Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction (CPR) Unit

CPR and Related Publications on Conflict and Development

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Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction (CPR) Unit

CPR and Related Publications on Conflict and Development
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Conflicts require careful policy planning and coordination. Very few delays in the realization of pledges. Early mobilization of reconstruction funds allowed for a smooth transition from humanitarian to development assistance and avoided gaps in reconstruction activities.

However, East Timor also demonstrates the inappropriate complexity of aid financing mechanisms for post-conflict countries with low capacity, which created barriers to national ownership, and prevented the integration of all funding sources into the national budget.

Government and donors largely overcame these constraints through the adoption of agreed reconstruction benchmarks covering political, administrative, economic and social reconstruction. The benchmarks, reviewed and monitored every six months, proved a useful way to maintain reconstruction momentum and ensure links between different activities. Regular multi-donor sector missions to identify gaps, duplication or new priorities helped. Close Government and donor discussions over the recurrent budget also improved sustainability.

Reconstruction design and implementation.

The paper reviews progress made in each of the main reconstruction sectors during the transition to independence. A key lesson emerging relates to the trade-off between speed of delivery and capacity building. In East Timor the sectors which made more progress in establishing institutions were often less strong initially in achieving physical reconstruction targets. To have real national ownership of the policy-making process, a fairly long and inclusive process of policy discussion is needed. Intensive efforts to build human and institutional capacity also take time away from the management of emergency rehabilitation and services. Finding the right balance is an important challenge. Early involvement of national counterparts, targeting training and information to political leadership, and unified sectoral programming increase the focus on sustainable policies and institutions. The use of community-driven approaches, non-governmental and private sector capacities, and early attention to building procurement and payment systems can help accelerate reconstruction and service delivery. In deploying non-governmental service delivery, care should be taken to strengthen rather than undermine nascent state capacities. Non-government implementation arrangements may be combined with explicit transitional sectoral strategies to strengthen national ownership.
and control of policy decisions, and gradually transfer implementation into government hands.

Within the Bank’s portfolio, project preparation time was cut from a Bank wide average of 15 months to 3.5 months while maintaining regular quality standards. The TFET portfolio achieved fast results on the ground in those program components executed through community or private sector mechanisms. Larger reconstruction works lagged, largely due to difficulties in managing standard procurement procedures in a post-conflict context. Specific measures are recommended to address this for future operations. Overall, the volume of outputs via the TFET has been high in the 2½ year period of its existence and it has played a large part in meeting East Timor’s core reconstruction needs.

The situation at independence provides useful lessons for the transitional and reconstruction period. There is much good news. Main development indicators were by 2001 at or near pre-crisis levels, which is a surprisingly fast recovery given the depth of destruction in 1999. The Government has prepared a medium term national development plan, three-year budget and one-year priority program, on the basis of which it has secured donor commitments to meet its external financing requirement for the next three years. Oil and gas revenues from the Timor Sea would provide an exit strategy from dependence on external financing by mid decade. The future thus looks fairly optimistic. The Government faces, however, a backlog of legislative and capacity-building work to establish key institutions; a serious crisis of capacity in the judiciary sector; and hard policy choices in relation to veterans’ policy, property rights and cost recovery. Arguably, these issues should have been addressed earlier in the transition.

3. Humanitarian Assistance, Reconstruction and Development in Afghanistan: A Practitioner’s View

Alsair J. McKechnie
(March 2003)

This paper reviews progress and early lessons on the transformation of Afghanistan, as it transitions from emergency relief to reconstruction and development. The lessons are preliminary since the paper has been written only ten months after the Interim Authority emerged out of the Bonn agreements, but they do provide insights into the challenges and dilemmas that government and donors are confronting.

The reconstruction of Afghanistan faced an enormous challenge resulting not only from two decades of war but also the legacy of decades of failed development and poor policies. Moreover, the conflict is not fully over and the country still confronts many long standing issues regarding modernization, government structures and the relation of religion to the state.

The needs assessment carried out jointly by the major international institutions involved in the country’s reconstruction, despite some limitations, provided a good framework for the initial reconstruction effort and facilitated a smooth flow of information between humanitarian and development institutions. Policy priorities have been generally appropriate for a post-conflict country and the government has articulated a coherent strategy to stimulate the private sector. At the same time and cognizant of its limited absorptive capacity, the government also has a vision on the role of the state and how it wishes to rationalize government functions.

Creating a secure environment remains a difficult challenge and a key precondition for effective reconstruction and development. While increasing wealth may help to achieve a more secure and less conflict-vulnerable environment, most Afghan and foreign observers consider that expanding military resources to support the central government will be necessary for effective reconstruction. At the same time, aid effectiveness depends on good policies and institutions. In Afghanistan, good government will depend on civil service reform, transparency and accountability of aid funds, and effective aid coordination and implementation.

Government officials have been concerned over the balance between humanitarian and reconstruction and development assistance. Given large aid commitments (about one quarter of GDP), government officials are concerned as to the right balance between supporting the consumption of this generation versus investing the funds to raise the welfare of future generations. Another area of concern is how the role of humanitarian institutions should evolve as local capacity increases. The emerging consensus is that service delivery should be competitive when government or donor funds finance services, with the government as the contractor and NGOs and UN agencies bidding to provide the services.

Also important will be the future aid architecture. The initial set up served the country well as it established its own government structures, but as these are consolidated there is a need to ensure that institutional arrangements put the government in the driver’s seat. In our view, the key instrument for aid coordination should be the government budget, including a rolling multiyear framework of national priorities defined and owned by the government. Donors would be encouraged to fund the budget directly and avoid projectizing assistance, with a few exceptions for large national projects.

Afghanistan has made remarkable progress in a short period of time, especially considering where it started. Although the challenges and risks ahead remain formidable, there are rays of hope, not least of which are the resilience of its people, a great deal of international goodwill toward Afghanistan and a number of able and dedicated government officials.

4. Central America: Education Reform in a Post-Conflict Setting, Opportunities and Challenges

Jose Marques, and Ian Bannon
(April 2003)

The three Central American countries examined in this study suffered violent internal conflicts during the 1980s but faced the 1990s largely at peace and with a renewed sense of hope. As in most post-conflict societies peace brings not just a cessation of hostilities, but also the opportunity for transformation, especially in terms of addressing the root causes of the conflict and building a better future for the next generation. The immediate post-conflict period offers a window of opportunity, often brief however, to undertake these transformations by adopting bold and longer-term reform processes. Transforming as well as rebuilding education systems is often at the center of post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction agendas. The motivation for this study was to try to understand why some post-conflict countries are more successful than others in seizing this opportunity. Although the conflicts in El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua had different manifestations and resolutions, the fact that the three embarked on major post-conflict education reform programs with varying degrees of success offers an excellent
opportunity to contrast and to try to learn from their experiences.

The impact of education reforms has been positive, El Salvador having progressed further than Guatemala and Nicaragua. Education now is much more participatory and classrooms more democratic. Students and parents have a greater influence on education quality and classroom environments. Most increases in education funding have been earmarked for pre-primary and primary schooling, with an emphasis on rural areas. There are now more community-managed schools and more bilingual education services have been introduced.

Independent school achievement assessment systems have become more widespread and education ministries modernized. As civil society becomes more conscious of the importance of education, communities are taking greater interest in the school system and pressing for improvements. Education systems have become less politicized as stakeholders increasingly focus on quality improvements and expanding the systems’ reach.

The fact that education reform advanced more swiftly in El Salvador was perhaps because that country managed to forge a national consensus on the reforms’ importance and priority, firmly supported by three successive governments from the same party (the same Ministry of Education authorities having served throughout that period), and external donors who provided continued technical and financial support. In Guatemala and Nicaragua no such clear vision of education reform took shape nor was the political commitment as strong, probably accounting for a lack of coordination and coherence in implementation, inadequate funding and weak support for the reforms.

The experiences examined here offer general lessons for any country that decides to embark on a comprehensive education reform process, but especially for post-conflict countries that have a brief window of opportunity to push through bold and radical reforms and undo errors of the past. Section IV of the paper, presents a series of stylized Do’s and Don’ts for education reform in post-conflict settings. Annex I presents a very personal account of the lessons from El Salvador's education reform process, viewed from within the reform process itself.

5. Using Case Studies to Expand the Theory of Civil War
Nicholas Sambanis
(May 2003)

This paper uses a comparative case study design to refine and expand the Collier-Hoeffler (CH) model of civil war onset. The CH model develops an economic theory of civil war and argues that the opportunity structure for rebellion—the financial and organizational aspects of insurgency—are more important determinants of civil war outbreak than grievances. While Collier and Hoeffler test their model using statistical methods on a dataset of 160 countries, this paper draws on 20 case studies that apply the CH model to explain over 30 civil wars.

The case study project was not designed to test the CH model, but as a secondary line of inquiry designed to illuminate some of the pathways through which independent variables influence the dependent variable and to explore interactions among the independent variables. A key conclusion is that while the CH model accurately describes some associations that seem significant in explaining many of the wars (and no-wars) in the sample, the causal mechanisms that are implicit in the CH analysis are frequently incorrect or limited. Through the case studies, a more nuanced approach is developed for the conditions under which different variables exert a significant influence on the outbreak of civil war.

The paper suggests a number of improvements and additions to the CH model. First, it suggests that civil war needs to be better defined and measured in order to augment the efficiency of empirical estimates and the certainty of our causal inferences. Second, some of the hypotheses derived from the CH model should be refined and clarified so that the model tests clearly-defined theoretical propositions. Ambiguities in the operationalization of these variables create uncertainty as to what it is they actually measure, so it is difficult to interpret results with reference to the literatures on ethnic conflict and political institutions and nationalism.

Third, different estimation methods should be employed in the CH model, including the addition of country-specific effects, time-decaying functions, and controlling for spatial dimensions of violence and neighborhood effects. Fourth, further empirical testing should explore and challenge the assumption of unit heterogeneity among cases of large-scale organized political violence. One way to do this is to further explore some of the selection effects highlighted in the paper. In richer nations, the state may be stronger and political institutions stable, all factors that can reduce civil war risk. In poorer states, political institutions will be weaker and less able to manage inter-ethnic conflict. The CH model predicts that political variables do not matter for civil war. But the influences between economic and political variables must be disentangled before this causal inference can be drawn from the data.

What becomes clear from the case study project is that it is difficult to see “greed” and “grievance” as competitive explanations of rebellion. Greed and grievance are often alternative interpretations of the same phenomenon—shades of the same problem. We often see more political greed and economic grievance than the other way around. If political institutions can reduce grievances and if economic factors influence political stability, then economic variables indirectly affect “grievance” factors in the CH model. And if state failure or government illegitimacy turns domestic politics into a near-anarchic world, then what CH term “greed” is really synonymous to the pursuit of survival. Civil wars may be a response to “greed” or “grievance” but most often they will be the result of both. We must now move beyond the greed-grievance distinction to explain why some countries are more prone to civil war than others.

6. Financing and Aid Management Arrangements in Post-Conflict Situations
Salvatore Schiavo-Campo
(May 2003)

This paper is concerned with the specific issues of financing modalities and aid management arrangements in post-conflict situations. The lessons presented are based on experiences with multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs) in the West Bank and Gaza, Bosnia and Herzegovina, East Timor (Timor-Leste) and Afghanistan. While generally applicable recommendations do emerge from the review, the most important recommendation is to tailor the design and sequencing of financing and aid coordination to the circumstances of the specific case. Each case has its own unique core features.

The first lesson of experience for aid in post-conflict situations is the imperative of assuring robust linkages between the aid and the rebuilding of local institutions, and the
core challenge is the balancing of immediate reconstruction priorities with long-term institutional development.

Among structural and design issues, the main conclusions are that an MDTF must fulfill both a fiduciary and an executive function, and a realistic, comprehensive and public government budget, consistent with the reconstruction program, is essential. Also, there must be incentives for individual donors to join an MDTF, including an MDTF design that gives them comfort that their aid goes for priority purposes while precluding earmarking of funds. For example, donors should be able to contribute to an MDTF, while the recipient country’s government would have the discretion to use the funds for immediate reconstruction priorities. A MDTF must also have an independent operational arm, and the MDTF must report to donors, clarity of funding arrangements and cohesion among the main donors are more important than organizational simplicity per se. The paper notes that the main advantage of an umbrella fund is the possibility of a closer linkage with the recipient country’s budget, and hence more robust dialogue on fiscal and development policy. What must be avoided is fragmentation of funding vehicles, especially between financing of recurrent costs and investments. On balance, it is preferable for a Bank-administered MDTF not to finance police or prisons.

Among the organizational and procedural issues, the main observations are that time is essential for aid interventions in post-conflict situations; and that a pragmatic compromise is needed between the extremes of waiting until all contributions are deposited, and of starting MDTF operations as soon as the first pledges are made. No compromise can be made, however, with the need to put in place measures to minimize corruption and leakages before the MDTF enters into any commitment. Non-project technical assistance (TA for institutional development and capacity building) can be financed either as a component of an umbrella MDTF or by a separate trust fund.

7. Community-Driven Reconstruction as an Instrument in War-to-Peace Transitions

Sarah Cliffe, Scott Guggenheim, and Markus Kostner
(August 2003)

As the Bank has expanded its work in post-conflict reconstruction, it has extended its community-driven development (CDD) approach to reconstruction. This paper discusses the role of community-driven reconstruction (CDR) and offers some guidance on design and implementation of CDR approaches. CDR has two main objectives: fast and cost-effective reconstruction assistance and an emphasis on local choice and accountability. It also involves two policy choices—decentralization and participation, which in turn lead to two key design features: support for democratic selection of local councils and provision of block grants directly to community councils.

CDR explicitly recognizes that the process of decision-making is as important as the decisions and ensuing outcomes. Transparency and accountability are features of CDR, which are especially important in post-conflict contexts given the need to rebuild vertical and horizontal social capital. Preliminary evidence also suggests that a CDR approach leads to lower unit costs per work completed.

A CDR approach, however, will not always be appropriate, or at least not for the initial phase of post-conflict reconstruction. There are a number of important preconditions. A basic level of internal security is critical. Without it, it may be difficult to transfer funds to communities or to hold community meetings and elections. CDR also requires some basic capacity in local institutions and availability of provincial payments systems. Governance characteristics will also affect the speed with which CDR can be developed, especially the presence of a strong and influential sponsor within the government for the decentralized, participatory approach, as well as the ability of local administrative structures to retain some degree of political influence and capacity.

The design of CDR needs to be adapted to each post-conflict reconstruction setting, especially in terms of: (i) adapting governance structures, particularly in terms of community councils, and the role of central and local governments; (ii) addressing technical and implementation issues; (iii) allowing for more speed in the early stages; and (iv) coordinating with sectoral reconstruction efforts. CDR needs to be viewed as part of a national recovery strategy rather than a self-standing reconstruction effort. Two factors are important in encouraging donors to support a coordinated CDR approach. The first is to encourage donors through their projects and activities to strengthen communities and community councils. The second is to provide for donor visibility by acknowledging their funding and involving them in project management and design.

A CDR approach carries a number of risks. Misuse of funds is a major risk, especially given that local capacity will invariably be weak. To mitigate this risk it will be important to build in transparency of local expenditure management and include extensive supervision from the center. Local elites may also attempt to capture community structures and funds. This can be partly offset through open meetings, publication of council decisions and relatively frequent council elections, de-linked from local or national party elections. The role of government gives rise to two opposing risks. That it is either too close or too distant from the CDR process.

In order to move from CDR to CDD, at least three elements need to be in place: (i) local development councils should be an integral part of local government responsible for community development; (ii) capacity needs to have been strengthened beyond the community councils; and (iii) as external funding diminishes, sustaining a community-driven approach will require fiscal decentralization.

8. Gender Equality and Civil Wars

Mary Caprioli
(September 2003)

We know, most notably through Ted Gurr’s research that ethnic discrimination can lead to ethno-political rebellion—intrastate conflict. Caprioli seeks to determine whether gender inequality is also a meaningful predictor of intrastate conflict. Although democratic peace scholars and others highlight the role of peaceful domestic behavior in predicting state behavior, many scholars have argued that a domestic environment of inequality and violence—structural and cultural violence—results in a greater likelihood of violence at the state and international level. This paper contributes to this line of inquiry and further tests the grievance theory of intrastate conflict by examining the norms that can lead to insurrection. In many ways, the author provides an alternative explanation for the significance of some of the typical economic measures—greed theory—based on the link between discrimination, inequality, and violence.

Caprioli tests whether states with greater gender inequality are more likely to experience intrastate conflict. The basic premise of this research predicts that the
presence of higher levels of gender inequality increase the likelihood that a state will experience intrastate conflict. According to the theories reviewed in the paper, gender inequality should have a dual impact on intrastate conflict. First, it is a manifestation of structural and cultural violence with their inherent norms of discrimination and violence that result in heightened levels of societal violence. Second, it facilitates a nationalist call to arms.

