



## MOROCCO CAS COMPLETION REPORT REVIEW

*This OED review of the FY01-04 CAS program and the CAS Completion Report (CASCRC) finds that there was mixed progress towards achieving the four main objectives of the CAS. The poverty reduction program achieved a number of its objectives, but the program for growth and private sector development saw a number of shortfalls in implementation. The objective of reducing the vulnerability of incomes of the poor to drought was not fully achieved as government programs were not improved as targeted, while irrigation cost recovery moved in the right direction but did not achieve its somewhat ambitious targets. The program to improve public governance fell short as the public sector wage bill increased instead of declining as projected, so that CAS triggers for sector lending were only partly met, and the sector lending approved after the CAS period only introduces reform programs to be implemented in coming years. The CAS was overambitious and many components of the proposed lending program were dropped or delayed, while implementation of ongoing projects lagged. Conversely, AAA expanded substantially. The outcome of the CAS is rated moderately unsatisfactory.*

*The CASCRC presents a large number of specific outcomes against detailed indicators and provides explicit guidance for the FY06-09 CAS. However, it could have better integrated this material and more clearly specified outcomes by main objective. OED finds that past programs have not been adequately calibrated against the government's reform programs and its willingness to absorb Bank assistance, and that AAA has not been carefully managed against clear objectives.*

1. Morocco has achieved success in stabilization with improved GDP growth, low inflation and a somewhat strengthened external position. Trade and the financial sector have been liberalized, some modernization has been achieved in the public sector and in agriculture, and the telecommunications sector has been privatized successfully. But challenges remain. Fiscal performance has been variable, as improvements of the 1990s dissipated in 2000 when spending increased as the government treated as current revenue the large receipts from telecommunications privatization. Domestic debt has increased and the decline in external debt has been inadequate. Savings and investment rates have improved, but GDP growth has been volatile and as yet insufficient to achieve needed reductions in unemployment, especially among the young and women. Structural reforms are needed for further poverty reduction, private sector development and improved governance.
2. The 2001 Country Assistance Evaluation (CAE) concluded that the outcome of the Bank's 1997 CAS had been moderately unsatisfactory. Achievements in reducing the rural education gender gap, improving rural access to health care, and expanding private participation in infrastructure had been offset by large fiscal deficits, low social sector budget support, lagging sector development efforts (except in infrastructure), low cost recovery in irrigation, and lagging public sector reform. Many proposed lending operations had not materialized. The CAE recommended that the Bank:

- highlight public sector management issues such as the excessive public sector wage bill;
- encourage increased government budgets for social sectors and rural areas;
- support increased irrigation cost recovery and elimination of other agricultural subsidies;
- assist the government to remove obstacles to private sector development, and
- ensure clear linkages between lending and improved GDP growth and poverty reduction, and more selectivity in structural adjustment lending.

### GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVES, CAS OBJECTIVES, AND OVERVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION

3. The Government's objectives for the 2001-2004 CAS period were detailed in the Five-Year Plan. The CAS objectives were well aligned with the Government's program and responsive to the CAE's main recommendations, comprising:

- poverty reduction through human development and inclusion policies;
- enhancing conditions for economic growth and private sector development;
- reducing the vulnerability of the poor, and especially of the rural population to droughts, while improving safety nets; and
- Improving governance by decentralization, better budget management and accountability, civil service reform, and strengthening civil society.

4. *Lending program.* The CAS proposed a Base Case program of \$613 million for FY01 through FY04, comprising both a core investment/LIL program for US\$413 million and a sector reform program of US\$200 million contingent on macroeconomic and sector reforms, for a total of 18 IBRD operations (see Table 1 below). The adjustment lending proposed for the as yet unidentified sector reform programs ran counter to the recommendations of the CAE, which called for more selectivity in adjustment lending. A High Case program for US\$250-450 million per year never materialized. There was no Low Case. Actual lending fell far short of the core component of the Base Case, totaling only US\$216 million for seven investment operations. However, Morocco was deemed to have met the fiscal triggers for sector lending<sup>1</sup> in the final year of the CAS, and two sector loans (Public Administration Reform and Basic Education Reform) were approved in FY05 after the CAS period. Dropped projects and the relatively small size of implemented projects resulted in an average project cost some 50 percent higher than that for MENA and two and a half times the Bankwide average.<sup>2</sup>

5. For FY99-05, 14 out of 20 projects exiting the portfolio (74 percent) were rated satisfactory by OED; 82 percent of projects achieved a Sustainability rating of likely vs. the Bankwide average of 70 percent, while only 30 percent received an Institutional

---

<sup>1</sup> These were: (a) maintain budget revenues at 24 percent of GDP (which was met), and (b) contain the wage bill and other current expenditures. The wage bill was not contained (see para. 10), although overall current expenditures were contained at 23 percent of GDP. A fiscal trigger such as overall deficit reduction instead of containment of current expenditures would have left less ambiguity. See also footnote 5.

