AFRICA RURAL DEVELOPMENT STUDY
BACKGROUND PAPER

RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN TANZANIA:
A REVIEW OF UJAMAA

by

F. Abraham
and
F. Robinson

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PREFACE

1. This report was prepared as a background paper for the Africa Rural Development Study (ARDS) conducted by the Development Economics Department of the World Bank. The ARDS was prompted by the very substantial interest in the East and West Africa Regional Offices of the Bank in finding ways of designing rural development projects which, despite the limited financial and manpower resources available for rural development in Africa, will effectively "reach" large numbers of low income rural people. Thirteen rural development projects and programs from sub-Saharan Africa, representing diversity in location, design and implementation, were selected for analysis (see attached list). The reviews raised a consistent set of questions regarding design, implementation and performance of these projects and programs to provide the basis for a comparative evaluation. The main report on the Africa Rural Development Study by Uma Lale summarizes the lessons that can be learned from these project reviews.

2. Each of the background papers is based on existing information, supplemented by field investigations. With rare exceptions, no additional quantitative data were collected. Because the availability of data varied widely between projects, there are substantial differences in the scope of the individual project reviews.

3. Since most of the data were collected by other agencies, the IBRD can not attest to the accuracy of the statistical information which appears in this report. The views expressed in this report are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IBRD.
RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN TANZANIA:
A REVIEW OF UJAMAA

I. RURAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY

A. Rural Development: Pre-Arusha Declaration

1. The basic ideology which underpins Tanzania's rural development policy is subsumed by the concept of Ujamaa. Ujamaa can be translated literally as "familyhood," and it is meant to connotate the mutual obligations and expectations found in the institution of the extended family. The content of this ideology did not merge whole but rather evolved over the years, primarily in the speeches, policy statements, and essays of President Julius Nyerere.

2. Immediately prior to Independence, Nyerere spoke of a "new synthesis" of the lessons of East and West and Tanzania's traditions, which would create a new pattern of society. The values implicit in this tradition include a type of socialism and democracy which were practised in the extended family and which Nyerere wishes to see preserved and expanded to the entire nation. One of the functions of the Ujamaa ideology is to draw from Tanzanian traditions and society a concept or set of principles with which Tanzanians can identify and around which they can unite.

3. The successful consummation of such unity and identification could serve important social, political, and economic ends. It is necessary to assert the continuity of African culture from the period before European colonial penetration, through the colonial era, to the period after Independence. It is highly desirable politically to give this continuity a national perspective by emphasizing "Tanzanian" or "African" qualities. And, for Nyerere, it is imperative that a means of social and economic organization be devised that will facilitate cooperative agricultural enterprise in an overwhelmingly rural, agricultural country. But in the first half of the 1960's, Ujamaa remained a set of ideas and ideals without an operational program. That program was to be provided by the Arusha Declaration of February 1967 and a series of subsequent policy statements, especially "Socialism and Rural Development" (September 1967) and "TANU Guidelines—Mwongozo" (February 1971).

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The significance of the course events after 1966, however, cannot be fully appreciated without some reference to the experience of the Village Settlement Program—the rural development strategy of the early sixties.

Influenced partly by the recommendation of the World Bank Mission that visited Tanganyika in 1959, and partly dictated by political imperatives of the times, the Tanganyikan Government launched a two-pronged attack on the problem of rural underdevelopment in its first five year plan—the improvement approach and the transformation approach. The improvement approach implied the continuation of the conventional and pre-independence extension approach and attempted to bring about increased production without changing the traditional social and legal structures. The second, or transformation, approach was aimed at bringing about rapid production increase under Government-created institutions and legal system. The approach entailed the removal of selected farmers from their traditional and "conservative" settings and placing them in nucleated village settlement schemes. The aim was to provide the necessary infrastructure in terms of roads, water, schools, clinics, and modern inputs under close Government supervision, to ensure the production of priority crops. The Village Settlement Program also envisaged the eventual conversion of the settlement schemes into cooperative societies.

Of the two approaches, priority was given to the transformation approach. The improvement approach was deemed too slow and unlikely to ensure rapid increase in production. In terms of extension services, infrastructure, provision of inputs, and marketing, the approach was considered too costly because the farmers lived in scattered homesteads. It was further considered to be a strategy that could not easily be monitored, nor the results easily predicted, since it relied on a very large number of small farmers. Lastly, from the psychological and political points of view the improvement approach was not dramatic enough, and President Nyerere had stated that Tanganyika would achieve results in ten years that the colonial powers could not achieve in nearly a century.

Under the guidance of the Village Settlement Agency, the executive arm of the Village Settlement Commission (which never convened), seventy-four village settlement schemes were to be established between 1964 and 1969. Each village was to have 250 families and was estimated to cost approximately $150,000; each farmer was expected to make a cash income of $150 per year. The Village Settlement Program was launched in 1963, and by the end of 1965 there were twenty-two pilot projects of which "only one had reached the stage of forming a self-governing co-operative society ... the remaining still being managed and financed by the Government." 1/

7. The Village Settlement Program as a development model failed partly because of overspecialization relative to its capacity to generate economic benefits and partly because of the dependency-ethnic it fostered among the settlers. There were a number of disputes, often bitter, between the Village Settlement Agency staff, which included the scheme managers, and the elected settlers' committees over areas of responsibility, especially control of scheme finances. The selection of settlers was done unsystematically and, partly because of the defective recruitment mechanism and partly because of tight and often unimaginative management, the settlers had little or no identification with the scheme. On several schemes the settlers feared that they had been conscripted into the army or National Service.

8. In April 1969, the Government announced that no new schemes would be initiated under the old Village Settlement pattern, rather the emphasis would shift toward modernizing existing traditional villages, and those schemes already on the ground would be converted into Ujamaa villages.

9. Nor did the Village Settlement Program coincide with the socialist content of the Ujamaa ideology. Several of the schemes, e.g., Urambo Tobacco Scheme, were based entirely upon individual small-holders. In fact, the Program was characterized by ambivalence over whether to locate schemes in already developed areas, where a maximum economic return could be expected, or in the less developed areas, where the need for Government assistance was greatest.

8. Rural Development: Post-Arusha Declaration

10. An awareness of existing and incipient political and social problems that had continued, or developed, after Tanzania's Independence was revealed in February 1967 with the promulgation of the Arusha Declaration and a rapid succession of policy statements and explanations. The Declaration unequivocally pledged the Party and Government to the establishment of a socialist state in Tanzania and, as a first step in the new direction, placed severe restrictions on outside incomes for Party and Government leaders. In this document Nyerere explains that three basic assumptions made a traditional Ujamaa life-style possible: mutual respect, communal living with social equality based upon the common control of property, and the obligation for those able to work to do so. Fortunately, he says, the modern trend in rural Tanzania has been in the direction of small-scale capitalist farming and inchoate

1/ Nyerere, reprinted in Freedom and Socialism, op. cit., pp. 231-250.
agricultural class division between farm laborers and those employing them. There were, Nyerere noted, some rural groups working in the spirit of Ujamaa, but they were few and made no real impact on either agricultural output or the developing social structure of the country.

11. Such was the situation as Nyerere saw it in September 1967, when "Socialist and Rural Development" was released and in which he states, "the objective of socialism in Tanzania [is] to build a society in which all members have equal rights and equal opportunities, in which all can live in peace with their neighbours without suffering or imposing injustice, being exploited or exploiting, and in which all have a gradually increasing basic level of material welfare before any individual lives in luxury." 1/

12. Given the fact that 95 percent of the population lived in the rural areas, a program of socialist development had to start with the "socialization" of land. If the rural sector was not restructured along socialist lines, the commitment to build a socialist state would be a meaningless rhetoric even if the industrial and commercial sectors were nationalized. Given the commitment to build a socialist state and the belief that economic development without social development was unacceptable, Ujamaa became the practical and political expression of that commitment and that belief.

13. The ideas and ideals of Ujamaa take on more concrete form when Nyerere describes the type of communities that rural Tanzanians should live in:

A group of families will live together in a village, and will work together on a common farm for their common benefit. Their houses will be the ones they build for themselves out of their own resources; their farm will be owned jointly, and its produce will be their joint property. The activities of the village, and the type of production they undertake, as well as the distribution of crops and other goods they produce, will all be determined by the village members themselves. In other words, we shall have an up-to-date and larger version of the traditional African family... 2/

Ujamaa-based rural development means the creation of a nation of cooperative farm units based on equality and non-exploitation as opposed to a nation of individual peasant holdings. Ujamaa as the foundation for a socialist structure not only connotes cooperative production and marketing, but also means to provide for the rural population a framework for meaningful political participation and social intercourse. Ujamaazation


implies thus much more than the creation of nucleated villages. It refers to a total integrated strategy for enabling farmers to participate fully in, and eventually be responsible for, planning and decision-making in production, marketing, distribution, and definition of the quality and texture of rural, political, and social life.

The strategy to be adopted in building Ujamaa as presented in all of the Government's policy statements is one of persuasion and "step-by-step transformation." In some areas the Government and TANU would attempt to persuade families who lived in scattered homesteads to move into villages, but the farmers would for some time continue to retain their individual holdings. In others, ten-house cell leaders, or some parents and their school children, would be persuaded to start communal plots, cultivated cooperatively with proceeds shared on the basis of the amount of work done. The next step would be to gradually increase the communal plots and decrease the private plots. Thus, complete Ujamaa is the last stage in the process of gradually building up a nation of cooperative economic units.

However, between 1967, the year of Arusha, and 1971 insufficient progress occurred in the area of development along the lines of Ujamaa. This failure was implicitly attributed to the Government bureaucracy's inability or unwillingness to move vigorously in the proper directions. The proposed solution was to put more power into the hands of the people. The set of Party guidelines called Mwongozo, already mentioned, was issued in February, 1971, to help achieve this effect. Although neither Ujamaa nor Ujamaa villages were mentioned in the document, the concerns discussed and the principles enunciated within it would have important implications for the Ujamaa village development program.

Mwongozo constitutes the most recent broad statement of Tanzania's perception of the problems, including economic progress and national defense and security, confronting the country and the African continent, and ways of dealing with those problems.

Africa, states Mwongozo, is locked in a "liberation struggle." The protagonists are "those who have for centuries been exploiting Africa's natural resources and using the people of this continent as their tools and as their slaves" and those Africans who have "decided to engage in the struggle to liberate themselves". 1/ The problem of development (economic or otherwise) is not merely one of the relationship between the Tanzanian people and their resources, but a triangular relationship among the Tanzanian people, Tanzanian resources, and those outsiders who would attempt to exploit both. Although it does not deal comprehensively with alignments in the perceived struggle, the following breakdown does not distort the sense of the document.

THE WORLD

Imperialist Countries
Colonialist Countries
Neo-Colonialist Countries
Racist Countries
Capitalist Countries
"Puppet" Countries

Revolutionary movements of Africa, Asia, and Latin America

versus

Minorities fighting for justice and human equality anywhere, especially in the USA.

AFRICA

Colonial Countries:
Portugal and Spain

Imperialist Countries:
Britain, France, Belgium

Racist Regimes:
South Africa, Rhodesia

Capitalist:
Europeans, Americans

"Puppet" Regimes:
Uganda under Amin, an example

Revolutionary liberation movements of Africa

versus

Revolutionary countries: for example, Tanzania, Guinea

TANZANIA

Indigenous feudalist and/or capitalist exploiters who are supported by outside exploiters, are counter revolutionary, and are potential "puppets"

The Tanzanian people as represented by TANU.

It is within the framework of these perceived power relationships that Mwongozo attempts to set Tanzania's development strategy priorities, and it is the TANU leader's view of these relationships that leads to the statement: "For a people who have been slaves, or have been oppressed, exploited and humiliated by colonialism or capitalism, 'development' means 'liberation.'" 1/ Mwongozo maintains that "liberation" can be

1/ Ibid., p. 6.
achieved only by the people themselves, acting through TANU. Hence, two imperatives are laid down: to educate the people in the proper ideology and to get the power of self-determination into the hands of the masses. The dilemma basically is how to convince the Tanzanian people to follow voluntarily the path to development which (in the opinion of the leaders) they ought to follow.

18. Mwongozo is a macrocosmic statement of the relationship between global and/or continental problems and the problems of Tanzanian development, and it concludes that what is needed first is strong national unity and security, built around TANU policies. It quotes the Arusha Declaration's warning against "...internal stooges who could be used by external enemies who aim to destroy us" 1/ and maintains that political education will enable the people to identify these enemies, their strategies, and the manner in which they conflict with Tanzania's convictions and goals. To defend itself, given Tanzania's inability to field a large conventional army,"...it is imperative to start training a militia for the whole country, which will work in cooperation with the regular army." 2/ Only after establishing a position deemed most suitable to Tanzania's defense and security does Mwongozo address the question of economic development.

19. It is in terms of the social and political ramifications of economic development that Mwongozo states, "Any action that gives the people more control over their own affairs is an action for development, even if it does not offer them better health or more bread." 3/ To understand Tanzania's development strategy one must not minimize the integrated economic-political-defense framework which informs that strategy. From the Tanzanian leaders' point of view, under colonialism, imperialism, and capitalism, Africa was conquered, exploited, and humiliated. Under "flag" independence, "puppet" regimes—many through military coups d'etat—have been established, a neo-colonial system created, and Africa continues to be exploited. Africa's priorities, therefore, must be to eliminate any remaining colonial powers, free itself from neo-colonial control, overthrow minority racist regimes, and guard against capitalist commercial and/or ideological penetration. In all its undertakings, Tanzania's policies must be consistent with these continental priorities because Tanzania's own ultimate ability to progress is dependent upon meeting these priorities.

20. In brief, Mwongozo holds that the basis of Tanzania's development has to be the people themselves. TANU represents the people, and it

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1/ Ibid., p. 5.
2/ Ibid., p. 6.
3/ Ibid.
is the Party's responsibility to lead the people by guiding their institutions—Government, parastatals, and national organizations—in order to "safeguard national independence and to advance the liberation of Africans," 1/ without which the economic progress of Tanzanians cannot take place. The decentralization of development planning and management aims at facilitating the implementation of Party policies by effecting a higher level of participation by the people and increasing the involvement of the Party in both development and Government affairs.

II. THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

A. Organizational Frame: Pre-Decentralization

21. Before the decentralization of the administration in July 1972, almost all of the development activities in the regions and districts were controlled by the concerned ministries or agencies in Dar es Salaam. With the exception of the promotion of Ujamaa villages, which was regarded as too massive an operation to be left to any one body or organization and consequently was left to every rural worker who understands the objective of Ujamaa villages, all programs in Ujamaa villages were linked vertically to the parent ministry or agency, although there was an Ujamaa Division of the Ministry of Rural Development and Regional Administration. Thus, a water supply program in an Ujamaa village would be the responsibility of the Ministry of Water Development and Power; a clinic, that of the Ministry of Health; agricultural extension, that of the Ministry of Agriculture, etc. From an operational viewpoint, the implication of such an organizational framework for the Ujamaa villages was that programs were designed and details worked out and implemented in a "vertical" fashion, with little or no bilateral integration and limited involvement of the rural population. Despite both the national commitment to Ujamaa as the vehicle of socio-economic development and the Government's declared policy to work toward development in a "balanced" manner, the organizational framework was such that coordinated packages of activities could not be carried out successfully at either the Ujamaa village level or the district and regional levels.

22. Problems of development at the Ujamaa front arose because of deficient planning and ill-defined responsibility for the promotion and follow-up of Ujamaa villages. First, the Party regarded itself responsible not only for defining and issuing socialist policies for development but also for translating those policies into action programs. With nothing much more than President Nyerere's pamphlet "Socialism and Rural Development" to guide its activities, the Party embarked on a nation-wide "Ujamaazation" program, and the Regional and Area Commissioners became

1/ Ibid., pp. 3-l.
the major agents of transformation. Secondly, ministries and agencies with any rural program component were to cast their programs within an Ujamaa framework. Thirdly, the cooperative movement was to be reorganized so that it could embrace both marketing and production.

23. Partly because of the very large number of bodies involved in bringing about rural transformation, partly because of the lack of guidelines for the formation of Ujamaa villages, and partly because of the shortage of trained and/or experienced staff, there was a danger that the whole structure could collapse. Then, too, increasingly the number of Ujamaa villages and their membership tended to be taken as measures of success; it was as if the purpose (socio-economic development) was confused with the means (Ujamaa).

24. In a number of cases farmers were persuaded or forced to move into new Ujamaa villages in areas about which neither government nor Party officials had previous knowledge of such things as soil characteristics, amount and pattern of rainfall, suitability of the crops to be grown, disease situation, including the possible incidence of malaria, tsetse, etc. In some cases farmers were made to move into new areas with no provision for food during the build-up period.

25. A second set of problems arose because of the centralized nature of the Government bureaucracy. Programs for villages were prepared, priorities worked out, budgets allocated, and personnel deployed by the sectoral ministries in Dar es Salaam. Personnel in the field were responsible to their parent ministries or agencies and they rarely, if ever, regarded themselves as members of a development team. Decisions were an inordinately long time both in the making and in reaching the field; and in the absence of a framework to enable horizontal integration of activities, local initiative and cooperation was strangled.

Regional organization

26. In the pre-decentralization period Regional Commissioners still held very powerful positions, combining as they did the roles of chief coordinator of central Government departments, head of the regional administration, Secretary of TANU, and Chairman of the Regional Development Committee. Their power was limited in the development sphere by the fact that the regional administration was not a "spending ministry." They thus had little say in the regular process of allocation of funds for various development projects or services. Also, as a result of the existing local government structure, Regional and Area Commissioners had to work either directly through the Party or rely on the staff of the technical ministries and local authorities for continuing or development initiatives by the Commissioners themselves.

