “evil” rapes—seems an important inroad to understanding some forms of rape committed First, it was reported in the group discussions that many in DRC and implies that soldiers have varying percep- soldiers are too poor to afford and sustain a relationship tions of cruelty with regards to SGBV. or pay for commercial sex. But men (including soldiers) have an uncontrollable need for sex. Therefore, if they 2.3.3. Research involving Maï-Maï Combatants cannot convince a woman to have consensual sex or can- The study by Jocely Kelly is part of the Harvard Hu- not pay for it, they “have to” rape her. manitarian Initiative’s larger research project on sexual Second, soldiers reported being so poor that their wives violence in armed conflict. For this study, 33 Maï-Maï “do not love them anymore,” that is, refuse to have sex. combatants were interviewed between January 2009 and Again following the logic of an uncontrollable sex drive, February 2010 in Eastern DRC—17 in Kamituga, eight the men therefore “have to” fulfill their sexual needs in Katogota, and eight in Chambucha in South Kivu. The by raping another woman. (Conjugal rape was not dis- interviews were conducted by male Congolese social cussed by the participants, most likely because it is not workers and psychologists and covered two groups: the seen as rape.) Maï-Maï Shikito and the Maï-Maï Kifuafua. The partici- pants included male and female Maï-Maï. The interview The third explanation found by Baaz and Stern linked protocol was qualitative, including a fixed set of ques- poverty to frustration and anger and the latter to rape. tions. Only some of these questions were on the topic of According to this explanation, soldiers were frustrated sexual violence. by their low pay and poor living conditions. They then The interviewees cited both individual motivation and committed crimes of sexual violence as an outlet for military explanations as reasons for sexual violence. The their anger and frustration. former was described as raping a woman out of sexual The study also offers explanations for sexual violence desire. In this context rape is described as opportunistic. that are more closely connected to the situation of armed According to this research, it might include the abduction conflict in the eastern and northern parts of DRC. Partici- of women and girls. Here we may see an overlap with the pants report that “the spirit and craziness of war” as well explanation of “normal” rape given by the FARDC sol- as the consumption of drugs lead soldiers to commit the diers in the previously described study. most brutal forms of sexual violence. Specifically linking sexual violence to its military con- text, the interviewees reported receiving orders to rape One of the most noteworthy findings is that the inter- and/or to abduct women. They further describe women viewed soldiers make a clear distinction between “nor- as a spoil of war and claim that women are “given” as a mal” rapes and “evil” rapes. According to the soldiers, reward and “distributed” according to rank. “normal” rapes are a result of poverty paired with un- controllable lust (as described above). These rapes seem Again a picture emerges in which some forms of rape are acceptable or at least understandable to the participants. seen as “normal,” while the most brutal forms of rape are “Evil” rapes, on the other hand, were reported to be those described as “evil” and “unacceptable.” 19 The study finds some group difference. While no partici- denied any occurrence of sexual violence within the area pant from the group Maï-Maï Shikito admitted any in- under their control or even in the entire DRC. In con- volvement in sexual violence, combatants from Maï-Maï trast, participants from Maï-Maï Kifuafua reported rap- Kifuafua described different forms of SGBV carried out ing for individual reasons as well as kidnapping women by their group. Some combatants from Maï-Maï Shikito for themselves or their commanders. 20 3 Study Design the standardized Appetitive Aggression Scale (AAS) 3.1 Study Objective (Weierstall and Elbert, 2011). The objective of this study is to investigate individual Participants in the study provided socio-demographic motivations for sexual violence as well as its potential information, their history in AG, their motivation for strategic or tactical aspects and to explore differences in joining an AG, and information on substance use. A list behavior between AG and other forces. of the traumatic events14 experienced over the course The key questions to be answered are: of their lives allowed the researchers to assess ex-com- batants’ trauma exposure. Symptoms of Post-Traumatic 1. Why is the violence directed against women and Stress Disorder (PTSD) were assessed with an inter- girls so exceedingly brutal/cruel? nationally validated instrument, the PTSD Symptom Scale−Interview (PSS-I). The commonly assumed rea- 2. What motivates combatants to perpetrate the most sons for sexual violence were presented to the intervie- brutal forms of SGBV? wees, to which they could agree or disagree. One open 3. Is SGBV employed strategically by any of the in- question was asked for possible explanations of the most vestigated AG? Do hierarchies, incentives, punish- brutal forms of rape. In the last section of the interview ments, or direct orders play a role? we asked whether specific orders had been given to physically attack and/or sexually assault civilians and 4. If SGBV is employed strategically by any of the whether sexual violence was part of the AG’s reward investigated AG, what are the strategic and/or tacti- system. cal goals? The interviews were carried out by international clinical 5. How do individual motivational and strategic fac- experts; interpreters were from DRC. At the beginning tors interact to perpetrate SGBV? and of the study all the interpreters were trained. The ques- 6. Do the mechanisms and motivations for SGBV tionnaire was discussed with them item by item several on individual as well as on leadership levels vary times and reviewed for cultural and language fit. The in- among different AG? terpreters also observed one another during interviews to ensure standardized interpretation. During the course of 3.2 Interview Format and the study several supervision meetings were held. Instruments 3.3 Sampling Participants were asked about their well-being and their Interviews took place at two sites in Goma, the United war experiences. Most important, interviewees were Nation’s Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegra- asked about the violence they had experienced, wit- tion/Resettlement and Reintegration (DDR/RR) camp, nessed, or carried out. The interview protocol was struc- and the Equipe d’Education et d’Encadrement des tured and quantitative. Open and freely worded ques- Traumatisés de Nyiragongo (ETN) Centre. The DDR/ tions were also asked to further motivate the participants RR camp is a transit camp where former combatants as well as to build trust and confidence. begin the process of repatriation but remain for only a The development of the interview protocol, built on pre- few days before being moved to other places (e.g. if they vious research conducted by vivo international (Maedl, are Rwandan to Rwanda). Both Rwandan former com- 2011; Weierstall and others, 2012) was adapted to the batants and Congolese former combatants arrive there. current context with the help of translators. The somatic All but a few combatants transiting through the camp complaint list (health-related information) was adapted from a validation study vivo international conducted with Rwandese and other refugees in Uganda (Ertl and 14 For example: Have you ever been physically assaulted—for exam- others, 2010). The level to which an individual enjoys ple, by being attacked, hit, slapped, kicked, beaten up (includes beatings or has a need to perpetrate violence was assessed using with sticks)—in such a way that you had to fear for your life? 21 at the time of the interviews were interviewed here. The generated statistical inferences in our findings that ETN Centre is a nonprofit local nongovernmental orga- were not equally representative. nization (NGO) that provides support, education, and ■■ The sample was drawn from those who had left their skills training to young adults who are suffering from respective AG or force and thus may have gener- the consequences of the ongoing conflict (such people ated responses that are not indicative of the depth include former combatants, former child soldiers, and of political motivation among those who remain women who were victims of sexual violence). Every in the field. It is possible that our sample contains former combatant or former child soldier who was not a larger percentage of those with weaker political ill or absent during the study at the ETN center was in- motivation than is the norm within the remainder of terviewed. All interviewees were volunteers. A consent the AG. The reported numbers (both on experienced form was read and explained to them. Oral, rather than traumatic events as well as perpetrator events) could written consent was accepted in cases of illiteracy. The easily underestimate the number for those still ac- interview participants received a small compensation for tive in the groups, who joined for political reasons. the interview. Those who left—often under life threatening cir- A total of 224 interviews were conducted, 213 of which cumstances—might have never been strongly com- were completed. The 11 interviews that could not be mitted to their group or might de-emphasize their completed were all conducted at the DDD/RRR, and political commitment in hindsight. were terminated because the participants were repatri- ■■ The motivations to leave various AG is not known ated before the interviews could be completed. Given in sufficient detail. It might well be that those with this circumstance, the actual number of interviewees comparably low levels of appetitive aggression leave and the number of members of AGs may vary slightly the AGs while the more aggressive ones stay. If this in the following chapters. Most interviews, 72 percent is the case there might be a group difference with (n = 162), took place at the DDR/RR camp; 27 percent regard to this variable between ex-combatants and (n = 60) were conducted at the Equipe d’Education et active combatants. Understanding this relationship d’Encadrement des Traumatisés de Nyiragongo (ETN) better would facilitate better DDR programming. center; and 1 percent at a military detention facility in Goma. ■■ Little is known about mortality rates pertaining to the various AGs from which the sample was drawn. 3.4 Study Limitations Again this has an impact on the generalization of the present findings from ex-combatants to active fight- The current assessment demonstrates the feasibility and ers. In sum, we cannot generalize from the present practicability of interviewing ex-combatants in DRC sample of former ex-combatants to active combat- about their perceptions and motivations relevant to ants in DRC with respect to the reported rates of SGBV. Given the lack of research in this area, the find- psychosocial suffering and reported attitudes. ings derived from the current research outweigh its limi- tations. Nonetheless, the research includes the following ■■ Ethnic and tribal affiliations were not assessed, but limitations: would have provided a deepened understanding of the concept of “the enemy.” More research should ■■ The sample sizes of different AG and the various be conducted to assess the relationship of AGs, eth- ranks within the AG did not match, and therefore nic and tribal affiliations, and enemy perceptions. 22 4 Study Participants’ Profile 4.1 Age and Origin 4.2 Armed Groups and Forces The age of the participants varied widely. The youngest When interview participants presented themselves for was 13 years old, the oldest was 50. The mean age was demobilization, they reported belonging to a wide vari- 24 years (SD = 7), but differed significantly (p < 0.001) ety of AG, as presented in Table 1 per interview site. While the mean age of participants at More than one-third (37 percent) of the participants be- the DDR/RR camp was 25 years (SD = 8), it was only 20 longed to more than one AG or force during the course years (SD = 2) at the ETN center. of their lifetime. About 11 percent of them changed their membership (by force or voluntarily) more than once All participants interviewed at the ETN center were and, 3 percent more than twice. Congolese, as this was a condition of the program. At the DDR/RR site, 65 percent were from DRC, 35 per- In most of the following calculations and presentations, cent were from Rwanda, and one participant was born all the Maï-Maï groups are coded together, but the Patri- in Uganda. Taking all participants together, 75 percent otes Résistants Congolais (PARECO) are reported sepa- rately. The FDLR, the FDLR Ralliement pour l’Unité were born in DRC, while 25 percent were born in Rwan- et la Démocratie Urunana (RUD), and the Armée de da (mainly former combatants of Rwandan AGs operat- Libération du Rwanda (ALIR) are coded together as ing in the Eastern DRC). FDLR. Figure 1 presents the distribution of AGs at the time of demobilization: Table 1. Affiliation with Armed Group Figure 1. Membership of Participants before DDR Fiscal Armed Group Percentage Implications Pareco FDLR/FOCA 43 98 CNDP 6% FARDC 5 11 10% FDLR CNDP 10 22 44% Maï-Maï (not otherwise 4 9 specified) Maï-Maï APCLS 13 29 35% Maï-Maï FDN 5 10 Mai-Mai 5% Maï-Maï Kifuafua 4 10 Maï-Maï Kirikicho 3 6 FARDC Maï-Maï Simba 3 6 Maï-Maï FAC 1 3 Maï-Maï FPLC 1 3 4.3 Education Educational background varied widely across the sam- Maï-Maï Banyampiriri 0,4 1 ple (Figure 2). Of those interviewed, 29 percent were Maï-Maï Cobra 0,4 1 illiterate, while 14 percent had spent 10 or more years PARECO 6 14 in school. On average participants had been to school for five years (SD = 4). On average those staying at the RCD 0,4 1 ETN Centre went to school for 7 years (SD = 4), while 23 Figure 2. Years of formal education, by AG Participant 1034 “My step-father treated me very badly when I was a child. 8 There was a lot of violence at our home. So I joined the Maï- 7 Maï Kifuafua when I was ten years old. Two years later I went to stay with Maï-Maï APCLS. In 2007 MONUSCO found me 6 and other children. They took us to the DDR camp. But I did not want to go there! They forced me! 5 As a soldier I drank alcohol and smoked marijuana every 4 day. All soldiers do that. I used to be in charge of the 3 medical supplies and of witchcraft. I miss being a soldier. I miss the power! Sometimes I killed others just for fun. 2 Others did so, too. Blood carries people away. They cannot stop killing anymore.” 1 0 FDLR FARDC Mai-Mai CNDP Pareco 39 percent joined under the age of 15. There are no sta- tistically significant differences between the groups sur- Armed Group of Force veyed. The graph below indicates numbers of ex-com- batants who joined the first AG when under the age of 18 versus those who joined as adults, disaggregated by their first AG. those passing through the DDR/RR camp only went to school for four years (SD = 4). The wide range of years 4.5 Rank and Combat Experiences of education is applicable to former members of all AGs. On average, former members of the FDLR have been to Participants ranged from former supporters to colonels. school for the least number of years. Some reported rather uncommon ranks like “chief of child soldiers.” The interviewers asked therefore about the number of people the participants had under their 4.4 Child Soldiers direct command, and then categorized them accord- Of those interviewed, 64 percent joined their first AG ingly using the classifications: noncombatant supporters, or force when under the age of 18 (Figure 3). In total, (“simple”) soldiers, non-commissioned officers and offi- cers. In total, 5 percent were support- ers, 53 percent soldiers, 22 percent Figure 3. Joining first AG under the age of 18, by AG noncommissioned officers, and 20 percent officers. But it is important to note that the ranks are not necessarily 60 comparable across different groups. 50 A high number of former Maï-Maï combatants report having held the 40 position of an officer (Table 2). This reflects two possibilities: (1) that it is 30 no easier to obtain this rank within some yes of the Maï-Maï groups than in some 20 other AGs, and (2) that the former Maï-Maï combatants might claim this 10 rank hoping to receive more DDR benefits. It is assumed here that ranks 0 were more reliably reported among FDLR FARDC Mai-Mai CNDP Pareco FAR RCD AFDL the politico-military motivated AGs, as compared to the others, in part be- First Armed Group cause there are generally no formal records kept in the Maï-Maï groups. 24 Participant 2082 “Our army was not as structured like the army here in town. For example, a major in our group had 20 people under his command.” Participant 2082 was from the Maï-Maï Simba Equally important for the research is the question wheth- There are no differences between groups with regard to er the interviewed participants actually have first-hand combat experience. An equally high percentage (94 per- combat experience and can therefore provide direct in- cent in all groups) report combat experience, while 95 sight into the links between combat and acts of SGBV. percent report having owned at least one weapon. Table 2. Armed Groups and Forces by Categories of Rank Armed Groups and Forces by Categories of Rank Rank by Categories Total Supporter Soldier Nco Officer N 9 65 20 4 98 FDLR % 9.2% 66.3% 20.4% 4.1% 100.0% N 0 5 4 2 11 FARDC % .0% 45.5% 36.4% 18.2% 100.0% N 2 32 12 32 78 Maï-Maï % 2.6% 41.0% 15.4% 41.0% 100.0% N 0 11 10 2 23 CNDP % .0% 47.8% 43.5% 8.7% 100.0% N 1 6 3 4 14 PARECO % 7.1% 42.9% 21.4% 28.6% 100.0% N 12 119 49 44 224 Total % 5.4% 53.1% 21.9% 19.6% 100.0% 25 5 Reasons for Joining the First Armed Group T he following chapter provides an overview of the cruited by force (Table 3). reasons given for joining the first AG. Half of all interviewees reported having been forced to join an Many times there is no clear distinction between forced AG in the first place, with levels of forced recruitment and voluntary enlistment. Many former combatants the highest for the CNDP and FDLR. For the FARDC joined an AG to preempt forced recruitment by this very forced recruitment was, as expected, less frequently. group or by others. Some combatants of Rwandan origin For participants who had not been physically forced into recruitment, Table 3. Forced or voluntary recruitment by AG a multi-causal picture of reasons Forced Recruitment15 for recruitment emerged. Most re- ported either self-defense or the Forced to Join Joined Voluntarily Total fact that friends had joined the re- spective AG. Higher percentages of N 53 29 82 both Maï-Maï and PARECO cited FDLR % 64,6% 35,4% 100,0% self-defense as a reason to join their respective AG, which is in line with N 3 9 12 the assumption that these AGs fight FARDC % 25,0% 75,0% 100,0% for tribal/territorial self-defense instead of political reasons. Rein- N 24 49 73 forcing this finding is the fact that Maï-Maï political motivation was given as a % 32,9% 67,1% 100,0% reason for joining the first AG more N 15 6 21 often for the FARDC and less often CNDP for the Maï-Maï and PARECO. % 71,4% 28,6% 100,0% Slightly over half of the participants N 11 5 16 PARECO reported that they were forced to % 68,8% 31,3% 100,0% join their respective AG with sig- nificant differences (p < .001) be- N 1 6 7 tween the surveyed AG (Cramer’s FAR % 14,3% 85,7% 100,0% V = .40). For the CNDP, 71 percent report that they had been forced to N 5 1 6 join; the same is true for 65 percent RCD % 83,3% 16,7% 100,0% of the participants who were first in the FDLR. From PARECO, 69 per- N 0 3 3 cent report forced recruitment, but AFDL for the other Maï-Maï groups it is % 0% 100,0% 100,0% lower, at around 33 percent. Three N 112 108 220 participants 1 (25 percent) from the 5 Total FARDC report that they were re- % 50,9% 49,1% 100,0% 15  Note: The last three groups—the Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR), the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD), and the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre (AFDL)—do not exist anymore. They appear because it was the first group joined in the past. Due to ex-combatants’ migration across AGs in the course of time, different numbers of AG categories emerged for different interview questions, such as “first armed group” and “last group before DDR.” Therefore AG categories in tables might vary slightly. 