Fertility rate and percent of women in the legislature are two of the best measures in capturing the complex matrix of gender discrimination and inequality that includes political, economic, and social discrimination. Because of data limitations, fertility rates are included in the final models as a measure of gender inequality.

The model uses logistic regression to test the impact of gender inequality on the likelihood of intrastate conflict, covering 1960-97 and yielding an ‘N’ of 5,743. Controls for the possible influences on conflict include middle regime, democracy, GDP per capita, GDP per capita growth rate, prior domestic conflict, state capability, and the existence of and number of at-risk minorities. The fertility rate is dichotomized in order to minimize any data inconsistencies and as a better estimate for missing years. The cut-off point for the dichotomous fertility rate variable is set conservatively at 3.

The results confirm the hypothesis—gender inequality increases the likelihood that a state will experience internal conflict (PRIO/Uppsala conflict dataset). High-fertility states are twice (2.07) as likely to experience internal conflict as low-fertility ones, controlling for other possible causes of internal conflict. A statistically significant cross tabulation shows that 88 percent of the PRIO/Uppsala coded internal conflict is within states with a fertility rate over 3.0. A decennial version of the data produced a slightly higher result (2.27).

Caprioli concludes that measures of gender equality are not merely issues of social justice since, as this research shows, they have more dire consequences in contributing to intrastate conflict. In addition to lowering fertility rates, she draws six implications from her research: provide opportunities for women; foster economic growth but target women; include basic women’s rights under the rubric of human rights in international law; ensure that these laws are enforced; support women’s rights in established doctrines of humanitarian intervention; and gather and disseminate better measures of gender equality.

9. Do Participatory Development Projects Help Villagers Manage Local Conflicts?

Patrick Barron, Rachel Diprose, David Madden, Claire Q. Smith, and Michael Woolcock (September 2003)

This paper outlines a methodology that seeks to determine whether and how development projects contribute to conflict resolution and whether the social skills learned through group-based decision-making—a key feature of community-driven development (CDD) approaches—are transferable to the successful management of local conflicts. The methodology uses as its empirical reference point Indonesia’s Kecamatan Development Program (KDP)—KDP is a massive community development project, the largest in Southeast Asia, operating since 1998 and covering over 20,000 villages across Indonesia. The paper spells out how qualitative and quantitative approaches are being combined in two provinces—Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT) and Jawa Timur (East Java)—to produce detailed ethnographic accounts of the pathways by which conflict is generated and then resolved or exacerbated.

The research first seeks to understand and map conflicts and tensions that exist in the research areas, as a preliminary step to understanding the capacity of communities to cope with conflict. The research then looks at the conflict resolution mechanisms that exist, whether they are successful or not, and which mechanisms people turn to in times of trouble. The study seeks to integrate qualitative and quantitative tools, in a way that takes advantage of the strengths of each approach, while controlling for the weaknesses. A particular feature of the methodology is that it elicits information enabling comparisons to be made between villages in which KDP was present for three years, and statistically comparable villages in which KDP was not present.

The research seeks to answer five questions: (i) what are the main factors that affect local level capacity to manage conflict; (ii) how important is the nature and extent of interaction between different groups, and between those groups and the state, to local conflict mediation, and how boundaries between different groups are constructed and sustained; (iii) does KDP help communities manage conflict more constructively and can external agents help establish more inclusive, transparent, and accountable local-level institutions for mediating conflict; (iv) if so, for what types of conflict and under what conditions; and (v) if so, which elements of KDP appear to be most influential.

As far as the authors can ascertain, this is the first systematic and comprehensive effort to establish whether and how a CDD project can help to improve local conflict mediation processes. Also noteworthy are its reliance on integrated—quantitative and qualitative—data sources, and the relatively long periods of time spent by field staff in villages collecting data.

Outputs from the research will take a number of forms. Local field staff will have the opportunity to disseminate locally the material from their case study narratives, and importantly, to provide feedback to the communities that originated the data. Too often data collection is a one-way process, with researchers gathering data but rarely returning to share the results.

Eight workshops are planned at the subdistrict level to disseminate and discuss results. The researchers will be responsible for running these workshops. The material collected in the research will also be publicly available once it has been cleaned up to protect confidentiality. Other researchers, academics, NGOs, and the government will be able to use the data collected by the study. In addition, the results of this research are expected to feed into the design and implementation of follow-on KDP projects (KDP2 and KDP3) but would also be of interest to researchers and practitioners working on participatory mechanisms more broadly.

10. Landmine Clearance Projects: Task Manager’s Guide


Land mines destroy not just lives, but livelihoods. Even after armed conflict has stopped, land mine contamination kills and maims innocent people, obstructs emergency assistance, and hampers economic and social development. The removal of land mines is often essential to restart development and rebuild shattered communities, and the
lingering threat to physical and human capital makes their removal a priority for humanitarian and development agencies alike. Since the end of the Balkan crisis, financial support for land mine clearance has been a growing activity for the World Bank and an important component of its evolving agenda on conflict and development. However, because land mine clearance is expensive and involves complex political and security issues, it requires special attention and approaches.

The Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction (CPR) Unit in the World Bank’s Social Development Department has been active in addressing issues related to the effective removal of land mines in post-conflict economic recovery. The CPR Unit follows closely the work of the United Nations specialized agencies on mine action and is a member of the Mine Action Working Group of the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS).

This guide complements Demining—Operational Guidelines for Financing Land Mine Clearance, which the Bank issued in February 1997, bringing together our experience in addressing this problem. The guide is also available in electronic format, together with background material, on a companion CD-ROM available on request from the CPR Unit (see Annex D for the list of documents included in the CD-ROM).

This Guide describes suggested good practice for use by task managers in the design and implementation of land mine clearance projects financed by the World Bank. It is not a statement of Bank operational policy, and the analysis, views, and opinions expressed herein are the sole responsibility of the authors.

11. Timor-Leste: Independent Review of the Credit Component of the Community Empowerment Project

John D. Conroy
(March 2004)

This review analyzes experience with the Community Empowerment Project (CEP) credit component, and draws a number of lessons and general principles. Credit contributed to a revival of rural economic activities, especially petty trading and the supply of manufactured goods, helping to re-establish markets and stimulating production and marketing of foodstuffs and higher-value crops. While CEP was not a financial sector project, its use of credit to achieve post-conflict reconstruction goals had implications for the revival of financial services. Since the latter was also an important reconstruction goal, CEP had an obligation to avoid compromising the re-establishment of financial services. While a badly-conducted credit program may succeed in reviving business activity, it might do so at an unacceptably high cost in terms of negative impact on the credit culture. Whether significant negative impact has occurred in Timor-Leste as a result of the poor repayment performance of the CEP and Small Enterprise project (SEP) projects may only become apparent as microcredit begins to expand throughout the country.

Credit was an add-on feature to CEP, something that could be attached to the project to enhance its effectiveness. The amount allocated to credits for economic activities was only 13% of total subgrants in the project, but credit is not an accessory that can be added with minimal preparation. It requires specialist inputs for successful operation, and in any case its promotion may not be consistent with the most immediate needs of post-crisis reconstruction. As the experience of project implementation showed, the credit elements of CEP probably caused operational difficulties and diverted staff to a degree disproportionate to their weight in total spending.

Whenever credit is included in a package of assistance it must be taken seriously, in the sense that appropriate targets for repayment should be defined and appropriate measures for collection determined. If this does not seem appropriate, consideration should be given to employing outright grants, rather than loans, in order to finance activities necessary to revive economic activity. Much of this funding would be to recapitalize businesses which have been destroyed or de-stocked by conflict, for micro-entrepreneurs based on viable proposals evaluated on business principles.

Severe economic fluctuations in the immediate post-crisis period will expose borrowers to high risks, which further strengthens the case for grants vis-à-vis loans. These factors also point to the need to phase emergency stimulus from grants to credit over time considering the need to revive the financial system. The experience of CEP validates the conclusions on credit reached in the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for SEP I, calling for a transition from ‘intermediated grants’ to ‘intermediated credit’, with the former administered by government or quasi-government entities and the latter by financial institutions.

CEP experience offers no new lessons on microcredit, but reinforces those from experience elsewhere. It does, however, underline some limitations of microcredit in the immediate post-conflict crisis setting:

- where decision-making is divorced from risk, credit allocation is inefficient;
- subsidized credit tends to undercut credit delivered by institutions striving toward sustainability;
- the absence of any assurance of follow-up credit is a disincentive to repayment;
- failure to recycle credit promptly reduces the multiplier effect on economic activity of a given amount of loan capital;
- the contamination of non-repayment spreads rapidly if immediate and effective action is not taken;
- microcredit is not well-adapted to the needs of seasonal agriculture; and
- credit-management groups are organic entities forged by training and sustained by mutual obligation, not arbitrary and administratively-convenient assemblages.

12. Social Capital and Survival: Prospects for Community-Driven Development in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone

Paul Richards, Khadija Bah, and James Vincent
(April 2004)

This social assessment study (SA) of Sierra Leone seeks to analyze and evaluate how collective action functions in rural communities recovering from the war in Sierra Leone. The objective is to better understand poverty and vulnerability in order to strengthen the National Social Action Project (NSAP), a modality for funding direct community action administered by the National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA) as part of the Transitional Support Strategy for post-war recovery and poverty alleviation in Sierra Leone.

In the rural areas, the division between ruling lineages and dependent lineages, and migrant “strangers” is perpetuated through the control lineage that elders exercise over marriage systems, and over the labor of young men. This is a strong push factor in the decision of many to leave the rural areas, and opt instead for diamond digging where
they become vulnerable to militia recruitment. Reversing this rural outflow will require a changed mindset, local legal reforms and better rural market opportunities. High rural outflow represents a problem for community-driven development, since projects depend on community contributions generally put forward in the form of the labor, especially of young men.

Nevertheless, there are still rural institutions that work and are respected. Membership cuts across the divide between leading lineages, commoners and strangers. Evidence is presented that club activity has increased as a result of war and displacement.

As a result of humanitarian aid, ad hoc committees appointed by relief agencies emerged, generally known as Village Development Committees (VDCs). These tended to be dominated by leading lineages, and are argued to have added to the divisions between rural elites and the bulk of the poor.

Furthermore, the report argues the failure of chiefdom governance was a cause of the war. A consultative process launched by government in rural chiefdoms in 1999 and 2000 revealed a pattern of local complaints about failed local institutions. Local people voiced many good reform ideas, but the consultation was not extended to the newly accessible areas following the November 10, 2000 Abuja agreement.

The paper considers how the state re-established itself in the countryside through restoration of chiefdom administration and current progress toward administrative decentralization. Examples considered are proposals which create a hierarchy of local management committees in the education sector. The emphasis on a hierarchy of management institutions apparently at the expense of parent power is indicative of concerns to retain political control over a decentralized process. The paper also discusses the nature of “the community” in rural Sierra Leone, and analyzes the main sources of poverty and vulnerability. It argues that women, youth, and strangers have been politically marginalized, and that the rural community is typically divided between leading lineages and the rest.

There are ten main conclusions of the assessment six of which have specific operational implications for NaCSA.

- The agrarian crisis is institutional; the rights of land-owners are over-protected and the rights of rural laborers under-protected.
- The agrarian crisis is technical; the opportunity structure is weak due to inadequate markets, roads, credit, training and technology policy.
- There is a lack of true cohesion in rural communities to support community-driven development.
- There is evidence of extensive change in social attitudes among marginalized groups in the countryside, and these changes need to be understood and built upon.
- CDD is threatened by undemocratic procedures, villagers’ lack of knowledge of their rights, and lack of local capacity to handle project inputs.
- CDD is threatened by fraud, and a failure to understand that fraud is an institutional failure, not a cultural failure.
- CDD implies that international and local implementing partners need to develop new roles and skills.
- CDD requires collective action, which in turn is underpinned by a distinction between the sacred and the profane. Agencies will need to “do no harm” and to respect the sacred as an aspect of local culture.

One of the main lessons of BiH’s experience is the need to press for investment-related policy reforms as early as feasible. Donors are now fully aware of this, and are supporting rapid reform accordingly. Opinions differ on the extent to which it might have been possible to accelerate reforms at an earlier stage. It might have been difficult politically. However, there is no doubt that earlier reform would have been desirable, and this is one of the most important lessons for other post-conflict environments.

PRI is of most value to investors when they can identify a turning point in a country’s fortunes. The opportunities and the turning points will come to different sectors at different stages in the recovery process. For banks the turning point has already arrived. Partly because of their internal financial disciplines, banks value PRI more than other industries. Recent reforms have opened up new opportunities to foreign banks, and MIGA’s BiH portfolio reflects this. Banks are important both as investors in their own right but also because they facilitate the development of other businesses—including SMEs. They are among the building blocks that would-be investors require. It therefore makes sense for policy as well as practical commercial reasons for MIGA to focus on financial institutions at an early stage in the post-conflict recovery process.

If policy-makers wish to promote FDI in post-conflict zones, they should look to small regional companies as well as large multinationals. This conclusion reinforces the arguments in favor of three current aspects of MIGA policy. MIGA is trying to expand its client base among small and medium enterprises (SMEs); it is seeking to promote cross-border investment between developing countries; and it is working to expand the capacity of smaller public insurance providers—such as the Slovene Export Corporation—by providing them with reinsurance facilities. Regional export credit agencies will have far easier access to SMEs in their own territories than MIGA will.

MIGA sources confirm that the EU fund enabled it to begin operations in BiH earlier than it otherwise would have done. This assessment reflects the agency’s measured approach to the management of its own risk: MIGA helps private sector clients negotiate turning points in countries’ fortunes, but first it needs to get over a turning point of its own. The fund was a success in that it helped leverage investment worth more than six times the value of the capital provided by the EU. Perhaps the key lesson is that it is a good

13. MIGA’s Experience in Conflict-Affected Countries: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina

John Bray

(June 2004)

This paper aims to draw lessons from the involvement of the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) in the reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Foreign and domestic companies need certain building blocks to be able to operate effectively—as well as confidence that the conflict really is finished. These building blocks include a legal and regulatory environment that is in tune with the needs of private companies, and a viable financial infrastructure. BiH scarcely met these requirements during the 1990s. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, MIGA was in contact with several potential investors whose projects never took off. Political risk insurance (PRI) is of no value unless would-be entrepreneurs can first identify viable opportunities that are worth insuring.
example of MIGA collaboration with another agency. Such collaborations, whether in the form of special funds or reinsurance arrangements, give MIGA the capability to take on larger and higher risks, especially important in post-conflict regions.

In the course of the 1990s, private sector insurers came to play an increasingly important role both in trade-related PRI and in investment PRI. However, even at the end of what had turned out to be an expansionist decade for the private sector, there was an acknowledgement that public sector insurers still had an important role in long-term investment insurance in difficult countries. This is the area that is MIGA’s forte. Events in the last three years have reinforced rather than weakened this argument. Post-conflict regions need public sector PRI interventions more than anyone.

Henrik Urdal
(June 2004)

It has been suggested that large youth cohorts, so-called ‘youth bulges’, make countries more unstable in general, and thus more susceptible to armed conflict. In the present study this notion is put to an empirical test. The paper explores possible links between youth bulges and violent conflict theoretically and attempts to model under what conditions and in what kind of contexts youth bulges can cause armed conflict. The research hypotheses are tested in an event history statistical model covering a high number of countries and politically dependent areas over the period 1950–2000. The study finds robust support for the hypothesis that youth bulges increase the risk of domestic armed conflict, and especially so under conditions of economic stagnation. Moreover, the lack of support for the youth bulge hypothesis in recent World Bank studies is found to arise from a serious weakness in the youth bulge measure employed by World Bank researchers.

The author finds no evidence for the claim made by Samuel P. Huntington that youth bulges above a certain ‘critical level’ make countries especially prone to conflict. The study, however, provides evidence that the combination of youth bulges and poor economic performance can be explosive. This is bad news for regions that currently exhibit both features, often in coexistence with intermediary and unstable political regimes, in particular Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab world. In addition to economic performance, a key factor that affects the conflict potential of youth bulges is the opportunity for migration. Migration works as a safety valve for youth discontent.

Uwe Kievelitz, Thomas Schaef, Manuela Leonhardt, Herwig Hahn, and Sonja Vorwerk
(August 2004)

The Practical Guide is the product of a partnership between the United Nations Development Group, the Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery of the United Nations Development Programme, and the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit of the World Bank, with support from the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. The German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) was commissioned to prepare the guide based on a review and analysis of recent past experiences, as well as research on other assessment methodologies that could be useful. The aim is to provide a concise and practical guide for the use of country teams that will be involved in multilateral post-conflict needs assessments.

The present document constitutes the guide, which is supplemented by a number of additional documents which provide additional details and information, and which are available online from UNDG and CPR, and on request from GTZ.