27. Since 1967 the lowest level planning institution has been the Ward Development Committee (WDC), which covers the same geographic area as the TANU branch. WDCs are expected to draw up development plans for
their areas and mobilize whatever resources are locally available (usually only self-help manpower) to implement them. Such plans then are submitted to the district where, prior to decentralization, approved projects were either funded from the district development budget or forwarded to the region for possible financing from Ministry of Community Development funds. The fact that the TANU Branch Chairman was ex-officio Chairman of the WDC was sufficient to insure that the Party's desire to promote the formation and progress of Ujamaa villages would get a strong hearing at the ward level; but in the established planning process ward level plans would have to be forwarded to the District Development and Planning Committee (DDPC).

28. The DDPC was the development arm of the District Council, a body composed of both an elected membership and up to ten Presidential appointees, which provided services, raised revenues—through local rate and produce cess—and passed by-laws. The function of the DDPC was both to prepare a list of suitable projects which might qualify for material assistance from the Ministry of Community Development and to draw up long-term plans for district development. It also had the authority to co-opt as members any district officers of the central ministries. The Committee was chaired by the Area Commissioner and included among its members the heads of all technical departments of the central Government, representatives of TANU, the Cooperative Movement, and other organizations. A provision that required two-thirds of the Committee's membership to be elected councilors was never enforced.

29. The existence of an elective institution of local government and a development committee dominated by civil servants and elected councilors caused two major problems. First, the technical ministries traditionally have been the primary source of pressure for productive economic investment at the local level, while locally-elected district officials have reflected their constituents' desire for increased social services. As a result, for example, the District Councils, usually supported by local TANU institutions, devoted an increasing percentage of their expenditures to expanding educational facilities in the face of central Government policy to limit primary school enrollment to 50 percent of the relevant age group. Second, these local government institutions, with strong representation of successful private farmers, posed a potential obstacle to the development of Ujamaa villages, especially if the statutory two-thirds elected membership of the IDPC were invoked.

30. Even assuming that plans of, and for, Ujamaa villages were given first priority at the ward and district levels of the planning process, additional potential problems existed at the regional level. The Regional Development Committee (RDC) was chaired by the Regional Commissioner and usually had over fifty members. These were predominantly central Government officials, but also included all important

1/ Local rate and produce cess were abolished in 1969, and with decentralization the District Council was replaced by the District Development Council.
interests in the region, such as the Party, voluntary agencies, and private businesses. The same problems of central pressure for increased production in the localities, local pressure for increased provision by Government of services, and local antagonism toward the Ujamaa village concept obtained at this level. In addition, however, locally-initiated and centrally-conceived plans failed to mesh at the regional level, since in the period 1961-1969 the Regional plans were derived primarily by dividing out the national targets and projects (consisting of little more than crop targets which were supposed to be sub-divided between districts and other local units), and extrapolated investment levels intended as guidelines for the various sectors. Only if the primary concern of the central ministries and planning agencies was the development of Ujamaa villages would such development have a chance of occurring in a meaningful fashion; but for most of the pre-decentralization period, the guidelines established in the first five-year plan were followed, and for the rest of the period, there was the official priority without an appropriate structure for its implementation.

The Party

31. TANU, frustrated by attitudinal and organizational impediments to Ujamaa, added pressure for ideological conformity to the downward thrust for economically productive investment and the upward thrust for expanded social services. The Party rejected Government programs, such as the model farmers of the village settlement schemes, which had tended either to encourage rural capitalism or to concentrate investments in the already more highly developed areas of the country. Such programs were antithetical to the central tenets of the Party's ideology, which prescribe policies leading to either social or economic inequities. Yet, in the face of the mandate of the Aursha Declaration, the bulk of Tanzania's rural development thrust continued to rely overwhelmingly on individual, private cultivation. This was true through 1970, the year the last "Best Farmer Awards," for instance, were bestowed by the Ministry of Agriculture on individual, conspicuously successful farmers.

32. To move the peasant to a position of overt support for the Ujamaa village program would appear to require dealing with three basic attitudes:

(a) The peasant wants (often expects) certain basic social services, such as health care, education, water, roads.

(b) He is willing to work harder to improve his standard of living, if he can see a reasonable correlation between his efforts and the results.

(c) He does not see the link between "going" Ujamaa and an increase in his standard of living, nor does he see clearly the relationship between his labor and the Government's ability to provide him with basic or improved social services.

As was pointed out in the discussion of Mwongolo, development means much more to the Party than simple economic progress, and in that document TANU expressed a willingness for the country to experience a slower rate of economic growth in order to achieve certain political and social gains. It is within this context that the Party decided (a) to risk a slower economic growth rate (at least in terms of gross domestic product or average per capita income) in order to concentrate on supplying at least minimum basic social services to the less-developed areas of Tanzania, and (b) to organize rural life and production within Ujamaa villages. The latter of these had the purpose of both laying the economic foundation for financing the social services within a framework of Ujamaa socialism, and facilitating the administration and provision of the services. The Party felt it was on solid ground in making this political decision, believing that following a sound ideology will lead to both economic and social progress.

33. On the organizational side, TANU felt that a major reason for the failure of Party policy to penetrate the development process effectively was the parallel, but essentially separate, structure of regional organization. Separation was particularly pronounced in the vertical links of the Regional and district departments with their central ministries. The Party was tied into the rest of the regional organization by the fact that Ward Development Committees were composed in part of TANU ten-cell leaders and chaired by Branch Chairmen; the ex-officio TANU District Secretary, the Area Commissioner, was also the Chairman of the District Development and Planning Committee; the TANU District Chairman was, ex-officio, the Chairman of the District Council; all elected members of the District Council were nominated by TANU; and the ex-officio TANU Regional Secretary, the Regional Commissioner, was Chairman of the Regional Development Committee. That in spite of this level of integration of Party and Government TANU desired greater involvement suggests a number of possible explanations:

(a) The feeling of a need for greater political mobilization because of the general difficulty associated with effecting massive social change.

(b) A tendency for TANU representatives to be dominated at the local levels by technical officers of Government with narrower views of development.

1/ Appendix A, Chart B.
(c) The erection of formidable barriers to the Ujamaa strategy by powerful vested interests both in and out of Government.

(d) There is considerable apathy and/or opposition among the peasantry itself.

In any case, decentralization quite clearly aims not only at bringing the decision-making process closer to the people and increasing the planning and implementation capacity of the regions and districts, but also at improving substantively the ability of the Party to have impact on and oversee the development process at all levels—district, regional, and national.

3. Organizational Framework: Post-decentralization

34. The promotion of Ujamaa villages remains, as during the pre-decentralization period, the responsibility mainly of TANU and the Regional and Area Commissioners. But unlike the situation prevailing in the pre-decentralization period, the regional administration, and through it the district administration, are presently fully responsible for the planning and implementation of all activities in Ujamaa villages. 

35. The role of the parent or sectoral ministry has been reduced to the working out of broad policies and priorities for the relevant sector, the provision of technical advice on request via the regional administration, and the discharge of regulatory functions. Whereas the powers of the parent ministries have been considerably reduced, those of the Prime Minister's Office have been considerably increased. In theory, all contacts between the central Government and the regional administrations are to be channeled via the Prime Minister's Office. All regional plans are to pass through the Prime Minister's Office, where they are to be consolidated to form a national rural development program. They are then to be forwarded to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development Planning for incorporation into the national development plan.

36. Decentralization, according to the Principal Secretary, Prime Minister's Office, has three basic objectives relating to the management of rural development: (a) rural development must be managed locally; (b) it must ensure the active support of the masses; and (c) it must be coordinated at the center. These objectives necessitate the formation of

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This does not apply to programs with significance cutting across regional boundaries, such as training institutes, research centers, trunk roads, hospitals, etc. Also some ministries have not been decentralized; e.g., Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Information.
...strong local representative development committee structures and increasing the Party's involvement in rural development activities. 1/

Regional organization

37. As a result of decentralization, the Regional Commissioner's position within the Government hierarchy was raised to the equivalent of Minister. Each regional administration became similar to a ministry, with the Regional Commissioner as its political head. Regional Development Directors were appointed as the chief civil servants under the Regional Commissioners, their job being to coordinate development planning and oversee implementation. They are financially responsible and accountable in the same way as the Principal Secretary of a central ministry. Assisting the RDDS are three staff officers--finance, planning, and personnel--and ten functional managers. 2/ No longer are the regional technical officers directly responsible to their parent ministries; they now fall under the supervision of the RDDS.

38. The District Council has been abolished and the district administration considerably strengthened. The district is structured to parallel the regional administration; its political head is the Area Commissioner, and the senior district civil servant is the District Development Director (DDD). Under his supervision are district staff officers and functional managers, corresponding to those of the region. The dearth of technically qualified personnel and the attendant constraints on planning capacity at the district level does put into question the actual distribution of the burden for development planning between the district and region, although it is clearly intended under decentralization that the district be the keystone of the planning process. Of the districts, Nyerere says, "We are trying to increase their power over local expenditure, not decrease it. Least of all are we trying to transfer District power to the Regions!" 3/

39. In the planning process chain, the Ward Development Committee, its structure and functions, remain unchanged. Added, however, is the Ujamaa Village Development Committee, which may by-pass the Ward


2/ They are: crop development, livestock development, water, works, land, Ujamaa and cooperatives, natural resources, commerce and industries, health, and education.

structure. 1/ The ultimate relationship between mature Ujamaa villages and the ward has not yet been sorted out, but Ujamaa villages with 250 families or more qualify to be full TANU Branches (which usually coincide with ward boundaries) in their own right. Also, the more mature villages deal directly with the district and its planning committee. It is likely in this event that the Ujamaa Village Development Committee supersedes the Ward Development Committee. It is almost certainly the case when the village is both a TANU Branch and registered cooperative society. When a village is a Party Branch, the Party, village, and development committee leadership are coincident. The question of who becomes the cooperative leadership when a village is registered is an open one; but in Kigwe Ujamaa village in Dodoma Region, the Party, village, committee, and cooperative leadership are the same.

L0. When the District Council was abolished, in its place was established a District Development Council. The chairman of the Council is the District TANU Chairman, and its membership includes the Area Commissioner, the DDD as Secretary, the elected local councilors, M.P.'s, district staff officers, and functional managers. The former responsibilities of the District Council, such as providing services, have been taken over by the district administration, under the authority of the new regional administration. The District Development and Planning Committee has been retained with the Area Commissioner as its Chairman, but its Secretary is now the DDD. It functions as the executive arm of the Development Council and includes among its members district M.P.'s, one-fourth of the elected members of the Development Council or ten of the elected members—whichever is the larger number—the district staff, and the functional managers.

L1. The addition of the Ujamaa Village Development Committee at the ward level has had the effect of creating a direct development link between the village and the district, thus obviating the necessity to go through the Ward Development Committee, which has as its concern those living outside, as well as inside, Ujamaa villages. The changes at the district level put the district technical officers under the control of the DDD. In this way their first concern can be directed toward the Ujamaa village program, though they can still draw on the parent ministries for technical assistance and advice. The changes at both levels combine to give Ujamaa villages a clear channel of communication to the district and first call on the expertise of district staff.

L2. The size of the Regional Development Committee has been limited to not more than twenty-five members, including the Regional Commissioner as Chairman, the Regional TANU Chairman, the RDD as Secretary, M.P.'s, DDD's, Area Commissioners, and the regional staff and functional managers. The Committee has the ultimate responsibility for coordinating the plans of Development Committees at the lower levels and managing the regional development program. Thus, ideas, projects, and plans elicited from

1/ See Appendix A, Chart G.
Ujamaa villages and Ward Development Committees by the district staff, and coordinated and organized into district development priorities by the District Development and Planning Committee and District Development Council, are melded into an overall regional plan with emphasis on Ujamaa village development.

The Party

43. During the pre-decentralization period, the Party’s main impact upon the structure of the development planning process derived from two sources: (a) the position of National Executive Committee as the top policy-making body in Tanzania; and (b) the fact that TANU officials, i.e., elected chairmen or appointed Commissioners, chaired the development committees at the various local levels. Immediately preceding decentralization, three elements of the development structure could be construed as limiting TANU’s influence over development planning and implementation. First, while TANU was responsible for formulating overall policy, the existing administrative linkages connected the various local development committees directly to the Ministry of Development Planning, while the horizontal linkages to TANU were attenuated. Second, though TANU was represented on the local development committees, it had no veto power over actual plans as they proceeded from level to level. Third, the heads of the regional technical departments remained under their respective ministries and thus, with all the influence that their superior technical expertise could bring, were a potential, and sometimes actual, countervailing force to Party policy. 1/

44. Decentralization brought the technical heads under the control of political heads of the regions and districts. Regional plans now go to the Prime Minister’s Office before being sent to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development Planning (DevPlan). Most significant of all for TANU is the change in the flow of the development plans from committee to committee. Plans emanating from the district must be forwarded to the TANU District Executive Committee for policy approval before submission to the regional level. From the regions they must go to the Regional TANU Executive Committee before going to the Prime Minister’s Office and finally to the National Executive Committee. 2/ In order to meet the responsibility that this substantial increase in power entails, TANU Headquarters is planning to place an additional TANU staff member in each district. His function will be to organize seminars, do research on Ujamaa, act as liaison between Government and the Party, and earmark Ujamaa villagers for higher training. His status will be roughly that of Assistant TANU District Executive Secretary.

1/ See Appendix A, Chart B.

2/ See Appendix A, Charts F and H.
Role of regions and districts

45. The role of the regions and districts in the Ujamaa village development program varies according to the particular circumstances involved. Both are generally involved in promoting the formation of Ujamaa villages. This may mean encouraging those farmers who already live in nucleated, traditional villages to "go" Ujamaa, in which case efforts are aimed at organizing the village into an Ujamaa village structure with increasingly communal activities. Management and coordination are guided and assisted by district staff. The case of people living on scattered homesteads who want to move to establish an Ujamaa village is more complicated. The availability of water must be established, soil surveys conducted, general suitability for human habitation determined, and plans made for clearing, housing, crops, etc. Because these basic requirements put such a strain on regional, and especially district, technical manpower resources, they are often not met satisfactorily. Hence, in practice the movement from old houses and farms to a new village is usually gradual or incremental.

46. Farmers may move their houses first and still cultivate their old plots, or they may simply start a communal plot at the new location and continue to live and farm on their traditional homesteads. The latter seems often to be the case when a cash crop is being introduced. While the move to the Ujamaa village continues, the traditional food plots are the last things abandoned and committed to the new village. In this incremental approach, farmers' "bridges" are not "burned" until the last possible moment. Farmer pressure for incentives (i.e., social services) thus has the opportunity to mount, and since local leaders want to be successful in implementing the national Ujamaa policy, the temptation for the districts and regions to respond, or at least make promises, increases.

47. "Operations," involving as they do the movement of large numbers of people are quite a different matter. ("Operation Dodoma" has involved 65,000 families in Dodoma District alone.) Planning and coordination of "operations" are primarily the responsibility of the Prime Minister's Office, but the regions and districts are completely mobilized to implement them. Because the Ujamaa philosophy per se has not been the primary justification for current "operations," 1/ villages in "operations" areas are Ujamaa only in the sense that people are living together in entities called Ujamaa villages. This places the considerable burden on the regions and districts concerned of creating Ujamaa structures and activities where relevant motivation on the part of the villagers may be lacking. Again, the temptation to offer the promise of social services as "bait" is apt to arise.

48. There are no indications of any regionally centered research programs or projects. The most important regional training institutions

1/ Rufiji was said to be for flood relief; Dodoma for famine relief; and Kigoma for relief from traditional social and economic neglect.
as far as Ujamaa villages are concerned are the Rural Training Centers. These Centers are manned by regional and district staff members and offer courses of up to three months in a variety of practical subjects from tractor driving to marketing. At the Ujamaa village level, seminars or study groups, organized by district staff and TANU, are held in cooperative and Ujamaa education. At this level the approach appears to be exhortative and political rather than technical. Unfortunately, few villagers have the opportunity to attend Rural Training Centers, except for some leaders and those in villages near district and regional centers. Thus, for the indefinite future villages will have to rely upon the technical staff posted to them (e.g., agricultural, Ujamaa, and cooperative and rural development assistants). These people, however, often know no more, and sometimes know less, than the villagers themselves. It is, therefore, at this field assistant level that a major upgrading effort must be made.

There was uniform opinion in the areas visited that decentralization has created a greater interest on the part of the regions and districts in the Ujamaa village program than existed when its management was controlled centrally by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. Now that problems and responsibilities are shared by entire regional and district teams, each with a Planning Officer and coordinated by a Development Director, development action should be smoother and swifter. Already there appears a keener appreciation of and desire for basic statistical data, particularly comparative productivity figures, than existed in the past. The existence of a District Development Director is singled out as a signal factor in improved coordination between the regional and district technical staffs.

Decentralization has attempted to upgrade the quality of personnel in the regions. In the five regions visited, the Ujamaa review team met with two Regional Development Directors, and both would have to be described as very impressive, particularly as leaders of their staffs. The team had sufficient contact to make judgement with the staffs of only four of the regions. Of these one seemed exceptionally competent and well organized and three somewhat less so, but still very good. Of the five District Development Directors met, two seemed exceptionally qualified, two very good, and one probably excellent in other respects, but obviously biased toward the Ujamaa village program. The six district staffs were of very mixed quality.

Role of central ministries and agencies

Although the power and responsibility for the management of rural development have been decentralized, the Regional Development Directors are responsible to the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) for overall policy direction and control. The PMO coordinates regional plans and budgets, formulates policy directives and policy guidelines and, if necessary, will assist the regions in preparing their development programs. Ujamaa villages and cooperatives fall specifically under the Commissioner, Rural Development Division, PMO. The functions of the Commissioner's Office are structured as follows:

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Currently, the Planning and Development Research Section is designing a framework for organizing existing data on Ujamaa villages and determining information gaps. A simple farm budgeting guide is being compiled in the hope that by 1974 or 1975 at least 50 percent of the villages will be doing some farm budgeting. Also, a five-year education plan for Ujamaa villages and cooperatives was to be initiated in July 1973, which would include a target of teaching, by 1978, at least one villager in each Ujamaa village how to keep books. The present sources of data are
monthly reports from the district and regional Ujamaa and cooperative
functional managers, but they are of uneven quality and follow no uniform
reporting pattern. A standard reporting system is now being developed
for use in the districts. It is expected that when Ujamaa villages have
budget plans, they will be able to identify their own constraints and
growth points and make more rational application of regional development
funds and loans.

