WDP-45 World Bank Discussion Papers Primary School Teachers' Salaries in Sub-Saharan Africa Manuel Zymelman with Joseph DeStefano RECENT WORLD BANK DISCUSSION PAPERS No. 1. Public Enterprises in Sub-Saharan Africa. John R. Nellis No. 2. Raising School Quality in Developing Countries: What Investments Boost Learning? Bruce Fuller No. 3. A System for Evaluating the Performance of Government-Invested Enterprises in the Republic of Korea. Young C. Park No. 4. Country Commitment to Development Projects. Richard Heaver and Arturo Israel No. 5. Public Expenditure in Latin America: Effects on Poverty. Guy P. Pfeffermann No. 6. Community Participation in Development Projects: The World Bank Experience. Samuel Paul No. 7. International Financial Flows to Brazil since the Late 1960s: An Analysis of Debt Expansion and Payments Problems. Paulo Nogueira Batista, Jr. No. 8. Macroeconomic Policies, Debt Accumulation, and Adjustment in Brazil, 1965-84. Celso L. Martone No. 9. The Safe Motherhood Initiative: Proposals for Action. Barbara Herz and Anthony R. Measham LAlso available in French (9F) and Spanish T9S)] No. 10. Improving Urban Employment and Labor Productivity. Friedrich Kahnert No. 11. Divestiture in Developing Countries. Elliot Berg and Mary M. Shirley No. 12. Economic Growth and the Returns to Investment. Dennis Anderson No. 13. Institutional Development and Technical Assistance in Macroeconomic Policy Formulation: A Case Study of Togo. Sven B. Kjellstrom and Ayite-Fily d'Almeida No. 14. Managing Economic Policy Change: Institutional Dimensions. Geoffrey Lamb No. 15. Dairy Development and Milk Cooperatives: The Effects of a Dairy Project in India. George Mergos and Roger Slade No. 16. Macroeconomic Policies and Adjustment in Yugoslavia: Some Counterfactual Simulations. Fahrettin Yagci and Steven Kamin No. 17. Private Enterprise in Africa: Creating a Better Environment. Keith Marsden and Therese Belot No. 18. Rural Water SuPPlY and Sanitation: Time for a Change. Anthony A. Churchill, with the assistance of David de Ferranti, Robert Roche, Carolyn Tager, Alan A. Walters, and Anthony Yazer No. 19. The Public Revenue and Economic Policy in African Countries: An Overview of Issues and Policy Options. Dennis Anderson No. 22. Demographic Trends in China from 1950 to 1982. Kenneth Hill No. 23. Food Import Dependence in Somalia: Magnitude, Causes, and Policy Options. Y. Hossein Farzin No. 24. The Relationship of External Debt and Growth: Sudan's Experience, 1975-1984. Y. Hossein Farz-in No. 25. The Poor and the Poorest: Some Interim Findings. Michael Lipton No. 26. Road Transport Taxation in Developing Countries: The Design of User Charges and Taxes for Tunisia. David Newbery, Gordon Hughes, William D.O. Paterson, and Esra Bennathan No. 27. Trade and Industrial Policies in the Developing Countries of East Asia. Amarendra Bhattacharya and Johannes F. Linn No. 28. Agricultural Trade Protectionism in Japan: A Survey. Delbert A. Fitchett No. 29. Multisector Framework for Analysis of Stabilization and Structural Adjustment Policies: The Case of Morocco. Abel M. Mateus and others No. 30. Improving the Quality of Textbooks in China. Barbara W. Searle and Michael Mertaugh with Anthony Read ana Pnilip Cohen (Continued on the inside back cover.) 45 E z World Bank Discussion Papers Primary School Teachers' Salaries in Sub-Saharan Africa Manuel Zymelman with Joseph DeStefano The World Bank Washington, D.C. Copyright ©C 1989 The World Bank 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20433, U.S.A. All rights reserved Manufactured in the United States of America First printingJanuary 1989 Discussion Papers are not formal publications of the World Bank. 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The complete backlist of publications from the World Bank is shown in the annual Index of Publications, which contains an alphabetical title list and indexes of subjects, authors, and countries and regions; it is of value principally to libraries and institutional purchasers. The latest edition of each of these is available free of charge from Publications Sales Unit, Department F, The World Bank, 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20433, U.S.A., or from Publications, The World Bank, 66, avenue d'Iena, 75116 Paris, France. Manuel Zymelman is adviser on the economics of education in the Africa Regional Office of the World Bank; Joseph DeStefano is a research assistant. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Zymelman, Manuel. Primary school teachers salaries in Sub-Saharan Africa .' Manuel Zymelman, Joseph DeStefano. p. cm. -- (World Bank discussion papers ; 45) ISBN 0-8213-1173-5 1. Elementary school teachers--Salaries, etc.--Africa, Sub -Saharan. I. DeStefano, Joseph, 1959- . II. Title. III. Series. LB2844.A357Z96 1989 331.2 81372967--dcl9 88-35236 CIP FOREWORD The 1987 World Bank Policy Study "Education in Sub-Saharan Africa" identified the training of teachers as a major factor in determining the quality of education in primary schooling, and the salaries of teachers as a major topic of inquiry in the quest for reducing unit costs. The Study of Primary School Teacher Salaries in SSA develops further the discussion of these issues by presenting for the first time a comparative analysis of hitherto unavailable data on the training requirements, working conditions and salary structures of primary school teachers in SSA. This comparative analysis is supplemented with a general model for forecasting teacher salaries. This work is useful for decision makers in Sub-Saharan African governments, particularly planners in Ministries of Education, Planning and Finance, as well as policy analysts in academic and other institutions. It provides a statistical basis for exploring relationship of salaries to income per capita, trends in real salaries in the 1980s, and expected average salaries of teachers for the next two decades. More important, the study points to the crucial roles of the structure of salary scales, present distribution of the teaching force over the scale, and rate of growth of the education in determining future costs. We hope that the insights gained from this study and the suggested steps to facilitate the analysis of teacher salaries in SSA will increase the effectiveness of educational planning and help governments develop their own country specific solutions for dealing with the problem of reducing teacher average cost while maintaining educational quality. Hans Wyss Director Technical Department Africa Region I ' . , , . . . . I  . ..... ABSTRACT Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are trying to make their proposed goal of universal primary education a reality. Given the budgetary constraints it is natural to seek to increase efficiency and to reduce the cost of inputs. Teachers' salaries account for over ninety percent of the primary school recurrent budget. Therefore, the analysis of teachers' salaries is crucial to forecasting primary school expenditures and developing policies to rationalize teachers' cost. Until now a comparative study of teachers' salaries for SSA did not exist. The present study remedies this situation. The study analyzes factors affecting teachers' salaries in general, and describes categories of teachers, salary structures, and pay supplements in SSA countries. With the use of a computer forecasting model this study provides forecasts of teacher cost for the next two decades for 20 SSA countries under varying hypotheses, and suggests steps to facilitate planning of teacher salaries in SSA. TABLE OF CONTENT Page Nos. I. Introduction ........................................... 1 II. Factors Affecting Teachers' Salaries ................... 2 Economic Factors ................................... 2 Government Policy ................................... 3 Individual Criteria ................................ 4 Salary Scales ...................................... 7 III. Supplements to Teacher Salaries ........................ 15 Supplements Related to Work ........................ 15 Supplements Related to Welfare ...................... 16 IV. Teachers' Salaries in Sub-Saharan Africa .... ........... 19 Categories of Teachers ............................. 19 Comparison of Salary Structure ..................... 27 Supplements to Teachers' Pay ........................ 29 The Relative Value of Primary Teachers' Salaries .... 32 V. The Impact of Salary Scales in SSA in Future Costs of Primary Education ............................... 38 VI. Recommendations ....................................... 46 Appendix .................................................... 50 I. Introduction Primary education in SSA is facing an uncertain future. After a remarkable progress since independence, where enrollments increased almost five-fold and enrollment rates almost doubled - the rate of increase of enrollments can barely keep up with the growth rate of the primary school age population. As for the future, just to keep the same enrollment rates the effort would have to be gargantuan. By the turn of the century almost 40 million new student places would have to be created; another million teachers would have to be employed; recurrent expenditures would have to double. And all this, while going through a painful economic adjustment process which is required for modernization and development. Given the stricture of future educational budgets, there is no alternative but to increase resources to basic education by redistributing increases of the education budget, and by introducing measures to increase efficiency to lower unit costs. Unit costs depend not only on the utilization of inputs but also on their price. In primary schooling the most important input is the teacher (salaries of teachers account for between 90 and 95 percent of the recurrent budget in African countries). It is incumbent, therefore, to study, understand, and analyze teachers salaries in SSA, to be able to forecast primary school expenditures and develop realistic policies to minimize teachers' cost. - 2 - II. Factors Affecting Teacher's Salaries Economic Factors These are likely to be the same affecting salaries in general. Theoretically, in free societies, wages of salaries have an allocative