26 Participant 1012 “The FDLR attacked my village when I was 26 years old. They forced me to come with them and kept me as a prisoner. I had to carry loads for them for five years. Then, in 2010, they made me their soldier and gave me a weapon. However, they never fully accepted me, because I am Congolese. They treated me as an outcast and sent me on all the dangerous and life-threatening missions. I ran away from the FDLR because I gained nothing and had a hard life in the bush.” Participant 0012 “I was born in Kibuye (Rwanda). When I came to DRC I was still a baby. First I was in a refugee camp with my parents. When I was four years old my mother died of illness. From then on I stayed in a village with another family. There I was treated very badly. They were beating me so terribly that I still have scars on my body. The adults in the family also burned me with hot water. I think if the FDLR had not abducted me, I might have joined them voluntarily just to get away from this family. When I was twelve years old, the FDLR came to loot the village. They killed my father and forced me to carry their loot. Then they made me join their ranks. Some time after I had been with the FDLR, there was a fight with the CNDP. The CNDP took me and others and made us their slaves. We managed to escape after a while. Then we were roaming the forest alone for some days until we found the FDLR again. This time we joined voluntarily. In the FDLR we were also treated badly, but we were not beaten as much as in the CNDP. In the FDLR we often had to carry loads that were far too heavy for us. Today, I have a lot of pain because of this. The FDLR commanders sent us to fight, but we did not gain anything from this.” Participant 2086 “In Kichanga, when you are 15 years old, the CNDP start to look for you and make you their soldier. I did not want to be with them so I joined the Maï-Maï.” also report that they joined the FDLR at an early age because they Figure 4. Other Reasons to Join first AG had lost their parents and wanted to stay with people who spoke their language (Kinyarwanda). Some Reasons to Join and Armed Group of Force former combatants or soldiers had been abducted by the same or dif- wanting to be a fighter ferent groups several times. wanting to get wife For those participants who were not physically forced to join the political motivation first armed group (n = 108), dif- self-defense Percentage of ferent possible reasons for joining agreement the first armed group or force were income presented (multiple answers pos- friends sible, Figure 4). family Family and Friends. In total 20 percent of the interviewees report- 0 20 40 60 80 ed that they had joined their first AG or force because their relatives were already members or plan- ning to join. While this situation applied to 45 percent the FARDC. Of participants who joined their first AG or of those who had voluntarily joined the FDLR, it was force because their friends were joining, 59 percent had much lower for all other AG (8 percent Maï-Maï, 20 belonged to the FDLR, 56 percent to the FARDC, and 69 percent PARECO, 17 percent CNDP and 0 percent for percent to the Maï-Maï groups. Around 80 percent who 27 had joined the PARECO also cited this reason, as did 83 of the FARDC). Of those who joined the FDLR, 38 per- percent of those who had joined the CNDP. cent did so for political reasons, as did 50 percent from the CNDP, 33 percent from the Maï-Maï, 20 percent Income. Around 25 percent of interviewees who joined from the PARECO, and one person from the RCD. an AG did so to earn income with the following varia- tions by AG: 20 percent who joined the Maï-Maï, 10 Wanting to be a Fighter. Participants were also asked percent who joined the FDLR, 33 percent who joined the whether they joined because they wanted to be a fighter. CNDP, and 20 percent who joined the PARECO. In con- Sometimes this statement was qualified by asking wheth- trast, 67 percent of those who joined the FARDC and 50 er they liked the idea of being “a real fighter / soldier” percent of those who joined the FAR did so for income. or the idea of “being involved in combat.” Those who originally joined a government armed force agreed more Self-Defense. In total 67 percent said that one reason often with this statement (56 percent from the FARDC; why they joined their first AG or force was to defend 67 percent, FAR; 60 percent, PARECO, versus 43 per- themselves or their family. cent from Maï-Maï, 41 percent for FDLR, 33 percent of CNDP) Political Motivation. Around 39 percent of the partici- pants agreed that they joined their first AG or force for Wanting a Wife. Only one participant from the FAR en- political reasons. Again, affirmation is highest among dorsed the statement that he joined because he wanted to those who joined a government armed force (44 percent “get a wife.” 28 6 Substance Use and Abuse S elf-reported consumption of alcohol and drugs is Participants reported the following effects marijuana had usually understated. Half of the study participants on the behavior of those who consumed it: increase in ag- reported to have consumed alcohol before enter- gression (“I feel mighty”; “I easily get aggressive”) and ing the DDR process. One out of five ex-combatants sexual arousal (“I get sexually simulated”), as well as ef- reported they had consumed marijuana during their time fects that mitigate trauma (“It calms me down”; “It takes with the AG, and two out of three stated that drugs— away my fear”) and makes life as a combatant or soldier most often marijuana—were frequently consumed in more bearable (“It takes away hunger”) (Table 4). their unit. Increased aggression and sexual arousal as well as “consumption as a coping strategy for trauma- Table 4. Reported behavioral effects of marijuana related suffering” were reported as the main effects of marijuana. One-third of all participants disclosed that Percentage marijuana was frequently consumed right before com- responding yes bat, yet hardly ever given out by the commanders to the soldiers. The interviewees also claimed to see a link be- It takes away fear 89 tween substance use and sexual violence, “going crazy,” I feel mighty / powerful 85 as well as perpetrating very brutal forms of violence. Alcohol. Some participants were very reluctant to talk I get easily aggressive 78 about their own alcohol and substance consumption. I get happy / euphoric 75 Most cited religious reasons for ostensibly not consum- ing any alcohol, but often explained in detail the con- I get awake 66 sumption patterns of their fellows. Despite initial reser- vations, half of the participants reported that they drank I can hear / see things others do 52 alcohol during the four weeks before they left their AG not hear / see or government force. Most of those drinking consumed It takes away pain 50 beer or locally made banana beer (66 percent), while 32 percent mainly consumed hard liquor. Around 5 percent It calms me down 39 reported heavy consumption—they drank more than 1.4 liters of beer or more than 700 milliliters of hard liquor I get sexually stimulated 34 daily. This number most likely underestimates the actual It takes away hunger 8 percentage of combatants and soldiers who abuse or are addicted to alcohol. Marijuana. When asked about the consumption of any Participant 2069 type of drug, 23 percent of the participants reported that they had consumed hallucinogenic drugs during their “The FDLR grows marijuana in places like Masisi or Kimua. It time with an AG or government force. Another 63 per- is their business. cent reported that hallucinogens were consumed regu- In the APCLS, the ones who smoked marijuana smoked it in larly within their unit, almost exclusively marijuana. Ad- secret. The punishment was to be jailed and beaten.” ditionally, there were some reports on the consumption Participant 2069 studied medicine for one year before he of “36 oiseaux” (Datura stramonium / “jimson weed”)16 left university and joined the Maï-Maï Kifuafua. He became and cocaine as well as of sniffing petrol. a captain within the group. He later left the group to join the Armée de Peuple pour un Congo Libre et Souverain (APCLS), where he was a major. He finally demobilized 16  This is a plant from the Solanaceae (nightshade) family, which is because life in the bush was very difficult and he wanted to also a hallucinogen and deliriant. It is also used spiritually for the intense take better care of his family. visions it produces (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Datura_stramonium). 29 The interviews further explored Figure 5. Drug used before Combat by AG, percentage whether marijuana is particularly used to enhance combat capabil- ity or brutality by asking about the Drug Use Mostly Before Combat time of consumption as well as the 80 origin of the drug. Thirty-five per- cent reported that marijuana was 70 often smoked directly before com- 60 bat. Most participants (74 percent) said it was consumed during leisure 50 Yes time or at no special time, while the 40 No remaining few reported the use di- 30 rectly after combat or during rituals Missing (Figure 5). 20 Some participants showed physical 10 and psychological signs of with- 0 drawal during the time in the DDR FDLR FARDC Mai Mai CNDP Pareco camp. Others continued smoking marijuana in the camp, but none of the participants were intoxicated during the interview. Most participants reported that they grew the marijuana themselves (58 percent), or received it from fellow com- Participant 2087 batants or soldiers (28 percent) and/or local communi- ties (46 percent). Only a small minority, 6 percent, re- “They took people’s fields by force and turned them into ported that a commander had distributed the marijuana. marijuana fields. Now they sell it and earn a lot of money. The only group for which receiving marijuana from the When the soldiers smoked, they beat us a lot.” commander was not reported was the FARDC. Quite a number of participants alleged that the FDLR was grow- Participant 2087 was captured by the FDLR in 2008 and ing marijuana not only for their own use, but also to sell forced to work as a cook. to other AGs and the FARDC. In particular, participants Participant 2080 “In Maï-Maï Janvier they smoked marijuana. When they smoked, they were eager to go fighting. But when they did not smoke, they were lazy. We were close to FDLR and worked together. They even brought us marijuana free of charge.” Participant 2080 joined the Maï-Maï under the Command of Akilimali in 2002. After about one year he was brought to the Centre de Transit et d’Orientation (CTO, a demobilization center for children), and after some time he went home to Nyabyondo. There he joined the Maï-Maï Janvier in 2005 and stayed with them for about three years. He was taken byMONUSCO to the CTO again. After that he went back to Nyabyondo, and from there he went to Goma to the Equipe d’Education et d’Encadrement des Traumatisés de Nyiragongo (ETN) center. discussed the presence of FDLR marijuana plantations in marijuana, “going crazy,” and raping women in the most Ntoto, Masisi, and Kimua (Ishanga). Several participants brutal ways. It is important to keep in mind that this con- reported severe punishment for drug consumption, while nection can also be seen as an excuse or justification. others reported command tolerance. In some cases, such Three lines of reasoning could be plausible for the ex- reports conflicted among ex-combatants within the same cuse. First, if the perpetrator had a “moral” dissonance group. with committing sexual and gender-based violence Sexual Violence and Substance Consumption. Many (SGBV), it would help him to attribute the cruelty not to participants see a clear connection between smoking himself, but to his “intoxicated self.” Second, impunity 30 comes into play here. In many court trials the defendant giving these accounts seem neither to excuse their would not be considered as fully responsible if he were sexual violence against women nor to regret it. Often intoxicated with substances at the time of a committed sexual violence is not described as a crime but rather as crime. Third, social acceptability during the interviews a simple reality of war. could also be considered here. But many participants Participant 2092 “When soldiers smoke marijuana, they cause trouble. They start to fight and you have to watch them so that they do not run away and rape.” After participant 2092 had finished his second year at university he went home for the holidays. There he found his family very concerned about harassment by AGs. The family thought that this would cease if one of them joined the Maï-Maï, and decided that this was participant 2092’s duty because he was the oldest. So 2092 joined the Maï-Maï Force de Defense Nationale (FDN). Within the group he already knew a major from the university and was immediately promoted to be a captain. Participant 2054 “As a soldier I took a lot of drugs. I was drinking beer, smoking marijuana, and sniffing petrol. Drugs help you to have no fear and just to shoot.” “In the CNDP we raped a lot of women. And we killed civilians. When they refuse to carry the loot, you just shoot them. Once, we captured the wife of an enemy and chopped her to death. The other soldiers ate her flesh, but I only pretended to eat it. In combat we always had to move forward, otherwise they would shoot us. When the soldier in front of me did not move forward, I shot him. Otherwise I would have been killed, too. We were always stepping over so many bodies and walking in all this blood. Soldiers rape because they get out of control from smoking all this marijuana. When you are fighting against the enemies, you are not seeing them as humans. You see them as paper sheets that you are tearing.” “Today, I am still drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana. I will go back to FDLR; there I had at least a mattress to sleep on.” Participant 2054 was born in 1990 in DRC. His parents died when he was very young. Afterwards a man took care of him, but when he was 15, he was forced to join the CNDP. Later he joined the FDLR. 31 7 Traumatic Experiences and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder T his chapter deals with the question of whether ex- The interviewers asked about such events and ensured combatants had experienced and/or witnessed trau- that they met these criteria. For example, being beaten matic events and if they exhibited symptoms of by a caregiver appears to be a very common experience mental-health-related suffering, namely post-traumatic in DRC and was frequently reported during interviews. stress disorder (PTSD). Ex-combatants reported extreme It was only rated as a traumatic event if marks were left levels of trauma exposure; almost all had witnessed on the person’s body and the person experienced help- killings, physical assaults, and had been physically as- lessness or horror or actually feared for his life. These saulted by members of other AGs. Further reports on extreme forms of beatings by caregivers—qualifying as traumatic events equally give evidence of the strict com- a traumatic experience—were reported by 63 percent of mand chain within the AG. Data gathered in this chap- all interviewees (141 participants). ter also reinforces the notion that the chain of command within each AG played an important role in this violent The following diagram provides an overview of the prev- behavior, as many ex-combatants report being coerced alence of traumatic events which were probed for in this by threat of death or injury. Given the enor- mous number of traumatic experiences that Figure 6. Prevalence of traumatic events, percentage the ex-combatants reported in the survey, it is not surprising that 24 percent of the overall sample exhibited clinical symptoms severe enough to qualify for diagnosis of PTSD. Hit by caregiver With regard to sexual violence, 12 percent Hit by caregiver, W of all respondents disclosed during the in- terviews that they had been victims of sex- Burned by caregiver ual violence while being a soldier. In many Burned by caregiver, W cases, their own commanders had been the Natural disaster perpetrators. Further, 60 percent of inter- Fire / explosion viewees reported having witnessed sexual violence. Accident Accident, W Criteria of Traumatic Events. Participants Lifethreatening illness were victims and perpetrators of violence at the same time. A horrible event is clinically Lifethreatening illness, W Percentage defined as traumatic if it is accompanied by Seen violent death an actual or perceived threat to the physi- Physical assault cal integrity or life of the respondent or Physical assault, W someone else (APA, 1994) and if the person feels intense fear, helplessness, or horror. Armed assault An experience is also considered traumatic Armed assault, W according to these criteria if a person wit- Sexual assault nesses such an event; for example a soldier Sexual assault, W experiences a traumatic event when his comrade is killed during combat, even if he Seen dead bodies himself remains safe and sound. Crucial in Seen massacre the definition of a traumatic event is the in- 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 dividual perception and feelings during the situation, for example, intense fear, help- lessness, and/or horror. 32 Participant 2086 “When CNDP captured me, they beat me a lot. They put me into a hole and poured cold water on me. Then they took me out again and beat me again. Then they asked me questions about APCLS. They put me back in the hole and did everything again and again.” Participant 2086 joined the Maï-Maï APCLS at the age of 14. After three years with the group he went home and was captured by the CNDP. study. Here, both those events which are experienced as a survivor, as well as those experienced as a witness, are Participant 0002 presented. The latter are marked with a “W.” “One day another soldier stole a pig from a civilian. He was Witnessing Killings. Almost all participants, 94 percent, ordered to pay compensation for this, but he refused. So reported that they have witnessed at least one person be- the commander ordered me to kill him. I had to beat him to ing killed. death. I could not refuse.” Physical Assault. The majority of the participants, 85 Participant 0002 was part of the FARDC until he was percent, had also been physically assaulted themselves. captured by a Maï-Maï group and kept as a prisoner. He In other words, these participants had been beaten up, was finally released because of his young age. Today, his biggest concern is that his family received no salary from kicked, or hit (with sticks but not with other weapons) in the FARDC while he was a prisoner of war. such a way that they feared for their lives. In 83 percent of these cases, the perpetrators were members of an AG or force. Often participants reported several such events and by several groups of perpetrators (the latter was re- Participant 2045 ported by n = 25). “I always ordered one soldier to beat the others as a Even more participants, 95 percent, reported that they punishment. In this way they got afraid of each other.” had been physically assaulted with a weapon. These fig- Participant 2045 joined the Maï-Maï FAC in 2000. He later ures fit well with the combat experience reported above changed to the PARECO and then to the APCLS. Because and demonstrate the active nature of the groups sur- he had been to school for 12 years, he was given a higher veyed. Accordingly, 94 percent of the participants had rank right after he joined the Maï-Maï. In the APCLS he was seen a number of dead bodies. captain and had around 150 people under his command. Moreover, 63 percent had been threatened with death Participant 2045 left the APCLS because the group was short on ammunition and had lost many combatants. The by their own commanders. Adding to this picture of APCLS still calls him every day to enquire when he will generalized violence, 73 percent of the participants had return. been forced by a superior to beat or injure someone else—in many cases a fellow combatant who was sentenced to punishment for some transgression. Another Witnessing Massacres. Of those interviewed, 66 percent 36 percent had been forced to kill someone outside of had witnessed a massacre, of which 5 percent (or 11 par- actual combat. ticipants) when they were not yet with an AG. About 25 percent of the participants also admitted their own in- Participant 2044 volvement in massacres. These data will be presented in more detail in the next chapter on perpetrated violence. “My commander often gave me orders to beat or kill different people.” Witnessed Sexual Assault. Fifty-eight percent reported they had witnessed a sexual assault during their time as a Participant 2044 joined the Maï-Maï Forces Armées combatant or soldier, and all AGs were indicated as per- Congolaises (FAC) when he was 13. He then changed to the petrators. FDLR was named 49 times, CNDP 18 times, RCD and later to the PARECO. FARDC 11 times, PARECO 10 times, and the various Maï-Maï groups taken together were indicated 30 times. 33 Though these numbers must not be considered a rep- One participant (1080) alleged that the abuse and rape of resentative estimate for perpetrators of sexual violence child soldiers was common within the FDLR. (because of the composition of the study sample), they Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. Participants experi- demonstrate that a significant portion of combatants and enced a large number of traumatic events as discussed soldiers have witnessed sexual violence being perpetrat- above and are therefore at risk for developing trauma- ed by combatants from all sides of the conflict. related mental disorders such as PTSD or major depres- Combatants as Victims of SGBV. Some participants had sion. It is also possible, as discussed in chapter 2, that been both perpetrators and victims of sexual violence. In perpetrating violence and learning to enjoy it might pro- total 12 percent reported that they had been sexually as- tect against trauma-related mental illness. saulted themselves. In most cases the perpetrator was the PTSD involves three clusters of symptoms: (i) unwanted commander of the victim. As this was the first time par- memories in the form of intrusions, such as flashbacks ticipants disclosed this form of violent experience, it is and nightmares; (ii) avoidance of reminders of the trau- reasonable to assume that this figure underestimates the matic event, which includes feeling of numbness (avoid- number of actual victims. Also, reporting sexual violence ance of bodily reminders); (iii) permanent readiness to toward men in a context highly shaped by perceptions of initiate an alarm response, resulting in sleeping diffi- masculinity and being a fighter is not easy to discuss. culties, alertness, and hyper-reactivity. Further somatic Participant 2041 “In the CNDP being beaten with a stick is the common punishment. But you can also be punished by being sexually assaulted. This happened to me, too. But the soldiers also rape women.” Participant 2041 was forced to join the CNDP at the age of 15. He managed to escape during heavy combat. Participant 1054 “I was raped by my commander. If he humiliates men in this way, imagine what he does to women! I was also sexually abused by a female soldier. This was even worse than the rape by the commander. She forced me to have sex with her twice. Today, I try to avoid women. I do not want to marry. I was coached to do evil by my commander. Evil became part of me.” Participant 1054 joined the FDLR, together with his parents, in 2005. In 2010 they were terribly beaten by the CNDP and 1054 was separated from his parents. He joined the CNDP to look for them. Participant 1036 “If you did something wrong, your genitals were squeezed as a punishment. When it comes to raping, soldiers take women. I also did this. I raped many women. And I took part in the killings. I saw so many civilians being killed. And I mutilated people. I want to be a soldier again. Life was easy back then, I could get whatever I wanted. But sometimes I feel guilty and cannot get rid of the pictures of the people I have killed and raped.” Participant 1036 joined the FARDC when he was 15. But after two months he was told to leave because he was underage. He joined the PARECO, but then decided to escape in 2010. Participant 2019 “The PARECO often attacked villages to loot and steal. They killed a lot of civilians. Many soldiers rape. They have a need for sex and they just go and satisfy it. But they are not ordered to do it. My own commander was raping me, so I decided to run away.” Participant 2019 was abducted by the PARECO together with his brother at the age of 16. 34 symptoms, like tension headaches, are very common. ETN center (20 percent). It is thus reasonable to assume that spontaneous remittance is low and a significant pro- Number of traumatic events per person. Out of 23 pos- portion of former combatants and soldiers remain men- sible traumatic event types, 90 percent of the participants tally ill even if assisted with a spectrum of economic had experienced more than 10 traumatic event types. Still 58 percent had experienced more than 15 such event reintegration services, as in the ETN center. types, and 13 percent had experienced 20 or more types The breakdown of the PTSD diagnosis according to the of traumatic events. different AGs is as follows: 27 percent of all participants Prevalence of PTSD among (Former) Combatants who were with the FDLR were diagnosed with PTSD, and Soldiers. Applying the strict diagnostic criteria as while 27 percent of all the FARDC combatants presented laid out by the international Diagnostic and Statistical with PTSD. The PTSD prevalence rate for the CNDP and Manual for Mental Disorders (DSM-IV), 24 percent of PARECO was equal at 26 percent. Only in the PARECO the participants had PTSD. The prevalence of PTSD in group did respondents report somewhat lower PTSD the transit camp is slightly higher (26 percent) than in the symptoms, at 19 percent. 