53. Prior to decentralization, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and
Development Planning (DevPlan) organized special planning teams composed
of personnel from various ministries and the university. These teams
went into the regions to study the possibilities and problems of the for-
mation of Ujamaa villages. A report would be made, DevPlan would meet
with the relevant ministries, and an "operation" would be launched.
After decentralization, the PMO became the primary initiator and coor-
dinator to encourage Ujamaa village development and provide advice. Now
plans from the regions go to the PMO, at which point DevPlan and Treasury
are brought in to determine whether there are sufficient funds available
and whether the regional plans and projects are compatible with overall
plans (i.e., do they have national, regional, and financial consistency).

54. The question of establishing Ujamaa villages (in the case
of "operations"), or encouraging their formation (in the case where local
initiative is relied on), is a matter between the regions and the PMO.
Previously the provision of services to villages was dependent upon whether
the concerned ministry would include them in their plans and subsequently
provide them. Now if regional plans call for such provision, the concerned
ministry meets with DevPlan and, in a dialogue with the regions, a plan is
developed, to be implemented by the regions in coordination with the PMO.
The major difference is that DevPlan's pre-decentralization links were
directly with the concerned functional ministry; now, the linkage involves
a dialogue with the PMO and the decentralized centers, i.e., Regions.

55. As has been mentioned, the functional ministries relate to Ujamaa
villages indirectly through the provision of technical advice and services
to the regional and district functional managers. For example, previously
the Ministry of Agriculture controlled agricultural extension officers
directly to the village level; now, their disposition is a responsibility
of the regions. One of the results has been that agricultural field
assistants are being assigned to specific Ujamaa villages and are concen-
trating their services there, rather than with individual private farmers.
Moreover, political cadres are now being drafted into the extension service
to help promote the formation of Ujamaa villages.

56. Decentralization necessitated the reorganization of the functional
ministries (a process that is still going on), especially in the areas of
manpower, sectoral planning, research, and planning. The Ministry of agri-
culture, for example, is still responsible for the training of agricultural
officers and field staff in its Agricultural Training Institutes, and
Agriculture personnel continue to man Rural Training Centers and provide
teaching material, although the centers are now under regional control.
57. The Tanzania Rural Development Bank (TRDB), which provides medium and long-term credit, channels loans to Ujamaa villages directly when the village is a registered cooperative. This is also true in some cases where the village sells its crops directly to an Authority (e.g., tobacco, tea, cotton), or indirectly to an authority through a nearby cooperative society. Security of loans to Ujamaa villages is a problem, and the TRDB has moved away from conventional concepts of security and is looking more toward village management, the viability of proposed projects, and national policy on Ujamaa villages. At least 95 percent of all TRDB loans are in kind, though some cash loans have been made to provide thirty shillings per month to farmers for the four or five months that their crops are in the field. (The National Bank of Commerce will pick up this function soon.) For crop loans, borrowers must sign an irrevocable letter of authority to enable TRDB to collect from Marketing Boards and Authorities, or crop proceeds must be paid to the National Bank of Commerce, so TRDB can recover under a banker's order.

58. Presently, the TRDB is assisting the regions in writing projects for the farmers until the regions develop the capacity for drafting "bankable" projects. A major problem in this regard is the inability of Ujamaa villages to keep proper accounts which can be used for planning purposes. The TRDB hopes to prepare a simple bookkeeping system for Ujamaa villages.

59. The National Bank of Commerce (NBC) will provide short-term credit to Ujamaa villages in the form of loans to finance daily needs during the period prior to the harvesting and selling of crops. Although the National Bank of Commerce (NBC) will be willing also to extend credit to those Ujamaa villages which "...may profit most by credit (possibly those with marginal projects which might be made fully viable units through selective credit programs)." 1/ The NBC wishes to avoid villages "who do not need credit, but might apply for credit only in order to use their liquidity for less desirable uses" 2/ and those "with sub-marginal projects who may need more than credit to become viable." 3/ The conditions the NBC places on the granting of cash loans to Ujamaa villages eliminates the vast majority of them. The conditions emphasize such things as registration as cooperative societies, records, banking of annual surpluses, and "acreage and the estimated value per acre of the crop." 4/ The NBC also feels that it could assist by financing small-scale industries in Ujamaa villages at concessionary rates, for example, 6% percent as opposed to the standard 8 or 9 percent.

2/ Ibid., p. 2.
3/ Ibid., pp. 2-3.
4/ Ibid.
60. The impact of agencies, as the Lint and Seed Marketing Board and the National Agricultural Products Board, on Ujamaa villages has been very indirect, occurring mainly in the form of the Boards' influence over pricing and research and development. The same is true of the National Milling Corporation. The Cotton Authority of Tanzania (CAT), which evolved from the Lint and Seed Marketing Board on July 1, 1973, will move into the production aspects of cotton growing, and in this capacity expects to become much more involved with Ujamaa villages. The newly formed Cashew Authority will become involved with Ujamaa villages which plan to grow cashews. The Tobacco Authority of Tanzania (TAT) is active already in tobacco growing Ujamaa villages, especially in Tabora region. TAT participates in campaigns to get farmers to start tobacco Ujamaa villages, provides inputs, and posts tobacco experts to the larger villages. Similarly, the Tanzania Tea Authority works directly with Ujamaa villages, choosing sites, establishing trial plots, recruiting villagers, and securing necessary material and money.

61. TANU Headquarters has a Department of Political and Ujamaa Education, with a staff of five in the Ujamaa villages section. The headquarters gets data on Ujamaa villages through the Party structure, i.e., Branch, Division, District, etc. The data are collected by Branch Secretaries and committees which evaluate the social, political, and economic development of Ujamaa villages. TANU also collects data on villages yearly from Government bodies. There is no formal political or technical training for Ujamaa village, Branch or Sub-branch Secretaries, and other local TANU officials, except through Rural Training Centers or, in a very few cases, Kivukoni College. 1/ It is expected that this situation will improve with the establishment of Regional Party Colleges which will train Ujamaa leaders, especially Secretaries. TANU sometimes supplies manpower to Ujamaa villages, usually in the form of TANU Youth League members, for such projects as land clearing and the construction of temporary housing. It organizes Ujamaa seminars at all levels, and promotes Ujamaa villages through radio programs and policy papers.

Summary conclusions

62. Three lines of pressure converging on local administration have been identified: (a) from the central ministries, especially the technical or "development" ministries, for increase production investment; (b) from the "grass roots" for increased or improved social services; and (c) from the Party for the realization of both (a) and (b) within the ideological framework of Ujamaa through the agency of Ujamaa villages. Decentralization has substantially altered, at least structurally and no doubt ultimately in fact, the power that can be applied along these pressure lines. It has markedly increased TANU's ability to promulgate Ujamaa ideology by making the Party the policy overseer at all levels of the planning process.

1/ TANU's political education center in Dar es Salaam. It is being decentralized and will serve as the eventual hub of regional party colleges.
Decentralization also allows local forces to militate for increased social services, since it has increased local administrative decision-making, and presumably local administration is now more susceptible to local initiative. Both these gains were achieved possibly at the expense of the central ministries' ability to promote investment for productive economic development, since the ministries' influence over local development staff has been curtailed severely.

63. Nascent representative local government also appears to have suffered a set-back in the abolition of the District Council.

64. How effectively decentralization has increased the power of the people may depend as much on the downward "command" and upward "information" functions of the Party mechanism as on the structural changes in regional administration. In the absence of elected responsible local officials reliance must be made on the goodwill and intentions of local leaders. Increased opportunities for participation of the people in their own affairs, given the demise of the District Council and the recent history of the cooperative movement (discussed below), rests fundamentally on the TANU ten-house cell and elected Ujamaa village leaders. It is here that views can be made known to directly elected representatives. However, a student of the TANU cell system says of the cell leader that he

is expected to communicate government and party policies to the villagers/leaders/... On the other hand, the party, with the strong support of President Nyerere, expects him to articulate the villagers' views to TANU and the government/information/. He performs the first of these functions remarkably well... It is open to question, however, how effectively the cell leader delivers the views of the people to higher points in the hierarchy. In fact, the research suggests that should the views be critical of government policy or reveal poor response to official directives, it is likely that they will simply not be communicated beyond the ward level. 1/

The broader responsibilities of the Ujamaa village leaders and the greater size of their constituencies should combine to give the leaders a more authoritative voice at higher levels and make them more responsive to villagers than is the case in the ten-house cell.

65. In all, the changes decentralization has effected in the regions, districts, and central ministries and agencies, and the accompanying alterations in the Party's relations in the Party's relationship to the development process, have resulted in an impressive and far reaching mobilization

of institutions around the focal point of Ujamaa village development. If
a major thrust of this mobilization is directed toward aiding and assisting
Ujamaa villages which have demonstrated self-help initiative through actual
development, and which show further growth potential, it is difficult to
imagine many of these villages not becoming productive economic units,
thereby contributing to the financing of further Ujamaa village development.
Such successes are of course imperative to convince non-Ujamaa villagers
that living and producing together in a communal manner can lead to their
own economic advance.

C. Ujamaa Villages and the Cooperative Movement

66. Because all successful Ujamaa villages ultimately will become
registered multi-purpose, cooperative societies, and because cooperatives
have become increasingly ubiquitous in Tanzania, an examination of the
cooperative movement and its relationship to Ujamaa villages is of single
importance.

67. The first Cooperative Societies Ordinance was enacted in 1932,
and voluntary "growers associations" existed as early as the 1920's, but
the great surge in the formation of cooperative societies came after
Independence in 1961. By 1972 there were some 1,800 registered societies,
of which about 1,300 were agricultural marketing societies. Presently,
the Government's interest in the development of cooperatives centers around
the facts that they touch the peasant's economic life directly, have credit
capacity with an ability to recover from crop proceeds, and some have
accumulated large surpluses of capital. However, the Government's plans
for cooperatives vis-a-vis Ujamaa village development and the cooperative
movement's plans for itself have not necessarily coincided. Commenting
on the Government's interest in utilizing cooperatives for development
purposes, an observer notes that the Government found itself in the

...position of jockeying with the quasi-autonomous
cooperatives over the exact contribution they can be
expected to make in terms of the financing or devel-
opment and of the initiatives to be undertaken. 2/

As the Government increasingly has pursued a socialist policy, it has
begun to question the role of the cooperatives. Certainly with rare
exceptions, cooperative society members have been individual private

1/ Memorandum on the Cooperative Movement of Tanzania (Mainland) containing
Recommendations on Reorganization of the Cooperative Union of Tanganyika
Limited and the Cooperative Movement, Dar es Salaam: Cooperative Union

2/ John Saul, "Marketing Cooperatives in a Developing Country; the Tanzanian
Case," in Socialism in Tanzania, Vol. 2, ed. by Lionel Cliffe and John
farmers, and few societies contemplated a different system before 1967 and not very many for some time after.

68. Currently, the cooperative structure consists of an apex organization, the Cooperative Union of Tanganyika Limited (CUT), 18 regional cooperative unions, and constituent cooperative societies. In a 1972 memo, CUT proposed new functions for itself and the unions to promote, develop, and organize new cooperatives, and to carry out supervisory and audit services. 1/ This proposal should be viewed in the light that it is very unlikely that any new cooperatives will be formed and registered other than as Ujamaa villages. The authors of the memo seem to be aware of this reality since they include, under the functions and duties of the regional unions, the transformation of primary marketing cooperatives into Ujamaa villages. Assuming that existing primary societies are transformed into Ujamaa villages and that all new cooperatives will be Ujamaa villages, if CUT and the unions are given responsibility for supervisory and audit functions over cooperative societies they will effectively be in control of at least a large part of the Ujamaa village program in Tanzania.

69. It is impossible to determine from the available evidence whether the authors of the memo were proposing seriously such a shift of responsibility from the Government to the unions and CUT, or whether they were establishing a position from which to bargain in order to prevent further encroachment into what they consider the cooperative domain. The latter seems more likely. What is certain is that the cooperative movement has become inextricably intertwined with the Ujamaa village movement, and many on the cooperative side see a danger of being absorbed; on the Ujamaa side, many see the cooperatives as private farmer-oriented and an obstacle to Ujamaa.

70. President Nyerere has said that there is no organization so suited to the needs of Tanzanian rural development as the cooperative, but he has warned also that cooperatives which serve capitalist farmers are capitalist institutions: "It is only if the agricultural production itself is organized in a socialist pattern that cooperative marketing societies are serving socialism." 3/ It is apparent, then, that what is attractive to the Government about the cooperative movement is the existing structure rather than its philosophy per se. The question is whether the cooperatives can be used to further Ujamaa, or whether that movement must itself be absorbed by the Ujamaa movement.

1/ "Memorandum." op. cit.

2/ These functions are currently exercised by the Rural Development Division, PMO, and the Unified Cooperative Services Commission.

71. The cooperative movement is fully aware of its situation. In its 1972 Memorandum, the very first sentence after the preamble states defensively: "It must be understood that Cooperatives operate on principles which are the same as the principles of socialism." 1/ The memo goes on to point out that the cooperatives are democratic, their management being responsible to a general meeting of the members or to their elected representatives. The regional unions and CUT serve to supplement the services rendered by the constituent societies. Because "...cooperatives enjoy local autonomy, the question of decentralization does not arise." 2/

Therefore, what the cooperatives need is "less government control and direction." 3/ In defense of the existing cooperative movement, the memo invokes the Arusha Declaration, Mwongozo, Presidential Circular No. 1, '970 4/—on the establishment of workers, councils and committees—and ".the recent move to decentralize government machinery to give more power to the people." 5/

72. The ultimate position of the cooperative movement likely will be determined by the outcome of the current discussions over criteria for registering Ujamaa villages as multi-purpose cooperative societies.

73. The question of registration criteria must be examined in two parts: (a) what is an Ujamaa village; and (b) when does an Ujama village qualify for registration as a multi-purpose cooperative society? There seems to be considerable confusion surrounding both of these questions.

74. An undated 6/ memo by the Minister of State for Regional Administration and Rural Development, refers to the fact that Ujama villages were not able to obtain credit from existing lending institutions, because the villages were not recognized under law, and legal proceedings could not be taken against them if they failed to repay loans. The memo, an address to Parliament, discusses three stages of Ujamaa villages:

The Formative Stage

This stage is characterized by a group of farmers deciding to unite to form an Ujamaa village, but they

1/ "Memorandum," op. cit.
2/ Ibid.
3/ Ibid.
5/ "Memorandum," op. cit.
6/ "Development of Ujamaa Villages," Memorandum by the Minister of State, Regional Administration and Rural Development (Address to Parliament), 1968(?) mimeographed. Internal evidence strongly points to early or middle 1968.
need organization, encouragement, technical advice, and social services, such as clean water, health and education. Credit necessary to meet these needs will come from the Regional Development Fund for projects with long term benefits, such as bush clearing and access road construction, and from nearby cooperative societies on a first priority basis over individual farmers for directly productive inputs, such as improved seed, fertilizer and insecticide.

Second Stage

In this stage farmers have developed a better understanding of the meaning of living and working together; they have a workable constitution and some communal activities are being performed. As they approach economic viability, they can obtain loans from the National Development Credit Agency (the precursor of TRDB).

Stage Three

To enter this stage, villages must have proven their economic viability and social maturity; all or most of the village activities are communally operated; economies of scale have been achieved; villages have tangible security. Then they are able to register as multi-purpose cooperative societies and obtain loans from lending institutions (commercial credit). 1/

The Minister is referring to legislation, subsequently passed later in 1968, to enable Ujamaa villages to get credit through local primary societies.

75. The Economic Survey and Annual Plan, 1970-71, notes that an Ujamaa village as a unit may join an existing primary cooperative society, and that "villages that are members...will also receive the same servicing facilities as individual members." 2/ There are some legal problems involved in the unit membership of Ujamaa villages in cooperative societies. The amendments added to the Cooperative Ordinance in 1968, as an interim measure to give Ujamaa villages legal standing and enable them to get loans through the local cooperatives, appear to conflict with the mother

1/ "Development of Ujamaa Villages," cr. cit.

legislation. This is not surprising, since encouraging cooperative societies to assist Ujamaa villages on a first priority basis over individual farmers creates a conflict over the use of members' funds and organizations for the benefit of non-members. Also, Ujamaa villages as unit members receiving the "same servicing facilities as individual members" raises the problem that, unlike individual members, the villagers have not been required to purchase shares in the society, yet they constitute competition for finite resources.

76. Presently, consideration is being given to amending the Cooperative Ordinance again. President Nyerere, speaking to a meeting of judges and magistrates in Dar es Salaam, recently stated:

The point is that Ujamaa Villages are a political creation. They have no legal status... So far there is no law which provides for the rights and obligations of Ujamaa Villages...I think the aim behind the transformation of Ujamaa Villages (into producer and marketing cooperative societies) is to give such communities a legal status. 2/

If the present laws were to obtain, Ujamaa villages would remain in an ambiguous legal position until they were either registered as multi-purpose cooperative societies or obtained some intermediate legal status. It appears that the latter may be the case.

77. The latest statement dealing with the questions of definition of stages of Ujamaa villages and qualifications for registration as multi-purpose cooperative societies is a draft document prepared by the Rural Development Division, PMO, and circulated to the regions for comment. 3/ Ultimately, this draft will form the basis for new cooperative legislation.