function: salaries are offered for the services of persons as an inducement to take up or to stay in a certain occupation, while salary differentials among occupations are incentives to induce manpower shifts. Although earnings are not the only variable, if other factors are kept constant, occupations offering higher salaries will attract more and/or better qualified candidates than occupations offering lower salaries. The two most obvious economic factors affecting salaries in general are the level of national productivity and changes in the cost of living. In general t t W = W (l+m) (l+n) t 0 where: W = salary t = number of years m = rate of increase of prices n = rate of growth of productivity This formulation explains why education necessarily becomes more expensive even for providing education of a constant quality and in the absence of price inflation. If teachers salaries are held constant while other wage earners increase their earnings because of increased productivity the quality of teaching would deteriorate, since in the long run the best teachers or candidates for the teaching profession would shift to other occupations. If teaching is to claim well-qualified teachers, the profession will have to be made as attractive as other comparable professional or semi-professional occupations. While factors affecting teachers' salaries are largely economic in nature, there are also some social and political factors exerting strong pressures. For example, the fact that teachers are also public employees means that other government objectives may conflict with the allocation of resources to education; in some cases where teachers form the bulk of public and urban employment, they can exert considerable political pressure; in other instances, the legal prohibition to strike may mitigate against salary raises. Social and cultural traits that confer higher social status to teachers may make teaching at lower salaries more attractive, demographic pressures and attempts to lower student/teacher ratios may intensify teacher shortage and spur higher salaries. Government Policy. Theoretically, salary scales (schedules) for the teaching profession should be used to ensure that an individual teacher's remuneration is commensurate with his/her level of qualification and professional responsibility and to guarantee the individual a reasonable career prospect. Teachers in SSA are mostly government employees. Salary scales for teachers are either part of the overall pay scheme for public functionaries or specific to the teaching profession. In the former case teachers are assigned a grade within the normal government employee ranks and paid a salary equivalent to their equally qualified civil servant counterpart. Where teachers pay scales exist apart from other government employees, their salaries can be established and updated separately. However, in practice, adjustments to teacher salary scales are based on, and often made at the same time as, adjustments to all civil servant salaries. In SSA the decision to regulate teacher salaries is most often made unilaterally by the government without consultation of or participation by representatives of teachers. In many SSA countries teacher unions exist. However, collective bargaining is rarely used as a means of setting teachers salaries. It is more likely that unions exert political pressure on the government with the expectation of influencing its decisions. Individual Criteria A teaching pay structure is a pre-determined succession of salary levels corresponding to different categories within the teaching profession. The placement of each individual in the appropriate category and step of the corresponding salary scale (schedule) depends on the characteristics of that teacher as compared to pre-determined criteria. The criteria used throughout Sub-Sahara Africa include the following: the level of qualification of the candidate, the degree of responsibility associated with his assignment, and the amount of experience. In some countries, professional performance also plays a role in determining a teachers's subsequent advancement within the salary scale. Level of Qualification The primary determinant of the category to which a teacher is assigned (and therefore his/her salary and career -5- prospects) is the level of academic qualification. Included within the individual's qualifications are the years of general and specialized education as well as any professional training received. Categories exist in most countries for teachers who have completed primary, junior secondary, or senior secondary levels of education. Distinctions are also made between teachers having received no specialized pedagogical training and those who have received varying degrees of training (as part of their secondary education or in addition to it). Also, the majority of countries differentiate between certified and uncertified teachers. This division is usually based on completion of specialized training and success in a state examination. Interestingly, though minimum standards exist for primary teacher qualifications (in most countries at least a junior secondary certificate in pedagogy), because of shortages of qualified personnel in some countries, categories for non-qualified teachers have been added to the salary scales. Salaries and career opportunities within the different categories are directly related to the level of qualification. A teacher entering the profession is placed in a salary scale (category) matching his/her qualifications and will remain in that scale category for the entire career. However, it is possible to pass from one scale to another by obtaining the qualification required to enter the higher category. Responsibility. The other factor determining the salary scale grade on which a teacher is placed is the degree of responsibility assumed - 6 - in the post. This includes different levels of responsibility as a teacher (e.g. teaching different subject areas or being named a head teacher), acquiring responsibilities in addition to teaching (e.g. supervisory or administrative in nature), or moving from a teaching role to an administrative position. Often different scales exist that correspond to different degrees of responsibility associated with a variety of teaching or administrative assignments. In general, salaries in those scales directly reflect the nature of the responsibility assumed by a teacher in the corresponding position. For example, administrative posts are higher paid than teaching posts. Experience While qualifications and responsibility determine the salary scale into which a teacher is placed, it is primarily years of experience in the field that permit the teacher to advance within that scale during the course of his/her career. Assuming that experience in the profession improves the quality of a teacher, (see page 13) some incremental advance is afforded all teachers for their years of service. Even systems in which advancement is based on merit (see below) a minimum increment is guaranteed to teachers receiving a satisfactory evaluation. The amount of time required to remain at a given step within the salary scale before advancing to the next, and the size of the salary increments vary from country to country. Automatic promotion from one step to the next is common. Performance The other criterion determining the level a teacher attains within a given salary scale grade is his/her professional - 7 - performance. In all countries teachers are evaluated at least on an annual basis. In countries where advancement on the salary scale is based on merit, this evaluation determines salary for the next year. Minimum standards of performance exist across Sub-Saharan Africa, and provisions are also made for penalizing teachers evaluated below those standards. This usually involves denial of a salary increment. In summary, the government establishes and regulates the structure of teacher salary scales in relation to other public employees (either directly or indirectly). The individual factors discussed above allow as much as possible an objective placement of teachers on the corresponding salary scale. Salary Scales A salary schedule is a statement of policy on remuneration by which the salary of any teacher is determined in accordance with his/her qualifications. The qualifications usually used are: professional and academic preparation and experience. Other qualifications could be sex, marital status, number of dependents, grade level taught, etc. The most widely used teacher salary schedule is the unified or single salary schedule. The Unified Salary Schedule. It is generally held that pay should be determined by the value of work performed. However, in education, it is difficult to determine the"output" and to specify the contribution to the "output" of an individual teacher. Training and experience, both easily determined, are used, therefore, as proxies. - 8 - The typical unified salary schedule is two-dimensional: training level and experience (see Table 1). TABLE 1 Training Levels 1 2 n Experience Steps Years 1 0 S11 S21 ---- Sni 2 1 S12 S22 ---- Sn2 3 2 M (M-1) S1 S2m -nm- Sil is the port of entry salary of a teacher with a degree of level one. Sml is the maximum salary of a teacher with a level one degree. Smn is the maximum salary of a teacher with a level n degree. The cost for each level of training is m Z S.. x N.. i = 1 1 j Where N = number of teacher of type j in step i The cost for all the staff is m m T \ ~~~~S.. x N. / / 1~~~~~j ij i=l j =1 An "index" schedule is a salary schedule in which the minimum and maximum salary and the annual steps as well as the relationships between levels of training, are stated in terms of ratios to the basic salary rather than in monetary amounts (Table 2). -9- TABLE 2 Training Levels 1 2 ---- n Experience Steps Years 1 0 1 1.2 ---- 1.6 2 1 1.1 1.3 ---- 1.8 3 2 1.2 1.5 2.0 4 3 M (M-1) 2.0 2.4 3.0 The relationships between training levels, between minimum and maximum levels, and between increments among the steps are all policy variables that can be used to attract and retain qualified teachers, to encourage professional growth and, within constraints, to minimize costs. In theory,ll the starting salary of a teacher with minimum degree qualifications (S,j) should be that of an individual with similar level of qualification that had entered some other area of employment where 1/ The entry salary could be different if the time profile of earnings is also different. In this case, only the present value should be equal. n n P.V. = St/(l+r) t t=l t=l P.V. = present value S = salary of teacher at time t S = salary of other occupation at time t r = interest rate - 10 - economic advancement is similar to that of a teacher, (disregarding, of course, non-pecuniary benefits of both jobs). Similarly, the differential of salaries between levels of training can be calculated by assuming the extra cost of attaining a higher level of training, including the opportunity cost of working and advancing in the scale ladder. 