<sup>2</sup> See Morocco CASC (para. 52).

Development Impact (IDI) rating of substantial, compared to a Bankwide average of 48 percent (see Annex Table 2). While OED ICR Reviews identify a number of project specific reasons for low IDI ratings, cross-cutting themes include overly centralized control and lack of adequate civil service deployment, rationalization, and training. Implementation delays detracted from the Bank's program, and 14 out of 25 projects in the portfolio during the CAS period had their closing dates extended by at least 12 months.<sup>3</sup>

**Table 1: CAS-Proposed versus Actual Commitments (US\$ million)**

Project		Planned	Status	Actual	Purpose			
					Pillar I	Pillar II	Pillar III	Pillar IV
<b>FY</b>								
<b>01</b>	Information Infrastructure	65	Actual	65		x		
	Irrigation-based Community Dev.	33	Actual	32.6			x	
<b>FY</b>			Postponed beyond					
<b>02</b>	Education	50	CAS (to FY05)					
	Asset Management Reform	30	Delayed until FY03	45				x
	Rainfed Agriculture Dev.	20	Delayed until FY03	26.8			x	
	Social Development Agency	5	Actual (replaced Social Fund LIL)	5	x			
	Governance LIL	5	Dropped					
<b>FY</b>			Delayed past CAS					
<b>03</b>	Sector Reform (public admin.)	100	(approved in FY05)					
	Rural Infrastructure (roads)	40	Delayed until FY04	37	x			
	SME/IT	30	Dropped					
	Adult Literacy	20	Actual (changed to LIL)	4.1	x			
	Cultural Heritage LIL	5	Dropped					
	Irrigation LIL	5	Dropped					
<b>FY</b>			Delayed past CAS					
<b>04</b>	Sector Reform (Education)	100	(approved in FY05)					
	Basic Ed. Reform Support	40	Delayed past CAS )					
	Cultural Heritage	40	Dropped					
	Forestry CBD	20	Delayed past CAS period (to FY06)					
	Municipal Development LIL	5	Dropped					
<b>TOTAL</b>		613		216	3	1	2	1
Memo: Sector Reform Loans planned for FY03 and 04 but approved in FY05								
	Public Exp. Reform	100		100				x
	Basic Ed. Reform Support	100		80	x			

Note: Pillar I: Poverty Reduction, Pillar II: Growth and Priv.Sec. Dev., Pillar III: Reduced vulnerability of the poor, Pillar IV: Improved Public Governance

6. The CAS proposed 15 AAA tasks but this increased during implementation to 42, in effect, substituting for the shortfall in lending operations. A QAG Country AAA Assessment notes that many of these were relatively small and that the program was difficult to manage. The problem was exacerbated by the lack of a CEM which could have integrated and

<sup>3</sup> See CASCRC (para. 51).



prioritized important results. Programmatic ESW was introduced in an effort to better align tasks with objectives, but does not yet appear to have succeeded in fully addressing the management issue. The program did include some work of very high quality such as the Poverty Report (FY05) which was innovative in its carefully constructed poverty mapping that can now be used to target more precisely safety net and welfare programs. Finally, the QAG assessment noted that improved dissemination is needed, and that the recent increase in the number of Public Information Centers to 5 is a step in the right direction.

### **CAS Implementation by Objectives**

7. The CAS program was based on four pillars (see para. 3) with detailed performance indicators, discussed below. For consistency and clarity, this Review maintains the same structure as the CAS and the CASCRC despite some confusing aspects. Two overlapping pillars address poverty: pillar 1, poverty reduction, and pillar 3, variability of income of the poor related to droughts. For example, one of the two core performance indicators for pillar 3, public expenditure on social assistance programs, could have played an important role in achieving the objectives of pillar 1. In addition, one of the two core performance indicators for pillar 2 (growth and private sector development) is poverty incidence. Rationalizing the structure of the pillars and their indicators would have provided a more transparent basis for analyzing results.

