world development report 2011

Conflict, Security, and Development
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Cover design: Heads of State
Typesetting: Barton Matheson Willse and Worthington

The manuscript for this overview edition disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues.

By analyzing the nature, causes, and consequences of violent conflict today, and the successes and failures in responding to it, this World Development Report aims to sharpen the discussion on what can be done to support societies struggling to prevent or grapple with violence and conflict. Some of the ground that the Report covers falls outside the World Bank’s traditional development mandate, a reflection of a growing international policy consensus that addressing violent conflict and promoting economic development both require a deeper understanding of the close relationship between politics, security, and development. In studying this area, the World Bank does not aspire to go beyond its core mandate as set out in its Articles of Agreement, but rather to improve the effectiveness of development interventions in places threatened or affected by large-scale violence.
Foreword

In 1944, delegates from 45 countries gathered at Bretton Woods to consider the economic causes of the World War that was then still raging, and how to secure the peace. They agreed to create the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the original institution of what has become the World Bank Group. As the delegates noted, “Programs of reconstruction and development will speed economic progress everywhere, will aid political stability and foster peace.” The IBRD approved its first loan to France in 1947 to aid in the rebuilding of that country.

Over 60 years later, the “R” in IBRD has a new meaning: reconstructing Afghanistan, Bosnia, Haiti, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Southern Sudan, and other lands of conflict or broken states. Paul Collier’s book, The Bottom Billion, highlighted the recurrent cycles of weak governance, poverty, and violence that have plagued these lands. Not one low-income country coping with these problems has yet achieved a single Millennium Development Goal. And the problems of fragile states spread easily: They drag down neighbors with violence that overflows borders, because conflicts feed on narcotics, piracy, and gender violence, and leave refugees and broken infrastructure in their wake. Their territories can become breeding grounds for far-reaching networks of violent radicals and organized crime.

In 2008, I gave a speech on “Securing Development” to the International Institute for Strategic Studies. I chose the forum to emphasize the interconnections among security, governance, and development, and to make the point that the separate disciplines are not well integrated to address the inter-related problems. I outlined the challenge: bringing security and development together to put down roots deep enough to break the cycles of fragility and conflict.

As we are now seeing again in the Middle East and North Africa, violence in the 21st century differs from 20th-century patterns of interstate conflict and methods of addressing them. Stove-piped government agencies have been ill-suited to cope, even when national interests or values prompt political leaders to act. Low incomes, poverty, unemployment, income shocks such as those sparked by volatility in food prices, rapid urbanization, and inequality between groups all increase the risks of violence. External stresses, such as trafficking and illicit financial flows, can add to these risks.

The 2011 World Development Report looks across disciplines and experiences drawn from around the world to offer some ideas and practical recommendations on how to move beyond conflict and fragility and secure development. The key messages are important for all countries—low, middle, and high income—as well as for regional and global institutions:

First, institutional legitimacy is the key to stability. When state institutions do not adequately protect citizens, guard against corruption, or provide access to justice; when markets do not provide job opportunities; or when communities have lost social cohesion—the likelihood of violent conflict increases. At the earliest stages, countries often need to restore public confidence in basic collective action even before rudimentary institutions can be transformed. Early wins—actions that can generate quick, tangible results—are critical.
Second, investing in citizen security, justice, and jobs is essential to reducing violence. But there are major structural gaps in our collective capabilities to support these areas. There are places where fragile states can seek help to build an army, but we do not yet have similar resources for building police forces or corrections systems. We need to put greater emphasis on early projects to create jobs, especially through the private sector. The Report provides insight into the importance of the involvement of women in political coalitions, security and justice reform, and economic empowerment.

Third, confronting this challenge effectively means that institutions need to change. International agencies and partners from other countries must adapt procedures so they can respond with agility and speed, a longer-term perspective, and greater staying power. Assistance needs to be integrated and coordinated; multi-donor trust funds have proven useful in accomplishing these aims while lessening the burdens of new governments with thin capacity. We need a better handoff between humanitarian and development agencies. And we need to accept a higher level of risk: If legislatures and inspectors expect only the upside, and just pillory the failures, institutions will steer away from the most difficult problems and strangle themselves with procedures and committees to avoid responsibility. This Report suggests some specific actions and ways of measuring results.

Fourth, we need to adopt a layered approach. Some problems can be addressed at the country level, but others need to be addressed at a regional level, such as developing markets that integrate insecure areas and pooling resources for building capacity. Some actions are needed at a global level, such as building new capacities to support justice reform and the creation of jobs; forging partnerships between producer and consumer countries to stem illegal trafficking; and acting to reduce the stresses caused by food price volatility.

Fifth, in adopting these approaches, we need to be aware that the global landscape is changing. Regional institutions and middle income countries are playing a larger role. This means we should pay more attention to south-south and south-north exchanges, and to the recent transition experiences of middle income countries.

The stakes are high. A civil conflict costs the average developing country roughly 30 years of GDP growth, and countries in protracted crisis can fall over 20 percentage points behind in overcoming poverty. Finding effective ways to help societies escape new outbursts or repeated cycles of violence is critical for global security and global development—but doing so requires a fundamental rethinking, including how we assess and manage risk.

Any such changes must be based on a clear roadmap, and on strong incentives. I hope this Report will help others and ourselves in sketching such a roadmap.

Robert B. Zoellick
President
The World Bank Group
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E fforts to maintain collective security are at the heart of human history: from the earliest times, the recognition that human safety depends on collaboration has been a motivating factor for the formation of village communities, cities, and nation-states. The 20th century was dominated by the legacy of devastating global wars, colonial struggles, and ideological conflicts, and by efforts to establish international systems that would foster global peace and prosperity. To some extent these systems were successful—wars between states are far less common than they were in the past, and civil wars are declining in number.

Y et, insecurity not only remains, it has become a primary development challenge of our time. One-and-a-half billion people live in areas affected by fragility, conflict, or large-scale, organized criminal violence, and no low-income fragile or conflict-affected country has yet to achieve a single United Nations Millennium Development Goal (UN MDG). New threats—organized crime and trafficking, civil unrest due to global economic shocks, terrorism—have supplemented continued preoccupations with conventional war between and within countries. While much of the world has made rapid progress in reducing poverty in the past 60 years, areas characterized by repeated cycles of political and criminal violence are being left far behind, their economic growth compromised and their human indicators stagnant.

For those who now live in more stable neighborhoods, it may seem incomprehensible how prosperity in high-income countries and a sophisticated global economy can coexist with extreme violence and misery in other parts of the globe. The pirates operating off the coast of Somalia who prey on the shipping through the Gulf of Aden illustrate the paradox of the existing global system. How is it that the combined prosperity and capability of the world’s modern nation-states cannot prevent a problem from antiquity? How is it that, almost a decade after renewed international engagement with Afghanistan, the prospects of peace seem distant? How is it that entire urban communities can be terrorized by drug traffickers? How is it that countries in the Middle East and North Africa could face explosions of popular grievances despite, in some cases, sustained high growth and improvement in social indicators?

This World Development Report (WDR) asks what spurs risks of violence, why conflict prevention and recovery have proven so difficult to address, and what can be done by national leaders and their development, security, and diplomatic partners to help restore a
stable development path in the world’s most fragile and violence-torn areas. The central message of the Report is that strengthening legitimate institutions and governance to provide citizen security, justice, and jobs is crucial to break cycles of violence. Restoring confidence and transforming security, justice, and economic institutions is possible within a generation, even in countries that have experienced severe conflict. But that requires determined national leadership and an international system “refitted” to address 21st-century risks: refocusing assistance on preventing criminal and political violence, reforming the procedures of international agencies, responding at a regional level, and renewing cooperative efforts among lower-, middle-, and higher-income countries. The Report envisages a layered approach to effective global action, with local, national, regional, and international roles.

Because of the nature of the topic, this Report has been developed in an unusual way—drawing from the beginning on the knowledge of national reformers and working closely with the United Nations and regional institutions with expertise in political and security issues, building on the concept of human security. The hope is that this partnership will spark an ongoing effort to jointly deepen our understanding of the links between security and development, and will foster practical action on the Report’s findings.

PART 1: THE CHALLENGE OF REPEATED CYCLES OF VIOLENCE

21st-century conflict and violence are a development problem that does not fit the 20th-century mold

Global systems in the 20th century were designed to address interstate tensions and one-off episodes of civil war. War between nation-states and civil war have a given logic and sequence. The actors, sovereign states or clearly defined rebel movements, are known. If a dispute escalates and full-scale hostilities ensue, an eventual end to hostilities (either through victory and defeat or through a negotiated settlement) is followed by a short “post-conflict” phase leading back to peace. The global system is largely built around this paradigm of conflict, with clear roles for national and international actors in development in promoting the prosperity and capability of the nation-state (but stepping out during active conflict), in diplomacy in preventing and mediating disputes between states and between government and rebel movements, in peacekeeping in the aftermath of conflict, and in humanitarianism in providing relief.

21st century violence does not fit the 20th-century mold. Interstate war and civil war are still threats in some regions, but they have declined over the last 25 years. Deaths from civil war, while still exacting an unacceptable toll, are one-quarter of what they were in the 1980s (Feature 1, figure F1.1). Violence and conflict have not been banned: one in four people on the planet, more than 1.5 billion, live in fragile and conflict-affected states or in countries with very high levels of criminal violence. But because of the successes in reducing interstate war, the remaining forms of conflict and violence do not fit neatly either into “war” or “peace,” or into “criminal violence” or “political violence” (see Feature 1, F1.1–1.2 and table F1.1).

Many countries and subnational areas now face cycles of repeated violence, weak governance, and instability. First, conflicts often are not one-off events, but are ongoing and repeated: 90 percent of the last decade’s civil wars occurred in countries that had already had a civil war in the last 30 years. Second, new forms of conflict and violence threaten development: many countries that have successfully negotiated political and peace agreements after violent political conflicts, such as El Salvador, Guatemala, and South Africa, now face high levels of violent crime, constraining their development. Third, different forms of violence are linked to each other. Political movements can obtain financing
FEATURE 1

How violence is changing

FIGURE F1.1 Deaths from civil wars are declining

As the number of civil wars declined, the total annual deaths from these conflicts (battle deaths) fell from more than 200,000 in 1988 to fewer than 50,000 in 2008.


Note: Civil wars are classified by scale and type in the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset (Harbom and Wallensteen 2010; Lacina and Gleditsch 2005). The minimum threshold for monitoring is a minor civil war with 25 or more battle deaths a year. Low, high, and best estimates of annual battle deaths per conflict are in Lacina and Gleditsch (2005, updated in 2009). Throughout this Report, best estimates are used, except when they are not available, in which case averages of the low and high estimates are used.

TABLE F1.1 Violence often recurs

Few countries are truly “post-conflict.” The rate of violence onset in countries with a previous conflict has been increasing since the 1960s, and every civil war that began since 2003 was in a country that had a previous civil war.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Violence onsets in countries with no previous conflict (%)</th>
<th>Violence onsets in countries with a previous conflict (%)</th>
<th>Number of onsets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000s</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Walter 2010; WDR team calculations.

Note: Previous conflict includes any major conflict since 1945.

(Feature continued on next page)
**FEATURE 2 How violence is changing (continued)**

**FIGURE F1.2 Organized criminal violence threatens peace processes**

Homicides have increased in every country in Central America since 1999, including those that had made great progress in addressing political conflict—and this is not unique; countries such as South Africa face similar second generation challenges.

![Graph showing absolute change in homicide rate relative to 1999](image)

Sources: WDR team calculations based on UNODC 2007; UNODC and Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank 2007; and national sources.

Note: Base year for homicide rate is 1999 = 0.

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**How violence disrupts development**

**FIGURE F1.3 The gap in poverty is widening between countries affected by violence and others**

New poverty data reveal that poverty is declining for much of the world, but countries affected by violence are lagging behind. For every three years a country is affected by major violence (battle deaths or excess deaths from homicides equivalent to a major war), poverty reduction lags behind by 2.7 percentage points.

![Graph showing poverty headcount](image)


Note: Poverty is % of population living at less than US$1.25 per day.
from criminal activities, as in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Northern Ireland.\(^5\) Criminal gangs can support political violence during electoral periods, as in Jamaica and Kenya.\(^6\) International ideological movements make common cause with local grievances, as in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Thus, the large majority of countries currently facing violence face it in multiple forms. Fourth, grievances can escalate into acute demands for change—and the risks of violent conflict—in countries where political, social, or economic change lags behind expectations, as in the Middle East and North Africa.

Repeated and interlinked, these conflicts have regional and global repercussions. The death, destruction, and delayed development due to conflict are bad for the conflict-affected countries, and their impacts spill over both regionally and globally. A country making development advances, such as Tanzania, loses an estimated 0.7 percent of GDP every year for each neighbor in conflict.\(^7\) Refugees and internally displaced persons have increased threefold in the last 30 years.\(^8\) Nearly 75 percent of the world’s refugees are hosted by neighboring countries.\(^9\)

The new forms of violence interlinking local political conflicts, organized crime, and internationalized disputes mean that violence is a problem for both the rich and the poor: more than 80 percent of fatalities from terrorist attacks over the last decade were in nonwestern targets,\(^10\) but a study of 18 Western European countries revealed that each additional transnational terrorist incident reduced their economic growth by 0.4 of a percentage point a year.\(^11\) Attacks in one region can impose costs all through global markets—one attack in the Niger Delta can cost global consumers of oil billions in increased prices.\(^12\) In the four weeks following the beginning of the uprising in Libya, oil prices increased by 15 percent.\(^13\) The interdiction of cocaine shipments to Europe has increased fourfold since 2003,\(^14\) with even areas such as West Africa now seriously affected by drug-related violence.\(^15\)

Attempts to contain violence are also extremely costly. For example, the naval operation to counter piracy in the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean is estimated to cost US$1.3–$2 billion annually, plus additional costs incurred by rerouting ships and increasing insurance premiums.\(^16\) Efforts by households and firms to protect themselves against long-duration violence impose heavy economic burdens: 35 percent of firms in Latin America, 30 percent in Africa, and 27 percent in Eastern Europe and Central Asia identify crime as the major problem for their business activities. The burden is highest on those least able to bear the cost: firms in Sub-Saharan Africa lose a higher percentage of sales to crime and spend a higher percentage of sales on security than any other region.\(^17\)

No low-income fragile or conflict-affected country has yet achieved a single MDG. People in fragile and conflict-affected states are more than twice as likely to be undernourished as those in other developing countries, more than three times as likely to be unable to send their children to school, twice as likely to see their children die before age five, and more than twice as likely to lack clean water. On average, a country that experienced major violence over the period from 1981 to 2005 has a poverty rate 21 percentage points higher than a country that saw no violence (Feature 1, figure F1.3).\(^18\) A similar picture emerges for subnational areas affected by violence in richer and more stable countries—areas where development lags behind.\(^19\)

These repeated cycles of conflict and violence exact other human, social, and economic costs that last for generations. High levels of organized criminal violence hold back economic development. In Guatemala, violence cost the country more than 7 percent of GDP in 2005, more than twice the damage by Hurricane Stan in the same year—and more than twice the combined budget for agriculture, health, and education.\(^20\) The average cost of civil war is equivalent to more than 30 years of GDP growth for a medium-
size developing country. Trade levels after major episodes of violence take 20 years to recover. In other words, a major episode of violence, unlike natural disasters or economic cycles, can wipe out an entire generation of economic progress.