The guide includes a discussion of the context in which post-conflict needs assessments take place, its links with the post-conflict recovery phase, and a broad typology of post-conflict settings that influence the approach to the needs assessment. The guide reviews some key conceptual issues, including the need to embed the process within a longer-term vision on reconstruction, linkages to other processes, the selection of priority sectors, approaches to costing needs, integration of cross-cutting issues such as gender and environment, and the need to focus on institutional capacity building. The guide includes recommendations on managing the needs assessment process, from the preparatory phase to the lessons-learned phase. It also presents indicative estimates of the costs involved in mounting needs assessments missions. Throughout the guide, the emphasis is on practical approaches and recommendations, with a focus on sequenced steps, phases and responsibilities.

16. The Private Sector’s Role in the Provision of Infrastructure in Post-Conflict Countries: Patterns and Policy Options
Jordan Schwartz, Shelly Hahn, and Ian Bannon
(August 2004)

Countries emerging from a conflict urgently need to provide access to basic infrastructure services for their populations, but they lack adequate public revenues, government capacity and investor interest to re-establish these services quickly. Although donors often support the early phases of post-conflict reconstruction with generous aid packages, post-conflict public sectors are often constrained by extremely weak absorptive capacity. At the same time, a large number of urgent policy priorities in the immediate post-conflict period means that governments rarely focus on establishing a welcoming investment climate that can spark the interest of potential private investors in infrastructure. Thus, for the first few years they confront a bitter paradox—they can neither absorb fully reconstruction aid nor can they attract much private investment to infrastructure sectors that could offset the state’s low absorptive capacity.

This paper examines private investment patterns in post-conflict countries based on the Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure database, and looks at some success stories that may offer useful policy lessons for other post-conflict countries. The investment patterns show that telecoms investments, particularly mobile telephony, materialize immediately after (sometimes even before) the end of the conflict. Electricity generation and distribution projects start to emerge about three years after the conflict and increase in frequency after year five. Private investment in transport and water tend to come much later. Within the transport sector, seaports receive the majority of private investment. The experiences of a number of conflict-affected countries, such as the Philippines, Mozambique, El Salvador and Guatemala,
However, suggest that there is much in the policy front that conflict countries can do to speed up private investment in infrastructure, and thus the contribution of the private sector to reconstruction processes and the resumption of growth. Policy recommendations suggest that the timing of reforms is important. Stepped arrangements may also be considered, including a planned progression from modest forms of private participation in infrastructure (e.g., service or management contracts) to deeper forms such as leases or long-term concessions. Governments can also encourage (and especially refrain from constraining or regulating out of existence) the development of small-scale private service providers. Although they are generally not well captured in the data, a number of case studies and user surveys suggest that these entrepreneurs often play a key role in the absence of fully-functioning states, established public utilities and major private investments.

The paper also examines the positive correlation between risk ratings and the ability of post-conflict countries to attract private investment in infrastructure. Given the influence of the perceptions of risk on long-term investment, donors and governments may benefit from addressing those elements of political and economic risks that are within their control or influence. Specifically, there is a role to play for donors that can assist with the re-establishment or deepening of short-term finance, banking and insurance, as well as considering mechanisms to provide political risk insurance for foreign investors interested in infrastructure sectors. A key feature that affects country risk ratings is the government’s track record in the payment for publically-contracted goods and services, respecting contracts, and allowing foreign investors to repatriate capital. Since telecoms operators are the first to arrive, the ability of the government to demonstrate good contractual faith and establish an appropriate regulatory framework can have a powerful demonstration effect on other investors.

17. Within and Beyond Borders: An Independent Review of Post-Conflict Fund Support to Refugees and the Internally Displaced

Swarna Rajagopalan
(October 2004)

This independent review assesses the performance of seventeen Post-Conflict Fund (PCF) grants relating to Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees. These seventeen PCF grants adopt a wide variety of approaches, have different objectives, and are implemented by many different partners. They also represent a new area of work for the World Bank as refugees and IDPs are not usually the focus of development programs. As such, these seventeen PCF grants represent a valuable source of information. This review is an attempt to learn from these experiences.

First, this review assesses existing operational literature on the topic and compiles a set of ‘best practices’. Second, it analyzes the seventeen PCF grants assessing their performance as per the ‘best practices’ and per their initial objectives. Third, it recommends ways in which IDP and refugee needs can be better addressed by PCF grants. While discussing PCF grants directly, the recommendations are believed to be of a general character and, as such, relevant to development projects seeking to address the needs of displaced people.

The PCF does reasonably well vis-à-vis the ‘best practices’ list. On balance, PCF’s strength stems from its flexibility and openness to fund innovative approaches in different situations, with a variety of beneficiaries, and its willingness to work in partnership with others. PCF however, performs less well on the following counts:

- In the assessment of what needs to be done, there also needs to be an assessment of what is possible given existing skill levels and what constraints exist in terms of security or other factors.
- Political and security issues are seldom factored into proposals or rationales. However, for a program that operates in very sensitive contexts, some of the first questions that should be raised in feasibility assessments should be those relating to political and security circumstances and consequences.
- PCF grants are generally implemented over a 1-2 year period and a lot is left to the follow-up phase. This is not long enough for some of the development projects to bear fruit. So while the size of the grants may not be problematic, the need to keep raising funds could be.
- PCF does not meet the bar on considerations of gender equity. Few of its approved program proposals factor gender relations into their needs assessment, their evaluation standards or their assessment of impact.
- PCF performs slightly better when it comes to taking a rights-based approach to working with situations of displacement, but that does not seem to be a function of design as much as sheer serendipity.
- PCF has a problem when it comes to recovering reports and evaluations from its grant recipients. Therefore, the capacity for institutional learning is less than it might be given the resources of the World Bank.

In light of the review of the seventeen grants, the review makes the following recommendations:
- Political and security assessments should be part of the needs assessment.
- Project proposals should be accompanied by skills assessments.
- Short-term funding should be accompanied by fund-raising assistance.
- Gender equity issues should inform post-conflict project processes and objectives.
- PCF’s position on the place of rights advocacy and the question of return/resettlement should be debated and articulated.
- The PCF should prioritize information management.
- Analytical end products should be made available in the public domain.
- Applicants should articulate a clear conflict rationale as opposed to a purely developmental one.
- Skilled project partners should be used as resources for training others.

18. Drugs and Development in Afghanistan

William Byrd, and Christopher Ward
(December 2004)

This paper analyzes the linkages between drugs and development in Afghanistan. It argues that the opium economy—including its nexus with insecurity, warlords, state weakness, and poor governance—constitutes a central development problem for the country. The Afghan drug industry is unprecedented in international experience in
terms of its relative economic size, its penetration of the polity, economy, and society, and the insecure and lawless environment in which it has thrived. While international experience can provide some useful lessons, Afghanistan’s own largely unsuccessful experience in anti-drug efforts suggests the problem is of a different order of magnitude.

The development implications of the opium economy include pluses as well as minuses. Among the former are the support provided by the opium economy to overall economic activity and the balance of payments. The opium economy has boosted rural incomes and has served as a coping mechanism helping large numbers of poor people through wage labor and sharecropping and tenancy arrangements which provide them with access to land and credit, albeit on unfavorable terms.

Major drawbacks of Afghanistan’s opium economy, include large price and quantity volatility which can have a major macroeconomic impact, and the price and exchange rate effects of the economy’s heavy reliance on opium which could discourage production of other tradables through a “Dutch disease” effect. Substantial numbers of poor farmers are deeply mired in opium-related debt, which virtually requires them to continue cultivating opium poppy and may precipitate drastic measures like mortgaging and losing land, or giving up their daughters in marriage to pay off opium debt. More generally, opium is becoming “capitalized” in the economy and society, affecting agricultural sharecropping and tenancy arrangements, land prices, urban real estate, bride prices in opium-producing areas, etc. Also, drug addiction in Afghanistan may be substantial and appears to be growing.

The nexus of drugs with insecurity and warlords, a vicious circle that would keep Afghanistan insecure, fragmented politically, weakly governed, poor, dominated by the informal/illicit economy, and a hostage to the drug industry, is clearly the most serious problem. This threatens the entire state-building and reconstruction agenda and as such outweighs all the combined economic benefits.

Closely related is the corrosive effect of the drug industry on governance through massive corruption.

The positive and negative development impacts of the opium economy need to be fully taken into account in the counter-narcotics strategy. From a development perspective, it would make sense for the strategy to focus on the most damaging aspects of the opium economy, which would imply emphasis on interdiction of trafficking and processing and sanctions against drug industry principals and sponsors. It is also very important that the strategy include measures to address the adverse side effects of successful anti-drug actions in the macroeconomic, livelihoods, and poverty spheres.

The Government’s National Drugs Control Strategy provides a sound framework, but there are tensions between the cautious tone in much of the document and the ambitious targets it sets, as well as pressures for quick and visible results, even if at the expense of longer-term sustainable improvements. There are also implementation issues relating to prioritization and sequencing between interdiction, alternative livelihoods and eradication, and enormous needs to build capacity in governance, law enforcement, and the judicial and penal systems. All in all, and not surprisingly given past experience and the size of the drug industry, there are no easy answers, only difficult trade-offs in the search for a multi-pronged, sustained, and effective response to the drug problem in Afghanistan.

19. Understanding Local Level Conflict in Developing Countries

Patrick Barron, Claire Q. Smith, and Michael Woolcock  (December 2004)

Previous research on conflict has focused primarily on large-scale, high-profile episodes of violence and framed them in terms of ethnic/religious tensions, separatist discontent, thwarted economic opportunities, or weak institutions. Such research, often derived from secondary sources and/or from observations at a single point in time, tends to offer cultural or structuralist explanations, and technocratic solutions.

The authors first examine some of the ways in which conflict is conceptualized and researched within the literature, and discuss some of the limitations of previous approaches. They group the literature on conflict and violence into four broad camps, which for convenience they refer to as cultural sociology, political sociology, political economy, and legal anthropology. The authors highlight some of the weaknesses of this literature and research, including: insights from theory have often not been thoroughly tested empirically; econometric approaches have helped in hypothesis development, but these hypotheses have rarely been subjected to more in-depth qualitative study; measurement has often been made statically, precluding an understanding of the mechanisms and processes by which conflicts evolve; and much of the analysis has compared states, thus excluding the examination of intra-state variations.

The authors look instead at local level (‘everyday’) conflicts, the dynamics shaping their evolution over time, and the mechanisms by which different outcomes are achieved through engagement with (and interactions between) traditional and formal dispute resolution mechanisms. Using detailed evidence gathered by twelve researchers over six months in forty-one villages in two Indonesian provinces, the authors present an integrated framework for understanding the pathways that conflicts can take, the conditions under which they follow one trajectory rather than another, and the characteristics that make for effective intervention. Such a framework, they argue, can help enhance the capacity of citizens, policymakers, and practitioners in developing countries to craft more constructive precedents and procedures for preventing everyday forms of conflict—an inevitable and inherent feature of development—from turning violent.

The key elements of this foundation are the importance of coherent and enforceable rules and over-arching meta-rules, the malleability and political salience of different identity group claims and the willingness, capacity and legitimacy of mediators. Individually and collectively, these elements can help to inform a corresponding set of policy recommendations for various actors focused on providing incentives, resources, and spaces for crafting viable mediating institutions that enable otherwise weak, competing, or incompatible rules systems to co-exist.

The authors also argue that these elements provide a possible challenge to the idea of a “policy recommendation” understood as a top-down instrument solely or primarily designed and implemented by technocrats or other external elites. They argue that the early detection and effective resolution of local level conflict, is in large part an “adaptive” rather than a “technical” problem, one requiring an emphasis on the role of many different parties (government, donors, academia, and civil society), at different levels, in establishing a basis for effective
dialogue, evidence-based decision making, and enforceable agreements, the final specification of which is not always likely to be known at the outset.

20. Addressing Gender in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations in the Philippines

Sonia Margallo
(January 2005)

This working paper presents the findings and recommendations of a review undertaken to identify how gender is addressed in various conflict and post-conflict situations in the Philippines, with a focus on Mindanao. Published and unpublished documents, books and websites were consulted to review recent and ongoing efforts to address gender and gender issues in communities affected by conflict, some of which are no longer experiencing conflict while others are still affected by violence. To validate and complement the findings from the desk review, twelve gender focal points and program managers were interviewed in the cities of Manila, Zamboanga, Davao, and Cotabato.

The review identified three major categories of issues in Mindanao and corresponding interventions to address these issues: (i) access to basic services, (ii) protection and security of internally displaced populations, and (iii) disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. In all cases, while the review notes important efforts to address gender concerns around these three sets of issues, there is also a need for greater coordination and a more systematic approach to mainstreaming gender in conflict-affected regions. The review also notes the need to address gender through multi-sectoral approaches.

The paper also presents briefly five case studies of interesting interventions or approaches which may offer lessons for future post-conflict reconstruction in Mindanao. The case studies cover the psychosocial effects of conflict on children, gender-sensitive community-based education for peace, micro-lending and entrepreneurial training in peace zones, the Go and See Visit program for internally displaced persons that are trying to decide whether to return to their places of origin, and a livelihood assistance program for ex-combatants and their families.

Major recommendations include:

- Ensure use of accurate gender disaggregated data on displaced populations and other groups affected by armed conflict, and train program personnel in recording and consolidating disaggregated data;
- Provide equal opportunities for male and female demobilized combatants in livelihood activities and parallel benefit packages;
- Conduct men’s and women’s assemblies starting from the barangay level to the regional level, to disseminate information, encourage involvement in the peace process, and lobby to have women participate on peace panels and/or have a seat at the negotiations table;
- Consider launching a regional gender and peace audit in Mindanao to monitor the implementation of commitments toward gender and peace;
- Establish stronger and closer coordination among the national and local government, and gender-oriented NGOs at the regional, provincial, and local levels;
- Establish a focal government body to coordinate all projects and programs that provide assistance to post-conflict Mindanao;
- Institutionalize gender and peace education in the country’s education system, starting with Mindanao, including a review and revision of the elementary and secondary school curricula; and
- Utilize the media to encourage community awareness and advocacy in relation to gender and peace.

21. Community Cohesion in Liberia: A Post-Conflict Rapid Social Assessment

Paul Richards, Steven Archibald, Beverlee Bruce, Watta Modad, Edward Mulbah, Tormorah Varpliah, and James Vincent
(January 2005)

At the core of Liberia’s conflict lies a class of marginal young people who currently lack faith in any kind of institutions. They consider that family, marriage, education, markets and the administration of justice have all failed them. Many have preferred to take their chances with various militia groups. Successful peacebuilding, and reconstruction through community empowerment will, to a large extent, depend upon the dismantling of these institutionally embedded distinctions between citizens and subjects. A genuinely inclusive, appropriately targeted community-driven development (CDD) process could play a crucial role in shaping a different kind of society, but only if it incorporates marginalized and socially-excluded groups in the rebuilding process.

The rapid social assessment (RSA) reveals that the assumptions of social cohesion, community participation and consensus underpinning some CDD activities in Liberia are too optimistic given Liberia's dualistic legacy and should be reconsidered. Community in Liberia is a deeply contested notion, reflecting historical inequalities in access to land, and distinctions between persons considered to be "civilized" and "aboriginal". A more realistic set of assumptions is required. Donors need to work with the Liberian government to change ground rules in relation to land, labor and justice. Agencies need to invest in local-level conflict resolution and rights-based development activity to shape a new and more inclusive community dynamic.

The report includes suggestions on how to address these issues. A key point is to trigger a process in which rural people are challenged to devise more inclusive notions of community and social cohesion as part of the post-war rebuilding process. In order to contribute to stability in Liberia, CDD must firmly focus on the inclusion of socially marginalized groups. Further entrenchment of personal rule and the privileges of a rural minority will only hasten the return of war.

War in Liberia reflects a long-term agrarian crisis based on inter-generational tensions and the failure of rural institutions. Addressing the roots of the crisis requires changes to institutional frameworks that influence rural social solidarity, including marriage and access to land.

Promoting CDD activities based on generalized assumptions about ‘community participation’ and ‘consensus’ risks empowering certain groups over others. CDD processes should support, as far as practicable, community-led definitions of cooperation and management structures. It must also be recognized that some community-based ways of organizing serve to empower particular groups over others, and that external agency/NGO-initiated structures typically do likewise.

There is a danger in seeing CDD activities only in technical terms, e.g., as an exercise in simply providing infrastructure, or in
transferring international procedures for participatory development. To avoid this, communities themselves need to engage in analysis of different forms of co-operation and solidarity to create social capital that encourages cohesion. This can only be attempted with the active involvement of Liberian groups seeking the return to constitutional rule.