78. In the draft's definition of Stage I no mention is made of unit membership for Ujamaa villages in existing primary marketing societies. A village will enter Stage II when "some development" has been achieved, and at that point it will be registered as a probationary, multi-purpose cooperative society. In this stage, a village, "besides getting aid from the Government and TANU, can get credit from the Tanzanian Rural Development Bank." Stage III is that of a "self-supporting" registered multi-purpose cooperative society.

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1/ Interview, Assistant Secretary, Department of Political and Ujamaa Education, Head of Section on Ujamaa Villages, TANU, May 9, 1973.


3/ "Important Things to Note When Registering Ujamaa Villages as Multi-purpose Cooperative Societies." Unofficial Translation by Fred Robinson. This document is reproduced in full in Appendix D.
79. It appears that an Ujamaa village will remain in Stage I until it shows some evidence of development through its own initiative and participation, although some outside help is understood. Villagers have a wide variety of motives for joining Ujamaa villages, but the draft document indicates that out of this heterogeneity of motivation, some display of seriousness of development purpose must come in order for a village to proceed to Stage II.

80. The document suggests that Stage II is meant to be an extended probationary period for ideological and economic development and testing, although the criteria for this stage are somewhat vague. In spite of this vagueness, the general points emerge that ideological commitment, size/scale, and planning capacity are important considerations in the passage from probationary to full cooperative registration.

81. Somewhat more specific points are also contained in the document in relation to Stage II. Income and expenditures, for example, should have become such that the village is able to meet its day to day expenses, and before full registration "the per capita income of villages should be no lower than the national average." 1/ All communal and private activities should be carried out within the village, and the time spent on communal activities should be no less than half of the time spent on all village activities. Finally, the draft warns that registering villages as multi-purpose cooperative societies solely to enable them to obtain credit will lead to their failure and destruction.

82. It is a fact that by 1972 the Ujamaa village program was in a serious muddle and getting worse. In the midst of an on-going debate over what constituted an Ujamaa village, the reported number of villages grew from 609 in 1969 to 5556 by the end of 1972. 2/ In the six-month period, June to December 1971 alone, there was a reported 90 percent increase, from 810,000 to 1,660,000 people, in the number of inhabitants of Ujamaa villages, 3/ an astounding feat, even with a broad definition of what constitutes an Ujamaa village. All indications are that the draft criteria represent an attempt both to sort out the chaos that emerged in the Ujamaa village movement between 1969 and 1972 and to impose some order on further development. As broad as the draft criteria are, they represent a favorable sign that an effort is being made to strike a balance between the social and political goals of the Ujamaa movement on the one hand and the economic goals on the other.

1/ Ibid.
83. The draft criteria also suggest further erosion in the autonomy of the cooperative movement, which now finds itself in the following position: Ujamaa villages and cooperatives are combined under an Assistant Commissioner for Ujamaa and Cooperatives Development. The Commissioner for Rural Development is also the Registrar of Cooperative Societies, but shortly Regional Development Directors will serve in his stead as Assistant Registrars of Cooperative Societies. Cooperative unions have been reorganized so that there is one union for each region. The draft criteria propose a Stage II wherein villages would be registered as probationary multi-purpose cooperative societies. If the draft criteria are enacted (the legislative form would be as amendments to the Cooperative Societies Ordinance), Regional Development Directors in their new roles as Assistant Registrars will be applying the criteria. Apparently the General Managers of the regional cooperative unions are also considered functional managers under the Regional Development Directors. Taken together, these developments leave little doubt that the cooperative movement is being absorbed by Government and merged into the Ujamaa village program.

84. New cooperatives will be Ujamaa villages registered as either probationary (Stage II) or full (Stage III) multi-purpose cooperative societies. Existing primary marketing societies will either expand into production (by becoming Ujamaa villages), or will wither and die as their membership is absorbed into Ujamaa villages which ultimately become cooperative societies in their own right. Regional unions have been co-opted into the Ujamaa village development structure by the dual position of their general managers. The Cooperative Union of Tanganyika Limited functions as a representative of the cooperative movement, but this function, which is exercised by agreement with the unions and not by law, has been severely eroded. CUT's education wing, the Cooperative Education Center in Moshi, has been absorbed by the Cooperative College, and its function of providing advisory and legal services seems to be shifting to the PMO. In fact, it appears that CUT is becoming a redundant institution, and it is aware of this danger. Its 1972 Annual Report to the National Executive Committee of TANU proclaims:

If TANU and the Government are serious about the CUT being the parent body to the unions, then it is high time something was done to give it more powers so that it can have effective control over their activities.2/

1/ Interview with Chief of Planning and Development Research Section, Rural Development Division, June 2, 1973. He stated that the General Managers were functional managers under the RDD. However, they do not appear separately on available regional organizational charts. When the Ujamaa review team visited Dodoma Region in June 1973, the Regional Ujamaa and Cooperative Officer was Acting General Manager of the regional union, and the same situation obtained in Mheya in May 1973. Perhaps this represents a pattern that is meant to continue.

The policy of Ujamaa villages, says Nyerere, "is now the central force for developing Socialism and Democracy in Tanzania," 1/ and the ideological and economic development of these villages will be controlled through a revised cooperative registration process and a network of Ujamaa and cooperative functional managers and staffs. It is extremely unlikely that the Government will tolerate, let alone encourage, the interposition, between it and Ujamaa villages of any autonomous or semi-autonomous institutions, including those institutions of the cooperative movement.

III. UJAMAA VILLAGES IN ACTION

85. There is very large variation in the organization, management, and functioning of Ujamaa villages. There is no model toward which all Ujamaa villages are expected to move. Admittedly, the declared policy of the Tanzanian Government is to permit maximum initiative and freedom to Wajamaa; 2/ and considering the multiplicity of objectives of Ujamaa, embracing as it does economic, social, and political goals, it is both difficult and undesirable to issue a blueprint. The varying factor-endowments and the diversity of social, cultural, and economic environments in the various areas, coupled with President Nyerere's commitment to the avoidance of the use of force, make the task of working out one model impossible. Nonetheless, there is a need for broad guidelines indicating the path to be followed in order to create a nation of "economic and social communities where people live together and work together for the good of all, and which are interlocked so that all of the different communities also work together in cooperation for the common good of the nation as a whole."3/

86. What follows should not be taken as a description of the state and mode of operation of all—not even most—Ujamaa villages. It is meant only to throw light on their pattern of formation and functioning.

A. Formation

87. In general, all Ujamaa villages come into existence in one of the following ways:

(a) Campaigns by Party and Government officials at the regional, district, and ward levels.


2/ Wajamaa: members of an Ujamaa village.

(b) The initiative of farmers themselves, usually in response to hardships—overcrowding, drought, flood, danger of external aggression as in some parts of Mtwaru and Ruvuma near the Mozambique border.

(c) Traditional villages embarking on some activities on a cooperative basis.

(d) Massive mobilization of people on a whole district (Coast) or regional basis (Dodoma, Kigoma).

88. Farmers are usually drawn from radii of 5 to 10 kilometers, although there are some exceptions. Some 2,000 farmers moved, for example, from the overcrowded slopes of Kilimanjaro in the north of the country to Manda District in Dodoma Region in the central part of the country in 1968. Some 1,000 moved from Rungwe District in Mbeya to Chunya. In cases where the Government has mounted massive Ujamaazation on a regional basis, settlers have come from greater distances.

B. Layout of Ujamaa Villages

89. The general pattern, especially in the recent past, has been one of nucleated settlements. In the past, officials or the planning teams dispatched to the various districts from Dar es Salaam would prepare a layout for the Ujamaa village. Each mjama would be granted a plot of from half an acre to two acres for living quarters and private cultivation. An area would be set aside for public facilities such as a school, a dispensary, a store, etc. The remaining land would be earmarked for communal cultivation. In theory, the Wajamaas are to decide on how large an area is to be cultivated communally, what crops are to be grown, what proportion is to be used for cash crops and what proportion for food crops, and future plans for expansion. But in practice it has usually been the agricultural officers who decide on the crop mix.

90. There is a great variation among the villages in the degree of Ujamaazation. In some (e.g., Horohoro Ujamaa village), all food and cash crops are cultivated communally. In others, food crops are grown on private plots and cash crops on communal plots. In still others only land clearing is done communally, and land is allocated to individual farm families where crops are grown on an individual basis (e.g., Kwamkono Ujamaa village in Handeni District, Tanga Region; Mkola Ujamaa village in Tabora).

91. In the larger villages with memberships of between 100 to 500 people, one of the major problems arises from the pattern of settlement. If settlers are allocated say half a hectare to one hectare for their houses and individual cultivation, they would be spread over an area of 200 to 300 hectares. The very purpose of Ujamaa of concentrating peasants in limited areas to facilitate the provision of services and to create integrated communities would thus be defeated.
C. Decision-making and Work Organization

92. There is a great variation in the way work is organized and decisions made, usually reflecting the forces behind the formation of Ujamaa villages. But all villages have systems of committees in charge of one aspect or another of village life. The size, composition, and functions of the committees vary from village to village but the general pattern apparently emerging is to have an executive or central committee with, on the average, five to six other committees as shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village Assembly</th>
<th>V.A. = ultimate decision-making body</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exec. or Central Committee</td>
<td>E.C.C. = executive arm of the assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

93. The most important of the committees are the Works, Agriculture, Finance, and Security and/or Conciliatory Committees. The Works Committee is the organ that is responsible for ensuring, first, that the various agricultural operations (clearing, plowing, seeding, weeding, pesticide application, harvesting, etc.) are executed on time. Secondly, it ensures that all Wajamaa are assigned tasks and that the tasks are accomplished on time. The latter involves checking that all members are at the work sites on schedule and recording the amount of work done or the amount of time spent. In some Ujamaa villages only the amount of time spent is recorded. In others, tasks are assigned on a piece-meal basis. In the case of the latter, a Wajamaa who completes the task assigned to him/her ahead of time is allowed either to continue to work on the communal farm, and hence continue to accumulate points, or to go and work on his/her individual plot. In most cases where piece-work is the measure used, members work on their private farms once the assigned task is accomplished.

94. The Agricultural Committee is responsible for ensuring that the advice given by the "bwana shamba"--the agricultural field agent, known also as the field assistant--is followed. In some cases, the "bwana shamba" is an ex-officio member of the committee. Such matters as planting dates, seeding and fertilization rates, spraying dates, etc, come under the purview of this committee. However, because of the low level of training and competence of the "bwana shamba," coupled with deficiencies in both research support and extension strategy, the committee does not seem to be of much relevance. In none of the villages visited were yields, seeding and fertilization rates known. In many, even total production of the various crops was not known.

1/ A field assistant typically has eight years of schooling with five to seven months' training in agriculture.
the Rural Development Division in the Prime Minister's Office, as well as those of the regions, is narrow and unreliable. Secondly, the number of Ujamaa villages visited was so small and the data provided so shaky that an attempt at generalization on that base would be totally meaningless. Thirdly, there is no reliable data on a national scale showing crops by acreage, total production, or marketable surplus.1/ In the absence of such data it is virtually impossible to determine a production and productivity profile or the impact of Ujamaa villages on such a profile.

In isolated cases, however, there is evidence to show that production has fallen. In the Ismari area, for instance, maize production has reportedly fallen by 70 percent. 2/ The shortage of food stuff in many major cities and towns, including Dar es Salaam, would seem to be a further indicator of decline of production or at least of production not keeping pace with demand. It is not possible, however, to identify the cause of the decline in the absence of adequate data.

E. Social and Political Components

The Ujamaa review team visited eight villages in various regions of Tanzania. The villages were chosen to give the team an opportunity to see different agro-economic conditions, crops, and levels of development; but obviously, with over 5,000 Ujamaa villages in existence, it is difficult to arrive at meaningful generalizations. The visits did provide a "feel" for what an Ujamaa village is.

The trips to the Ujamaa villages suggested several things.

(a) Villagers are either committed to Ujamaa, or at least aware of the right things to say in order to appear committed. (The latter is not unimportant, since one can hardly become committed to anything of which he is unaware.

(b) The level of communal activity is quite low (presuming that the team was shown the best rather than the worst villages).

1/ In June 1973 publication of the Rural Development Division of the Prime Minister's Office, for example, there is no information on total acreage under cultivation by Ujamaa villages. The growth of Ujamaa villages and Wajamaa during the period January 1968 to March 1973 is shown but neither crops grown nor acreage cultivated are indicated. Further, the population figure is not of much value since it includes children, who constitute by far the largest category.

2/ Oral information from a confidential source within the Government.
(c) The registration of some villages as full multi-purpose cooperative societies has not been tied to any discernible standards. Four of the eight villages are registered cooperatives and two others have been recommended for registration. Of the four registered villages, two do not even keep their own records; one has virtually no communal activity; another has limited communal activity and even then is likely a block farm with individual holdings; a third clearly is economically non-viable; and the fourth became a cooperative at its inception under the tutelage of an authority (Tobacco), though it probably will mature into a viable, communal Ujamaa village.

(d) Success in most cases is being pinned to "illagization," i.e., the living together in one place, rather than to increases in production. (Schools, dispensaries, water wells, roads, grinding mills, new buildings, etc., are pointed to with pride, while disappointing production is attributed to bad weather, wild animals, late planting, easy planting, lack of tractors, etc.)

12a. Obviously, there must be important social and political components of the Ujamaa village program for it to have continued at such a rapid pace in the face of increased cost to Government and little discernible increase in production. By "going" Ujamaa, the villagers in seven of the eight villages visited reaped clear benefits in the form of Government inputs and/or increased access to the services of nearby cooperative societies. The villagers of four of these had come from scattered areas and occupations and by all appearances had previously shared little in Tanzania's development. Not only is life in Ujamaa villages more attractive to the poorer farmers, but the Government feels an obligation to help them.

105. The more economically developed areas of Tanzania (e.g., Kilimanjaro, Bukoba, East Lake, and Rungwe) have not been pressured as much as other areas to form Ujamaa villages. Official attention has focused on the less developed areas, especially in the case of "operations." Even in the more developed regions, the Ujamaa village emphasis has been on their less developed parts. The villagers in these Ujamaa villages tend to be the isolated homesteaders, the landless, the unemployed, the victims of drought or flood, the migrant laborers, the neglected. Moving such people to a common center facilitates the provision of basic social services by Government and provides an opportunity for the villagers to live and work more productively than previously. Production does not have to come first, however, since a clean water supply, schooling, and health care are considered by the Government to be "rights" of all Tanzanians. From a humanitarian point of view it is felt that the Government should be placing its Ujamaa emphasis on the less developed areas and attempting to supply basic services where they have been long neglected or non-existent.

106. There are also practical reasons for emphasizing these areas of the country. Ujamaa villagization is least popular in the most developed areas. Premature (i.e., before substantial production increases occur in poorer regions) disruption of the more developed areas could have counter-productive
results. 1/ Also, the less developed areas tend to be sparsely populated and have available uncultivated land, thus potential conflict can be avoided between Ujamaa villages and private farmers over land claims. In two of the villages visited there were problems over land: one involved a village's claim to land also claimed by the local primary school; the other was over unused land wanted by a village but claimed by private farmers. Ultimately, of course, all areas of the country will have to conform to the principles inherent in the Ujamaa village approach to rural development.

107. In the absence of an overall increase in the wealth of Tanzania, especially by the efforts of new Ujamaa villages, the more developed areas are paying for the cost of the Ujamaa village program. Such a redistribution of wealth has the potential consequence of creating political opposition in the more developed areas, a possibility singled out for special attention in Mwongozo. 2/ This situation generates an imperative for the political mobilization of the poor masses of peasants who stand to gain most from the success of the Ujamaa village program. The power of the wealthier few must be counterbalanced by the numbers of the many poor. The Ujamaa village itself is a political mobilization unit.

108. Political education seminars are conducted by TANU at each of the villages visited, and such courses are taught specifically for village leaders at Rural Training Centers. Four of the eight villages visited have leaders who are also TANU Branch officials, and three of the remaining four make TANU membership a prerequisite for election to village offices. In each village visited, the role of TANU in its activities was emphasized and highlighted by the singing of songs of praise to the Party (e.g., "TANU is Building the Nation") and the shouting of Party slogans (e.g., a leader would shout "Freedom and Progress!", and the villagers would respond, "is the work of TANU!"). With the exception of one village where there was no cooperative cultivation and none was planned, all evidence indicated that the leaders, both village and TANU, were popular and identified closely with the needs and aspirations of the villagers. Even where these "aspirations" seemed unwarranted or impractical, to the extent that they represent real political pressure, particularly through TANU, they can have a salutary effect as a counterweight to forces which would oppose an attempt at redistribution of wealth or the opportunity to gain wealth in Tanzania. While the danger of a new type of social and/or economic stratification centered around powerful Party position at the local level cannot be ignored, only TANU has the potential political power to impede the underdevelopment phenomenon of the "rich" getting richer as the poor get relatively poorer.

1/ Some claim that the major factor in the drop in maize production in Ismani was an intense effort to create Ujamaa villages in that area or Iringa Region.

2/ Cf. discussion earlier, pages 5 and following.
109. The Ujamaa village is also a nation-building unit. To the extent that Ujamaa villages bring the people into closer contact with the various agencies of Government, a sense of national identity is intensified. This contact occurs by an increased flow of social services, technical assistance and advice, political education, and general information on the one hand and, on the other hand, by increased participation by villagers in the affairs of Government, through the various village committees and the general meetings.

110. As mentioned earlier, each of the villages visited had a Defense Committee (kamati ya ulinzi). For the most part these committees are concerned with the general welfare and security of the villages. However, along the Mozambique border (one of the areas of largest concentration of villages), they have military defense functions as well. Mwongozo calls for "training a militia for the whole country." The logical training unit is the Ujamaa village, and undoubtedly the Defense Committee is the village agency responsible for the development of a militia capacity for defending the nation against internal subversion and external attack.