These numbers have human consequences. In highly violent societies, many people experience the death of a son or daughter before their time: when children are late coming home, a parent has good reason to fear for their lives and physical safety. Everyday experiences, such as going to school, to work, or to market, become occasions for fear. People hesitate to build houses or invest in small businesses because these can be destroyed in a moment. The direct impact of violence falls primarily on young males—the majority of fighting forces and gang members—but women and children often suffer disproportionately from the indirect effects. Men make up 96 percent of detainees and 90 percent of the missing; women and children are close to 80 percent of refugees and those internally displaced. And violence begets violence: male children who witness abuses have a higher tendency to perpetrate violence later in life.

Yet when security is reestablished and sustained, these areas of the world can make the greatest development gains. Several countries emerging from long legacies of both political and criminal violence have been among the fastest making progress on the MDGs:

- Ethiopia more than quadrupled access to improved water, from 13 percent of the population in 1990 to 66 percent in 2009–10.
- Mozambique more than tripled its primary completion rate in just eight years, from 14 percent in 1999 to 46 percent in 2007.
- Rwanda cut the prevalence of undernutrition from 56 percent of the population in 1997 to 40 percent in 2005.
- Bosnia and Herzegovina, between 1995 and 2007, increased measles immunizations from 53 percent to 96 percent for children aged 12–23 months.

Vicious cycles of conflict: When security, justice, and employment stresses meet weak institutions

Internal causes of conflict arise from political, security, and economic dynamics. Yet it is difficult to disentangle causes and effects of violence. Lower GDP per capita is robustly associated with both large-scale political conflict and high rates of homicide. Youth unemployment is consistently cited in citizen perception surveys as a motive for joining both rebel movements and urban gangs (Feature 2, figure F2.2). Feeling more secure and powerful is also cited as an important motivator across countries, confirming existing research that shows that employment dynamics have to do not only with income but also with respect and status, involving social cohesion as well as economic opportunity. Political exclusion and inequality affecting regional, religious, or ethnic groups are associated with higher risks of civil war, (and are also cited in citizen surveys as a key driver of conflict alongside poverty—see figure F2.1) while inequality between richer and poorer households is closely associated with higher risks of violent crime (table 1.1).

External factors can heighten the risks of violence. Major external security pressures, as with new patterns of drug trafficking, can overwhelm institutional capacities (see Feature 2). Income shocks can also increase risks of violence. Work on rainfall shocks in Sub-Saharan Africa concludes that civil conflict is more likely following years of poor rainfall. Using rainfall variation as a proxy for income shocks in 41 African countries between 1981 and 1999, Satyanath, Miguel, and Sergenti (2004) found that a decline in economic growth of 5 percent increased the likelihood of conflict by half the following year. Corruption—which generally has international links through illicit trafficking, money laundering, and the extraction of rents from sales of national resources or international contracts and concessions—has doubly pernicious impacts on the risks of violence, by fueling grievances and by undermining the effectiveness of national institutions and so-
Institutional capacity and accountability are important for both political and criminal violence (see Feature 2). In some areas—as in the peripheral regions of Colombia before the turn of the 21st century or the Democratic Republic of the Congo today—the state is all but absent from many parts of the country, and violent armed groups dominate local contests over power and resources. Most areas affected by violence face deficits in their collaborative capacities to mediate conflict peacefully. In some countries, institutions do not span ethnic, regional, or religious divides, and state institutions have been viewed as partisan—just as they were for decades prior to the peace agreement in Northern Ireland. In some communities, social divisions have constrained effective collaboration between elite dominated states and poor communities to address sources of violence.

Rapid urbanization, as occurred earlier in Latin America and today in Asia and Africa, weakens social cohesion. Unemployment, structural inequalities, and greater access to markets for firearms and illicit drugs break down social cohesion and increase the vulnerability to criminal networks and gangs.

### TABLE 1.1 Security, economic, and political stresses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stresses</th>
<th>Internal</th>
<th>External</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>• Legacies of violence and trauma</td>
<td>• Invasion, occupation&lt;br&gt;• External support for domestic rebels&lt;br&gt;• Cross-border conflict spillovers&lt;br&gt;• Transnational terrorism&lt;br&gt;• International criminal networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>• Low income levels, low opportunity cost of rebellion&lt;br&gt;• Youth unemployment&lt;br&gt;• Natural resource wealth&lt;br&gt;• Severe corruption&lt;br&gt;• Rapid urbanization</td>
<td>• Price shocks&lt;br&gt;• Climate change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>• Ethnic, religious, or regional competition&lt;br&gt;• Real or perceived discrimination&lt;br&gt;• Human rights abuses</td>
<td>• Perceived global inequity and injustice in the treatment of ethnic or religious groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: WDR team.

Note: This table, although not exhaustive, captures major factors in the academic literature on the causes and correlates of conflict and raised in the WDR consultations and surveys.
• Countries with weak institutional capacity were more likely to suffer violent social unrest during the food shocks of 2008–09.43
• Some states have tried to maintain stability through coercion and patronage networks, but those with high levels of corruption and human rights abuses increase their risks of violence breaking out in the future (see Feature 2).

Weak institutions are particularly important in explaining why violence repeats in different forms in the same countries or subnational regions. Even societies with the weakest institutions have periodic outbreaks of peace. South-central Somalia has had interludes of low conflict over the last 30 years based on agreements by small numbers of elites.44 But temporary elite pacts, in Somalia and elsewhere, do not provide the grounds for sustained security and development unless they are followed by the development of legitimate state and society institutions.45 They are generally short-lived because they are too personalized and narrow to accommodate stresses and adjust to change. New internal and external stresses arise—a leader’s death, economic shocks, the entry of organized criminal trafficking networks, new opportunities or rents, or external security interference—and there is no sustained ability to respond.46 So the violence recurs.

A focus on legitimate institutions does not mean converging on Western institutions. History provides many examples of foreign institutional models that have proven less than useful to national development, particularly through colonial legacies,47 because they focused on form rather than function. The same is true today. In Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority established commissions on every subject from tourism to the environment in parallel with struggling line ministries, and model laws were passed that had little relationship to national social and political realities.48 Even transfers of organizational forms between countries in the South can be unproductive if not adapted to local conditions—the truth and reconciliation, anti-corruption, and human rights commissions that delivered so marvelously in some countries have not always worked in others. There are gains from sharing knowledge, as the Report makes clear—but only if adapted to local conditions. “Best-fit” institutions are central to the Report.

PART 2: A ROADMAP FOR BREAKING CYCLES OF VIOLENCE AT THE COUNTRY LEVEL

Restoring confidence and transforming the institutions that provide citizen security, justice, and jobs

To break cycles of insecurity and reduce the risk of their recurrence, national reformers and their international partners need to build the legitimate institutions that can provide a sustained level of citizen security, justice, and jobs—offering a stake in society to groups that may otherwise receive more respect and recognition from engaging in armed violence than in lawful activities, and punishing infractions capably and fairly.

But transforming institutions—always tough—is particularly difficult in fragile situations. First, in countries with a track record of violence and mistrust, expectations are either too low, so that no government promises are believed, making cooperative action impossible—or too high, so that transitional moments produce expectations of rapid change that cannot be delivered by existing institutions.49 Second, many institutional changes that could produce greater long-term resilience against violence frequently carry short-term risks. Any important shift—holding elections, dismantling patronage networks, giving new roles to security services, decentralizing decision-making, empowering disadvantaged groups—creates both winners and losers. Losers are often well organized
FEATURE 2 High stresses and weak institutions = risks of violence

Justice, jobs, and violence

FIGURE F2.1 What are citizens’ views on the drivers of conflict?

In surveys conducted in six countries and territories affected by violence, involving a mix of nationally representative samples and subregions, citizens raised issues linked to individual economic welfare (poverty, unemployment) and injustice (including inequality and corruption) as the primary drivers of conflict.

Source: Bøås, Tiltnes, and Flatø 2010.

FIGURE F2.2 What drives people to join rebel movement and gangs?

The same surveys found that the main reasons cited for why young people become rebels or gang members are very similar—unemployment predominates for both. This is not necessarily the case for militant ideological recruitment (chapter 2).

Source: Bøås, Tiltnes, and Flatø 2010.
transforming institutions accelerated considerably in the late 20th century, with increases in citizen demands for good governance and in the technologies that can help supply it. Indeed, making progress in a generation is actually quite fast: progress at this speed would represent immense development gains for countries such as Afghanistan, Haiti, Liberia, and Timor-Leste today.

The basic framework of the WDR focuses on what we have learned about the dynamics of institutions and resist change. Third, external stresses can derail progress.

Creating the legitimate institutions that can prevent repeated violence is, in plain language, slow. It takes a generation. Even the fastest-transforming countries have taken between 15 and 30 years to raise their institutional performance from that of a fragile state today—Haiti, say—to that of a functioning institutionalized state, such as Ghana (table 2.1). The good news is that this process of transforming institutions accelerated considerably in the late 20th century, with increases in citizen demands for good governance and in the technologies that can help supply it. Indeed, making progress in a generation is actually quite fast: progress at this speed would represent immense development gains for countries such as Afghanistan, Haiti, Liberia, and Timor-Leste today.

The basic framework of the WDR focuses on what we have learned about the dynam-

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**Jorge Montaño**, Member, International Narcotics Control Board; former Ambassador of Mexico to the United States; *WDR Advisory Council Member*

**The role of external stresses**

Drug and human trafficking, money laundering, illegal exploitation of natural resources and wildlife, counterfeiting, and violations of intellectual property rights are lucrative criminal activities, which facilitate the penetration by organized crime of the already vulnerable sociopolitical, judicial, and security structures in developing countries.

In Central America, for example, several countries that regained political stability two decades ago are now facing the decay of the state, whose institutions lack the strength to face this onslaught. Transnational organized crime has converted some Caribbean countries into corridors for the movement of illegal drugs and persons toward Europe and North America. Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, continue to be the main global cocaine producers, while Mexico is facing an unprecedented wave of violence given its border with the largest immigrant, drug consumption, and arms producing market. West Africa has become the newest passage of drugs coming from South America and destined for Europe. Several African countries suffer the illegal exploitation of their natural resources, while Asia is a hub for tons of opiates originating from Afghanistan. The unprecedented progression of organized crime could spell the collapse of many weak states as their institutions fall prey to the associated violence. The precarious economic development observed in many regions of the world provides a stimulus for consolidating these illegal activities, which will continue to thrive as a consequence of the impunity they encounter in developing countries.

**WDR Note: Weak institutions are a common factor in explaining repeated cycles of violence**

Building on previous work by Collier, Fearon, Goldstone, North, Wallis, and Weingast, and others, political scientists Jim Fearon and Barbara Walter used econometric techniques for the WDR to test whether general rule of law and government effectiveness, low corruption, and strong protection of human rights correlate with a lower risk of the onset and recurrence of civil war and of high homicides from criminal violence. Fearon finds that countries with above average governance indicators for their income level have a significantly lower risk of the outbreak of civil conflict within the next 5 to 10 years—between 30 to 45 percent lower—and that the relationship also holds true for countries with high homicides. This work confirms earlier directions in the policy community, such as the International Network for Conflict and Fragility’s emphasis on the links between peacebuilding and state-building.

Measures of accountability are as important as measures of capacity in this calculation. Fearon finds that high levels of political terror in past periods increase the chances of current conflict. Walter finds that significant reductions in the number of political prisoners and extrajudicial killings make the renewal of civil war between two and three times less likely than in countries with higher levels of human rights abuses. She notes, “A reasonable interpretation of these results is that greater repression and abuse by a government creates both grievances and signals that those governments (sic) are not dependable negotiating partners; suggesting that less coercive and more accountable approaches significantly decrease the risk of civil conflict.” Other measures of accountability also matter: measures of rule of law and corruption are as or more important than measures of bureaucratic quality.
Institutional transformation and good governance, central to these processes, work differently in fragile situations. The goal is more focused—transforming institutions that deliver citizen security, justice, and jobs. When facing the risk of conflict and violence, citizen security, justice and jobs are the key elements of protection to achieve human security.51 The dynamics of institutional change are also different. A good analogy is a financial crisis caused by a combination of external stresses and weaknesses in institutional checks and balances. In such a situation, exceptional efforts are needed to restore confidence in national leaders’ ability to manage the crisis—through actions that signal a real break with the past and through locking in these actions and showing that they will not be reversed.

Confidence-building—a concept used in political mediation and financial crises but rarely in development circles52—is a prelude to more permanent institutional change in the face of violence. Why? Because low trust means that stakeholders who need to con-
A repeated process enables space for collaborative norms and capacities to develop, and for success to build on successes in a virtuous cycle. For each loop of the spiral, the same two phases recur: building confidence that positive change is possible, prior to deepening the institutional transformation and strengthening governance outcomes.

Confidence-building—Inclusive-enough coalitions and early results

The state cannot restore confidence alone. Confidence-building in situations of violence and fragility requires deliberate effort to build inclusive-enough coalitions, as Indonesia did in addressing violence in Aceh or Timor-Leste in its recovery after the renewed violence in 2006 or Chile in its political transition. Coalitions are “inclusive-enough” when they include the parties necessary for implementing the initial stages of confidence-building and institutional transformation. They need not be “all-inclusive.”55 Inclusive-enough coalitions work in
Overview

two ways: (1) at a broad level, by building national support for change and bringing in the relevant stakeholders, through collaboration between the government and other sectors of society—as well as with regional neighbors, donors, or investors, and (2) at a local level, by promoting outreach to community leaders to identify priorities and deliver programs. Inclusive-enough coalitions apply just as much to criminal as to political violence, through collaboration with community leaders, business, and civil society in areas affected by criminal violence. Civil society—including women’s organizations—often plays important roles in restoring confidence and sustaining the momentum for recovery and transformation, as demonstrated by the role of the Liberian Women’s Initiative in pressing for continued progress in the peace agreement.56

Persuading stakeholders to work collaboratively requires signals of a real break with the past—for example, ending the political or economic exclusion of marginalized groups, corruption, or human rights abuses—as well as mechanisms to “lock-in” these changes and show that they will not be reversed. In moments of opportunity or crisis, fast and visible results also help restore confidence in the government’s ability to deal with violent threats and implement institutional and social change. State-community, state-nongovernmental organization (NGO), state-international, and state-private-sector partnerships can extend the state’s capacity to deliver. Actions in one domain can support results in another. Security operations can facilitate safe trade and transit, and the economic activity that creates jobs. Services delivered to marginalized groups can support perceptions of justice. More detailed approaches to support inclusive-enough coalitions are described in the section on practical policies and programs for country actors below.