### **Objective I: Poverty Reduction through inclusion and participation**

8. This objective aimed at improving living conditions for the poorer segments of the population by promoting human development and inclusion policies, focusing on delivery of basic health and education services and on gender equality. Poverty incidence was reduced in rural areas, from 27 percent at the start of the CAS period to 20-21 percent, compared to the CAS goal of 22 percent. This was largely due to good rainfall and better than average harvests, but also in part due to projects implemented under the CAS such as rural roads, rainfed agriculture, and irrigation-based community development. It should be noted that poverty rates for the end of the CAS period are based on Bank estimates and extrapolations of earlier data, since official data are not yet available (the national, as opposed to rural, poverty rate was a performance indicator under Objective II). Households with access to safe water increased from 42 percent to 54 percent, although this was short of the goal of 60-70 percent. Net primary enrolment of rural girls as a percentage of urban boys<sup>4</sup> has increased from 53 percent at the start of the CAS period to 86 percent, in excess of the CAS goal of 75 percent. In addition, the SWAp to help finance the Basic Education Support Program was approved by the Board in February 2005, which could presage further improvements regarding this objective as well as broader goals in basic education. Government spending on education as a percentage of GDP has increased, although that on health decreased. On balance, this objective was achieved.

---

<sup>4</sup> Urban boys are taken as the reference since they have the highest enrollment rates.

## **Objective II: Growth and Private Sector Development**

9. This objective aimed at enhancing economic growth which is strongly correlated with poverty outcomes. The two performance indicators used were the fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP and the national poverty incidence. The fiscal deficit was reduced from 7.7 percent of GDP in 2001 to 5.2 percent in 2003, short of the goal of 3.4 percent<sup>5</sup>. The national poverty incidence declined from 19 percent to 15 percent but, as discussed above, this was largely due to strong growth in the agricultural sector which benefited from good rainfall, and so the indicator was not a good measure of private sector development. Some reform objectives were achieved. Trade was liberalized with a new trade agreement with the US, and competitiveness appears broadly appropriate. Growth in the information and communications technology sector has been dynamic. The CASCRC notes that the FSAP is being followed up by preparation of a development policy loan, but does not elaborate on the implementation of the proposed reforms. However, a number of important reform objectives were not achieved. The CASCRC acknowledges the Bank's limited contribution to Morocco's partial success in improving the investment climate. The Private Participation in Infrastructure strategy was never carried out. There has been no reduction in distortions in the agriculture sector. On balance, this objective was partially achieved.

## **Objective III: Reduced vulnerability of income for the poor to drought**

10. This objective aimed at improving the social safety net for the poor especially in rural areas, and at enhancing the sustainability of efforts to improve the irrigation network by improving cost recovery. Public expenditure on social assistance programs as a percentage of GDP was deemed far too low and was targeted to double. However, the latest estimates are that it remained flat. The Bank's report on social protection (FY02) introduced important new perspectives, but was inadequately disseminated and discussed. The CASCRC found that progress on improving the social safety net and social protection had not been achieved. The FY05 Poverty Report was innovative and discussed in more depth, but the Government has yet to act on the key recommendations. Water cost recovery rates in the seven (out of nine<sup>6</sup>) irrigation areas which charge for water increased from 62 percent to 76 percent, a positive trend although short of the ambitious target of 90 percent. On balance, this objective was not achieved.

## **Objective IV: Improved Public Governance**

11. The program sought to: (a) decentralize public administration and improve accountability of regional and local governments, and (b) reform the civil service to reduce overstaffing and the consequent fiscal drain. The single core performance indicator, a reduction in the total government wage bill from 12 percent of GDP in 2000 to less than 10 percent in 2004, was not met; the government wage bill actually increased to 12.9 percent

---

<sup>5</sup> Note that this performance indicator differs from the fiscal trigger for sector lending. See footnote 1.

<sup>6</sup> The two irrigation areas for which there is no cost recovery are traditional society areas which are treated differently by the government in a number of respects.

in 2003 (latest available estimate). The Government formulated an action program to improve governance, supported by the Public Administration Reform Adjustment Loan that was approved by the Board after the CAS period in FY05, despite not fully achieving the fiscal trigger for sector lending (see footnote 1). It would be premature to assign too much weight to this program until there is more evidence on program implementation. On balance, this objective was only very partially achieved.

### **Overall Regional Assessment**

12. The 2005 CAS assesses “implementation of the 2001 CAS as moderately satisfactory” but does not explicitly rate outcome.<sup>7</sup> It does note that “results were partially or completely achieved for fourteen out of the seventeen CAS outcomes,” but an assessment of the program on this basis would depend on aggregating the seventeen CAS outcome indicators by pillar, which is not done, and would depend on judgments of the relative importance (and degree of implementation) of the nine partially implemented activities and five fully implemented activities. It should also be noted that of the nine “core performance indicators” developed to evaluate improvement in Morocco’s performance against the four pillars of the Bank’s program,<sup>8</sup> there are no data for one, three were achieved, and five were not achieved.