35 8 Perpetrator Experiences and Self-Reported Violence This chapter describes the reported perpetrator events and self-reported violence committed by participants ac- Participant 1009 tive in AGs. Almost all participants reported having been a perpetrator of violence in the past; almost all had com- “When we attacked the village, the commander said: ‘Kill mitted armed physical assaults. When asked about vio- all—or I will kill YOU.’” lence against civilians, interviewees reported frequently Participant 1009 was born in Rwanda. He fled to DRC after that they had taken food from civilians and attacked ci- the genocide, together with his parents. His father was an vilian settlements and 24 percent disclosed that they had alcoholic and very violent. He was later forced to join the taken part in the massacre of civilians. Reasons given for FDLR. these brutal forms of violence were: revenge, wanting to harm the enemy, punishment, or unspecified reasons (such as during lootings). No significant differences be- tween AGs were noted. Participant 2034 Physical Assault. Of those interviewed 72 percent ad- “The FDLR got weak. This is why they attack villages and mitted that they had physically assaulted someone; that looted them. They force people to carry the loot and to join is hit (with or without an object), severely kicked, or them. They force Congolese to fight against their brothers. beaten someone. This is bad.” Participant 2034 is Congolese and joined the Maï-Maï Lafontaine at the age of 20. He became a captain in this Participant 2043 group. He later left the Maï-Maï to join the FDLR. “When a civilian does not want to give you his phone or money, you shoot him.” percent or 57 persons admitted that they themselves had Participant 2043 joined the Maï-Maï Simba at the age participated in a massacre. Again, those who had partici- of 15. pated in the purposeful killing of numerous civilians are from all AGs. “Only” two participants report that they have taken part in a massacre during their time with the Additionally, 90 percent reported that they had assaulted FARDC. someone with a weapon, most often with a firearm. In general, participants had little or no concept of what Stealing Food from Civilians. Three-quarters of inter- constitutes a civilian. Many times they spoke about viewees reported that they “had to” take food from civil- “those who dwell amongst the enemy” or “those who ians to survive.17 live close to the enemy.” Participants made it clear that Attacking Civilian Settlements. Slightly fewer than noncombatants staying with or around combatants or those who had stolen food from civilians, namely 70 per- soldiers were considered to belong with them and there- cent, said that they had attacked villages or settlements. fore were seen and treated as enemies. Here all groups are frequently implicated in such attacks. “Only” two participants, however, reported having at- Participant 2056 tacked a civilian settlement with the FARDC. “We were not even considering civilians as human beings.” Massacre. While, as cited above, 66 percent of the par- ticipants reported that they had witnessed a massacre, 25 Participant 2056 joined the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) when he was 10 years old and stayed with the group for four years. 17  For further explanation, see Annex 4. 36 The interviewees describe different types of massacres. First, civilians were targeted in order to harm the en- Participant 2088 emy or take revenge. Second, civilians were killed as “After combat we killed everybody who was left except punishment. This could either be for their perceived or the beautiful women. We took them with us. We were actual support of the enemy or—as described by one raping and stealing a lot. For example, one time the FDLR participant—for direct aggression against combatants. killed our civilians and as revenge we killed their civilians. Furthermore, civilians were killed during lootings. Fi- Another time, the CNDP went to one of our villages and nally, some participants reported the deliberate killing of killed civilians. We rushed there and fought against them. civilians without any qualifying reason. It was an intensive fighting, but we won. However, the next Because civilians are not seen as a distinct group sepa- day they got support and won. Then we got some more rate from enemy combatants, it is often difficult to deal support and entered their camp at night. We launched with them separately. grenades. Then we went into the rooms and chopped everybody’s head off with machetes. Everywhere was blood. Only 12 people escaped in a pickup.” Participant 2049 Participant 2088 was abducted at the age of 12 by the “One time we were ordered to go to a village which was Maï-Maï 13th brigade under the command of Akilimali controlled by the enemy. We were ordered to kill the (later Force de Defense Nationale, FDN). He stayed with the villagers, not with guns but with knives and machetes.” group for three years. Participant 2049 joined a small Maï-Maï group at the age of 13. He left the group after two years. who have lost some of their own family members in massacres. Following the same logic, civilians were also seen as an appropriate target for revenge. This can lead to a spiral of In addition to targeting civilians to take revenge on the violence in which AG attack and kill “each other’s’” ci- enemy, they are also attacked and killed as a punishment. vilians. Attacking and killing civilians is also sometimes This can either be punishment for actual or perceived described as a personal form of revenge by combatants, support of the enemy or for standing up to the AGs. Participant 1023 “I had witnessed massacres by the CNDP. To take revenge I also took part in FDLR massacres. In the beginning I thought it was fun to be a soldier, but after my first combat experience I changed my mind.” Participant 1023 was born in Gisenyi (Rwanda). When he was nine years old, his parents were killed. He then joined the FDLR and stayed with the group for almost 13 years. Finally, he was caught Participant 2032 “When I was in the CNDP we fought against the FDLR in a village. The civilians stayed there. They were sure that the FDLR would win and protect them. But the CNDP won. So our commander ordered us to kill all civilians.” Participant 2032 became a soldier at that the age of 26. During his 15 years as a soldier and combatant, he fought for the FARDC, the RCD, the CNDP, and finally the FDLR. Participant 2044 “One day, when I was in RCD, villagers captured one of our soldiers. We, therefore, went and killed all people in their village. My commander often gave me orders to beat or kill different people.” Participant 2044 joined the Maï-Maï FAC at the age of 13. He later fought for the RCD and finally for Patriotes Résistants Congolais (PARECO) until he demobilized last year. 37 Other accounts of massacres included Table 5. Reported committed sexually assault by AG the killing of civilians in the context of organized lootings or events without specific motives. “Have you ever sexually assaulted someone else?” Never Yes Total Participant 2010 “The PARECO often attacked villages to N 87 6 93 FDLR loot and steal and they killed a lot of % 93,5% 6,5% 100,0% people then.” N 9 2 11 FARDC % 81,8% 18,2% 100,0% Participant 2036 N 69 8 77 “When I was with PARECO we killed Maï-Maï many civilians. I took part in these % 89,6% 10,4% 100,0% killings. And I mutilated many people.” N 19 4 23 CNDP % 82,6% 17,4% 100,0% Participant 2045 N 10 4 14 “One time, when I was with the Maï-Maï PARECO FAC there was a marriage of enemies in % 71,4% 28,6% 100,0% a church. There were a lot of civilians, too. N 194 24 218 We went there and killed everybody in Total this church.” % 89,0% 11,0% 100,0% Perpetrated Sexual Violence. Eleven percent of the par- participants did so voluntarily or had been forced to ticipants reported that they had sexually assaulted others, do this. Furthermore, 26 percent reported that they had with significant differences among AGs. Almost one out seen others eating human flesh or drinking their blood. of every five former combatants from the CNDP reported Only a single case took place outside of the context of having sexually assaulted someone, compared to 7 per- an AG. cent for FDLR and 10 percent for Maï-Maï (Table 5). Participant 1041 Participant 1071 “Drinking human blood and eating human flesh is part of “The FDLR rape a lot. I was not forced to rape; it was just the military training of the FDLR. Everyone who does not normal in the group to do it. One day I was with some other admit this lies to you.” soldiers and we took a woman and raped her. One after the other. Maybe five of us. We raped a lot. Even children and men, whoever we could get.” Participant 2043 Participant 1071 was abducted by the FDLR at the age of “Sometimes when you kill a person you feel the need to eat 15. He later fled the group and joined the FARDC. He later flesh. You cut off a part of the person, maybe the arm and had to leave the FARDC because he was still underage. take it home. You cook it and eat it with fufu. In Maï-Maï Simba we often ate human flesh.” Cannibalism. About 8 percent of participants af- Participant 2043 was frequently beaten for deviant firmed they had eaten human flesh18 or drunk human behavior by his parents. He left his family to escape these blood (n =18). It is not clear in all cases whether the beatings and joined the Maï-Maï Simba at the age of 15. 18  For further explanations, see Annex 4 38 Participant 2042 “I ate the hearts of our enemies to gain strength.” When participant 2042 lost his parents at the age of 12, he had no more means to pay for his school fees. He therefore decided to join the Maï-Maï, and became responsible for witchcraft within the group. Participant 1009 “One who was with our unit used to eat human flesh. But I found it disgusting to see the forearm being cooked, because white parts stick out!” Participant 1009 was born in Rwanda. He fled DRC after the genocide, together with his parents. His father was an alcoholic and very violent. He was forced to join the FDLR. In the group he too developed a visible alcohol dependency and now, after demobilization, shows visible signs of withdrawal. Participant 2077 “Maï-Maï cut the genitals of captured CNDP to use them for witchcraft.” Participant 2077 joined the Maï-Maï Cobra in 2003, but was later captured by the Congrés National pour la défense du people (CNDP) and became a combatant there. But he left the CNDP during the Amani program because he did not want to be integrated into the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC). Participant 2073 “We ate hearts and drank blood. When a soldier pushed a knife in the body of an enemy it was common to suck the blood.” Participant 2073 joined the Maï-Maï Forces Armées Congolaises (FAC) when he was 12 years old. After two years with the group he was dismissed for being too young. 39 9 Appetitive Aggression in Ex-combatants A significant proportion of former combatants showed pants reported that they not only fought other combat- higher than normal signs of aggression. They re- ants or attacked civilians to achieve specific aims, but ported that they enjoyed fighting and liked to see also for the pleasure of a “manhunt,” which included their victims suffer. Other reasons given for aggression injuring enemies and victims. The percentage of former were: the feeling of satisfaction when harming others FDLR combatants who report this is somewhat lower (44 percent), having an urge to fight (35 percent), and (30 percent) than for most other groups, and the dif- finding it difficult to resist being aggressive (40 percent). ferences are statistically significant (Cramer’s V = .30; These former combatants and soldiers clearly not only p < .01, Table 6). got used to violence, but, over time, came to enjoy it and The Urge to Fight. A significant number of former com- developed a need to be increasingly cruel. Interestingly, batants and soldiers reported that they felt an inner urge the members of the FDLR reported these statements less to fight. In total, 35 percent of the interviewees agreed frequently compared to other groups. Noteworthy also that one motivation to be involved in combat was the is the fact that some combatants (8 percent) described sensation of a bodily craving or physical need to go out combat and attacking others as sexually arousing. A re- and fight. Some 13 percent reported that at times this urge lationship was also observed between difficulty control- to fight was so overwhelming that they went into com- ling aggression and rank: the higher someone is in rank, bat even though they knew they might be killed. These the more aggression he reports. former combatants and soldiers agreed to the statement: Satisfaction Gained from Harming Others. Of all inter- “I fought because of my hunger (thirst) to fight, even viewees, 44 percent “agreed a bit” or “strongly agreed” though I knew it could kill me” (Nilipigana kwa sababu that it can be satisfying to harm another. These partici- ya kiu ya vita, hata kama nilijua inawezekana ninakufa kwenye vita). There were no group dif- ferences. Table 6. Reported agreement with satisfaction to harm others by AG Difficulties Resisting the Urge for Ag- “It can be satisfying to harm others.” gression. The data also shows that for some former combatants and soldiers Neither nor Agree Disagree Total fighting and acting out physical ag- gression became, over time, a goal in N 9 28 55 92 itself. From those interviewed, 16 per- FDLR % 9,8% 30,4% 59,8% 100,0% cent agreed to the statement: “After I became a good fighter, fighting was the N 0 6 4 10 only thing I really wanted in life.” As FARDC this comes from former combatants and % 0% 60,0% 40,0% 100,0% soldiers who have just voluntarily left N 7 45 24 76 their group or force, it is expected that Maï-Maï the percentage is higher among active % 9,2% 59,2% 31,6% 100,0% fighters. N 3 10 10 23 Even more participants reported that at CNDP % 13,0% 43,5% 43,5% 100,0% the moment when they were commit- ting an aggressive act it was difficult N 1 9 4 14 for them to stop, even though their vic- PARECO tim might be already defeated or de- % 7,1% 64,3% 28,6% 100,0% fenseless. Forty percent said, “If I start N 20 98 97 215 beating another person it is difficult to Total stop”, with some differences between % 9,3% 45,6% 45,1% 100,0% groups. While around 29 percent of for- 40 mer FDLR combatants agreed to the statement, between is in rank, the more aggression he reports (Table 7). 43 percent and 51 percent of the interviewees from the other armed groups and the FARDC affirmed it. A clear Sexual Arousal during Combat. A minority of former relationship between the difficulty to control aggression combatants and soldiers (8 percent; n = 19) reported that and the reported ranks is observed. The higher someone attacking others was sexually arousing. Table 7. Reported agreement with statement “If I start beating another person, it is difficult to stop” by rank of ex-combatant. “If I start beating another person it is difficult to stop” Strongly disagree Disagree a bit Neither nor Agree a bit Strongly agree Total N 10 0 0 1 0 11 Supporter % 90,9% ,0% ,0% 9,1% ,0% 100,0% N 52 10 7 24 21 114 Soldier % 45,6% 8,8% 6,1% 21,1% 18,4% 100,0% N 27 2 2 5 11 47 NCO % 57,4% 4,3% 4,3% 10,6% 23,4% 100,0% N 6 6 5 11 15 43 Officer % 14,0% 14,0% 11,6% 25,6% 34,9% 100,0% N 95 18 14 41 47 215 Total % 44,2% 8,4% 6,5% 19,1% 21,9% 100,0% Participant 2083 “Sometimes you harm others without any reason or order. For example, you see people on a hill and you like to shoot at them.” Participant 2083 joined the Maï-Maï Kifuafua at the age of 13. He stayed with the group for eight years. Participant 2088 “I was making others really suffer. We went to steal at night and destroyed all people we met. If we came across a woman we raped her, if we came across a boy we beat him. […] When we captured an enemy, we asked him questions about the location and strategy of his group. Sometimes he had to show us their places, sometimes we chopped his head off. After combat we killed everybody who was left, except the beautiful women. We took them with us.” “Today, I cannot stay more than four days without sex. When someone provokes me I think about how it would be to chop his head off. For a man fighting is everything. If I hear the sounds of bullets I wish I would be fighting. This thirst to fight is in me. It is like the thirst of a person who likes Coca Cola. The thirst will not be satisfied until the person drinks a Coke.” “I was close to the commander. I liked the group, I was a good soldier.” Participant 2088 was forced to join the Maï-Maï 13th brigade under the Command of Akilimali (later the Force de Defense Nationale, FDN) and stayed with them for three years. 41 10 Ordered Violence against Civilians (Leadership Level) W hile the previous chapter discussed the experi- ences of those who perpetrated violence, this Participant 0008 chapter analyzes whether orders were given by “We were sent to steal food. Sometimes we were walking the leadership of AGs to commit violence against civil- for the whole day and walking back the next day. We were ians. Almost nine out of every 10 respondents reported like slaves for the FDLR. They forced us to steal food. While they received orders to loot civilians, almost eight out we did this, the FARDC was shooting at us.” of 10 to attack settlements, and six out of 10 to burn houses. Participant 0008 was a trader who frequently supplied the FDLR with goods. In 2008 they forced him to join their Thirteen percent of all respondents reported that they ranks. had received orders to rape; however, there were notable differences across AGs. While there were no reports of SGBV-related orders from the ex-FARDC respondents, 30 percent of former CNDP respondents reported hav- Participant 2054 ing heard orders to commit SGBV. Meanwhile, 8 per- “In CNDP we killed a lot of civilians. When they refuse to cent of interviewees reported that abductions of women carry the loot, you just shoot them.” were ordered for forced marriage. When he was 15, he was forced to join CNDP. Later he Orders to Loot. Almost nine out of 10 participants had joined the FDLR. heard orders to “steal goods or food.”19 While around 8 out of 10 former FARDC soldiers reported this, well over nine out of 10 former com- Table 8. Reported received or hearing order to attack batants from all AG had heard this order. civilian settlements by AG Several participants also reported they set up roadblocks to rob money, salt, oil, and Order to Attack Civilian Settlements other commodities from civilians, or forced civilians to carry loot. Some of the respon- No Yes Total dents had been abducted themselves during such lootings. N 16 76 92 FDLR % 17,4% 82,6% 100,0% Participant 2078 N 3 6 9 “We went to villages with guns and machetes FARDC to collect food. When we had no money, % 33,3% 66,7% 100,0% we made roadblocks. We were beating the people who passed by and taking their N 17 59 76 money. Then we also made roadblocks on Maï-Maï % 22,4% 77,6% 100,0% market days. Everybody had to give us a part of what he wanted to sell. Rebels want to N 4 19 23 fight, because after it they can loot. This is the CNDP motivation for fighting.” % 17,4% 82,6% 100,0% Participant 2078 joined the Maï-Maï in 2008, N 1 13 14 but left this group the same year. PARECO % 7,1% 92,9% 100,0% Total N 41 173 214 19 See annex 4 for explanation of perpetrators’ % 19,2% 80,8% 100,0% perceptions about looting 42 Orders to Attack Civilian Settlements. Al- Table 9. Reported hearing orders to rape civilians by AG most 8 out of 10 the participants reported that they had received or heard orders to attack civilian settlements (Table 8). As Have you ever heard the order to rape civilians in your group? discussed before, most combatants do not No Yes Total distinguish between combatants and civil- ians, especially as attacks follow lines of N 77 15 92 tribal/ethnic affiliation. FDLR % 83.7% 16.3% 100.0% Orders to Burn Houses. A high number of N 9 0 9 participants from all groups reported that FARDC they had heard the order to burn homes. % 100.0% .0% 100.0% In total 61 percent had witnessed, at least N 73 3 76 once, the issuing of such an order. Of former Maï-Maï CNDP combatants, 74 percent said they % 96.1% 3.9% 100.0% had heard this order, of the FDLR 73 percent, of PARECO 72 percent, of the N 16 7 23 CNDP FARDC 56 percent, and of the Maï-Maï % 69.6% 30.4% 100.0% 50 percent. N 12 2 14 Orders to Rape Civilians. In total 13 per- PARECO cent of the participants reported that they % 85.7% 14.3% 100.0% had heard or were given orders to rape civilians. Here we see significant differ- Total N 187 27 214 ences between groups (Cramer’s V = .20; % 87.4% 12.6% 100.0% p < .01). Almost one-third of former CNDP combatants affirmed that such orders were given. Furthermore, 14 percent of former PARECO combatants and 16 percent of former FDLR combatants Participant 0003 reported orders to rape civilians. While no ex-FARDC reported this,20 4 percent of former Maï-Maï combatants “When we went to loot, there was a motto: ‘If you do not said they had heard such orders (Table 9). find enough, burn the house.’” Participant 0003 went to school for six years. At the age Several participants also mentioned orders to abduct of 16 he was abducted by a FDLR commander who called women for the commander. In general a picture emerges himself Nkundaneza. He was forced to do hard labor for in which committing rape is a “regular” part of combat- the FDLR, and his main coping strategy was to smoke ants’ lives. It is clearly tolerated and encouraged by su- marijuana. periors, but may not be frequently ordered. In order to understand better the role of rank in the con- text of commanded rape, table 10 compares the data for Participant 1049 soldiers versus officers. Although the sample size is too small to provide strong inferences, more officers from “Sometimes we were ordered to burn huts. Sometimes we both the Maï-Maï and PARECO AG had heard orders just did it as revenge against the enemy. To the enemy you are to rape civilians than soldiers. Orders to rape were more allowed to do whatever you want.” frequently reported from former FDLR and CNDP sol- diers than from officers. Participant 1049 was separated from his parents at the age of four in 1998. A FDLR commander then took care of him. Participant 1049 then stayed in the FDLR for 13 years. 20  Our study worked with too few ex-combatants to be seen as inclu- sive or representative. The case of mass rapes committed by the FARDC following the orders of Lt. Col. Kibibi Mutuare Daniel shows that the FARDC is not exempt from this type of crime. For a detailed account, see Annex 5. 43 Table 10. , Reported hearing orders to rape civilians by AG for soldiers and officers Have you ever heard the order to rape civilians in your group? Soldiers Officers No Yes No Yes N 49 12 4 0 FDLR % 80.3% 19.7% 100.0% 0% N 5 0 2 0 FARDC % 100.0% 0% 100.0% ,0% N 31 1 30 2 Maï-Maï % 96.9% 3.1% 93.8% 6.2% N 7 4 2 0 CNDP % 63.6% 36.4% 100.0% 0% N 6 0 3 1 PARECO % 100.0% 0% 75.0% 25.0% Participant 2041 “Soldiers rape women who come from markets. Some commanders order to rape and no commander punishes for rape. They rape to provoke and because they are frustrated. Often one person rapes and encourages the others to rape, too. After a good fight, they took all the girls from the nearest village and every soldier could take one as a reward for the good fighting.” Participant 2041 was forced to join the CNDP at the age of 15. Participant 2083 “After combat we raped the women of the enemy. There was no mercy. The commanders raped them, too. It was like an order to rape.” Participant 2081 joined the Maï-Maï Kifuafua at the age of 13. He stayed with the group for eight years. Participant 1027 “There are commanders who do not order to rape, but they do it themselves. They are role models for the other soldiers.” Participant 1027 was abducted together with ten other villagers by the FDLR in 2007. He stayed with the FDLR until 2011. 44 Sexual Violence as a Reward, Forced Marriage. Fi- Breakdown data shows that with regards to women be- nally, we asked participants whether different types of ing given as a reward, six participants said this was the rewards existed in their AG. This included the question case in the CNDP, seven said this happened in the FDLR, whether soldiers could “receive” a “woman, wife, girl, and one each for the Maï-Maï APCLS, Maï-Maï FAC, man, or boy” as a bonus or incentive. While none re- Maï-Maï FDN, Maï-Maï Kifuafua, Maï-Maï Simba, and ported that men or boys are given as a reward, around 8 PARECO. percent affirmed that women are. Participant 1108 “The FDLR uses rape in order to frighten or to punish the population. You can also get girls as a reward to have sex with them, but only for the sake of sex. In the FDLR you do not marry these girls.” When participant 1108 was still a child he came DRC as a refugee. There he was separated from his parents and found by a FDLR soldier. The soldier raised him, and he then joined the FDLR himself in 2009. He finally left the group to go back home and find out whether his parents were still alive. Participant 1048 “If a soldier liked a girl, he just told General Janvier. Then he got a soldier and they went to take the girl by force. This is how we married our wives. If they were talking about a coming battle or an attack, I was always the first to be ready.” When participant 1048 was 13 years old his father died. After this loss he could not pay for his school fees anymore and decided to join the Maï-Maï APCLS. 