Transforming institutions that deliver citizen security, justice, and jobs

There is a limit to the amount of change societies can absorb at any one time, and in fragile situations, many reforms need a build-up of trust and capacity before they can be successfully implemented. Getting the balance right between “too fast” and “too slow” transformative action is crucial, and some basic lessons emerge from successful country transitions.

First, prioritizing early action to reform the institutions responsible for citizen security, justice, and jobs is crucial, as in Singapore’s post-independence development (see Feature 3). Stemming illegal financial flows from the public purse or from natural resource trafficking is important to underpin these initiatives. Pragmatic, “best-fit” approaches adapted to local conditions will be needed. For example, Lebanon restored the electricity needed for economic recovery during the civil war through small private-sector networks of providers, albeit at high unit costs.57 Haiti’s successful police reforms in 2004 to 2009 focused on ousting abusers from the force and restoring very basic work discipline.58

Second, focusing on citizen security, justice, and jobs means that most other reforms will need to be sequenced and paced over time, including political reform, decentralization, privatization, and shifting attitudes toward marginalized groups. Systematically implementing these reforms requires a web of institutions (democratization, for example, requires many institutional checks and balances beyond elections) and changes in social attitudes. Several successful political transitions, such as the devolution that underpins peace in Northern Ireland and democratic transitions in Chile, Indonesia, or Portugal, have taken place through a series of steps over a decade or more.

There are exceptions—where the exclusion of groups from democratic participation has been a clear overriding source of grievance, rapid action on elections makes sense; and where interests that previously blocked reform have diminished, as with post-war Japanese or Republic of Korea land reform,59 fast action can take advantage of a window of opportunity. But in most situations, systematic and gradual action appears to work best.
REFLECTIONS FROM ADVISORY COUNCIL MEMBERS: 2011 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT

FEATURE 3  
Country experiences of confidence-building and transforming institutions for citizen security, justice, and jobs

Confidence building in South Africa

Jay Naidoo, Chairman of Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition; former General Secretary, Congress of South African Trade Unions; Minister of Reconstruction and Development, South Africa; and Chairman of the Development Bank of South Africa; WDR Advisory Council Member

(Abbreviated from WDR 2011, chapter 3)

In South Africa, the “moment” of transition in 1994 was preceded by multiple transition points which required efforts from the protagonists to shift the debate and that gave credibility to the process. On the African National Congress (ANC) Alliance side, this included the shift to a broader, more inclusive approach, and the realization of the need to ensure incentives for the National Party and the white population. On the National Party side, this included the shift from thinking in terms of group rights and protection of minorities to thinking in terms of individual rights and majority rule. Certain signals which were perceived as irreversible (notably the unconditional release of Nelson Mandela and the suspension of the ANC’s armed struggle) were critical in maintaining trust between parties. After the 1994 elections, delivering a few early results—including maternal and infant healthcare and using community structures to improve water supply—were important to maintain confidence in our new government.

In addition to successes, there were opportunities missed which may be of use when other countries consider South Africa’s experiences. This included too little attention to job creation for youth and risks of criminal violence. It meant that we did not fully address the critical need to ensure that the new generation who had not lived through the apartheid struggle as adults were provided with a strong streak—and economic opportunities—in the new democratic state.

There was also too much of an assumption that 1994 marked the culmination of a process of democratization and reconciliation. Relatively little attention was given to what was meant by the transformation to a constitutional state; the continued role of civil society in deepening not just democratization and accountability but also delivery. And there was a need for a deeper and more thorough ongoing debate on racism, inequality, and social exclusion.

All politics is local and early attention to security, justice, and jobs

George Yeo, Minister of Foreign Affairs for Singapore; WDR Advisory Council Member.

(Abbreviated from WDR 2011, chapters 4 and 5)

Successful efforts must begin at the local level. Without emphasis on local results, citizens lose confidence in their government’s ability to provide a better life. Actions to restore security, create trust, generate employment, and provide services in local communities lay the foundation for national progress. It is not enough to deliver results in big cities. In cases of ethnic and religious strife, where mutual insecurity can feed on itself, a local authority that is seen to be fair and impartial by all groups is absolutely essential before the process of healing and recovery can take place. This was Singapore’s experience when we had race riots in the 1960s. A trusted leader can make a decisive difference.

It takes time to build institutions. Getting the urgent things done first, especially improving security and providing jobs, helps people to feel more hopeful about the future. Success then creates the condition for further success. Without a practical approach, new institutions cannot take root in the hearts and minds of ordinary people. For Singapore in the early years, the priority was on security, law and order, and creating favorable conditions for investment and economic growth. Confidence was everything. National Service was introduced within a year. Secret societies and other criminal activities were suppressed. Corruption was progressively rooted out. To promote investment and job creation, labor and land acquisition laws were reformed early. Against conventional wisdom in many developing countries at that time, we eschewed protectionism and encouraged multinationals to invest. Managing the politics of change was always a challenge.

The key was winning the trust of the people. Institutions which endure are sustained by the respect and affection of the population. It is a process which takes at least a generation.
Addressing external stresses and mobilizing international support

External stresses, such as the infiltration of organized crime and trafficking networks, spillovers from neighboring conflicts, and economic shocks, are important factors in increasing the risk of violence. In fragile situations, many of these external pressures will already be present and the institutions to respond to them are generally weak. If they are not addressed, or if they increase, they can derail efforts at violence prevention and recovery. Far more so than in stable development environments, addressing external stresses therefore needs to be a core part of national strategies and international supporting efforts for violence prevention and recovery.

REFLECTIONS FROM ADVISORY COUNCIL MEMBERS: 2011 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT

FEATURE 3 Country experiences of confidence-building and transforming institutions for citizen security, justice, and jobs (continued)

Colombia’s restoration of confidence in safe transit

Marta Lucia Ramirez de Rincon, Director, Fundacion Ciudadania en Accion; former Senator and Chair of Security Commission, Colombia; former Defense Minister and former Foreign Trade Minister, Colombia; WDR Advisory Council Member

(Abbreviated from WDR 2011, chapter 5)

The challenge we faced in 2002 was preventing Colombia from becoming a failed state. This meant shielding our citizens from kidnapping and terrorism. It also meant protecting our infrastructure, roads, and democratic institutions against attacks by the guerrillas, the paramilitaries, and drug traffickers. These groups hijacked cars and kidnapped people as they travelled across the country. Since this problem had worsened in the years ahead of the 2002 elections, the government set the restoration of security in roads and highways as a key priority on their agenda. It devised the Meteoro program widely known as, “Live Colombia, travel across it” (“Vive Colombia, Viaja por ella”).

Meteoro aimed at restoring control of the roads and highways across the country back from the illegitimate hand of armed groups that inflicted fear in the population. The government invited the Colombian population to drive their cars and travel across the country without intimidation, while at the same time launching a major military, intelligence, and police operation to protect the roads and ensure the safety of the population. Through this plan, the government sought to give people back their country and to reactivate trade and tourism. Above all, this plan, implemented at the very early stage of the new government, brought about a breakthrough in the restoration of trust and hope in the Colombian society.

Do not confuse speed with haste in political processes

Lakhdar Brahimi, former UN Special Representative of the Secretary General to Iraq and Afghanistan; WDR Advisory Council Member

(abbreviated from WDR 2011, chapter 5)

It is important not to confuse speed with haste in political processes: too hasty approaches can precipitate the opposite effect from the one we seek to support. The international community’s high hopes for Iraq’s 2005 experiment in proportional electoral democracy produced a contest for power which increased rather than allayed sectarian violence and the constitution hastily produced later is proving difficult to implement. Similarly, the 2009 election in Afghanistan proved to challenge rather than bolster perceptions of institutional legitimacy in the immediate aftermath.

The options are not mutually exclusive—there is great worldwide demand for more inclusive and responsive governance, and elections can be a crucial means to provide this. But their timing requires careful attention. Democratic traditions have developed in most countries over a considerable period. Democratization efforts today, similarly, require attention to historical heritages and existing political cleavages, and must be seen as an ongoing process of social transformation and the development of a broad range of institutions that provide checks and balances rather than an identifiable “event.” Democratization does not start or end with elections.
Political and policy signals to build collaborative, inclusive-enough coalitions

There is a surprising commonality across countries in the signals that most frequently build confidence and collaborative coalitions (see Feature 4). They can include immediate actions in credible national or local appointments, in transparency, and in some cases, the removal of factors seen as negative, such as discriminatory laws. Security forces can be redeployed as a positive signal of attention to insecure areas, but also as a sign that the government recognizes where particular units have a record of distrust or abuse with communities and replaces them. Measures to improve transparency of information and decision-making processes can be important in building confidence, as well as laying the basis for sustained institutional transformation.

Signals can also be announcements of future actions—the selection of two or three key early results; the focus of military and police planning on citizen security goals; or setting approaches and timelines toward political reform, decentralization, or transitional justice. Ensuring that political and policy signals are realistic in scope and timing and can be delivered is important in managing expectations—by anchoring them in national planning and budget processes and discussing any external support needed in advance with international partners.

When signals relate to future action, their credibility will be increased by commitment mechanisms that persuade stakeholders that they will actually be implemented and not reversed. Examples are Colombia’s and Indonesia’s independent, multisectoral executing agencies and third-party monitors, such as

Practical policy and program tools for country actors

The WDR lays out a different way of thinking about approaches to violence prevention and recovery in fragile situations. It does not aim to be a “cookbook” that prescribes recipes—each country’s political context differs, and there are no one-size-fits-all solutions. While the choice of confidence-building measures and institution-building approaches needs to be adapted to each country, a set of basic tools emerging from experience can be the basis for that adaptation. These core tools include the options for signals and commitment mechanisms to build collaborative coalitions, demonstrating a break from the past and building confidence in positive outcomes. They also include a description of the programs that can deliver quick results and longer-term institutional provision of citizen security, justice, and jobs. The Report first presents the basic tools and then looks at how to differentiate strategies and programming to different country circumstances, using country-specific assessments of risks and opportunities.
### Feature 4 Core Tools

#### RESTORING CONFIDENCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Signals: Future policy and priorities</th>
<th>Signals: Immediate actions</th>
<th>Commitment mechanisms</th>
<th>Supporting actions</th>
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<tr>
<td>- Citizen security goals</td>
<td>- Participatory processes</td>
<td>- Independence of executing agencies</td>
<td>- Risk and priority assessments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Key principles and realistic timelines for political reform, decentralization, corruption, transitional justice</td>
<td>- Local security, justice, and development results</td>
<td>- Independent third-party monitoring</td>
<td>- Communicating costs of inaction</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Mix of state, community, NGO, and international capacity</td>
<td>- Credible appointments</td>
<td>- Dual-key national-international systems</td>
<td>- Simple plans and progress measures on 2–3 early results</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Use of low-capital systems for rural and community policing</td>
<td>- Transparency in expenditures</td>
<td>- International execution of one or more key functions</td>
<td>- Strategic communication</td>
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#### TRANSFORMING INSTITUTIONS

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<th>Citizen security</th>
<th>Justice</th>
<th>Jobs and associated services</th>
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</thead>
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<td><strong>Foundational reforms and “best-fit” approaches</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Security sector reform:</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Designed to deliver citizen security benefits</td>
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<td>- Capacity increases linked to repeated realistic performance outcomes and justice functions</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Dismantling criminal networks through civilian oversight, vetting and budget expenditure transparency</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Use of low-capital systems for rural and community policing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Justice sector reform:</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Independence and link to security reforms; strengthening basic caseload processing; extending justice services, drawing on traditional/community mechanisms</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Phasing anti-corruption measures: demonstrate national resources can be used for public good before dismantling rent systems; control capture of rents and use social accountability mechanisms</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Gradual, systematic programs</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Phased capacity and accountability in specialized security functions</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Political and electoral reform</td>
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<td>- Decentralization</td>
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<td>- Transitional justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Comprehensive anti-corruption reforms</td>
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<tr>
<td>Multisectoral community empowerment programs: combining citizen security, employment, justice, education, and infrastructure</td>
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#### NATIONAL ACTION TO ADDRESS EXTERNAL STRESS

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<tr>
<th>Citizen security</th>
<th>Justice</th>
<th>Jobs and associated services</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Border cooperation</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Military, police, and financial intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Cross-border development programming</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Coordinate supply and demand-side responses</td>
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<td>- Joint investigations and prosecutions across jurisdictions</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Building links between formal/informal systems</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Multisectoral community empowerment programs: combining citizen security, employment, justice, education, and infrastructure</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Employment programs: regulatory simplification and infrastructure recovery for private-sector job creation, long-term public programs, asset expansion, value chain programs, informal sector support, labor migration, women’s economic empowerment, and asset expansion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Humanitarian delivery and social protection: with planned transition from international provision</td>
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<tr>
<td>Macroeconomic policy: focus on consumer price volatility and employment</td>
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#### FEASIBLE RESULTS INDICATORS TO DEMONSTRATE OVERALL PROGRESS

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizen security</th>
<th>Justice</th>
<th>Jobs and associated services</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Short term</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Violent deaths</td>
<td>- Perception surveys by groups (ethnic, geographical, religious, class) on whether their welfare is increasing over time and in relation to others</td>
<td>- Perceptions of whether employment opportunities are increasing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Perception survey data on increases/decreases in security</td>
<td>- Perception survey on trust in national institutions and on corruption</td>
<td>- Price surveys (for real income implications)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Longer term</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Victim surveys</td>
<td>- Governance indicators refocused on outcomes and degree of progress within historically realistic timeframes</td>
<td>- Household data on employment and labor force participation</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Household survey data on vertical and horizontal inequalities and access to justice services</td>
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the joint ASEAN-EU (Association of Southeast Asian Nations–European Union) Aceh monitoring mission. Sole or “dual-key” authority over one or more functions involving international agencies—as with the jointly run Governance and Economic Management Program in Liberia, the International Commission Against Impunity (CICIG) in Guatemala, or when UN peacekeeping missions have executive responsibility for policing—is also a commitment mechanism when institutional capacity and accountability are low.

Strong strategic communication on these signals of change are always important—actions and policy changes cannot influence behaviors unless people know they have taken place and how they fit into a broader vision. Where the risks of crisis escalation are not fully recognized by all national leaders, providing an accurate and compelling message on the consequences of inaction can help galvanize momentum for progress. Economic and social analyses can support this narrative—by showing how rising violence and failing institutions are causing national or subnational areas to lag far behind their neighbors in development progress; or by showing how other countries that have failed to address rising threats have faced severe and long-lasting development consequences. The WDR analysis provides some clear messages:

- No country or region can afford to ignore areas where repeated cycles of violence flourish and citizens are disengaged from the state.
- Unemployment, corruption, and exclusion increase the risks of violence—and legitimate institutions and governance that give everyone a stake in national prosperity are the immune system that protects from different types of violence.
- Citizen security is a preeminent goal in fragile situations, underpinned by justice and jobs.
- Leaders need to seize opportunities before violence escalates or recurs.