### **Overall OED Assessment**

13. The proposed lending program was overambitious and could not be implemented as planned when triggers for sector lending were not met, and a number of proposed investment projects and LILs could not be implemented. AAA increased as the lending program did not materialize. The large number of dropped operations added to the high cost of the program. Implementation of the inherited portfolio was halting with a large number of postponed closing dates. Project outcome ratings are in line with Bankwide averages, although ratings for Institutional Development Impact are far below Bankwide averages. The first objective (poverty reduction) was on balance achieved,<sup>9</sup> but the second objective (growth) was only partially achieved, while the third objectives (reduced vulnerability of the poor to droughts) was on balance not achieved, and the fourth objective (governance) was only very partially achieved. Therefore, OED assesses the outcome of the 2001-2004 CAS program as moderately unsatisfactory.

### **Assessment of the CAS Completion Report**

14. The CASCRC contains an exceptionally detailed analysis of CAS outcomes, based on the large number of core and secondary performance indicators in the CAS. The analysis provided by the CASCRC would have been clearer if it had aggregated outcomes against the

---

<sup>7</sup> See para. 29 and 30. This material is not contained in the CASCRC.

<sup>8</sup> See 2001 CAS Table 9 and the CASCRC (Tables 1,3,5 and 7)

<sup>9</sup> This pillar contains 4 out of the 5 outcome indicators which were fully achieved.

four objectives.<sup>10</sup> Portfolio analysis is very thorough, but the AAA review could have better reflected the QAG review which cites a number of positive aspects but also weaknesses such as lack of a unifying product such as a CEM, an important shortfall given the large number of individual tasks, and the relative inattention to macroeconomic work in general. The CASCRC identifies a number of reasons for shortfalls in lending, including less expensive sources of funding such as the EU, too much optimism by the Bank concerning institutional capacity and reform implementation, and the failure to meet the triggers for sector lending. The CASCRC notes that the increased flexibility in programming now permitted in CASs for middle income countries such as Morocco will be useful in avoiding dropped projects and in preparing projects to meet emerging demand. In addition, the CASCRC derives explicit guidance for future programs based on CAS outcomes.

## Findings

15. The observations from the 2001 CAE remain largely valid (see para 2). In addition, this review finds that:
  - Lending has not been adequately targeted to achieving well-specified goals, taking due account of institutional capacity constraints. Given alternative sources of financing and the time needed to achieve a consensus, especially for policy-based lending, it has been difficult to organize lending, especially in the absence of firmer government commitments needed to ensure effective implementation. Policy based lending was approved although the specified triggers were not fully achieved.
  - The value of AAA would have been enhanced by more adequate dissemination. Value would have also been added by a product such as a CEM which would have provided a central focus.

---

<sup>10</sup> The outcome of the CAS program is distinguished by OED from the implementation of the CAS. The latter is associated with Bank performance. The CAS contains 17 outcome indicators which are not clearly linked to the nine core performance indicators, which adds to the difficulty of evaluating the program.