Successful social reintegration requires support for local conciliation processes, and mechanisms to encourage open, informed debate around issues of justice and human rights. Peace will largely depend on the successful reintegration of ex-combatants and the larger group of dispossessed, uprooted young people vulnerable to future militia recruitment. Jobs and skills training are only part of what is needed. Processes of conciliation, and examination of issues of justice and rights, will also be important. Without support for community-driven peace-making activities, alongside CDD activities, social fund projects may do no more than rebuild some of the societal causes of conflict.

The report includes the following recommendations: (i) ensure equal opportunities for CDD participation; (ii) ensure consistent dissemination of information; (iii) ensure that vested interests do not dominate CDD processes; (iv) support community-led creation of representative structures; (v) address barriers to CDD in remote areas; (vi) enhance agrarian employment opportunities; (vii) promote participatory and accountable local governance; and (viii) promote rights-based and conflict resolution approaches to reintegration.

22. International Companies and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Cross-Sectoral Comparisons

John Bray (January 2005)

The role of international companies in post-conflict reconstruction is an essential complement to the work of international aid agencies. However, if policy-makers are to secure the maximum benefits from private investment, they need to understand how different companies and sectors view opportunity and risk, and take account of their overall impact in post-conflict settings.

In development circles, the debate about the role of business in conflict-affected regions has tended to focus on petroleum and mining. This paper begins with a review of the extractive industries, but then broadens the discussion to discuss three other sectors: mobile phones, construction and commercial banks. It cites examples from Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, Somalia, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste.

The four sectors vary in the scale of investment that they need, and the time-frame in which they expect to make returns. These calculations in turn influence their attitudes to conflict-affected countries. ‘Junior’ petroleum and mining companies are willing to take on high political and security risks in the hope of making major discoveries before their larger, more risk-averse competitors. However, ‘major’ companies in the extractive industries normally expect a reasonable prospect of long-term stability before committing to large-scale projects which may last for 20-30 years.

By contrast, mobile phone companies make smaller investments, and start getting a return as soon as the first subscriber makes a call: they may be able to recover their initial outlay within two or three years. Construction and engineering companies will take on short-term reconstruction contracts, but will hesitate to commit to long-term investment—for example in utilities—unless there is a stable government and legal system. Banks will not set up operations unless there are viable banking laws and foreign exchange regulations. Initially, they tend to concentrate on international customers, such as diplomats and aid workers, and may not develop a retail market for many years after the end of the conflict.

Large companies—the truly global players—will seize opportunities in post-conflict countries if these are commensurate with their size and capabilities, for example in Iraq. In smaller economies, large international companies are rarely willing to take high risks for returns that—on the scale of their balance sheets—are likely to be marginal. The most active foreign investors will be niche players with a higher tolerance of risk, or regional companies with regional development strategies.

Most larger international companies now emphasize corporate social responsibility including charitable programs. However, companies’ most significant social impact will come from the way that they conduct their core activities, and in particular from their relationships with local communities and sub-contractors. Greater awareness of the risk of ‘doing harm’ has increased interest in the concept of conflict impact assessment as a sub-category of social impact assessment. International Alert and other NGOs are now developing tools to assist with this process.


Claire Q. Smith (January 2005)

Following the fall of Suharto in 1998, incidents of ethnic, religious and separatist violence have broken out across Indonesia. This paper seeks to show the way in which cultural, socio-economic and institutional elements combine to produce violent conflict, by exploring the 2001 ethnic conflict in Central Kalimantan and the impact on Madura, East Java. It aims to show that ethnic violence was not inevitable—it was a result of socio-economic marginalization of one group coupled with failed state interventions, in the context of the weakened role and capacity of informal and traditional organizations for managing conflict.

The paper outlines the main explanatory factors for ethnic violence in Central Kalimantan, and argues that they are intrinsically linked to the weakness of formal and informal institutions for managing conflict between different ethnic and religious groups. Formal and traditional mechanisms for mediating inter-group conflict were weakened by two parallel processes: internal migration and the breakdown of authority. The paper also illustrates why the role of culture is nevertheless important to understand ethnic violence in Central Kalimantan.

The paper also examines the Madurese expulsion and their return to Madura. With unemployment of over 90% among the displaced community in Madura, most displaced Madurese hoped to return to Central Kalimantan. Conflicts between the local community and the displaced were triggered by competition over resources and emergency aid for the displaced. The majority of the displaced were unable to integrate in Sampang. Conflict mediation capacity in Sampang was already limited before the displaced arrived, especially with high levels of violent crime, and as a result, local authorities were overstretched in managing local conflicts between the competing groups.
From the Dayak perspective, the scope for reconciliation with the Madurese in Central Kalimantan would depend on the role of the elite Dayak leaders in the region, reconciliation within the Dayak community, the capacity of local mediating mechanisms, and the role of individual mediators.

Several key factors affect the possibility for Madurese to return to Central Kalimantan—government policy on return of displaced Madurese; the role of local mediation mechanisms in conflict mediation and reconciliation between Madurese groups in Madura; and the role of individual mediators, both from the displaced and the host communities. Informal, non-governmental mediators have had relatively more success at leading inter-ethnic mediation than formal government mediators. However, the role of informal local mediators in bridging inter-group conflicts was constrained when their influence was limited to one particular ethnic or identity group; and when they did not have trust from or legitimacy with the other group(s) involved in the conflict.

There were some notable exceptions to the general rule that formal government institutions had limited success in inter-group reconciliation. Government leaders had more success when they worked through inter-village community forums and development forums with representatives from each community/identity group involved in decision making; and relied on facilitation by trusted community leaders. Local communities and community leaders stressed three factors to prevent violence: (i) representation from each community at decision making meetings or forums and adaptation of local forums to include all groups; (ii) account taken of the post-conflict needs of the local and host communities; and (iii) mediation by trusted community leaders who held authority over each group.

The paper suggests three main challenges. First, recognizing that this type of violence may not be temporary or isolated. A second challenge is the exclusion of the grassroots or community level from mediation and peace brokering. The third challenge is managing the complex issues surrounding competition for natural resources and displacement. Specific project interventions for the Bank within its current and projected project portfolio are suggested. The four project interventions recommended relate specifically to the Bank’s community-driven development platform, implemented through the Kecamatan Development Project (KDP) and the Support for Poor and Disadvantaged Areas Project (SPADA). More broadly, the recommendations link to the Bank’s governance agenda, as articulated in the 2003 CAS. Recommendations for the Government focus on the need to improve local governance, raising standards in the security agencies, and designing more inclusive rather than targeted projects for marginalized communities in conflict areas.

24. The Mindanao Conflict in the Philippines: Roots, Costs, and Potential Peace Dividend

Salvatore Schiavo-Campo, and Mary Judd  
(February 2005)

This paper briefly reviews the historical roots and the current status of the conflict and peace negotiations in Mindanao. By far the heaviest costs of the conflict to the Bangsamoro people and the Lumads, to Mindanao, and to the Philippines as a whole have been qualitative and dynamic. The paper provides a quantitative assessment of the direct economic costs of conflict estimated in traditional comparative statics terms as a base on which to add the more dynamic and less quantifiable costs.

The paper finds that the direct costs of the conflict have been substantial but only at the local level, with a comparatively small impact on the rest of Mindanao and the country as a whole. While bearing in mind the severe methodological limitations, the paper estimates the direct output loss from the conflict during 1970-2001 in the range of $2.3 billion, which is low compared to estimates for other civil conflicts.

The costs are much higher, although difficult to quantify, when the authors add human and social costs (e.g., deaths and injuries, displacement, increased poverty and increases in criminality), indirect economic costs (e.g., decreased agricultural productivity, deterioration in the investment climate), and governance and social costs (weakening in security and the rule of law, disruptions to social services).

The authors argue that the potential peace dividend is high, especially in terms of improved governance, lower spending on security, improvements in fiscal outcomes and investment climate, recovery and exploitation of Mindanao’s considerable hydropower and tourism potentials, and improved access to services, especially by the poor. They suggest that whether these dividends materialize will depend critically on the adoption an inclusive approach in post-conflict reconstruction, breaking the vicious cycle of weak-capacity-low autonomy-low capacity, and attention to environmental and social risks.

The paper also includes an Annex discussing three cross-country studies of the output effects of civil wars which were applied to available data on the Mindanao conflict to estimate the overall economic costs for the Philippines. The authors also provide a brief comparison with economic costs for the conflict in Sri Lanka.

25. Counting Conflicts: Using Newspaper to Understand Violence in Indonesia

Patrick Barron, and Joanne Sharpe  
(May 2005)

Responding to conflict, in Indonesia and elsewhere, requires an understanding of its distribution, forms, and impacts. Given that different types of conflicts may require different policy and programmatic approaches, an understanding of the type and nature of conflicts in different areas and how they are similar, and/or how they differ is vital.

Relatively little is known about the incidence and costs of conflict in Indonesia. ‘Headline’ conflicts such as those that have taken place in the Malukus, Central Sulawesi, Papua and Aceh have received significant attention. However, there is an increasing realization that conflict is not confined to these ‘high conflict’ provinces alone, but that it can be found across the country. In large part this is because of the methodological difficulties associated with mapping conflicts, including through household surveys, key informant interviews, and the use of police or other secondary data.

In this paper, the authors outline an attempt to use local newspaper monitoring to measure the levels and impacts of violent conflict from 2001-2003 in two Indonesian provinces (East Java and NTT), and to assess variation in incidence, impact, and form across and within areas.

There are a number of significant findings. First, the levels and impacts of conflict are far higher than previously expected, and even areas thought of as not being particularly prone to conflict report high conflict impacts. Comparing the authors’ data with that of a previous attempt to use newspapers to map

Gary Barker, and Christine Ricardo
(June 2005)

Gender is increasingly used as an analytical framework in program and policy development for youth in Africa, but in most cases gender refers almost exclusively to the disadvantages that women and girls face. Given the extent of gender inequalities in sub-Saharan Africa, an almost exclusive focus on women and girls has been appropriate. However, a gender perspective and gender mainstreaming have too often ignored the gender of men and boys. The aim of this paper is to explore what a gender perspective means when applied to young men in Africa focusing on conflict, violence and HIV/AIDS. It explores the construction of manhoods in Africa and argues for the application of a more sophisticated gender analysis that also includes men and youth.

The authors carried out an extensive literature review, identified promising programs applying a gender perspective to work with young men, carried out 50 informant interviews with staff working with young men in Botswana, Nigeria, South Africa and Uganda, and 23 focus group discussions and interviews with young men in Nigeria, South Africa and Uganda.

A gendered analysis of young men must take into account the plurality of masculinities in Africa. Versions of manhood in Africa are socially constructed, fluid over time and in different settings, and plural. The key requirement to attain manhood in Africa is achieving some level of financial independence, employment or income, and subsequently starting a family. Older men also have a role in holding power over younger men and thus in defining manhood in Africa. Initiation practices or rites of passage are important factors in the socialization of boys and men throughout the region. For young men in Africa, as for young men worldwide, sexual experience is frequently associated with initiation into adulthood and achieving a socially recognized manhood.

There are a handful of important program examples that explicitly include discussions of gender socialization in their work with young men. Some key operating principles emerge from the various experiences in working with young men in a gender-specific context, including: (i) explicit discussions of masculinities in educational activities; (ii) creation of enabling environments in which individual and group-level changes are supported by changes in social norms and in institutions; (iii) broader alliance-building; and (iv) the incorporation of the multiple needs of young men.

Key challenges include: (i) the need for better impact evaluation; (ii) the scope for scaling up and engaging the public sector; and (iii) the need for documentation, dissemination and technical exchange on program experiences and lessons learned.

Throughout the report, the authors make references to alternative, non-violent versions of manhood and to elements of traditional socialization in Africa that promote non-violence, and more gender-equitable attitudes on the part of young men, and to forms of socialization and social control that reduce the vulnerabilities of young men and reduce violence. Included in this section are examples of young men whose stories represent ways in which young men can question and counter prevailing norms.

These stories and the emerging literature point to some of the following protective factors that promote gender equality, health-seeking or health-protective behaviors and non-violence: (i) a high degree of self-reflection and space to rehearse new behaviors; (ii) having witnessed the impact of violence on their own families and constructed a positive lesson out of these experiences; (iii) tapping into men’s sense of responsibility and positive engagement as fathers; (iv) rites of passage and traditions that have served as positive forms of social control, and which have incorporated new information and ideals; (v) family members that model more equitable or non-violent behaviors; (vi) employment and school enrollment in the case of some forms of violence; and (vii) community mobilization around the vulnerabilities of young men.

Changing gender norms is slow, and it is made even slower by the fact that those who make program and policy decisions often have their own deep-seated biases about gender and are frequently resistant to question those. Efforts to question the sexual behavior of men in the African context, for example, have sometimes run into resistance by national level leaders who perceive that African men themselves are being “bashed” or maligned. The challenge to promote changes in gender norms is to tap into voices of change and pathways to change that exist in the context of Africa. Ultimately it will be the voices of these young men and adult men,
and women, who will promote the necessary individual, community and social changes.

27. Conflict-Sensitive Development Assistance: The Case of Burundi

Juana Brachet, and Howard Wolpe (June 2005)

Since its independence in 1962, Burundi has been mired in an unending cycle of conflict. Successive waves of violence have increased ethnic and regional divisions, while deepening already extreme poverty. Although Burundians traditionally did not mobilize politically around their Hutu and Tutsi ethnic identities, the chronic post-independence violence inserted a mass dimension to what is fundamentally an elite-driven and manipulated conflict. Repeated inter-communal massacres have rendered the population susceptible to ethnically framed political appeals.

The still-evolving peace process begun in Arusha, Tanzania in 1996 offers an opportunity for Burundi to break out of the zero-sum game that has characterized its political and social life since shortly after independence. Although active conflict has diminished, peace and reconciliation remains fragile—as tragically demonstrated by the August 2004 massacre of Congolese Banyamulenge in a refugee camp in Burundi and sporadic eruptions of violence in Bujumbura Rurale province. In this context, the paper explores ways in which development assistance can contribute to the consolidation of peace, framed within a contextualized assessment of Burundi’s conflict using the Bank’s Conflict Analysis Framework.

The conflict analysis finds ethnicity is only one of several cleavages in Burundian society. Although the ethnic divide is perceived to be more prominent because of four decades of manipulation of socio-ethnic identities, there are also important clans, regional and class-based divides. These divides have been exacerbated by: differential social opportunities; a history of violence and impunity; poor economic performance, inequality and environmental stress; failed governance and institutions; and the spillover effects of regional conflict among Burundi’s neighbors.

Four years into the transition that began in November 2001 some factors threaten to escalate Burundi’s conflict, while others are working to dampen the conflict or have an uncertain impact. The large number of “on the brink” factors suggests that there are still many opportunities for development assistance, and traditional and Track II diplomacy to assist in the consolidation of Burundi’s peace process.

The paper notes eight principles to guide development assistance: (i) “do no harm” particularly to avoid reinforcing or triggering conflict causes; (ii) make peace dividends visible to the population; (iii) include short-term issues, especially the restoration of security; (iv) limit the potential for mass mobilization; (v) address the structural causes of conflict; (vi) address the perceptual and attitudinal legacy of the conflict; (vii) ensure that development assistance is consistent and sustained; and (viii) consider the regional context.

The paper reviews a number of development areas where there are opportunities to incorporate the above principles, including: the PRSP process; rural development; infrastructure; security sector reform and demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants; land tenure; employment generation; governance; and the social sectors.

In terms of project design and implementation, the paper emphasizes the need to: engage the elites on the side of peace; invest in bottom-up approaches, especially through inclusive and community-driven interventions; include peace-building components in projects; carefully monitor and assess development interventions in terms of explicit peace-building objectives and indicators; map and consider the multiplicity of variables that affect the peace process; and complement regional stabilization efforts.

28. Survey of the German Language Literature on Conflict

Barbara Müller (October 2005)

Theoretical frameworks, approaches and concepts in the non-English language literature on conflict may differ substantially from those developed in English, yet are only occasionally taken into account in the conflict-related work of international development agencies. This survey identifies German-language theoretical frameworks, concepts and findings in the study of conflict. It follows a very broad approach with regard to phases, levels, causes of conflict and overlap with related areas. The research included literature from Germany, Switzerland and Austria.

Due to the complexity of the issue, and the limited time frame, no comprehensive overview was attempted but rather a compilation of interesting concepts, as well as practical experiences, as food for thought and inspiration. Emphasis was given to practice-oriented concepts and to approaches that may be little known and that have potential for wider applicability.