**National program design to restore confidence and transform institutions**

The core program tools that emerge from different country experiences are deliberately kept small in number to reflect country lessons on focus and priorities. They are all designed to be delivered at scale, in large national or subnational programs rather than small projects. They include multisectoral programs linking community structures with the state; security sector reform; justice reform; national employment policy and programs; associated services that support citizen security, justice, and job creation, such as electricity and social protection; and phased approaches to corruption. They also include programs that can be crucial for sustained violence prevention: political reform, decentralization, transitional justice, and education reform where systematic attention is needed once early reforms in citizen security, justice, and jobs have started to make progress.

The top five lessons of what works in program design are:

- Programs that support bottom-up state-society relations in insecure areas. These include community-based programs for violence prevention, employment, and associated service delivery, and access to local justice and dispute resolution. Examples are community policing in a wide range of higher-, middle-, and lower-income countries, the Afghanistan National Solidarity Program, and Latin American multisectoral violence prevention programs.
- Complementary programs for institutional transformation in the priority areas of security and justice. Early reform programs should focus on simple basic functions (such as criminal caseload processing, adequate basic investigation, and arrest procedures); include civilian oversight, vetting, and budget and expenditure transparency to dismantle covert or criminal networks; and link the pace of reform between the police and civilian justice systems to avoid situations where increasing
police capacity results in prolonged detentions or the release of offenders back into the community without due process.

• “Back to basics” job creation programs. These programs include large-scale community-based public works, such as those India and Indonesia use throughout the country, including in marginalized and violence-affected communities; private-sector regulatory simplification and addressing of infrastructure bottlenecks (in particular, electricity, which is the number one constraint for businesses in fragile and violent areas); and access to finance and investments to bring producers and markets together, as in Kosovo’s and Rwanda’s coffee, dairy, and tourism initiatives.64

• The involvement of women in security, justice, and economic empowerment programs, such as the Nicaragua, Liberia, and Sierra Leone reforms to introduce female staffing and gender-specific service in the police force; and economic empowerment initiatives in Nepal, which addressed issues of gender roles that had previously been divisive in insecure areas through the provision of finance and business training to women’s groups.65

• Focused anticorruption initiatives that demonstrate that new initiatives can be well governed. Tools have included the use of private-sector capacity to monitor functions vulnerable to grand corruption, as with Liberia’s forestry inspection and Mozambique’s customs collection, combined with social accountability mechanisms that use transparent publication of expenditure and community/civil-society monitoring to ensure funds reach their intended targets.66

Some of the early confidence-building results that can be targeted through these programs include freedom of movement along transit routes, electricity coverage, number of businesses registered and employment days created, processing of judicial caseloads, and reduction of impunity through vetting or prosecutions. What is crucial here is that early results generate improvements in the morale of national institutions and set the right incentives for later institution-building.

For example, if security forces are set targets based on the number of rebel combatants killed or captured or criminals arrested, they may rely primarily on coercive approaches, with no incentive to build the longer-term trust with communities that will prevent violence from recurring. Targets based on citizen security (freedom of movement and so on), in contrast, create longer-term incentives for the role of the security forces in underpinning national unity and effective state-society relations. Similarly, if services and public works are delivered only through top-down national programs, there will be few incentives for communities to take responsibility for violence prevention or for national institutions to undertake responsibility to protect all vulnerable citizens, men and women. A mixture of state and nonstate, bottom-up and top-down approaches is a better underpinning for longer-term institutional transformation.

Phasing transitions from humanitarian aid is also an important part of transforming institutions. In countries where current stresses overwhelm national institutional capacity by a large margin, national reformers often draw on international humanitarian capacity to deliver early results. These programs can be effective in saving lives, building confidence, and extending national capacity. But a difficult trade-off occurs in deciding on the time needed to shift these functions to national institutions. For food programs, this generally means phasing down deliveries before local harvests and moving from general distribution to targeted programs, in coordination with government social protection agencies where possible. For health, education, water, and sanitation, it means reducing international roles step-by-step over time as the capacity of national or local institutions increases—as in the transition
from international to national health provision in Timor-Leste, which moved from international execution to government contracting of international NGOs and then to government management.67

**Regional and cross-border initiatives**

Societies do not have the luxury of transforming their institutions in isolation—they need at the same time to manage external pressures, whether from economic shocks or trafficking and international corruption. Many of these issues are beyond the control of each nation-state to address, and the last section of the Report considers international policy to diminish external stresses. National leaders may play a significant role in galvanizing broad regional or global cooperation on issues such as trafficking, as well as bilateral cooperation. Possible initiatives include:

- Openness to discuss both security and development cooperation across insecure border regions, based on shared goals of citizen security, justice, and jobs rather than purely on military operations. Cross-border development programming could simply involve special arrangements to share lessons. But it could also move toward formal joint arrangements to design and monitor development programs in insecure border areas and move toward specific provisions to help insecure landlocked areas gain access to markets.

- Joint processes to investigate and prosecute incidents of corruption that can fuel violence, as Haiti and Nigeria have done (with the United States and the United Kingdom) to combat corruption and money-laundering.68 These can build capacity in weaker jurisdictions and deliver results that could not be achieved by one jurisdiction alone.

**Mobilizing international support**

Some constraints in international support come from policies and systems established in the headquarters of multilateral agencies and donor countries. Actions on these issues are discussed in Part 3 under Directions for International Policy. National leaders and their partners on the ground cannot individually determine these broader changes to the international system, but they can maximize the benefits of existing support.

It helps when national leaders and their international partners in the field lay out clear program priorities across the security, justice, and development domains. Country experiences indicate that efforts need to focus on only two or three rapid results to build confidence, and on narrowly and realistically defined institution-building. Priorities are better laid out in a very limited number of clear programs—such as community-based interventions in insecure areas, security and freedom of movement on key roads—as in Liberia after the civil war and in Colombia in the face of criminal violence in 2002. Using the national budget process to decide on priority programs coordinates messages and develops cooperation in implementation between the security and development ministries.

National leaders can also produce better results from external assistance by being alert to the needs of international partners to show results and manage risks. International partners have their own domestic pressures—to demonstrate that assistance is not misused and to attribute results to their endeavors. A frank exchange on risks and results helps to find ways to bridge differences. In Indonesia in the aftermath of the Tsunami and Aceh peace agreement, for example, the government agreed with donors that incoming assistance would be “jointly branded” by the Indonesian Reconstruction Agency and donors, with special transparency measures in place to enable both sides to show visible results and manage risks while bolstering the legitimacy of state-society relations in the aftermath of crisis. A “double compact” between governments and their citizens and between states and their international partners, first proposed by Ashraf Ghani and
Clare Lockhart, is another way of managing different perspectives on risk, the speed of response, and long-term engagement with national institutions—by making dual accountability of donor funds explicit.71

**Monitoring results**

To evaluate the success of programs and adapt them when problems arise, national reformers and their international partners in country also need information on overall results in reducing violence, and on citizen confidence in security, justice, and employment goals at regular intervals. For most developing countries, the MDGs and their associated targets and indicators are the dominant international framework. The MDGs have raised the profile of broad-based human development and remain important long-term goals for countries facing fragility and violence. But they have drawbacks in their direct relevance to progress in violence prevention and recovery. They do not cover citizen security and justice. They move slowly, so they do not provide national reformers or their international partners with rapid feedback loops that can demonstrate areas of progress and identify new or remaining risks.

A useful supplement to the MDGs would be indicators that more directly measure violence reduction, confidence-building and citizen security and justice (Feature 4). Citizen polling data, glaringly absent in many fragile and conflict-affected countries, could help fill this role.72 Middle- and higher-income countries use polling all the time to provide governments with feedback on progress and risks, but it is little used in low-income, fragile countries. Direct measurement of security improvements can also show rapid progress, but while data on violent deaths are fairly easy to collect, they are not available for the countries that would benefit most from them: low-income, fragile states. Employment data needs to be upgraded.

**Differentiating strategy and programs to country context**

While there is a basic set of tools emerging from experience, each country needs to assess its circumstances and adapt lessons from others to the local political context. Each country faces different stresses, different institutional challenges, different stakeholders who need to be involved to make a difference, and different types of transition opportunities. The differences are not black and white but occur across a spectrum—each country will have different manifestations of violence, different combinations of internal or external stresses, and different institutional challenges—and these factors will change over time. But all countries face some aspects of this mix. The Report covers some of the most important differences in country circumstances through the simple differentiation shown below.

National reformers and their country counterparts need to take two types of decisions in each phase of confidence-building and institutional reform, taking into account the local political context. First is to decide the types of signals—both immediate actions and announcements on early results and longer-term policies—that can help build “inclusive-enough” collaborative coalitions for change. Second is to decide on the design

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spectra of situation-specific challenges and opportunities</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Types of violence:</strong> Civil and/or criminal and/or cross-border and/or sub-national and/or ideological</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transition opportunity:</strong> Gradual/limited to immediate/major space for change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key stakeholders:</strong> Internal versus external stakeholders; state versus nonstate stakeholders; low-income versus middle-high income stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key stresses:</strong> Internal versus external stresses; high versus low level of divisions among groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional challenges:</strong> Degree of capacity, accountability, and inclusion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of priority programs to launch for institutional transformation.

In differentiating political and policy signals, the type of stresses faced and the stakeholders whose support is most needed for effective action make a difference. Where ethnic, geographical, or religious divides have been associated with conflict, and the cooperation of these groups is critical to progress, the credibility of appointments may rest on whether individuals command respect across group divides. Where corruption has been a severe stress, the credibility of key appointments may rest on individuals’ reputation for integrity.

The type of transition moment also makes a difference. At the end of the wars in Japan and the Republic of Korea, the birth of the new nation of Timor-Leste, Liberia’s first post-war election, military victory in Nicaragua, and in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, there was greater space for rapid announcements of long-term political, social, and institutional change than exists today for the coalition government in Kenya or other situations of negotiated reform.

Institutional capacity, accountability, and trust among groups also affect the choices and timetable of early policy announcements. In countries with institutions that are strong but have been viewed as illegitimate because they are exclusive, abusive, or unaccountable (as in some transitions from authoritarian rule), action on transparency, participation, and justice may be more important for short-term confidence-building than delivering goods and services. Where social cohesion is fractionalized, time may be needed to build trust between groups before wider reform is attempted. In South Africa, for example, leaders wisely allowed time for constitutional reform and the development of trust between groups before the first post-Apartheid election. And in Northern Ireland the devolution of security and justice functions were delayed until trust and accountability increased.

A core message is that the particular manifestation of violence at any one time is less important than the underlying institutional deficits that permit repeated cycles of violence—and that successful approaches to address political, communal, and criminal violence have much in common. But the mix of different types of violence does affect strategy. Inequality among ethnic, religious, or geographical groups is important as a risk for civil conflict—employment programs and services would thus target equity and bridging opportunities among these groups. But for organized criminal violence, inequality between rich and poor matters more (irrespective of ethnic or religious identities). Violence with strong international links—organized crime, international recruitment into ideological movements—requires greater international cooperation.

Country circumstances also make a difference for program design, requiring the “best fit” to local political conditions. For example, multisectoral community approaches can be effective in contexts as different as Côte d’Ivoire, Guatemala, and Northern Ireland—but more care would be needed in Côte d’Ivoire and Northern Ireland to ensure that these approaches were not seen as targeted to one ethnic or religious group but, instead, as building bonds among groups. Both Colombia and Haiti are considering reform in the justice sector, but accountability and capacity problems are a bigger challenge in Haiti, and reforms would have to be designed accordingly. For middle-income countries with strong institutions facing challenges of exclusion and accountability, lessons on program design, successes, and missed opportunities will come primarily from countries that have faced similar circumstances, such as the democratic transitions in Latin America, Indonesia, Eastern Europe, or South Africa. So national reformers and their international partners need to think through the political economy for interventions and adapt program design to that context (Feature 5).

Each country needs its own assessment of risks and priorities to design the best-fit strategy and programs for its political context. International assessment tools, such as post-conflict/post-crisis needs assessments,
can identify the risks and priorities. These assessments could be strengthened by:

- Adapting assessments regularly and frequently at different transition moments, including when risks are increasing, not only after a crisis.
- Identifying the specific characteristics of transition opportunities, stresses, institutional challenges, stakeholders, and the institutions that provide citizen security, justice, and jobs.
- Identifying priorities from a citizen and stakeholder perspective through focus groups or polling surveys, as South Africa did in developing its reconstruction priorities or as Pakistan did in assessing the sources of violence in the border regions.76
- Considering explicitly the history of past efforts, as Colombia did in reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of previous efforts to address violence in the early 2000s.77
- Being more realistic about the number of priorities identified and the timelines, as with the changes recommended to the joint United Nations–World Bank–European Union post-crisis needs assessment.

PART 3: REDUCING THE RISKS OF VIOLENCE—DIRECTIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL POLICY

International action has delivered great benefits in improved security and prosperity. It is difficult to imagine how committed leaders in post–World War II Europe, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Liberia, Mozambique, Northern Ireland, or Timor-Leste would have stabilized their countries or regions without help from abroad. Many individuals working on fragile and conflict-affected states are dedicated professionals attempting to support national efforts. But they are held back by structures, tools, and processes designed for different contexts and purposes. Specifically, while processes exist to provide the kind of post-war assistance typical of 20th century paradigms, there is little attention to helping countries that struggle with prevention of repeated cycles of political and criminal violence (Feature 6, figure 6.1) and with the challenges involved in transforming institutions to provide citizen security, justice, and jobs. Internal international agency processes are too slow, too fragmented, too reliant on parallel systems, and too quick to exit, and there are significant divisions among international actors.

The range of preventive tools in the international system has improved, with increases in global and regional mediation capacity78 and in programs that support both local and national collaborative efforts to mediate violence. Examples include the Ghana peace committees supported by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the UN Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA)79 and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) community projects for citizen security. Such programs do often support activities relating to citizen security, justice, and jobs, but they are not in the mainstream of diplomatic, security, or development thinking. UN, regional, and NGO-sponsored mediation has played a significant role in a range of cases—from AU-UN-ECOWAS mediation in West Africa to UN facilitation of Afghanistan’s Bonn Agreement to nongovernmental efforts such as the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and the Crisis Management Initiative in Aceh.80

But these programs are still not delivered to scale. It is much harder for countries to get international assistance to support development of their police forces and judiciaries than their militaries. International economic development assistance is easier to obtain for macroeconomic policy, health, or education capacities than for job creation. UN police capacity, doctrinal development, and training have increased, but are not fully linked to justice capacities. While some bilateral agencies
Countries: Afghanistan, Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia, Indonesia, Nepal, Rwanda

The basic elements of a post-conflict community development program are simple and can be adapted to a broad range of country contexts. All community programs under state auspices consist, essentially, of a community decision-making mechanism to determine priorities and the provision of funds and technical help to implement them. Within this model is a great deal of variance that can be adapted to different types of stresses and institutional capacities as well as to different opportunities for transition. Three important sources of variance are in how community decision-making is done, who controls the funds, and where programs reside within the government.