Annex Table 1: Macroeconomic and Social Indicators, 1994-2003

Series Name	MOROCCO											AVERAGE 94-03					
	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	Morocco	Egypt	Peru	Tunisia	middle Inc	Lower-MENA	
GDP growth (annual %)	10.0	-7.0	12.0	-2.0	8.0	-0.1	1.0	6.3	3.2	5.5	3.6	4.4	4.3	4.6	4.3	3.4	
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US\$)	1,170.0	1,120.0	1,300.0	1,250.0	1,260.0	1,210.0	1,180.0	1,190.0	1,170.0	1,320.0	1,216.0	1,269.0	2,089.0	2,014.0	1,334.0	2,072.0	
GNI per capita, PPP (current international \$)	3,030.0	2,840.0	3,190.0	3,120.0	3,340.0	3,350.0	3,390.0	3,630.0	3,730.0	3,950.0	3,352.0	3,311.0	4,460.0	5,510.0	4,259.0	4,987.0	
GDP per capita growth (annual %)	8.0	-8.0	10.0	-4.0	6.0	-1.7	-0.7	4.6	1.6	3.8	2.0	2.5	2.5	3.2	3.4	1.3	
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)	19.0	15.0	19.0	15.0	17.0	15.3	13.8	15.6	16.1	18.3	16.3	16.9	9.6	12.3	13.4	12.0	
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	31.0	33.0	31.0	33.0	32.0	32.0	31.9	31.0	30.3	29.7	31.5	32.5	29.6	28.6	38.0	39.5	
Services, etc., value added (% of GDP)	51.0	52.0	50.0	52.0	51.0	52.7	54.2	53.5	53.6	52.0	52.4	50.6	60.6	59.1	48.4	48.6	
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)	25.0	27.0	26.0	28.0	28.0	30.1	31.4	33.0	32.3	29.4	29.4	18.7	14.8	44.1	25.5	30.4	
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)	31.0	34.0	30.0	32.0	32.0	33.9	37.6	36.2	36.7	35.4	34.0	25.1	17.8	47.4	25.0	27.8	
Current account balance (% of GDP)	-2.0	-4.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.5	-1.4	4.8	4.1	0.9	..	-0.1	-4.6	..	..	..	
Total debt service (% of exports of goods and services)	38.0	33.0	28.0	27.0	24.0	24.7	20.9	17.3	23.9	..	26.2	11.0	25.9	15.9	20.5	15.8	
External debt (% of GNI)	79.0	75.0	69.0	73.0	68.0	67.1	63.8	58.4	52.6	..	64.9	40.6	54.8	61.2	46.0	46.2	
Total reserves in months of imports	5.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	5.4	4.4	7.7	8.6	10.5	5.7	9.2	9.5	2.3	7.0	8.3	
Current revenue, excluding grants (% of GDP)	28.0	28.0	0.0	28.0	28.0	29.6	..	..	..	..	..	31.5	17.0	..	..	..	
Expenditure, total (% of GDP)	32.0	33.0	0.0	31.0	31.0	32.5	..	..	..	..	..	33.5	18.5	..	..	..	
Overall budget balance, excluding capital grants (% of GDP)	-3.0	-5.0	0.0	-1.0	-2.0	-2.5	..	..	..	..	..	-1.3	-0.3	..	..	..	
Gross domestic savings (% of GDP)	15.0	14.0	16.0	17.0	18.0	19.3	17.4	19.6	18.4	16.7	17.6	11.8	18.5	22.7	28.0	24.9	
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)	5.0	6.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	0.7	1.9	0.6	2.8	1.2	..	5.6	7.4	..	..	..	
Immunization, DPT (% of children ages 12-23 months)	89.0	90.0	95.0	95.0	93.0	91.0	95.0	96.0	94.0	..	92.9	92.6	90.0	95.6	86.4	89.9	
Improved water source (% of population with access)	..	..	..	..	..	..	80.0	..	..	..	80.0	98.0	81.0	82.0	82.0	88.0	
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)	..	..	..	67.0	..	..	67.7	..	68.4	..	68.0	68.0	69.7	72.3	68.7	68.3	
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	..	51.0	..	..	..	..	41.0	..	39.0	..	42.7	43.0	34.7	23.3	33.5	43.0	
Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access)	..	..	..	..	..	..	68.0	..	..	..	61.0	68.0	62.0	80.0	60.0	75.0	
School enrollment, preprimary (% gross)	..	..	..	..	64.0	65.0	60.5	59.7	..	..	61.2	11.5	57.8	16.5	36.3	16.0	
School enrollment, primary (% gross)	..	..	..	..	89.0	95.7	101.2	107.0	..	..	100.6	97.5	121.8	113.5	114.0	95.5	
School enrollment, secondary (% gross)	..	..	..	..	38.0	39.3	40.9	..	..	..	41.2	84.3	85.7	76.3	69.5	67.6	
Population, total (million)	25.9	26.4	26.8	27.3	27.8	28.2	28.7	29.2	29.6	30.1	28.0	62.2	25.3	9.4	2,546.8	286.4	
Population growth (annual %)	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	2.0	2.0	1.8	1.2	1.0	2.0	
Urban population (% of total)	51.0	52.0	53.0	53.0	54.0	54.8	55.5	56.1	56.8	57.4	54.3	43.0	72.1	64.4	46.7	57.2	