The main focus is on post-Cold War literature, as the end of this conflict pattern marks a clear turning point in the writing on conflict. Additionally, globalization emerged as a new, structuring force in the 1990s. Since then, different subject areas have emerged, and more attention has been given to conflicts on a regional or local level. Much writing centers on approaches that are considering suitable structures for global or regional problem solving. Much of this relates to the global governance discourse. Others use the European idea and its visions as reference point. Two other themes are related to the causes of war on the one hand and the conditions for and the meaning of peace, on the other. Much of this literature is not primarily meant for practical application. Since most of the concepts of this survey have been developed independently, they do not relate to each other. As a comprehensive framework, the concept of "prevention" and its application to different phases of conflict was used to organize the review of concepts. In a systematic attempt, the concepts are presented according to the level they are aiming at, starting with the global arena and ending at the micro-project level. In all, 58 concepts have been identified and described.

To gain a proper understanding of the delicate nature of conflict intervention, the Contingency Model provides some key insights and serves to select appropriate interventions according to the stage of conflict. It therefore seems to provide the most significant additional benefit by being the only comprehensive conflict management model that has not been completely translated into English. A proper frame to shape actors and issues might be offered by the Systemic Conflict Transformation approach.

Development organizations generate their own instruments for conflict analysis or needs assessments; monitoring indicators; and conflict impact and risk analysis. This survey suggests that there are a number of concepts and approaches that might deserve a closer look.

Several concepts from the economic area can be employed in conflict prevention. Ideas for integrating peacebuilding and preventive
29. Demand-Driven Approaches to Livelihood Support in Post-War Contexts: A Joint ILO-World Bank Study

Piet Goovaerts, Martin Gasser, and Aliza Belman Inbal
(October 2005)

This paper is a collaboration between the ILO and the World Bank, exploring potential applications of demand-driven, community-led approaches to livelihood support in post-war contexts. It is based on review of the two organizations' experience with such instruments in conflict-affected areas, the former in the context of its Local Economic Development (LED) approach and the latter in the context of its Community Driven Development (CDD) approach. The study is based on the premise that demand-driven methods may be uniquely suited to meeting challenges to livelihood support and economic revitalization posed by post-war environments. As a first initiative in an effort to link demand-driven approaches, conflict environments and livelihoods, it is meant to provide a foundation for further discussion. It includes an analysis of contextual factors in conflict-affected communities; a brief description of what demand-driven approaches entail; likely benefits of and challenges to applying these approaches; and operational principles and recommendations for action.

The study suggests seven advantages associated with use of these approaches for livelihood support in post-war environments: (i) facilitating knowledge flows on economic opportunities, threats, needs and locally available resources; (ii) repairing community rifts and rebuilding social and business networks necessary for economic growth; (iii) combating social exclusion and facilitating more equitable economic growth processes; (iv) enhancing flexibility and decentralization of livelihood support to better suit local opportunities and address needs; (v) counteracting problems associated with weak or destroyed formal institutions supporting livelihoods; (vi) empowering communities in their relations with donor organizations and government to meet livelihood needs; and (vii) enhancing the purchasing power capacity of local markets.

Alongside these benefits, this study presents three challenges: (i) tension between achieving quick results to meet urgent needs and engendering sustainable, equitable and inclusive community processes; (ii) vulnerability to resource-capture on the part of powerful, coercive elements present in most post-war contexts; and (iii) danger of community processes reinforcing inequalities rather than counteracting them.

On the basis of the World Bank and the ILO’s experience, this study identifies eight “operational principles” for application of demand-driven approaches for livelihood support in conflict contexts: (i) begin with a comprehensive mapping exercise of livelihood opportunities and resources, building on local capacities, resources and skills; (ii) implement both community-based and individual livelihood support activities; (iii) emphasize three areas essential to post-war reconstruction—namely farming, fishing and construction—and their related support sectors including local trade networks, as well as the support sector to international donor activity; (iv) use short-term “aid sector” opportunities as a springboard to sustainable, long-term economic growth; (v) prioritize credit provision from the outset; (vi) start with small scale livelihood activities, progressively expand scope as resources and institutional capacities increase; (vii) link the local economy with other district economies and with the national economic recovery strategy; and (viii) catalyze information exchange on livelihoods opportunities.

30. Strategic Environmental Assessments: Capacity Building in Conflict-Affected Countries

Rob Verheem and Reinoud Post, with Jason Switzer, and Bart Klem
(December 2005)

The World Bank asked the Netherlands Commission for Environmental Assessment to prepare a first discussion draft on a potential role for a Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) in countries affected by armed conflicts, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Haiti. The paper focuses on questions such as: what should be the purpose of an SEA and when to apply it? How to undertake an SEA most effectively in those situations; is it different from emerging good practice in non-conflict situations? How to build capacity for an SEA in conflict-affected countries: what are priorities and where to start?

The purpose of a SEA in conflict-affected countries should be first and foremost to help preventing natural resources from becoming a source for further conflict in the future. It should aim at strengthening or restoring natural resource-based livelihoods in resource-scarce settings. And to reduce opportunities for natural resource based-trade to fuel war economies. Added to this, the SEA process itself should be designed such that participants are not put at risk, ongoing peace-building initiatives are not jeopardized, and one side is not favored over another in a way that exacerbates divides. On the other hand, the SEA process can be a relatively safe opportunity to bring disputants together over a shared concern with relatively low visibility, i.e., the environment, and thus contribute to peace building.

SEA should only be applied when the environment is a priority and at the same time certain preconditions in the country are met. Priorities include circumstances where environmental issues were or may be a source of conflict, reconstruction actions when badly planned may seriously damage the environment, or when environmental programming could open opportunities to peace-building that could not be better developed in other sectors. In terms of preconditions, an SEA will only be effective where an institution (in most cases the state) exists in a country that has the mandate, the capacity and the willingness to follow up on the key results of agreed actions in an SEA. Stakeholders in the country must also be willing to participate and able to do so without being put at risk. These preconditions mean that in most cases an
SEA will not be a priority during the first stages of reconstruction, when the main focus will be on relief, rehabilitation and institution building. It could be a priority, however, during the later stages, as peace is consolidated and the country transitions into longer-term development. In these cases, of course, SEA capacity building should start before, during the early reconstruction phase.

Carrying out a conflict-sensitive SEA is no different from an ‘ordinary’ SEA, with two notable exceptions: to ensure a conflict-sensitive design there is a need for a more careful preparation of the integrated plan/SEA process and to the selection of appropriate methods and approaches to stakeholder involvement in the SEA process. During preparation more attention should be given to issues such as the historical drivers of the conflict, the issues and individuals that can bring parties together or drive a wedge between them, sites that are contested, tensions between parties such as communities, the state and armed factions. Along the same lines, the methods of stakeholder participation should be selected in a way that they do not worsen divisions among conflicting groups, increase danger for participants, reinforce violence or disempowered local people. Working in conflict sensitive situations means that even more flexibility is required in applying SEA than in non-conflict settings.

Building capacity for an SEA is also not different in conflict-affected countries from other countries, yet should not create tensions by itself. Therefore, the same recommendations apply as stated earlier for stakeholder involvement. A specific point of attention is the conflict or reconstruction ‘context’: learning activities should be focused on core functions of a (post conflict) government and not on institutions destined for closure or major restructuring.

31. Consolidating Indonesia’s Democracy: Conflict, Institutions and the “Local” in the 2004 Legislative Elections

Patrick Barron, Melina Nathan, and Bridget Welsh
(December 2005)

Despite widespread fears of potential violent conflict, Indonesia’s April 5, 2004 legislative elections saw limited incidents of violence and represented a significant step in Indonesia’s democratization process. In order to evaluate conflict and conflict prevention, this study analyzed four diverse provinces—Bali, East Java, Maluku and NTT—from March 15 to May 15, 2004 covering the election campaign, polling day and the immediate aftermath. Studying the legislative elections provided a window through which to examine issues related to local conflict and the role institutions play in managing it. Given the extent to which decentralization has devolved power to the local level, examining the process of local competition helps shed light on the nature and state of Indonesia’s democracy and the institutions that underlie it.

Overall, the elections were peaceful. In the four provinces there were a limited number of election-related conflicts, of which just over 10 percent were violent. This is an impressive achievement. The study shows that the low level of election-related conflict was the product of a number of factors, but especially the lack of interaction between pre-existing forms of conflict and the local electoral processes, as well as a range of conflict prevention measures. Local elites and grassroots initiatives, especially in high conflict areas, played a pivotal role in minimizing tensions.

Although the elections were relatively peaceful, the study highlights institutional weaknesses and the need for increased attention to three broad areas. First, the study found that one of the major factors underpinning whether election-related conflict was likely to arise/escalate was prior history of local conflict. While conflict prevention was by and large successful in reducing electoral violence, in many cases the measures tended to address symptoms rather than causes. This highlights the need to rethink the way in which we conceptualize conflict and conflict resolution. Conflict in Indonesia is not just an episodic, event-driven occurrence, but is a symptom of broader problems, cleavages and interests. Thus, unresolved conflicts during the electoral period may potentially feed into existing tensions and lead to future outbreaks of conflict.

Second, these deeper more structural efforts to reduce conflict can only be undertaken by strengthening institutions that can positively channel tensions. One of the major study findings was that the performance of institutions in Indonesia (both those focused on managing the electoral process, as well as state institutions more broadly) was mixed: capacity, professionalism, and constructive societal engagements were lacking in many localities. These institutional shortcomings resulted in high levels of protest and, in some cases, attacks against state institutions.

The 2004 legislative elections were the first time that the police were solely in charge of internal security and it successfully adopted conflict prevention measures that resulted in peaceful elections. However, the police performed best at deterrence when its presence by sheer force of numbers reduced the likelihood of clashes. This study emphasizes, however, that successful conflict reduction occurs when police adopt community policing approaches which involve consulting and working with a broad range of actors from local government and the military, to community actors and community-based organizations. This underscores the need to deepen and broaden police reform. At the same time, by adopting a supporting role and remaining neutral, the military contributed positively to the ongoing security reforms required to consolidate democracy in Indonesia.

Finally, the study’s most significant finding was the pivotal role local actors and institutions played in preventing and managing conflict. While national agencies provided important policy guidelines, the success of conflict reduction measures depended on local knowledge, ownership and implementation at the regional levels of state institutions, the quality of cross-institutional coordination and cooperation, and the role of other local actors. The importance of local knowledge and ownership underscores the need to recognize and support community-driven peace-building efforts where they are successful and build capacity at this grassroots level where efforts are less developed.

32. Fearing Africa’s Young Men: The Case of Rwanda

Marc Sommers
(January 2006)

Male youth in Africa are leading the charge to cities, rapidly transforming the historically rural-based African population into a mostly urban one. Youth feature in military outfits across the continent, are being devastated by the AIDS epidemic, and their place on the margins of most reconstruction and development efforts in Africa threaten to undermine sustainable development. Perhaps more than any other African nation, Rwanda is at a crossroads. For years, it stood as the least urbanized country in the world, but now has the world’s highest
urbanization rate. Most male youth, some of whom were foot soldiers of the 1994 genocide, remain pinned on the margins, receiving little attention or support. This is a potentially disastrous situation, given their significant demographic numbers, their legacy of being drawn and forced into acts of extreme violence, and limited opportunities to contribute to Rwanda’s development.

This paper sets the case of Rwanda’s male youth within the larger context of Africa’s urbanization and burgeoning youth population. It investigates the pervasive images of male urban youth as a menace to Africa’s development and its primary source of instability. It then turns to the Rwandan case, examining the desperate conditions its young men (and women) faced before the civil war (1990-94) and 1994 genocide, as well as their experience of it. It draws on field interviews with Rwandan youth to consider the situation male youth face in the post-war, post-genocide era. The paper situates the Rwandan case within the debate on whether concentrated numbers of African male youth are dangerous (the youth bulge theory), as well as prospects for Rwanda’s male youth population.

The case of Rwanda’s male youth illustrates the inherent weakness of the youth bulge theory and those who argue that high concentration of African male youth is inherently dangerous. Their frightening, predictive message reveals more about their proponents than their male youth subjects. It may be more useful to ask why certain people are so threatened by some young men rather than why those young men seem so threatening. It is also useful to bear in mind the central irony surrounding Africa’s urban youth: “...they are a demographic majority that sees itself as an outcast minority.” The situation confronting most Rwandan youth, and most of their counterparts in Africa remains alarming. Their plight constitutes a largely silent emergency. Tragically, their general peacefulness makes them all the more invisible.

The situation facing Rwandan youth today is likely not as punishing as before the 1994 genocide in large part because an urban outlet, to some degree, exists. But that does not mean that life for Rwanda’s youth has transformed from mainly hopeless to primarily hopeful. The plight for the overwhelming majority remains extremely serious. Rwanda’s National Youth Policy provides a potential platform to support youth, but its implementation will require consistent and sustained efforts and resources.

If positive engagement and appropriate support for members of the marginalized youth majority in Africa is to be enacted, it will be necessary to remember that location matters. A component of successfully working with youth is to do it where they reside. Again, the example of post-war, community-based reintegration work is instructive. The term reintegration, in fact, inaccurately describes what is actually required because it assumes that people seek to reintegrate. They may not. Youth in cities, for example, may wish to integrate into new communities, not reintegrate into old ones—a decision that should be recognized, respected, and supported. Similarly, people in rural or urban communities may have very good reasons to avoid reintegrating themselves into social and economic arrangements that existed before war. The backward glance inferred by reintegration may be precisely what many people, youth in particular, do not want.

The fact that this paper addresses the fear and invisibility of Africa’s male youth should in no way obfuscate the even greater invisibility and needs of their silent colleagues—female youth. Research in 20 war-affected countries over the past decade and a half shows how no population group is more at-risk and overlooked with more regularity than adolescent girls and young women. The contrast between their plight and those of their male counterparts is instructive. In too many contexts, the relatively few youth programs and organizations that exist are dominated by male youth. Meanwhile, existing women’s programs and organizations are often dominated by more senior women. Stating this is in no way intended to undermine or question the needs of other war-affected populations. On the contrary, it is intended to shed light on the unnoticed lives of most female youth in war-affected contexts—the results for them are frequently harsh and hidden.

33. Mainstreaming Gender in Conflict Analysis: Issues and Recommendations

Sanam Naraghi Anderlini (February 2006)

This report was commissioned by the CPR Unit in an effort to improve the gender sensitivity of the Bank’s Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF). It raises a number of issues and offers specific recommendations on ways to adapt the existing conflict framework and its indicators to better reflect the fact that conflict affects women and men differently. The report also includes a number of links where additional information and resources on gender can be found and should be consulted as part of a conflict analysis process.

Although the goal of conflict analysis is to enhance the sensitivity to conflict in the operations of development agencies such as the World Bank, existing frameworks across agencies that use them focus too much attention on the causes of conflict at the expense of the drivers of peace—i.e., those factors or social dynamics that may be acting to strengthen a community’s resilience to conflict. Most conflict assessment frameworks either neglect or include only cursory treatment of gender issues. Perhaps more importantly, while conflict analysis frameworks tend to provide a macro-level strategic assessment of the drivers of conflict, the inclusion of gendered perspectives provides a more ‘people-centered’ approach, and stands a better chance of allowing analysts to explore the drivers of peace. Without a gender lens, the analysis can lead to a skewed understanding of the situation under study, and lead to overlooking critical elements in society that are withstand or resisting conflict. At the same time, there is still very limited understanding of the impact of conflict on men and their capacities to adapt to changes in socio-economic and political conditions.

Gender variables are missing in most frameworks. This is partly the result of (i) a general tendency to conflate gender with women, (ii) insufficient data and information on the ‘gendered’ impact of the development, conflict and poverty nexus, and (iii) the fact that when and if gender is addressed, it is typically covered under social issues or indicators, rather than mainstreaming gender throughout the analysis.

A desk review of eight conflict analysis frameworks and a secondary review of three additional frameworks shows that the majority make some mention of women and/or gender-related issues, but none devote sufficient space to the issues. Users are generally advised to take note of particular gender issues but there is rarely any guidance on how this could be done or potential impacts, both on conflict and on peace. In some agencies, there is recognition of the importance of gender in this type of analysis,
but there are constraints in terms of either the availability of gender specialists, or gender groups within agencies tend to marginalize, making gender mainstreaming difficult.

The CAF itself can benefit from more systematic integration of gender variables into its current structure. Certainly the collation of more gender disaggregated data and analysis of this information would have enormous benefit. The greater challenge, however, is ensuring that analysts using the tool are themselves aware of and recognize the significance of gender issues to conflict and programming for poverty reduction across all issues. This can be done through, first, a combination of short term training or workshop sessions as they prepare to use the framework, as well as through exposure to sample studies or examples of where and how gender matters to governance, security, economic development and social issues.

Second, awareness needs to be matched with the ability to reflect on, analyze and link gender indicators into the broader picture being developed. Too often, there is ad hoc mention of violence against women, or youth unemployment, but insufficient attention is given to understanding the impacts or the gendered nature of the issues and variables. Third, beyond awareness and analysis, teams need exposure to possible opportunities for alleviating the situation, in part by identifying existing efforts at mitigating conflict and poverty in their specific case, or perhaps by drawing on experiences elsewhere.