1/ The determination of maximum salaries, the annual increment for experience, the rhythm of these increases, in theory, should depend on the impact of experience on efficiency. If we accept the assumption of a relation between years of experience and efficiency, the problem is to determine the nature of this relationship. Again, theoretically, we can assume three plausible types of functions relating experience to efficiency. 1/ The differential can be considered as an annuity received over the employment life of the teacher, and should be equal to the foregone earnings and cost of further training. [r1 11g C = A (l+r) r Where C = opportunity cost of further training A = annuity r = interest rate n = number of working years. - 11 - TOTAL AND MARGINAL EFFICIENCY OF TEACHING Efficiency Marginal Efficiency Years Years Efficiency Marginal Efficiency II Years I Years Efficiency Marginal Efflciency Years Years World Bank-43483:1 - 12 - In the first case, teachers's effectiveness increases slowly at first, then it accelerates and later on the rate decreases to become zero (presumably at the time the salary reaches a maximum). In the second case, experience increases at a decreasing rate i.e. the first year gains in experience are the largest. In the third case, the increases in effectiveness is constant up to the maximum and then ceases altogether. The economic implications for the budget of each of these assumptions is different and depends very much on the age distribution of the teaching force. If the purpose is to minimize costs in the short run, and the bulk of the teaching force is young, then the application of assumption I is the most productive. If most teachers are older, assumption II might be more useful. The maximum/minimum ration and the differential between categories can also be adjusted for specific purposes. We can affect costs if we can decrease the maximum/minimum ratio by either increasing the minimum or increasing the minimum faster than the maximum or if we reduce differentials among different types of training. Another way of compressing the salary scale is to provide an "across-the-board" increase. M + X M N + X N M = maximum salary N = minimum salary X = increment Besides structuring the salary scale to accommodate the budget, it is possible to adjust the scale to attract better candidates to the - 13 - teaching profession, to encourage teachers to improve their performance, and attract teachers into subject areas where there is excess demand over supply, for example science and mathematics teaching. For these purposes, other pay systems can be instituted: the "merit rating system," the "subject differential" scale, and the 'differentiated" pay scale. In the "merit system,' the allocation of salaries is on the basis of difference of performance. Sometimes it means that supplements are added to the unified scale for better than average performance. The basic assumption is that higher pay is an incentive to increase effort and performance. In the "subject-differential" pay scale, there are additional steps to compensate or attract teachers with backgrounds in fields where there are severe shortages. In this case, there are three factors determining salary: education, experience and subject matter. The "differentiated pay scale" supplies flexibility in the salary structure by providing schedule supplements attached to specialized duties such as administrative positions or special teaching posts, supervisors, and team leaders, including special salaries levels for interns, less than full fledged teachers, etc. Each of these systems has advantages and disadvantages. The "unified" or "single" salary schedule is simple and administratively easy to implement. It makes it easy to calculate the budget; teachers feel secure with it. But at the same time, it ignores supply and demand - 14 - conditions in specific subject areas, in individual performance, and concentrates only on the individual's education and experience. The "merit system' overcomes the latter objections, but only in theory, because evaluation of performance is largely subjective and unreliable. There is the danger that arbitrary judgements of supervisors may lead to favoritism and low morale. Teachers usually feel that higher salaries will go to those that conform to the supervisors wishes rather than to those that may be doing an outstanding job. The "subject differential" salary scale, while solving the problem of scarcities, may imperil teachers' morale and hence effectiveness, by creating different "types' of teachers. It may create administrative problems when the scarcity is over. The "differentiated" salary scale is attractive for creating new career patterns and for adjusting to new educational technologies and division of labor. But this type of remuneration scale requires a re- examination of educational objectives, criteria of effectiveness and the role of the teacher. The implementation of this system is also very complex since it requires restructuring of the whole system and redefinition of traditional roles. Salary incentives are fundamental, but not only variables affecting the attractiveness of the teaching profession. The establishment of better working conditions, the attractiveness of the working place, the adequacy of materials and equipment, higher status, participation in - 15 - decision making, etc. are important means for recruiting and retaining good staff. III. Supplements to Teacher Salaries In addition to a base salary determined by the application of the above explained scales, teachers receive various supplemental payments. These additional benefits could include a wide variety of allowances and, in some cases, the accumulated effect of several of these indemnities adds substantially to the gross expenditure of a teachers's remuneration (up to 30Z in some SSA countries). The following discussion explains the different types of benefits commonly received by teachers in Sub-Saharan Africa. Supplements Related to Work Where teacher salary scales are incorporated into the civil service pay scales and they receive an established percentage differential above the same grade and level of civil servants, that differential is considered a professional supplement. This offers a means to adjust the remuneration of teachers without altering the basic government scales. It is also a statement that teachers have a higher professional status than equally qualified (i.e. educated) civil servants. A teachers's basic duties consist of a required number of classroom hours of teaching and the ancillary activities associated with that work: preparation of lessons, correction of exercises, etc. In addition, teachers may perform a few hours of administrative work per week as a regular part of their job. An established regulation usually denotes - 16 - the minimum and maximum number of hours of teaching and/or administrative work teachers are expected to engage in. In some instances, responsibilities assumed beyond the statutory standards are compensated by supplemental payments. For example, teachers working extra hours could receive overtime premiums, or those performing supervisory or administrative tasks in addition to their normal classroom work would receive a responsibility supplement. However, it is more often the case that different salary scale grades exist for the different levels of responsibility in the school system. Teachers may also be compensated for any non-teaching activities they undertake (e.g. coaching, counseling), though extracurricular activities are usually performed on a voluntary basis. Supplements Related to Welfare In most Sub-Saharan countries educational authorities are faced with problems of staffing schools in remote rural areas. Residential allowances are usually paid to teachers hired to work in these regions. Regions of a country that are difficult to get to, and areas that lack commercial facilities and general government services and have no amenities such as running water or electricity present genuine hardships to inhabitants not originally from the area. Teacher can only be attracted to accept posting in these more isolated areas by the offer of a wage differential that would compensate for the above described conditions. As in most government jobs, teaching involves accepting the post to which you are assigned and being subject to transfers after a fixed - 17 - number of years in one location. Perhaps because of this, a housing indemnity is offered in almost all SSA countries. In some cases the government guarantees and supplies teachers housing. In other countries, or where it is not possible to directly provide a dwelling, the government supplements teachers' monthly salaries with an allowance to either cover rent or permit the purchase of a house. In addition to helping ensure housing for teachers, the government usually covers any travel expenses incurred through or for work. For example, travel to and from a new post is paid for as are any official trips, travel to obtain services, and, in some cases, vacation trips to a designated home region. Family allowances are a standard component of teacher remuneration. All of the countries surveyed provide indemnities for married teachers and for dependent children. The amount of the monthly supplement usually depends on the number of children, and in some instances the sex of the parent (In Zaire women are paid a lower