Source: GDF &amp; WDI Central Database (SIMA) as of April 14, 2005



Annex Table 2: OED Project Ratings for Morocco, Exit FY 99-05

Exit FY	Proj ID	Outcome % Sat (No)	Inst Dev Impact % Subst (No)	Sustainability % Likely (No)
FY99	HEALTH SECTOR INVEST	Mod. Unsat.	Modest	Uncertain
	MA-FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT	Sat.	Substantial	Likely
	MA-MUNICIPAL FINANCE I	Sat.	Substantial	Likely
	MA-CONTRACTUAL SAVINGS	Mod. Sat.	Modest	Likely
	POLICY REFORM SUPPOR	Mod. Unsat.	Modest	Likely
FY00	MA-MEDITERRANEAN POLLUTION CONTRO	Sat.	Modest	Likely
	ENVIRONMENT MANAGEME	Mod. Unsat.	Modest	Likely
	LAND DEVELOPMENT	Sat.	Substantial	Likely
FY01	SECOND LSI IMPROVEME	Mod. Sat.	Modest	NE
	IRR. AREAS AGR. SERV	Unsat.	Modest	Unlikely
	MA-TELECOM, POST AND IT	Highly Sat.	High	Likely
FY02	WATER SUPPLY V	Unsat.	Negligible	Unlikely
	MA-SECONDARY ROADS	Sat.	Modest	Likely
FY03	MUNICIPAL FINANCE II	Sat.	Modest	Likely
	MA-PSD III-VOC TRG.	Mod. Sat.	Substantial	Likely
	MA-RURAL W.S.& SANITATN	Mod. Sat.	Substantial	Likely
	SPI - HEALTH	Mod. Unsat.	Modest	Likely
	MA-INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE SECTOR	Sat.	Modest	Likely
FY04	MA-SPI EDUCATION	Mod.	Modest	Likely
	MA-LEGAL AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT	Sat.	Substantial	Likely
	MA-SUSTAINABLE COASTAL TOURISM DEVELOPMENT	Sat.	Substantial	Likely
	MA-COOR/MON SOCIAL PRO	Sat.	Modest	Likely
	MA-PILOT FISHERIES DEV.	Mod. Sat.	Modest	Likely

Region	Total Evaluated (No)	Outcome % Sat (No)	Inst Dev Impact % Subst (No)	Sustainability % Likely (No)
Morocco	23	73.9	30.4	81.8
MIENA	133	72.5	38.2	70.6
<b>World Bank</b>	<b>1,635</b>	<b>75.2</b>	<b>48.0</b>	<b>70.4</b>

Source: Business Warehouse as of April 20, 2005.

NE - Non-evaluable

**Annex Table 3: Analytic and Advisory Work, FY 1998-2004**

Document Title	Date	Report No	Document Type
Maroc - Secteur de l' Eau et de l' Assainissement - Note de politique sectorielle Vol. 1 of 1 (French)	12/01/2004	29994	Sector Report
Maroc - Sources de croissance Vol. 3 of 3 / Services de pointes - structure de l' industrie (French)	09/09/2004	29865	Economic Report
Morocco - Poverty report - strengthening policy by identifying the geographic dimension of poverty Vol. 1 of 1 (English)	09/01/2004	28223	Economic Report
Morocco - Poverty report - strengthening policy by identifying the geographic dimension of poverty Vol. 1 of 1 / Maroc - Rapport sur la pauvreté : comprendre les dimensions géographiques de la pauvreté pour en améliorer l' appréhension à travers les politiques publiques (English and French)	09/01/2004	28223	Economic Report
Morocco - Harnessing the resources of cultural patrimony for national development - Policy Paper Vol. 1 of 1 (English)	05/01/2004	30238	Sector Report
Morocco - Institutional reform of the large scale irrigation sector - findings and recommendations of the Working Group Vol. 1 of 1 (English)	04/04/2004	30901	Sector Report
Maroc - Etude d' evaluation de la gestion des finances publiques Vol. 1 of 1 (French)	10/01/2003	28067	Country Financial Accountability Assessment
Maroc - Note de strategie pour l' education non formelle Vol. 1 of 1 (French)	06/30/2003	27608	Sector Report
Royaume du Maroc - Evaluation du cout de la degradation de l' environnement Vol. 1 of 1 (French)	06/30/2003	25992	Sector Report
Royaume du Maroc - Note de strategie pour l' enseignement superieur Vol. 1 of 1 (French)	06/17/2003	27606	Sector Report
Integrated forestry development in the Middle East and North Africa Vol. 1 of 1 (English)	05/30/2003	30899	Sector Report
Maroc - Croissance agricole et reduction de la pauvreté rurale - orientations de politique économique Vol. 1 of 1 (French)	01/21/2003	30900	Sector Report
Morocco - Social protection note Vol. 1 (English)	12/19/2002	22486	Sector Report
Morocco - Country assistance strategy public information notice (CPIN) Vol. 1 (English)	08/27/2001	PIN65	CAS Public Information Note
Morocco - Country assistance evaluation Vol. 1 (English)	05/14/2001	22212	Operations Evaluation Study
Morocco - Country assistance strategy (CAS) Vol. 1 (English)	05/07/2001	22115	Country Assistance Strategy Document
Morocco - Poverty update Vol. 1, 2 (English)	03/30/2001	21506	Sector Report
Morocco - Education reform strategy note Vol. 1 of 1 / Note de strategie : un partenariat pour la reforme du systeme éducatif (French)	09/28/2000	27607	Sector Report
Morocco - Financial sector strategy note Vol. 1 (English)	09/26/2000	20885	Sector Report
Morocco - Financial sector strategy note Vol. 1 of 1 / Note de strategie du secteur financier (French)	09/01/2000	20885	Sector Report
Rural development - from vision to action? - Phase II Vol. 1 (English)	06/22/2000	20628	Operations Evaluation Study
Maroc - Sources de croissance Vol. 1 of 3 / Rapport d' orientation : le potentiel de croissance des secteurs du tourisme, de l' habitat et de la pêche (French)	04/25/2000	29865	Economic Report
Maroc - Sources de croissance Vol. 2 of 3 / Rapport sur le potentiel de croissance des services de pointe (French)	03/08/2000	29865	Economic Report
Morocco - Private sector assessment update : fulfilling the promise of private sector-led growth Vol. 1 (English)	12/15/1999	19975	Sector Report
Introduction du gaz naturel au Maroc - Plan de développement gazier, Phase 2 Vol. 1 (French)	02/28/1999	ESM210	ESMAP Paper
Introduction du gaz naturel au Maroc - prix et principes de tarification du gaz naturel Vol. 1 (French)	10/31/1998	ESM209	ESMAP Paper