45 11 Reported Opinions on Motives for SGBV in DRC A ll interviewees were asked how they might explain percent). Thirty percent of former Maï-Maï fighters and the sexual violence occurring in DRC. The most 43 percent of both former FDLR and former CNDP com- common explanations included: (i) “combatants batants agreed with the statement. Twenty-three percent are out of control” (82 percent agreed); (ii) “it happens agreed that sexual violence is “used to exercise control when combatants are in small groups (gang rape)” (55 over civilian communities” while 49 percent strongly percent agreed); (iii) “because of frustration” (54 percent disagreed with this statement. agreed); and (iv) “revenge” (41 percent). Combatants Out of Control. As detailed in the intro- Further, about one-third of all interviewed ex-combatants duction, many accounts of sexual violence describe it agreed that (i) “the absence of a wife” (33 percent), (ii) as random acts of sexual lust committed by combatants “proving manhood” (32 percent), and (iii) interestingly, who are neither controlled by their superiors nor able to “the absence of punishment at leadership level for per- control themselves. This interpretation is widely shared petrating SGBV” (35 percent) are reasons behind SGBV among former combatants. Eighty-two percent agree or strongly agree to the statement: “Violence against wom- in DRC. Twenty-seven percent agreed to the statement, en happens, because sometimes combatants just get out “Violence against women happens, because combatants/ of control.” soldiers are ordered to do it.” The lowest level of agree- ment to this statement was among former FARDC sol- Personal Frustration and Lack of a Permanent Part- diers (11 percent) and former PARECO combatants (15 ner. In accordance with the soldiers cited by Erikson Table 11. Reported agreement to “Violence against women happens when combatants/soldiers feel frustrated about their lives.” by AG Have you ever heard the order to rape civilians in your group? Armed Group or Force FDLR FARDC Maï-Maï CNDP PARECO Total Strongly n 18 0 8 0 0 26 disagree % 19,6% ,0% 10,5% ,0% ,0% 12,2% Disagree n 0 0 2 0 0 2 a bit % ,0% ,0% 2,6% ,0% ,0% ,9% Neither n 34 2 17 7 4 64 nor % 37,0% 22,2% 22,4% 30,4% 30,8% 30,0% Agree a n 15 2 5 7 0 29 bit % 16,3% 22,2% 6,6% 30,4% ,0% 13,6% n 25 5 44 9 9 92 Strongly agree 27,2% 55,6% 57,9% 39,1% 69,2% 43,2% n 92 9 76 23 13 213 Total % 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 46 Baaz (Baaz and Stern, 2009), around half (54 percent) Around one-third of participants (33 percent) agreed that of the participants agreed that “Violence against women “Violence against women happens because combatants/ happens, when combatants/soldiers feel frustrated about soldiers do not have wives.” their lives.” While agreement is high in all groups, we Proving One’s Manhood and Gang Rape. Around found significant (p < .001) difference among them (Cra- one-third of the participants (32 percent) agreed raping mer’s V = .40). This is mainly because disagreement is women was necessary to prove manhood or strength. generally low (12 percent) and varies widely. Around More than half (55 percent) agreed with the statement: 20 percent of former FDLR combatants and 13 percent “Violence against women happens if combatants act in from the Maï-Maï groups disagreed with the statement, (small) groups.” Many combatants explained that the while no interviewee who was with the FARDC, the most dangerous groups for women consist of around CNDP, or PARECO at the time of demobilization dis- three to five combatants. According to them, within agreed (Table 11). groups of this size a dynamic would easily develop that Participant 2044 “Soldiers rape when they have had too many days without sex. They just need it. They are not allowed to bring their wives to the bush. So they need other women. But if you ask a woman who does not know you to have sex with you, she refuses. Then you have to force her. Even commanders rape.” Participant 2044 joined the Maï-Maï FAC when he was 13. He then changed to the RCD and later to PARECO. Participant 2013 “No man can stay five years without sex. If they are not allowed to see their wives, they have to take another woman by force.” Participant 2013 was forced to join the FDLR at the age of 23. He left the group when he heard about Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) on the radio. Participant 2043 “We rape women. How can you stay for two weeks without sex?! Every soldier needs sex.” Participant 2043 was frequently beaten for deviant behavior by his parents. He left his family to escape these beatings and joined the Maï-Maï Simba at the age of 15. Participant 2019 “I saw groups of soldiers encouraging each other to rape. Then they negotiated who starts and who comes after. And they all raped one woman. Many soldiers rape. They have a need for sex and they just go and satisfy it. And because of marijuana, soldiers get uncontrolled and do extraordinary things. But they are not ordered to do it.” Participant 2019 was abducted by the PARECO together with his brother at the age of 16. He ran away from the group, because he was raped by his commander. Participant 0008 “In the FDLR rapists are beaten to death. But I have also heard FDLR speaking amongst themselves: “I have raped X, I have raped Y.” Participant 0008 was a trader who frequently supplied the FDLR with goods. In 2008 they forced him to join their ranks. 47 encourages group members to act out their sexual and Around one-third (35 percent) agreed to the statement: aggressive fantasies. In larger groups, however, perpe- “Violence against women happens because commanders trators run the risk that someone with moral concerns do not punish combatants/soldiers for it.” While only 8 might report this crime to the superiors. percent of former PARECO members endorsed the state- ment, a full 65 percent of former CNDP members found Lack of Punishment for SGBV at Leadership Level. it to be true (Table 12). Table 12. Reported agreement violence against women happens because lack of punishment by commanders by AG “Violence against women happens because commanders do not punish combatants/soldiers for it.” Armed Group or Force FDLR FARDC Maï-Maï CNDP PARECO Total Strongly n 35 4 32 6 8 85 disagree % 38,0% 44,4% 42,1% 26,1% 61,5% 39,9% Disagree n 4 1 3 0 1 9 a bit % 4,3% 11,1% 3,9% ,0% 7,7% 4,2% Neither n 19 2 14 2 3 40 nor % 20,7% 22,2% 18,4% 8,7% 23,1% 18,8% Agree a n 2 0 4 4 0 10 bit % 2,2% ,0% 5,3% 17,4% ,0% 4,7% N 32 2 23 11 1 69 Strongly agree % 34,8% 22,2% 30,3% 47,8% 7,7% 32,4% N 92 9 76 23 13 213 Total % 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% Participant 2086 “The CNDP were raping and killing in villages. They rape during combat. The commanders know about it and rape, too.” Participant 2086 joined the Maï-Maï Janvier to escape forced recruitment by the CNDP. But he left the Maï-Maï (then the APCLS) and was captured by the CNDP. In January 2009 the CNDP formally ceased to exist as an armed group (AG); it integrated into the FARDC at the onset of Operation Umoja Wetu (January 19, 2009). Participant 2081 “Lust was pushing us. We were like bandits. Mostly two soldiers went together to rape women. We even sometimes forced sticks into their vaginas. The commanders knew about it, but they did not punish us.” Participant 2081 was forced to join the APCLS at the age of 13 in 2008. 48 Orders to Rape. Twelve percent of participants reported as orders to abduct women. that they had personally heard orders to rape civilians, as discussed below. Significantly more participants said that Rape as an Instrument of Control. Of those interviewed, this was a reason for the occurrence of sexual violence. 23 percent agreed that sexual violence is used to exercise A full 27 percent agreed to the statement: “Violence control over civilian communities. Meanwhile, 49 per- against women happens because combatants/soldiers are cent said this was definitely not the case. A high rate of ordered to do it,” with the lowest level of endorsement interviewees (27 percent) were not able or willing to take among former FARDC soldiers (11 percent) and former a position on this question (Table 13). PARECO combatants (15 percent). Thirty percent of Revenge. Around 41 percent said “taking revenge” is a former Maï-Maï fighters and 43 percent of both former motive to commit acts of sexual violence, as when one FDLR and CNDP combatants agreed with the statement. AG or force rapes to take revenge on an enemy group The participants also explained that there were different or force. Of these 92 interviewees, 57 gave specific ex- types of orders for sexual violence. There were explicit amples (who rapes whom to take revenge on whom). and implicit orders to rape women after combat as well Participant 2044 “When a group is new, the commanders sometimes order to rape so that the group will get known. It was like this for Maï-Maï FAC, CNDP and PARECO. Soldiers can rape because they have guns to threaten.” Participant 2044 joined the Maï-Maï FAC when he was 13. He then changed to the RCD and later to the PARECO. Participant 2077 “In the CNDP they raped women. I saw even [name removed] raping women. One time he raped two white women who distributed things to the villages. One of the women killed herself afterwards. In the CNDP we took women by force, some even married women by force. Commanders ordered the soldiers to collect girls for them to rape.” Participant 2077 joined the Maï-Maï Cobra in 2003. He was later captured by the CNDP and became a combatant there. But he left the CNDP during the Amani program because he did not want to be integrated into the FARDC. Participant 1096 “I was kept by my commander like a slave. He did not order to rape. In the CNDP to rape was like an implicit order. With enemies you can do whatever you want. Civilians under the control of the enemy are also enemies.” Participant 1096 was abducted by the CNDP in 2007. After his battalion was integrated into the FARDC in 2010 he left the army in January 2011. Participant 1103 “Child soldiers were often punished by being raped by grown-up soldiers. And when the soldiers went to loot, they killed and raped. But they protected each other so nobody was punished. During looting everything was allowed: killing, raping, burning houses, or mutilating. It was not an explicit order but there was no punishment and it was clear that it was expected by the commanders. We attacked civilians more often than soldiers. We rarely fought battles against other armed groups but we often went to loot.” “FDLR often took women when they looted, and brought them to their military base as sex slaves.” Participant 1103 was forced by his own father, who already was a FDLR combatant, to join the group. He had to work in FDLR- controlled mines, from where he escaped in May 2011. 49 Table 13. Reported agreement violence against women happens to control communities by AG “Violence against women is used to control the communities to which the women belong.” Armed Group or Force Strongly disagree Disagree a bit Neither nor Agree a bit Strongly Agree Total n 40 4 26 4 18 92 FDLR % 43,5% 4,3% 28,3% 4,3% 19,6% 100,0% n 2 0 3 2 2 9 FARDC % 22,2% ,0% 33,3% 22,2% 22,2% 100,0% n 44 0 20 3 9 76 Maï-Maï % 57,9% ,0% 26,3% 3,9% 11,8% 100,0% n 7 0 7 3 6 23 CNDP % 30,4% ,0% 30,4% 13,0% 26,1% 100,0% N 7 1 2 0 3 13 PARECO % 53,8% 7,7% 15,4% ,0% 23,1% 100,0% N 100 5 58 12 38 213 Total % 46,9% 2,3% 27,2% 5,6% 17,8% 100,0% Participant 1041 “The most brutal rapes are committed as revenge. Combatants are allowed to do whatever they want to the enemy and their allies. This way they show who is strongest and who rules.” Participant 1041 was recruited at his school by the FDLR. Participant 2083 “When we defeat the CNDP, we rape the women in their area. And they are ordered to do the same in our area. We were always taking revenge on each other.” Participant 2083 joined the Maï-Maï Kifuafua at the age of 13. He stayed with the group for eight years. Participant 2053 “Wherever a soldier is, all women are his wives. The Maï-Maï rape the women of the enemy, because they would rape our women, too.” Participant 2053 joined the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre (AFDL) in 1997. After he had been caught by Ugandan soldiers, he joined a Maï-Maï group and stayed with them for two-and-a-half years. 50 Ethnicity. Some participants reported ethnically moti- accused other groups and forces rather than their own vated violence against women, but only a small number of having this strategy. The only interviewees who re- (n = 16; 7 percent) reported that the ethnic or tribal af- ported that this was practiced by their own group were filiation of a woman increased her risk of being harmed. two former members of the CNDP. Two former FDLR Most participants affirmed that no specific group of girls combatants claimed that the Rwandan government was and women is targeted. But in the narrations many say deliberately trying to spread HIV. One said this was done that it is “the enemy,” “the women of the enemy” they through sending HIV+ prostitutes; the other alleged that target—the enemy being an ethnically/tribally composed this was done through rape. A third former FDLR com- or specific AG. For participants, there is no difference batant said this happened in the past when there were between an enemy and the civilians that are associated still Rwandese refugee camps in DRC. with it. Civilian Perpetrators. Around 11 percent agreed to the Spreading HIV/AIDS. Around 17 percent of the partici- statement: “Violence against women is mainly perpe- pants agreed to the statement: “Violence against women trated by civilians.” Most interviewees, however, vig- happened because armies/AGs want to spread AIDS in orously objected. Some even found the question rather the victims’ communities.” Here participants mostly ridiculous. Participant 1022 “FDLR soldiers rape especially women from the Bahunde tribe. CNDP soldiers rape especially women of FDLR soldiers.” Participant 1022 was abducted at the age of 18 by the Maï-Maï APCLS. Participant 2088 “Rwandans and Bahunde are enemies. We were often destroying Rwandan women. Sometimes we raped them. Often we inserted a knife or a stick into the vagina and turn it. Later we killed them.” Participant 2088 was forced to join the Maï-Maï 13th brigade under the command of Akilimali (later Force de Defense Nationale, FDN) and stayed with them for three years. Participant 2089 “Both rape, soldiers and civilians. But soldiers wait for people and threaten them. There is no consent. For civilians I have heard that it happens when the woman meets a man and likes him, but then she says stop and the man is pushing her.” Participant 2089 was captured by the FDLR in 2009. 51 12 Reported Reasons for the Most Brutal Forms of Rape C ombatants were asked about the motivation to com- intimidate and take revenge on women, as well as to mit the most brutal forms of rape. These include punish them for resistance during SGBV. gang rapes, the insertion of objects (such as sticks or guns) into a body opening (vagina/anus), burnings, Marijuana. The overwhelming majority of those inter- mutilation, and, finally, murder. A number of participants viewees who attributed the most brutal forms of rape to denied any knowledge of such criminal acts, or said they the mental state of the perpetrators saw the use of drugs have only heard about them on the radio. But many oth- as the main reason for the crime. On the one hand this ers offered a multitude of explanations for these rapes. explanation can be seen as an attempt to explain or even Very frequently it was attributed to the use of marijuana. excuse what seems unexplainable. By attributing these Most frequently reported was the potential of a victim’s crimes to drugs, individuals can make it easier for them- resistance during sexual violence as well as wanting to selves to face that they or their comrades are committing silence the victims after perpetrating SGBV. The high these crimes. On the other hand, there is a very real pos- number of further explanations offered by the intervie- sibility that the heavy use of drugs contributes to the loss wees indicates that the most brutal forms of rape consti- of inhibition displayed during these rapes. Participants tute a phenomenon with a multitude of causes. In sum, also described the perpetrators of the most brutal forms they were described as evil deeds committed by mentally of rapes as “crazy” and “evil.” They saw a clear con- derailed individuals, as motivated by witchcraft and ex- nection between these states of mind and the abuse of acerbated by group dynamics, as purposefully used to marijuana. Participant 0011 “These soldiers are out of control of their commanders and take a lot of marijuana. They kill and rape in a very brutal way. They are evil.” Participant 0011 is Rwandese. He voluntarily joined the FDLR in 1998. Participant 2026 “It happens because of all the marijuana. It gives them thoughts and ideas that you would think are not possible.” Participant 2026 joined the PARECO voluntarily in 2007. Two years later he was captured by the FDLR and integrated into the group. He finally left the FDLR because he was tired of life in the bush. Participant 2054 “It happens because the sound of bullets and all this marijuana make you crazy.” Participant 2054 was forced to join the CNDP when he was 15. Later he joined the FDLR. Participant 1081 “They are very stupid and evil. Maybe because of smoking marijuana. They do not reflect, and the devil controls their mind. In the FDLR adults are allowed to smoke marijuana, but child soldiers are not.” Participant 1081 was abducted from school by the FDLR in 2000. He was later captured by the Maï-Maï. His capturers cut the word “worthless” into his arm, which is still legible today. 52 Frustration and Self-Hatred. Some participants also re- One participant also named former soldiers and ex-com- ported frustration and self-hatred as one cause of the most batants as perpetrators of the most brutal forms of rape. brutal forms of rapes. In a vicious cycle these feelings He explained that these persons commit the most horren- are caused by the experience of violence, its perpetration, dous acts of sexual violence to compensate for the loss and the impossibility of a return to a peaceful life. of power they have suffered by giving up their status as combatants. According to this interviewee, these rapes serve to demonstrate to the population that former sol- Participant 2034 diers and combatants still have power. “These people hate themselves because of what they A third form of frustration and anger that was used to experienced in war and combat. They want to destroy other explain the most brutal forms of sexual violence was people, too.” prompted by crimes committed against an individual Participant 2034 joined the Maï-Maï Lafontaine at the age combatant’s or soldier’s family members. Some were of 20. He became a captain in this group, but later left to said to take revenge for the violence their mothers or join the FDLR. other female relatives had suffered. Lust for Power. While frustration can be seen as sign of weakness, a few participants described clearly that the Participant 1063 most brutal forms of rape are born out of a feeling of strength. They see the lust for power as a reason behind “I do not know. Mostly soldiers, who are bandits, do this. these crimes. But when all explanations are taken togeth- They are evil and cannot go back, neither to their armies nor er, this one played a rather minor role. into civilian life. They are frustrated about life and just want to destroy peoples’ life the way they can.” Witchcraft. A few participants reported that the most brutal forms of rape happen in the context of witchcraft. Participant 1063 was abducted by the FDLR in 2002 at the Either the crime itself serves this purpose, or witchcraft age of 20. is the motivation for mutilations. One participant alleged Participant 2039 “There is no special reason, they just like it. They do it because they can. They have the power.” Participant 2039 was forced to join the PARECO at the age of 14. He was unhappy in the group because of the large numbers of Hutu there. His own friends were members of the APCLS. So he changed to this group later, but left it when he was given a brochure by MONUSCO. Participant 2075 “Soldiers do it, who like to force, because then they feel strong and powerful.” Participant 2075 joined the Maï-Maï in Masisi in 2008 at the age of 16, but ran away after nine months with the group. Participant 2063 “Maï-Maï say that they are looking for witchcraft on women’s bodies or even babies’ bodies. They cut breasts, genitals, or ears.” Participant 2063 joined the ALIR in 1999. He was forcefully demobilized by the FARDC in 2011. 53 Participant 2060 “Mostly the perpetrators are not soldiers. Civilians who want to have witchcraft have to fulfill the task of killing a person or mutilating a person. Not only women get mutilated.” Participant 2060 joined the Maï-Maï Kifuafua in 2006. He was later captured by the CNDP in an ambush and from then served this group as a captain. that the perpetrators of rape, which are thought to pro- penis, might insert objects and/or kill the victim to hide vide magic powers, are civilians. this from their fellows. Group Dynamics. As explained in Chapter 11, gang Victim’s Ethnic Background. As discussed in Chapter rape is common. Interviewees described small groups of 11, only around 7 percent of the respondents saw the eth- three to five combatants or soldiers as the most danger- nic or tribal affiliation of a woman as the reason for her ous-sized group of men for women. In a group of this being a target for rape, but some interviewees reported size the perpetrators can easily cover up for one another. that this might be an explanation for the brutality of the These groups are not only prone to commit gang rape, crime. While this explanation was mostly brought for- but, according to some interviewees, to further torture ward by former FDLR combatants,21 some former sol- their victims. The rapists might thus slide into a compe- diers and combatants from other groups also supported tition of cruelty. Individuals who do not want to, or are this rationalization.2223 physically unable, to penetrate their victims with their Participant 2042 “It happens because they act in groups and everybody wants to be the first to rape. So it gets out of control and maybe the woman tries to defend herself. But later the soldiers feel sorry.” When participant 2042 lost his parents at the age of 12, he had no more means to pay for his school fees. He therefore decided to join the Maï-Maï and became responsible for witchcraft within the group. Participant 1014 “Women are raped differently according to their language. Women who speak Kiswahili are raped normally, but if they speak Kinyarwanda, they are raped in a more brutal way or even mutilated just because they are Rwandan.” Participant 1014 joined the FDLR. Participant 2074 “It is animated by the spirit of destruction. They just want to destroy women. It happens because of the tribal conflicts of Bahutu and Bahunde.” 23 Participant 2074 voluntarily joined the Maï-Maï Kifuafua in Nyabyondo in 2004 at the age of 12, but later ran away. He was, however, chased by his group and seen as a deserter, so he decided to join the FARDC. 21  For further information, refer to background chapter 2.2.1 and Annex 2. Profile of AG. 22  Annex 1 provides more information about the role of ethnic tensions and motivations for attacks on civilians, while Annex 3 offers a comprehen- sive account of ethnic and tribal clashes in North Kivu in the recent past. 23 See Annex 3. 