The report includes a number of recommendations on ways to gender sensitize the CAF, including: methodology, framework, variables, staff training, ToRs for consultants and partners, contacts with counterpart governments, stakeholders and consultations, report structure, documentation, and piloting of a gender sensitized CAF. Appendices include a discussion of armed conflict and the feminization of poverty, details of the desk review of conflict analysis frameworks utilized by other agencies, and suggestions of additional indicators to consider for the different categories of variables included in the CAF.

34. Facilitating Transitions for Children and Youth: Lessons from Four Post-Conflict Fund Projects

Aly Rahim, and Peter Holland
(May 2006)

This review draws on international practices to highlight promising approaches and assesses four PCF projects that address the needs of children and youth. Lessons from these projects are consistent with the lessons from other post-conflict program evaluations. The following guidance emerged:

Voice, Inclusion, and Community Participation. Voice and inclusion projects should always involve youth and (to the extent possible) children from design to completion; and staff must be willing to listen to and act upon what they propose. The project might involve them in participatory monitoring and evaluation, as a further means of empowerment.

Demobilization and Reintegration of Young Ex-Combatants. During demobilization, young ex-combatants should be housed in dedicated facilities, with critical services such as psychosocial support, family tracing, health, community sensitization, and rehabilitation of social skills. Over the long term young combatants can benefit more from psychosocial support provided through the family and communities than from institutionalized trauma programs.

Young ex-combatants consistently express a desire to resume formal education but they also face economic responsibilities, and therefore require education programs suited to their needs. Traditional vocational training programs have had an inconsistent record; other programs, such as second-chance education opportunities for overage and working youth, the rehabilitation of family-based small enterprises and apprenticeship programs, have shown more promise.

Employment Generation and Livelihoods. Securing livelihoods can help to foster stability in post-conflict environments. Employment generation programs should capitalize on existing assets, and care must be taken to match skills training with demand, by linking employers and trainers.

Labor-intensive projects offer great potential for broad-based growth, but careful planning is needed to balance the labor intensity and cost effectiveness of infrastructure projects, and to ensure that young women have access to the same training and learning opportunities as their male counterparts.

Emergency Education. Emergency education programs can lessen the psychosocial impact of war by providing physical, social and cognitive protection, and by disseminating vital survival messages. It is critical that all children have access to some form of structured educational activity to help them overcome the psychological disruption of conflict and take part in the restoration of cross-cutting and bonding social capital, that is, strong social cohesion both within and between distinct groups. Exclusion from education ultimately results in a second-class group of children and youth who become a post-conflict at-risk category.

Donors should not neglect local first responses to educational needs, but should assimilate these community interventions into the emergency education strategy. However, inappropriately designed local responses can further entrench conflict, and donors must discern between effective and potentially harmful local responses.

35. The Impact of Armed Conflict on Male Youth in Mindanao, Philippines

Shobhan Rajendran, David Veronesi, Nasrudin Mohammad, and Alimudin Mala
(July 2006)

This study is a companion to an earlier study on Gender and Conflict in Mindanao that was heavily focused on the impact of armed conflict on women (including young women), and stems from a need to understand the situation of young men in the context of the conflict in Mindanao. It also complements a study conducted in early 2005 that examines the impact of the conflict on men, women and youth in five provinces of Mindanao. The specific objectives of this study are:

- To gain an increased understanding of how the conflict has affected male youth; and
- To develop recommendations that respond to their most immediate needs.

The study covered seven provinces in four out of the six regions in Mindanao. The field research focused on communities heavily affected by years of conflict. The research was based on qualitative data collection, including focus group discussions with male youth, individual interviews, and key informant interviews with national and local experts.

The study shows that despite growing up in an environment shaped by violence, young
Thania Paffenholz, and Christoph Spurk

36. Civil Society, Civic Engagement, and Peacebuilding

With the proliferation of conflicts in the 1990s and the increasing complexity of the peacebuilding efforts confronting the international community, donors and the peacebuilding discourse increasingly focused on the potential role of civil society. This led to a massive rise in civil society peacebuilding initiatives but it was not matched by a corresponding research agenda and debate on the nexus between civil society and peacebuilding. There has been little systematic analysis of the specific role of civic engagement and civil society in the context of armed conflict and even less regarding its potentials, limitations and critical factors. The aim of this study is to:

- analyze existing research knowledge on the nexus of civil society and peacebuilding,
- examine operational experiences and lessons learned, and
- develop operational principles, guidelines and questions for further research.

The study provides an overview of the concept of civil society, its history and understanding in different contexts. It elaborates an analytical framework of civil society functions derived from democracy theory, development discourse and case study knowledge, which in turn is applied to the context of peacebuilding. Peacebuilding theory and practice is analyzed in terms of its civil society functions and their validity, scope and content. The results show that the mere existence of and support for civil society does not automatically lead to peacebuilding. A good understanding of civil society’s roles and potential for peacebuilding is required. It is also important to recognize that certain roles and functions of civil society vary depending on the phases of conflict and may not all be equally relevant and effective in all conflict phases.

Research suggests that merging the civil society discourse in democracy theory, with the development and civil society peacebuilding discourse leads to a much clearer and focused understanding of the role of civil society in peacebuilding. In particular, applying a functionalist analytical framework is a major contribution to the current debate. The study presents and applies an analytical framework developed from the fields of democracy and development, and based on seven core functions of civil society: (i) protection; (ii) monitoring and accountability; (iii) advocacy and public communication; (iv) socialization and a culture of peace; (v) conflict sensitive social cohesion; (vi) intermediation and facilitation; and (vii) service delivery.

The study also suggests the need to analyze the enabling conditions for civil society to fulfill a constructive role in peacebuilding and approach this from a holistic understanding of what are the needs of civil society. Not only is it necessary to identify the relevant functions of civil society within peacebuilding, but also the composition of civil society. This would avoid the common misconception that conflates support to civil society with support to NGOs. Moreover, there is a need for a better understanding of the conditions and obstacles that affect civil society’s ability to play a constructive role in peacebuilding, including the behavior of potential or existing ‘uncivil’ society actors and the role of fragile or authoritarian states.

The study draws 10 major lessons: (i) civil society has important roles to play in peacebuilding; (ii) beware of simple civil society enthusiasm; (iii) current support is not based on a full understanding of civil society and its composition; (iv) not all civil society functions are equally effective in all conflict phases; (v) civil society can also have a dark side; (vi) the role of the state is equally important; (vii) civil society is more than NGOs; (viii) NGO peacebuilding impact must be critically assessed; (ix) the timing and sequencing of various civil society functions are crucial for achieving impact; and (x) there is a need for a holistic and comprehensive approach to civil society.

The study also suggests four areas for further research: (i) the appropriateness and impact of civil society functions; (ii) the role and selection of actors; (iii) the enabling environment for civil society; and (iv) questioning the role of service delivery as a peacebuilding function.

37. Rule of Law Reform in Post-Conflict Countries: Operational Initiatives and Lessons Learnt

Kirsti Samuels
(October 2006)

This paper aims to provide a tour d’horizon of common operational initiatives and policy approaches adopted by agencies and institutions involved in the area of rule of law reform in fragile or post-conflict countries, and identify key lessons highlighted in the policy literature.

There is a growing focus on rule of law reform in aid and development packages. However, as discussed in this paper, the numerous rule of law assistance programs implemented in post-conflict or fragile countries have had few lasting results on the somewhat intangible social-end goals associated with rule of law reform: (i) a government bound by law (ii) equality before the law (iii) law and order (iv) predictable and efficient rulings, and (v) human rights. Despite two decades of experimenting, still little is known about how to bring about these difficult and interdependent social goods.

In the non-conflict development context, rule of law reform appears to have been moderately more successful. However, even in those cases, there is little solid analysis in the literature evaluating why those strategies were relatively effective, or how they could be adapted to post-conflict settings. It is clear that the difficulties faced are severely heightened in the post-conflict context, where capacity and the rule of law starting point are very low and the country is often facing urgent law and order and dispute resolution problems.
The paper reviews some of the key lessons to have emerged from the last two decades of rule of law experience, typically undertaken in fragile or post-conflict countries (and more generally in developing countries) by a multiplicity of uncoordinated actors and projects. There is a striking lack of systematic results-based evaluations of the programs, especially independent rigorous cross country evaluations, or comprehensive case studies of all the programs in a country. The rule of law expertise that exists is not centralized or institutionalized, and resides in individuals who have often learnt through trial and error. The field lacks a common foundation or basic agreement on the goals of rule of law reform, on how different aspects should be sequenced to avoid them working against each other, and fundamentally what sorts of strategies are effective. The paper highlights 11 important lessons: lack of coherent strategy and expertise; insufficient knowledge of how to bring about change; a general trend to focus on form over function; emphasis on the formal legal system over informal and traditional systems; short-term reforms in contrast to longer term strategies; wholesale vs. incremental and context-determined change; the need for local change agents; how to engender local ownership; rushed and compromised constitution making; poorly designed training and legal education programs; and the need to sequence and prioritize change.

The paper also includes detailed annexes on (i) key international actors involved in rule of law reform (ii) comprehensive examples of rule of law interventions in conflict-affected and developing countries, organized by actor, as well as (iii) a detailed reference list organized by major themes.

In this complex situation, it would be difficult, and probably unhelpful, to devise a rule of law strategy for the Bank without first undertaking comprehensive and well structured evaluations of how the different rule of law reform projects have interacted and played out in a range of post-conflict countries, as well as in some of the apparently more successful non-conflict countries. Given the state of development of this field, a literature review of the type undertaken in this paper can only serve as a starting point. However, a carefully designed, comparative field project based on systematic results-based case study evaluations, and drawing on the expertise of those that have worked in this field for years, could contribute substantially to the evolution of the field of rule of law reform. It would help give direction, centralize, institutionalize, and render accessible some of the lessons that should be guiding future programming in this area. These case analyses will be part of the second phase of this work at the Bank with the aim of contributing to the rule of law programming in post-conflict countries.

38. Remittances and Economic Development in Somalia: An Overview

Samuel Munzele Maimbo (November 2006)

This collection of papers examines the role and impact of Somalia’s remittance system. After an introduction, Chapter II examines how a dynamic private sector, powered by remittances from abroad, has managed to thrive in a country that is a failed state and among the poorest in the world. Adapting well and even flourishing in a stateless conflict ridden economy, private sector activities have emerged in trade, money transfer services, transport and telecommunications. At the household level, recent studies show that remittances constitute 40 percent at the income of urban households. While recognizing the benefits of remittances, it also cautions that further private sector growth is limited in a country without a functioning government and essential public goods.

Chapter III illustrates the positive impact of remittances by focusing on the collapse of the public education system and mass emigration as two features of the last two troubled decades of Somali history. The remittances received by a substantial minority of city-dwellers improve their economic status and access to education. In Hargeisa, the case explored in this chapter, remittances often play a central role in the livelihoods of those that receive them and help finance education, in some cases allowing the family to choose higher cost forms of education. Children in the households of people receiving remittances have relatively good school attendance rates. Moreover migrants often encourage families to whom they send money to educate their children. Sibling solidarity plays a particularly crucial cultural role in the education and welfare of children and young people.

Chapter IV distinguishes myth from reality regarding Somali Remittance Companies, such as: the remittance businesses are owned by Somalis in Somalia; only the Somalia diaspora transfers money through them; that remittance organizations are not legal or registered and do not pay taxes; and that client funds are not safe. These companies are not as informal as often assumed. Instead, they have the full trust and confidence of their customers, have an extensive network of agents that service all towns and villages in Somalia, as well as all major cities in countries populated by Somali diaspora; run operations that are more efficient than traditional financial services; and most importantly, are well placed to serve rural areas that would be little served by traditional banking institutions.

Remittance companies face severe challenges in setting up and sustaining operations within and outside Somalia. In Chapter V, Shire, an experienced remittance operator, lifts the veil on the complexities of remittance operations in conflict-affected countries. He links these challenges to the dynamic business environment in which companies have to engage with regulators; international, national and local authorities; global and local market competitors, the media and the public. After discussing the threats and opportunities presented by each, he offers recommendations on how remittance companies, banks, regulators and the international development community can ensure the continuation of remittance services, build trust and strengthen mutually beneficial partnerships. To do otherwise, he warns, would result in the disruption of a service that not only provides a lifeline during periods of conflict, but also prevents humanitarian disasters in Somalia (another wave of mass displacement and emigration, instability, and resentment and extremism).

The final chapter focuses on the broader financial sector, acknowledging that rebuilding a financial system after a period of sustained conflict is a challenging task. Trying to do so while the political process of nation building is still at its nascent stages makes the task doubly challenging. Managing the expectations of government, the private sector and the public is complicated by the evolving assumptions made about the likely direction of the political process and the resulting state structure. The authors argue that it can be done and offer a primer on rebuilding the financial sector after conflict, including the types of reforms required, some of the necessary pre-conditions, and options to consider over the short to medium term, versus medium to long term.
Grievances over perceived inequalities in resource distribution and political authority between the center and periphery are often a root cause of intra-country separatist conflicts. Decentralization of political and economic powers is a commonly chosen strategy for quelling separatist demands. In Aceh, at the northwest tip of Indonesia, demands from local elites for greater control of the resource pie have been evident since the discovery of one of the world’s largest natural gas fields in the early 1970s and have helped fuel a near-30 year conflict over the political status of the province that claimed 15,000 lives. Demands for greater political authority to manage economic, social, and religious affairs stretch back even further to the time of Indonesian independence.

The Helsinki peace agreement (MoU) signed by the rebel Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Indonesian Government in August 2005 is the latest of a series of special autonomy deals—many not fully implemented—which aim to keep Aceh within Indonesia. Key tenets of the agreement, which follows and extends Indonesia-wide decentralization, are arrangements for the province to retain 70 percent of natural resource revenues and additional resource allocations from Jakarta. Significant devolution of political powers include the allowance of local political parties, independent candidates, control over many areas of policymaking, and the incorporation of local cultural and religious symbols and practice into the political sphere. Redefining center-periphery relations is seen as the means of quelling separatist unrest and cementing Aceh’s place within the Indonesian state and nation.

This paper challenges the notion that addressing center-periphery inequality will in itself result in sustainable peace in Aceh. The authors argue that an evaluation of the (potential) impacts of the decentralization intrinsic in the peace agreement on conflict must look at the flow of economic and political resources within Aceh, and, more specifically, at the local government institutions that manage their distribution. There will be plentiful resources within Aceh that can be used for developmental purposes. In 2006, local government in Aceh received revenues five times higher than before decentralization in 1999. The implementation of the MoU will further increase the inflow of public resources, and the US$ 8 billion tsunami reconstruction budget and ongoing post-conflict donor and central government support will also provide a windfall. Yet local government institutions do not presently have the capacity to effectively manage and spend such resources. Corruption is widespread. Mechanisms for managing political competition are weak. Recent government expenditure has largely been concentrated in urban centers, captured by politically-connected elites, and continues to disenfranchise the rural poor. It is largely on the basis of these inequalities and grievances that GAM has been able to mobilize resentment toward the center and forge a political identity at odds with Jakarta; if such inequalities are not addressed, Aceh will continue to remain prone to conflict.

The paper draws on data from the Aceh Public Expenditure Analysis (APEA) and fieldwork associated with the World Bank’s support to the current Aceh peace process. The authors argue that over the medium-to long-run, the key challenge for securing peace in Aceh is ensuring resources and political power are equally and transparently distributed within Aceh. Ensuring such ‘internal equality’ is at least as important as tackling ‘center-periphery inequality’, both to address community grievances and to prevent elites from mobilizing based on local discontent. This requires building strong, just, accessible and legitimate institutions with a focus on delivering services, fighting corruption, improving transparency, increasing capacity, and ensuring participation. International actors can support this by engaging directly with the state and by helping to create an enabling environment that allows good governance to flourish. Long-term engagement, working with a diverse range of partners, and local understanding are key.
B. Joint Publications and Occasional Papers

Integrating Mental Health and Psychosocial Interventions into World Bank Lending for Conflict-Affected Populations: A Toolkit

Florence Baingana, and Ian Bannon (September 2004)
HNP/CPR

Among the many adverse effects of conflict is the impact on the mental health and psychosocial wellbeing of large parts of the population in countries and communities affected by conflict. These effects are often referred to as the ‘silent wounds’ of conflict because they frequently remain hidden, under-reported in post-conflict needs assessments, and consequently un-addressed in most donor-supported post-conflict reconstruction programs.

