1. Project Data:

- **OEDID:** C2209
- **Project ID:** P001993
- **Project Name:** Public Works and Employment Project
- **Country:** Niger
- **Sector:** Employment
- **L/C Number:** C2209
- **Partners involved:** Originally KfW and OPEC Fund but many others funded similar programs with the same agency (such as CIDA, CFD, EDF, the Netherlands, etc.)
- **Prepared by:** Robert van der Lugt, OEDST
- **Reviewed by:** Patrick Grasso, OEDPK
- **Group Manager:** Roger Slade, OEDST
- **Date Posted:** 06/11/1998

2. Project Objectives, Financing, Costs and Components:

   The major objectives of the project were to: (a) create, at least temporarily, new employment in urban areas using the private sector; (b) improve the individual skills of workers and the competitiveness of the firms involved; (c) demonstrate the feasibility of labour-intensive projects and test new public sector works commissioning procedures; and (d) review existing public work program and retrofit them for better performance and speedier implementation. These objectives were to be achieved by: (a) avoiding any increase in civil service employment; (b) combining low cost and high visibility; (c) supporting but not replacing other development programs; and (d) using transparent but expeditious procedures. To achieve these objectives the project included the following components: (a) a program of public facility and infrastructure rehabilitation and maintenance in urban areas to be carried out under labour-intensive schemes by local contractors; (b) a package of services related to work organisation, management and labour force training; (c) a supervision and monitoring component; (d) a selective audit of public works programs; and (e) a package of consultancy services for: a training program, a grassroots participation program, and preparatory work for a mutual guarantee company. The project was carried out by an autonomous executing agency called NIGETIP (Agence Nigerienne de Travaux d'Interet Public pour l'Emploi [Niger's Public Works and Employment Agency]).

3. Achievement of Relevant Objectives:

   The project was implemented successfully and met all its relevant objectives.

4. Significant Achievements:

   Substantial short term employment was created at or slightly below the level anticipated at appraisal (the ICR has overestimated the project impact on employment creation - see below). A large number of local contractors and consulting firms benefited from the project and their competitiveness and worker's skills were improved. The mutual guarantee study helped strengthen the existing institution. There is no doubt that the project has demonstrated the feasibility of the approach. Modeled on earlier experience with public works projects in West Africa, it introduced a new model for implementing public works through delegated contract management. The model was successful and triggered a multiplier effect. Many other donors and the Bank in other projects have entrusted NIGETIP with the management of works programs. As a result the overall NIGETIP program (at CFAF 35 billion) is much larger than the project (CFAF18 billion).

5. Significant Shortcomings:

   Counterpart funding was a major problem during project implementation and was only solved by other donors financing the government obligations towards the project. The study on government contracting procedures was carried out but had little impact so far in terms of regulatory changes. The community participation program resulted in reported "sensitising" of beneficiaries but there was little benefit in terms of community maintenance of infrastructure. While many small contractors were registered with NIGETIP only a small percentage did benefit in terms of receiving contracts. In 1996 the Government intervened in the NIGETIP program. The planned social facilities program was halted and replaced by a customs
stations construction program. It is doubtful that this program met the selection criteria, but more importantly it caused resentment among the beneficiaries and was contrary to the project's principle of NIGETIP autonomy. It is not clear why the Bank did not act more forcefully against this intrusion beyond accepting a pledge that future funds would be earmarked for construction of this social infrastructure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6. Ratings:</th>
<th>ICR</th>
<th>OED Review</th>
<th>Reason for Disagreement /Comments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome:</strong></td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Despite a difficult institutional environment and limited impact on the public sector, the project did create substantial capacity in the semi-public (NIGETIP) and private sector and hence the capacity in Niger to manage human and financial resource improved considerably. While the institutional development objectives of the project were limited and only partly achieved, the institutional impact was substantial.</td>
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<td><strong>Institutional Dev.:</strong></td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Substantial</td>
<td>Especially noteworthy are the successful replication of earlier experiences and the good staff continuity.</td>
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<td><strong>Sustainability:</strong></td>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td></td>
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<td><strong>Bank Performance:</strong></td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>While NIGETIP's performance was very satisfactory, Borrower performance was not. Counterpart funding was a major problem. Effectiveness delays were another problem. And while the government seemed to have largely respected the autonomy of NIGETIP, it did intervene to change NIGETIP's program in 1996. Also in terms of related sector policies no discernible improvements were made.</td>
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<td><strong>Borrower Perf.:</strong></td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Unsatisfactory</td>
<td></td>
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<td><strong>Quality of ICR:</strong></td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
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7. Lessons of Broad Applicability:
The format of an autonomous agency with its own statutes has proven effective in implementing public work programs without reliance on external technical assistance; NIGETIP is only an implementation tool and it can not compensate for lack of sound sector policies or insufficient grassroots participation; quality is an important selection criterion for sub-projects; and grassroots community participation must be assured if sub-projects are to be sustainable.

8. Audit Recommended? ☐ Yes ● No

9. Comments on Quality of ICR:
The ICR covers all the necessary topic in accordance with the guidelines, but could have covered development results and impact in more depth; for example the impact of the sub -projects on the beneficiaries, the relation between employment created and the overall labour force etc . Also the ICR does not sufficiently distinguish between the total NIGETIP program and the project evaluated . As an example, the ICR states that 46,000 jobs were created through more than 900 work contract valued at CFAF 21 billion. Yet the value of works contracts in the project cost table is only CFAF 16 billion. It is also not completely clear how the ICR calculated the labour content of the works contracts . Little attention is given to the operational phase beyond mentioning the follow -up project. Yet there are problems with sustainability and these should have been addressed in more detail, especially with regard to the existing sub-projects. While apparently much has been done to improve sustainability and sector context, little of this is recorded in the ICR. A missed opportunity.