111. The Ujamaa village program is more than a strategy for rural economic development; it is a strategy for rural development, and "development," says Mwongozo, means "liberation." Certainly liberation from material want is included, but so also are liberation from domestic and foreign exploitation and/or subversion, or invasion. Therefore, while the ultimate and paramount goal of the Ujamaa village program is to increase Tanzania's material wealth, other measures of success include humanitarian responses to the people's needs, the political mobilization of the rural population, the creation of a unified nation, and the strengthening of that nation's will and ability to defend itself.

112. However, in the long run these "non-economic" measures of success are dependent upon the success of Ujamaa villages as productive economic units. In the short run, in the absence of substantive economic achievement there may be social and political gains, and this is consistent with the Ujamaa ideology. But there is a fundamental fallacy in the notion that peasants who give up certain elements of a traditional life-style in order to improve their economic well-being will be satisfied with socio-political "gains" or "progress" in the absence of an increase in their standard of living. In such an instance they merely will have changed one way of life for another, one which in their own eyes is not necessarily better than the one they had. In a perhaps over-simplified sense, if peasants living and farming separately had wanted to farm together, they would have done so (just as they have done in some parts of Tanzania). If they resist the change, one must assume that they do not want it. If such a demonstration takes considerable time and the peasants become impatient and recalcitrant, either the policy must be abandoned or coercion must be used.

113. There have been instances of coercion associated with Ujamaa village development, and undoubtedly there will be more. The type of fundamental changes in the social and productive relationships which Tanzania is trying to achieve could not reasonably be expected to occur without some opposition and disruption. But the central question is what
can be done to make Ujamaa villages economically sufficiently successful so as to (a) serve as incentives to others to join or form such villages, and (b) justify any sacrifice of individual rights and liberties necessitated by Tanzania's social and political mobilization to redistribute available goods and services while at the same time increasing their absolute quantity.

IV. DEVELOPMENT OF UJAMAA VILLAGES

A. Growth of Ujamaa Villages

114. There does not seem to be general agreement on how many Ujamaa villages were actually in existence prior to 1967. One estimate gives 68 Ujamaa villages with a total population for 1967 of 5,000 and estimates for as late as 1968 range from 180 to 350 villages. 1/ Although there were some Ujamaa villages as early as 1960, mainly in the southern parts of the country, from the point of view of Ujamaa as the basic socialist strategy of rural development, 1966 and 1967 can be regarded as the most crucial years. In April 1966, the Government decided to abandon the "transformation approach" to rural development and announced that no new village settlement schemes were to be launched. With the Arusha Declaration in February 1967 and the second "post-Arusha" policy paper, "Socialism and Rural Development," in September 1967, the Government made explicit and unequivocal commitment to Ujamaa as the basis of rural development and transformation.

115. Following the call to the nation by President Nyerere in 1967 to "go Ujamaa," the nation witnessed a proliferation of Ujamaa villages. The years 1970, 1971, and 1972 marked a dramatically increased tempo of Ujamaazation. (See Table 1.)

116. From an estimated 800 Ujamaa villages in 1969, the number rose to over 1,950 in 1970 and to nearly 4,500 by 1971. Membership increased nearly three-fold over the same period, from about 530,000 to over 1.5 million. Ujamaa village members accounted for less than 4.5 percent of total rural population in 1970; this increased to over 12 percent by 1971.

1/ Discrepancies in estimates of both number of Ujamaa villages and population are indicated in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Information</th>
<th>Villages</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Villages</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister's Office</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthony O. Ellman</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>53,500</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1: GROWTH OF UJAMAA: 1969 TO MARCH 1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Number /a</td>
<td>809</td>
<td>1,956</td>
<td>4,481</td>
<td>5,556</td>
<td>5,628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Membership /a</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>531,200</td>
<td>1,545,200</td>
<td>1,980,862</td>
<td>2,028,164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Average population</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. New Villages</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1,147</td>
<td>2,528</td>
<td>1,072</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. % increase in number (base: 1970)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>129.2%</td>
<td>56.8%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. New membership</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1,014,000</td>
<td>1,335,622</td>
<td>1,7302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. % increase in membership (annual)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>190.9%</td>
<td>82.0%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Average population of new villages</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1,001</td>
<td>1,006</td>
<td>657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Average population difference: new vs. old villages (9-8-3)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. New size of villages as % of old size (8 ÷ 3 x 100)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>116.5%</td>
<td>114.0%</td>
<td>182.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Membership as % of rural population /b</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

/a Source: Rural Development Division, Prime Minister's Office.

/b Computed from the 1967 population census at an annual growth rate of 2.7 percent.
B. Pattern of Location of Ujamaa Villages

117. The Government's declared policy on Ujamaazation is "a widespread frontal attack" on the problems of rural underdevelopment with the aim of restructuring the entire rural society along socialist lines. The objective is "to move towards ujamaa on all possible fronts, mobilizing the full range of governmental and political institutions behind the principles of ujamaa...the whole society will be mobilised to pursue the goals of socialist production and living...the aim will be to move to make at least some movement towards ujamaa." 1/ The alternative of concentrating available resources, in terms of funds, facilities, and planning expertise, in selected areas in order to achieve a more rapid "transformation" into a socialist mode of production in those areas has been explicitly rejected.

118. An examination of the location of Ujamaa villages reveals, however, very large regional variations. (Cf. Table 2.) As of March 1973, of the total 5,631 Ujamaa villages, about one-third were located in two of the 18 regions, and four regions contained 3,066, or over 55 percent, of the total number. In terms of membership, two regions alone had two-fifths of the total 2,028 population. Four regions accounted for nearly 66 percent of the national totals. 2/

119. There are a number of factors that account for the concentration of Ujamaa villages and Wajamaa. First, the socio-economic conditions that presently obtain in the regions vary a great deal. In areas where cultivation has been carried on for a long period of time, where farmers have been exposed to the cash economy and are relatively well-off, "going Ujamaa" has proved a touchy and difficult operation. Five of the regions lowest in number of Ujamaa villages and/or membership, are among the six highest contributors to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The top six regions that contributed over 55 percent of the GDP in 1967 accounted for less than 10 percent of the Ujamaa population, and for about 15 percent of the Ujamaa villages, in 1973. Ujamaa villages have thus tended to be located in the relatively poor regions. Over 60 percent of the Ujamaa villages, embracing nearly 70 percent of the entire 1973 Wajamaa population (2,128,144), are located in five regions which taken all together contributed less than 25 percent to the 1967 GDP.


2/ A detailed breakdown of the number of Ujamaa villages and members on a district and regional basis as of March 1973 is shown in Appendix II.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Usamaa Population</th>
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<td>59,120</td>
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<td>873.8</td>
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<td>Tabora</td>
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<td>299.1</td>
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<td>209.1</td>
<td>377.3</td>
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<td>TANZANIA (Total)</td>
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<td>1,545,240</td>
<td>1,980,862</td>
<td>2,028,114</td>
<td>1,956</td>
<td>4,161</td>
<td>5,556</td>
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<td>Annual Increase</td>
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<td>2,528</td>
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<td>Growth Index</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>290.9%</td>
<td>372.9%</td>
<td>381.8%</td>
<td>229.2%</td>
<td>281.1%</td>
<td>287.7%</td>
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</table>

G. I. = Growth Index - Base: 1970

Source: Compiled from data provided by the Rural Development Division, Prime Minister's Office.
Ujamaa villages have tended to be located in areas where there is extensive uncultivated land. In particular, ujamaaization that has occurred as a result of the various "operations" mounted by the Government has taken place in regions of sparse population and/or great poverty—"Operation Pwani" covering parts of the Coast Region; "Operation Dodoma" covering the whole of the Dodoma Region; "Operation Kigoma" covering the whole of the Kigoma Region.

The location of Ujamaa villages has far-reaching consequences on the country's rural development effort. Approximately 5.5 percent of the land area supports 35 percent of the rural population. The average density of population in these areas is 75 persons per square kilometer or 1.3 hectares per person. Assuming a cultivable percentage of 50 percent, the available average cultivable land per capita is something on the order of 0.6 to 0.7 hectares, which is probably a minimum for survival. Under such circumstances the issue of nucleated settlements along the lines of Ujamaa villages to enable the Government to provide services "cheaply" cannot be of much relevance because farmers live close to one another. Secondly, new settlements cannot be created in these areas partly because land is a constraint and partly because most of the land is owned or claimed by individuals.

In the poor regions where the Government has mounted massive ujamaaization campaigns and "operations," the benefits, at least in the short-run, are likely to be limited and the cost to the Government in terms of services very great. The abolition of local rates and produce cess in 1969 may have had salutory effects in shifting the tax-incidence from the rural to the urban areas, but it is not likely to have increased the Government's total revenue and for that reason hinder the tempo of ujamaaization in the frame of "operations."

C. Size of Ujamaa Villages

There is a large variation in the size of Ujamaa villages, both in terms of land under communal cultivation and membership. As mentioned previously, it is unfortunate that there is no data on a national scale either on acreage under communal cultivation or on acreage of various agricultural products, and it is not possible to determine shares of production relative to communal cultivation and private plots, nor the degree of variation of acreage and value of production within Ujamaa villages. The only data that exist on a national scale are those covering membership. As of March 1973, the average membership per Ujamaa village on a district basis varied from 1,866 in Dodoma District, Dodoma Region,

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1/ Some studies exist on communal acreage in selected Ujamaa villages but none cover a whole district or a whole region.
There are as yet no guidelines on the formation and operation of Ujamaa villages and, although the smaller villages seem to function much better than the larger ones, the average size of villages shows a steadily rising trend. The national average Ujamaa village population size for 1970 was 272 and in March 1973 it stood at 360. Ujamaa villages created under "operations" as a result of vigorous Government campaigning and massive assistance are by far the largest. In the three "operations" areas of Coast, Dodoma, and Kigoma Regions, the average size as of March 1973 was 928. In the particular districts where "operations" have been focussed, the average membership is even higher--1,559 as compared to the national average of 360.

Although there have been no studies undertaken to isolate factors that may explain why certain Ujamaa villages have failed where others have succeeded, one crucial factor would appear to be the size. The larger the village the less the community sense, cohesion, and sense of belonging and responsibility. Many of the successful Ujamaa villages have memberships ranging from as little as 30 up to 100.

Although no data exist that show what proportion of Government rural development expenditure is absorbed by Ujamaa villages, many of the "operation-based" Ujamaa villages are provided with a large range of services and inputs that do not seem warranted by the production increase expected. For example, during one month the Government was to provide for the Dodoma operation, among other things,

- 200 Government vehicles to help move people to villages;
- 3,000 youths from the national service to help in the

1/ The average population sizes per Ujamaa village for each of the 18 regions for the years 1969-1973 (March) are shown in Appendix II.
demolition of houses, the loading and unloading of equipment...building units from neighboring regions... (to) help the people to build the size of houses they want;...forming (of) a regional tractor unit which could reach to a number of 40...; the Central region cooperative union to provide 150,000 shillings worth of fertilizer and...1,421,289.45 shillings (US$203,000) to help Ujamaa villages...The money is to be used to buy tractors for villagers... 1/

127. Although part of the decision to establish Ujamaa villages is based on the rationale of making it easier for the Government to provide services, in the absence of guidelines for Ujamaa village formation, there is a danger of Government assistance substituting for self-help. In its eagerness to transform the country-side into units of cooperative communities, the Government may be helping to erode the very basis of Ujamaa--self reliance.

V. LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE

A. Positive Features

Clear Conception of objectives

128. There is probably no country in the whole of Africa that has expressed the meaning and objectives of its development program with greater clarity or higher nobility than Tanzania. The major objective is to bring about rapid economic development, at the same time holding under control the forces that make for class formation and widening gaps of income. The Arusha Declaration with its unequivocal statement that the "policy of TANU is to build a socialist state" is eloquent testimony to the commitment of the leaders and the country's seriousness of purpose, spelling out as it does the meaning and content of Tanzanian socialism and the leadership code which makes it a legal offense for TANU and Government leaders to have more than one source of income. The policy paper "Socialism and Rural Development" specifies in even greater detail the aims and purposes of the Tanzanian development effort and the strategy to be adopted to achieve those goals. "Education for Self-reliance," which re-examines educational policy in light of the "new society" to be created, and which indicates the kind of re-orientation of the educational system necessary to make it reflect the needs and aspirations of a peasant country, is another policy statement that further testifies to the vision and single-mindedness of the Tanzanian leadership. The TANU guidelines

1/ The Standard (Dar es Salaam), July 16, 1971. (Article repeated on July 17, 1971.)
(Mwongozo) and the recent decision to decentralize the administration are further indications of the deep commitment of both Party and Government to have their raisons d'être center on the needs of the peasantry.

**Leadership**

129. The farmer is being "taught" what Government is all about, what TANU is, and what his own rights are. Government officials are being "re-educated" on the meaning of responsibility and the qualities of leadership.

There must be a deliberate effort to build equality between the leaders and those they lead. For a Tanzanian leader it must be forbidden to be arrogant, extravagant, contemptuous and oppressive. The Tanzanian leader has to be a person who respects people, scorns ostentation and who is not a tyrant. He should...be a champion of justice and equality. 1/

130. "Education for Self-reliance" aims at producing future leaders who fully appreciate the spirit of the Arusha Declaration and truly identify with the peasantry. Should Tanzania succeed in its efforts, the outcome would be no less a revolution, and a much more meaningful one, than the Green Revolution.

**Sense of purpose**

131. The clarity with which the development objectives are stated, the single-mindedness with which the objectives are pursued, the constant attempt to help the Tanzanian people understand the ideological basis of the development strategy, the inspiring moral leadership of President Nyerere—all these combine to create a very strong sense of purpose and direction. No doubt there are some Tanzanians who resent the single-minded policy of socialism being pursued and the means employed to create a socialist state. But one of the most arresting features of a very large number of Tanzanian leaders and the young educated "technocrats" is their dedication to the improvement of the lot of the peasantry. One of the greatest impacts of the decentralization decision, in addition to the purely "technical" benefits (quicker decision-making, greater involvement of farmers in plan implementation and formulation, better coordination, etc.), is likely to be in imbuing the "development managers"—development directors and functional managers in the regions and districts—with an even greater sense of purpose and responsibility.

Rural sector at the forefront

132. Although perhaps there is no development plan that does not reiterate the truism that development means "moving the agricultural sector," there are few countries in Africa that have shown the kind of seriousness and determination necessary for implementation that reflects such a policy.

133. The second five-year plan of Tanzania (1969-74) aims at allocating the sectoral ministries' development budgets in such a way that over 60 percent of development expenditure would have rural impact as compared to less than 38 percent for urban impact. Although the actual budgetary allocation fell somewhat short of that proportion in the initial years of the plan, the proportion going to rural impact projects is planned to increase to 70 percent in 1972-73 and 1973-74. The allocation of the development budget among the various competing claims on resources within the rural sector could be questioned, particularly with regard to the proportion assigned to directly productive activities vis-à-vis infrastructural investments. But the wisdom of according the highest priority to the rural sector, which supports approximately 94 percent of the population, cannot be questioned with any justification.

Participation by the rural population

134. The Government and the Party have with great consistency expressed the view that "the development of a country is brought about by the people." If a development plan is to be meaningful the people must participate in the planning process—no one is better equipped than they to know their own problems. "The duty of TANU is not to urge the people to implement plans which have been decided upon by a few experts and leaders. The duty of our Party is to ensure that the leaders and the experts implement the plans that have been agreed upon by the people themselves."

135. The point being made is not that all the sentiments expressed in Mwongozo have been translated into action programs but that in the minds of the policy-makers the need to involve the rural population in planning and implementation occupies the highest priority. The structure that links the peasant to the Party is meant to ensure that participation does not remain mere rhetoric. The ten-house-cell leader, and the village and ward development committees, which are primarily forums of farmers, are linked to the apex TANU structure via the district and regional organizational framework.

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3/ See Appendix A, Chart H.
With decentralization and the fast expansion of Ujamaa villages—whose memberships increased from about half a million people in 1970 to over 2 million by March 1973, representing more than 12 percent of the rural population—the participation of the peasantry in the development effort will substantially increase.

3. Major Defects in the Operation of Ujamaa Villages

The major shortcomings of the Ujamaa-based Tanzanian development strategy can conveniently be divided into two broad classes—those found at the national level and those existing at the Ujamaa village level.

National Level

The absence of data.—One of the most glaring deficiencies noted at the national level is the absence of both meaningful data and a mechanism to assess the accuracy of the little data that do exist. Although there are some data on the number of villages and their membership, there is as yet no data on acreage under communal cultivation; types of crops grown; yields of communal and/or private plots; the tempo of expansion of communal plots, etc. In the absence of such data it is impossible to form any opinion on such vital issues as the ratio of active labor force to cultivate and/or cultivable land; the returns to land and labor on communal plots on the one hand and private plots on the other; the relative yields of communal and private plots; the rate of adoption of innovations on both individual and communal farms; the degree of variation in production and income within and among Ujamaa villages.

The absence of such data makes it not only impossible to gauge the degree of goal-fulfillment in the rural sector but seriously limits the Government's capacity to monitor the rural development effort, formulate new policies, or amend existing ones. No doubt the shortage of trained manpower partly explains the dearth of data. But a more fundamental explanation is related to both the low priority given to the data collection task and defective field organization. With the existing field personnel most of the data needed could be collected.

Absence of a global framework to fit studies.—The second serious deficiency observed at the national level is the absence of any kind of framework into which investigations and studies can be fitted. There have been a large number of studies and investigations made by numerous organizations and agencies such as the Rural Development Division of the Prime Minister's Office, the Economic Research Bureau (ERB), the Bureau for Resource Assessment and Land Use Planning (ERALUP), students and staff of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences of the University of Dar es Salaam, and various bilateral donor agencies. But because of the absence of a global framework and set of priorities with regard to areas of investigation, a great many of the existing studies are of limited geographic application.
and/or operational value. Various committees exist to synchronize rural research efforts. However, judging from the gaps in the data base and the very limited light most of the studies throw on Ujamaa as a fundamental tool of development, it is difficult to believe that the committees have had much relevance. 1/

101. Evaluation and monitoring.—At the national level the third fundamental deficiency noted is the absence of a mechanism for evaluation and monitoring. As Ujamaaization affects more areas and encompasses more farmers, the failure or success of the entire rural development effort will revolve even more than at present around the failure or success of Ujamaa villages as economic units. It is thus essential to create a mechanism for evaluation (based on a solid data base) in order both to benefit from the experience of existing Ujamaa villages and to work out "ujamaaization" strategy for the future. As of this date, there has been no systematic effort made to improve the Government's ability to monitor its Ujamaa program.