The Toolkit is based on the premise that failure to address mental health and psychosocial disorders in populations that have experienced mass violence and trauma caused by conflict will impede efforts to enhance social capital, promote human development and reduce poverty. It is also based on a growing body of evidence showing that interventions to address mental health are both desirable and feasible, in order to support post-conflict recovery, the consolidation of peace and reconciliation, and the transition to sustainable development and poverty reduction. A number of studies document the link between mental disorders and psychosocial suffering and dysfunction. This dysfunction persists over time and is linked to decreased productivity, poor nutritional, health and educational outcomes for children of mothers with these problems, and inability to participate in and benefit from development and poverty alleviation efforts.

Support for mental health in conflict-affected countries can thus make an important contribution to meeting then Millennium Development Goals.

The Toolkit discusses approaches and offers guidance on integrating mental health and psychosocial interventions into Bank lending and support for countries emerging from violent conflict. The Toolkit is the product of a partnership between the Bank’s Health, Nutrition and Population Team in the Human Development Network, and the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction (CPR) Unit in the Social Development Department. The Bank’s work on mental health was made possible by the generous support of the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) and the Center for Mental Health Services (CMHS), both of the U.S. government, during June 2002-November 2003. Support for the Bank’s mental health work from the MacArthur Foundation and the World Federation for Mental Health (WFMH) during February 1999-May 2002 also contributed to the activities that made this Toolkit possible.

ACS Staff Working in Conflict-Affected Countries: Listening to their Voices

Dee Hahn-Rollins, Stephanie Schalk-Zaitsev, and Alan Tidwell (February 2005)
CPR

Administrative and Client Support (ACS) staff working in the Bank’s local offices of conflict-affected countries play and important role in supporting the organization’s post-conflict-reconstruction efforts. Local staff in these countries faces difficult challenges in their normal administrative work, but they are also directly and personally affected by the post-conflict tensions and constraints that play out in the societies they live in.

Recognizing that ACS staff in conflict-affected country offices face more difficult and complex challenges, and as part of its aim to support knowledge sharing and professional development, the Bank’s ACS Network sought to better understand and learn from ACS staff in three conflict affected countries—Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Democratic Republic of Congo—about the issues and problems they face on a day-to-day to basis.

This report picks up the experiences of these staff. It is based on three structured videoconference workshops where participants were asked to respond to the question, ‘How has the trouble in your country affected you and your work in the Bank?’ The areas covered included: job performance and management, security and safety, work-life balance, workflow, occupational health and stress, communications, job design, and visiting missions.

Not surprisingly, in-country security and safety was a concern in the three country offices, including care and concern for visiting missions, as well as the personal well-being of ACS staff themselves. The heavy workload under difficult conditions due to logistical and communications constraints was also an important concern. The need for training and managing stress also rated high in ACS staff concerns.

ACS staff offered a number of suggestions for managers of country offices as well as advice for other ACS colleagues that may face similar issues. For managers, ACS staff emphasized the need for support and training when new offices are opened, being a good listener and communicator, as well as being sensitive to the impact of conflict on the work of ACS staff. For colleagues, ACS staff emphasized the need for teamwork, being accountable for their own work, learning more about the Bank’s work and to help their own families better understand the work they are involved in.

The report’s authors also include a set of recommendations. For headquarters, they emphasize the need for a targeted human resources strategy to support ACS staff in conflict-affected countries, which should include the identification of a focal point in headquarters, tailored training programs for ACS staff, and a web-based information source. They also include a set of recommendations for country office managers and staff, focusing on staff development, systems and procedures, sensitization of visitors, communications, and stress management. They also recommend extending the project to other conflict-affected country offices and reviewing the experiences of other agencies in managing country offices in conflict-affected countries.

Mental Health and Conflicts: Conceptual Framework and Approaches

Florence Baingana, Ian Bannon, and Rachel Thomas (February 2005)
HNP

The paper provides an overview of the Bank’s role in conflict and development, and explores the links between poverty, social capital and mental and psychosocial disorders in conflict settings. The premise of the paper is that increased understanding and targeted interventions to deal with mental health can play an important role in effective post-conflict reconciliation and
reconstruction. It also argues that there are effective approaches that can be adapted to different conflict settings. The paper presents a conceptual framework based on experiences in and outside the Bank that can help guide interventions and approaches to address mental health and psychosocial disorders in conflict-affected countries. The paper briefly examines mental health approaches adopted by the Bank in West Bank and Gaza, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Uganda, Burundi and Afghanistan. These brief country illustrations suggest there are a variety of approaches and a growing body of experience on which Bank country teams can draw. The paper concludes by noting areas where additional research would seem appropriate and presenting suggestions for further Bank analytical and operational work.

Improving Child Health in Post-Conflict Countries: Can the World Bank Contribute?

Flavia Bustreo, Eleonora Genovese, Elio Omobono, Henrik Axelsson, and Ian Bannon

June 2005

Human Development Network (HDN)

The paper provides a number of key messages. First, children, particularly under five years, experience the highest mortality, morbidity and mental health impairment in conflict-affected settings. Second, a health system's ability to provide adequate health care to its population is severely affected by conflict. Third, there are approaches that have been effective in reducing the negative effects on conflict on children. Fourth, the case studies of World Bank operations illustrate that the Bank has an important role to play in conflict settings. Successful operations exist and have been characterized by early engagement, partnerships and donor coordination, sound planning for the transition from relief operations to longer-term strategies, strong institutional support to Ministries of Health and other stakeholders, adequate and flexible financing instruments and delivery basic health packages. Fifth, the Bank can strengthen its efforts to address the health needs of children affected by conflict by making the needs of children an essential and explicit part of its work in conflict settings, focusing more on the mental health of children, improving its formation sharing within the Bank, adapting and streamlining procurement procedures, developing toolkits, and training staff on how to better incorporate child health in conflict and post-conflict operations, for example during the needs assessment phase of a program.

Youth in Post-Conflict Settings

Ian Bannon, Peter Holland, and Aly Rahim

November 2005

Youth Development Notes: 1(1)

Youth development is an emerging focus in World Bank across many sectors, yet much remains to be learned. This issue of youth Development Notes examines the unique challenges confronting youth living in post-conflict settings: demobilization, reintegration, employment generation, emergency education, as well as voice, inclusion and community participation. The note highlights lessons from the literature and from the field on how to facilitate the simultaneous transitions that youth face, from conflict and childhood, to peace and adulthood.

Parliaments as Peacebuilders: The role of Parliaments in Conflict-Affected Countries.

Mitchell O’Brien

2005

World Bank Institute (WBI) Working Paper

WBI and Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA)

The changing nature of conflict and the increase in intra-state conflict during the 1990s, followed by its slow decline since the turn of the century has shifted the focus away from the resolution of intra-state conflict to examining how emerging conflict can be better managed to avert the incidence of violent conflict. Parliaments are coming to the fore as natural forums which are uniquely designed to address contentious issues and relationships in conflict-affected societies thereby contributing to peacebuilding efforts.


The paper argues that one of the best tools a nation has at its disposal for managing conflict and poverty is parliament. Parliament is a prime institution through which to address the divergent interests of multiple groups because of the nature of the parliamentary process and parliaments' ability to build relationships within parliament and within the broader community. The role of parliament in conflict-affected countries becomes even more pronounced when you consider the correlation between poverty and conflict; by addressing issues of poverty, equitable distribution of resources and economic development, parliamentarians can attempt to guard against the creation of an enabling environment that is prone to the escalation of conflict.

Some of the strategies parliaments and parliamentarians can adopt in order to reduce the incidence of conflict and effectively manage conflict when it does emerge are discussed in broad terms. In particular, the paper looks at participation and representation; parliamentary functions and oversight; the role of civil society and the media; the opposition; promoting socio-economic equality; rule of law; decentralization; and regional parliamentary peacebuilding. It is hoped that by developing a better understanding of the nexus between parliament, poverty and conflict, parliamentarians will be more aware of the array of options open to them when seeking to contribute to conflict management in conflict-affected societies.

The Investment Climate in Afghanistan: Exploiting Opportunities in an Uncertain Environment

Finance and Private Sector Development Unit, South Asia Region, and The World Bank

December 2005

In a post-conflict environment, attracting new foreign and domestic firms is central to private sector development. New decisions about investment (in existing or new firms) usually depend on the availability of five basic factors: political and economic stability and security; clear unambiguous regulations; reasonable tax rates that are equitably enforced; access to finance and infrastructure; and an appropriately skilled workforce. In Afghanistan, these conditions are lacking. The challenges facing the government of Afghanistan in addressing these constraints and in turn attracting further foreign and domestic investment cannot be underestimated. This report was prepared to assist the government of...
Afghanistan in addressing its private sector development challenges.

**Demand-Driven Approaches to Livelihood Support in Post-War Contexts: Progress Report, March 2006**

This dissemination note reports progress on a partnership between the ILO and the World Bank’s Jakarta Office to lay the foundations for a common conceptual framework between the Bank’s community-driven development (CDD) approach and the ILO’s local economic development (LED) approach through concrete collaboration in post-tsunami and post-peace agreement interventions in Aceh, Indonesia. The collaboration builds on the conceptual piece and core principles developed in a previous study (see Working Paper No. 29).

**Gender, Justice, and Truth Commissions, June 2006**

This study reviews the gender-related aspects of the work of Truth Commissions in Peru, Sierra Leone, and South Africa, as expressed in their daily work, in the drafting of the commission’s mandate, in the participation of civil society institutions, and in the preparation of the final report. The study is the result of a collaborative effort between the Bank’s PREM Gender Group, the CPR Unit, the Legal and Judicial Reform Practice Group, and the LAC Public Sector Group. Following a description of the experiences in the three countries, the study focuses on the Peruvian case to illustrate how the formal and informal justice systems have responded to the gender-relevant findings of the Truth Commission. The study also provides general suggestions for the consideration of World Bank staff, particularly in the incorporation of gender issues into the Bank’s post-conflict interventions in relevant sectors. Finally, the study reviews some basic indicators of progress and impact in Bank-financed interventions in post-conflict and transitional settings.
C. Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction (CPR) Unit Dissemination Notes

1. Rebuilding the Civil Service in a Post-Conflict Setting: Key Issues and Lessons of Experience
(March 2002)
Recreating a professional, meritocratic civil service is especially challenging in a post-conflict setting. The experiences of East Timor and Kosovo offer a number of lessons and suggest the types of issues that need to be addressed.
The note was prepared by Robert Beschel Jr. (SASPR).

2. Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-Conflict Countries
(April 2002)
Aid is considerably more effective in augmenting growth in post-conflict situations than in other situations, but the pattern of aid matters. Key post-conflict priorities should be social policies first, followed by sectoral policies and macro policies last.
The note was prepared by Paul Collier, then Director of the Bank’s Development Research Group (DECRG).

3. Child Soldiers: Prevention, Demobilization and Reintegration
(May 2002)
Demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers is difficult, but country case studies show they can become productive members of their communities. Key factors are political will, including child soldiers in peace agreements, resources to meet their special needs, and community and family involvement.
The note summarizes the findings from a study by Beth Verhey published in the Africa Region Working Paper Series.

4. The Structure of Rebel Organizations: Implications for Post-Conflict Reconstruction
(June 2002)
Applying organizational dynamics to the study of rebel groups yields a number of interesting findings. Whether a rebel group is organized around material incentives or shared identities has dramatic implications for how the organization behaves during the conflict, for negotiations to end the conflict, and for the design of demobilization, disarmament and reintegration programs.
The note was prepared by Ian Bannon of the CPR Unit.

5. The Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF): Identifying Conflict-Related Obstacles to Development
(October 2002)
The Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction (CPR) Unit has developed a Conflict Analysis (CAF) to integrate sensitivity to conflict in Bank assistance, and to enable Bank teams to consider factors affecting conflict when formulating development strategies, policies and programs.
The note was prepared by Shonali Sardesai and Per Wam of the CPR Unit.

6. Colombia: Development and Peace in the Magdalena Medio Region
(November 2002)
The Program for Development and Peace in Magdalena Medio, supported by a Bank Learning and Innovation Loan, promotes a community-based participatory approach to development and peace in one of the most conflictive regions in Colombia. With a heavy emphasis on the strengthening of social capital and productive sub-projects, the Project offers important lessons on development interventions in conflict-affected regions.
The note was prepared by Jairo Arboleda (LCCO) and Elsie Garfield (LCSE R).

7. Conflict and Labor Markets in Manufacturing: The Case of Eritrea
(December 2002)
Eritrea is facing a critical labor shortage, partly the result of recent conflict. Mobilization has drained white collar and skilled workers, resulting in high female participation rates, rising wages and declining employment. High unit labor costs are affecting private sector competitiveness and export potential. Swift implementation of the demobilization program coupled with appropriate training is urgently needed.
The note was prepared by the CPR Unit, drawing on a Bank Investment Climate Assessment for Eritrea by the Africa Private Sector Group.

8. The Economic and Social Costs of Armed Conflict in El Salvador
(January 2003)
El Salvador’s civil war (1979-81) had devastating economic and social costs. This note estimates the ground lost in terms of growth forgone, higher poverty and worsened social indicators. Had the conflict been avoided, income per capita could be almost double in 2000, the poverty rate lower by 15 percentage points and Millennium Development Goals social indicators substantially better. El Salvador’s experience shows that conflicts are not only extremely costly in economic and social terms, but the recovery takes an inordinate amount of time, even with very good post-conflict policies and reforms.
The note was prepared by Humberto Lopez (LCC2C).

9. Aid, Policy and Peace: Reducing the Risks of Civil Conflict
(February 2003)
This note, summarizing recent research by Collier and Hoeffler, presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of the effects of economic policy and aid on the risks of conflict. It finds that aid and policy do not have direct effects on conflict risk. However, both directly affect growth and dependence on primary commodity exports, and these in turn affect conflict risk. Simulating the effect of a package of policy reform and increased aid on the average aid recipient country, it finds that if sustained for five years, the risk of conflict is reduced by nearly 30%.
The note was prepared by Ian Bannon (CPR Unit) based on research by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler.

(March 2003)
Although the Bank was created to help rebuild European countries after World War II, putting the ‘R’ back in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development has been a case study in institutional change for the multilateral agency.
The note was written by Collin Scott and Ian Bannon of the CPR Unit.
11. Nigeria Strategic Conflict Assessment: Methodology, Key Findings and Lessons Learnt (June 2003)

This note reviews experience in conducting a multi-donor conflict assessment in Nigeria, which included participation and support from DFID, UNDP, USAID and the World Bank, as well as Nigeria’s national Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution.

The note was prepared by Sarah Lyons (JPA) and Dirk Reinermann (AFR).

12. Financing Aid Arrangements in Post-Conflict Settings (May 2003)

This note, summarizing the analysis and recommendations of a subsequent CPR Working Paper, looks at issues related to financing modalities and aid management arrangements in post-conflict situations. It makes a number of recommendations based on a review of several recent case studies, of which four are assessed in detail: West Bank and Gaza, Bosnia and Herzegovina, East Timor, and Afghanistan. It focuses on the lessons of experience on multi-donor trust funds and on the recipient government’s aid management architecture in post-conflict settings.

This note was prepared by Salvatore Schiavo-Campo (consultant).


This note discusses the relevance and design of mental health care interventions in post-conflict situations. Mental health disorders and psychosocial problems arising from conflict need to be addressed as part of post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation efforts. The note presents a conceptual framework for mental health interventions in post-conflict settings and illustrations from a number of countries.

The note was prepared by Florence Baigana (Senior Health Specialist), with contributions from Ian Bannon and Signur Asland of the CPR Unit.


This note looks at the challenges of capacity building in post-conflict countries, including options for creating capacity and the trade-offs between speed and longer-term impact, the need to ensure that aid management agencies include sunset provisions, and six proposed general lessons for more sustainable capacity building.

The note was prepared by Alastair J. McKechnie, Country Director for Afghanistan.

15. Social Change in Conflict-Affected Areas of Nepal (January 2004)

This note reports on the findings of a recent DFID-commissioned study to assess social change in conflict areas of Nepal. It looks specifically at the impact on hierarchical relations based on gender, caste and ethnicity. All parts of society have been affected by positive and negative social changes. Most of the positive changes have not yet become imbedded in the fabric of social relations but are enforced through coercion and the threat of violence. The challenge for development actors will be to capitalize on these positive changes and effectively address problems of exclusion and social inequality.

This note was prepared by Lynn Bennett (SDV Nepal) and Ian Bannon (CPR Unit), based on the findings of the report Social Change in Conflict Areas, commissioned by DFID Nepal.

16. Redefining Corporate Social Risk Mitigation Strategies (February 2004)

This note looks at how companies engage with stakeholders in areas with high social or political tensions. It argues that most social risk-mitigation strategies often exacerbate tensions and risks to companies. The note offers a checklist of risk indicators and a set of questions companies can use to gauge the state of relations with communities and other stakeholders. The real risk to corporations is not whether they take measures to benefit local communities, but the types of relations they build—not so much what they do, but rather how they do it.

The note was commissioned by the CPR Unit and prepared by Luc Zandvliet from Collaborative for Development Action (CDA).