family allowance than men). Theoretically, the support per child can increase, stay the same, or decrease with the number of children depending on the assumption about the marginal burden of a child. But in practice it is more determined by the availability of budgetary resources. When teachers or their families suffer from illness, the government in all countries intervenes to either cover medical expenses and/or provide sick leave. Either medical treatment is provided free of charge to teachers and their dependents at state hospitals, or the - 18 - government reimburses all or a designated percentage (e.g. 80Z) of the cost of treatment in a private facility. Sick leave with pay is normally permitted for a set time period ( 3 to 6 months) and additional leave at half pay (3 to 6 months also) would follow that initial period if more time off was necessary. Beyond the established limit of sick leave, if a teacher continued to be absent for medical reasons, it would be without pay. Maternity leave is available everywhere and usually ranges from 12 to 14 weeks with some time off allowed before giving birth and some designated for afterwards. This leave is provided at full pay or, at least, at half pay. As discussed in a previous section, passage from one salary grade to another usually calls for the successful completion of the qualifications that the higher grade requires. In an effort to encourage teachers to upgrade their qualifications, some countries provide a study allowance to teachers continuing their education. This allowance can take the form of free tuition, a scholarship to cover tuition and/or room and board, or the payment of all or part of a teacher's salary while she is in school or participating in in-service training. Supplementary payments are established as either absolute fixed amounts or a given percentage of a base salary. An absolute allowance usually takes the form of a determined monthly allotment. The size of the allotment is determined by a teacher's place on the salary scale - teachers in the higher grades receiving the larger monthly payments. If the monthly - 19 - allowance is established as a percentage of the teachers earnings, then automatically higher grades and higher steps on the salary scale would receive larger allowances. IV. Teachers Salaries in Sub-Saharan Africa Categories of Teachers The most important determinant of a teacher's salary is the category assigned on entering the profession. In SSA these categories are numerous and vary from country to country. However, in general there are some common elements: the required qualifications, education, and teacher training, and the corresponding categories. There are two basic systems of teacher training in SSA. In one system (secondary level training) the training of teachers takes place in teachers' colleges or 'normal' schools. These are specialized secondary schools emphasizing a concentration in teacher training which students attend either directly after completing primary education or after a preliminary cycle of lower secondary schooling. Teacher training colleges provide the students with a general secondary education and the necessary training in subjects related to education (e.g. psychology, pedagogy, methodology, etc.). A teacher training curriculum also includes a cycle of practice teaching, the completion of which is a prerequisite for certification as a qualified primary school teacher. In this kind of system, teacher certification is equivalent to a high school diploma. In the other system, primary teacher training is not part of general secondary education. In this type of system prospective teachers complete either a - 20 - junior or senior secondary cycle of schooling and only then enter pedagogical training. The training takes place in teacher training institutes which usually function separately from the university system. No country requires a university level degree or training for primary teacher certification, however the training received in teacher training institutes can be considered in many cases post secondary education. Teaching certification is obtained in addition to a secondary school diploma. In either system, the highest salary scale corresponds to the highest level of qualification. For example, in many West African countries using post-secondary training the category "Instituteur" contains teachers having completed lower or upper secondary schooling (brevet or baccalaureate) and the required number of years of additional teacher training. In most anglophone countries using the British system of education, the highest category is composed of teachers with an upper secondary ("O" level) diploma plus teacher training. Lower categories contain teachers who have either less training, less education, or both. In some countries a single category contains teachers who have obtained their qualification through different means. For example, in Togo an "instituteur" (category 3) has either a lower secondary diploma (brevet) and 3 years of training or a higher secondary Certificate (Baccalaureate) and 2 years of experience. Both types of instituteurs however must succeed at a professional examination in order to be certified. Some examples may help to illustrate how different categories are determined. - 21 - In-Mali, "Maitres deuxieme cycle", some of whom teach primary school, have completed lower secondary and four years of teacher training while "Maitres de premier cycle" have completed lower secondary and only two years of teacher training. In Ghana, "Certificate A" teachers are divided into two categories: those who have completed upper secondary ("o" level - eleven years general education) and 3 years of teacher training and those who have completed lower secondary (ten years general education) and four years of training. All Kenyan qualified teachers have had two years of training. In this case the different categories correspond to completed upper secondary, completed lower secondary, and completed primary. In Zambia a classification is based not only on the requisite number of years of education but also on whether an examination at the end of the cycle has been successfully taken. Upper secondary leavers with two years of training are divided into two categories, those with a state diploma and those without. Teachers not holding a diploma are placed in the same grade as lower secondary leavers with teacher training. The following table presents the various levels of education and training required for one or more categories of teachers in 36 countries. The total number of years of pre-service education and training (TOTAL YRS EDUC) is given and then broken down into the highest completed cycle of general education (HIGHEST GEN ED and GEN) and the amount of teacher training (TCH TRGN). Where a single category is given (denoted by H) it corresponds to the highest qualified category of primary teachers. In countries showing more than one category, the grades are numbered from lower to higher qualification. - 22 - TABLE 3 EDUCATION AND TRAINING OF PRIMARY TEACHERS BY COUNTRY AND CATEGORY TCH TOTAL HIGHEST TCH TOTAL HIGHEST COUNTRY CATEGORY YRS EDUC GEN ED GEN + TCH TRNG COUNTRY CATEGORY YRS EDUC GEN ED GEN + TCH TRNG BENIN H 11 LS 10 1 GHANA 1 10 LS 10 0 1 2 11 US "O" 11 0 C.A.R. 1 14 US 13 1 3 14 LS 10 4 2 15 US 13 *2 4 14 US "O" 11 3 3 15 US 13 2 GUINEA-BIS H 12 P 9 3 CONGO 1 11 LS 10 1 2 13 LS 10 3 |LIBERIA H 12 LS 9 3 3 14 US 13 1 3 NIGERIA 1 11 P/LS 6/9 5/3 GABON 1 12 LS 10 2 | 2 12 US "A" 12 PRACT 2 14 LS 10 4 3 14 US "O" 11 3 GUINEA H 11 LS 8 3 | SIERRA-L 1 15 US 12 3 2 15 US 12 3 R.C.I. 1 11 LS 10 1 2 13 LS 10 3 |BURKINA H 12 LS 10 2 TOGO 2 11 LS 10 1 I CAPE VERDE H 11 LS 9 2 3 13 LS 10 3 CHAD 1 12 LS 10 2 ETHIOPIA 1 13 Us 12 1 2 13 LS 10 3 2 14 US 12 2 3 16 US 12 4 jGAMBIA H 13 US "0" 11 2 KENYA i <10 p < 8 2 KMALI 1 11 LS 9 2 2 10/12 LS 8/10 2 2 13 LS 9 4 3 14 US "O" 12 *2 I 4 14 US "O" 12 2 HAURITANIA H 12 LS 9 3 MAURITIUS 1 15 US 13 2 I 2 same as cat. 1 ptus 15 yrs exp SOMALIA 1 10 P 8 2 NIGER 1 12 LS 10 2 2 13 US 12 1 2 14 LS 10 4 SUDAN 1 13 LS 9 3 SENEGAL 1 12 LS 10 2 2 13 US 12 1 2 16 US 13 3 UGANDA 1 11 P 7 4 BOTSWANA H 12 LS 10 2 2 11 LS 9 2 3 13 US 11 2 LESOTHO H 13 LS 10 3 BURUNDI H 12 LS 10 2 |MALAWI 1 5 P 5 0 2 8 P 8 0 DJIBOUTI 1 12 LS 10 2 3 12 LS 10 2 2 13 LS 10 3 4 14 US 12 2 MADAGASCAR 1 < 10 P 5 - I SWAZILAND 1 12 LS 10 2 2 10 P 5 5 f 2 14 LS 10 4 3 13 P 5 8 3 TANZANIA 1 10 p 7 3 RWANDA I < 12 P 8 - I 2 13 LS 11 2 2 12/13 P 8 4/5 3 14/15 P 8 6/7 ZAMHBIA 1 8 P 8 0 I 2 10 P 8 2 ZAIRE 1 10 LS 8 2 3 12/14 LS/US 10/*12 2 2 12 LS 8 4 4 14 US 12 2 NOTES: In the column "HIGHEST GEN ED" the abbreviations used refer to the highest completed cycLe of education and are defined as: P - primary education LS - lower secondary US - upper secondary school A" and "O" - British system advanced and ordinary Levels * indicates that teachers in the category have completed the same Level of edcuation or training as the next highest category but have not received certification. - 23 - This table shows that the most common highest category of teacher is the one which requires lower or secondary education plus professional training. This is in line with the "professionalization" of primary teaching as advocated by Unesco, but in each of the countries presented other categories below the "desired" level exist. These categories are rooted in the history of the development of education in SSA. Historically, teacher training in SSA had a low priority. In the past the need for professional training of primary school teachers was not convincingly put forward and the prevailing attitude was that any literate person could teach. It is only recently that the teaching profession has been upgraded enough to warrant specialized attention to the training of teaching professionals. Missionaries, whose primary role was the christianization and "civilization" of Africans, also served to train the teachers they would need to staff their schools. Local mission students who earned the favor of the evangelist overseer often graduated to become catechists or pupil teachers. These preferred Africans became village teachers or were chosen to continue their education. Primary school teachers were often only primary or lower secondary graduates who received on the job training. Many of the older experienced teachers today are products of mission schooling. 