Source: World Bank Imagebank as of January 21, 2005

Annex Table 4: Portfolio Status Indicators, FY99-05

Country	Fiscal Year	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Morocco	# Proj	20	20	19	18	16	12	10
	Net Comm Amt	981.5	901.7	738.7	595.3	425.0	338.3	313.6
	# Proj At Risk	4	3	4	1	2	2	1
	% At Risk	20.0	15.0	21.1	5.6	12.5	16.7	10.0
	Comm At Risk	216.4	133.0	147.0	65.0	98.6	14.6	9.6
	% Commit at Risk	22.0	14.8	19.9	10.9	23.2	4.3	3.1
Egypt	# Proj	20	20	18	18	16	17	13
	Net Comm Amt	1,401.5	1,448.0	1,083.0	1,012.0	763.8	1,014.1	965.5
	# Proj At Risk	3	4	1	5	2	3	2
	% At Risk	15.0	20.0	5.6	27.8	12.5	17.6	15.4
	Comm At Risk	172.0	536.0	15.0	347.2	123.7	16.4	20.5
	% Commit at Risk	12.3	37.0	1.4	34.3	16.2	1.6	2.1
Peru	# Proj	11	12	9	8	12	9	12
	Net Comm Amt	1,344.4	1,139.0	515.6	415.6	558.1	286.1	323.1
	# Proj At Risk	1	1	1	3	1	0	2
	% At Risk	9.1	8.3	11.1	37.5	8.3	0.0	16.7
	Comm At Risk	85.0	150.0	27.0	83.0	5.0	0.0	62.0
	% Commit at Risk	6.3	13.2	5.2	20.0	0.9	0.0	19.2
Tunisia	# Proj	21	22	19	17	15	13	12
	Net Comm Amt	1,393.8	1,546.9	1,082.9	1,097.4	969.7	774.7	672.5
	# Proj At Risk	1	1	1	4	1	0	0
	% At Risk	4.8	4.5	5.3	23.5	6.7	0.0	0.0
	Comm At Risk	65.0	50.0	38.7	215.4	21.3	0.0	0.0
	% Commit at Risk	4.7	3.2	3.6	19.6	2.2	0.0	0.0

Source: Business Warehouse as of April 20, 2005

Annex Table 5: Net Disbursements and Charges Summary Report, FY 99-05

In USD million

FY	Gross Disb	Repay	Net Disb	Interest	Fees	Net Transfer
1999	411	299	113	211	5	-103
2000	107	333	-227	198	3	-427
2001	116	246	-130	178	1	-310
2002	53	270	-218	148	9	-375
2003	59	284	-225	134	2	-362
2004	112	328	-216	113	2	-332
2005	123	408	-284	72	3	-247
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>981</b>	<b>2168</b>	<b>-1188</b>	<b>1054</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>-2156</b>