54 Participant 2006 “Tutsi people followed the Hutu people to Congo and now they go on to mutilate them. That’s why they do this with the women.” Participant 2006 worked as a pharmacist before he was forced to join the PARECO in 2008. Victim’s Resistance, and Revenge. Respondents’ most when they try to resist being raped. This reportedly is the common explanation for brutal forms of rape was that it case for three reasons. First of all, women are mutilated served to terrorize the victim, and others in the surround- and/or killed to punish them for their resistance. Second, ing area. In the rationalization of these interviewees, the this serves as a strong signal to other (potential) victims perpetrator either took revenge on the victim for resist- of rape not to try to defend themselves. Third, perpetra- ing the rape, or mutilated/killed her to silence her. Taking tors are said to become so angered by the resistance of revenge on the victim for her/his resistance (or on the their victims that they commit further violence against group to which the victim belongs) emerged as the stron- them. Surely, power, anger and control issues play an gest motive for the most brutal forms of rape. According equal role here. to the interviewees, women are mutilated and/or killed Participant 0019 “The FDLR rapes girls. If a girl refuses to be raped, they take her with force and afterwards they put a knife into her. They do this to punish her.” Participant 0019 was 13 years old when the FDLR attacked and killed his father and abducted him. After he was brought to the FDLR camp, the commander nailed his arm to a tree (the scars are still visible today). He managed to escape when he was 16. Participant 1103 “Usually it happens if you asked for things and the people refuse to give or they refuse to have sex with the soldiers and they try to defend themselves.” Participant 1103 was forced by his own father to join the FDLR at the age of 14. Participant 2049 “It happens when women argue. It is a threat to other women who would defend themselves. They should be afraid to be mutilated, too, and so they should not defend themselves. They should be easy to rape.” Participant 2049 joined a small Maï-Maï group at the age of 13. He left the group after two years. Participant 2005 “Women are asked for sex and if they refuse sex, they are raped in a very brutal way, for example an ear is cut off, to make the women never forget that they should obey.” Participant 2005 voluntarily joined the Maï-Maï in 2004. Four years later, he demobilized for the first time, but he had such strong feelings of guilt about his past deeds that he felt he could not live among civilians and went back to the bush, where he was caught by the PARECO. He again demobilized in 2011. 55 Participant 1048 “They do it because they want to harm the civilians. They want to destroy their life. In the APCLS it happened if they refused to give money. As a revenge you destroy them and their life.” When participant 1048 was 13 years old his father died. After this loss, he could not pay for his school fees anymore and decided to join the Maï-Maï APCLS. Participant 1062 “It happens if they resist sleeping with the soldiers. They want to destroy. Often FARDC soldiers did this to Banyarwanda to humiliate them and to demoralize the soldiers of CNDP and their allies.” Participant 1062 is from Rwanda. He saw his father being burned in his own house during the 1994 genocide. He joined the CNDP in 2007. Silencing the Victim. Several respondents also reported been done to them. The more brutal and outrageous the that the most brutal forms of rape not only serve to en- crimes are, the more shame and hesitation the victim will sure that future potential victims will offer little resis- feel to tell others about it. Unfortunately, this is not only tance, but also to prevent actual victims from reporting true in the rationalization of the perpetrators, but also fits the crimes. Obviously, victims of rape who are murdered with our understanding of trauma. The greater the hor- will not be able to tell their story or seek justice. ror experienced, the more it becomes “unspeakable” (see also Chapter 7). Furthermore, combatants or soldiers Additionally, according to the interviewees, those vic- might rape a woman in retaliation for having accused tims who have been treated most brutally and/or have them or their group of rape. been mutilated will also be hesitant to report what has Participant 1011 “It happens because the rapists feel that the women will tell others or blame them. So he has two options, either to kill or to mutilate the woman, so that she is too afraid to tell anybody.” Participant 1011’s parents were killed when he was 12 years old. As he did not know what else to do, he joined the Maï-Maï Akilimali. Participant 2089 “They do it because of hatred. If soldiers have the opportunity, they try to increase the level of cruelty; they want to prevent the women from reporting rape.” Participant 2089 was captured by the FDLR in 2009. Participant 1023 “These are people of bad intentions. Women could report. They are treated so brutally, because in that way they will never report that they have been raped. For them the woman has no value as a human. Sometimes they want to show the enemy that they are stronger.” Participant 1023 was born in Gisenyi (Rwanda). When he was nine years old his parents were killed. He then joined the FDLR and stayed with them for almost 13 years. Finally, he was caught by the FARDC, kept in prison, and severely maltreated before being handed over to MONUSCO. 56 13 Sexual Violence Directed Against the Enemy’s Group As discussed in the Chapter 2 dealing with the history civilians, but either as part of one’s own group/force or and character of armed groups in Eastern DRC, and tak- as an enemy (adversary tribal or ethnic group) and thus ing into account anecdotal reports gathered alongside the as legitimate targets. In sum, motives for perpetrating semi-structured interviews, it is clear that most AG have SGBV that related to “harming the group of the enemy” deliberate policies that treat civilians, regardless of age were: as punishment for collaborating with the enemy’s or gender, as if they were either enemies or friends. The group, to demoralize the enemy’s group, as well as to distinction between civilian and military is often simply demonstrate superiority over the enemy. not made. A further important motivation for sexual violence of- Participant 1006 fered by our respondents—and beyond individual mo- tives—is to harm “the enemy” on a group level. Several “Only women who belong to the enemy are raped in such a motives emerged that all share this feature. Sexual vio- brutal way, not civilians.” lence can serve to punish women for perceived or actual collaboration with the enemy, to demoralize the enemy, and demonstrate one’s own superiority and power. Again Sexual Violence as Punishment for Collaborating with it is important to keep in mind here that combatants and the Enemy. Following this logic, women who belong soldiers make no clear distinction between combatants to one’s own group cannot actually collaborate with the and civilians. Once battle is joined, the only distinc- antagonistic groups or forces. Several participants, how- tion that is relevant to them is that between enemies ever, reported that women who are suspected of coop- and friends. This distinction is maintained regardless of erating with or being an ally of the enemy are subjected age, gender, or evidence of military status. Within this to the most brutal forms of rape. Again, it must be noted Manichean worldview, friends must be protected and en- here that any woman who is not a member of one’s own emies destroyed. The distinction tends to follow tribal group will potentially be seen as ally of the enemy, and or ethnic lines. Women are never perceived as neutral thus, as an enemy. Participant 2053 “Wherever a soldier is, all women are his wives. The Maï-Maï rape the women of the enemy, because they would rape our women, too. […] It happens if the woman is an ally of the enemy. If soldiers catch her, they do what they want with her.” Participant joined the AFDL in 1997. After he had been caught by Ugandan soldiers, he joined a Maï-Maï group and stayed with them for two-and-a-half years. Participant 2044 “It happens when the woman is an ally of the enemy.” Participant 2044 joined the Maï-Maï FAC when he was 13. He then changed to the RCD and later to the PARECO. Participant 2080 “Sometimes a woman is suspected to be a spy. Soldiers are then sent to kill her and before killing, they rape her.” Participant 2080 joined the Maï-Maï 13th brigade under the Command of Akilimali in 2002. After his first demobilization, he joined the Maï-Maï Janvier (APCLS) in 2005 and stayed with them for about three years. 57 Participant 2040 “The women who get mutilated are spies from the government. They know things.” Participant 2040 was captured by the Maï-Maï at the age of eight and raised by a colonel. After serving with the Maï-Maï, he inte- grated into the FARDC. But he later left the government forces and fought for the Maï-Maï.24 His age at the time of interview was 18. No known reports from survivors of sexual violence de- tail women’s voluntary collaboration with armed groups or forces. More interviews with both perpetrators and vic- Participant 1006 tims are needed to shed light on this discrepancy. Again, “Only women who belong to the enemy are raped in the suspicion of collaboration could also be regarded as such a brutal way, not civilians. It is for the perpetrators to an excuse to “justify” the violence committed. show that they are strong and to reduce the morale of the Sexual Violence to Demoralize the Enemy. According to enemy.” our respondents the vulnerability of women in the DRC Participant 1006 came with his parents from Rwanda is exploited to weaken enemies’ morale. Following this to DRC, but both his parents died when he reached the rationalization it is each group’s responsibility to protect country. Participant 1006 then joined the FDLR at the age the women associated with them. If a group is not able to of 10. Later his commander chief, Roy, left the FDLR to form fulfill this role, it is seen as a weakness or defeat of this his own group and participant 1006 followed him and was group and therefore as a victory for the perpetrators. Per- promoted. ceptions of and attitudes toward manhood, strength, and power hierarchies seem to play a role here as well. Participant 1056 “It happens for the sake of destruction. They do it to the women because they are the weakest part of the enemy. It is as if they would do it to the enemy himself. It is a weapon to weaken the morale of the enemy. I have witnessed this being done by the CNDP and the FARDC. It happens quite often.” Participant 1056 was born in Rwanda. He came to the Congo at the age of 12 in 1994. He lived in a refugee camp until he settled in Masisi in 1996. After his father died, he could not pay for his school fees anymore and life became unbearable. He felt mistreated by the Congolese, because he was Rwandese. Therefore, in 2010, he asked a friend to help him join the CNDP. Participant 1009 “The defeated enemy has to run. The women stay there. So the winner profits from the opportunity of raping them. And when the enemy comes back and sees that the women have been raped, his heart will be in pain. On the other side, these men live in the bush for five years or longer, they do not have a wife. So they just wait at the side of the road and their lust is so big that they rape the women! In this country nobody will know. You will not go to jail and be punished. You just take what you want to take.” Participant 1009 was born in Rwanda. He fled to the DRC after the genocide, together with his parents. His father was an alcohol addict and very violent. In 1998 participant 1009 was forced to join the FDLR. 24 24 For more information refer to the DDR background. 58 Sexual Violence to Demonstrate the Group’s Superior- ity. Some participants also described that sexual violence Participant 2086 serves to demonstrate a group’s superiority. In this con- “When a woman belongs to the part of civilians that live text the respondents referred to superiority over antago- next to the enemy, they do it. They want to show that they nistic groups, not to superiority over the actual victim. are crueler than the enemy.” Again, women here are described as important objects in this conflict—the ability to either protect or harm them Participant 2086 joined the Maï-Maï Janvier in 2006 to is seen as a sign of strength and serves as a show of force escape forced recruitment by the CNDP. But he left the vis-à-vis the enemy. Accordingly, women are not seen as Maï-Maï (then APCLS) in 2009 and was then captured by independent agents or carriers of rights and dignity. the CNDP. Participant 1080 “They are stupid. Maybe when they rape a woman that way they take revenge and want to harm and kill the enemy. They want to destroy them and make the enemy suffer. They even cut the belly of pregnant women to kill the babies.” Participant 1080 was born in Rwanda and came to DRC in 1994. He was separated from his family when the refugee camps were destroyed in 1996. He then joined the Armée de Libération du Rwanda (ALIR). He went to Congo-Brazzaville with the group to fight with Laurent-Desirée Kabila against the RCD and later returned to DRC to stay with the FDLR. Participant 2003 “Only the young and beautiful survive. The others have to die. Sometimes after a good fight, we chased the enemy away. After that we were allowed to rape the women. If we like we could even kill the children. If the commander allows it, then there is no punishment. But later in life you feel guilty about it.” Participant 2003 was recruited from a school at the age of 16 by the CNDP. He carries a burn mark with which all young soldiers and cows alike were marked by the commander. 59 14 Strategic and Tactical Aspects of Sexual Violence A s discussed throughout this report, there are many reasons for the sexual violence committed by com- 14.1 Sexual Violence to Gain Political batants and soldiers. Clearly, there are also tactical Attention (Strategic) and strategic aspects of sexual violence in the Eastern DRC. SGBV may be employed to demonstrate a group’s Sexual violence can be employed by AGs to draw at- strength and to draw political/public attention to it, or to tention to themselves as part of an overarching political terrorize civilians into compliance with the AG’s rules. strategy. Several interviewees reported that it was used to gain the attention of the Congolese government as When looking at strategic motives, it is assumed that well as the international community, and to demonstrate AGs perpetrating SGBV intend overall political gain. strength. One respondent reported that sexual violence From a tactical perspective, it is assumed that SGBV is was employed deliberately to put pressure on the Con- perpetrated to achieve immediate objectives in a particu- golese government. But participants did not explain how lar engagement. The research found evidence of under- they thought their leaders intended this to work nor what lying strategic (for example, to gain political attention), response they expected from either national or interna- tactical (for example, to facilitate lootings), as well as of tional actors. overlapping strategic and tactical (for example, to con- trol civilians) aspects of SGBV in DRC. Participant 1032 “All armed groups rape because they want to be noticed by the government. The war in the bush is not noticed in town, but rape is reported even to town. It puts the government under pressure.” Participant 1032 was abducted in March 2009. The CNDP came to his school and killed all pupils in first and second grade , while they abducted all boys from third to sixth grade. Participant 1032 estimates that around 100 boys were abducted alongside him. Participant 1096 “They are rebels. They want to be noticed by the government. New groups have to get known and t respected. They want to threaten the government and the international community and to show that they could do even more evil if they wanted to.” Participant 1096 was abducted by the CNDP in 2007 at the age of 17. His battalion was integrated into the FARDC in 2010. He left the FARDC in January 2011. Participant 2055 “New groups do a lot of bad things to get a reputation and to get to be known by the government.” Participant 2055 voluntarily joined the Maï-Maï Simba at the age of 15. He later changed to the Maï-Maï Cobra. 60 conclude that SGBV is used as a tactic that is part of an 14.2 Sexual Violence as an overall strategy that aims, however vaguely, at improv- Instrument of Control (Strategic and ing the position of an AG in the next power-sharing ar- rangement with the government. Tactical) In the previous chapters we saw that combatants and 14.3 Terror to Facilitate Lootings soldiers are divided on the question whether sexual vio- (Tactical) lence is employed as an instrument to control civilian populations. Around 23 percent said that this was the Several respondents, either former FDLR or Maï-Maï case. While, on the one hand, controlling a specific area combatants, reported that different AG were leaving could be seen as a strategic objective of an AG, it is also written messages for civilian populations. In the mes- possible that controlling civilians may be regarded as a sages they reportedly demanded civilians to leave a cer- military tactic used to achieve a strategic objective (for tain area or to deliver certain goods. The messages im- example, to negotiate with the government). One could plied that noncompliance would be heavily punished. Participant 2077 “One time, when we were in South Kivu, CNDP wanted to take control of an area, so we raped all the women in the village. The ones who tried to defend themselves got their heads chopped off. The heads were then put on sticks and carried around.” Participant 2077 joined the Maï-Maï Cobra in 2003. He was later captured by the CNDP and became a combatant there. But he left the CNDP during the Amani program because he did not want to be integrated into the FARDC. Participant 1105 “This is done by FDLR. I saw them cutting off breasts and putting sticks into the vaginas of women. They want to take revenge on the local population who supports the enemy. If they control an area they want the local population to flee with them so that the enemy only finds empty villages and deserted fields. So the enemy goes away quickly and they can come back and still control the area. If the local population refuses to flee, they help the enemy to control the area. If FDLR manage to come back, they do evil to the population to take revenge and to punish them for supporting the enemy.” Participant 1105 joined several Maï-Maï groups. First he was abducted by the Maï-Maï at the age of 18. Participant 2096 “The FDLR put out announcements to let people know that they will come. When we loot, we forced our way into houses, threatened and beat the people to force them to give us money.” Participant 2096 was forced to join the FDLR at the age of 15, but escaped the group at the age of 17. Participant 2091 “FDLR often puts announcements on trees like: ‘People, you have to give us . . ., otherwise we will kill you.’ FDLR and FDN also put out announcements to each other to insult and provoke each other.” Participant 2091 voluntarily joined the Maï-Maï FDN at the age of 24 and demobilized three years later. 61 Participant 1098 “FDLR uses announcements to warn and threaten the population. It can also be revenge to the enemy. We put announcements on trees in the village and say that we will come to collect food. If they dare to inform FARDC, we will destroy the whole village.” Participant 1098 was born in Rwanda and came to DRC as a refugee. He joined the FDLR in 2008 at the age of 20. He demobilized in 2011 after former FDLR combatants called him from Rwanda. Participant 2090 “The FDLR puts announcements to the FARDC on trees. They write something like ‘When we meet, we will fight.’ They also leave announcements like: ‘We will kill and burn every person who is still in this area in two days.’” Participant 2090 was abducted by the CNDP at the age of 15. After five months with them he was forced to join the FDLR with his father, but managed to escape the following year. Participant 2083 “The CNDP puts announcements in the villages to declare that this land belongs to them or that the country is under their control or that they will fight us. Sometimes it was written: ‘Do what we want or we will kill you!’” Participant 2083 voluntarily joined the Maï-Maï Kifuafua at the age of 12 and stayed with the group until he was 20 years old. 62 15 Summary M otivations behind the extreme brutality used proper psycho-social functioning, and would require in many cases of rape in the context of armed specialized psychological treatment. conflict in the DRC remains poorly understood and under-researched. This study has been conducted Almost all participants reported having been a perpetra- to determine individual motivations, as well as strategic tor of violence and committed armed physical assaults. or tactical aspects of gender-based violence of different One quarter took part in the massacres of civilians and armed groups and their leadership. 66 percent had witnessed such events. Furthermore, at least 1 out of 10 reported having perpetrated sexual vio- Ex-combatants interviewed belonged to 16 different AG lence, 8 percent reported having eaten human flesh, and or forces including, among others, Forces Démocra- one quarter had observed others eating human flesh. tiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), Maï-Maï groups, Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple Reasons given for the brutal forms of violence perpetrat- (CNDP), Patriotes Resistants Congolais (PARECO), and ed include revenge, wanting to harm the enemy, punish- a small sample from the national army. Close to 40 per- ment, or unspecified reasons (such as during lootings), cent of those interviewed had changed from one AG to with significant differences between AG. In general, par- another at least once. While the educational background ticipants had little or no concept of what constitutes a of interviewees is weak overall (average number of years civilian, or made no distinction between armed enemies of education is 5 and 29 percent are illiterate), at least 14 and a population affiliated to them. percent of interviewees spent 10 years or more in school. A significant proportion of former combatants reported The majority (64 percent) started as child soldiers under high levels of appetitive aggression. They reported en- the age of 18. More than half of all interviewees reported joying fighting and liking to see their victims suffer, to have been forced to join an AG in the first place; lev- feeling satisfaction when harming others (44 percent), els of forced recruitment are the highest for CNDP and having an urge to fight (35 percent), and finding it diffi- FDLR. For those who had not been physically forced cult to resist being aggressive (40 percent). These former into recruitment, there are multiple reasons for their re- combatants clearly not only became used to violence, cruitment, including self-defense or peer pressure. Po- but over time came to enjoy it and developed a need to litical motivations are high on the agenda of those who be increasingly cruel. Almost 1 out of 10 ex-combatants joined a group that believes it has a political legitimacy described combat and attacking others as sexually arous- for its actions, such as FDLR. Participants ranged from ing. Furthermore, former higher ranking ex-combatants former supporters to colonels: 5 percent supporters, 53 reported more frequently that it is difficult to stop fight- percent soldiers, 22 percent non-commissioned officers, ing once is starts. They not only fought other combatants and 20 percent officers. Alcohol and marijuana were the or attacked civilians to achieve specific aims, but also main substances consumed or abused and consumption for the pleasure of a man-hunt, which includes injuring rates reported exceeded 50 percent. Traditional local enemies and victims. drugs were also used. High numbers of former combatants reported having re- Ex-combatants reported extreme levels of exposure to ceived orders to commit violence against civilians, with traumatic events. Almost all had witnessed killings, almost 9 out of 10 respondents having received orders physical assaults, and had been physically assaulted to loot civilians, 8 out of 10 to attack settlements, and themselves. Reports on traumatic events also provide 6 out of 10 to burn houses. Overall 13 percent reported evidence of the strict command chain within the AG, as that they had received orders to rape. The Maï-Maï and many ex-combatants reported being coerced by threat PARECO officers reported more frequently than soldiers of death or injury. Out of 23 traumatic event types, 90 to have received orders to rape, and CNDP and FDLR percent of the participants had experienced more than soldiers reported to have received such orders more of- 10 different traumatic event types, and 58 percent more ten than officers. than 15. Almost one quarter exhibited clinical symptoms severe enough to qualify for diagnosis of Post-Traumat- When asked about their explanations and opinions about ic Stress Disorder (PTSD) with its related disability for the causes for SGBV in Eastern DRC, the most common 63 opinions given by ex-combatants are that: (i) combat- Concerning the most brutal forms of sexual violence, ants get out of control (82 percent); (ii) it happens when such as gang rapes, the insertion of objects, burnings, combatants are in small groups – gang rape (55 percent); mutilations, and killings, ex-combatants identified nu- (iii) because of frustration (54 percent); and (iv) revenge merous reasons. Among these, the use of marijuana was (41 percent). Furthermore, about one-third agreed that frequently cited as a factor. Other responses were the re- the absence of a wife, proving manhood, and having the sistance of the victim or the desire to silence them after opportunity to commit a violent act without punishment they had been violated. A further important motivation from the leadership are reasons for SGBV. Overall, more for excessive sexual violence offered by our respondents than one quarter agreed that violence against women goes beyond individual motives. They suggested that happens, because combatants/soldiers are ordered to do the intention in these cases is to harm “the enemy” as it. The lowest level of agreement to this statement was a group. It is important to keep in mind that combatants found amongst former Forces Armées de la République and soldiers in this study make no clear distinction be- Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) soldiers (11 percent) tween combatants and civilians, but rather identify who and former PARECO combatants (15 percent). Thirty is “with us or against us.” Hence, civilians associated percent of former Maï-Maï fighters and 43 percent of with the enemy are not perceived as civilians but as en- both former FDLR and CNDP combatants agreed with emies. the statement. 