1/ 1/ Dove, Linda, A. Teaching and Teacher Education in Developing Countries. Croan Helen, Kent: 1986. - 24 - Missionaries who brought formal western education to the area, also introduced the western models for teacher training. The patterns observed in table 3 of a post-lower secondary training in professional institutes or the specialized normal schools, are copies of the British and French systems as transported by missionaries in the twentieth century. With independence, governments began to build up national school systems and to take over the responsibility for education and the training of teachers from the mission societies, though in many Sub-Saharan Countries mission schools still function alongside the government systems of education. In 1966, seeing the need to establish international standards in the profession, UNESCO published a Recommendation Concerning the Status of Teachers. Principles laid down in this document intended to professionalize teaching through calling for approved teacher training courses in appropriate training institutions on the post-secondary level as a basic requirement to enter the field. The 1970's witnessed a tendency to raise the level of teacher training and to adopt the ideals of the UNESCO recommendation. The presence of less trained and qualified teachers is a problem across Sub-Saharan Africa. The following table illustrates the proportion of teachers in each grade, including unqualified teachers. It also gives the average years of experience of the teachers in each category so that some assumptions can be made about the relative ages of the teachers in the different groups and the hiring practices of the different countries. TABLE 4 DISTRIBUTIONS OF PRIMARY TEACHERS BY CATEGORY OF OUALIFICATION tE RR P ;§ll2{ °l TCH AVp YRS COU*N;*RX**********tAFT A YR* BENIN unqu.tified GUINEA-BISSAU unqualified 42.55% 3 16 4 3 il (a) LIBERIA unqualified 71.00% C.A.R. unqaified 1 1 NIGERIA unquaiified 4:111 (b) EQ. GUINEA unquatified 60.00% (a) SIERRA LEONE unqualified 61.00X GUINEA unqua ifi ed M BURKINA-FASO 2 36 31 COTE D'IVOIRE 24R l CAPE VERDE unqualified 83.70% TOGO unquaAiffed CHAD unquaif ied ETHIOPIA . GAMBIA unqua ified it3R 4 11:1 142 5:5MALI 2 i6a KENYA untrained 31.l MAURITANIA unqua if ied 7 MAURI T IUS 2 "Hyl 491 NIGER unqua ified SOMALIA Un LlfiedSEGA SOMALIA ~~twl Uoary 4 lxSENEGAL unquaAified 12%85n (a) UGANDA unqualified 50.00% BURUNO I ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~(a) BOTSWANA uniquaLified 36.00% (a) LESOTHO unqualified 36.00% DJIBOUTI MALAWI un9uilifed 4 MADAGASCAR unqua ified - (a) SWAZILAND unqualified 23.00% 3 :f2l TANZANIA 2 PA RWANDA unquaified 2 1 ZAMBIA u13qu.ified I0 ZAIRE ZAMBI 4 unqualfie 2 GHANA ZIMBABWE unqualified 40.00% (a) GHANA unqualified 36.00% *************************************************************** k**************************************************************** Unauatifid is defined as.havlnl conteted less thanuooer secondary generat education Udavlifgie had no.p!otessoonao lraling .or having completed primary education and ~avnV~ on~~i~iaj voessiona trL g (a) Countries for whic l n y in ormat ion Re percentage of unqualified teachers tneP;iarytmhn _ocewas ?ava gabe nource: pi 9. a,A.g Tle%ang and Teacher Education in Developing Countries, (b) Unqualified°ene as hAving recevied no professional training - 26 - In the 33 countries for which data are available, there are 10 where the majority of the teachers are unqualified. In only three countries, Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal, and Mauritania the majority of the teachers are in the "desired" category. The average years of experience of teachers in each category provides an indication of recent hiring trends. Two distinct patterns emerge from the data. One group consists of countries in which the unqualified or least qualified categories of teachers are a minority of the teaching force and have higher average years of experience than the higher qualified teachers. This would indicate that the lower qualified category is being phased out and the system is being upgraded as new hires consist of more qualified personnel. Good examples of this are Rwanda, Togo, and Zambia. In Rwanda, the unqualified teachers, those having complete primary but an incomplete specialized secondary education, are 21.9Z of the teaching force and are, on average, two or three times as experienced as their qualified colleagues. The other group of countries show an opposite pattern of experience and distribution of teachers in the different categories. For example, Burkina-Faso has 63.69Z of its teachers in the lower qualified category and they have, on average, about a third of the experience of the higher qualified instructors. The Gambia similarly has a teaching force that is 64.53Z unqualified, and those teachers are about half as experienced as their qualified peers. This type of pattern of experience and teacher distribution would indicate that lower qualified or unqualified categories of teachers are only recent hires and that the system has been experiencing a downgrading of its teachers. These different patterns are probably the result of different rates of expansion of primary education - 27 - accompanied by a budget squeeze. For the examples cited above,the countries experiencing an upgrading - Rwanda, Zambia and Togo - had seen their numbers of teachers grow by 25Z, 27Z and 9% respectively between 1980 and 1985. The countries exhibiting a downgrading of teacher qualifications - Burkina-Faso and The Gambia - experienced a 64Z growth in their teaching force during those same years. The pressure of a rapidly expanding system and the low production of qualified teachers because of budgetary restrictions compelled these systems to hire less qualified teachers. As can be seen in Table 4, many SSA countries have significant proportions of unqualified and underqualified personnel presently in their teaching forces. Any recommendations concerning improvements in the quality of primary education in Africa must address the large numbers of untrained teachers already in the field. Comparison of Salary Structures In comparing structures of salary scales two factors should be considered: 1) ratio of maximum and minimum salaries in each category, 2) the years required to go from the minimum to the maximum. The average salary increase per year for a teacher in a given category (the slope of the salary scale) is determined by 1 and 2. To facilitate analysis all ratios are referred to a numeraire, the entry salary of the least qualified teac'hLer. Table 5 presents this information for 22 SSA countries. - 28 - TABLE 5 STRUCTURE OF SALARY SCALES BY COUNTFY RATIOS OF SALARIES TEACHER TO MIN SALARY TCH 1 YEARS PERCENT CHANCE COUNTRY CATEGORIES MIN MAX MIN TO MAX PER YEAR (SAL) ***e.ee*e*asoee*ae*aes*ste*s.aa.sse***.i.se*.e*ssasesae*es*s**ses*ae* BENIN 1 1.00 1.80 17 3.S2% 2 1.25 2.30 17 3.6SX 3 1.40 2.85 17 3.s2x C.A.R. I 1.00 1.66 18 2.87% 2 1.54 3.32 23 3.39X 3 1.88 3.98 21 3.60x GUINEA 1 1.00 1.87 27 1.91% 2 1.50 2.58 26 2.0OX COTE D'IVOIR 1 1.00 1.60 19 2.49n 2 1.83 3.41 23 2.7SX TODO 1 1.00 2.48 21 4.42% 2 2.04 3.89 23 2.8fsX 3 2. 78 6-"A 23 3.76X ETHIOPIA I 1.00 2.13 21 3.67% 2 1.19 2.42 21 3.44% 3 1.50 2.91 21 3.19x 4 1.88 3.48 21 3.02% KENYA 1 1.00 2.40 22 4.05X 2 1.64 2.87 16 3.58% 3 1.91 3.19 15 3.49X 4 2.8* 4.80 16 3.44% LAURITIUS 1 1.00 2.17 19 4.15X 2 2.17 2.57 8 2.88% SUDAN 1 1.00 3.26 29 4.16X 2 1.08 3.25 27 4.1ax BURUNDI 1 1.00 2.10 13 s.89x 2 1.60 3.21 13 S.60x DJI8OUTI 1 1.00 1.85 24 2.69% 2 1.28 2.30 24 2.48X MADAGASCAR 1. 1.00 1.46 18 2.11% 2 1.28 1.90 18 2.28% 3 1.69 2.84 18 2.92X RWANDA 1 1.00 2.88 28 3.65% 2 1.66 3.89 28 2.90X 3 2.19 5.16 28 3.10X ZAIRE I 1.00 1.81 28 2.13X 2 1.08 1.98 28 2.14X 5HANA 1 1.00 1.11 5 2.16X 2 1.14 1.34 8 2.01% 3 1.56 1.90 13 1.Sl% 4 1.70 1.90 8 1.38% NIGERIA 1 1.00 2.88 15 8.79X 2 1.13 3.05 1S 8.85% 3 1.38 3.73 1S 6.86X 4 1.81 5.10 16 7.16X SIERRA LEONE 1 1.00 1.58 2 1.07 2.06 3 -1.39 5.07 BURKINA-FASO 1 1.00 2.04 24 3.02X 2 1.21 2.32 18 3.69% GAMBIA 1 1.00 1.10 8 1.58X 2 1.67 2.88 30 1.90X MALI 1 1.00 1.53 29 1.47% 2 1.23 1.71 20 1.67X MAURITANIA 1 1.00 1.34 24 1.23% 2 1.31 1.77 24 1.28X 3 1.31 2.42 24 2.69% NIGER 1 1.00 2.08 21 3.66X 2 1.37 2.73 21 3.38% 3 2.28 4.73 21 3.6sx SENECAL 1 1.00 1.18 26 0.88% 2 1.06 1.38 21 1.23% 3 1.22 1.94 21 2.23X MALAWI 1 1.00 1.88 9 S 90% 2 1.23 2.08 9 6.03% 3 1.88 2.93 9 5.07% 4 2.28 3.40 9 4.67% ZAMBIA 1 1.12 1.12 -- -- 2 1.00 1.62 19 2.58% 3 1.48 1.87 11 2.15% 4 I.S5 2.53 17 2.88% - 29 - The countries with the smallest initial salary differentials between the highest and least qualified categories of teachers are Zaire -ratio of minimum salary of highest category to minimum salary of lowest category--(1.08), Senegal (1.22), Burkina (1.21). Djibouti (1.28), and Sierra Leone (1.39). Largest differentials of maximums of highest and lowest categories are evident in Togo (2.78), Malawi (2.28), Niger (2.28), Kenya (2.2), and Rwanda (2.19). When the slopes of higher category teachers is greater than those of lower category, the ratio of maximums between categories becomes larger. This is the case of Sierra Leone and Senegal where the ratios among the maximums of the different categories are 3.25 and 1.64 respectively. This pattern is evident in 7 of the 22 countries. When the slope is similar (in 11 of the 22 cases) the ratios among maximums remain the same as they were for the minimums. For example, for Zaire, Djibouti, and Burkina Faso the ratios of maximums are 1.04, 1.24, and 1.13 respectively. In only two cases, Rwanda and Malawi, the slopes for the higher category of teacher is lower than those of the lower category Supplements to Teachers' Pay The earlier section on supplements to teacher salaries discussed the different types of additional payments received by teachers. The salary supplements discussed here are what the earlier section referred to as supplements related to welfare, namely, housing, family, and hardship allowances. In some SSA countries primary teachers receive other allowances (e.g. for travel or