102. A study of the successful Ujamaa villages reveals, for example, that in general the greater the size of the village, the less its chances for success. In this regard it is interesting to note that, of the villages that have been established as a result of massive ujamaaization efforts, those in the Coast, Kilima, and Dodoma Regions are the largest. In 1973 the national average membership in Ujamaa villages was 360, with the highest regional average 1,126 (Dodoma Region) and the lowest 112 (Shinyanga Region). The average membership of the three regions combined was 928—2 1/2 times the national average.

103. Consideration of economies of scale, possibilities for specialization and diversification, ease of delivery of inputs, provision of credit, marketing, etc., would all dictate that the larger the size of the Ujamaa village the better. On the other hand, increased participation, greater community-sense, and better control of village activities by farmers would favor smaller sizes. No mechanism or data exist to enable an attempt to work out possible trade-offs among relative sizes.

104. Although the making of an Ujamaa village into a self-governing and self-reliant economic unit is to be reached in three stages, the criteria set and guidelines suggested 2/ are so vague as to be of little operational value. Since the degree of success of the districts and regions in their rural development efforts tends to be measured by the number of villages and the size of their memberships, there is a tendency both to label almost any collection of farmers "Ujamaa" and to rush the Ujamaa

1/ The Government has recently established the National Scientific Research Council, which is entrusted with, among other functions, coordinating research efforts.

2/ See Appendix D.
villages to the third and final stage just to have them registered. Thus, for example, in five regions the number of registered Ujamaa villages (i.e., Stage III) in 1972 exceeded the number of Ujamaa villages in Stage II 18 months earlier. Unless a more easily quantifiable set of criteria for Ujamaa villages in the various stages is worked out and strictly followed, any meaningful attempt at evaluation of the performance of Ujamaa is rendered a difficult exercise.

1h5. Integration of Ujamaa into supra-local and national plans.—There is a fourth area of deficiency noted at the national level. The stated policy of the Government is to create Ujamaa villages throughout the country rather than in selected areas and to expand the process of ujamaization gradually. This has two major implications. One is that the approach seriously hampers the Government's ability to evolve an appropriate ujamaization strategy specifically tailored to fit features peculiar to the various regions and districts. The second implication is that it renders the task of integrating sectional planning with Ujamaa-generated plans more difficult. Sectional plans may call for treating an agro-economic zone as a unit. But districts and regions cut across such units and, with decentralization, regional plans are to be formulated and implemented by the regions and districts.

1h6. Agricultural research and extension chain.—A fifth area of serious deficiency at the national level lies in the agricultural research-extension chain. Although a number of agencies are involved in some aspects of agricultural research, there is no organization to define research priorities, identify constraints to increased agricultural production, design and conduct research programs, and ensure that the research results reach the farmer. For some time to come the increase in production is likely to come from cultivation of larger areas rather than from improved technology. Although there is a large field staff, the impact of extension on production is almost negligible. A detailed study made in western Tanzania, for example, concluded "the data failed to show any measureable positive influence of contact with the 'bavana shamba' (agricultural field assistant) on cotton husbandry standards." 1/ One major shortcoming in extension strategy is the fact that it is not target-oriented. Secondly, even with the best of will, an extension agent or field officer simply has neither an organization to approach for assistance nor research support, and he is neither trained for nor expected to conduct research himself.

1h7. Shortage of skilled manpower.—One effect of decentralization has been the dispersion of skilled and trained staff to the districts and regions. There seems to be little doubt that decentralization is one of the most

significant policy decisions since Independence and is a move in the right direction. But its impact has been to substantially reduce the capacity of the center to formulate policy without, in the short-run, producing dramatic results in the rural areas. With decentralization each region and district can be regarded as a comprehensive integrated rural development project area. The trained manpower requirements for eighteen regions and over sixty-five districts is so great that it will be a long time before the various key positions can be filled by professionals.

Ujamaa Village level

118. Lack of expert guidance.--The weaknesses enumerated at the national level, in particular the absence of an evaluation mechanism, are reflected at the Ujamaa village level. First, there is the conflict of, on the one hand, the degree of freedom farmers are to enjoy in planning for their village and, on the other, the need for central planning and guidance. Secondly, unless a Ujamaa is made to see that he is demonstrably better off as a member than as a non-member, the whole Ujamaa framework can easily crumble. Because of the lack of data and operation-oriented studies, the Government is not in a position to advise in such important areas as the activities which are amenable to ujamaazation; the crops which can be grown with the greatest benefit on a cooperative basis; the optimum sizes for different operations; the appropriate size range in launching Ujamaa villages so that benefits of scale are reaped without sacrificing the sense of belonging and cohesion so essential for success; or--on the organizational side--the type of committees that need to be established; the size of work groups; the relative sizes of communal and private plots, and so forth.

119. The strategy of the Government is to encourage farmers to start communal cultivation on a limited scale and then have them gradually increase the communal plots and reduce the private plots. There are no studies on the tempo of communalization. Data on acreage and production are difficult to obtain but even from the limited studies available it seems clear that production in many areas is stagnating. In some villages that are registered as multi-purpose cooperative societies and deemed therefore to have attained the third and final stage, communal production is still much smaller than production from private plots and, in some extreme cases, there are no communal plots in Stage III Ujamaa villages.

150. Unless an evaluation mechanism is instituted these and related problems are likely to continue to plague the strategy of Ujamaa-based development.

151. Leadership and management.--The essence of Ujamaa is to enable the farmers to come to grips with their problems and to help them form self-reliant communities. Further Ujamaa villages are being formed at so fast a rate that, even if the Government were willing, the provision of assistance in management and day-to-day operations would be impossible. Able leadership and management must then be forthcoming from the farmers themselves.
The Government is fully aware of the deficiencies in leadership and management in many of the Ujamaa villages and has plans for farmers' training programs. But its capacity to train falls far short of the need, and the problems of incentives for increased production and an effective system of distribution of proceeds from the communal farms are likely to remain unsolved for some time to come.

152. Also, with the strong leadership role projected for TANU in Ujamaa village development, a studied effort must be made to keep open the "information" channel of communications from the village level to the highest reaches of the Party. If this channel does not become as efficient as the "command" channel, guidance and supervision could become dictation and control. Similarly, Commissioners' and Development Directors' substantial power must be matched by self-restraint.

153. Self-reliance and self-help versus Government assistance.--The declared policy of the Government is to maximize the self-help component of the development effort, and this aspect is considered to be one of the fundamental features that distinguishes the Ujamaa approach from the village settlement scheme. But the assistance given by the Government in the three priority areas of dispensaries, schools, and water supply, especially in the "operations" areas, is on such a massive scale that in many cases the expectation of assistance has been the main motive for formation of an Ujamaa village. A major policy issue is thus the determination of the relative shares of the Government and Ujamaa members in supplying the resources necessary for ujamaazation: how much is to be borne by the Government and how much by the Wajamaa by way of self-help. A second major policy issue is the relative weight to be given to directly productive activities vis-a-vis social overheads. Judging from the Ujamaa villages created by the "operations" programs, the Government's attitude seems to be to provide social overheads first and to assume that these will be paid for from the ensuing increased production.

154. Production.--From the fragmentary data available it is not possible to determine if Ujamaa policy is partly responsible for the sluggish growth rate of agricultural production and, if so, to what extent. But in some areas production fall is associated with very ambitious ujamaazation drives. The Ismani area in the Iringa Region two to three years ago experienced an intensive ujamaazation drive under an overzealous Regional Commissioner, 1/ and a considerable amount of coercion was used. The idea was to convert the Ismani area into a collectivised maize growing area. Maize production in the area is reported to have fallen by 70 percent in two years. 2/

1/ The Regional Commissioner was later murdered by one of the embittered farmers in the area.

2/ Confidential source in the Prime Minister's Office.
Status of Ujamaa villages.--Until an Ujamaa village has reached Stage III, and is registered as a multi-purpose cooperative society, it has no legal status. This raises problems of land acquisition and of eligibility for credit. In some cases Ujamaa villages have been permitted to incorporate adjacent land claimed by individuals if the majority of farmers decide to expand the communal plot or plots. But legally, there is no basis for allowing Ujamaa villages to expropriate private land.1/

C. Recommendations

Recommended studies and organization

The Government's policy of making Ujamaa villages economically viable units needs first to be translated into concrete plans of action at the Ujamaa village level; secondly, the objective of making Ujamaa villages capable of producing economic surplus must be placed in a defined time horizon or time context. The first would entail introducing production targets into the plans of Ujamaa villages, districts, and regions. For example, for Government expenditure in agriculture and agriculture-related infrastructure, there should be a corresponding forecast of production increases expected as a result. By time horizon for surplus generation is meant an indication of the number of years an Ujamaa village should take before it can become a net contributor to Government resources.

The lack of data and the absence of a mechanism for data collection and evaluation have made it impossible to determine the impact of Ujamaa on production. It is of the greatest urgency that a system be established to collect such vital data as the volume and value of production; amount, type, and cost of input; land under various crops; land under communal and private cultivation; etc. The task is one mainly of organization. There are over 3000 agricultural field agents who increasingly are being posted to live in Ujamaa villages. These, aided by the cooperative and Ujamaa village field assistants, the primary cooperative society committees, the central committees of Ujamaa villages, the TANU ten-house cell leaders, and the various functional managers at the district and regional levels, could initiate an impressive data collection scheme.

There is a need to make a thorough investigation of the elements contributing to the success or failure of the Ujamaa-based rural development strategy. A very large number of studies of Ujamaa villages have been made but, in the absence of a national framework into which the investigations can be fitted, the studies are neither thorough in their coverage nor cumulative in their effect or impact.

1/ The Government is considering both amending the laws governing land and passing a law giving Ujamaa villages a corporate existence.
159. The Rural Development Division in the Prime Minister's Office, which is responsible for the Ujamaa program, needs to be strengthened considerably in terms of both number and quality of its staff. The fact that it comes under the Prime Minister and has considerable leverage in the allocation of regional budgets would seem to make the Division ideally suited for the responsibility of data collection and evaluation and the initiation and coordination of investigations and studies on Ujamaa.

160. There is a need to establish an agricultural research organization with the aim of introducing production-increasing innovations. With the proliferation of Ujamaa villages, and the increase in the number of people living in them, the possibilities of increasing production by bringing new land under cultivation are limited. It is also necessary that Ujamaa villages be made not only self-sufficient but producers of surplus. The establishment of a national agricultural research organization is thus of the highest importance.

161. Although the number of agricultural field agents is impressive, many studies have indicated that the impact of extension on production is minimal. At the present time extension suffers from two weaknesses. First, the research base is so weak that the field agent has little to impart to the farmers. When problems arise he is no better equipped to provide solutions than the farmers themselves because he has no research organization to turn to for assistance. Secondly, the training of agricultural field agents is grossly inadequate. A strong link should thus be established between the research organization and the extension network. Also, the training of the field agents must be radically revised so that they are able to both advise farmers on improved agricultural practices and identify production constraints.

162. Although sustained official emphasis has been placed on the need for voluntary peasant participation in Ujamaa village formation, the temptation remains great for over-zealous local Party and/or Government officials to apply inordinate pressure for Ujamaa development in their areas. A national ombudsman network could be created, perhaps manned by otherwise unofficially active elders. These would be mandated to receive Ujamaa village development related complaints and transmit them directly to a body like the Permanent Commission of Enquiry for the Prevention of the Abuse of Power.

Possible areas of assistance

163. The decentralization of administration has meant that each region and each district can be regarded as an area of integrated regional development. To the extent that the Regional Development Directors and District Development Directors are responsible for all of the development activities in their regions and districts, they can be regarded as "managers" of complex development programs. Any assistance to the rural sector would seem to offer excellent prospects for self-sustained growth if formulated to fit into the existing district and regional development structures. As decentralization takes root, the Regional and District Development Directors
gain experience, and the farmers begin to see their views reflected in
district plans, any outside assistance is bound to be used more effectively
than would be the case if plans were formulated and projects designed from
the "outside," as they were in the pre-decentralization period. Many of
the implementation problems that plague rural development projects are not
likely to arise when there is a framework that embraces farmers, technical
staff (functional managers), Development Directors, and representatives of
TANU. The IBRD supported Tabora project and the Kigoma proposal are in the
right direction. The IBRD can help in the formulation of regional develop-
ment projects and in financing the implementation.

164. To ensure that viable projects which are too small to attract
outside assistance do not fail to materialize because of a shortage of
funds, the financial base of the Tanzania Rural Development Bank (TRDB)
needs to be widened and its managerial capacity strengthened. In parti-
cular, the district development corporations, which are basically aimed to
help bring about diversification from agriculture, need to be supported.
They have been by and large unsuccessful so far mainly because of the
shortage of experienced and/or trained staff. For a long time to come
they will continue to be too small to attract outside assistance, but they
can be supported through financial and managerial support to intermediaries
like the TRDB.

165. With appropriate short training programs the problem of shortage
of manpower in the district development corporations can be solved. The
training required would consist of simple management techniques and record
keeping.

166. Even after the proposed training programs the district develop-
ment corporations cannot be expected to conceive, formulate, and implement
small-scale industrial ventures. What is needed is an attempt at evolving
a rural industrialization strategy on a national scale. As the incomes of
the farmers increase and new consumption patterns emerge, the possibilities
for industrial ventures should increase. The suggested industrial develop-
ment strategy would thus be an attempt to forecast the demand pattern that
would emerge. The district development corporations would then be used as
the instruments to execute the components of the industrial program. This
would seem to be another area ideally suited for outside assistance.

VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

167. An assessment of the Ujamaa-based rural development effort of
the Tanzanian Government must deal first with the socialist ideology of
TANU and then with the extent to which the organizational framework and
the processes of plan formulation and implementation reflect the policy
statements.
The policy of TANU is to build a socialist state" 1/ and, as over 90 percent of Tanzanians live in the rural areas, the success or failure of building a socialist state will be determined in the countryside. The Tanzanian rural development strategy thus aims at fulfilling the following objectives within its socialist ideology:

(a) the spread of the benefits of development throughout the country with particular emphasis on the rural sector;

(b) the encouragement of collective and cooperative forms of activities with a view toward avoiding wide differences in income;

(c) the creation of a framework that would enable unfettered mobilization of the people for development and self-reliance;

(d) the creation of a base for sustained economic and social transformation through a rapid expansion of productive capacity; and

(e) the use of a widely based frontal development strategy with a view toward avoiding unbalanced regional development.

The restructuring of rural society along socialist lines is to be brought about through the creation of Ujamaa villages throughout the country so that the nation becomes one of cooperative farm units as opposed to one made up of individual peasant holdings. Each village is to organize its activities and plan for its future as a unit, and is to be run by democratically elected farmer-leaders. The Party and the Government will view each village as a political, social, and economic unit, and the whole spectrum of Government programs will be worked out and services provided on the basis of Ujamaa units or groups of Ujamaa units. In theory, individual Ujamaa village plans are to be horizontally integrated to create larger and more meaningful socio-economic units; they are to be vertically integrated with the sectoral ministries and the central government to enable national planning. Horizontal integration is to be achieved by a "development management system" that would make it possible for all rural programs to be co-ordinated at the Ujamaa village, district, and regional levels. Vertical integration is to be achieved through the channel connecting the village, ward, district, and regional committees to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development Planning.2/

1/ "The Arusha Declaration." op. cit.

2/ See Appendix A, Chart F.
170. Thus "going Ujamaa" is not simply the creation of villages. It refers to an integrated strategy encompassing, from the point of view of the farmers, a framework for planning, for decision-making, and for a particular mode of production and marketing. From the point of view of the Party and the Government, ujamaization is the process by which the rural sector is to be transformed into a socialist structure and through which rural development is to be brought about, at the same time keeping in check forces that would give rise to class formation and uneven distribution of income. Further, the Ujamaa village program is to be the mechanism by which social and political unity are consolidated and the need for national defense fulfilled, given both Tanzania's emphasis on development and its limited ability to field and support conventional armed forces.

171. An Ujamaa village may begin in either of two ways. It may be formed in a new, previously uncultivated, area thus necessitating a large movement of people. The Government is then generally responsible for selecting the site, providing food, construction material, and transportation for settlers and their belongings, and ensuring that there is an adequate water supply. Regions or districts are selected by the Government, usually on the basis of poverty, for what are called "operations." To date there have been three major "operations"—Operations Pwani (Coast), Operation Dodoma, and Operation Kigoma—and two more are planned. Alternatively, an already existing village may be persuaded, or may decide on its own initiative, to become an Ujamaa village. This usually does not entail movement of people, although some movement is not precluded. In such cases, land under private cultivation would gradually be changed to communal cultivation. In either situation farmers would then begin to be treated as members of the Ujamaa unit and not as individual peasants.

172. After the Ujamaa village has been formed the villagers create their own organization and establish various committees, the most important of which are the Central, or Executive Committee, and the Works, Agricultural, Finance, and Security/Conciliatory Committees. Village plans are prepared by the committees with the assistance of district personnel and are then passed to both the District Planning and Development Committee and the Regional Development Committee, where they are integrated into the regional development plan.