Different stresses and institutional capacity and accountability affect community decision-making. In many violent areas, preexisting community councils either have been destroyed or were already discredited. A critical first step is to reestablish credible participatory forms of representation. In Burundi, for example, a local NGO organized elections for representative community development committees in the participating communes that cut across ethnic divides. Similarly, Afghanistan’s National Solidarity Program began with village-wide elections for a community development council. But Indonesia’s programs for the conflict-affected areas of Aceh, Maluku, Sulawesi, and Kalimantan did not hold new community elections. Community councils were largely intact, and national laws already provided for local, democratic, village elections. Indonesia also experimented with separating grants to Muslim and Christian villages to minimize intercommunal tensions, but eventually used common funds and councils to bridge divides between these communities.

Different institutional challenges also affect who holds the funds. Programs must weigh the trade-offs between a first objective of building trust with the risks of money going missing or the elite capture of resources, as shown in the following examples:

- In Indonesia, where local capacity was fairly strong, subdistrict councils established financial management units that are routinely audited but have full responsibility for all aspects of financial performance.
- In Burundi, a lack of progress in overall decentralization and difficulties in monitoring funds through community structures meant responsibility for managing the funds remained with NGO partners.
- In Afghanistan’s National Solidarity Program, NGOs also took on the initial responsibility for managing the funds while councils were trained in bookkeeping, but within a year block grants were being transferred directly to the councils.
- In Colombia, where the primary institutional challenges were to bring the state closer to communities and overcome distrust between security and civilian government agencies, funds are held by individual government ministries but approvals for activities are made by multisectoral teams in field offices.
- In Nepal, community programs show the full range: some programs give primary responsibility for fund oversight to partner NGOs; in other programs, such as the country’s large-scale village school program, community school committees are the legal owners of school facilities and can use government funds to hire and train their staff.

The type of transition moment affects how community decision-making structures align with the formal government administration. Many countries emerging from conflict will also undergo major constitutional and administrative reforms just as the early response community programs are being launched. Aligning community councils with the emergent structures of government can be difficult. In Afghanistan’s National Solidarity Program, for example, the Community Development Councils, though constituted under a 2007 vice-presidential bylaw, are still under review for formal integration into the national administrative structure. In Cambodia’s Seila Program, councils were launched under United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) auspices and then moved into the government’s newly formed commune structure. In Rwanda, greater space for change after the genocide meant the councils could be integrated into the government’s decentralization plans from the start.

Source: Guggenheim 2011.
Commission survey of assistance to Cambodia, more than 35 percent of all projects were less than one year in duration, and 66 percent were less than three years. Despite the need for more consistent and sustained assistance, aid to fragile states is much more volatile than that to nonfragile states—indeed, more than twice as volatile, with an estimated loss in efficiency of 2.5 percent of GDP for recipient states (Feature 6, figures F6.2 and F6.3).85

Regional and global action on external stresses is a key part of risk reduction, but assistance is still focused primarily at the individual country level. Some innovative processes against trafficking combine demand-side and supply-side incentives and the efforts of multiple stakeholders in developed and developing countries86—one is the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme to stem the sale of conflict diamonds.87 Yet a general principle of co-responsibility, combining demand-side and supply-side actions and cooperation between developed and developing regions, is lacking. Existing efforts suffer from weakness and fragmentation in the financial systems used to “follow the money” flowing from corrupt transactions. And they are constrained by a multiplication of weak and overlapping multicountry endeavors rather than strong and well-resourced regional approaches. Despite some exceptions—the Asian Development Bank and European Union long-standing regional programs, the UN Department of Political Affairs regional offices, and recent increases in regional lending by the World Bank—most development donors focus primarily on national rather than regional support.

The international landscape is becoming more complex. The end of the Cold War had the potential to usher in a new age of consensus in international support to violence and conflict-affected areas. In fact, the last decade has seen an increase in complexity and continued coordination problems. The political, security, humanitarian, and development actors present in each country situation have become more numerous. Legal agreements that set standards for responsible national leadership have become more complicated...
over time: the 1948 UN Convention Against Genocide has 17 operative paragraphs; the 2003 Convention Against Corruption has 455. Within OECD countries, there are divided views over the relative role of security and development assistance and over aid through national institutions. The increase in assistance from middle-income countries, with a history of solidarity support, not only brings valuable new energy, resources, and ideas, but also new challenges in the differing views of international partners. WDR consultations frequently revealed divided views among national actors, regional bodies, middle-income countries, and OECD donors over what is realistic to expect from national leadership in improving governance, over what time period, and over the “forms” versus the “functions” of good governance (elections versus broader democratic practices and processes; minimizing corruption in practice versus establishing procurement laws and anticorruption commissions).

Dual accountability is at the heart of international behavior. International actors know that faster, smarter, longer-term engagement through national and regional institutions is needed to help societies exit fragility. But as highlighted by the OECD International Network on Conflict and Fragility, they are also acutely sensitive to the risks of domestic criticism of waste, abuse, corruption, and a lack of results in donor programs. International actors need to be accountable to their citizens and taxpayers as well as to partner country needs, and these expectations can be at odds (figure 3.1).

The slow progress in changing donor behavior comes from these underlying incentives. For example, undertaking small projects through parallel systems, focusing on the “form rather than function” of change (with an emphasis on elections, model procurement laws, and anti-corruption and human rights commissions), and avoiding engagements in riskier institution-building—all help donors to manage domestic expectations of results and criticism of failure. In today’s tight fiscal environment for many donors, the dilemma is becoming more prominent, not less. Domestic pressures also contribute to divisions among donors, since some donors face far more domestic pressure than others on corruption, gender equity, or the need to show economic benefits at home from aid overseas. Accountability to taxpayers is a desirable facet of donor aid—but the challenge is to make domestic expectations fit with the needs and realities of assistance on the ground.

Multilateral responses are also constrained by historical arrangements suited to more stable environments. For example, the international financial institutions’ procurement procedures were based on the assumption of

**FIGURE 3.1** *The dual accountability dilemma for donors engaged in fragile and conflict environments*

Source: WDR team.
**FEATURE 6** Patterns of international assistance to violence-affected countries

**FIGURE F6.1 Uneven international support in West Africa—Post-conflict trumps prevention**

A one-off concept of progress and the difficulties of prevention have led to an excessive focus on post-conflict transitions. The amount of aid and peacekeeping assistance going to countries after civil war has ended greatly exceeds what is provided to countries struggling to prevent an escalation of conflict.

Source: WDR team calculations based on OECD 2010d.

**FIGURE F6.2 Aid volatility increases with duration of violence**

Over the last 20 years, countries that experienced longer periods of fragility, violence, or conflict experienced more volatility in their aid. Figure 6.2 shows that the coefficient of variance of net official development assistance (ODA), excluding debt relief, is higher for countries that have experienced prolonged violence since 1990. This relationship, reflected by the upward trend line, is statistically significant and suggests that, on average, a country that experienced 20 years of violence experienced twice the volatility in aid of a country that did not experience violence. Volatility of revenues has considerable costs for all governments, but particularly so in fragile situations where it may derail reform efforts and disrupt institution-building.

Source: WDR team calculations based on OECD 2010d.

**FIGURE F6.3 Stop-go aid: Volatility in selected fragile states**

The four countries below provide an illustration. It was not uncommon for total aid to Burundi, the Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, and Haiti to drop by 20 or 30 percent in one year and increase by up to 50 percent the following year (humanitarian aid and debt relief, excluded from these statistics, would further increase the volatility).

Source: WDR team calculations based on OECD 2010d.
ongoing security, a reasonable level of state institutional capacity, and competitive markets. They thus have difficulty adapting to situations where security conditions change between the design and tendering of a project, where a small number of qualified government counterparts struggle to manage complex procurement documentation, and where the number of qualified contractors prepared to compete and mobilize is very limited. Similarly, the UN Secretariat originally developed procurement systems designed for its function as a headquarters-based advisory service and secretariat to the General Assembly. But when peacekeeping operations were launched, these systems were extended with relatively little adaptation, despite the difference in contexts and objectives.

To achieve real change in approaches that can restore confidence and prevent risks from recurring, international actors could consider four tracks to improve global responses for security and development as follows:

- **Track 1:** Provide more, and more integrated, specialized assistance for citizen security, justice, and jobs—targeting prevention in both immediate post-conflict and rising risk situations.

- **Track 2:** Reform internal agency systems to provide rapid action to restore confidence and promote long-term institution-building, in support of national efforts.

- **Track 3:** Act regionally and globally on external stresses.

- **Track 4:** Marshal support from lower-, middle-, and higher-income countries, and global and regional institutions, to reflect the changing landscape of international policy and assistance.

### Track 1: Providing Specialized Assistance for Prevention through Citizen Security, Justice, and Jobs

Security-development linkages apply in all areas struggling to prevent large-scale political or criminal violence. Both political and criminal violence require “outside the box” thinking, outside the traditional development paradigm. Issues of citizen security and of grievances over justice and jobs are not peripheral to “mainstream” development. They are in varying forms a problem for larger and more prosperous countries facing subnational urban or rural violence, for countries emerging from conflict and fragility that need to prevent recurrence, and for areas facing new or resurgent threats of social protest and instability. Strengthening the institutions that provide citizen security, justice, and jobs is crucial to prevention of violence and instability—such action is not a “magic bullet” that can prevent every episode of violence with certainty, but it is crucial to changing the probabilities of violence, and to continuous risk reduction.

A key lesson of successful violence prevention and recovery is that security, justice, and economic stresses are linked: approaches that try to solve them through military-only, justice-only, or development-only solutions will falter. A specialized suite of programs is needed in fragile environments, combining elements of security, justice, and economic transformation. But because these areas are covered by different international agencies, both bilaterally and multilaterally, combined action under one overall program framework is rare. A specialized suite of combined security-justice-development programs needs to aim at a catalytic effect, supporting national collaborative efforts to address these challenges. Changes in international agency approaches to support such programs would include (figure 3.2):

- Moving from sporadic early warning to continued risk assessment wherever weak institutional legitimacy, and internal or external stresses indicate a need for attention to prevention and to capacities for peaceful reform processes.

- Simplifying current assessment and planning mechanisms to provide countries with one process supporting national planning that covers the political, justice, security, humanitarian, and developmental areas.
FIGURE 3.2 Combined action across the security, development, and humanitarian spheres for external actors to support national institutional transformations

Source: WDR team.

- Shifting from the rhetoric of coordination to supporting combined programs for security, justice, and local jobs and associated services, each within their respective mandates and expertise. Two priorities for combined programs are—
  - Technical assistance and financing for security and justice reforms supported by combined teams. Development agencies, for example, can support measures to address budget and expenditure processes in security and justice functions, while partners with security and justice expertise can contribute to technical capacity-building, as was done in Timor-Leste in the run-up to independence.89
  - Multisectoral community programs that involve policing and justice as well as development activities, such as the initiatives in Latin America to provide local dispute resolution and justice services, community policing, employment and training, safe public and trading spaces, and social and cultural programs that promote tolerance.

- Establishing facilities for mediators and special envoys (internal and international) to draw on greater seconded expertise from international agencies, both to inform transition arrangements and to galvanize resources for integrated activities identified collaboratively by the different parties to a conflict situation. This should include specific efforts to support the growing role of regional and subregional institutions, such as AU and ECOWAS, by providing them with specific links to development expertise.

- Considering when humanitarian aid can be integrated into national systems without compromising humanitarian

EXTERNAL SUPPORT AND INCENTIVES

A NEW WAY OF DOING BUSINESS
Moving from early warning to continuous risk assessment
On budget support and technical assistance for citizen security and justice in joint teams
Financing in support of collaborative, mediated agreements
Unified planning processes
State-community, state-NGO, state-private sector programs for service delivery and multi-sectoral violence prevention
Humanitarian support for state protection systems
principles—building on existing good practice by UNDP, UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), World Health Organization (WHO), World Food Program (WFP), and others in combining humanitarian delivery with capacity-building, using local personnel and community structures, and purchasing food locally.

Implementing these programs would require systemic changes in international capacity. Citizen security and justice require new and interlinked capacities to address repeated waves of political and criminal violence. The starting point for deeper capacity in this area is government investment in standby, pre-trained personnel for a range of executive and advisory police, corrections, and justice functions. States will need police and justice reserves to respond effectively to contemporary violence, drawing on retired personnel, active service volunteers, and formed police units in some countries. Second, these capacities must be trained, and able to deploy, under shared doctrine to address the challenges of coherence presented by different national policing models. Increased investment through the UN and regional centers in the development of joint doctrine and pretraining of government capacities would increase effectiveness and reduce incoherence.

Third, linking military and policing assistance with justice assistance is crucial, since disconnects have been a pervasive source of problems in fragile situations. So is linking criminal justice assistance with help for local justice services such as land and property disputes. Fourth, it is important that new capacities provide a full range of services to countries facing challenges—from co-responsibility for policing or justice functions authorized by the UN Security Council or regional institutions, to police units and judicial personnel provided at the request of governments but without a corresponding intrusive mandate from global or regional institutions, to advisory, financing, and training services.

Last, ownership for justice reform work should be clarified in the international structure to enable multilateral and bilateral agencies to invest in developing the requisite capacity and expertise. There are areas where, at the request of government, the Bank and other institutional financial institutions (IFIs) could consider playing a greater role in supporting the developmental underpinnings of violence prevention within their mandates—such as the links between public financial management and security sector reform and institution-building, legal administration, justice systems development and multisectoral approaches at the community level that combine community policing and justice services with social cohesion, developmental and employment creation programs. But the IFIs are not equipped to lead specialized international support in these areas. A clear lead within the UN system would help this effort.

Agencies with economic expertise need to pay more attention to jobs. National community-based public works programs should receive greater and longer-term support in fragile situations, in recognition of the time required for the private sector to absorb youth unemployment. Other priority programs for job creation include investments in supporting infrastructure, in particular, electricity and transit. A third program cluster is those that invest in skills and work experience; develop links between producers, traders, and consumers; and expand access to finance and assets, for example, through low-income housing. Current international financial institutions and UN initiatives focused on employment creation should explicitly address the specific needs of areas affected by fragility, conflict, and violence, recognizing that job creation in these situations may go beyond material benefits by providing a productive role and occupation for youth, and evaluating and expanding the examples of best-fit employment policies in fragile situations presented in this Report. Global employment work should include re-focusing on the risks posed by youth employment.

These approaches would help. But there is likely to be continued pressure from large youth unemployed populations unless a more significant international effort is launched.
A bolder approach could draw together capacities from development agencies, the private sector, foundations, and NGOs in a new global partnership to galvanize investments in countries and communities where high unemployment and social disengagement contribute to the risks of conflict. Focusing primarily on job creation through project finance, advisory support to small and medium businesses, training and work placement, and guarantees, the initiative could also support social and cultural initiatives that promote good governance, collaborative capacities in communities, social tolerance, and recognition of young people’s social and economic roles. Private-sector capacities to draw on would include large companies that trade and invest in insecure areas (creating links with local entrepreneurs), as well as technology companies that can assist with connectivity and training in remote insecure areas.