study), but these types of allowances are paid only to those teachers incurring additional expenses (through work related travel or in continuing their education). It would be difficult to estimate the numbers of teachers benefitting from supplements of this * 30 - nature. Therefore the discussion in this section is limited to the kinds of allowance most teachers receive regularly. Not all SSA countries provide teachers with housing. In those countries that do, if direct monthly payments are not received to cover housing costs, the government usually provides teachers a place to live. For example, in Zambia, teachers are provided housing by the government for which they must pay 12.5Z of their monthly salary as rent. If teachers make their own housing arrangements, they receive a tax-free monthly allowance of 90 kwacha. Housing supplements can constitute as much as a 27Z addition to a teachers monthly salary, as is the case in Senegal. Family allowances are more common and range from as little as less than a 1Z increase in a teacher's remuneration in Zaire, to as much as a 16Z increase in Togo. The family supplements are based on the number of children and they allow a per child payment usually for up to six children. Only teachers working in specified regions of a country receive hardship supplements. In some cases a predetermined percentage of a teachers's base salary is awarded as compensation for working in any of the hardship areas. For example in Kenya teachers working in any of 11 districts receive a 30Z supplement, up to a maximum of 1200 shillings per month for married personnel. In other SSA countries the amount of the supplement depends on the district in which the teacher is posted. In Mali, teachers working in one of 17 zones receive a hardship allowance equal to roughly 5Z of their base salary while teachers working in certain - 31 - parts of the region of Cao receive an allowance equal to about 14Z of their base pay. No data are available on the numbers of teachers in different countries actually receiving various supplemental payments. For this reason it is difficult to estimate the budgetary impact of teacher salary supplements. However, some indication of the cumulative size of housing, family, and hardship salary supplements is pr,esented in the following table. The monthly supplements included in these estimations are based on the assumption that a teacher receives the average housing and hardship allowances, and the family allowance for a married parent of four children. Total salary supplements can constitute a 32Z increase in the teacher salary bill as in Senegal, or as little as an 8 to 9Z increase as in Madagascar or Zaire. On average the various allowances create a 20Z augmentation in the base salary costs for primary teachers. TABLE 6 Monthly supplements to primary teacher salaries as percentage of the average monthly satary assuming that a typical teacher receives the average housing and hardship allowances and the family allowance for a married parent of four children. AVERAGE SUPPL. AS X PERCENTAGE OF SUPPLEMENT For: SALARY' OF AVG SAL Housing Family Hardship U BENIN $36,190 6.38X U BURKINA $44,273 45.17X KADAG $72,114 8.60X 100X MALI $44,106 21.92Z 16X 41% 43X U KAURITIUS S2 625 0.19X SENEGAL S146:308 32.32X 85X 15X ZAIRE 4, 711 8.81X 95f 5X ZAMBIA S539 16.69$ 100X TOGO U 8,910 16.36X 100X RCI $171,687 20.82X 28X 72m I …z…=====:Sz szs=xaz:=zs:zzzxz=:==::aZSz- z=:===ajS * Average monthly salary in local currency. # Data taken from ILO October tnquiry of 1985. - 32 - THE RELATIVE VALUE OF PRIMARY TEACHERS' SALARIES Ratio Primary Teacher Salaries to GNP per capita. Average primary teacher salary to GNPCAP for SSA is 6.34 with a standard deviation of 3.4 (see Table 7). This indicates that the ratio takes on a broad range of values in Africa, going from a low of 1.5 in Equatorial Guinea and Ghana to a high of 14.7 in Ethiopia. Table 7 also shows that francophone countries in SSA have a higher mean ratio of average primary teacher salary to GNPCAP (7.6) than non- francophone countries (5.1). However there is considerable variation in both subgroups. Summary statistics for the six World Bank regions are also given in the table. No relationship between the ratio of average teacher salary to GNP per capita and the level of national income of a country is apparent for the full SSA sample, though in low income countries (GNPCAP <= $US 200) a negative relationship between these variables does exist.l/. 1/ Regression of the ratio of average primary teacher salaries on GNPCAP for the sub-sample of 8 countries with GNPCAP less than or equal to $US 200 resulted in a beta estimate of -4.7 with a standard error of 2.0 and an R- squared of .48. The regressions for the full sample and for the sum-sample of countries with GNPCAP greater than $US 200 did not have significant results. - 33 - TABLE 7 AVERAGE PRIMARY TEACHER SALARIES COMPARED TO GNPCAP: 1985 (figures are in local currencies) 1 2 COUNTRY AVG TCH SAL GNPCAP RATIO 1:2 FRANCO REGION BENIN $425,439 $127,176 3.3 X AF1 C.A.R $913,353 $121,300 7.5 X AF1 EQ. GUINEA $180,000 $121,300 1.5 0 AF1 R.C.I. $2,121,081 S270,402 7.8 X AF1 ETHIOPIA S3,341 $228 14.7 0 AF2 KENYA $23,777 $4,528 5.3 0 AF2 MAURITIUS $146,110 $15,525 9.4 x AF2 SUDAN S6,100 $760 8.0 0 AF2 BURUNDI $210,548 $30,460 6.9 X AF3 MADAGASCAR $577,002 $165,620 3.5 x AF3 RWANDA $229,437 S29,366 7.8 X AF3 ZAIRE S26,207 S8,478 3.1 X AF3 GHANA $38,989 $25,326 1.5 0 AF4 GUINEA-BIS $179,385 $27,135 6.6 0 AF4 BURKINA $696,339 S69,488 10.0 X AF5 CAPE VERDE S81,900 $37,203 2.2 0 AF5 CHAD S267,060 $50,120 5.3 X AF5 GAMBIA S2,771 S896 3.1 0 AF5 MALI $821,804 S65,100 12.6 X AF5 MAURITANIA $302,567 $31,605 9.6 X AF5 NIGER S828,119 $89,852 9.2 X AF5 SENEGAL S1,614,977 $166,226 9.7 X AF5 BOTSWANA $5,395 $1,809 3.0 0 AF6 MALAWI $1,117 S293 3.8 0 AF6 SWAZILAND $3,879 $1,445 2.7 0 AF6 TANZANIA $39,772 $4,293 9.3 0 AF6 ZAMBIA $4,151 S1,057 3.9 0 AF6 ZIMBABWE $5,445 $904 6.0 0 AF6 in the column franco, X denotes francophone countries and 0 denotes non-francophone. The Regions correspond to the World Bank divisions of Africa. SUMMARY STATISTICS: Ratio of Average Primary Teacher Salaries to GNPCAP. MEAN VAR STD N TOTAL SAMPLE 6.34 11.881 3.447 28 FRANCOPHONE 7.56 8.190 2.862 14 OTHER 5.11 13.246 3.639 14 REGIONS: AFI 5.05 9.860 3.140 4 AF2 9.34 15.631 3.954 4 AF3 5.33 5.697 2.387 4 AF4 4.08 12.859 3.586 2 AF5 7.72 13.796 3.714 8 AF6 4.78 6.186 2.487 6 GNPCAP: -= SUS 200 8.17 17.420 4.174 8 > SUS 200 5.60 8.730 2.955 20 - 34 - In very low income countries a teacher's salary is many times the national income per capita but this higher ratio is more a reflection of the low national income per capita rather than high level of teachers salaries. With GNPCAP below $US 200, having any salaried "modern sector" occupation virtually guarantees an individual a salary well above the national per capita income. Relative Wages. Comparing average primary teacher salaries to GNPCAP does facilitate cross country comparisons, but this ratio alone does not indicate the relative value of teachers' salaries compared to other occupations' wages. A comparison of average teacher salaries to the average salaries of other occupations affords an estimate of the relative status of the teaching profession. ILO data on the average salaries of stenographer/typists in the wholesale trade and banking sector and of auto mechanics were compared to the average salaries of primary teachers in a given year (1985 or 86). The ratios of average primary teacher salary to the average stenographer/typist salary and average auto mechanic salary were computed for nine countries and are shown in table 8. In six of the nine countries primary teachers earn an average salary that is less than the average wage of stenographer/typists and in six out of eight countries teachers, on the average, earn more than auto mechanics. The mean relative wages of primary teachers to stenographer/typists and to auto mechanics are .75 and 1.22 respectively. In general, teachers have a status above that of auto mechanics but below that of stenographer/typists. Two extreme examples - 35 - exist, Mali and Cape Verde, in which teachers are paid less than both of these other occupations. TABLE 8 TEACHER WAGE RATES AS COMPARED TO OTHER OCCUPATIONS (wage rates are annual averages in tocal currency) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) COUWNTRY 91 130 AVG 1&2 110 150 5:3 5:4 MALI $640,956 S540,000 S590,478 S540,000 S513,948 0.87 0.95 BURKINA $460,560 $498,528 S479,544 $460,560 $531,276 1.11 1.15 BURUNDI $363,987 S572,762 S468,374 $176,389 S210,548 0.45 1.19 BENIN a S515,400 - - - S565,595 1.10 RWANDA S231,840 S198,720 $215,280 S144,000 S229,437 1.07 1.59 KENYA $29,972 S83,250 $56,611 $14,539 $15,804 0.28 1.09 ZAMBIA $4,248 $7,492 S5,870 S3,600 $5,664 0.96 1.57 S LEONE - S17,565 S17,565 $3,402 $6,055 0.34 1.78 CAPE VERDE S126,000 S160,800S143,400 S186,000 S81,900 0.57 0.44 Cotumn headings correspond to ILO occupationaL codes: 91 - Stenographer typist in wholesale industry 130 - Stenographer typist in the Banking sector 110 - Auto mechanic 150 - Primary Teacher a: For Benin the wage in column (1) is for a receptionist in the hotel industry SOeWRCE: IO YearLy BuLLetin, 1987. Real Average Teacher Salaries in the 1980s Further insight into the relative value of teachers salaries can be gained by examining trends in average salaries over time. Table 9 shows real average primary teacher salaries in 18 SSA countries from 1980 to 1985 (with 1980 as the base year). On the average real primary teacher salaries declined 11.5Z between 1980 and 1985. In only two countries (Rwanda and Niger) have average primary teacher salaries increased in real terms. In 10 countries the overall decline exceeded lOZ, with the extreme cases of Zimbabwe and the Central African Republic in which real primary teacher salaries decline about 37Z. In five of the ten countries real average primary teacher salaries have remained fairly constant. Summary statistics for different sub-samples within this group are also shown in table 9. - 36 - TABLE 9 INDICES OF CHANGES IN REAL AVERAGE TEACHER SALARIES: 1980 = 100 COUNTRY YEAR \ CAR RCI MTA BDI MAD RWA GHA BUR GAM -- -- -- -- - X - . . .... .