173. The decentralization of the Government which took place in July 1972 was primarily motivated by the desire to both ensure that farmers and their institutions, as well as the various representatives to the sectoral ministries, would participate fully in plan formulation and implementation, and that such participation would result in plans consistent with the Ujamaa ideology.
Ujamaa as the basis of the Tanzanian development strategy was officially articulated only in January 1967, and ujamaazation on a meaningful scale did not start to occur until 1969-70. Partly because of the complex set of Ujamaa objectives, partly because of the fact that Ujamaa as a strategy of rural development is a recent phenomenon, and partly because of the absence of data, it is extremely difficult to assess the extent to which the Ujamaa-based development strategy is succeeding in the fulfillment of the stated objectives of the Tanzanian Government. The observations made and the conclusions indicated should thus be regarded as tentative and subjective.

As a practical expression of the process of building a socialist state, Ujamaa embraces political, social, and economic aspects. From the political point of view, Ujamaa villages seem reasonably well integrated into the body-politic via the ten-house cell leader, through the ward, district, and regional Party organizational framework to the national Party structure. When viewed as an attempt to create a rural society with no class stratification, Ujamaa appears reasonably successful. This is due, in part, to the fact that not enough development has occurred to generate forces for class formation and, in part, to the high quality of Tanzanian leadership and high degree of "politicalization." From the viewpoint of the Ujamaa village as the ultimate unit of economic development, however, the strategy does not appear to be working as well.

It is much too early to evaluate the extent to which Ujamaa as the framework for rural development has succeeded in raising the standard of living of the peasantry. A more appropriate, and perhaps a fairer, approach would be to examine the extent to which the Ujamaa-based development strategy has the potential to accelerate the development process. What are the lessons of experience to date? What are the strong points of the system? What are the weak points? What changes may be needed in order to make the Ujamaa strategy fulfill more effectively the goal of economic development?

Both at the national (i.e., central Government and Party) level and the Ujamaa village level, there are some fundamental weaknesses that could endanger the survival of Ujamaa as a development strategy.

(a) There are three contending, though not necessarily always conflicting, pressures—the need for directly productive investment, the demand for social services, and the necessity for ideological consistency. Tanzania's goal is to have the three converge in a situation where investment in Ujamaa villages produces surpluses from which an improved standard of living can be financed. In the meantime, the speed at which Ujamaa villages can be converted into surplus-generating units will be determined by both the relative weights attached to production increasing programs vis-à-vis those aimed primarily as social equity, and by consideration of how such decisions impinge on TANU's ideological frame.

The relatively low level of priority given to production increasing programs vis-à-vis those concerned with social equity is one of the major weaknesses.
The provision of food, water, schools, and dispensaries—or the promise of them—has served as an incentive to persuade people to move into or form Ujamaa villages. In particular, in the "operations" areas, families have been physically uprooted and moved to new areas. In such cases, it is obvious that the Government must provide facilities to sustain life. These necessities must be provided even before any productive activity is begun by the new villages, since the vast majority will no longer have the traditional means of livelihood on which to fall back. Until these new Ujamaa villages become economically viable, other areas will have to take up the slack.

What are the other areas? The industrial sector of Tanzania is exceedingly small, contributing less than 10 percent of GDP. Expansion of state farms was a provision of the second five-year plan (1966-69) but has never been considered, especially by President Nyerere, as an instrument of rural development in terms of production or employment. The private agricultural sector is contracting, and will do so at an increasing tempo as Ujamaaization expands, and its economic contribution will decline correspondingly. Thus Ujamaa villages must not only become self-sufficient, but also generate surpluses, in order to contribute to the continuing Ujamaa village program. What the Ujamaa program needs, perhaps more than anything else, are some examples of economic success, examples of farmers living better than they did previously on the basis of self-help and self-reliance in Ujamaa villages.

(b) TANU's role in the country's development is not confined to the formulation and/or approval of policies. The Party is also expected to participate in planning and oversee implementation from the highest levels to the Ujamaa village level. With the post-decentralization planning process, all plans initiated in the Ujamaa village must be approved by the appropriate TANU organization: the TANU District Executive Committee for all plans within a district; the TANU Regional Executive Committee for all regional plans; and the TANU National Executive Committee for national plans. The immense power wielded by TANU may carry with it the arms of destruction, partly because it does not have people technically qualified to appreciate the complex mechanics of development, and partly because of the danger of socialist rhetoric substituting for the imperatives of generating economic benefits within the Ujamaa framework.

(c) The Government's decision to "Ujamaa" the countryside on a "frontal" scale rather than on a selective basis has had some negative consequences. First, the frontal Ujamaaization strategy resulted in the increase of Ujamaa villages from 809 in 1969 to 5,631 in 1973, and in membership growing from 531,000 in 1970 to over 2 million by March 1973. The Party and the Government seem so taken up by numbers that it is sometimes difficult to discern what collection of people constitutes "Ujamaa" and what collection does not. Of the eight villages visited, two were Ujamaa only in name. 1/ Given the size and diversity of Tanzania, there

1/ Mkola in Tabora and Mwamaji in the Coast Region.
cannot be only one blue-print for ujamaazation strategy. The densely 
populated areas need a strategy different from one designed for the poor 
and underpopulated areas. The Ujamaa approach to nomadic cattle people 
should be radically different from one aimed at settled farmers. Some 
period of consolidation is necessary to allow the Government to examine 
elements of success and failure in the Ujamaa villages in existence; the 
Ujamaa approach applied on an unsystematic basis is bound to create 
considerable difficulties.

The second major implication of the "frontal approach" has 
been to put considerable strain on both the Government's planning capacity 
and available manpower. Thirdly, it seems to have brought into more stark 
confrontation than would otherwise perhaps have been the case, the conflicting claims on the limited resources of the Government of social services 
vis-à-vis directly productive activities. The "selective approach" which 
implied the concentration of resources and planning expertise in selected 
areas has been rejected by the Government. That rejection also implies the 
rejection of a strategy that would have made it possible to have a collection 
of Ujamaa villages contribute more to the Government than they receive from 
it, making it thus impossible to widen the resource base.

(d) The absence of systematic data collection machinery and a 
mechanism for evaluation has limited the Government's ability to provide 
guidance to Ujamaa villages. The immense proliferation of Ujamaa villages 
since 1969 notwithstanding, the Government and the Party do not seem to 
be in a much better position than they were in 1962 (when "Ujamaa, the 
Basis of African Socialism" 1/ appeared) to work out strategies for Ujamaa 
formation suited to the various regions' specific problems, resource 
endowments and attitudes of farmers. The Government is not presently any 
better equipped to provide guidance on the appropriate mix between social 
overhead and directly productive investment, or to advise on village organization and work-systems, the tempo of expansion of communal cultivation 
within Ujamaa villages, the optimum range of sizes for different agricultural operations, the proportion of cash vis-à-vis food crops, etc. The inability of the Government to provide such guides is accounted for only partly by the shortage of trained staff. It is also the result of the 
absence of either a national framework for the various existing studies and 
investigations, and those that need to be made, or any evaluation mechanism.

(e) The integration of Ujamaa village plans with sectoral and 
national plans has in the past been so weak that "much of the expenditure 
in the rural sector (forced) no part of the rural development strategy laid 
down in the plan." 2/ The decentralization of the Government which occurred

1/ Julius K. Nyerere, "Ujamaa, the Basis of African Socialism," in Freedom 
and Unity, pp. 162-171.

2/ D. R. Jones in Rural and Regional Planning in Tanzania.
in July 1972 will definitely improve the situation. But given the lack of data and studies that could throw light on the functioning of Ujamaa villages, and the inadequacy of the Rural Development Division in staff and expertise, the problem of integration of Ujamaa village plans into the sectoral and national plans will remain a serious one.

(f) The essence of Ujamaa is to equip Tanzanian farmers to themselves come to grips with their problems and to help them form self-reliant communities. The declared policy of the Government is to maximize the self-help component in its rural development program. In order to ensure that farmers appreciate the benefits of Ujamaa, the Government has devoted considerable resources to the provision of social services. Without a corresponding increase in production the Government's resource base will be too narrow to continue to provide these services in the face of the tempo of Ujamaa expansion. In addition to the need to emphasize production increasing programs, the situation dictates the translation of the Government's declared policy of maximizing self-help into concrete plans of action. There is no reason, for example, why the allocation of the regional development fund (RDF) among Ujamaa villages cannot be done on the basis of the magnitude of self-help schemes undertaken by villages. Such activities as the maintenance of roads, and the building of houses for agricultural field assistants, dispensaries and schools, etc., can be made conditions for eligibility for funds from the RDF. The magnitude of assistance provided to Ujamaa villages, especially in the "operations" areas, is so massive that it seems to have the potential of eroding the very foundation and essence of Ujamaa—self-reliance.

(g) The question of incentives will continue to pose serious problems at both the national and the Ujamaa village level. At the national level, given the emphasis, particularly by President Nyerere, on voluntary compliance with Ujamaa policy, the problem is one of providing incentives within the limited resource base of the Government, sufficient to encourage farmers to join or form Ujamaa villages. At the Ujamaa village level, the problem is one of creating a system that would make economic sense to the farmer and encourage him to devote an increasing amount of his time to the collective farm. This latter essentially boils down to the question of return to labor. A member who is asked to devote, for example, 200 working days to the communal plot must be convinced that those 200 days would not have generated greater benefits if devoted to his/her private plot.

(h) Further, weak leadership and management have proved, and will continue to prove, very serious problems. The field staff assigned to the Ujamaa villages—agricultural field agents, and cooperative and Ujamaa village field assistants—cannot provide much help. They are ill-equipped to provide assistance of a technical, much less organizational, nature. In addition to being very young and inexperienced, the vast majority of them have weak technical training.

(i) Until Ujamaa villages have reached Stage III and are registered as multi-purpose cooperative societies, they have no legal status. This has resulted in conflict between the courts on the one hand
and the Government on the other. In the absence of legislation to give
corporate existence to Ujamaa villages in Stages I and II, courts have
found it difficult first to treat Ujamaa villages in the early stages as
legal entities and, secondly, to pass judgment in favor of any Ujamaa
village that decides to incorporate private land into its communal land.

178. The shortcomings indicated are shortcomings of the mechanics of
creating "rural economic and social communities where people live together
and work together...and which are interlocked so that all of the different
communities also work together in cooperation for the common good of the
nation as a whole." 1/ Further, the attempt to indicate the economic
impact of Tanzania's socialist ideology on the rural sector may have
resulted in giving the impression that Tanzania is headed for disaster.
This is erroneous. The clear conception of the goals of the Tanzanian
development effort, the inspiring sense of purpose and dedication of the
leadership and its refreshing commitment to socio-economic development,
the emphasis on rural development, the determined fight to abort forces
tending to class formation so that development benefits the vast majority
of Tanzanians--all these are elements making for a very favorable environ-
ment for development. Many of the defects mentioned can be overcome, and
the dedication of the leadership is such that we are optimistic they will be
overcome. The goal conflicts indicated are essentially conflicts that
characterize only a certain portion of the development process--the
"earlier part of the process." No doubt the pursuit of some of the poli-
tically and ideologically motivated goals has been at the expense of a
faster rate of economic development. The Government is aware of this and
is prepared to bear the cost. "Inherent in the Arusha Declaration (is) the
belief that...if the pursuit of wealth clashes with things like human
dignity and social equality, then the latter will be given priority." 2/
The choice is obviously not made on the basis of quantified trade-offs.
Such an exercise would be highly conjectural, especially from the Tanzanian
point of view since it can hardly be argued that, confronted with quantified
trade-offs, TANU may abandon its socialist ideology based on Ujamaa.


Chart II

Relationship Between TANU and Government - 1969

TANU STRUCTURE

- National Executive Committee
- Regional Secretary
- Regional Executive Committee
- District Chairman
- District Secretary
- District Executive Committee
- Branch Chairman
- Branch Executive Committee

Ten by Ten Party Cells - Leaders

GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE

- Ministry of Regional Administration
- Regional Commissioner (Administrative Secretary)
- Area Commissioner (Area Secretary)
- District Development and Planning Committee
- District Council
- Ward Development Committee

Technical Ministries

- National Executive
- Ministry of Economic Affairs & Dev. Planning
- Regional Heads of Departments
- National Heads of Departments

Note: Dual Party and Government Positions marked

Chart C
Local Government and Development-1969*

Regional Development Committee
Chairman: Regional Commissioner (who is also Ex-Officio Regional Secretary of TANU)

Regional Commissioner

District Commissioner
Chairman: TANU District Chairman

District Council Chairman: TANU District Chairman

District Council Chairman:
Education and Culture
Communications & Building

Finance, Establishment & General Purposes
Natural Resources
Public Health

Development and Planning Chairman: Area Commissioner who is also Ex-Officio TANU District Secretary

WDC: Ward Development Committees

* Based largely upon Delle Harris, "Government Proposals on Local Government Councils", Mbioni, Volume III (October, 1966), pp. 3-17.
Based primarily on Mulokozi, op. cit., p. 5.
Chart F
The Planning Process - 1973

Policy Guidelines and Assistance

Economic Committee of the Cabinet → TANU National Executive Committee

→ DevPlan

→ Prime Minister's Office

→ Regional Staff

→ Regional Development Committee

→ TANU Regional Executive Committee

→ District Staff

District Development & Planning Committee

→ TANU District Executive Committee

Ujamaa Village Development Committee

Plan Formulation

Economic Committee of the Cabinet → TANU National Executive Committee

→ DevPlan

→ Prime Minister's Office

→ TANU Regional Executive Committee

→ Regional Staff

→ Regional Development Committee

→ TANU Regional Executive Committee

→ District Staff

District Development & Planning Committee

→ TANU District Executive Committee

Ujamaa Village Development Committee

Ward Development Committee
Chart G
Ward and Ujamaa Village Structure-1973

Area Commissioner

Division Secretary
(Combines Party and Administrative Roles)

Branch Chairman

Branch Executive Committee

Party Cells

Ward Secretary

Ward

Chairman

Secretary

Ward Development Committee

10 Elected Members

OR

Area Commissioner

Divisional Secretary
(Combines Party and Administrative Roles)

Branch Chairman

Branch Executive Committee

Party Cells

Village Secretary

Ujamaa Village

Secretary

Ujamaa Village Development Committee

10 Elected Members
Chart II
Relationship Between TANU and Government - 1973

TANU STRUCTURE

President
Vice President
National Conference
National Executive Committee
Regional Secretary
Regional Executive Committee
District Secretary
District Executive Committee
Branch Chairman
Branch Executive Committee

GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE

President
National Assembly
Prime Minister's Office
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Dev. Planning
Technical Ministries
Chairman
Regional Commissioner
Regional Development Director
Regional Development Committee
Chairman
Secretary
Regional Development Council
Regional Projects
Chairman
District Commissioner
District Development Director
District Development Council
District Dev. & Planning Committee
Staff Officers and Functional Managers
Chairman
Chairman
Ward Development Committee

Note: Dual Party and Government Positions marked
### APPENDIX B

#### UJAMAA VILLAGES: NUMBER, MEMBERSHIP AND AVERAGE MEMBERSHIP AS OF MARCH 1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Membership</th>
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|         | Kisorawe | 27  | 6,510      | 241                | 211,828               | 3.1             |
|         | Mafia    | 8   | 2,290      | 286                | 19,651                | 11.7            |
|         | Mzizima  | 21  | 3,160      | 151                | 88,764                | 3.6             |
|         | Rufiji   | 62  | 77,252     | 1,246              | 142,001               | 54.4            |

| Dodoma  | Dodoma   | 134 | 249,970    | 1,866              | 348,995               | 71.6            |
|         | Kondoa   | 107 | 146,415    | 1,434              | 248,975               | 18.7            |
|         | Mpwapwa  | 95  | 82,500     | 868                | 206,724               | 39.9            |

| Iringa  | Iringa   | 152 | 89,072     | 586                | 270,900               | 32.9            |
|         | Mufindi  | 106 | 34,556     | 326                | 139,000               | 24.9            |
|         | Njombe   | 101 | 119,899    | 299                | 374,071               | 32.1            |

| Kigoma  | Kasalu   | 75  | 95,391     | 1,272              | 243,596               | 39.2            |
|         | Kibondo  | 20  | 11,000     | 550                | 160,650               | 6.9             |
|         | Kigoma   | 37  | 8,000      | 216                | 126,186               | 6.3             |

| Total   |          | 188 | 115,382    | 611                | 600,165               | 19.2            |
|         |          | 336 | 378,915    | 1,128              | 804,694               | 47.1            |
|         |          | 659 | 243,527    | 370                | 783,971               | 31.1            |
|         |          | 132 | 114,391    | 867                | 530,432               | 21.6            |
### APPENDIX B

#### Page 2

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* Extrapolated from the 1967 census at 2.7 percent growth per year.
## APPENDIX C

### NUMBERS, MEMBERSHIP OF UJAMAA VILLAGES, AND RATES OF GROWTH ON A REGIONAL BASIS

**1969-1973 (March)**

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APPENDIX C
Page 2
### Appendix C

#### Table: Growth Rates of Ujamaa Villages (1969-1973)

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**a Base = 1970**
1. It is known that Ujamaa Villages go through various stages of development. In order to make these stages more understandable to the implementors of the Ujamaa Village policy, the Economic Committee of the Cabinet Paper 27/70 considers in depth three stages, and ways in which Ujamaa Villages could be helped to develop their activities.

2. The 1st Stage is when the Villages are being started, at which time they do not have a completely sound economic foundation. Therefore, the major task in this stage is preparing that foundation which is so critical to developing the economy of the Villages; this includes construction of storage facilities, roads/bridges, preparation of public services (school, water, health), and other instruments of development. It is expected that in this stage all activities will be undertaken by the villagers themselves and the Government.

3. In the 2nd Stage, Villages will have achieved some development and, therefore, should be registered as probationary, multi-purpose cooperative societies. Because they have the foundation and some on-going economic projects, Villages in this Stage, besides getting aid from the Government and TANU, can get credit from the Tanzania Rural Development Bank.