**Track 2: Transforming procedures and risk and results management in international agencies**

To implement rapid, sustained, and integrated programs for citizen security, justice, and jobs, international agencies need internal reforms. For the g7+ group of leaders of conflict-affected and fragile states who have begun to meet regularly as part of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, reforming internal agency procedures, particularly procurement procedures, was the number one suggestion for international reform. International agencies cannot respond quickly to restore confidence or provide deep institutional support if their budget, staffing, approval, and contracting procedures take months and set unrealistic prerequisites for recipient institutional capacity. International agency systems would require fundamental changes to implement these programs effectively, based on the following four principles (how to approach implementing these is covered in Feature 7):

- Accept the links between security and development outcomes.
- Base fiduciary processes on the real world in fragile and violence-affected situations: insecurity, lack of competitive markets, and weak institutions.
- Balance the risks of action with the risks of inaction.
- Expect a degree of failure in programs that require innovation and engagement with weak institutions in risky environments, and adapt accordingly.

Donor risk management also relies primarily on headquarters controls rather than “best-fit” delivery mechanisms adapted to local conditions. This approach may manage donor risk, but it constrains real progress in institution-building on the ground. An alternative is to embrace faster engagement through national institutions, but vary the ways aid is delivered to manage risks and results. Some donors have a higher risk tolerance and will be able to choose modes that go more directly through national budgets and institutions; others will need greater oversight or nonstate involvement in delivery.

Three complementary options:

- Vary the oversight and delivery mechanisms when engaging through national institutions. Oversight mechanisms to adapt to risk include shifting from budget support to “tracked” expenditure through government systems, and from regular reporting and internal control mechanisms to independent financial monitoring agents, independent monitoring of complaints, and independent technical agents. Variations in delivery mechanisms include community structures, civil society, the private sector, the UN, and other international executing agencies in delivering programs jointly with state institutions.
- In situations of more extreme risk, where donors would normally disengage, have executive capacity supplement national control systems, as with “dual key” mechanisms, where international line manage-
Quick action? Ghana helps restore electricity in Liberia

Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, President of Liberia; WDR Advisory Council Member

After the 2005 election in Liberia, the new government announced a 100-day plan that included the restoration of electricity to certain areas of the capital to help restore confidence in the state and jumpstart recovery in economic activities and basic services. With ECOWAS support, the Liberian government approached various donors to help, since the new government lacked resources and institutional capacity for implementation. None of the traditional donors, which included the United Nations, the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the European Union, and USAID, were able to provide the generators needed for this endeavor within the desired timeframe under their regular systems. The Liberian government was eventually successful in securing help from the Government of Ghana, which provided two generators that helped restore electricity in some urban areas.

The Liberian experience points to two key lessons. First is the need for early consultation between national governments and international partners on realism in delivering quick results and demonstrating progress to local populations. Second is the challenge of rigidities in donor systems unable to provide particular types of assistance fast. In fact, the EU, USAID, and the World Bank were able to provide other types of support (fuel, transmission line restoration) for the electricity system within the 100 days, but none of the donors were able to cover the specific need for generators. Indeed, there is a need to rethink existing policies and processes, to modify what I call procedural conformism for countries in crisis situations.

WDR Note: Options for applying the WDR principles for internal agency reform in different contexts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accepting the links between security and development outcomes</th>
<th>Economic and social interventions in situations of insecurity can justifiably be designed to contribute to citizen security and justice outcomes (in the Liberia electricity program above, an increase in citizen trust in government would have been an appropriate measure of program success, rather than the sustainability of the electricity provision). Security programs can also be designed to contribute to development outcomes (an increase in trade, for example). This would require agencies to use outcome measure outside their traditional “technical” domains and work together within the combined program frameworks described above.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Base budget and fiduciary processes on the real world: insecurity, lack of perfectly competitive markets, and weak institutions</td>
<td>When insecurity is high, both the costs and benefits of interventions may change dramatically over a short period. This argues for greater flexibility in administrative budget and staff planning. In program budgets, it implies careful sequencing wherein some programs will be more beneficial at a later date, but also placing high weight on speed (over some cost-efficiency and quality concerns) in contracting where benefits to fast action are high. Where competitive markets are very thin and not transparent, different procurement controls—such as pre-tendering internationally under variable quantity contracts, or contracting processes that allow direct negotiations with knowledge of regional markets—can be appropriate. Where institutional capacity is insufficient, procedures need to be distilled to the simplest level of due process, together with flexible mechanisms to execute some activities on behalf of recipient institutions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Balance risks of action with risks of inaction</td>
<td>Outside the realm of natural disasters, international actors often tend to be more sensitive to the risk that their support will backfire into criticisms of wastage or abuses than to the risk that delays in their support will increase the potential for violence or derail promising reform efforts. Decentralizing greater responsibility and accountability to international staff on the ground can increase responsiveness to the risks of inaction. Transparent publication of achievements against target timelines for donor funds release and activities—and reasons for delays—would also help.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Expect a degree of failure in programs in risky environments, and adapt accordingly</td>
<td>Because returns to successful programs are high, international assistance can afford a higher failure rate in violent situations. This is not how most assistance works, however: donors expect the same degree of success in risky environments as in secure ones. A better approach is to adapt private-sector principles for venture capital investment to support for fragile and violence-affected situations: pilot many different types of approaches to see which work best; accept a higher failure rate; evaluate rigorously and adapt quickly; and scale up approaches that are working.</td>
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ment capacity works alongside national actors and agency processes governed by joint national and international boards. Not all governments will wish to take up these options. Where they do not, using local personnel and community structures for delivering humanitarian, economic, and social programs still maintains some focus on local institutional capacity, mitigating the brain-drain of local skills overseas.

• Increase the contingencies in budgets, under transparent planning assumptions. Where governance is volatile, development program budgets, as well as the budgets for political and peacekeeping missions, would benefit from greater contingency measures so that activities and delivery mechanisms can be adjusted when new risks and opportunities emerge without disrupting overall support. The planning assumptions for such contingencies—for example, that additional oversight mechanisms will be adopted if certain agreed measures of governance deteriorate—should be transparent to both recipient governments and the governing bodies of international agencies.

To achieve results at scale, pooling funds in multidonor trust funds is also an effective option, since it provides recipient governments with larger single programs and international partners with a way to support programs that greatly exceed their own national contribution. It can also be an effective way to pool risks, shifting the burden of responsibility for risks of waste, abuse, or corruption from the shoulders of each individual donor to the multilateral system. Multidonor trust funds have delivered excellent results in some situations—funding, for example, a range of high-impact programs in Afghanistan through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) and the Law and Order Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), supporting essential start-up and system maintenance costs for the nascent Palestinian Authority under the Holst Fund in the mid-1990s in West Bank Gaza, or serving as catalytic funding in Nepal under the auspices of the Peacebuilding Commission. But the performance of multidonor trust funds is mixed, with criticisms ranging from slowness to a lack of expectation management and mixed success in working through national systems. The combined security-justice-development programs and internal agency reforms described above would help to mitigate this risk.

International agencies need to think carefully about how to lengthen the duration of assistance to meet the realities of institutional transformation over a generation without raising costs. For humanitarian programs in prolonged crises, building on existing initiatives to support local staffing, local purchases, and community-based delivery can increase the impact on institution-building and lower unit costs. For peacekeeping, there is potential for greater use of more flexible arrangements, including over-the-horizon security guarantees, where external forces outside the country either supplement forces on the ground during tense periods or extend the leverage of external peacekeeping after missions are drawn down—as suggested in inputs to this Report from the AU and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Better resourcing for mediation and diplomatic facilitation is also an easy win, since it is low cost and can reduce the probabilities of conflict.

For development agencies, reducing the volatility of flows to programs delivering results in citizen security, justice, and jobs—or simply preserving social cohesion and human and institutional capacity—can increase impact without increasing the overall cost. As already described, volatility greatly reduces aid effectiveness, and it is twice as high for fragile and conflict-affected countries as for other developing countries, despite their greater need for persistence in building social and state institutions. There are options for reducing volatility, including providing threshold amounts of aid based on appropriate modalities (as described by Advisory Council member Paul Collier in chapter 9), topping up aid allocations to the most fragile states when specific types of programs have demon-
Actions alone are constrained in these circumstances, and competition between gangs and cartels produces high levels of violence in production and transit countries. Exploring the costs and benefits of different combinations of demand- and supply-side measures would be a first step to underpinning more decisive demand-side actions.

Following the money—tracking illicit financial flows—is at the heart of action against the illegal trafficking of drugs and natural resources. For areas seriously affected by illegal trafficking and corruption, such as Central America and West Africa, most countries have nothing approaching the national capacity needed to gather and process information on sophisticated financial transactions, or to investigate and prosecute offenders. Along with initiatives that help to support a global community to address corruption issues, such as the International Corruption Hunter’s Alliance and the Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (STAR), the following two key measures could help in this effort:

• Strengthen the capacity to conduct strategic analysis of these flows in a critical mass of countries with the majority of global financial transfers. About 15 major financial markets and hubs play this role. Concerted efforts to strengthen the openness of financial centers and financial intelligence unit capacities, as well as to proactively analyze suspicious flows, and exchange information could greatly increase the global ability to detect illicit financial flows and to recover stolen assets. Global financial institutions could also perform strategic analysis and make it available to affected countries. To respect privacy, this could be based on shifts in aggregate flows rather than individual account information.

• Expand commitments from developed states and financial centers to joint investigations with law enforcement authorities in fragile and violence-affected countries. As part of this commitment, they could also undertake capacity-building programs with law enforcement authorities in fragile

Track 3: Acting regionally and globally to reduce external stresses on fragile states

Effective action against illegal trafficking requires co-responsibility by producing and consuming countries. To stem the far-reaching impact of illegal trafficking, it must be recognized that effective action by one country alone will simply push the problem to other countries, and that regional and global approaches are needed. For trafficking where the supply, processing, or retail markets are concentrated and easily monitored—such as diamond trafficking—interdiction efforts combined with multistakeholder producer and consumer campaigns can be effective. In addition to the Kimberley Process for diamonds and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, the new Natural Resource Charter and a recent World Bank/UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)/Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) initiative on standards for international land purchases have similar potential. For drug trafficking, the situation is complicated by highly fragmented illegal production sites and processing facilities. Supply-side and interdiction
states—as with the U.K.-Nigeria and U.S.-Haiti examples above.\textsuperscript{96}

Regional action can also target positive opportunities. Donors could increase their financial and technical support for cross-border and regional infrastructure—and various forms of regional administrative and economic cooperation—giving priority to violence-affected regions. Such support could take the following forms:

- **Cross-border development programming.**
  International actors could support more closely opportunities for cross-border activities that integrate action on citizen security, justice, and jobs. Even where regional or cross-border political collaboration is less well established, international support for cross-border programming may still be able to support and respond to bilateral government efforts, using development issues such as trade and transit infrastructure or cross-border health programs to support a gradual increase in trust. Special financial provision for access of fragile landlocked regions to markets, as has recently been agreed upon by the World Bank’s governing structures, is another way to encourage developmental cooperation across borders.

- **Shared regional administrative capacity.**
  Pooling subregional administrative capacities can allow states to develop institutional capabilities they could not manage on their own. There are already good examples of shared courts in the Caribbean and shared central banking capacity in West Africa.\textsuperscript{97} While these initiatives take time to establish, they supplement difficult national institutional transformations and merit assistance from regional and international development institutions.

Rather than these somewhat incremental approaches to specific cross-border initiatives, international donors could take a larger step to finance regional approaches. The principle of such an initiative would be to build on the local political knowledge and legitimacy of regional institutions, in combination with the technical and financial capacity of global agencies. Delivered through regional institutions in collaboration with global agencies, such an effort could adapt lessons from those initiatives that have already successfully pooled regional capacity. It could also draw lessons from existing cross-border cooperation, such as the Greater Mekong subregion,\textsuperscript{98} West Africa’s initiatives on trafficking and economic integration,\textsuperscript{99} and the European Union’s programs\textsuperscript{100} for previously conflict-affected border regions. It would support political initiatives of regional institutions (such as the African Union’s Border Program\textsuperscript{101} and ASEAN’s subregional initiatives),\textsuperscript{102} with financial and technical expertise from global partners.

Further research is also needed to track the impacts of climate change on weather, land availability and food prices, each of which can impact in turn on conflict risk. Current research does not suggest that climate change itself will drive conflict, except perhaps where rapidly deteriorating water availability cuts across existing tensions and weak institutions. But a series of inter-linked problems—changing global patterns of consumption of energy and scarce resources, increasing demand for food imports (which draw on land, water and energy inputs), and the repurposing of land for climate adaptation—are increasing pressures on fragile states. These warrant further research and policy attention.

**Track 4: Marshaling support from lower-, middle-, and higher-income countries and global and regional institutions, to reflect the changing landscape of international policy and assistance**

The landscape of international assistance in fragile and violence-affected countries has changed in the last 20 years, with more aid and policy input from middle-income countries with a history of solidarity support. Several regional institutions are also playing
a greater role in security and development issues. Yet, discussions of global conflict and violence, the norms of responsible leadership to respond to it, and the shape of international assistance have been driven more by northern than southern actors. The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding has been created to help address this deficit.

The WDR team conducted wide-ranging consultations with violence-affected countries, regional policy makers, and regional institutions, as well as with traditional donor partners. It found many areas of agreement—such as the focus on institution-building and governance and on citizen security, justice, and jobs—but also some areas of difference. As described earlier, these differences included what it is realistic to expect in terms of responsible national leadership in improving governance, and over what time period, and over the “forms” versus the “functions” of good governance. Perceived double standards were also criticized by WDR interlocutors, who reflected a sentiment that donor countries and organizations that have faced their own internal governance challenges could approach shortcomings in fragile developing states with more humility. Developed countries are not immune to corruption, bribery, human rights abuses, or failures to account adequately for public finances. So effective implementation of standards of good governance is also a challenge in advanced countries, even more so when the international community has played an executive government or security role in violence-affected areas.

Lack of concerted support for the norms of responsible leadership is a concern, because progress in global norms is crucial for reducing the risk of violence. Regional and global standards, as well as recognition and sanction mechanisms in constitutionality, human rights, and corruption, have provided support and incentives for national reformers, particularly where the capacity of the domestic system to provide rewards and accountability is weak. For example, the Lomé Declaration in 2000, which established African standards and a regional response mechanism to unconstitutional changes in government, has been associated with a reduction in coups d’état from 15 in the 1990s to 5 in the 2000s; and, despite an increase in coups in the last five years, continental action to restore constitutional government has been consistently strong.

Some modest actions could strengthen collaboration among higher-, middle-, and lower-income countries on shared problems of violence and development, both global and local, as follows:

- **Increase both South-South and South-North exchanges.** South-South exchanges have enormous potential to provide relevant capacity and lessons in current fragile and violence-affected situations. Low- and middle-income countries that have gone through their own recent experiences of transition have much to offer to their counterparts—as demonstrated in this Report, where Latin American countries offered perspectives on urban violence prevention and security and justice reforms, China on job creation, India on local public works and democratic practices, and Southeast Asian and African countries on community driven development in conflict areas. Yet South-North exchanges are also important. While institutional capacities differ, many northern and southern countries, provinces, and cities face some similar stresses. Program approaches—such as addressing trafficking, reintegrating ex-gang members and disengaged young people, and fostering tolerance and social bonds among communities that are ethnically or religiously divided—will have lessons relevant for others. Such exchanges would increase understanding that the challenges of violence are not unique to developing countries and that developing countries are not alone in struggling to find solutions.