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1980 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1981 104 93 98 96 100 160 91 110 106 1982 98 85 106 89 64 145 76 98 95 1983 88 86 97 81 57 130 61 132 73 1984 96 96 96 74 61 147 45 06 69 1985 63 88 93 77 71 149 96 81 98 MLI MTS NGR SEN W! ZAM ZIM KEN SWAZI 1980 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1981 105 100 117 84 96 83 92 98 82 1982 99 85 107 84 99 89 89 84 89 1983 91 100 123 77 96 113 72 73 76 1984 83 92 111 76 94 88 55 68 92 1985 90 83 116 74 96 63 71 96 SLM4ARY STATISTICS: PERCENT DECLINE IN REAL AVG TEACHER SALARIES 1980-85 MEAN VAR STD N FULL SAMPLE* 17.03 143.08 11.96 16 FRANCOPHONE 20.04 95.90 9.79 9 OTHER 13.15 198.70 14.10 7 GNPCAPS300 14.98 131.43 11.46 8 E Excluding the countries (Rwarda & Niger) in which real average teacher salaries increased. INDICES OF CHANGES IN REAL AVERAGE MANUFACTURING UAGES: 1980 z 100 YEAR KENYA MAURITIUS MALAWI SWAZI* ZAMBIA ZIMBABWE BURUNDI BOTSWANA ..... ....... Z......... ................. ..................................... ......... ........ ..... ............ ... 1980 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1981 99 101 101 78 83 109 145 100 1982 92 93 136 65 78 114 125 86 1983 89 98 96 61 71 105 105 101 1984 89 99 79 63 59 98 127 105 1985 82 99 67 68 103 124 For Swaziland real, average wages in the transportation, storage and communication sector were used. SOURCE: ILO Yearly Bulletins. - 37 - In several countries the trend in real average primary teacher salaries follows a decreasing, then increasing, then decreasing pattern, This pattern can be explained by the deterioration in real salaries due to inflation being followed by a sudden rise in real salaries when the government grants a pay increase. That increase is then subsequently eroded by the continued effect of inflation. As discussed earlier, the natural tendency of primary teacher average salaries, because of salary structures, is to increase over time as teachers move up the pay scale. In SSA the general decline in real average teacher salaries is magnified by this fact because the 11.5% average decrease in real salaries occurred while average salaries should have been increasing. Relative Wages Over Time Table 10 presents the relative average wage of primary teachers to workers in the manufacturing sector from 1980 to 1985. In Kenya, Malawi, Swaziland, and Zambia, real average wages for both teachers and manufacturing workers have decreased in the 1980s (see table 9). But in Kenya, the relative wage of teachers to manufacturing workers decreased indicating that teachers salaries were more eroded by inflation than were the salaries of workers in manufacturing. In the other three countries, of this group the relative wage increased -- evidence that inflation had the opposite effect. - 38 - In Mauritius, Zimbabwe, and Burundi, real wages in manufacturing increased or remained the same while real average primary teacher salaries decreased. This resulted in a greater decline of teachers' relative wages than in the case of Kenya. TABLE 10 RELATIVE AVERAGE SALARIES OF PRIMARY TEACHERS TO MANUFACTURING WORKERS YEAR KENYA MAURITIUS MALAWI SWA21- ZAM&IA ZIMBABWE BURUNDI BOTSWANA 1980 1.00 3.25 0.91 0.41 1.05 1.71 1.52 1981 1.00 2.81 0.86 0.44 1.05 1.43 1.09 1.16 1982 0.92 2.33 0.67 0.56 1.19 1.33 1.04 1.28 1983 0.83 2.45 0.91 0.52 1.66 1.16 0.99 1.04 1984 0.77 2.10 1.09 0.61 1.56 0.96 0.95 1.20 1985 0.87 1.78 1.32 0.59 1.04 1.01 INDICES OF CHANGES IN RELATIVE SALARIES YEAR KENYA MAURITIUS MALAWI SWAZI' ZAMBIA ZIMABWE BURUNDI BOTSWANA ___NUUN@_u_HI_ IUSIHSII4HNINUUU_1NNU..U..NN..WI.f-1.. I_u_ .Un._I__.*S._II_ I__ .1- 1980 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1981 99 87 95 105 100 84 71 100 1982 92 72 73 136 114 78 68 110 1983 82 75 100 125 158 68 65 89 1984 77 65 119 146 148 56 62 103 1985 86 55 145 142 61 66 - For Swaziland, primary teacher average salaries are corqpared to average sataries in the transportation, storage and communication sector as defined by the ILO. SOURCE: ILO Yearty Bulletins V. The Impact of Salary Scales in SSA on Future Costs of Primary Education Future costs of primary schooling in SSA countries will depend on only on the number of students to be educated and the technology used, but also on the average salary of teachers, since teacher salaries is the largest expenditure item in primary education (in SSA teacher salaries account for more than 902 of the budget). Average teachers' salaries is a function of (a) the characteristics of salary schedules: minimum and - 39 - maximum salaries, rate of progression, frequency of promotion, etc.; (b) the distribution of teachers among the different categories; qualified, unqualified, etc.; (c) the initial distribution of teachers on the salary scale within each category; (d) the rate of increase of the teaching force. A forecast of teachers salaries 1/ for 19 SSA countries shows that for all countries we may expect an "upward drift" in average salaries. This upward drift will be strongest during the next ten years and weaker from years 11 to 20. Table 11 presents the drift in salaries as measured in yearly rates of increase of average salaries and total costs. Column (1) presents the case where the number of teachers in each category remains constant, i.e., attrition of teachers in each category is compensated by teachers entering the profession at the lowest end of the salary scale of the corresponding category. Column (2) to (6) assume that the number of teachers increase at 3Z corresponding to the average increase of the school age population. Results shown in column (2) are based on the assumption that the proportion of teachers in different categories remains unchanged. Column (3) assumes that all increases will be of teachers of type 1; column (4) assumes teachers of 1; column (4) assumes that all the increase will be of type 2; column (5) assumes that all the increase will be of type (3); and column (6) assumes that all the increase will be of type (4). Type 1 is the least qualified; 4 the most qualified. The impact of the different assumptions can be seen clearly in the following graph. 1/ See appendix 1 for a detailed forecasting model. TALBLE 1 1 TWENTY YEAR FORECASTS OF RATES OF GROWTH OF AVERAGE TEACHER SALARIES AND TOTAL TEACHER COSTS BY COUJNTRY COtUNTRY EOUJI (L11 R IUM 3% GROWT 42lYSTEN 3% G.ROWT 3?CH 1 3%'GROW`TA'?CH 2 3% GROWTh'?CH 3 3% GROWTA6?C11 4 YRS 1-10 11-20 1-10 11-20 1-10 11-20 1-10 11-20 1-10 11-20 1-10 11-20 BENIN A .. ...... GUJINEA AVGCg TOT i :1 H3RN I A M :8 O COTE D'IVOIRE AVGCA TOGO AYGTOT ETHIOPIA AVCGA TOT G i i3§138 R M A MR 2: :R N 7 : : KENYA A GCA!i 1: -:: ~ ~ 9~( :9 MAURITIUS AVG SA~ TOT COS UR~ :1:3H -N 1A~ - - - - BURUNDI AVGCg TOT H DJIBOUJTI AVGCA TOT NO81 UR21 HOI :B N MADAGASCAR AVGCSA~ ZAIRE AYGCgA118 :~ BURKINA-FASO AV SAL TOTG CST A _A R 98101I 1I GAMBIA AVGSA TOTCO 81 R 910 N R 18iM :6 MALI ATYGCSA 1 8: ~ ~ 9~~9~ - - - MAURITANIA AVGCSAL10% Q42 Q? ) *~ TOT CST :9 108%1 NH*~ ~4? q~ i*IU .qUR J9:1. NIGER AVGCa SENEGAL AVGCa TOT H :3 RA R O 10 R N1 :1 38 ZANBIA AVG SA~ TOT COS H 883 A :1 :9 2s R KR 4i N AVERAGE ANNUA~, AV SAL .7% 0Q p1 O4 .5% -2Q.'i6 I.Q4Z 9:j j.ZQj Q.014 ?.22~ I.Q4 RATEiS OF GROW H TO? COST 1.ThX MRui .5.Y4 2.(47 3.4 94U: .I. .Z1 .Y7 ACROSS COUNTRIES …-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 41 - TRENDS IN AVERAGE TEACHER SALARIES BURUNDI 130 128 126 124 122 120 o 118 - 1126 10 104 I 0 i 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 9 10 11 12 13 14 lS 16 17 lB 19 20 YEAkRS 3Wth + 3X growth O 3X gr tch I a 3Xgr tch 2 In this case (Burundi) average salaries under assumption of Columns (1) to (4) follow a bell shaped pattern. The difference between average salaries under assumptions of columns (3) and (4) is over 251. In the group of SSA countries there are four basic patterns of "upward drift." These are presented in the following graphs based on figures of column (1) 2/ 2/ It is interesting to note that in the majority of cases there is a change around the 10th year. The reason for this is that the bulk of the present teaching force is relatively young (see table 4). After ten years many in this group will reach the plateau of maximum salaries and stay there until retirement. As a result, with new teachers coming in at the lower salary step, the rate of growth of salaries will fall. Whereas during the first 10 years the majority continues to climb the salary ladder, only a smaller proportion will do so during the following ten years. - 42 - PROJECTED AVERAGE SALARIES - under equilbiurn 170 160 150 14.0 1 30- 120- 110 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 B 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 cm OR+ ETH N NGR A RC x ZA v MTA PROJECTED AVERAGE SALARIES - under equlibrniru 150 1 140 130- 120- 110 - 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 B 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 a BEN + MU o RWA A SEN x ZAM - 43 - PROJECTED AVERAGE SALARIES - under equllbrium 14-0 135 - 130 / 125- 120- 115 110 105 100 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 X OUR + 801 oil a KEN X GUI v TOG PROJECTED AVERAGE SALARIES - under oqulbriwi 110 106 - 104 102 100 - 98 96 94- 92- 90 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 O GAM + MAD 0 MTS - 44 - The first graph comprises countries where the "upward drift" is continuous; the second comprises countries where the increase in the first 10 years are substantial, and the increase in the last years smaller; the third includes countries where the increase of the two periods are small; the fourth includes countries where there is a substantial increase in the first period and very small or even negative growth in the second. Conclusion The forecasts of table 11 based on a growth rate of 3Z of the teaching force-a mild assumption for most SSA countries-show that the next ten years will be critical to primary schooling. Total teaching costs will grow at an average of over 4Z. This is way above the expected real growth rate of governments' operational budgets for most SSA countries. The first reaction to this problem could be as it was in the past, to try to reduce average salaries. A prevalent, though seldom explicit and mostly unintended, remedy