4. In the 3rd Stage, Villages should have reached an even higher level of development and be capable of self-sustained growth: they make their own development plans and implement them; they program the costs of such plans, how to fund them, and how to repay the debts incurred. This means the Villages at this stage are self-supporting in their different activities.

5. The Cabinet Paper did not deal in full with the important things to consider when up-grading a Village from the 2nd to the 3rd Stage. The up-grading of a Village to Stage 3 is so critically important to socialist rural development that serious consideration must precede such a move. Therefore, it is important to have some indicators that show that a given Ujamaa Village is in fact ready for this Stage. This will eliminate the uncertainty that exists at present in many Regions. Many Villages which have been certified as having reached this Stage in different Regions, in fact have not undergone the necessary development, either economically or politically. This is the theme of this paper.

6. As pointed out above, the different Stages are closely related to the question of the loans and credit which will help Villages produce more. Because the decision regarding such matters is very important, it is necessary that a Village being considered for Stage 3 meet certain
criteria, in order to be registered as a multi-purpose cooperative society.

7. The very first thing is that Villages should have reached Stage 2, a stage which indicates that these Villages have sound economic, political, and cultural foundations, etc., which will enable the Villages to further their own development:

7.1. These Villages must have enough people to produce sufficient wealth to forward the economy and an Ujamaa type of life, with the spirit of Ujamaa, and determination to develop. This will be confirmed by a Constitution, and the matters dealt with in it, a kind of constitution which will work, with the sort of leadership which will work. Also the number of people should be large enough for the economic use of Government-provided public services.

7.2. These Villages must demonstrate and confirm that they are politically mature and have faith in the principles of Ujamaa, and these will be confirmed by the following:

7.2.1. The political climate in the Village, and among its members generally and especially its leadership, should be such as to allow the implementation of an Ujamaa plan of development.

7.2.2. The Villages should understand, believe in, implement, and defend the principles of Ujamaa.

7.2.3. The condition of leadership should be such that it is able to carry out Village affairs and such that the Village has complete plans for training leaders and technicians.

7.2.4. All the laws or regulations of the Village should correspond to the purposes of Ujamaa.

7.2.5. The cultural conditions in the Village should assist its progress.

7.3. These Villages must have sound economies, which are developing and self-sustaining. This condition should be confirmed by investigation to be such that:

7.3.1. The Villages prepare their own development plans.

7.3.2. All general plans are prepared in accordance with the principles of Ujamaa, guaranteeing "large economies of scale" which derive from the villagers living and working together.

7.3.3. The Villages have production goals.

7.3.4. The Villages should have a sound plan for work distribution and work norms, in order that an equitable distribution of income can be made and incentives for Ujamaa work and life can be provided.
7.3.5. The condition of income and expenditures should be such that the Villages can meet daily expenses. At the time of registration, the per capita income of villagers should be no lower than the national average.

7.4. All activities of the villagers, communal and private, should be carried out within the Villages. Also, the time spent on communal activities should not be less than half of the entire time spent on all Village activities.

7.5. It should be confirmed that the technicians from the Government and various national agencies are available or can be made available to assist these Villages in preparing and implementing their development plans. Also, it should be confirmed that the Villages have sound leaders for overseeing the Village plans and that they have their own technicians or plans for training them.

8. These are some of the important things that should be taken into account when registering Villages in the 3rd and Last Stage. It will lead to the destruction of these Villages if they are registered without proper investigation, just for the sake of enabling them to get credit, when there is full knowledge of their inability to repay that credit, a failure which is a drain on the national wealth. But the most important thing is that those who will be involved in the investigation will be required to take into account the various aspects listed above. We should agree that Villages that have achieved one stage of development, especially the 3rd Stage, should be at a fairly uniform level of development.
I. Objectives

1. To identify factors which are crucial in making Ujamaa an effective instrument for achieving the stated aims of rural development in Tanzania, namely:

   a) the spread of the benefits of development widely throughout the country with particular emphasis on the rural sector.

   b) the encouragement of collective and co-operative forms of activities with a view to avoiding wide differences of income.

   c) the creation of a frame that would enable unfettered mobilization of the people for development and self-reliance.

   d) the creation of a basis for sustained economic and social transformation through a rapid expansion of productive capacity.

   e) widely based frontal development strategy with a view to avoiding unbalanced regional development.

2. On the basis of the findings, to provide guidelines for lending to rural development in Tanzania.

The review will provide an input into Phases I and II of the Africa Rural Development Study. Phase I consists of reviews of 13 different projects and programs in sub-Saharan Africa. The purpose of Phase I is to provide guidelines for designing the Bank's rural development projects so as to substantially broaden participation of the rural population in Bank projects through building appropriate local rural institutions. Phase II consists of rural sector missions to Kenya and Tanzania. The objective of Phase II is to develop the Bank's strategy for lending to the rural sectors of these two countries.
Stage 3: Case Studies of Ujamaa Villages - To be completed by August 1973.

Through field investigations, select a representative sample of Ujamaa villages so as to reflect variability in:

1. Cropping pattern - importance of subsistence vs. cash crops.
2. Degree of spontaneity in formation: motivation, leadership, cooperation.
3. Stage of development.
4. Degree of success.

Sample size should be kept flexible depending on the manpower available for doing case studies. If possible, study at least some villages that have already been analyzed to examine their progress over time.

1. Formation
   a. How and when was Ujamaa village formed?
   b. What prompted its formation: Government publicity, spontaneity, persuasion, leadership?
   c. How close is the new location to the village where people came from?
   d. How well did villagers know each other? From how widely dispersed background have people come?
   e. What was their age structure? Educational level? Sex composition? What were their occupations, incomes and assets prior to joining Ujamaa?
   f. Over how long a period was the village formed?
   g. What degree of self help and government assistance was involved in formation - food, housing, roads, input supplies, organization?
   h. What was the nature and extent of cooperation between various members at early stages of formation?
   i. When, how and on what basis were leaders selected initially? What organizations were formed?
ii. Development:

a. How are decisions regarding various economic activities made? E.g., how much to produce collectively? How much through private cultivation? What social activities, e.g., schools, roads? How is land allotted between private and public use? What are tenurial arrangements?

b. How is labor allocated to these activities? What conflicts, if any, in private and social allocation of labor and other resources? How strictly are rules regarding division of responsibility observed?

c. How is income distributed among members?

d. How are decisions about investment of surplus, degree of mechanization, marketing and produce, use and timing of inputs made? How are these activities carried out?

e. How have productive and social activities expanded over time?

f. How is labor allocated to creation of public services, such as construction of roads?

iii. Leadership, Organization, Communication:

a. How have numbers, scope and functions of village organizations changed over time?

b. On what basis are leaders elected? How is leadership related to traditional patterns of authority?

c. How are new innovations or ideas accepted? What is the degree of influence of government staff on formulation of new programs in Ujamaa?

d. How are leaders in Ujamaa trained?

e. What public services are organized by villagers? What services are provided by the government?

iv. Fiscal

a. How are the villages under study taxed?

b. What types of subsidies do they receive?

c. Do taxes and subsidies vary between villages studied? On what basis?
III. Reports

On the basis of the analysis carried out in the three stages, a preliminary report will be prepared in June '73 and a final report in September 1973.
APPENDIX 7

QUESTIONS FOR REGIONAL AND DISTRICT ADMINISTRATION

1. Statistical Information

1.1 Number and rate of growth of Ujamaa Villages, by region/district and by stages (Stages I, II, III).

1.2 Location.

1.3 Dates of formation.

1.4 Population—by age and sex. Population development over the life of the Ujamaa Villages.

1.5 Crops grown and acreage by year, separately for cash and subsistence crops.

1.6 List and type of non-agricultural, but directly productive activities, e.g., small-scale industries, distribution, etc.

1.7 List and type of social and infrastructural programs carried out, e.g., schools, roads, water supply, dispensaries, etc.

1.8 List of ministries and agencies that provide financial and/or manpower resources to Ujamaa Villages.

1.9 List of resources allocated to Ujamaa Villages—by type of resource (money, manpower, other resources in kind) distributed on district basis—by year, distributed on district basis.

1.10 Indicative magnitude of financial resources handled by Ujamaa Villages—cost of purchased inputs, revenue from sales, cooperative levy, development levy, etc., by areas and by districts.

2. Procedures

2.1 Data Collection

a. What mechanisms do you use to collect data on Ujamaa Villages?

b. What is the frequency and mode of reporting?
2.2 Registration Criteria

a. What criteria are used to designate a village as an Ujamaa Village?

b. What criteria are used to determine when an Ujamaa Village is in what stage? Who is/are responsible for this decision?

c. What are the criteria for recommending an Ujamaa Village to be registered as a cooperative?

d. What is the distinction between a Stage III Ujamaa Village and a multi-purpose cooperative? Between Ujamaa Village Stage II and Ujamaa Village Stage III?

e. Do Stage III Ujamaa Villages exist that are not registered cooperatives?

f. What assistance do Ujamaa Villages receive in Stage III that cooperatives do not?

3. Plan Formulation

3.1 How are Ujamaa Villages' plans formulated, e.g., what crops to plant, what purchased inputs to use, what acreage to cultivate communally, and privately, degree of mechanization, etc.?

3.2 What kind of assistance do Ujamaa Villages receive from the region/district in formulating their plans?

3.3 What kind of assistance do Ujamaa Villages receive from the Central Government and institutions stationed in Dar es Salaam, e.g., Rural Development Division, C.U.T., research bodies, etc.?

4. Resource Allocation

4.1 What criteria are used for resource allocation (manpower, funds, services, etc.) to the various programs emanating from Ujamaa Villages?

4.2 In what ways is assistance given to Ujamaa Villages by

a. Education—what type of school to build; recruitment of teachers; testing and evaluation, etc.

b. Health—in establishing first-aid care, dispensaries, environmental hygiene and health education, recruitment and/or training of health personnel, etc.
c. Water Development—in water supply, drainage, irrigation, etc.?  
d. Natural Resources—in regard to general ecological balance, wildlife administration and game policy, general forest administration, forestry and bee-keeping, etc.?  
e. Commerce and Industries in fostering and/or assisting small scale industries, trade or other non-agricultural activities?  

4.3 What types of screening (of projects, requests for aid, etc.) are involved at the various levels of authority—Ward, Division, District, Region?  

4.4 What kinds of safeguards or mechanisms exist to avoid uneven growth in Regions, Districts, etc.?  

4.5 What is the regional breakdown of financial allocation to various Ujamaa Villages excluding the financial involvement of TRDB and NBC?  

4.6 What is the size of the regional development fund?  

4.7 a. How is this allocated?  
   b. Please provide district breakdown.  
   c. What percentage of the total regional budget does the RDF constitute?  
   d. What percentage of the total regional development budget does it constitute?  
   e. How significant is the RDF for the development of Ujamaa Villages?  

5. Promotion, Organization, Management, Coordination  

5.1 Please describe in detail the role and function of the regional and district administration in the following areas during the pre-decentralization period:  
   a. Promotion of Ujamaa Villages.  
   b. Organization of Ujamaa Villages.  
   c. Management of Ujamaa Villages.  
   d. Coordination of activities of Ujamaa Villages in the region and districts.  

5.2 What have been the major problems?  

6. Research and Training  

6.1 What kinds of research activities relevant to Ujamaa Villages have been or are being carried out?
APPENDIX F
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6.2 What kinds of training programs relevant to Ujamaa Villages have been or are being carried out at the regional and district levels on the one hand, and centrally (nationally) on the other, for the following:

a. technical staff members engaged in Ujamaa Villages and cooperatives?

b. leaders of Ujamaa Villages and elected officials of cooperatives?

c. members of Ujamaa Villages and of cooperatives?

6.3 How are the training programs arranged? What role do the regions and districts play in:

a. selection of candidates for training?

b. determining length and content of courses?

7. Decentralization

7.1 What has been the impact of decentralization on:

a. promotion, organization, management and coordination of Ujamaa Villages?

b. Research and training?

7.2 How has the creation of functional managers affected Ujamaa Village-related activities?

8. Administration

8.1 What are the vertical administrative linkages between Ujamaa Villages on the one hand and regional and district administration on the other?

8.2 How have these changed as a result of decentralization?

8.3 Please indicate the organization frame, including staffing, of the Ujamaa Village and cooperative program in the region and districts.

9. District Development Corporations

9.1 Please describe the function and role of the DDC.

9.2 In what ways does the DDC help Ujamaa Villages?

9.3 What activities have been financed and/or have been planned through the DDC (Type and size)?
9.4 If sufficient funds were made available to the DDC, what new activities would be launched?

9.5 What are the major problems faced by the DDC?

10. Problems and Possibilities for Assistance

10.1 Please list in order of importance the major problems faced by the region and districts in their attempts to bring about socio-economic development in the frame of "Ujamaa Villages."

10.2 How do you think outside institutions like the World Bank can help to achieve the stated goals of Tanzania within the "Ujamaa" frame?

10.3 How would such assistance relate to the national development strategy and effort?
APPENDIX G

SURVEY FOR INDIVIDUAL UJAMAA VILLAGES

1. Formation

1.1 Why was the Village located in the particular place where it is?

1.2 When was the Ujamaa Village formed? Over how long a period was it formed?

1.3 What prompted its formation: publicity, spontaneity, persuasion, leadership? What organizations were most involved?

1.4 How close is the new location to the village where people came from?

1.5 How well did villagers know each other? From how widely dispersed a background did the people come?

1.6 What was their age structure? Educational level? Sex composition? What were their occupations, incomes and assets prior to joining the Ujamaa Village?

1.7 What degree of self-help and government assistance was involved in formation—food, housing, roads, inputs supplies, organization?

1.8 What was the nature and extent of cooperation between various members at early stages of formation?

1.9 When, how and on what basis were leaders elected initially? Are they still elected in the same way?

1.10 What organizations were formed? How many farmers' committees are there? Is there a manager? Professional?

2. Cropping Pattern and Productivity Profile

2.1 What types of crops are grown by the Ujamaa Village?

2.2 What is the acreage of crops grown on

a. communal shamba(s)?

b. private shambas?
2.3 What is the relative importance of cash crops and subsistence crops on the basis of
a. acreage?
b. labor investment?
c. production?

2.4 How are data on acreage, production yield, use of inputs, etc., fed into the national research set-up?

2.5 Are there differences in the yields of crops grown on communal shamba(s) and private shambas? If so, what accounts for the difference?

2.6 What incentive schemes exist to ensure high individual productivity on the communal shamba(s)?

3. Management

3.1 How are decisions regarding various economic activities made?

3.2 Is the communal shamba(s)block shamba(s)? If not, why not?

3.3 How is produce marketed from
a. communal shamba(s)?
b. private shambas?

3.4 What is the procedure (process) of acquiring credit for
a. communal shamba(s)? and/or activities?
b. private shambas?

3.5 What is the procedure and mode of repayment of credit used for
a. communal purposes?
b. private purposes?

3.6 What role does the Ujamaa Village organization play in advising farmers what crops to grow on their private shambas?

3.7 Are there any plans to expand the communal shamba(s)? The private shambas?

3.8 If so, from where would additional land come? From virgin land or land under private cultivation? If additional land is to come from currently privately cultivated land, what procedure or strategy would be followed?
3.9 What rights do the farmers have to the land in the Ujamaa Village? What happens when a member leaves the Ujamaa Village? Is he/she entitled to any compensation? How does this differ from the areas from which the farmers originally came?

3.10 How are new members incorporated into the Ujamaa Village? Would they pay anything to the pioneer Ujamaa Village members for the labor and other resources they had invested in the Ujamaa Village prior to the joining of new members?

3.11 What type of social activities are undertaken by the farmers in, for example,
   a. building of feeder or access roads?
   b. maintenance of existing roads?
   c. construction of schools or dispensaries, etc.?

3.12 How are such decisions made?

3.13 How are inevitable conflicts in such decisions reconciled?

3.14 How is manpower allocated to "directly" productive activities like crop cultivation, animal husbandry, etc., and "indirectly" productive or infrastructural activities like building of schools, dispensaries?

3.15 Are there any plans for diversification into any other agricultural products or into non-agricultural activities (i.e., small-scale industries, trade, etc.)?

3.16 How is income distributed among members?

3.17 How are decisions over utilization of surplus made?

3.18 How have such surpluses been used over the life of the Ujamaa Village?

3.19 What is the variation in the sizes of the different private plots?

4. Leadership and Organization

4.1 How have numbers, scope and functions of village organizations changed over time?

4.2 On what basis are leaders presently elected? How is leadership related to traditional patterns of authority?

4.3 From where do most innovations and new ideas come?

4.4 How are leaders in Ujamaa Villages trained?
4.5 What public services are organized by villagers? What services are provided by government?

4.6 What chain of relationship (both feed-forward and feed-back) connects the Ujamaa Village with the extension and research program?

4.7 Is there any difference in the receptivity of innovation and extension advice on the communal shambas vs. the private shambas?

5. Cooperative Movement

5.1 Is the Ujamaa Village a member of any cooperative?

5.2 How and what kind of services are provided to the Ujamaa Village by the cooperative?

5.3 What fees are paid to the cooperatives?

5.4 Do the Ujamaa Village members feel that those are commensurate with the services and assistance provided by the cooperative?

5.5 What prices has the Ujamaa Village been getting for the various crops marketed through the cooperative?

5.6 Is the Ujamaa Village free to sell its produce directly to the marketing board, by-passing the cooperative?

5.7 How and what kind of services were provided to the Ujamaa Village before it became a member of a cooperative?

6. Relationship with the Central Government

6.1 What are the 3 most active organizations of Government assisting or working with the Ujamaa Village? (List in order of importance)

6.2 What activities have they been involved with?

6.3 Within the last 6 months have there been any changes in the activities or tempo of activities of the Government vis-à-vis the Ujamaa Village? If so, what kind?

7. Major Problems Facing Village

7.1 What are the most serious problems facing the village?

7.2 What are the major problems facing the Village that are peculiarly Ujamaa Village-type problems?
BIBLIOGRAPHY