17. Colombia: The Role of Land in Involuntary Displacement (March 2004)

Internal displacement in Colombia has become more prevalent and serious. Expulsion of land users to gain territorial control is increasingly a tactical element in the conflict. High land inequality makes it easier to uproot populations. Providing assistance to displaced populations does not reduce their propensity to return. Together with other measures, a land policy that increases tenure security for those at risk of displacement and improves access to land can not only help to reduce the incidence of displacement but also make it easier for the displaced to cope. Public spending, especially on education is also critical.

The note was prepared by Ian Bannon (CPR) based on the findings of a World Bank report, Colombia: Land Policy in Transition.

18. Rwanda: The Impact of Conflict on Growth and Poverty (June 2004)

The human, social and economic costs of Rwanda’s Genocide have been staggering. Although the country has made remarkable progress over the last ten years, especially in terms of recovering some of the ground lost on education and health, GDP per capita remains much lower than what it would have been without the Genocide. Per capita GDP today would probably be between 25-30% higher if the conflict had not taken place. About one fourth of the population in poverty today can be said to be poor as a result of the Genocide.

This note was prepared by Humberto Lopez (PRMPR), Quentin Woodon (AFTPM) and Ian Bannon (CPR Unit).

19. Local Conflict in Indonesia: Incidence and Patterns (July 2004)

Local conflict characterizes many countries such as Indonesia, but research has tended to focus on large-scale, ‘headline’ conflicts. Using a unique dataset that maps conflict incidence across all of Indonesia’s 69,000 villages, and combining quantitative and qualitative methods, the study applies an empirical framework to analyze potential links between conflict and poverty, inequality, shocks, ethnic and religious diversity, and community-level associational and security arrangements. Positive correlations with conflict include unemployment, inequality, natural disasters, changes in sources of incomes, and clustering of ethnic groups within villages.

The note was prepared by Ian Bannon (CPR Unit) based on the report Local Conflict in Indonesia: Measuring Incidence and Identifying Patterns by Patrick Barron (EASES), Kai Kaiser (PRMPS) and Menno Pradhan (EASPR).
20. Landmine Contamination: A Development Imperative

(October 2004)

More than 80 countries are affected by landmine contamination, of which approximately 35 are seriously contaminated, most of them developing countries. It has become clear that addressing the problem of landmine contamination is not only a humanitarian imperative, but is also a precondition for sustainable development and the restoration of livelihoods in many mine-affected states. The Bank can assist to reduce landmine contamination where there is country demand, and in line with its mandate and operational guidelines for financing landmine clearance.

This note was prepared by Ian Bannon (CPR Unit) with the collaboration of Earl Turcotte of the UNDP Mine Action Team.

21. Guatemala: The Role of Judicial Modernization in Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Social Rehabilitation

(January 2005)

The Peace Accords of 1996 brought an end to 36 years of armed conflict in Guatemala and signaled the beginning of a complex and challenging process of reconstruction and social reconciliation. A central plank of the consensus expressed in the Peace Accords was the overhauling of Guatemala’s public institutions, which were seen to exacerbate the social and economic injustices that had contributed to the conflict. The Judicial Branch was identified as one of the key state institutions in a position to create the necessary conditions to help a divided and diverse population emerge from decades of conflict, social and economic exclusion, and mistrust in public governance. A World Bank supported Judicial Modernization Project is in its third year of implementation and helping in this process along with other donors (UNDP, Sweden, Finland, IDB, Soros Foundation and others).

This note was prepared by Waleed Haider Malik, Lead Public Sector Management Specialist in the Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank.

22. Conflict and Recovery in Aceh: An Assessment of Conflict Dynamics and Options for Supporting the Peace Process

(August 2005)

On August 15th the Government of Indonesia and the GAM signed a Memorandum of Understanding aimed at ending almost 30 years of armed conflict in Aceh. This note summarizes the results of a rapid conflict assessment prepared by the World Bank to understand conflict dynamics, to analyze possible scenarios after signing of the agreement, and to identify tools and mechanisms that the government, donors, and other stakeholders could use to support the peace process. The assessment was carried out from July 26 to August 19, 2005.

The note concludes that the improvement in security that will result from the peace process will provide new opportunities to reach the poorest in Aceh. The vertical conflict between GAM and the government, however, is likely to transform into a horizontal scramble for resources and revenue streams, underpinned by violent criminality. Addressing these issues will require the use of frameworks that take into account the multiple layers of conflict in Aceh, as well as a focus on longer-term institution and peace-building.

This note was prepared by Patrick Barron, Samuel Clark, and Muslahuddin Daud of the World Bank, Indonesia.

23. The Dynamics of Conflict, Development Assistance and Peacebuilding: Sri Lanka 2000-2005

(February 2006)

Significant transformations in the socio-political and economic landscape of Sri Lanka in recent years encouraged five development partners—World Bank, Asia Foundation, and the governments of the United Kingdom, Netherlands and Sweden, to collaborate on a conflict assessment in 2005. This reflects a growing trend in the development partner community of combining efforts, pooling resources, and taking advantage of comparative strengths to engage in conflict analysis exercises.

The multi-donor conflict assessment revisits the underlying structures of conflict, identified in the previous conflict assessment, and explores the current dynamics of conflict factors with a particular focus on the peace process and international engagement. This note presents key findings of the assessment, in particular, the approaches supported by development partners in Sri Lanka. While this is drawn solely from the Sri Lanka experience, it is likely to have a broad relevance to many such countries.

This note was prepared by Peter Harrold (Country Director, Sri Lanka) and Shonali Sardesai (Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit).


(July 2006)

In recent years, international organizations like OECD and the World Bank have concluded that standard principles of Public Finance Management (PFM) are equally applicable to all areas of the national budget, including the security sector. To date however, very few reviews of PFM systems have included the security sector, not least because many governments tend to be overly protective about scrutiny of public finances in this sector, and as a result most donors have been reluctant to engage. As a result, the bulk of public expenditure reviews have focused on non-security components of the national budget, which represent an important but incomplete slice of national spending. Despite growing awareness of the importance of extending PFM reviews to the security sector, so far the challenge of moving beyond basic principles toward the adoption of a more comprehensive approach to building an effective and fiscally sustainable post-conflict security sector remains elusive. In countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Sierra Leone, national authorities and donors are struggling to regain control of unaffordable levels of security sector spending, much of it financed directly by donors. In many cases long-term external assistance may be required for the security sector, generating severe trade-offs with other priority sectors which also require long-term external support. Overcoming the legacy of a fiscally unsustainable and poorly managed security sector calls for full application of PFM principles to support the establishment of checks and balances required to establish a wholly accountable security sector. The recent World Bank PFM review of Afghanistan, perhaps the first example of such a review, provides a number of lessons, summarized in this note.

This note was prepared by Peter Middlebrook, Rima Simpson, and Karene Melloul, based on the report: Afghanistan, Managing Public Finances for Development.
25. What Role for Diaspora Expertise in Post-Conflict Reconstruction? Lessons from Afghanistan, and West Bank and Gaza

(July 2006)

The Afghanistan Expatriate Program (AEP) and the Palestinian Expatriate Professional Project (PEPP) recruit expatriates through a merit-based system to build capacity in government departments and agencies in Afghanistan and West Bank and Gaza respectively. Beyond individual success stories, both initiatives faced the tremendous challenge of translating individual inputs into institutional capacity building and as a result, both programs could not generate the expected increase in capacity of the local civil service. Indeed, strengthening management and technical capabilities of the ministries and agencies in both projects was achieved only sporadically. The one real value of the expatriate programs was the expatriates’ knowledge of the local language and environment and, in the case of the AEP, a single window funding for short-term consultants. However, such programs are only stop-gap and unless they build capacity over the medium term, as donor funding diminishes they are unsustainable for recipient governments. This dissemination note aims to capture lessons learned from the AEP and PEPP programs.

This note was prepared by Rima Simpson based on evaluations conducted by Karene Melloul and Colin Scott.
Civil wars are a core development issue. Intrastate conflicts can dramatically slow a country’s development process, especially in low-income countries, which are more vulnerable to civil conflicts. Conversely, development can reduce the risks of civil war. When development succeeds, countries become safer; when development fails, countries experience a greater risk of being caught in a conflict trap. Ultimately, civil war is a failure of development.

Breaking the Conflict Trap identifies the dire consequences that civil war has on the development process and offers three main findings. First, that civil war has adverse ripple effects, which are often not taken into account by those who determine whether wars start or end. Second, some countries are more likely than others to experience civil war and therefore the risks of civil conflicts differ considerably according to a country’s characteristics, including its economic structure and performance. Finally, Breaking the Conflict Trap explores viable international measures that can be taken to reduce the global incidence of civil war and proposes a practical agenda for action.

The report was prepared under the supervision of Nicholas Stern, Chief Economist and Vice President at the World Bank. It was written by a team led by Paul Collier (Director, Development Research Group) and consisting of V. L. Elliott, Havard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol, and Nicholas Sambanis. It builds on research by the Economics of War, Crime, and Violence project in the World Bank Development Research Group. The project received funding from the Norwegian, Swiss, and Greek governments; the World Bank Post-Conflict Fund; and the World Bank Research Committee.


Violent conflict can spell disaster for developing countries and their neighbors, stunting and even reversing the course of economic development. World Bank research on the causes of conflict and civil wars finds that the countries most likely to be affected by conflict are those whose economies depend heavily on natural resources. Natural Resources and Violent Conflict first explains the links between resource dependence and conflict, and then considers what can be done to help reduce the risk of civil war in these countries.

In this collection of previously unpublished essays by experts in the field, contributors consider the risks of corruption, secessionist movements, and rebel financing. They also consider the roles played by government, the international development community, country government’s, and propose an agenda for global action. Focusing on what we can do collectively to reduce the likelihood of civil war, contributors to this volume suggest practical approaches and policies that could be adopted by the international community—from financial and resource reporting procedures to commodity tracking systems and enforcement techniques, including sanctions, certification requirements, and aid conditionalities.


The Role of the World Bank in Conflict and Development review’s the Bank’s experience in conflict and development. It traces the evolution of thinking inside the institution, how it has sought to adapt to more complex international challenges and how it is adapting instruments and approaches to better integrate sensitivity to violent conflict into its programs, programs and strategies. It also identifies a number of cross-cutting themes where the Bank is working to better understand the drivers and impacts of conflict, and areas that will require further work over the coming years.


The book provides a comprehensive analysis of gender and conflict and focuses on the policy relevance and implications for development institutions. It is the first book to link the World Bank’s work on gender mainstreaming with its agenda on conflict and development.

The authors explore several gender dimensions of conflict: female combatants,
sexual violence, formal and informal peace processes, legal frameworks, work, rehabilitation of social services, and community-driven development. Within each of these dimensions, they examine how conflict changes gender roles. Moreover, they suggest policy options to take advantage of opportunities afforded by conflict to encourage development of inclusive and gender-balanced social, economic, and political relations in post-conflict societies. Finally, the authors identify challenges and questions requiring additional research and analysis.

“Gender, Conflict, and Development” is the product of a collaborative effort between the Conflict Research Unit of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations, “Clingendael,” and the CPR Unit. The Social Development Team in the Bank’s Africa Region also supported this publication.


Every education system has the potential to exacerbate or mitigate the conditions that contribute to violent conflict. Therefore, every community or country needs to ensure that its citizens have access to appropriate education, before, during, and after conflict. Yet schools and education systems—whether contributing factors to the conflict or not—are invariably debilitated by conflict. This leaves them weakened, damaged, and under-resourced just when communities, governments, and international agencies need them to play a role in simultaneously rebuilding and transforming themselves and the societies they serve. The book focuses attention on the key role of education in the reconstruction of societies after conflict and in preventing the recurrence of violent conflict.

This twin mandate of reform and reconstruction offers significant opportunities and enormous challenges to societies emerging from conflict. Maximizing opportunities calls for strategies that can be carried out in the context of depleted human and institutional resources and unpredictable cash flows.

Reshaping the Future offers an overview of the main findings of a study of education and post-conflict reconstruction. The study, undertaken by a small team in the Human Development Network Education Department under the leadership of Peter Buckland, builds on work already undertaken in the Bank and in consultation with the CPR Unit, and draws on a review of literature, a database of key indicators for 52 countries affected by conflict, and a review of 12 country studies.


After more than a decade without an active program in Somalia, the World Bank reengaged in 2003 in partnership with UNDP and with the collaboration of other development partners engaged in the Somalia Aid Coordination Body mechanism. While reengagement activities over time would provide the Bank with vital knowledge about the country situation, given the mosaic of complex conflict relations apparent in Somalia, the country team decided to increase its knowledge base on the factors and dynamics at play through a systematic study of conflict in the country.

The objectives of the conflict analysis exercise is to increase the Bank’s and its partners’ understanding of conflict sources and dynamics in the three main regions of Somalia to help guide policy/program development in the country. Separate background studies for this report were conducted in northwest, northeast, and south-central Somalia.

In addition to resources from the World Bank (Africa Region, Social Development Department and the Learning Board), the study was made possible with funds provided by UNDP, DFID and the Government of Sweden. An advisory group, comprising WSP-International, the World Bank, UNDP, DFID, the European Union, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), USAID, Life and Peace Institute, and the Swedish Embassy in Nairobi, advised the conflict analysis exercise to ensure consistency with other efforts.


Civil war has long inspired—and, indeed, necessitates—significant research into its likely causes, its characteristics, and its consequences. In recent years, a model of civil war onset developed by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler has proven to be especially influential. Using large-N econometric tests, Collier and Hoeffler demonstrated that, for given levels of political and social grievance, the greater the opportunity for organized rebellion within a country, the more likely civil war is to occur. Additionally, they argued that the existence of such opportunity is largely determined by particular socioeconomic conditions, such as widespread poverty, low levels of education, and heavy dependence on natural resources.

Understanding Civil War uses the Collier-Hoeffler model as a point of departure. Not only does it apply the model to a set of case studies in order to learn more about them, but it also studies the model itself, using the cases to revise and expand the model. In so doing, it moves beyond correlations and delves into how and when the variables identified by Collier and Hoeffler lead to civil war. By tracing out the process of conflict escalation, the book takes the next step toward explaining when, where, and why civil war is likely to occur. The book advances our theoretical and empirical understanding of civil war and takes us closer to the goal of developing appropriate policy interventions to reduce the prevalence of civil war.


This study builds on a previous strategic conflict assessment conducted in 2000 and commissioned by the United Kingdom’s Department of International Cooperation. This study represents a joint initiative by five partners—the governments of the Netherlands, Sweden and the U.K., the World Bank, and The Asia Foundation—to analyze political events since 2000 and prospects for a political solution to Sri Lanka’s ‘national question.’

Like the previous study, this Strategic Conflict Assessment aims to do three things: First, to provide an analysis of the structures and dynamics of conflict and peace in Sri Lanka since 2000. Second, to examine how international engagement has
interacted with conflict and peace dynamics, with a particular focus on aid donors during this time period. Third, to identify how the strategies and approaches of international donors can best engage with and help strengthen domestic peacebuilding efforts. The primary end users of this assessment are expected to be aid donors, but it is hoped that it will be of interest to a wider audience inside and outside Sri Lanka.


The book, produced by WBI, is part of the World Bank’s effort to understand the positive role education can play in fostering respect for diversity and to redress the potentially negative role education can play in sustaining the social divisions and prejudices that help perpetuate generations of inequality and protracted conflict.

The book’s eight chapters cover: the links between violence, democracy and education; the role that changes in the education system can play to encourage respect for diversity; the role of textbooks in diversity; the role of textbooks in Apartheid and post-Apartheid South Africa; the experience of Romani children in European schools; textbooks and diversity in the US; social analysis in the design of Bank education projects, with an application to Sri Lanka; and guidelines for international assistance.


This volume provides a contribution to the nascent but growing interest in male gender and masculinity issues as it relates to development policy and practice. It attempts to bring the gender and development debate full circle. From a focus on empowering women during the late 20th century, the first years of the new millennium are witnessing a wider examination of the entire spectrum of gender and development, with the goal of moving closer to a more holistic gender framework that addresses gender as it pertains to both women and men and examines gender as a system.

Men and gender issues are analyzed from a variety of approaches and experiences, with a strong emphasis on young men and their transition to adulthood, as well as links to violence and conflict. It starts with an overview chapter that examines gender issues across countries and then moves into specific topics, first in Latin America and the Caribbean and then in Sub-Saharan Africa. A final chapter summarizes some of the key messages and suggests policy directions.

Country cases covered in this volume include the Caribbean, Colombia, the *favelas* in Rio de Janeiro, Rwanda and the role of excluded youth in the genocide, masculinity in Africa and its links with conflict and HIV/AIDS, masculinity in rural Kenya, and the role of youth in the axis of conflict in West Africa.