64 16 Conclusions and Recommendations A number of inter-related reasons for violence com- dously to addressing the high levels of ongoing SGBV. mitted by combatants and soldiers were identified. This requires, among others, addressing the social and Central is the human potential for developing a economic drivers of conflict and instability which are pleasurable perception when perpetrating violence, an historically deep-rooted, and driven by a complex mix act that becomes rewarding in itself and reinforces on of political, security, social and economic factors (World its own violent behavior under lawless circumstances, Bank, 2013). in concert with the concept of ‘appetitive aggression’. Also, it is widely recognized that SGBV is a complex Many former combatants reported that they perceive problem requiring an integrated and multi-sectoral re- perpetrating violence as arousing and fascinating and the sponse, even more so in a fragile environment with experience of living in a violent environment such as in ongoing conflict, such as in Eastern DRC. Responses an AG may increase the level of appetitive aggression. to violence against women need to address, among oth- Appetitive aggression in this sense appears to be adap- ers: health sector including physical and mental health tive in combat and rewarding for combatants (Elbert and issues, the criminal-justice sector, economic empower- others, 2010). This is also confirmed by the observed ment, community development (promoting equitable clear relationship between higher ranks and increased access to resources for women and men), prevention of levels of this form of aggressive behavior. violence (e.g., through formal and informal education), The violent context fosters sexual violence, supported by and advocacy at the community, national and interna- individual motivations such as the need to fulfill sexual tional levels. Any effective response must combine en- desire. In addition, there are underlying strategic (e.g., forcing laws and prosecuting perpetrators to break the gain of political attention), tactical (e.g., facilitating loot- cycle of impunity, while addressing the individual and ings), as well as overlapping strategic and tactical (e.g., societal wounds, and working to prevent a normalization control of civilians) aspects of SGBV in Eastern DRC. and recurrence of sexual violence. It is unclear to what extent these reasons are put forward The following recommendations are related to the find- as justification for brutal sexual excess. The FDLR, ings of this study and focus especially on the perpetrator CNDP, and Maï-Maï ex-combatants often reported that side of SGBV. sexual violence happens because soldiers are ordered ØØ Address the impunity issue. Strengthen the judi- to do it. In addition, a sizeable proportion reported that cial system in the DRC to apprehend and prosecute the absence of punishment was a reason for perpetrating perpetrators and to effectively implement the 2006 SGBV. Thus, explicit and implicit orders for sexual vio- Law on Sexual Violence, which broadened the defi- lence seem to be common throughout the AG in Eastern nition of sexual assault and toughened punishment DRC. for convicted offenders. Successfully prosecuting Furthermore, ex-combatants were not only perpetrators cases of high level perpetrators would send strong of violent acts, they were also victims of violence them- signals to state and non-state armed combatants. In selves, resulting in one quarter of former combatants addition, develop improved mechanisms to collect suffering from PTSD. At least 1 in 10 ex-combatants re- (forensic) evidence of SGBV to facilitate interna- ported having been sexually assaulted/raped in their AG tional, regional and national efforts to prosecute (frequently by their own commanders). The possible ef- perpetrators. fects of simultaneously being a survivor and perpetrator ØØ Include screening mechanisms for mental health of sexual violence require further exploration. issues in reintegration programs. Reintegration In summary, individual motives of perpetrating SGBV programs for ex-combatants, either into the nation- are closely interrelated with tactical and strategic mo- al army, or as civilians into society, should screen tives of armed groups which reinforce each other. former combatants for trauma symptomatology, in- cluding PTSD. Programs should provide treatment Obviously, ending the period of conflict, violence and following a needs assessment. In addition, specific insecurity in Eastern DRC would contribute tremen- criteria for exclusion should be included in those 65 programs that facilitate reintegration of former com- ØØ Dismantle the perception of civilians as “enemy”. batants into the national army. For example, former Support programs focused on rebuilding trust within combatants suffering from PTSD or appetitive ag- communities and between communities and the state gression should not be reintegrated into a national to address intercommunity hatred and build/restore army. social cohesion through broad based community de- velopment programs. At the same time, reconsider ØØ Break the cycles of violent behavior of former current civilian protection programming in light of combatants. Develop approaches to reinstate social norms of nonviolent interaction for former combat- the findings that all civilians are perceived as en- ants impaired by trauma-related disorders such as emies if not collaborating with AG perpetrators. PTSD or aggressive patterns of behavior. These ap- ØØ Include men in programs addressing SGBV. In- proaches should provide former combatants with crease understanding at the international, regional, tools to remain calm in stressful situations, to plan national and community level for the need to in- and follow-up on realistic goals for the future as clude men in programs addressing SGBV. These well as to initiate and sustain non-violent relation- programs must acknowledge men’s multiple roles ships. These approaches would combine therapy as perpetrators as highlighted through this study, but targeting symptoms of post-traumatic stress, as also as witnesses to SGBV, victims of sexual vio- well as tendencies towards violent behavior. As Ms. lence, service providers (e.g., health workers, police, Zainab Hawa Bangura, UN Special Representative peace-keepers and other workers in demobilization of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence, states and reintegration initiatives), decision-makers and there is a need to also “mentally disarm former com- policymakers, and change agents. Including men in batants“. programs addressing SGBV is especially important ØØ Safeguard against (re-)recruitment. Strengthen for prevention. information, sensitization, and awareness activities to prevent (re)-recruitment of combatants and vio- ØØ Support SGBV prevention. This will require lence. Educate at-risk populations (including par- broader actions to raise the status of women in the ents and the wider community) about the negative DRC, such as strengthening their legal capacity and consequences of joining an AG, including inform- property rights, improving their access to land and ing them of the use of false propaganda by many economic resources, building their human capital AG. Former combatants could speak out publicly through education and skills development, easing about their traumatic experiences, including sexual their overall workloads, and channeling resources violence within AG. These efforts should include, to them in the agricultural sector. 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Politics Society, 37(1), 131-161. 72 Annexes 73 74 Annex 1 Brief discussion of ethnicity and tribal affiliations in respect to concepts of identity Whether or not we are driven by deterministic forces, each of us must bear full responsibility for the choices we make whether or not to be destroyers. There can be no forgiveness; there can be no dampening of our outrage and protest against the killing of men. My desire is to understand how these terrible events come to be and what we might do to stop them, not to forgive them (Charny, 1982). 1. Controversial Terminology Depending on the author, Congo is said to be home to 200, 250, 365, 400, or 450 ethnicities25, with groups mentioned in this report falling under varying categories, again, depending on how different authors categorize them. Ethnologi- cal/anthropological concepts of ethnicity and tribal affiliations and their origins have undergone considerable change over time and are still the subject of controversy. It is therefore not possible to base a discussion on authoritative defi- nitions of the relevant terminology. However, certain terms are in common use in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, either in official wording or in unofficial discussion, including “indigenous” (Willame, 2010; International Alert), “natives” (Collier and Sambanis, 2005), “autochtones” versus perceived “foreigners” or “migrants” or “allochtones”. (Kambere-Muhindo). In addition to differences in understanding of terminology, the vocabulary used in political discourse may be heavily loaded with pejorative implications, sometimes connected to dubious versions of history. In the Great Lakes Region (GLR), ethnicity is sometimes connected to migration and perceived injustices committed against previous inhabit- ants, most often involving disputed land ownership. Such rhetoric has the potential to generate murderous levels of xenophobia. A well-documented example of an extreme case of such political rhetoric is Leon Mugesera’s demagogic speech, made in 1992 in Gisenyi (today Rubavu, Rwanda) in which he used tribally motivated extreme language to incite a massacre of opponents.26 This is an extreme example illustrating how perceptions of migration history led to conclusions touching at the heart of rights associated with citizenship and belonging, including rights of land ownership and ultimately denial of the right to exist. This type of inflamed rhetoric played an important role in the 1994 Rwandan genocide (Thompson, 2007) and in other genocides of the 20th century (Hinton 2002). Given connections between rhetoric aimed at dehumanizing and ostracizing groups in the recent past and the unspeak- able atrocities that ensued, the subject of ethnicity remains extremely sensitive, particularly in the GLR. All Armed Groups (AG) in the region with perceived self-defense agendas use ethnic and tribal identifications in one way or another. Hence, it is important to understand the semantic and emotive load carried by language used (and abused) to refer to ethnic or tribal identity by the participants of this study. Tribal and/or ethnic identifications used in the context of violent conflict in the Kivus refer mainly to two community groups: the “Bantu” group and the “Nilotic”. Numerous AG have been created, and continue to be created, using tribal/ ethnic self-defense agendas as justification for their violent agendas and actions. They present themselves as polarized 25  http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/R%C3%A9publique_d%C3%A9mocratique_du_Congo#Ethnies. 26  “Their penalty is death and nothing less. Your country is Ethiopia, and we are going to send you there very soon via the Nyabarongo (Nile river in Rwanda) express route. That is it. I repeat that we are soon going to get to work”. Translation from http://www.rnanews.com/politics/5690-translated- venomous-speech-of-troubled-leon-mugesera, AFP, May 2012. 75 by “Bantu” versus “Nilotic” identity frames,27 while the extreme minority group of pygmies seems to be of no impor- tance other than falling victim at times. There are numerous subgroups clustered around each pole. The Bantu groups in particular have a large number of smaller groups created around tribal identities responding to shifting alliances and momentary opportunities to advance their own group at the expense of another. Rivalries, such as that between the Hutu and Hunde groups, may generate friction but these generally, though not exclusively, take second place when a threat from a common arch enemy “Nilotic” group is perceived. For this study, only the “Tutsi” groups manifest in or affiliated with either the Congrés National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP) or, more recently, M23 in North Kivu and some similar Tutsi-based groups in South Kivu are considered. Richard Kandt (1904) reports the presence of a Kinyarwanda-speaking population in the Kivus of all (by then) known Rwandan tribal/ethnical affiliations as early as 1901, especially in the “southern North Kivu Province of today. How- ever, 0-he does not make mention of extraordinary tensions between them and other tribal groups he found present. Willame (2010) and International Alert make reference to polarized animosities between the perceived “indigenous,” in the Kivus others use the terminology “natives” (Collier and Sambanis, 2005) in that context, and Kambere-Muhin- do (no date) speaks of autochtones versus perceived “foreigners” or “migrants” or allochtones. Willame (2010) mentions the colonial land institution institution foncière colonial of the Comité National du Kivu (CNKi) attributing land to colonial farmers, which earned little sympathy from the locals. He explains that the co- lonial administration in the east, the CNKi, created the Mission for Immigration of Banyarwanda as early as 1937. An estimated 200,000 people migrated under the auspices of this agency, most of whom served in the colonial labor force and for other miscellaneous purposes. Willame, citing René Lemachand, also makes reference to the migration of “Bafumbiro,” Uganda-Rwandans, and mentions: “this situation [already at that time there was land shortage and competition over land ownership] . . . was judged by the colonial administration as ‘catastrophical’ and having ‘all ferments of serious political and social unrest’”. The actual breaking point, in the true sense of the word, might have been on August 11, 1910 when, as per the “Kongoakte” of Berlin, the final border lines became effective and the Ban- yarwanda living west of the line became Congolese overnight. 2. The Role of Ethnic Tensions in Attacks on Civilians Recent research clearly identifies land ownership issues and ethnic tensions as interlinked roots and key to the conflicts in the area of this research (SFCG, 2012a and b). The following quote from the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (CPCS) provides an excellent summary of the element of ethnic tensions and subsequent violence against civilians (CPCS, 2011). Ethnic Tensions. “One of the tactics of disorder in the Kivus and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in general has been the manipulation of ethnicity and ethnic tensions by political, military, and civil society leaders. For example, in May and June 2004, dissident soldiers rebelled and captured the city of Bukavu, South Kivu from government control. Both the state and the rebels committed war crimes and atrocities against the local population, who were often targeted based on their ethnicity. Fearing reprisals, thousands fled the area and 150 people, mainly women and children who fled to Burundi, were killed in August 2004 in what is known as the Gatumba Massacre. Tensions continue to be heightened between the Tutsi and Banyamulenge peoples—who are considered to have come from Rwanda during Belgium occupation and are still perceived as outsiders who have “stolen” land, and other eth- nic groups in Eastern DRC. In some places the animosity against the Tutsi is directed against all people with ties to Rwanda. In retaliation for the attacks, the Rwandan government threatened to intercede on behalf of the Tutsi and Banyamulenge, creating fear among the Congolese who suffered under the Rwandan occupation from 1996-2002. When Banyamulenge refugees returned from Burundi to the town of Uvira in October 2004, they and the MONUC soldiers tasked with protecting them were attacked. This demonstrates how ethnic tensions, which stem from real historical grievances, incite violence and anger, and can be used by rebel factions to garner support for their causes or camouflage true motives for violence.” Attacks on Civilians. “The brutal attacks on civilians in the Kivus have become a hallmark of the continued conflict, 27  The concepts of “identity frame” and “identity trap” are taken from Du Preez (1980). 76 as distinctions between civilians and combatants have been confused and blurred. Soldiers and combatants from all sides—rebel factions, the national army, and even the UN—have targeted civilians, a clear threat to human security in the region. Survival and any type of further human development and opportunity are swept aside by the violence. Some of the worst atrocities include displacement of large numbers of the population, rape, forced labor, abduction, torture, murder, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, and the destruction of property. As civilians flee the erup- tions of fighting, their movements internally and across international borders have contributed to the instability in the region. The illegal distribution of firearms to civilians by authorities in North Kivu in late 2004 is an example of the chaotic nature of the conflict and of the shifting alliances that take place as some of these firearms were used by civil- ians ‘to harm, rob, or intimidate others’.” 77 Annex 2 Profile of Armed Groups This annex provides a brief overview of AG of relevance to this research. Four categories of AG are considered here: ■■ Groups participating in the Goma Conference of 2009, including those that were created or re-created to partici- pate in the conference (known as résiduels).28 ■■ Groups created after the Goma Conference (groups réfractaires).29 ■■ Miscellaneous groups and bandits.30 ■■ Foreign Armed Groups I. Groups participating in the Goma Conference of 2008 1. Maï-Maï Groups Maï-Maï are a tribal, or alliance of tribal, militia with a mainly territorial self-defense and resistance agenda. The term first appeared in an uprising of locals in German East Africa (today Tanzania). The Maï-Maï movement seems to originate from the village of Ngarambe in the Matumbi mountains of southwestern Tanzania, where in 1904 a witch by the name of Kinjikitile spread the message that a ghost named Bokero had manifested itself in the Rufiyi River in the form of a snake called Kolelo. This snake had given him a magic medicine (Dawa), called “Maji“(Kisuaheli word for water) (Nuhn, no date). Resistance against the German colonial power cumulated in the Maï-Maï Rebellion from 1905-1907. The belief that holy water would make combatants bulletproof, or turn bullets into water, seems to originate from this. It seems Maï-Maï only reappeared in the 1964s in Congo/Zaire under its creator and leader Pierre Mulele and re- emerged, though it had never completely disappeared, in the course of the recent Congo wars, mostly during fighting against the Rwandan occupation. Just as in the former “Deutsch Ostafrika,” belief in supernatural powers and the magic power of their “holy water” applied by their witch doctors (docteur Mai Mai), remain important elements of the Mai Mai combat motivation and performance today, besides the community self-defense agenda and social and economic gain. The use of human body parts in the context of magic practices and cannibalism has been reported from several groups. 1.1. Maï-Maï Kifuafua History. The Maï-Maï Kifuafua31 are one of the oldest Maï-Maï groups (résiduel) who obey their former leader, Major-General Padiri, who integrated into the Forces Armées de la République du Congo (FARDC). While waiting to be called for the “brassage” process, the Mai Mai Kifuafua were frustrated by the extensive delays and obstacles of the reintegration process, as well as the relapse into conflict by the CNDP (2007/2008). Following the creation of the Patriotes Résistants Congolais (PARECO), the Maï-Maï Kifuafua decided to no longer obey the official chain of command, but to prepare for eventual attack by the CNDP or PARECO. 28  This overview of AG is largely based on Walimba, 2009 29  This overview of AG is largely based on Walimba, 2009 30  This overview of AG is largely based on Walimba, 2009 31  The term “Maï Maï Kifuafua” was created for the Goma Conference to make a distinction from other Maï Maï groups. Kifuafua means “chest,” as Maï Maï fighters show their chest when in combat (often combat naked). 