- **Better align international assistance behind regional governance efforts.** When
regional institutions take the initiative, as with the AU on constitutionality or ASEAN in certain conflict and natural disaster situations (Feature 8), they have great comparative advantage in traction with their member states. The potential convening role of regional institutions was also widely recognized in WDR consultations by higher-, middle-, and lower-income country interlocutors alike. Supporting regional platforms to discuss the application of governance norms is an effective way to increase ownership. Adopting clearer structures to discuss responses to major improvements or deteriorations in governance (such as coups d’états) among bilateral and multilateral actors would also improve information-sharing and the potential for coordinated responses, without creating unacceptable binding obligations on international actors.105

- **Expand initiatives to recognize responsible leadership.** While there is always a role for frank and transparent criticism, approaches from the North that are seen as disproportionately focused on criticism in fragile situations can be divisive. Initiatives such as the Ibrahim Prize for African leadership could be emulated to recognize leaders in different roles (for example, ministers who have a lasting impact on corruption or military leaders who implement successful security sector reform). Multistakeholder initiatives such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative could consider provisions to recognize individual leaders or leadership teams who have improved the transparency of resource revenues and expenditures, whether in governments, civil society, or companies.

More focused and realistic expectations of the timetables for governance improvements would also help bridge gaps in perspectives among countries receiving international assistance, their middle- and higher-income international partners, and global and regional institutions. This is particularly crucial in light of recent social protests that demonstrate strong grievances and expectations over governance change—that were not picked up by standard analyses of security and of development progress. Indicators are needed that focus on whether countries are on track to make institutional and governance improvements within the realistic generational timeframes that the faster reformers have achieved, and how citizens perceive trends in the legitimacy and performance of national institutions across the political security and development domains. The indicators presented in Feature 4 would be a simple way, as Louise Arbour suggests (Feature 8), to compare progress, stagnation or deterioration. Ensuring that such indicators measure outcomes rather than just the form of institutions (laws passed, anti-corruption commissions formed) is also important to ensure that they encourage rather than suppress innovative national action and that they foster learning among low-, middle-, and high-income country institutions. The UN Peacebuilding Commission, which brings together fragile states, donors, troop-contributing countries, and regional bodies, has unexploited potential to advise on better tracking of progress and risks, and realistic timelines for governance transformation.

At the beginning of this overview, we asked how piracy in Somalia, continuing violence in Afghanistan, new threats from drug trafficking in the Americas, or conflict arising from social protests in North Africa can happen in today’s world. The short answer is that such violence cannot be contained by short-term solutions that fail to generate the institutions capable of providing people with a stake in security, in justice, and in economic prospects. Societies cannot be transformed from the outside, and they cannot be transformed overnight. But progress is possible with consistent and concerted effort by national leaders and their international partners to strengthen the local, national, and global institutions that support citizen security, justice, and jobs.
REFLECTIONS FROM ADVISORY COUNCIL MEMBERS: 2011 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT

FEATURE 8 Regional initiatives and norms and standards

ASEAN experience in crisis prevention and recovery

Surin Pitsuwan, Secretary-General ASEAN; WDR Advisory Council Member

There are many conflicts simmering in the ASEAN landscape. But the region is not totally without its own experiences in mediation and conflict resolution. ASEAN has played an important role in endeavors. The ASEAN Troika in the Cambodian conflict of 1997–99, the Timor-Leste peace-keeping operation of 1999 onward, the Aceh Reconciliation of 2005, and the Myanmar Cyclone Nargis catastrophe of May 2008 were cases of mediation and eventual resolution where the regions and some ASEAN member states have made valuable contributions and learned lessons from the process. It has always been like putting pieces of a diplomatic jigsaw together, weaving tapestry of peace, improvising the best modality and pattern from the available and suitable materials at hand.

One important lesson for us is that our ASEAN structures can play an important political convening role when there are sensitivities with member states. There was a higher level of mutual confidence between Indonesia and of the ASEAN states participating in the Timor-Leste operation. We got around the rigid principle of “non-interference” by offering troops under a joint-command with an “ASEAN” military leader taking an active leadership role. And Indonesia made it easier for all ASEAN Partners by issuing an invitation to come and assist. In Myanmar, ASEAN played a central role in the dialogue with the Government after Cyclone Nargis, helping to open up the affected areas, where over 130,000 men, women and children had died and many more faced traumatic conditions, to international aid.

A second lesson is that we can find useful combinations of capacity between our local knowledge and political convening role, and the technical capacities of other partners. Our work in support of recovery after Cyclone Nargis was supported by technical teams from the World Bank, and performed in conjunction with the United Nations. In the Aceh Monitoring Mission, we worked jointly with colleagues from the European Union who brought valuable technical knowledge.

The third is that the more operations of this type that we undertake, the more our capacity builds. In Timor-Leste, long years of joint-military training and exercises between the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand, and supported by partners outside the region such as the US, paid off. The troops on the ground could communicate, cooperate, and conduct joint operations without any delay—but their experiences in Timor-Leste also added to their capacity. In Myanmar, ASEAN’s role meant drawing on personnel from many of our member states, such as Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand, who have extensive experience of managing post-disaster recovery, and also building capacity within our Secretariat. Linked to long-term programs of capacity-building with some of our donor partners, these experiences make us more ready to face new challenges in future. The cumulative results of these efforts in managing political conflicts and natural disaster relief have helped ASEAN in enhancing its capacity to coordinate our development cooperation strategies. We have learned to contain sporadic violence and tension in the region and would not allow them to derail our community development efforts aiming at common security and sustainable prosperity for our people.

All the recommendations of this Report have at their heart the concept of shared global risk. Risks are evolving, with new threats to stability arising from international organized crime and global economic instability. The landscape of international power relations is also changing, as low- and middle-income countries increase their share of global economic influence and their contributions to global policy thinking. This shift requires a fundamental rethink of the approaches of international actors to manage global risks collectively—and as equal partners. Real change requires a strong rationale. But a dual rationale exists: fragility and violence are major obstacles to development and are no longer confined to poor and remote areas or cityscapes. This past decade has seen the increasing penetration of instability in global life—in terrorism, an expanding drug trade, impact on commodity prices, and the rising numbers of internationally mobile refugees. Breaking cycles of repeated violence is thus a shared challenge demanding urgent action.
Reaffirming consensus on international norms and standards—the role of regional organizations

Louise Arbour, President, International Crisis Group; former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights; WDR Advisory Council Member

Whether based on universal values, such as the sanctity of human life, or on international legal rules, there are some universally accepted norms—reflected in the Charter of the United Nations and other international instruments.

These norms are not self-implementing, and, because they include the right to cultural diversity, their interpretation must reflect local, national, and regional diversity. The resistance to the exportation of “Western values” might be no more than the rejection of a foreign way of expressing a particular norm, rather than a rejection of the norm itself.

Regional institutions can bridge the distance between universal norms and local customs. Those customs or practices must conform, in substance, to the core international principles from which the international community derives its cohesion. Otherwise cultural diversity can simply override, and undermine, the international framework.

In the justice sector, for instance, uniformity of institutional models and procedures may obscure radical differences in the actual delivery of justice. But the adjudication of disputes based on principles of fairness, impartiality, transparency, integrity, compassion, and, ultimately, accountability can take many forms.

In their assistance to development, international actors must resist the exportation of form over substance and accept the regionalization of norms that enhance, rather than impede, their true universal character. In the same spirit, regional actors must translate, in a culturally relevant way, international norms and repudiate nonconforming practices.

And all must concede that the standards set by universal norms are aspirations. Measures of performance should reflect either progress, stagnation or regression, in a given country, toward a common, universal ideal.

Notes

1. The *World Development Report 2011* defines organized violence as the use or threat of physical force by groups, including state actions against other states or against civilians, civil wars, electoral violence between opposing sides, communal conflicts based on regional, ethnic, religious, or other group identities or competing economic interests, gang-based violence and organized crime, and international, nonstate, armed movements with ideological aims. Although these are also important topics for development, the WDR does not cover domestic or interpersonal violence. At times, violence or conflict are used as shorthand for organized violence, understood in these terms. Many countries address certain forms of violence, such as terrorist attacks by nonstate armed movements, as matters that are subject to their criminal laws.


3. Countries affected by fragility, conflict, and violence include those countries with: (1) homicide rates greater than 10 per 100,000 population per year; (2) major civil conflict (battle deaths greater than 1,000 per year (as defined in the from 2006 to 2009), (3) UN or regionally mandated peacebuilding or peacekeeping missions; and (4) low-income countries with institutional levels in 2006–09 (World Bank’s CPIA less than 3.2), correlated with high risks of violence and conflict. See Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Database (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005; Harbom and Wallensten 2010); UNDPKO 2010b; UNDP 2010c; World Bank 2010e.

4. For discussions of the trends in civil war onset and termination see Hewitt, Wilkenfeld, and Gurr 2010; Sambanis 2004; Elbadawi, Hegre, and Milante 2008; Collier and others 2003.

7. Bayer and Rupert 2004. While Baker and others 2002 found that the effect of conflict is equivalent to a 33 percent tariff barrier. For an updated discussion of the methodology for determining growth effects of conflict and theory and new analysis based on primary and secondary neighbors, see De Groot 2010; Murdoch and Sandler 2002.
10. Global Terrorism Database 2010; National Counter Terrorism Center 2010; WDR team calculations.
13. WDR team calculations based on Europe Brent spot price FOB (dollars per barrel) reported by the U.S. Energy Information Administration 2011.
14. UNODC 2010b.
15. UNODC 2010b.
16. Hanson 2010; Bowden 2010.
17. World Bank 2010d.
21. For an overview of costs of conflict and violence, see Skaperdas and others 2009. Specific estimates of the economic costs associated with conflict are found in Hoeffler, von Billerbeck, and Ijaz 2010; Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Cerra and Saxena 2008; Collier, Chauvet, and Hegre 2007; Rascos and Vargas 2004; UNDP 2006.
26. WDR team calculations.
27. Theories of the causes of conflict are explored in chapter 2 of the main text. Of the literature discussed there, selected recommended readings include: Gurr 1970; Hirshleifer 1995; Skaperdas 1996; Grossman 1991; Fearon 1995; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Satyanath, Miguel, and Sergenti 2004; Blattman and Miguel 2010; Keefer 2008; Besley and Persson 2009, 2010; Toft 2003; Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2007; Arson and Zartman 2005. The linkages among political, security, and economic dynamics are also recognized in the policy circle. See Zoellick 2010b.
32. For the relationship between institutional weakness and violence conflict, see Fearon 2010a, 2010b; Johnston 2010; Walter 2010.
33. In addition, there are structural and incremental factors that increase conflict risk. Among these are features of the physical terrain that make rebellion easier. These features do not cause war in the common sense of the word, they simply make it more possible. Mountainous terrain has been shown to increase risks, by increasing the feasibility of rebellion. Neighborhood matters too: there are both negative effects from proximity to other wars or countries with high rates of violent crime and illicit trafficking and positive effects from being in a neighborhood largely at peace. See Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008; Gleditsch and Ward 2000; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006;

34. McNeish 2010; Ross 2003.

35. This follows recent literature on statebuilding, notably North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009; Dobbins and others 2007; Fukuyama 2004; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001, 2005, 2006. This learning is reflected in recent policy documents as well: OECD 2010a, 2010g, 2011.

36. Institutions are defined in the WDR as the formal and informal “rules of the game,” which include formal rules, written laws, organizations, informal norms of behavior, and shared beliefs—as well as the organizational forms that exist to implement and enforce these norms (both state and non-state organizations). Institutions shape the interests, incentives, and behaviors that can facilitate violence. Unlike elite pacts, institutions are impersonal—they continue to function irrespective of the presence of particular leaders, and therefore provide greater guarantees of sustained resilience to violence. Institutions operate at all levels of society—local, national, regional, and global.


38. Arboleda 2010; WDR team consultations with government officials, civil society representatives and security personnel in Colombia, 2010.


40. A 2010 meeting of Anglophone and Francophone delegates in Kenya, convened by UNDP, coined the phrase “collaborative capacities” and further defined the institutions relevant to prevention and recovery from violence as “dynamic networks of interdependent structures, mechanisms, resources, values, and skills which, through dialogue and consultation, contribute to conflict prevention and peace-building in a society.” UN Interagency Framework for Coordination on Preventive Action 2010, 1.

41. Barron and others 2010.

42. World Bank 2010m; Buhaug and Urdal 2010.

43. See Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro 2010. Food protests data are from news reports; governance effectiveness data are from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010a.


45. For the role of institutions in economic growth and development, see Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2005. Also see Zoellick 2010b.


47. For the impact of colonialism on the development of modern-day institutions in former colonized countries, see Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001.


49. According to Margaret Levi, “Trust is, in fact, a holding word for a variety of phenomena that enable individuals to take risks in dealing with others, solve collective action problems, or act in ways that seem contrary to standard definitions of self-interest.” Furthermore, Levi notes that “At issue is a cooperative venture, which implies that the truster possesses a reasonable belief that well-placed trust will yield positive returns and is willing to act upon that belief.” Braithwaite and Levi 1998, 78.


51. The interlink between security and development has been debated under the notion of human security, which encompasses freedom from fear, freedom from want and freedom to live in dignity. By putting the security and prosperity of human beings at the center, human security addresses wide range of threats, both from poverty and from violence, and their interactions. While acknowledging the importance of human security and its emphasis on placing people at the center of focus, this Report uses the term “citizen security” more often to sharpen our focus more on freedom from physical violence and freedom from fear of violence. The hope is to complement the discussion on the aspect of freedom from fear in the human security concept. Building on the Commission on Human Security 2003 report, the importance of human security has been recognized in the UN General Assembly 2005 resolution adopted at the 2005 World Summit, the UN General Assembly 2009 report, and UN General Assembly 2010 Resolution, as well as in other fora such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, G8, and World Economic Forum. See Commission on Human Security 2003; UN General Assembly 2005b, 2009b, 2010.

52. “Confidence-building” in mediation terminology means building trust between adversaries; in a financial context, the term “confidence” denotes trust by market actors that governments are adopt-
ing sound policies and will be capable of implementing them. The WDR defines the term as building trust between groups of citizens who have been divided by violence, between citizens and the state, and between the state and other key stakeholders (neighbors, international partners, investors) whose political, behavioral, or financial support is needed to deliver a positive outcome.