for lowering average salaries is to allow salaries of teachers (and all other civil servants) to deteriorate with inflation. If the share of teaching costs in the Governments' budget remains constant, and assuming constant tax rates g =r + i = s = d + n + a (1) where g = rate of growth of the nominal government budget r = real rate of growth of taxable base i = rate of inflation s = rate of growth of nominal teaching budget d = 'upward drift" in average salaries - 45 - n = rate of growth of the teaching force a = rate of adjustment to inflation from (1) n = r - d + (i-a) (2) If salary scale parameters cannot be changed (d is fixed) n depends on r and (i-a) which measures the deterioration of salaries resulting from inflation (see table 9). This, formulation helps explain how governments in SSA are able to maintain or even increase the number of teachers' enrollments hence when the rate of economic growth falls below the rate of growth of the school age population. However, this process cannot go on indefinitely. When the accumulated deterioration (i-a) reaches a level that triggers political tensions, the government can temporarily raise real salaries either by limiting n (the rate of groth of teachers) or by borrowing. (This last measure would contribute to inflationary pressures in the future.) This process when repeated many times ends up producing a long run falling trend in real wages. R#eal Woges Low Umit T1nme - 46 - When real wages reach the lowest acceptable limit in the standard of living, teachers will react by withholding efforts and by lowering attendance in school in order to raise their revenue per unit of effort and time, and perhaps increase their income by using the extra time for other endeavours. The result will certainly have dire consequences for the quality of teaching. Maintenance, let alone increases, of enrollment rates in primary schooling at a satisfactory level of quality cannot rely on inflation as a long run solution. Only a combined effect of changing salary scale characteristics and the distribution by category of teachers of new entrants to the teaching force, improvement of teacher productivity and, especially, reallocation of budgets to favor primary schooling, can provide a feasible solution. VI. Recommendations SSA countries are trying to expand their primary school system to make their proposed goal of universal primary education a reality. This is an enormous and very expensive job at a time when budget constraints are putting a crimp on educational expenditures. The solution to this problem is: (1) to increase resources for primary education, (2) to improve the efficiency of the educational process, and (3) to lower costs of teaching inputs while conserving a desirable level of educational quality. This study provides information and analyses useful for dealing with (3). The following general recommendations for SSA which are derived from the review - 47 - presented in pp 21-46, suggests steps to facilitate planning of teacher salaries. 1 - In most countries salary scales of teachers are part and pracel of the civil service grading sysgtem. To have greater flexibility in determining teachers salary schedules it is better to delink teachers from other civil servants. 2 - Many SSA countries have significant proportions of unqualified and underqualified personnel in their teaching force. Any program to improve the quality of primary education in SSA must address this problem. But ways have to be found to mitigate the budgetary impact of upgrading these teachers. 3 - Institutional more than economic criteria is the norm for determining teachers salaries today. We should, therefore, strive to adjust salary scales to economic conditions. Maximums, minimums, and rates of progression in the salary scale should be used to attract and, then, retain qualified teachers, and, where possible, to minimize costs. This last objective could be achieved in conjunction with the other two because different combination of training and experience can produce the same teaching proficiency. 4 - It is in the nature of salary scales that decisions today concerning characteristics of the scale have differing effects over time. The evaluation of options, then, requires good forecasting of teachers salaries. This forecasting should be - 48 - based on the parameters of the salary scale, initial distribution of teachers on the scale, attrition rates, retirement age, rate of growth of the system, and policies concerning the distribution among categories of entering teachers. A good teacher cost forecast should also include a forecast of fringe benefits and social security contributions which can easily account for 25-30% of the salary bill. The number of recipients and amounts should be made explicit, something that is seldom done today. 5 - Decisions concerning the category mix of new entrants to the teaching force is usually predicated on the numbers of graduates from teacher training institutions who in most countries are guaranteed employment at graduation. To provide flexibility to the planning of teacher training the guaranteed employment clause should be abolished. 6 - The search for correct solutions to problems concerning teacher salaries requires detailed and reliable data on teachers: type, age, attrition rates, salary scales, fringe benefits, and distribution of teachers by steps of the salary scales. They are seldom available on a systematic basis, in spite of the fact that these data are required inputs for the preparation of a good budget proposal. The availability and low cost of present day computers makes the collection and analysis of these type of data an easy task. For the sake of good management, control and planning, the collection of this type of data on a permanent and - 49 - systematic basis should become a priority for all education ministries in SSA. Other problems such as the adequacy of teacher salaries to attract and retain good teachers, and the desirability and feasibility of reducing teacher salaries in order to lower unit costs, must be analyzed and solved on a country by country basis. Simplistic observations such as "teachers salaries as percent of gnp/capita in SSA are too high compared with other regions and therefore have to be lowered", ignore not only economic and institutional factors involved in setting salaries, but also the possible adverse impact on teachers' productivity of lowering inordinately teacher salaries. Given that the relationship of salaries to the supply of teacher services in terms of quality and quantity varies from country to country, measures to affect and change this relationship must be tailored to local circumstances. - 50 - APPENDIX 1 Forecasting Approaches There are two approaches to forecasting teachers' salaries. In the econometric method, wages can be determined from supply-demand equations using variables such as the number of secondary school graduates, income per capita, government budgets, age and sex of the teacher force, etc. In the eclectic approach, the present system is constructed and different conditions are simulated. In general, tghe eclectic approach is more effective in the medium and long run. It provides also flexibility for trying out different policies. The eclectic model, presented here, simulates a system of teachers' salaries assuming a "unified' or "single" salary schedule where promotion is automatic with every two years of service. The Forecasting Model This is a detailed flow model that -- given initial conditions, transition rates from one step to the salary scale to the next, and attrition rates by age -- calculates over time the number of teachers by type and by step of the salary scale the salary bill and average salary by type of teacher. The external variable driving the system is the number of new teachers entering the teaching force every year (ET). In general, ET is a function of the number of students in the education system and available teachers. - 51 - ET = (S x CH )-AT (1) CS x TH n AT = T (1-A ) (2) j =1 t-l where S = number of students CH = class hours CS = class size TH = hours of teaching AT = available teachers t = time Tj = number of teachers at step j Aj = attrition rate at step j If we wish to keep the number of teachers constant, and assuming that the number of students is also constant. ET = 2 TjAj (3) j = 1 Average salary (AW ) is calculated by n n AW = TjWj/ / Tj j =i j =1 where Wj = salary of teacher at step j and total salary bill (CT) by n CT TjWj j = 1 With this type of model, it is possible to simulate the effects on future teacher costs and average salaries of the structure of the salary scale, the initial distribution of the teaching force, the rates of - 52 - attrition, retirement age, and the speed at which the educational system expands. The following examples will show the impact of each of these variables on average and total cost of teachers. Data on teachers salaries and attrition rates are similar to those of a West African country. The computer model is written in Lotus 1-2-3. Initial Age Distribution of the Teaching Force Assuming that the number of teachers remains constant, retirement is after 30 years of work, and attrition rate zero, a 20 year simulation I shows 3 cases: 'even distribution,: "young population", and 'old population". As time advances, average and total cost of teaching increase for th "young" population, and decreases for the "old" one (Graph 1). Expansion of the System. The effect of an expanding system can be seen in Graph 2. In a growing system, the average salary tends to drop. The drop being a function of the rate of growth of the number of teachers, and the rate of progression of the salary scale. Attrition Rates. The introduction of attrition rates has the same effect as increasing the entrants to the teaching force. Figure 3 compares an evernly distributed teaching force with and without attrition rates. - 53 - These simple examples show that because parameters in the model can vary widely, it is impossible to predict a-priori future average salaries of teachers. However, availability of computer models provide an efficient way for forecasting teacher salaries under a variety of assumptions. AVERAG E SALARY 74a: il "