78 Narration from an interview with a former child soldier (Schauer, 2009). “. . . first there was an introduction ritual, which all children had to go through. . . You took a sort of medicine and afterwards there was no way back out of the group (Maï-Maï) . . . This medicine would shoot through your body like fire and make you feel strong and absolutely unbeatable. It would take away all fear. How was this medicine prepared? . . . He put one of the human lungs on a fire and roasted it to the point where it was almost charcoal . . . This lung was then pounded and powdered. . . Another ingredient was the ‘intelligence’ of small children. . . The master was a strong man, he could crush the skull of a baby with one hand. Usually we would get 1-2 small children a week. We would wait at places where women pass and forced them to release their babies to us. Usually we would go for the small ones, who were still carried on the back. The master had a magic cream, which he applied on the eyelids, the head and the lips of the baby. The children would fall asleep immediately. This way we could carry them to the river. After darkness the master would invoke the spirit of the water and we would walk into the river. There the master would crush the child’s head and scoop out the brain with his hands. He never took all, he always left some brain behind for the water spirit. We also cut the penis if it was a boy and took his eyes, and the vaginal lips and breasts if it was a girl. Sometimes we also needed toes of adults. Those were cut off as well. Then the master would let the bodies swim away in the river, now they were gifts to the spirit of the river. . . The ‘medicine’ was then made that day or the next morning and also consumed fast. Before battle everybody is given a little bit of the medicine mixture to drink. . . It protected us from the bullets of the enemy and it made us fearless. . . Then at the river the master would evoke the spirit of the river and a snake would appear around his neck. It was a snake colored like a rainbow, with stripes of red and yellow and green and black.32 The snake said ‘don’t fear me,’ . . . The snake was the master’s friend and nobody knew about it. . . definitely the snake was necessary to make the ‘medicine’. . . powerful. Location. In 2009 their headquarters were located in Busurungi in the “groupement de Waloa-Loanda” of the Walikale Territory. They are active in a part of the Walikale territory and of the “groupement de Ufamandu” in the Masisi Ter- ritory. 32 Motivation. The Maï-Maï Kifuafua key motivations include: (i) a need to fight the Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and CNDP; (ii) discontent over being left behind after having fought alongside Lau- rent Désiré Kabila with the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre (AFDL) in their struggle for power as far as Kinshasa; and (iii) discontent over the extension of the Parc National de Kahuzi Biega without consultations with local authorities. Though the Maï-Maï Kifuafua claim CNDP, PARECO, and FDLR as enemies, there is clear evidence that they collaborate with the PARECO and FDLR (identification as “Bantu” group) and have the CNDP (identified as “Nilotics”) as their only real enemy. Affiliation. Even though the majority of Maï Maï Kifuafua combatants are Tembo, somehow this is the only ho- mogenous group integrating larger numbers of combatants from other Bantu tribal origins (including, among others Nyanga, Hunde, Nande, Hutu, Rega, Shi, Bembe, and Fuliru), many of whom had previously belonged to other AG. Presence of Regular Forces. Among the Maï-Maï Kifuafua there are elements of the FARDC and the Police Nation- ale Congolaise (PNC) who are dissatisfied with their rank and/or function and have switched allegiance, though not necessarily openly. There are some reported cases of members appearing in FARDC or PNC uniform during the day and joining the Kifuafua at night. Collaboration with Other Forces. The Maï-Maï Kifuafua collaborate(d) with all AG other than the CNDP and the Forces Républicaines Fédéralistes (FRF), but oppose(d) the FDLR whom they see as a movement of foreigners who came to destabilize, invade, and exploit Congo’s wealth. Nevertheless, under certain circumstances such as avoiding reprisal, they collaborate with the FDLR. Recruitment. The Maï-Maï Kifuafua recruit among civilians and the FARDC, PNC, demobilized Congolese fighters, 32  The description does not fit exactly any actually existing snake species in the DRC. But most likely and closest to the description might come the in- offensive and easy-to-handle red-and-black-striped snake Bothrophthalmus lineatus (Peters, 1863) (vernacular: “Mongi” [tembo], or “Sangani” [rega]), as it is known to be used for magic practices and is aquatic. 79 and other local AG. They offer promises of higher ranks. New recruits undergo a probation period during which they are observed closely until they win trust. Subsistence. The Maï-Maï Kifuafua live mainly on the “voluntary contributions” by the population of the area they control, who have no other choice but to contribute. Furthermore, they raise “taxes,” cultivate, and hunt game animals. The combatants do not live in barracks nor hold permanent military positions, apart from those who guard their com- manders. The Kifuafua are simply present in every village under their control. They only carry their arms on market days to intimidate the population when collecting “taxes” or in case of threat or attack. 1.2. Maï-Maï Kirikicho History. The Maï-Maï Kirikicho, are a “residual” group who followed Major General Padiri. Most of them are either integrated into the FARDC or demobilized by the Programme Nationale de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinser- tion D.R.Congo (PNDDR). They returned to armed combat when the army integration/PN DDR process was inter- rupted by new hostilities with the CNDP and the creation of new AG such as PARECO. Location and Structure. In 2009 the headquarters of the Maï-Maï Kirikicho was Ziralo in the Kalehe Territory. The group has no political structure, their current President is Longangi Kanyere and their military commander is Colonel Kirikicho Mirimba Mwanamayi . Motivation. Similar to the Maï-Maï Kifuafua, the Maï-Maï Kirikicho justify their combat by two principal reasons: (i) to counter new aggression by the CNDP in 2008-2009; and (ii) to fight the FDLR/FOCA. Affiliation. The majority of combatants of the Maï-Maï Kirikicho belong to the Tembo, Havu, Shi, and Rega tribes (Bantu block). Presence of Regular Forces. There are some elements from the FARDC and PNC among the Maï-Maï Kirikicho who have been marginalized within the FARDC, and who expect to obtain higher ranks within the Maï-Maï Kirikicho. Collaboration with Other Forces. The Maï-Maï Kirikicho collaborate with the FARDC, PNC, PARECO, FDLR- FOCA (see remark under Kifuafua), Maï-Maï Kifuafua, and other local AG (other than the CNDP and FRF). Recruitment and Subsistence. Same as Kifuafua. 1.3. Maï-Maï Simba The Maï-Maï Simba are a “residual” group, under the direction of Hodaf Mungo Kalinda. Their headquarters is Mun- gele and they are under the command of Mandro Mando. They include combatants from the Barega and Bakusu tribes. This small group is active in the Pangi territories of Maniema and around Ntonto, Kimua, Langira, in the Wanianga collective of Walikale Territory, and Kashebere in the Masisi Territory of North Kivu. Their key motivation is opposi- tion to the existence of the Maiko National Park. 2. Patriotes Résistant Congolaise – Force Armées Populaire History. The Patriotes Résistant Congolaise – Force Armées Populaire (PARECO-FAP) was created in 2007 in Pinga at the border between the Walikale and Masisi territories as a counter reaction to the initiative of General Laurent Nkunda. As will be discussed further, one of the key motivations of the CNDP was to protect its (Tutsi) minority population from alleged plans for their elimination by other Kivu communities. Other tribal/ethnic groups saw this as a threat. In response, Colonels Mugabo (Hutu) and Sikuli La Fontaine (Nande), both officers of the FARDC, created PARECO. In their view, the CNDP was created with the objective to exterminate those Hutu who did not want to join their movement (CNDP). In turn, all young Hutu needed to join PARECO to protect the Hutu community from this threat. Later, Colonel Mugabo found support from other ethnic communities of North Kivu, including the Hunde, Nande, and Nyanga. The following four warlords created PARECO on March 14, 2007: Colonel Mugabo for the Hutu, Colonel 80 Ntasibanga for the Hunde, Colonel Lafontaine Sikuli for the Nande, and Colonel Blaise for the Nyanga.33 Location and Structure. Colonel La Fontaine Kakule was nominated Coordinator and Supreme Commander of the PARECO, seconded by Colonel Mugabo who became the Chief Operations Officer. All senior officers of this militia remain among their tribal communities along with a very clear majority of combatants drawn from those same com- munities. Combatants are not cantoned in camps but live among their home communities, with a concentration of combatants in close proximity to the headquarters of the commanders. PARECO combatants are deployed in the ter- ritories of Lubero, Masisi, Rutshuru, and Walikale. Motivation. To face the (perceived) threat that the CNDP poses to them, their key motivations to take up arms, as per PARECO’s official declaration, include (i) Fierce and energetic opposition to the “mixage” between the FARDC and the rebel troops of the dethroned General Laurent Nkunda; (ii) Opposition to the return of 46,000 Tutsi families cantoned in refugee camps in Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda; (iii) Kinyarwanda-speaking Hutu of the PARECO saw the CNDP, whose majority is Kinyarwanda-speaking Tutsi, as a threat and believed the CNDP intended to exterminate those Hutu who would not follow their ideology.; (iv) Recovery of land taken from Hutu communities by the Tuts; and (v) Opposition against the presence of foreign AG in Congo. They demand their departure without any condition (in- cluding FDLR, Interahamwe, the Ralliement pour l’Unité et la Démocratie- Urunana (RUD)/ Rassemblement Popu- laire Rwandais-Inyaragutabara (RPR) to remove the pretext that Rwanda uses to justify its presence in the DRC. Affiliation. Initially, PARECO was basically a military movement. Later, it developed a political wing to negotiate power sharing with the DRC government in Kinshasa, in a similar manner as the CNDP. Interestingly, the desire for superior ranks led the PARECO commanders to self-promotion and produced a number of generals, a secretary- general and speaker, and senior political advisors. General Mugabo’s wing is composed of a majority of Hutu, “ex-local defense” of the former Governor of North Kivu, and Eugène Serufuli, including some Hutus who were recruited from the ranks of the FDLR. Major General Sikuli’s faction has a Nande majority, but has also some former FDLR and ex-Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR). Presence of Regular Forces. Among PARECO there are elements of the FARDC and PNC, who are expecting to gain higher ranks. Collaboration with Other Forces. PARECO operates in areas where they meet with the FARDC as well as other AG, namely the Maï-Maï Kifuafua, Maï-Maï Kassindiens, Maï-Maï Vurondo, Mongols, RUD/RPR, and FDLR/FOCA. They collaborate with the FARDC and with the other aforementioned local and foreign AG operating in North Kivu, except the CNDP. Reasons for collaboration with other AG are the same as those of other Maï-Maï groups (see above). Recruitment. PARECO recruits among civilians, FARDC and PNC, demobilized Congolese fighters, and other AG operating in North Kivu, and occasionally from the ranks of the FDLR and RUD/RPR. Young combatants from FOCA sometimes join PARECO for better living conditions. FOCA acquires their supplies from the local population by force, while local village chiefs collect supplies for PARECO combatants. To successfully recruit the young among the Hutu community, PARECO recruiters need to convince potential recruits and their families that CNDP is a Tutsi movement whose only objective is to exterminate the Hutu and the only way to defend themselves is to fight. Territorial Domination. Even though they experience difficulties conquering and controlling some other areas, PARECO has been more successful holding territories they take in the course of their various confrontations with the CNDP than other Maï-Maï groups. In this environment and type of conflict every AG needs to control one or several localities to assure the survival of its combatants. The group would vanish without territory and without its population to provide food and information/intelligence. This is not generally problematic within their own home communities, but presents significant challenges to any group which takes over a community previously dominated by another AG—particularly if the community is the home of the defeated AG. The fact that the PARECO has little difficulty in those areas taken from CNDP suggests that CNDP were strangers to the areas in question and were not considered part 33  Colonel Kirikicho for the Tembo was included in the declaration in his absence to gain the support of the Batembo, but until now this has not materialize. 81 of the community, as will be discussed in more detail further in this annex. Subsistence. PARECO combatants live from taxes they impose on businesses in their area of control, especially on market days. The local population has to provide (in-kind) contributions, depending on their respective economic ac- tivities. Since the PARECO is mainly composed of young Hutu who are generally farmers, many of them take care of their fields to assure the survival of their families when not mobilized for military duties or combat. 3. Congrès National Pour La Défense Du Peuple History. Following the signing of the global and inclusive Pretoria accord on November 17, 2002, a government of national unity was constituted in DRC in which all (main) belligerents were represented, and combatants from the signatory troops were “reunified” into the Congolese army, sharing command positions at all levels of the army. Gen- eral Laurent Nkunda, a Tutsi from Jomba in Rutshuru Territory, was named Commander of the 8th Military Region in North Kivu, despite the fact that he disobeyed an order to report in Kinshasa. He also refused to take up the new post. In December 2003, General Laurent Nkunda created the organization la Synergie Nationale pour la Paix et la Con- corde (SNPC) in Bukavu, the predecessor to the Congres National Pour La Défense Du Peuple (CNDP). In May 2004, Nkunda joined the insurrection of Colonel Mutebusi, a Tutsi-Munyamulenge and former Second in Command of the 10th Military Region in charge of operations and intelligence in Bukavu. Together, they took Bukavu by force. The main reason they gave to justify their occupation of the town was to stop an alleged plan to conduct genocide against their Tutsi-Banyamulenge brothers of South Kivu by the authorities of the 10th Military Region In the course of SNPC’s operations, numerous war crimes and crimes against humanity were committed, including selective massacres, rapes and plunder (ICG, 2007; HRW, 2007). In response to these large-scale violations the international community put pressure on General Laurent Nkunda and Colonel Mutebusi to leave Bukavu town. Mutebutsi and his men retreated to Kamanyola, while Nkunda first went to Minova in North Kivu and later selected Kichanga in the Masisi Territory as his headquarters, from where he launched a new rebellion. In Kichanga, Nkunda, who was short of troops, was joined by the 81st Brigade of Colonel Rugahi (a Hutu), the 83th Brigade of Baudouin (Tutsi) and Mucho (Tutsi), who had all fallen out with the “brassage,” process, Colonel Makenga (Tutsi), Colonel Kabundi (Tutsi), Major Claude (Tutsi), and their respective men followed later. With this support, Nkunda created a new movement, le Conseil Militaire pour la Défense du Peuple (CMDP). Colonel Rugahi became its first president. In 2005, after a period of internal conflict and defection, the movement changed its name again to become the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP) with General Nkunda as its leader. After the defection of its operations commander, General Bosco Ntaganda, a former senior commander of the Ituri Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC) militia of Thomas Lubanga (under International Criminal Court prosecution), was named Chief of Staff in charge of operations and later Chief of Military High Command.34 At the end of the year 2008, internal problems within the CNDP culminated in the overthrow of General Nkunda by General Ntaganda, for reasons of poor administration (on January 16, 2009). Désiré Kamanzi became the president of the CNDP. On January 20, 2009, General Nkunda was arrested by Rwandan authorities in Gisenyi, and Brigadier Gen- eral Bosco Ntaganda took command. On March 23, 2009, the government of DRC and CNDP signed a ceasefire and peace declaration, which included “accelerated integration” of its troops into the FARDC. At that time, joint military operations of the FARDC with the Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) against the FDLR/FOCA had already started. Motivation. In the beginning, General Nkunda justified his combat by the presence of FDLR-FOCA (ex-FAR and Interahamwe) in Congo and the threat they presented to his people (Tutsi). Following this logic, these “negative 34  On March 18, 2013, General Ntaganda, who was wanted by the ICC for war crimes in Ituri, surrendered and turned himself in to the ICC via the US Embassy in Kigali. 82 forces,” which were accused of having committed the genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda, needed to be fought. Further- more, Nkunda claimed that the Tutsi minority was under threat of extinction by a genocide that he believed was being planned against them by other communities (tribal groups) in the Kivu provinces. Finally, he made the return of Tutsi refugees from the region to DRC, chiefly from Rwanda and Uganda, a condition of ending hostilities. In September 2008, the CNDP became a “liberation movement” (vs the “defense of Tutsi minority interests organization” as it was previously known), and Nkunda added power sharing with the central government at national and provincial levels to his list of demands. The underlying motivation of the CNDP’s actions are reflected in the “cahier des charge” that the CNDP presented as a base for negotiations with the government of DRC in Nairobi on December 8, 2008, as follows: (i) insecurity in East of Congo due to the presence of Foreign Armed Groups (FAG), among others the FDLR, (ii) need for reconciliation, (iii) lack of good governance, and (iv) review of exploitation contracts issued by the national government, especially with China. It is also important to note that government of DRC continued for a time to pay the salaries of CNDP soldiers under the label of the “not yet integrated” Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC) after the commencement of an open direct confrontation between the CNDP and FARDC in 2005. For combatants, it was not always clear whether the CNDP was part of the governmental army or not. There also appeared to have been a number of economic interests linked to the CNDP motivation, particularly land and grazing rights. There are a number of anecdotal reports suggesting that senior personalities in the Congolese Rwan- dophone community had taken advantage of the CNDP presence and support to appropriate large tracts of land in Rutshuru and Masisi. Finally, promises of rank, money (to be confiscated from captured banks), vehicles, and women to be delivered when Goma would fall, played an important role in motivating subordinate ranks within the CNDP. Presence of Regular Forces. Former FARDC and PNC were within the ranks of CNDP. Some joined voluntarily, others were incorporated during combat operations, and some joined to escape disciplinary measures. In a few excep- tional cases, even FDLR/FOCA elements are known to have joined the CNDP. Collaboration with Other Forces. Within the CNDP controlled areas, there was no systematic collaboration with any other force. In some localities, there was occasional collaboration with the PARECO-Hutu faction, apparently due to personal relationships between commanders of these otherwise hostile factions. Among AG of other provinces, there have been traditional allies, such as the FRF in South Kivu and the UPC in Ituri. Moreover, there were personal ties between some CNDP and FARDC leaders, for example, based on shared experi- ences within the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD). Recruitment. Nkunda often presented himself as a reverend pastor who was mandated by God to free the Congolese people. His officers underwent training in that sense and wore a button “Rebels for Christ” to prove successful partici- pation. For the political and military wing, CNDP recruited voluntarily and by force from among civilians, FARDC, PNC and demobilized Congolese ex-combatants. Rank-and-file fighters were recruited with promises of well-paid labor in mining companies and of good army salaries. Forced recruitment was quite often the method of choice. There are reports of executions in the case of refusal to join and as an act of punishment for perceived desertion by former CNDP officers. Recruitment usually happened in an organized manor, with parties sent to residences of known ex-combatants, which led people spending nights in the forest for weeks and in some cases, months at a time. Forced recruitment of civilians included taking minors directly from schools, as happened, for example, in Jomba.35 According to the UN Group of Experts report (2009: 45), CNDP recruited idle youth in Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi with promises of good salaries for work in rich mines. Some local chiefs and government officials remained within the CNDP in conquered areas, especially those in trouble with the government, who received a promise for rehabilitation within the CNDP. 35  On September 18, 2007, at Muheto-Nyamitaba; see MONUC (2007). 83 Recruitment within the political wing was open to other communities (tribal groups) of North Kivu and other prov- inces in DRC, which may be seen as strategic. But in its military wing, the vast majority of troops were composed of Tutsi and some Hutu from the RCD. Control of Territory. Allegedly, with external and internal economic and political support, CNDP managed to extend and effectively control an important part of the territories in which it operated. All conquered locations were effec- tively occupied and defended. At a certain point in time there was a belief that CNDP intended to conquer all eastern provinces with the aim to create an independent state, the “République Fédérale du Kivu”, for which a hand-drawn map was circulated. Since the CNDP had a very important military arsenal at its disposal it managed to master the territory it occupied and to conquer further areas, especially those of strategic interest, effectively extending its area of control and economic gain. Several cases of breach of signed treaties put them in even more favorable conditions, for example versus the FARDC particularly visible around the Goma conference. Support from the private sector across the region further strengthened the movement (UNSC, 2008: 7−15). Outside of the territories inhabited by the “Rwandaophone” population (Masisi and Rutshuru), CNDP encountered difficulties controlling the population. In certain areas all non-Tutsi were forced to flee to escape the acts of extreme violence committed by the CNDP troops. Once CNDP troops were integrated into FARDC under the “mixage” pro- cess, these atrocities continued large scale during operations against the FLDR/FOCA. The international community put enormous pressure on the government of DRC to end these operations. Subsistence. CNDP troops lived off the various taxes they imposed on the population in the territory under their con- trol. All farmers had to hand over a fixed quantity of their harvest and pastoralists a fixed number of livestock, follow- ing a formula based on their production. Further taxes were raised on houses, depending on the kind of construction material and type of use of the house (residential or commercial). These taxes were in addition to what business people paid on market days and road fees (péage route) as “effort de guerre” (whereas the province charged $25 before the war, CNDP requested US$500−US$800 per vehicle). Where the CNDP controlled border posts it also raised “governmental” customs and taxes on imports and exports. Further illegal income-generating activities (especially in the Virunga National Park) were logging, charcoal produc- tion, poaching, and trading of endangered wildlife species. Exploitation of mines also played an important role, and competition over them was often the cause of serious battle. Finally, remittances from around the world contributed to the financing of CNDP. II. Groups Created after the Goma Conference (“groupes réfractaires”) 1. Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souveraine History. The Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souveraine (APCLS) was created by Hunde members of the PARECO. The Hunde were the only participating faction that did not sign the Goma Agreement. In the course of the signing ceremony, representatives of the other PARECO tribal wings stated that this was of no importance as the movement was united and therefore the Hunde community was represented through its participation in the PARECO. Hunde members however disagreed. Location. APCLS is active in the Mutongo-Lukweti area in the western Masisi.36 Synonyms of the APCLS are the Maï-Maï Janvier, Maï-Maï FDN, or Maï-Maï Akilo, whereas Akilo is a dissident of the APCLS with Akilimali, alias Akilo at its head, who used to operate around Ntoto with some 30−50 combatants. 36  “Lukweti is located 17 km north of Nyabiondo in Bafuna Groupement” (Jason Stearns blog: http://congosiasa.blogspot.com/2009/11/monuc- internal-report-about-ex-cndp.html). 84 Motivation. APCLS’ main objective is to protect Hunde and other non-Tutsi Congolese in its area of operation. (http:// wikileaks.org/cable/2009). Affiliation. APCLS coordinates its activities with FDLR, usually in an ad hoc manner. Both recognize the FARDC as their common enemy. Recruitment. After its creation, APCLS leaders called for a “Bantu” tribal alliance, just as the PARECO had done before, and recruited across tribal lines. The group, however, remains clearly Hunde-dominated under the leadership of Colonel (later General) Janvier Buingo Karairi. APCLS is estimated at about 1,500 fighters, organized into four brigades. 2. Maï-Maï Sheka Ntabo Ntaberi Sheka, a Nyanga from Walikale, created the Maï-Maï Sheka/Nduma défense du Congo (NDC) AG in 2008 with the objective to defend the local population against violent acts, especially from FOCA, and prevent them from collaborating with the FARDC. Militia fighters under Sheka’s leadership are accused of carrying out hundreds of rapes of women and children be- tween July 30 and August 2, 2010 in reprisal attacks against villages who they accused of collaborating with gov- ernment forces. Furthermore, the group is accused of illegal mining and trade of minerals, enslaving, and recruiting children. Sheka is on the UN Sanctions Committee list (travel ban and asset freeze list as per 28 November 2011) and on several Western nations wanted list. Sheka also killed senior FDLR/FOCA Colonel Sadiki, one of his former allies, on Sunday November 20, 2011, which is believed to have been a revenge operation for Sadiki handing over those responsible for mass rapes in the course of joint military operations37: “. . . Colonel Sadiki and his troops, led by Captain Seraphin Lionceau, arrested those among Maï-Maï Sheka who committed rapes and handed them to authorities. These included especially Sheka’s Chief of Staff Sadoke Kikunda Mayele and other Maï-Maï Sheka operating in the area of Chalingwangwa, Maningwi, and Mutongo, in the zone of Ihana.”38 3. Front des Patriotes pour le Changement Lafontaine, the senior leader of the PARECO/FAP, a Nande from Butembo, separated from the PARECO in 2010 fol- lowing the attack on the UN Indian contingent at Kibumba by Maï-Maï combatants. It is speculated that, for fear of being held responsible, Lafontaine created his own group, the Front des Patriotes pour le Changement (FPC). 4. Front Patriotique pour la Libération du Congo The Front Patriotique pour la Libération du Congo FPLC) was created around the end of 2008 by Gad (also spelled Gady/ Gadi) Ngabo, and is not identical with the former Ituri AG of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the Forces patriotiques pour la libération du Congo (FPLC). The group is seen as “politico-military” and allegedly has links in the region to Ugandan and Rwandan opposition groups, with some suspecting the group being backed by the Government of Uganda. It is said to be Tutsi dominated and its leader is of Tutsi origin, born in Ngungu, Masisi. 37  Debelle (2012: 34): Sheka … has cooperated with the FDLR from 2009 to the end of 2011. During that period, the NDC and the FDLR-FOCA 2nd battalion Montana respected a business arrangement to jointly exploit the gold pits along the Osso river, near the locality of Mutongo in the Walikale territory in North Kivu. Their combatants jointly conducted the campaign of mass rapes in Luvungi between 30 July and 2 August 2010. This collabora- tion ended in November 2011 when Sheka participated in an ambush that killed Montana commander Lieutenant-Colonel Evariste Kanzeguhera (aka Sadiki Soleil). 38  http://www.afroamerica.net/AfricaGL/2011/11/21/fdlr-commander-colonel-sadiki-killed-by-mai-mai-cheka/;http://ukun.fco.gov.uk/en/ news/?view=PressS&id=699488182; http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/un-sanctions-drc-militia-leader-1.1189163. 85 III. Miscellaneous groups and bandits referred to by participants in the study39 These are not AG in the sense of having a defense agenda, rather they are better described as armed bandit groups or are invented names of nonexistent groups. Maï-Maï Banyampiriri, The Banyampiriri are a clan of the Bahavu tribe. A group of no more than 10 people who call themselves Maï-Maï Banyampiriri and are active in banditry and rape. Maï-Maï Cobra. This is a group active in banditry and rape of no more than 10 people who call themselves Maï-Maï Cobra. Maï-Maï FAC. This group is unidentified. But the Maï-Maï movement during the Congo wars called themselves FAC (Forces Armees Congolaise) and the Maï-Maï group of General Dunia (Babembe) called itself FAP (Forces Armées Populaire), so confusion is possible as both are referenced to as the “old” Maï-Maï movement. IV. Foreign Armed Groups 1. Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda/Forces combattants Abacunguzi History. Rwandan armed groups evolved from the remnants of the ex-Forces Armées Rwandaise (FAR) after their ex- odus from Rwanda at the end of the genocide in 1994 in which they were involved. These groups are well researched (Romkema, 2007, 2009; Omaar, 2008; Debelle, 2012). There was a series of organizations created, basically aiming to cover up the involvement of their senior members in the 1994 genocide. Among the recent organizations, the Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) is clearly dominant, having a worldwide political and support network, particularly among exiled Rwandans. It has recently come under severe pressure as its leadership has been challenged by western justice systems and is subject to military confrontations on the ground (see military operations). The Forces combattants Abacunguzi (FOCA) represents the military wing on the FDLR. Numbers of FDLR-FOCA have substantially been reduced over the last years, from well over 10,000 to an estimated 1,200-1,500 Location. FOCA combatants are concentrated in the Kivu provinces and have some visible presence in the Republic of Congo. Many members are located outside of these areas and their “membership” status may not be clear (for example “in-active,” “de facto self-demobilized,” “sleepers,” etc.). Recently, FOCA has lost much terrain through military op- erations against them, and members through voluntary repatriation to Rwanda. The FDLR’s political structure shows an almost global network, with centers of activity in Africa and Europe. Motivation. The FDLR believe that they are the only legitimate representatives of the majority of the Rwandan Hutu population. Their arch-enemy is the current Government of Rwanda, which they accuse of “Hutu genocide.” Collaboration with Other Forces. FOCA collaborates with most Congolese AG, except Tutsi-led groups and groups created to fight them, such as Raia Mutombuki. The situation of alliance versuss animosity is not always clear or stable. In the course of the Congo wars, the FDLR received support from the government in Kinshasa and collaborated as part of a government-led military coalition. More recently, and depending on personal relations and the situation on the ground, the FOCA have also collaborated with the FARDC. Recruitment. In the DRC, Uganda, Burundi, and even further, FDLR/FOCA recruit among refugee populations, tar- geting the Hutu population. Today, within the DRC, up to 50 percent of their recruitment is by force. They also recruit Congolese Hutu, and in Rwanda they recruit underground to a very limited extent. Subsistence. Their subsistence is similar to other AG, including from agriculture, control of remittances, control of a variety of trades, taxation, ransoms, to nonconventional logistics (NCL, Logistique Non Conventionnelle, LNC) oper- ated by Commandos de Recherche et d’Action en Profondeur (CRAP) units as explained further in this annex. 39  Although very small in size, these groups were mentioned by the study’s participants and as such included in this Annex. 86 2. Ralliement pour l’Unité et la Démocratie Urunana History. The Ralliement pour l’Unité et la Démocratie Urunana (RUD) is a breakaway element of the FDLR, which replicates structure and modus operandi, but to a very limited extent since it has far fewer members. They had a few hundred combatants at their peak, but were reduced to less than 100 after the Umoja Wetu Operation in 2009. Recent findings, however, indicate that numbers are possibly on the rise again. Location. The group is currently much reduced, operating only in a few locations in North Kivu. Motivation. The motivations for RUD are similar as for the FDLR. At the top, the RUD formed an alliance with a micro-group of Tutsi dissidents of the Armée Patriotique Rwandaise (APR) / Rwanda Defense Forces (RDF), called RPR, and therefore claimed legitimacy for its “inclusive bi-ethnic” base (vs the mono-ethnic base of the FDLR and its predecessors). Presence of Other Forces. RUD takes in discontented former FOCA combatants and FDLR (or predecessor organiza- tions) leaders. Collaboration with Other Forces. RUD collaborates with FOCA and certain Maï-Maï groups, although alliances keep changing. Recruitment. As stated above, principally the RUD takes in discontented former FOCA combatants and FDLR (or predecessor organization) leaders. It also recruits in refugee camps, especially in Uganda. Further, it attracts former senior officers from exile. Subsistence. Same as for the FDLR-FOCA. 3. Soki Soki (the nickname of its commander, late Colonel Sangano Musohoke alias Soki) is a dissident group of the RUD with no political agenda and basically in survival mode, that is, banditry. Additional names include FDLR-SOKI, RUD-SOKI, RUDI-SOKI. They are located in Rutshuru, along Ishasa Road. They are estimated to be less than 30, recruiting mostly deserters from other groups, mainly RUD and FOCA. 4. Map The following map (Figure 1), although outdated, illustrates the complexity of the geographical presence of FAG in North Kivu. The Allied Defense Forces – National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF-NALU) is a FAG not discussed in this report. 87 Figure 1. Mapping of FAG in North Kivu (UN, 2008) 88 Annex 3 Elements of Modus Operandi Related to Looting and Cannibalism 1. Stealing Food from Civilians As history shows, most conventional armies in times of severe logistical stress or emergency practice “requisition” of goods. This is not understood by them as a crime, but as a righteous act. But in reality, at least in some cases, the practice has morphed into pure banditry. For example, in the FDLR, “requisition” of goods is controlled by the chain of command and is executed upon order by specialized units that have undergone special training for this task—the CRAP units. Every FOCA battalion has a CRAP unit which, among other duties, is in charge of the logistical survival of the unit, known as “non-conventional logistics” (NCL).40 The CRAP units are grouped under “Special Units” and are under the command of the operational sectors of North and South Kivu, the Military Police battalion, and the liaison antenna of FOCA command in South Kivu (Debelle, 2012). In extreme cases, there are targeted operations based on intelligence to specifically collect certain key logistics (food, medicine, arms, ammunition, military clothing, and even live people). Targets are not restricted to civilians. Opposing AG are also specific targets of CRAP opera- tions, and in rare cases the UN and international organizations or enterprises. These are professionally planned and conducted commando operations. Hence, the understanding of these acts by combatants and the command of such groups, especially the FOCA, is viewed not as criminal, but rather as a righteous requisition of goods. 2. Cannibalism The discussion of cannibalism is often controversial. Even the existence of cannibalism is sometimes strongly con- tested. But 8 percent of former combatants interviewed during this study reported they had participated in acts of cannibalism. “Cannibalism has been reported in several recent African conflicts, including the Second Congo War”. A UN human rights expert reported in July 2007 that sexual atrocities against Congolese women go “far beyond rape” and include sexual slavery, forced incest, and cannibalism.”41 40  Debelle (2012: 40−41): The practice “non-conventional logistics” (NCL) was created in 1999 as a concept by Colonel Tharcisse Renzaho to label the production of resources needed for the rebel combatants’ subsistence and for the purchase of weapons, ammunition, and military fatigues from corrupt FARDC officers. This practice designates the taxation of Congolese villagers and economic operators; the trading of basic goods at local markets by families of the FDLR combatants; the traffic of marijuana, charcoal, and timber; as well as the exploitation of Congolese minerals. In some battalions, up to 20 percent of all combatants are assigned NCL-related tasks. Though the distribution of resources is formally regulated and managed by the battalion’s S-4 bureau (logistics), many FDLR officers assign NCL functions to their escorts as a way of personal enrichment. As a surpris- ing and important consequence of the NCL, the FDLR has developed tight socioeconomic ties with several Congolese communities in the Kivu. 41  For those who wish to further explore, Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cannibalism) might provide a reasonably well-written overview, with a specific section on Africa, from which the above quote is taken and may wish to consult Sir Harry Johnston, who offers numerous accounts (Johnston,1908: 43, 70, 121, 123, 140, 144, 145, 195, 254, 339, 351, 371, 376, 382, 390, 397-407, 428, 460, 462). 89 Annex 4 Example of Ordered Mass Rape To demonstrate a case of ordered mass rape, following is an extract of Open Society Justice Initiative, Congo Justice: What Happened in Fizi, by Chuck Sudetic (2011), describing a well-investigated and tried case of mass rape in Fizi, which was ordered by a senior FARDC officer, admittedly for tactical reasons and labeled “rape as a weapon of war” in the judgment42. “The trial of Lt. Col. Kibibi Mutware . . .” “In the Interests of Justice and in the Name of the Congolese People, The Military Court of Sud-Kivu, Bukavu, is Seized of the Case of The Military Prosecutor, the Ministry of Public Security, and Civilian Parties. Kibibi Mutuare Daniel, et al. » “The Kibibi judgment, and the incident that led to it, took place near the shores of Lake Tanganika, far across the mountains from Kamituga. It did not involve individual rape cases, like those being tried here. It involved rape as humiliation, rape as an act of retaliation, rape as a weapon of war. . . On the afternoon of New Year’s Day, 2011, a gunshot sounded in the center of the town of Fizi. One Petro Ndaisaba, a corporal in the army of the Democratic Republic of Congo, had shot a merchant named Faizi Kabiona. The gun discharged at the climax of a quarrel over a woman and an act of disrespect. Corporal Petro was the body guard of a certain Lieutenant Kifaru Alexis, who had asked Petro to approach Faizi and inquire about introducing Lieutenant Alexis to a young woman he had seen in Faizi’s shop and wished ‘to woo.’ Faizi refused.” . . . “The military contingent in the town of Fizi is a mixture of members of former irregular and rebel militias, including the CNDP. . . the sector’s acting commander on New Year’s Day, a hard-nosed 46-year-old Lieutenant Colonel Kibibi Mutuare—a man who had graduated from the country’s national military academy before the overthrow of the dicta- tor Mobuto Sese Seko, when Congo was still called Zaire. Kibibi became a CNDP officer during the wars in eastern Congo before his re-integration into the army in 2009. Despite the simmering of ethnic antagonisms and bad memories, soldiers stationed in the town of Fizi wondered why young Bembe women were ignoring their overtures. Lieutenant Alexis did not, apparently, take offense at Faizi’s refusal to act as an intermediary for him. He invited Faizi to have a beer. Faizi declined. Corporal Petro was hotter- headed and, on the afternoon of New Year’s Day, drunk. He took Faizi’s refusal to be an act of disrespect toward his superior officer, if not all the other soldiers in his unit. A bitter quarrel ensued. Lieutenant Alexis heard the commotion and hurried from down the street to intervene. He removed the loaded clip from Petro’s weapon, but neglected to clear the one round in the chamber. A few minutes later, Petro fired the bullet into Faizi’s right side. The gunshot transformed curious bystanders into an enraged mob. Lieutenant Alexis fled for his life. The crowd beat, kicked, and stoned Corporal Petro even after he had slumped to the ground. Neighbors rushed Faizi to a nearby hospital. Word of the mob violence reached Lieutenant Colonel Kibibi. He immediately ordered officers and soldiers to rush to 42  http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/congo-justice-what-happened-fizi. 90 the scene. They found Corporal Petro alive and wrestled him from the ground onto the saddle of a motorbike, which sped off toward the hospital. At that moment, a rumor spread that Faizi had died of his bullet wound. Local men now rushed toward the hospital, overtook the motorbike conveying Corporal Petro, and stoned him to death on the spot. Army officers and soldiers soon arrived at the scene of the stoning and delivered Petro’s body to the military camp, again on a motorbike. Kibibi then went to assess the scene of Petro’s altercation with Faizi.” . . . “Kibibi gathered officers and instructed them to have their men search every house and shop near the scene of the attack on Petro and to arrest every man they found. ‘If any of them run, shoot them,’ he said.” From about 7 p.m. until 4 a.m. on January 2, soldiers ran riot through the town of Fizi. They looted and ransacked stores and houses. They beat and confined men in a jail. They raped scores of women, some of them before the eyes of their children. More than a hundred soldiers took part in the orgy of violence. *** It took the government of Congo and its military only six weeks to investigate the Fizi incident and to arrest Kibibi and 10 other officers and soldiers, the only men whom the victims had identified. A mobile court—United Nations officials say the mobile military court system was the only tool the government had to react quickly and decisively to the Fizi mass rape—was organized in a village a few miles from the town. The trial opened on February 10. Fifty-five women, ranging in age from 19 to 60, joined the criminal and civil case against Kibibi. Forty-nine of them stood before a panel of five judges to testify in public that they had been among the scores raped in Fizi on that New Year’s Day. One witness testified that she had met Colonel Kibibi before the Fizi violence and that, during the military riot, Kibibi himself entered her house and raped her while elements of his security escort waited outside. Members of Kibibi’s escort testified that they had, indeed, waited for him outside the victim’s house. All but one of Kibibi’s officers testified that Kibibi ordered the operation and instructed his subordinates to kill anyone who tried to run. Before the court, Lieutenant Colonel Kibibi testified that his bodyguards were part of a plot against him, but admitted that he had been enraged by the attack on his solider. During the years when Congo was still Zaire, Kibibi explained, “if a soldier was killed by civilians, we would mark out fifty meters square and kill everyone inside. For one killed soldier, more or less, a hundred civilians would pay.” Prosecutors sought the death penalty against Kibibi and several others, and twenty-year sentences against officers and soldiers accused of lesser crimes. The mobile court applied the law of the International Criminal Court, rather than the law of the Democratic Republic of Congo, to convict Lieutenant Colonel Kibibi of crimes against humanity. He and three of his officers received twenty-year prison sentences. Five more officers received less lengthy sentences. Another was acquitted. The remaining defendant was found to be a minor and his case was transferred to a civilian court. *** “The sentences send a strong signal that sexual violence is not acceptable and will not be tolerated,” the UN secretary- general’s special representative on sexual violence in conflict, Margot Wallstrom, said.  91 Annex 5 Special Army Integration Attempts in DRC, an example from CNDP The following overview illustrates the rather complex sequence of key events around creation and operation of the CNDP: ■■ 2002 Pretoria Accord leads to the installation of a transitional government in June 2003 and a process of integra- tion of all factions into a single national army. ■■ Most of the military leaders enter the army integration process, such as General Padiri, who is appointed Com- mander of the 9th military region in Kisangani. General Laurent Nkunda and Colonel Eric Ruhorimbere, how- ever, refused to take their assigned posts and Nkunda started to challenge state power through renewed dissidence and the foundation of a new politico-military movement, the CNDP. ■■ In 2004, General Nkunda and Colonel Jules Mutebtusi conquer the South Kivu capital of Bukavu under the pre- text of protecting their harassed Banyamulenge brothers. Their troops commit serious human rights abuses. At the end of their occupation, Nkunda gains North Kivu (Masisi) and remnants of Mutebutsi’s troops reach the South Kivu high plateau under the name of “Groupe 47” (the 47 survivors) that later transforms into the FRF. ■■ On December 30, 2006, the CNDP/Nkunda publishes its “Cahier de Charge,” in which the key demands are: (1) the end of the presence of Rwandan AG in the DRC and (2) the return of Tutsi refugees to DRC. ■■ In 2007, a new formula was found to end confrontations between the CNDP and FARDC, a process of direct army integration called “mixage” was created with the support of the Government of Rwanda. Its sole objective was to end the presence of Rwandan AG in the Eastern DRC by use of military force. ■■ The “mixage” triggers the foundation of the PARECO FAP by Hutu, Hunde, Nande, Nyanga, and Tembo (all Eastern DRC Bantu tribes) officers led by Kakule Sikuli LaFontaine on March 14, 2007. ■■ August 2007: Collapse of “mixage” and resumption of serious armed violence, at its peak during the end of Au- gust 2008 with the threat of the CNDP taking over the provincial capital of North Kivu, Goma. ■■ Arrest and detention of General L. Nkunda by Rwandan authorities; Bosco Natganda takes over. ■■ January/ February 2009: Accelerated army integration of the CNDP combatants and recognition of the CNDP as a DRC political party in the context of a joint military operation “Umoja Wetu.” ■■ In April 2012, some 300 soldiers mutinied from FARDC and created the M23 rebel movement operating mainly in DRC’s North Kivu, following grievances over the GoDRC’s non-compliance with the March 23, 2009 agree- ments, including acceptance of military ranks and payment of salaries. M23 is accused of committing widespread atrocities against civilians under the military guidance and leadership of Colonel Sultani Makenga. 92 THE WORLD BANK 1818 H, Street N.W. Washington, D.C. 20433 www.logica-wb.org