53. On building trust and changing expectations, see Hoff and Stiglitz 2008.
58. UNDPKO 2010a.
59. For Japanese land reforms, see Kawagoe 1999. For Korean land reforms, see Shin 2006.
60. Braud and Grevi 2005.
61. The Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP), introduced in the run-up to the 2005 elections in Liberia, provides “dual key” authority in the areas of revenue earning and expenditure. Jointly managed by the government and the international community, it was designed specifically to reassure a skeptical population and donors that years of official looting and corruption were over and that services would be reliably delivered. Dwan and Bailey 2006; Government of the Republic of Liberia Executive Mansion 2009.
62. To combat corruption and crime, Guatemala created the International Commission against Impunity, known by its Spanish acronym, CICIG, through an agreement with the UN in 2007. Its mandate is to “support, strengthen, and assist institutions of the State of Guatemala responsible for investigating and prosecuting crimes allegedly committed in connection with the activities of illegal security forces and clandestine security organizations.” See UN 2006a.
63. For Afghanistan National Solidarity Program, see Beath and others 2010; Ashe and Parott 2001; UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and UNOHRCH 2010. For Latin American multi-sectoral violence prevention programs, see Alvarado and Abizanda 2010; Beato 2005; Fabio 2007; International Centre for the Prevention of Crime 2005; Duailibi and others 2007; Peixoto, Andrade, and Azevedo 2007; Guerrero 2006; Llorente and Rivas 2005; Formisano 2002.
64. For India, see India Ministry of Rural Development 2005, 2010. For Indonesia, see Barron 2010; Guggenheim 2011. For Kosovo, see Grygiel 2007; Institute for State Effectiveness 2007. For Rwanda, see Boudreaux 2010.
65. For Nicaragua, see Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007. For Nepal, see Ashe and Parott 2001.
66. For Liberia, see Blundell 2010. For Mozambique, see Crown Agents 2007.
67. For the Timor-Leste health programs, see Rohland and Cliffe 2002; Baird 2010.
69. Giovine and others 2010;
70. Guerrero 2006; Mason 2003; Presidencia República de Colombia 2010.
71. Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, in Fixing Failed States, analyze the issue of establishing legitimacy and closing the sovereignty gap in fragile and conflict-affected states through the lens of “double compact.” The double compact focuses on the “network of rights and obligations underpinning the state’s claim to sovereignty . . . ” and refers first to the “compact . . . between a state and its citizens . . . embedded in a coherent set of rules, and second, “between a state and the international community to ensure adherence to international norms and standards of accountability and transparency.” Ghani and Lockhart 2008, 8.
73. WDR consultation with former key negotiators from the ANC Alliance and the National Party in South Africa 2010.
74. Barron and others 2010.
75. WDR team consultation in Haiti, 2010; UNDPKO 2010a.
76. For South Africa, see Kambuwa and Wallis 2002; WDR consultation with former key negotiators from the ANC Alliance and the National Party in South Africa 2010. For Pakistan: World Bank and ADB 2010.
77. WDR team consultations with government officials, civil society representatives and security personnel in Colombia 2010.
78. These tools include UNDPA’s mediation unit; AU and other regional mediation capacity; “track II mediation,” such as the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.
82. Stewart and Brown 2007.
83. OECD-DAC 2008.
84. OECD-DAC 2010a.
85. A recent study examined the cost to countries of aid volatility, which induces volatility into government revenues and development programs. The loss in efficiency from volatility of net ODA was more than twice as high for weak states than strong states, at 2.5 versus 1.2 percent of GDP (see Kharas 2008).
86. Trafficking is intrinsically regional and global in nature, with knock-on impacts between producing, transit, and consuming countries. Colombia’s actions against drug cartels affect Central America, Mexico, and even West Africa; California’s recent policy debate on legalizing drugs potentially impacts producing countries. Similar effects happen with other commodities: restraints on logging in one country can increase demand in other countries that do not have similar policies, bringing with it increased vulnerability to corruption and violence.
87. The Kimberley Process is jointly undertaken by civil society groups, industry, and governments to stem the flow of “conflict diamonds” used to fuel rebellions in countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo. The process has its own diamond certification scheme imposing extensive requirements on its 49 members (representing 75 countries) to ensure that the rough diamonds shipped have not funded violence. See Kimberley Process Certification Scheme 2010.
88. OECD-DAC 2010a.
89. WDR team consultation with country team in Timor-Leste in 2010.
90. UNOHCHR 2006.
91. The g7+ is an “independent and autonomous forum of fragile and conflict affected countries and regions that have united to form one collective voice on the global stage.” The g7+ was established in 2008 and includes: Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Liberia, Nepal, the Solomon Islands, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, and Timor-Leste. See International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding 2010.
92. A practical example of this type of shift is Ethiopia in 2005, when government and donors agreed to move from regular budget support to a program of transfers to local and municipal governments. The program included measures to ensure that all regions of the country, irrespective of how they had voted in elections, received continuing central government support.
94. See OECD 2010i; Scanteam 2010.
96. Messick 2011.
98. The Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) countries (Cambodia, China, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam) have implemented a wide-ranging series of regional projects covering transport, power, telecommunications, environmental management, human resource development, tourism, trade, private sector investment, and agriculture. The GMS is recognized as having enhanced cross-border trade while reducing poverty levels and creating shared interests in economic stability and peace.
99. West Africa Coast Initiative (WACI) is a joint program among the UNODC, UN Office for West Africa, UN Department of Political Affairs, and INTERPOL to combat problems of illicit drug trafficking, organized crime, and drug abuse in West Africa. The initiative comprises a comprehensive set of activities targeting capacity-building, at both national and regional level, in the areas of law enforcement, forensics, border management, anti-money-laundering, and the strengthening of criminal justice institutions, contributing to peacebuilding initiatives and security sector reforms.

100. The “Euroregion” began as an innovative form of transborder cooperation (between two or more states that share a common bordering region) in the late 1950s. With the purpose of stimulating cross border economic, sociocultural and leisure cooperation, the Euroregion model grew, and was boosted through the creation of a common European market and recent democratic transitions. There are currently more than one hundred Euroregions spread across Europe, and the model has in recent times been replicated in eastern and central European territories. Cooperation has not been without problems in areas previously affected by conflict, but there are good examples of cross-border developmental, social and security programs that involve areas where ethnic minorities reside across several states or in areas that have suffered the trauma of interstate and civil war in the past. See Greta and Lewandowski 2010; Otocan 2010; Council of Europe 1995; Council of Europe and Institute of International Sociology of Gorizia 2003; Bilcik and others 2001.

101. Recognizing that insecure borders have been recurrent hosts to conflict, the African Union established the African Union Border Program in 2007 to delimit and demarcate sensitive border areas and promote cross-border cooperation and trade as a conflict prevention tool. The program consists of four components. First, it pursues both land and maritime border demarcation since less than a quarter of Africa’s borders have been formally marked and agreed, and disputes are likely to continue with future discoveries of oil. Second, it promotes cross-border cooperation to deal with itinerant criminal activities. Third, it supports cross-border peacebuilding programs. Fourth, it consolidates gains in the economic integration through the regional economic communities. Its first pilot project was launched in the Sikasso region in Mali and in Bobo Dioualasso in Burkina Faso—bringing together local, private, and public actors to strengthen cooperation. See African Union 2007a.

102. ASEAN has played an important role in mediation and conflict resolution in the Southeast Asia region. Examples include its assistance in the Cambodian conflict of 1997–99, the Timor-Leste peacekeeping operation of 1999 onward, the Aceh Reconciliation of 2005, and the Myanmese Cyclone Nargis catastrophe of May 2008.

103. WDR team calculations based on dataset in Powell and Thyne, forthcoming.

104. Of the different forms that South-South cooperation has taken, technical assistance has been the most common. Although many technical assistance projects focus on economic and social development, countries in the Global South have also developed specialized capacities in post-conflict peacebuilding. Examples include South Africa’s support to build structural capacities for public service through peer learning with Burundi, Rwanda, and Southern Sudan. Cooperation among 45 municipalities in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras helps to manage regional public goods such as water in the Tríñio region. The African Development Bank also has a specific facility for South-South cooperation in fragile states. See also OECD 2010e.

105. In the West African countries that have recently experienced coups d’état, for example, the view of the African Union was that donor support to social and poverty reduction programs should continue in these countries, but that larger-scale support should be paced to support the return to a constitutional path. In practice, donors were divided between those that suspended assistance completely and those that continued assistance with no change. WDR team consultation with officials from African Union in Addis Ababa, 2010.

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Overview


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Acknowledgments

This Report has been prepared by a core team led by Sarah Cliffe and Nigel Roberts and comprising Erik Alda, David Andersson, Kenneth Anye, Holly Benner, Natalia Cieslik, Ivan Crouzel, Markus Kostner, Daniel Maree, Nicholas Marwell, Gary Milante, Stephen Ndegwa, Nadia Selim, Pia Simonsen, Nicholas van Praag, Suranjan Weeraratne, and Nikolas Win Myint. Bruce Jones served as a Senior External Advisor to the team and made major contributions as did James Fearon, Jack Goldstone, and Lant Pritchett.

Bruce Ross-Larson was the principal editor.

World Development Report 2011 is co-sponsored by Development Economics (DEC) and the Operations Policy and Country Services (OPC). The work was conducted under the general guidance of Justin Yifu Lin in DEC and Jeffrey Gutman and Joachim von Amsberg in OPC. Caroline Anstey, Hassan Cisse, Shahrokh Fardoust, Varun Gauri, Faris Hadad-Zervos, Ann Harrison, Karla Hoff, Phillip Keefer, Anne-Marie Leroy, Rui Manuel De Almeida Coutinho, Alastair McKechnie, Vikram Raghavan, and Deborah Wetzel also provided valuable guidance. The WDR team extends a special thank you to the World Bank’s Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries Group (OPCFC) and the Global Expert Team on Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries (FCS GET) for their extensive inputs and feedback throughout the WDR development process.

An Advisory Council comprised of Madeleine Albright, Louise Arbour, Lakhdar Brahimi, Mohamed Ibn Chambas, Paul Collier, Nitin Desai, Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, Martin Griffiths, Mohamed “Mo” Ibrahim, H.E. Paul Kagame, Ramtane Lamamra, Shivshankar Menon, Louis Michel, Jorge Montaño, Jay Naidoo, Kenzo Oshima, Surin Pitsuwan, Zeid Ra’ad Al-Hussein, Marta Lucia Ramirez de Rincón, H.E. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Dmitri Trenin, Wu Jianmin, and George Yeo provided extensive and excellent advice.

World Bank President Robert B. Zoellick provided guidance and comments.

Many others inside and outside the World Bank contributed with comments and inputs. The Development Data Group contributed to the data appendix and was responsible for the Selected World Development Indicators.

The team benefitted greatly from a wide range of consultations. Meetings were held in Afghanistan, Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Lebanon, Mali, Mexico, Nepal, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Timor-Leste, the United Kingdom, the United States, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen. The team wishes to thank participants in these workshops, videoconferences, and online discussions, which included policy makers, government officials, and representatives of nongovernmental, civil society and private sector organizations.

The team would like to acknowledge the generous support of the African Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the European Union, the Government of Australia, the Government of Canada, the Government of China, the Government of Denmark, the
Government of Finland, the Government of Germany, the Government of Japan, the Government of Mexico, the Government of the Netherlands, the Government of Norway, the Government of Sweden, the Government of Switzerland, the Government of the United Kingdom, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the United Nations.

The team also wishes to acknowledge the tireless support of the WDR Production Team: Jessica Ardinoto, Nga (Ty) Lopez, Bertha Medina, Brónagh Murphy, and Jason Victor. The resource management support of Irina Sergeeva and Sonia Joseph is also much appreciated as well as the excellent production, publishing, translation, and dissemination support provided by the Office of the Publisher and GSDTR, with special thanks to Mary Fisk, Stephen McGroarty, Nancy Lammers, Santiago Pombo-Bejarano, Denise Bergeron, Janet Sasser, Cecile Jannotin, and Hector Hernaez for their contributions. Debra Naylor and Gerry Quinn provided design and graphics expertise. We also thank Ivar Cederholm, Jean-Pierre Djomalieu, Sharon Faulkner, Vivian Hon, Gytis Kanchas, Rajvinder (Dolly) Kaur, Alexander Kent, Esabel Khoury, Nacer Megherbi, Thyra Nast, Jimmy Olazo, Nadia Piffaretti, Carol Pineau, Jean Gray Ponchamni, Swati Priyadarshini, Janice Rowe-Barnwell, Merrell Tuck-Primdahl, and Constance Wilhel for their kind support to the team. Many thanks as well to Jeffrey Lecksell for expert production of map graphics. We appreciate the efforts of the World Bank's New York Office, including Dominique Bichara and Tania Meyer, as well as colleagues who assisted with WDR consultations worldwide—including those in the World Bank offices in Afghanistan, Belgium, China, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Lebanon, Mali, Mexico, Nepal, Pakistan, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sudan, Timor-Leste, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen.

Background papers for the Report are available either on the World Wide Web at www.worldbank.org/wdr2011 or through the World Development Report office. The views expressed in these papers are not necessarily those of the World Bank or of this Report.

We are grateful to persons in locations across the world who participated and provided comments. In addition, we thank bloggers and members of the public who commented on our blog: http://blogs.worldbank.org/conflict/

Despite efforts to compile a comprehensive list, some who contributed may have been inadvertently omitted. The team apologizes for any oversights and reiterates its gratitude to all who contributed to this Report.
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Saved:
- 40 trees
- 13 million Btu of total energy
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- 18,363 gallons of waste water
- 1,115 pounds of solid waste
With more than 1.5 billion people living in countries affected by conflict, the *World Development Report 2011* (WDR) looks into the changing nature of violence in the 21st century. Interstate and civil wars characterized violent conflict in the last century; more pronounced today is violence linked to local disputes, political repression, and organized crime. The Report underlines the negative impact of persistent conflict on a country’s or a region’s development prospects, and notes that no low-income, conflict-affected state has yet achieved a single Millennium Development Goal.

The risk of major violence is greatest when high levels of stress combine with weak and illegitimate national institutions. Societies are vulnerable when their institutions are unable to protect citizens from abuse, or to provide equitable access to justice and to economic opportunity. These vulnerabilities are exacerbated in countries with high youth unemployment, growing income inequality, and perceptible injustice. Externally driven events such as infiltration by foreign combatants, the presence of trafficking networks, or economic shocks add to the stresses that can provoke violence.

The *WDR 2011* draws on the experiences of countries that have successfully managed to transition away from repetitive violence, pointing to a specific need to prioritize actions that build confidence between states and citizens, and develop institutions that can provide security, justice, and jobs. Government capacity is central, but technical competence alone is insufficient: institutions and programs must be accountable to their citizens if they are to acquire legitimacy. Impunity, corruption, and human rights abuses undermine confidence between states and citizens and increase the risks of violence. Building resilient institutions occurs in multiple transitions over a generation, and does not mean converging on Western institutional models.

The *WDR 2011* draws together lessons from national reformers escaping from repetitive cycles of violence. It advocates a greater focus on continuous preventive action, balancing a sometimes excessive concentration on post-conflict reconstruction. The Report is based on new research, case studies, and extensive consultations with leaders and other actors throughout the world. It proposes a toolkit of options for addressing violence that can be adapted to local contexts, as well as new directions for international policy intended to improve support for national reformers and to tackle stresses that emanate from global or regional trends beyond any one country’s control.