Source: Controller's website as of April 20, 2005

Annex Table 6: Millennium Development Goals

MOROCCO				
	1990	1995	2001	2002
<b>1 Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger</b>	<i>2015 target = halve 1990 \$1 a day poverty and malnutrition rates</i>			
Population below \$1 a day (%)			2	..
Poverty gap at \$1 a day (%)			0.5	..
Percentage share of income or consumption held by poorest 20%			6.5	..
Prevalence of child malnutrition (% of children under 5)	9.5	9		..
Population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption (%)	6	7	7	..
<b>2 Achieve universal primary education</b>	<i>2015 target = net enrollment to 100</i>			
Net primary enrollment ratio (% of relevant age group)	58.2	72.3	88.4	..
Percentage of cohort reaching grade 5 (%)	75.1	75	83.7	..
Youth literacy rate (% ages 15-24)	55.3	61.5	68.4	69.5
<b>3 Promote gender equality</b>	<i>2005 target = education ratio to 100</i>			
Ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary education (%)			85.1	..
Ratio of young literate females to males (% ages 15-24)	51.8	68.9	77.9	79.2
Share of women employed in the nonagricultural sector (%)	36.8	31.4	26.6	..
Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament (%)	..	1	..	..
<b>4 Reduce child mortality</b>	<i>2015 target = reduce 1990 under 5 mortality by two-thirds</i>			
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000)	85	61	46	43
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)	66	51	41	39
Immunization, measles (% of children under 12 months)	80	88	96	96
<b>5 Improve maternal health</b>	<i>2015 target = reduce 1990 maternal mortality by three-fourths</i>			
Maternal mortality ratio (modeled estimate, per 100,000 live births)	..	..	220	..
Births attended by skilled health staff (% of total)	31	39.6	..	..
<b>6 Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases</b>	<i>2015 target = halt, and begin to reverse, AIDS, etc.</i>			
Prevalence of HIV, female (% ages 15-24)				
Contraceptive prevalence rate (% of women ages 15-49)	41.5	50		
Number of children orphaned by HIV/AIDS			115	114.4
Incidence of tuberculosis (per 100,000 people)			81	83.5
Tuberculosis cases detected under DOTS (%)	..	93	..	..
<b>7 Ensure environmental sustainability</b>	<i>2015 target = various (see notes)</i>			
Forest area (% of total land area)	6.8	..	6.8	..
Nationally protected areas (% of total land area)		0.7	0.7	0.7
GDP per unit of energy use (PPP \$ per kg oil equivalent)	9.8	9.4	9.9	..
CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita)	1	1.1	1.3	..
Access to an improved water source (% of population)	75	..	80	..
Access to improved sanitation (% of population)	58	..	68	..
Access to secure tenure (% of population)	..	..	..	..
<b>8 Develop a Global Partnership for Development</b>	<i>2015 target = various (see notes)</i>			
Youth unemployment rate (% of total labor force ages 15-24)	31.1	..	15.4	..
Fixed line and mobile telephones (per 1,000 people)	16.5	43.5	204.4	247.1
Personal computers (per 1,000 people)	..	3.2	13.7	23.6
<b>General indicators</b>				
Population	24.0 million	26.4 million	29.2 million	29.6 million
Gross national income (\$)	24.8 billion	29.6 billion	34.6 billion	34.7 billion
GNI per capita (\$)	1,030.00	1,120.00	1,190.00	1,170.00
Adult literacy rate (% of people ages 15 and over)	38.7	43.9	49.8	50.7
Total fertility rate (births per woman)	4	3.4	2.9	2.8
Life expectancy at birth (years)	63.5	65.7	67.7	68.4
Aid (% of GNI)	4.2	1.6	1.6	1.8
External debt (% of GNI)	100.7	75.2	58.4	52.6
Investment (% of GDP)	25.3	20.7	22.9	22.7
Trade (% of GDP)	58.9	61.5	69.2	69

Source: World Development Indicators database, April 2004

Note: In some cases the data are for earlier or later years than those stated.

Goal 1 targets: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than one dollar a day. Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger.

Goal 2 target: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling.

Goal 3 target: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 2005 and to all levels of education no later than 2015.

Goal 4 target: Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate.

Goal 5 target: Reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio.

Goal 6 targets: Have halted by 2015, and begun to reverse, the spread of HIV/AIDS. Have halted by 2015, and begun to reverse, the incidence of malaria and other major diseases.

Goal 7 targets: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programs and reverse the loss of environmental resources. Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water. By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers.

Goal 8 targets: Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system. Address the Special Needs of the Least Developed Countries. Address the Special Needs of landlocked countries and small island developing states. Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term. In cooperation with developing countries, develop and implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth. In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable, essential drugs in developing countries. In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications.