POLITICAL ECONOMY & FORCED DISPLACEMENT
GUIDANCE AND LESSONS FROM 9 COUNTRY CASE STUDIES
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Acknowledgements

This report was authored and produced by the Global Program on Forced Displacement of the World Bank. The report was written by Ray Salvatore Jennings (Senior Consultant, World Bank), Nat Colletta (Senior Consultant, World Bank) and Cordelia Chesnutt (Junior Professional Officer, World Bank). Support was provided by Joanna de Berry (Senior Social Development Specialist, World Bank), Nodoka Hasegawa (Junior Professional Officer, World Bank), Sadaf Lakhani (Consultant, World Bank), Margarita Puerto Gomez (Social Development Specialist, World Bank), Asger Christensen (consultant, World Bank) and Jordanka Tomkova (Consultant, World Bank). Niels Harild (Manager, Global Program on Forced Displacement, World Bank) oversaw the work. Advice was provided by Bernard Harborne (Lead, Social Cohesion and Violence Prevention, World Bank).
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Acronyms

AFP  Philippine Armed Forces
AFR  Africa (Region, World Bank)
BNPP Bank-Netherlands Partnership Program
CAS County Assistance Strategy (World Bank)
CAFGUs Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units
CDD Community Driven Development
CLIP Collaboration, Conflict, Legitimacy, Interests, and Power (analytical tool)
CMU Country Management Unit (World Bank)
COIN Counter-insurgency (war strategy used by AFP)
CSO Civil Society Organization
CVOs Civilian Volunteer Units
DDR Demobilization, disarmament and reintegration
DMA Disaster Management Agency of Somalia
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
EAP East Asia Pacific (Region, World Bank)
ECA Eastern and Central Asia (Region, World Bank)
FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
FY Financial Year
GPFD Global Program on Forced Displacement
ICRS Information Counseling and Referral Service
IDMC Internal Displacement Monitoring Center
IDP Internally Displaced Person(s)
IOM International Organization for Migration
LAC Latin and Central America (Region, World Bank)
MDGs Millennium Development Goals
MFDC Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance
MNA Middle East and North Africa (Region, World Bank)
NGO Non-government Organization
SPF State and Peacebuilding Fund (World Bank)
PEA Political Economy Analysis
RUPD United Registration System of Displaced Persons (Colombia)
UNHCR UN High Commission for Refugees
UNOCHAUN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNRWA UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
USAID US Aid Agency
WDR World Development Report
WFP World Food Program
Glossary

**Durable Solutions** to forced displacement situations are defined by UN as solutions that end displacement by involving voluntary repatriation (to country of origin), local settlement or integration (into country of asylum), and resettlement (to a third country).\(^1\)

**Forced Displacement:** The situation of persons who are forced to leave or flee their homes due to conflict, violence, and human rights violations.\(^2\) Forcibly displaced persons may be internally displaced or refugees that have crossed an international border.

**Fragile States:** The World Bank defines a country as a Fragile State if it is a low-income country or territory, IDA eligible (including those countries which may currently be in arrears), with a CPIA score of 3.2 or below.\(^3\)

**Internally Displaced Person (IDP):** A person displaced by armed conflict, violence, and human rights violations that has not crossed an international border.\(^4\)

**Protracted Displacement:** A displacement situation where refugees or internally displaced persons have been in exile for five years or more from their homes of origin. Refugee(s) or the internally displaced may receive assistance, but are unable to enjoy some or all basic rights (freedom of movement, employment, education, etc.), and for which durable solutions do not exist in the foreseeable future.\(^5\)

**Refugee:** A person residing outside his or her country of nationality, who is unable or unwilling to return because of a ‘well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a political social group, or political opinion’.\(^6\)

**Reintegration:** The achievement of a sustainable return i.e. the ability of returnees to secure the political, economic and social conditions to maintain their life, livelihood and dignity.\(^7\)

**Resettlement:** Where no other durable solution is feasible, assistance to enable refugees to resettle in a third country.\(^8\)

**Social Cohesion:** Refers to the way a group, community, or society reacts collectively to internal or external challenges. A cohesive society—which does not have to be culturally homogenous—minimizes internal conflict, and its members collaborate effectively to resolve problems or combat external threats.\(^9\)

**Self-reliance:** The ability of an individual, household or community to rely on their own resources (physical, social and natural capital or assets), judgment and capabilities with minimal external assistance in meeting basic needs, and without resorting to activities that irreversibly deplete the household or community resource base.\(^10\)
Executive Summary

This note describes why and how to conduct political economy analysis (PEA) of forced displacement. It also illustrates how PEA may contribute to understanding forced displacement crises with nine case studies: Casamance (Senegal), Colombia, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, the Philippines, Somalia, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe.\textsuperscript{11} Forced displacement is understood here as a situation where persons are forced to leave or flee their homes due to conflict, violence, or human rights violations.

PEAs of forced displacement analyze the contestation and distribution of power and resources along with the development challenges associated with forced displacement crises. By nature of their marginalization and the frequently protracted nature of their exile, the forcibly displaced are especially vulnerable as power and resources are disputed. The purpose of conducting a PEA on forced displacement is to inform policy dialogue and operations so that the interests of vulnerable forcibly displaced populations and their hosts are effectively accommodated in resource allocation decision-making and in poverty alleviation initiatives.

The key elements of forced displacement PEAs include: (i) a review of the historical context and displacement characteristics; (ii) durable solutions prospects; (iii) environmental, geographic, social, political, and economic drivers, constraints and opportunities; (iv) needs of the displaced and hosts; (v) existing policies, government/institutional context, and operations; and (vi) recommendations. This kind of analysis pays particular attention to the factors, actors, and interests contributing to forced displacement, and contextual variables such as but not limited to land, ethnic relations and historical grievances. Lessons learned from the case studies cited in this study include, for example, that drivers of forced displacement may include efforts by combatants to control strategic territory, manage electoral outcomes, forced conscription, encroaching salination, land evictions, controlling access to specific natural resources, and ambiguous land tenure and citizenship rights. It is also clear from the case studies that PEA of forced displacement conducted at the outset of programs can provide important baseline contexts for later metrics on improvements in the lives of the forcibly displaced.

Recommendations on development policies and programs that result from a PEA characteristically fall into at least four categories, namely: (i) improving access to land, housing and property; (ii) reestablishment of livelihoods; (iii) improving delivery of services; and (iv) strengthening accountable and responsible governance. In the context of the PEAs that are cited in this analysis, for example, recommendations include policy reforms for regulation of natural resources, reviews and reforms to land tenure and citizenship rights, security sector reform, improved access to services, livelihood programs for the forcibly displaced, and inclusion of the displaced into urban planning exercises. The process of validation and the implementation of the recommendations within a PEA will then depend on the specific country context and the stakeholders invested in the outcome of the analysis. In the Philippines, for instance, PEA contributed to multi-lateral regional planning
approaches, particularly for urban areas, that included the displaced as beneficiaries of operations. In Colombia, PEA contributed to the framing of land rights and restitution reforms.

Investing stakeholders from the outset is vital. Throughout the preparation of the PEA, an emphasis on partnership with bilateral development actors, UN agencies, NGOs, host governments, and academic institutions is important to ensure early engagement, to avoid duplication, and to set the stage for possible joint follow-up activities. Consultation with key stakeholders is also necessary to ensure the ultimate adoption and sustainability of any recommendations the PEA may offer. There are exceptions. At times, a key stakeholder such as a host government may have a negative view of the displaced, or even be complicit in their displacement. PEAs may be completed without their initial investment but then be used later to open political space for dialogue on the consequences of forced displacement and the opportunity of working with development partners to address the issue.

Although forced displacement is traditionally considered a humanitarian issue, there is growing recognition that development activities are required to improve the lives of displaced people and to support solutions to their situation. Forced displacement cuts across the considerations of political, security, humanitarian and development actors, and PEAs will typically straddle the humanitarian-development divide in order to facilitate policy and operational dialogue around the broader, long term dimensions of forced displacement. Yet sustainable improvements in the lives of the displaced, whether in place of exile or at their return destinations, require developmental action and PEAs can be instrumental in promoting the World Bank’s twin goals of poverty alleviation and shared prosperity for vulnerable displaced populations.

From the earliest design phase to dissemination of the results, the PEA is essentially an exercise in effectively collecting relevant data, analyzing these, and then marketing the analysis and its operational implications to the right stakeholders. Doing this well depends on the outcome of key decisions that are made throughout the entire sequence of PEA, including the identification of key counterparts and potential investing stakeholders, drafting a thorough scope of work, selecting appropriate research counterparts, the selection of appropriate field research methodologies, lucid and organized drafting of results, and appropriate targeting of validation and dissemination exercises. This note is intended to be an aid in navigating these decision points and activities and to encourage more frequent and better use of political economy analysis in evaluating and addressing forced displacement.
1.0 Why Conduct a Political Economy Assessment of Forced Displacement?

1.1 The Nature and Scale of Forced Displacement

The number of people displaced worldwide by armed conflict and other forms of violence was estimated at 44.2 million at the end of 2012. Of this number, around 15.2 million were refugees living outside their country of origin or habitual residence, while 28.8 million were internally displaced persons (IDPs) that had not crossed an international border. 

At least half of the refugees and IDPs worldwide live in urban settings or in rural host communities, rather than in organized camps. This creates a new set of challenges requiring a coordinated response with urban sector practitioners, rural social development specialists, health and protection experts, and their partners. It also requires attention to host populations accommodating the
displaced. These populations may be of the same socio-economic status as the displaced and become embittered by the impacts associated with displacement flows.  

1.2 Why Use a Political Economy Analysis to Look at Forced Displacement?

In 2013, the World Bank updated its strategy to emphasize two twin goals, namely to: (i) end extreme poverty by decreasing the percentage of people living on less than $1.25 a day to no more than 3% by 2030; and (ii) promote shared prosperity by fostering the income growth of the bottom 40% of every country. Achieving these twin goals is challenging in fragile and conflict-affected states (FCS), and the forcibly displaced are often among the most vulnerable groups within these settings. In addition, the majority of the world’s displaced live in situations of protracted displacement, or situations that have lasted more than five years, making efforts to address poverty among these populations even more difficult.

The vulnerability of forcibly displaced populations derives from several sources. The causes of forced displacement are political, social, and economic in nature and the result of a complex combination of conflict, institutional weakness, governance deficits, policy incoherence, the agendas of malign actors, and structural or situational economic inequities. Once displacement occurs, a number of factors then conspire to prolong displacement including the termination of livelihoods, the loss of property and assets, political and social marginalization, remoteness from support networks, complex debt and credit arrangements, and a lack of meaningful opportunities to contribute their skills in the places where they reside or return to.

To illustrate, electoral manipulation through forced population movements remains among one of the most salient drivers of forced displacement in the Philippines. In Colombia, manipulation of electoral outcomes as well as access to and control over illegal drug cultivation contributed to displacement. In Casamance, militarization of the almond trade and access to lucrative commercial routes are among the variables sustaining displacement. In Liberia, the DRC, and Cote d’Ivoire competing systems of land tenure, exclusionary cultural practices, and militarized disputes over land, natural resources and citizenship rights drive and sustain forced displacement.

Discerning these features of forced displacement environments, and formulating recommendations, requires a comprehensive analysis of how power and resources are contested and distributed, and the implications on development outcomes. This is at the core of political economy analysis. The World Bank describes political economy analysis as the study of historical legacies, structural drivers, and the incentives of leaders and citizens, as well as formal and informal institutions. In the process, PEA emphasizes the agency and roles of actors and how policies and politics influence economic growth and poverty reduction overall.

PEA can be contrasted with similar tools, such as human rights based approaches and fragility assessments in that political economy analyses are not constrained to legal and policy frameworks, or delineation of institutional capacities, or the likelihood of conflict in weak and fragile states. Political economy assessments may look not only at what is inefficient, unlawful, and unfair but also at the
positive drivers of political and economic change that may exist and how to leverage these and other interventions for better development outcomes.

Examining forced displacement as the consequence of historical trends, the distribution and contestation of power and resources, and the relevant interests of actors and institutions typically yields insights into developmental action where the displaced and others can contribute to improvements in their well being. It is still the case, however, that forced displacement is traditionally considered a humanitarian matter, even though the kinds of vulnerabilities and imbalances the displaced endure are particularly difficult to overcome with humanitarian aid.\textsuperscript{18}

1.3 Why Look at Forced Displacement as a Developmental Challenge?

Over a decade ago, Michael Cernea (1997) identified the key risks and impoverishment processes associated with forced displacement as: (a) landlessness; (b) joblessness; (c) homelessness; (d) marginalization; (e) food insecurity; (f) loss of access to common property resources; (g) increased morbidity; and (h) community disarticulation. A cycle of impoverishment begins with violence, insecurity and flight, typically leading to landlessness, joblessness, and homelessness.\textsuperscript{19} This downward spiral more often than not culminates in increased political marginalization and the breakdown of social capital and social cohesion. It is a process featured in the case studies cited in this note, and cycles like these and their consequences exemplify many of the core development challenges in forced displacement contexts.

The development challenge is not only to reverse risks like Cernea describes but to also prepare for the return of the displaced or durable solutions while involving the displaced and their hosts in mutually beneficial development practices. While the displaced bring risks to the communities where they seek shelter, they also may make beneficial contributions to their own and their hosts’ development by applying, for instance, their livelihood skills.

The most significant development needs\textsuperscript{20} of forcibly displaced refugees and IDPs include:

**Land, housing, and property:** Land, housing, and property that belong to displaced people have, in many cases, been taken over by others. Housing, property, and land rights thus become a major concern, and the resolution of land, housing and property disputes is essential to sustainable recovery and livelihood restoration.

**Reestablishment of livelihoods:** This element is critical if solutions to displacement are to become sustainable, both if displaced return home or if they are integrated elsewhere. Return areas characterized by post conflict or low level violence often have limited economic growth and few employment opportunities. People in protracted displacement situations also stand a higher threat of job discrimination, low wages and joblessness. Support for new livelihood opportunities through development interventions that build skills and provide access to credit and markets become critical for displaced peoples’ self-reliance.
Delivery of services: Health care, education, drinking water and sanitation, and access to infrastructure are essential for improving the quality of life for the displaced. Often, access to public services requires the provision of new identity documents that were lost or destroyed during displacement. Other critical services include: rule of law, security, demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants, demining, and reconciliation.

Accountable and responsive governance: Particularly at the local level, it is critical to ensure that issues relating to recovery – including land and property, livelihoods, or service provision – are resolved in ways that are viewed as legitimate by the displaced and community members in the places where they settle. Development interventions can provide the displaced with opportunities for equal participation and voice in local planning alongside host populations or those in their home areas.

In fragile and conflict-affected countries, displacement puts added strain on weak national and local institutions. If mismanaged, displacement can give rise to grievances leading to further conflict, crime, violence, and political instability. Displacement has negative developmental impacts on human and social capital, economic growth, poverty reduction, the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and environmental sustainability. The negative impacts of displacement may be less pronounced, however, where the displaced are able to develop their skills and use coping mechanisms to their own and the host community’s benefit. Positive benefits may include investment in infrastructure and social services and economic gains for the displaced and their hosts.

These kinds of developmental deficits and opportunities are often described in PEAs, along with the measures that may address these issues. Whether a PEA results in recommendations for additional research, programmatic, or policy interventions, well-designed political economy research is a key starting point in determining the situation on the ground for the displaced and the actors, factors, and interests that drive and sustain a forced displacement crisis, and that may be instrumental in resolving it.

1.4 The World Bank’s Engagement on Forced Displacement

The World Bank has, over the years, assembled bi-laterals, UN agencies, and NGOs to consolidate partnerships and explore opportunities for joint development work on forced displacement. A portfolio review of Bank activities found that between the 1980s until the end of fiscal year 2009, a total of 94 activities (10 studies and 84 operations) were undertaken to address forced displacement across the regions of the Bank. Early findings from a recent and ongoing update to this portfolio review finds that between July 2009 and December 2013, approximately 33 operations address forced displacement in various ways.

In this context, this paper provides guidance to World Bank country teams, governments, and other development actors on the utility and application of political economy analysis as an analytical tool in settings of forced displacement. Following consultations with World Bank country teams, these studies were selected (and ultimately funded) based on an identification of countries that had significant displacement issues in order to guide ongoing operations and develop policies and
programs that address the consequences of forced displacement. In some countries the analysis itself stimulated further demand for analysis and programs while in others PEA analysis informed ongoing programming.
2.0 What Will Political Economy Analysis of Forced Displacement Examine?

2.1 Understanding Factors, Actors, and Their Interests

In a similar fashion to the way Section 1.0 described the purpose, or “why” it is useful to conduct PEAs of forced displacement, this section examines the “what” question, or what should be the subject of this kind of analysis? In the most general terms, PEAs of forced displacement focus on the “actors”, “factors”, and “interests” related to a displacement crisis. The content of each of these shorthand terms is elaborated below.

2.2 Factors

“Factors” refers to variables such as historical context, the forms and duration of violent conflict, cultural practices, demographic considerations, the policy environment, social cohesion, geo-political influences, informal and formal modes of economic exchange, and type of political system. The combination of relevant contextual factors like these will be specific and unique to each forced displacement crisis. Here are some examples:

In Mindanao in the Philippines, for example, electoral violence resulting from national political elites conspiring with local proxies to influence election outcomes has led to cycles of local violence and forced displacement. Recent displacement is only the latest incident of displacement coinciding with election periods in the country. Forced internal displacement in the Philippines is also a result of armed conflict between the Government and separatist insurgents in Mindanao. It is, in essence, a

![Chart 1: Conflict-Induced Displacement in Central Mindanao, 2000-2010](chart.png)

means to control strategic territory (land and natural resources) by influencing the movement and loyalties of the local population. The displaced and local populations are pulled and pushed in multiple directions as the primary means of asserting territorial control and political influence.\textsuperscript{23} Chart 1 (below) portrays the spikes in displacement in Central Mindanao between 2000-2010, with peaks in armed conflict in 2003 and 2008.

Despite being a functioning state with a positive economic growth trajectory of about 5% annual GDP, \textbf{Colombia} has over five million internally displaced, or an estimated 11 percent of the entire population. Colombia has now surpassed such impoverished and fragile states as Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan in terms of the percentage of the forcibly displaced within its borders. Colombia possesses the oldest insurgency in the western hemisphere as well, now some 50 years and ongoing, in the \textit{FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia)} rebellion, as well as a number of smaller rebellions. In sum, the most potent factors driving displacement in Colombia are insecurity due to ongoing fighting, forced recruitment into paramilitary militias, assassinations, electoral manipulation, access and control over illegal drug cultivation and trade routes, and aerial fumigation of illicit crops.\textsuperscript{24} Impoverishment, destruction of physical capital and rural infrastructure, loss of livelihoods and property, contraction in agricultural production, limitations in land use and difficulty in reclaiming land, reduced access to markets, continued electoral manipulation and the loss of socioeconomic networks contribute to sustaining ongoing displacement.

\textbf{Colombia’s Victims Law and the Restitution of Land to the Displaced: Examples of Historical, Demographic, and Legal Factors}

Fifty years of conflict in Colombia have caused millions of persons to become displaced. The poor, rural and remote populations have been disproportionately affected. Impoverishment, destruction of physical capital and rural infrastructure, contraction in agricultural production, limitations in land use, reduced access to markets, and the loss of homes and socioeconomic networks are but some of the impacts associated with this displacement. As a consequence, many of the displaced have migrated to the country’s urban centers.

In 2011, the administration of President Santos passed a new Victims and Land Restitution Law that included the restitution of displaced peoples’ assets, mostly land. By reinforcing the state as the provider of justice to the victims of conflict and by addressing land rights as one of the main triggers of past and existing violence, this paradigmatic shift represents a major departure from past policy approaches. The law also introduces the concept of collective reparations for indigenous and marginalized communities and recognizes the relevance of social services and livelihoods rehabilitation in areas of return/integration of displaced people.

An ambitious rural development plan aiming to improve the formalization of property rights in rural areas is seen as an essential complement to the Victim Law’s implementation. The law is implemented by three institutions (Victims’ Unit, Land Restitution Unit, Center for Historical Memory) with 85 field offices country wide. To ensure the Law’s successful implementation, mechanisms for land restitution, inter-institutional coordination among government departments in the provision of support services to victims, means for restoring IDPs’ livelihoods, and an effective monitoring and evaluation system will need to be established.

Displacement in \textbf{Casamance} (Senegal) has historically been difficult to measure. Since 1982, frequent skirmishing along the border with Guinea-Bissau has been punctuated by intermittent ceasefires and peace talks between Senegal’s government and pro-independence groups, leading to circular cross-
border flight and return of the conflict’s estimated 150,000 refugees and displaced persons.\textsuperscript{25} There are no clear-cut divisions between refugees and IDPs as movement across the border or within Casamance is often dictated by security considerations and family links. It is common for the same individuals to have experienced being both a refugee and an IDP in their lives.\textsuperscript{26} Competing systems of land tenure, the militarization of the almond trade in the region, encroaching salinization, land mines and poor trade infrastructure are among the factors both driving displacement and complicating land claims, restitution and returns.

In Liberia, forced displacement was a common feature of the 14-year civil war involving multiple, relatively uncoordinated forces, foreign fighters, and ethnic polarization in a struggle over access to lucrative natural resources and political power. Despite a strong sense of responsibility to host the displaced in receiving communities, residents in villages and urban neighborhoods where the displaced have settled still make a distinction between “strangers” and “citizens.” “Citizens” see a person that was not born in their midst and whose ancestral line is not traced directly to the community as a “stranger.” “Strangers” (the displaced) are typically excluded from critical decision-making, claims to land, and prioritized services. Interactions with the larger village must be mediated through their “stranger father” or citizens that host or sponsor the displaced. In general, “strangers” are allowed to remain as long as they abide by the rules, customs, and cultural practices of the host communities.\textsuperscript{27} Cultural and informal political practices like these are an example of factors that sustain forced displacement in Liberia.

In Zimbabwe, factors such as the economic and political impact of election-related violence, land evictions and farm seizures have locked many of the country’s 80,000 to 1 million internally displaced and 2–4 million refugees into a circular pattern of return and protracted displacement in neighboring South Africa, Botswana and Mozambique.\textsuperscript{28} From 2000 onward, multiple overlapping crises, including consolidation of one party rule, land invasions and organized political violence against the ruling party’s opponents, forced unprecedented numbers of Zimbabweans to flee in search of security, educational opportunities and livelihoods. Annual GDP fell nearly fifty percent by 2008 and life expectancy plummeted to the lowest in the world in 2006 – 37 years for men and 34 years for women - impoverishing and mixing the fortunes of hosts and the forcibly displaced seeking both physical and economic security.\textsuperscript{29}

Fighting in the DRC has involved nine African nations and some twenty armed groups, contributing to the deaths of over 5.4 million people and the deprivation and displacement of 2.8 million persons in the Great Lakes Region. Four armed conflicts (with the biggest being the First and Second Congo Wars from 1996-2008) and their ancillary effects on social and ethnic solidarity have made repeated displacements common in the region. There are populations of Congolese refugees in every country bordering the DRC (Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Chad, Angola, and Zambia). There are also communities of refugees in the DRC from four of the DRC’s neighbors (Angola, Burundi, Rwanda and Sudan).\textsuperscript{30} Yet, at their core, the region’s conflicts are sustained by factors such as violent, militarized disputes over access to land and natural resources, and citizenship rights.
2.3 Actors

Identifying the actors (key groups, institutions, or individuals) that instigate or are affected by forced displacement is necessary to fully understand the influence of factors like those cited above. Examples of stakeholders associated with forced displacement crises are provided below:

In Cote d’Ivoire, shifts in power between autochtone (original inhabitants), allochtone (persons from elsewhere in the country), and allogene (“foreigners”) have defined the ways each group has historically gained and lost access to land in forested and agricultural areas. The prevalence of verbal agreements between landowners (tuteurs) and their lessees, the Government’s vagueness on Ivorian citizenship, local governments’ poor capacity to enforce land tenure policies, and tribal elders’ insistence that traditional rather than statutory authority applies in determining land ownership are illustrative of the roles these actors play in displacing over 300,000 persons since 2002.31

In southern Somalia, illegal occupation of land, competing land tenure systems, and state failure are examples of factors that complicate access to services for the displaced and deter return. Dominant clans and local militias, however, are the actors that operationalize these factors by controlling territory and ensuring land is not sold or returned to the displaced or members of other clans. In the absence of functional capacity by the Somali National Disaster Management Agency (DMA), District Commissioner offices, mayors or local sub-district offices, and clan-based traditional institutions determine land ownership and hosting options for the internally displaced. As a result, settlements for the 1.3 million internally displaced in Somalia are typically on privately owned land controlled by “gatekeepers” that control their movements and extort fees from the displaced in return for limited shelter and inconsistent service delivery.32

In Liberia, the country’s 14-year civil war that began in 1989 resulted in over 1 million refugees and internally displaced that lived in exile for periods lasting from several months to several years. Other estimates suggest that at least half of the country’s population of 4 million was at least temporarily displaced at one time or another during the fighting.33 Electoral crises in neighboring Cote d’Ivoire, the presence of multiple militias with countervailing agendas, the involvement of foreign fighters linked to warring ethnic groups, unclear title to land, ambiguous citizenship requirements, poor information flows on conditions within the country, and the availability of humanitarian aid has contributed to and perpetuated displacement within the country and from neighboring states.

In the Philippines, the behavior of combatants, particularly the Philippine Armed Forces (AFP) determines the scale and duration of subsequent displacements. “Positional warfare” or large-scale fighting over areas of central Mindanao results in significant and long-term displacement of tens of thousands of people. Counter-insurgency (or COIN) strategies employed by the AFP, civilian volunteer units (CVOs) and civilian armed forces geographical units (CAFGUs) conversely displaces fewer persons and for a shorter period due to the way smaller, mobile armed units move through the countryside. Insurgent activity resembling COIN tactics displaces inhabitants in a similar fashion. The result has been an uneven mix of protracted and cyclical displacement for the more than 250,000 internally displaced of central Mindanao.34
2.4 Interests

“Interests” refers to the motives of actors that are related to the displacement crisis. Why, for instance, has displacement resulted from the factors and behavior of actors cited above? What drives actors to behave as they do? The two examples below illustrate how the interests of actors, when combined with information on “factors”, begins to provide a more nuanced picture of situations of forced displacement.

In the Philippines, displacement is not simply a consequence of violence but an objective of the parties to the conflict. The Philippine Armed Forces routinely creates “free fire zones” as part of its positional warfare and counterinsurgency strategies to separate combatants and civilians. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) advocates return in order to infiltrate civilian populations and reassert political and territorial control. Moro clan oligarchs also have an interest in strategic displacement by ensuring land occupants and residents under their control are loyal to national political elites, who in turn reward oligarchs with treasury transfers and other status benefits. When linked to factors above like election-related violence, the connection between forced displacement and the political interests of key stakeholders, like clan oligarchs and national political elites becomes clear.35

In Casamance, the Senegalese army has restricted return options for displaced groups in the name of ‘their own safety.’ With a rise in the market value of cashew nuts in 2008, the separatist Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC) has increased attacks on farmers and prevented displaced groups from retaking possession of their land in an effort to keep control over the sale of cashews – an important and regular source of income for the MFDC.36 A low-level war economy based on illegal logging, almonds, and cannabis growing and smuggling has benefited both sides to the conflict and undermined any sense of urgency to facilitate return or end the conflict.37

2.5 Case Study Commonalities and Comparisons

The case studies on forced displacement associated with this note provide information on the context, key issues, and policy and operational recommendations for Philippines (Mindanao); Colombia; Zimbabwe; the DRC (Eastern Congo); Liberia; Cote d’Ivoire; Senegal (Casamance); Somalia; and the South Sudan. Annex II provides detailed case-by-case comparisons of the actors, factors, interests, and recommendations for each PEA. Several forced displacement contexts, drivers, and policy and operational recommendations resulting from PEA analysis are common across these case studies.

For instance, each case study profiled in this note features poor governance and corruption in the form of discriminatory policies, especially over identity and citizenship rights; a struggle for control of natural resources and productive assets (particularly land); and contestation over political power and minority rights. Within these contexts, the key issues sustaining and driving forced displacement include physical security; poor social accountability mechanisms and unclear access to citizenship; inconsistent application of land and property rights provisions; and difficulty in reestablishing livelihoods. Challenges related to key issues like these reflect the themes within the 2011 World Development Report on the nexus between security, justice, governance, and jobs.
Over twenty different policy and operational recommendations emerged from a comparative review of these case studies. The most common development initiatives that were recommended include: (1) establishing a registry of displaced populations; (2) reforming land tenure and property rights; (3) providing targeted livelihoods support; and (4) promoting good governance and social accountability measures. Examples of specific recommendations across these case studies include: labor market analysis, counseling and referral services (ICRS); security sector strengthening and reform; integrated rural area development and urban/peri-urban planning; enhancement of basic service delivery and access; developing and implementing appropriate reparation and restitution laws; building the capacities of local governments, NGOs, and CSOs; reviewing laws and procedures for clarifying citizenship rights; and improving cross border immigration policy;
3.0 How to Design, Conduct, Draft, and Disseminate Forced Displacement PEAs

This section describes the methods and sequence of steps that characterize the designing, conducting, writing, and dissemination of forced displacement PEAs. The successful completion of each of these phases, from design to dissemination, is required for PEAs to be useful in situation of forced displacement and each phase raises important questions and challenges that must be addressed.

3.1 Before Proceeding: The Political Economy of Forced Displacement PEAs

Governments, quasi-governmental entities, and armed non-state actors are often key actors in forced displacement crises. They may be complicit in the perpetuation of the crisis or indispensable in arriving at durable solutions. Governments or government-sponsored militias are often belligerent parties in armed conflict or situations of one-sided violence, and displaced communities may be viewed as enemy populations by governments. Governments may also expend their own resources to host, shelter, or compensate the displaced. Depending on conditions, the displaced may be regarded as victims, “temporary guests”, a worrisome strain on resources, a destabilizing factor on political and social stability, and a potential menace from conflicts within or across borders. External actors therefore may encounter a number of different political conditions when examining the status of displaced populations and their hosts, which might include:

- Limited or no access to the displaced;
- Closed polities in which displacement is not part of the policy dialogue;
- Refugees and IDPs are held in limbo as ‘political pawns’ in protracted inter- and intra-state conflict-settings e.g. refugee camps;
- Governments themselves are party to the armed conflict and therefore associated with the very act of forced displacement and/or are blind to it;
- Governments or non-state actors appeal for support to address unexpected inflows and feared social disruptions;
- Progressive government policies, where a client government requires targeted political economy data to provide compensation and comprehensive reparation, including restitution of land and other assets;
- Integrated efforts by development agencies and governments to address the challenges of forced displacement, and multi-donor sub-regional strategic approaches to forced displacement.

Comprehensive PEAs examine the actors, interests, and factors contributing to forced displacement in contexts like these and in more permissive environments, exposing the deeper connections between stakeholders, policies, and variables such as geography, natural resource use, ethnic relations and historical grievances.

Cases where the host government may be closed to such analysis or chiefly responsible for forced displacement are among the most difficult environments to contemplate PEAs. Multi-lateral
institutions like the World Bank or UN organizations are frequently sensitive to the interests and preferences of host government institutions, and while states may constrain or enable sensitive research on forced displacement, it is also the case that developmental actors may self-police their own research products in order not to offend local counterparts.  

In other words, opportunities and constraints in designing and conducting political economy research on forced displacement, or in determining a set of remedies based on that data, are often defined by the client state.  *Information asymmetry* may result between supply, or the body and implications of the original data that is collected, and the demand for it.  The result may be an abridged final product that undergoes substantial editing in successive validation exercises.  It may also be the case that the research design is rendered benign or is substantially revised from the start.  But it may also entail forgoing the involvement of a host government at the outset and completing a robust PEA in order to generate data that may open the political space to influence positive reforms among accessible counterparts within host institutions.

Navigating this “political economy of political economy research” is indispensable in determining how, and whether it will be productive, to conduct such analyses during the early stages of a study's inception.  The decision to move forward with political economy research should be made after the integrity of the findings can be assured and the dissemination and resulting analysis will reach its intended audience.

### 3.2 Typical Steps in Political Economy Assessments of Forced Displacement

Political economy assessments of forced displacement generally follow the sequence of steps outlined below.  These eight elements of forced displacement PEAs are based on the experience and best practices derived from the case studies commissioned for this note.

**Table 1: Designing, Conducting, and Disseminating Political Economy Assessments**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Steps and Considerations</th>
<th>Detail</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Analysis of interest of client(s)</strong></td>
<td>Is the PEA demand or supply driven? Is access granted or possible to key informants and areas? Are there difficult constraints placed on research from the outset by clients or other actors? Will targeted or broad and appropriate dissemination of the results of the work be possible? Considerations like these should factor into a “go/no go” decision. If the PEA proceeds, the following steps then take place.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Analysis of the Historical and Present Day Context** | When initiating a PEA, develop an overview of the contextual drivers of the forced displacement situation including:  
- History, regional and country context.  
- Overview of key actors, factors, interests  
- Develop a profile of refugee/IDP characteristics |
| Develop a scope of work | ● Determine strategic relevance and scope of work (e.g. geographic area, key variables, field work, survey needs).  
● Identify format of the expected report.  
● Consult with government and country teams to determine key stakeholders level and levels of cooperation and support to be expected from host government and Bank counterparts. |
| Locating appropriate consultant, or organization | ● Identify specific skills sets of consultants, firms or organizations.  
● Mixed (local/international), multi-disciplinary teams familiar with WB tend to provide more comprehensive analyses. |
| Select research methodologies | In consultation with consultant and client, select research methodologies (including closed menu and open-ended interview processes, household surveying, focus group approaches, CLIP methodologies, key informant interviews, direct observation, mapping) and expectations. |
| Conduct research | ● Frame analytical approach in terms of “actors”, “factors”, and “interests” as described above in section 2.0.  
● Profile the current needs of the displaced.  
● Examine drivers, opportunities and constraints of FD.  
● Assess prospects for durable solutions.  
● Map relevant policies and operations by governments and development actors.  
● Distill analytical, policy, programmatic recommendations.  
● Ensure methodological rigor and compliance with ethical protocols during data collection and its use. |
| Draft PEA results (see section 3.4 below for additional detail) | • Depending on the original scope of the PEA, focus on providing a comprehensive historical and present day account of the FD situation, inclusive of scope and social and demographic profiles of the displaced and their hosts.  
• Highlight: operationally relevant impacts, costs and benefits of forced displacement.  
• Describe the actors, factors and interests most relevant to the situation.  
• Describe the prospects for programming where the displaced reside or for durable solutions.  
• Provide a “map” of existing policies and operations portfolios by governments and other actors including bilaterals, UN agencies, NGOs, the private sector and the Bank.  
• Provide recommendations for additional analytical work, policies and/or programs. |
| Validate results | • Hold discussions with relevant Bank Country Management Units (CMUs) and government or other stakeholders to summarize and validate findings and recommendations.  
• Early drafts and presentations are useful points of departure for validation. |
| Disseminate results | • Effective dissemination of PEA and its impact on operations are positively correlated.  
• Strategic and diversified targeting of audiences and actors with special relevance to integrated/regional initiatives is critical during dissemination.  
• Avoid numbing statistics; provide concise but nuanced and illustrative accounts.  
• Depending on the client, results may be best illustrated with accompanying PowerPoint, and workshops. |
| Partnership approach | • Where possible and supportive, ensure a strong partnership approach with client government counterparts and CMUs throughout the process to generate opportunities for joint and coordinated action in the follow-up to the study.  
• Early engagement amongst partners in design phases is critical for subsequent cohesion and effective collaboration. |
3.3 Field Research Methodologies

Designing and conducting a political economy analysis requires flexibility in the selection of methods used to collect data. The context of displacement, the capacities of the research team, and the client requesting the study each influence design decisions on such issues as which geographic areas will be visited, which (if any) government or aid organizations may facilitate access, and how should informants for the study be approached. Favored field research methods include closed menu and open-ended interview processes, household surveying, focus group approaches, use of CLIP methodologies, key informant interviews and direct observation. Research methods like these may be applied directly or through local collaborators that leverage more nuanced indigenous understandings of the territory, culture, and the ability to access difficult to reach populations. These field research methods are often combined with literature reviews, surveys of secondary data, and third party interviews with experts familiar with the displacement situation.

The choice of appropriate research methods (and field tactics) is often influenced by such factors as restrictions on movement or legitimate security concerns for researchers and informants alike. By way of example, researchers in a recent USAID political economy study of conflict and displacement in Zimbabwe first obtained letters of invitation from influential traditional leaders and professional local security personnel to conduct research within marginalized communities where political violence is commonplace. Trusted local researchers driving ordinary vehicles with local license plates then travelled to these communities, assuming a low profile to reduce surveillance by informal groups of partisan gatekeepers. Once inside these settlements, researchers quietly convened focus groups in local houses, in addition to key informant interviews with local traditional leaders and police authorities, where possible. Identities and field data were encrypted and sent electronically via mobile phone to Harare, eliminating the need to carry a paper record of data collection.

Similar methods were used to study forced displacement in Somalia, where local researchers conducted primary data collection in Mogadishu and Doolow in ways that accommodated the security of informants and the mobility constraints faced by researchers. In conflict situations, data collection is often circumscribed by limited access and the politicization of information. Increasingly, affected populations create networks of trusted civic informants inside countries that communicate via social media, and this has been a useful way of assessing both the conditions of the forcibly displaced and the magnitude of internal population flows.

The use of such approaches is illustrative of how both formal and informal constraints can become determinants in the design and conduct of PEAs. This is particularly important when developing inferential or causal political economy analyses that heavily depend on primary data collection to explain strategic interactions between actors and the potential to move the status quo to a new equilibrium. Descriptive political economy analyses, on the other hand, may more easily rely solely on literature reviews, secondary source data, and third party interviews to create an “analytical map” of stakeholders’ interests.
3.4 Core Features of a Written PEA

The following six steps provide authors of PEAs with recommendations for preparing the written results of the data gathering exercise. 46 This should not be understood as an exhaustive or rigid outline of a written PEA. Each forced displacement situation is context specific and may require customization and inclusion of additional topics.

1. History, Regional and Country Context

Forced displacement (FD) is often the result of an accumulated set of events; it is helpful to begin any political economy analysis with an overview of the historical forces, political dynamics, key actors and present day implications that may have caused it.

2. Draft a Displacement Profile

Data on duration, scale of displacement, location, key demographic characteristics of FD populations (IDPs, refugees, asylum seekers, and returnees). Statistical accounts should be accompanied by dynamic and qualitative descriptions of the ethnic, geographic and socio-economic characteristics, identifying issues related to gender, children, elderly, and offering information on the coping strategies and mobility patterns.

3. Identify Actors, Factors and Interests

A dynamic description of the drivers of displacement, as well as the interests, power relations, (dis)incentives for polititical solutions, and distribution of resources among key actors and institutions. Typical actors include host populations, governments, leaders, political groups, aid agencies, displaced communities but also paramilitary groups and various intermediaries, etc.
4. Needs Analysis of the Displaced and Displacement Prospects
In order to provide operational recommendations, the short, medium, and long-term deficits (costs and impacts) endured by the displaced and their hosts should be identified. These deficits can be classified using four thematic pillars:

i) Degree of access to land, housing and property;
ii) Ability to practice, or return to, pre-existing livelihoods;
iii) Current levels of service delivery;
iv) Degree of participation in governance, resource allocation decisions.

5. Map Existing Displacement Programs
Review existing programs within the World Bank’s portfolio (and others) that may directly or indirectly address forced displacement and the deficits described earlier. Additional information on government programs, civic actors, and the work of other development actors will also highlight gaps and constraints for targeted development action.

6. Provide Analytical, Operational and Policy Recommendations
The recommendations section should be tailored to relevant development audiences within governments, UN agencies, bilaterals, NGOs and others that are deemed crucial to addressing the problems described in the analysis. Short, medium, longer-term perspectives of the FD situation, possible mitigating and development measures, their political and implementation feasibility, as well as strategic entry points for policy dialogue should be discussed. Links with existing or proposed Bank operations and ideas for new analytical, operational, and policy activities for the Bank and other development actors should also be provided, where appropriate.
3.5 Disseminating the PEA

While the structural presentation of PEA data is relatively straightforward, content and “marketing” of PEA products may be anything but unambiguous. There are many subtle factors that may influence the quality of analysis, how the findings of political economy research are presented, and how any recommendations are received.

A failure to anticipate political and institutional interest in the results of political economy analyses is frequently the cause of unrewarding validation or dissemination outcomes. The receptivity of an intended audience, be it a World Bank country team or a government counterpart, is often directly proportional to the degree to which these parties have participated in determining the scope of the study at its inception, for instance. In addition, the use of certain words may aggravate an audience (e.g. use of the term “refugee” where a host government declines to apply such a status to the displaced) and even the term “political economy analysis” may raise alarm and be changed to “context analysis” instead. Moreover, certain terminology may alternatively aid in getting a point across, such as references to “social cohesion”, “community resilience” or to “fragile states” and similar favored discourse within the World Bank at present. Knowing the audience for a study’s findings, the originating context of the political economy study itself, as well as the actors and factors impacted by the study will help make it possible to reference sources, frame recommendations and to craft language familiar and useful to an intended audience.
4.0 Outcomes of Political Economy Analyses of Forced Displacement: Analytical, Programmatic, and Policy Lessons Learned

Ideally, political economy analyses should be available and referenced as programmatic interventions are designed and then implemented. Situations of forced displacement are complex and few options may immediately exist for durable solutions in many of these countries. Instead, interim developmental interventions that improve conditions for the forcibly displaced are often required, and these interventions, such as land adjudication mechanisms, clarification of citizenship requirements, increased mobility and access to economic participation, improved services for hosts and the displaced, and livelihood assistance, often begin to create conditions for durable solutions over time. Implementing appropriate and effective developmental interventions similar to these actions requires research data that reveals opportunities and constraints in a useful and timely way.

The following sections highlight several analytical, policy, and operational lessons drawn from the PEA country cases presented in this paper. Not only are these examples useful in demonstrating typical recommendations that result from PEA studies, these initiatives also serve as examples of how political economy analyses may reveal root causes and drivers of displacement in ways that make targeted developmental interventions easier to identify.

4.1 Analytical Lessons Learned

A strong PEA will reveal as much about what are the knowledge gaps as to what is known. PEAs often conclude with recommendations for further research and data. The following examples profile three common areas where further analysis is typically required:

**Diagnosing the Problem: Registering and Surveying the Internally Displaced**

In order to better understand the contextual and institutional factors shaping violent conflict and forced displacement, it is necessary to undertake an analysis of the nature, scale, and patterns of the displaced as an essential first step. This typically entails a detailed identification and registration of internally displaced persons. Of course, one difficulty is obtaining accurate numbers of the displaced, given the fear of some to be identified, and the difficulty in even defining the beginning point (criteria for qualifying as an IDP) and end point (level of IDP vulnerability) of displacement. In many cases, multiple and recurring displacements even within a given locality is common, particularly in urban settings, requiring more targeted local research to ascertain the true character and scope of a displacement scenario.

In Colombia, it is reported that only a little more than 70% of the displaced households are registered in the Government’s United Registration System of Displaced Persons (RUPD). An independent NGO (CODHES) counting of the displaced using multiple, different sources at the local level especially in areas where national and local civilian authorities are absent has called attention to this problem and helped remedy the numbers. Also, legislation providing transparent criteria to evaluate the authenticity of victims as in Colombia’s new Victims Law has been a useful mechanism in clarifying the actual numbers and identifying the displaced through a transparent registration process.
While the registration process helps to provide a profile in terms of age and structure, that is, women, youth, and other vulnerable categories, as well as perceived causes of displacement, it is not a substitute for a comprehensive IDP survey as that undertaken jointly by the World Bank and the World Food Program in Mindanao. This survey, completed as a result of recommendations in the PEA for Mindanao, was done on a carefully designed sample basis, measured a range of independent variables from perceived government legitimacy, security, housing, social service access, livelihood opportunities, access to land, work, training and credit as well as basic needs (education, health, water), and social support networks or social capital. These variables are then correlated with the dependent variable of decision making among the displaced regarding the fundamental options of staying in situ, returning to communities of origin, or resettlement in a third locality. The findings illustrated that security and livelihood concerns usually related to property rights far outweigh other considerations in the perceived priorities of the displaced. The survey profiling exercise plays an important role in understanding the needs and priorities of the displaced, an essential ingredient to designing an effective program of development interventions either in place or elsewhere for both refugees and internally displaced persons.\textsuperscript{49}

A quantitative displacement survey such as this, either as part of a PEA or a follow-up to fill gaps in the data, goes beyond traditional methodologies such as focus groups, key informant interviews, and more general IDP needs assessments. This type of analytical work examines the aspirations of the displaced, perceptions, and agency or decision-making. It identifies key factors and weighs trade-offs among them in determining IDP behavior vis-à-vis durable solutions. When connecting this survey information to a registration and counseling or information sharing process, it enables relevant, customized program design for generating more durable solutions to displacement.

**Assessing the Opportunity Structure in Receptor Communities**

Understanding the characteristics and decision-making processes of the displaced is a necessary part of the programming equation. However, by itself, it is insufficient. Feasible opportunities for integration into existing localities, return and reintegration to communities of origin, or resettlement in a third locality, should be assessed. Here, a second important diagnostic exercise is useful. Assessing the opportunity structure or markets in receptor community environments is required, and it entails, at minimum, assessing the arable land or property market; employment opportunities; service delivery; credit availability; the practical functionality of formal and informal dispute resolution mechanisms; and access to knowledge and information. This provides deeper contextual understanding of the constraints of future programming than a simpler mapping exercise of factors and stakeholder interests.

The above elements are all critical in addressing the risks of landlessness, joblessness, and homelessness. However, the expropriation of land, particularly for rural populations, is potentially harmful in that it undermines the very foundation upon which a displaced person’s livelihood and identity are often rooted. Colombia’s Victims Law for Reparations and Restitution, for instance, is very much about adjudicating property rights of the displaced and thus enabling the reestablishment of a related viable livelihood. Efforts are made on a case-by-case basis to either return the displaced
property of origin or provide fair compensation or reparation for its loss to the displaced victim. Having observed the importance of this legal step toward enabling a durable solution for the displaced, it should be noted that land reform without agrarian or agricultural reform does not work since so many of the displaced return to agricultural pursuits at their place of origin or in a new location. In addition, even with the economic and technical means to make the land productive, if basic security requirements are not met, the displaced will be subject to a continuation of the vicious cycle of violence generated by multiple displacements.

**Urban Labor Markets, Employment and Counseling Services, and Sustainable Livelihoods**

As noted earlier in this report, many displaced persons, particularly those in urban settings, may weigh the costs and benefits of not returning to their communities of origin. Instead, they may choose, for rational reasons of security and unclear property rights affecting their livelihood opportunities (not to mention poor basic service access), to remain in place. To assist those choosing to stay in such situations of protracted displacement (mostly in urban and peri-urban areas), it is useful to undertake a labor market survey and design local information, counseling and referral systems (ICRS) to assist them in finding jobs and accessing skills and credit necessary for urban self-employment or wage labor. The typical short-term response is to expand the existing safety net and to organize labor-intensive public works. However, such actions, while they may be useful in the short term, are no substitute for creating sustainable jobs. Labor market surveys are frequently found among the many typical analytical recommendations of PEAs.

**4.2 Policy Lessons Learned**

In addition to analytical lessons, it is often the case that PEAs of forced displacement also culminate in policy recommendations to address situations of forced displacement. These recommendations are often provided in tandem with additional analytical work and complementary operational interventions. Below, find examples of policy recommendations emerging from the case studies conducted for this note.

**Natural Resource Governance**

As noted above, land and the struggle over natural resources is tightly connected to sustainable livelihoods for the majority of displaced persons. Access to high value, readily tradable commodities on the land, e.g., water, gold, diamonds, coltan, etc., is equally both a cause and a solution to forced displacement. The Eastern Congo is a clear example of where the struggle for high value commodities, such as gold and coltan is a cause of forced displacement. The West African states of Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea contain diamonds, particularly alluvial diamonds, which can be mined in a low technology, labor-intensive manner. Finally, the scarcity of water in the Sudan and the neighboring Sahel states of Chad and the Central African Republic is another example of where displacement due to armed conflict over natural resources prevails.

Opportunities for policy solutions to forced displacement due to natural resource struggles and environmental scarcity are numerous. The need for a transparent legal framework or *governance mechanism for the mining of diamonds* embedded in a *Mining Regulatory Law in Sierra Leone* and the *registration and sanctioning of illicit trade* in so called “conflict diamonds” are examples of
governance vehicles for managing conflict and preventing displacement. Development agencies are also advocating similar mining regulatory laws in the Eastern Congo as a part of the solution to conflict and displacement there.

Citizenship, Gender Equality and International Obligations
In Cote d’Ivoire and Liberia, development actors are urging governments to revise their citizenship laws to more easily accommodate long-term resident refugees and to enable women to own property and to enjoy full citizenship rights when they marry into local families. In the Middle East and North Africa region, most states are not signatories to the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its subsequent 1967 Protocol. In light of recent forced displacement crises in the region, several states have been urged to reexamine this stance and to afford refugee populations the right to live and work in local communities.

The World Bank, Development Actors and the Requirements of Addressing Forced Displacement
On the operational and financing fronts for the World Bank and others, the options for addressing displacement are: (a) restructuring existing ongoing projects and reallocating funds between categories with relevant objectives that mainstream displacement; and/or (b) providing smaller scale pilot interventions or action research projects using more flexible grant funding, such as the World Bank’s State and Peacebuilding Fund (SPF) or USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives “venture capital” rapid transition grants mechanism. PEAs typically result in suggestions for such pilots or larger scale mainstreaming initiatives along with policy reforms that may address the crisis at hand.

Ultimately, the variety and range of causes and issues related to displacement cannot be solved by any single development agency. It will be necessary to both develop a division of labor among donors as well as a coordinated effort both in defining the problem and designing and implementing integrated program solutions. Political economy analyses of situations of forced displacement may serve as important, foundational steps in doing this and in identifying where program and policy opportunities exist to transform conditions on the ground. The World Bank can be instrumental in emphasizing the importance of revealing these political economy underpinnings of displacement, and in convening donor forums in various conflict-affected countries to help crystallize points of prioritization, comparative advantage, mutual learning, and donor collaboration in finding interim and durable solutions for the displaced.

4.3 Programmatic Lessons Learned
Operational or programmatic recommendations resulting from PEAs typically advocate developmental interventions that ameliorate the burdens of displacement on IDPs, refugees and their hosts. These are highly context-dependent and in many cases are framed by security considerations and the level of interest and available resources by client states and assistance actors. The following sections provide examples of programmatic recommendations resulting from the PEA case studies. These recommendations are presented as illustrative of the “four pillar” framework developmental impacts often caused by forced displacement:
   i. Restoring Land, Housing and Property;
   ii. Reestablishing Livelihoods;
iii. Improving Access to Services; and
iv. Inclusion in Accountable and Responsible Governance.

Land, Housing and Property
In Côte d'Ivoire, the government’s decision to use the pre-war land titling law of 1998 that recognizes customary rural land rights is a long and poorly understood process requiring substantial financial resources to navigate – and significant (and absent) institutional capacity for the state to implement. Recommendations that came out of the PEA included: reducing the cost and complexity of this certification process; replacing lost identity documents; and providing a path to citizenship for long standing migrants would increase livelihood security and encourage Ivoirians to participate in state-led land tenure reform, altogether helping to consolidate the peace.

Reestablishment of Livelihoods
In Mindanao and elsewhere, community based and community driven development (CDD) projects are often deemed a necessary antidote to poverty and underdevelopment. However, the scale of such projects is typically too small to create the market access and critical mass for transformative development.\(^{50}\) The PEAs collectively indicate that such programs must go to the next level and improve infrastructure as well as connect small holders in empowered communities to larger markets. Work is now being undertaken in Mindanao, Colombia, the Sahel, and the Eastern Congo to develop such integrated regional development projects to address this limitation of CDD. In this regard, the World Bank and other development actors are also now adopting a sub-regional strategic approach to development in the Great Lakes Region with the need to address large-scale displacement in that sub-region from a development perspective.\(^{51}\)

Reestablishing Livelihoods Through Security Sector Reform and Economic Reintegration
Failed reintegration programs for ex-combatants from Colombia to Aceh, and from Mindanao to Côte d'Ivoire have inadvertently encouraged rent seeking, political exploitation, and natural resource expropriation when guns and recruits are readily available. Reducing recurrent armed conflict, criminality, and attendant displacement often requires effective social and economic reintegration programs for ex-combatants as part of larger post-conflict development assistance. For example, in Aceh, switching from poorly targeted individual livelihood assistance programs to community based market and economic development programs led to a more locally controlled and accountable distribution of peace dividends and a decrease in violence and displacement. In a related fashion, putting in place and enforcing complementary laws to regulate private armed groups as in Colombia is an important legal deterrent to the proliferation of non-state armed groups and resulting increased displacement.

Delivery of Services
From the Eastern Congo to the South of Colombia and the border areas of Myanmar, many states struggle to reassert their authority over ungoverned areas within their frontiers. Without core functions, such as rule of law or citizen security in areas where there is contestation of power, violence between states, insurgencies, or criminal enterprises will typically generate cycles of internal displacement and refugees. In most cases, only political settlements will create the
conditions for lasting peace and stability. In other cases, and in the interim, targeted technical assistance to build the capacity of state institutions may address many of these deficits.

Similarly, leadership of local governments also often requires capacity-building assistance. At the local level in situations of displacement, this more often takes the form of technical assistance for planning, budgetary and fiscal management, procurement, monitoring and implementation for results designing and delivering initiatives for the internally displaced. As noted in the Somalia case above, support to urban planning that connects IDPs to productive assets and markets can go a long way toward creating opportunities for durable solutions, especially with regard to livelihood regeneration.

**Accountable and Responsive Governance**

Zimbabwe is a classic case of armed political violence forcing displacement in the advent of elections. In Mindanao, local elites and national political figures forcibly displaced opposition voters in the lead up to national elections. Governance issues have also plagued Cote d’Ivoire where there is a lack of clarity around the customary versus modern methods of dealing with land questions. In Mindanao, the Philippines, weak state legitimacy has contributed to displacement and overall contestation. And in South Sudan, social and governance structures are complicated by shifting group dynamics within communities following displacement. Overall, these various displacement situations illustrate the complicated authority structures that must be understood for an effective development response to be designed.

Civil society has and can play an active role in advocating for greater transparency and integrity in the electoral process. Enhancing the capacity of professional media outlets to expose abuses of power and manipulation of voting through electoral related violence also may help mitigate displacement. It goes without saying that strengthening civil society organizational capacity and the professionalism and capacities of journalists to undertake such oversight, coverage and advocacy is an important contribution that development agencies can make to durable solutions for displacement due to armed conflict.
5.0 Conclusion

Political economy analysis often reveals the layered and complex origins and current characteristics of forced displacement crises. Conducted at the outset of operations, PEA can inform and influence the design and outcomes of programming, policies, and research that address forced displacement. To be successful, however, PEA should be understood as a comprehensive exercise that requires awareness of who the important counterparts for the study will be and how they may be invested in the outcome of the study before PEA even begins. From the earliest design phase to dissemination of the results, PEA is essentially an exercise in effectively collecting relevant data and then crafting it appropriately for specific stakeholders.

Doing this well depends on the outcome of key decisions that are to made throughout the entire sequence of PEA, as described in the sections of this note, including the identification of key counterparts, drafting a thorough scope of work, selecting appropriate research counterparts, selection of appropriate methodologies, lucid and organized drafting of results, and appropriate targeting of validation and dissemination exercises. This note, and the case studies that are summarized and referenced above, are designed to assist in completing these steps and to encourage more frequent and effective use of political economy analysis in evaluating and addressing forced displacement.
Annex I: Political Economy of Forced Displacement Case Summaries

CASAMANCE, SENEGAL PEA SUMMARY

Context
Recent displacement estimates range from 10,000-40,000 IDPs and over 20,000 refugees in neighboring countries (Gambia and Guinea-Bissau). At the heart of the conflict are land rights, cultural discrimination, and lacking employment and educational opportunities. Economic and political marginalization, combined with weak infrastructure, contrast with the region’s high agricultural potential. Marginalization by Dakar was accentuated by immigration of Northern business and administrative elites increasing the dominance of Wolof in language and religion. Concentration of power in the hands of Northerners became problematic when land was expropriated, agriculture modernized and the “sacred forest” a source of state predation. In sum, historical land policies, inequality, marginalization, weak governance, and entrenched poverty have fostered continued impoverishment and arrested development for the displaced.

Key Issues
- **Land and property rights** are instrumental in guaranteeing livelihood opportunities and durable solutions for the displaced. Access to land has a direct impact on livelihoods for both displaced and non-displaced groups. State institutions do not now effectively guarantee the (legal) status of land titles.
- **Joblessness, homelessness and marginalization.** Few job possibilities exist for trained individuals in the region. Reemployment is mostly in the NGO sector or illicit activities. People sleep outdoors or are in private accommodations at the place of refuge. If the IDPs stay with host families, cohabitation strains the economic and social resources of the hosts.
- **Social disarticulation.** The economic and social situation of both hosts and displaced is precarious. The price for solidarity is a considerable deterioration of living conditions. The social atomization of the Casamance and the government’s paternalistic centralization nourish conflict and impede development.
- **Food insecurity** prevails in the whole region. Refugees, IDPs, hosts, and most communities in the region are equally affected. Increased morbidity, and other indicators for vulnerability are highest anywhere.

Policy and Operational Recommendations
Factors informing the choices of displaced groups include property ownership, security, social networks, jobs and educational opportunities, and access to basic services. Younger generations who have grown up in urban contexts often do not want to return to rural areas. They lack the necessary training and skills to work in the agricultural sector. Several **policy and operational recommendations** are as follows:
- **Provide technical assistance to:** (i) undertake a comprehensive displaced peoples survey measuring the key factors in determining behavior vis-à-vis durable solutions; and (ii) review land tenure policy to clarify property ownership and user rights; map land disputes; and assess current dispute resolution processes, including the relationship of traditional and modern mechanisms.
- **Establish information and legal aid centers** to support the resolution of land disputes. The Maison de Justice in Ziguinchor could be strengthened by training their staff on the rights of IDPs and refugees.
- **Promote employment and educational opportunities.** A labor market research in Ziguinchor to identify specific job opportunities and synchronize with education and vocational training.
- **Rebuild social networks.** Different forms of social capital have been strengthened or weakened depending on the groups and thus leading to forms of exclusion compounded by changes in social dynamics.
- **Monitor and evaluate.** Integrate specific indicators related to durable solutions into development monitoring systems to inform choices of the displaced and design of development interventions.
COLOMBIA PEA SUMMARY

Context
Despite being a functioning State with economic growth, Colombia has over five million IDPs (11% of the population). Women, youth and other vulnerable groups bear the brunt of forced displacement. Under 25 years olds constitute 48% of the total population and 65% of IDPs. Urban forced displacement mixes with economic migration to challenge the search for durable solutions. Forced displacement has resulted from actors seeking to control territory and access routes, diversify funding, and establish legal and illegal agricultural production, mining, and drug trade. Government policy has shifted from humanitarian assistance to victims and transitional justice and socio-economic reintegration of former combatants under the Justice and Peace Law (2008) to addressing needs and aspirations of displaced under the Victims Reparation and Restitution Law (2010). This law supports reparation, including land restitution and compensation, physical and mental rehabilitation, and symbolic measures to dignify victims.

Key Issues
The political economy dynamics affects displacement through criminality, human rights violations, and land expropriation resulting in continuing violence, impoverishment and vulnerability. Key issues are:

- **Inadequate displaced registration.** There is a lack of information accompanied by insecurity, threats, and arbitrary denial of displaced person status by authorities;
- **Failed reintegration.** Demobilized combatants often turn to criminality as a livelihood, triggering displacement due to extortion, kidnapping, threats, armed confrontations, and land expropriation;
- **Dispossessed land and property.** Informality of property and land ownership (40% of rural property lacks formal titling), and a flawed land registration process facilitate displacement;
- **Illegal drug production and trafficking.** Actors (guerrilla, paramilitaries, gangs, criminal organizations-BACRIM) vie for power over disputed territories for economic gains and;
- **Poorly governed mining and agro-industry.** The mining and agro-industry sectors are often exploited by non-state armed groups and organized criminals that fill the governance vacuum.

Policy and Operational Recommendations

- **Create a unified victims registry.** One of the challenges is to build a Unified Victims Registry;
- **Undertake a survey of IDP decision-making.** Articulate IDP perceptions, needs and aspirations under varying conditions enabling more “locally customized” programs;
- **Review mining, agro-industry, and private security sectors’ regulatory framework.** Focusing on displacement effects on social cohesion, livelihoods, and indigenous culture patrimony; and
- **Evaluate reintegration programs.** Assess programs and survey former combatants to better understand their decision-making and improve alternative livelihood programs.
- **Support operations to include integrated IDP registration, information, counseling system;**
- **Promote a public information campaign** and improve registration and program planning;
- **Conduct labor market analysis and informal sector training and employment subsidies** connecting counseling and referrals with apprenticeship programs and employment placement;
- **Establish pilot municipal collective reparation and restitution programs** for livelihoods and capacity building–joint training/programming of reparations, restitution and reintegration teams;
- **Strengthen civil society capacity** for public information campaigns educating IDPs of rights;
- **Set up a donor displacement partnership forum** to enhance knowledge exchange/coordination.
COTE D'IVOIRE PEA SUMMARY

Context
Large-scale conflict broke out in Côte d'Ivoire in 2002 and triggered multiple waves of displacement. Following a decrease in violence, conflict resumed in 2010 following the contested election between Allasane Ouattara and Laurent Gbagbo, resulting in over one million IDPs and 150,000 refugees. Although a period of relative peace from 2011-2012 prompted significant returns, large numbers of refugees and IDPs remain unwilling or unable to return due to continued perceptions of insecurity, the destruction of their homes, a lack of access to basic services, and widespread land disputes. Durable solutions for IDPs and refugees and reconciliation between communities have been challenged by: economic decline and inequality; worsening land tenure disputes (e.g., boundary, occupation, sale, and inheritance leading to violence from waves of occupation, opportunistic expansion, and contested sales); and unclear citizenship rights (ethnic cleavages and intercommunity tensions exacerbated by questions of citizenship and nationality).

Key Issues
- **Conflicts** over access to productive resources (property rights) and citizenship (ethnic politics) and weak institutional capacity (poor governance) are key issues shaping IDP and refugee return:
- **Legal challenges.** These include: weak implementation of the 1965 protected Forest Code; the length, cost and complexity of the 1998 Land Law; and the lack of personal documentation and access to citizenship rights;
- **Dispute Resolution.** The resolution of overlapping disputes rooted in decades of migration and contested occupation. The mandatory registration and titling process in the 1998 law remains expensive, complex and lengthy, delaying the dispute resolution process;
- **Protected forests.** Many displaced have settled illegally in protected forests, planting cash crops such as cacao and coffee; and
- **Traditional versus modern governance.** There is a lack of clear authority over land (i.e., customary and modern) in the context of successive violent displacement. Attendant social disruption has undermined the status of women.

Policy and Operational Recommendations
To help address the above issues the Bank could undertake the following actions:
- **Legal Reform.** Provide legal and legislative technical assistance to review and revise the nature and efficiency of implementation of 1965 Protected Forest Code, the 1998 Land Act, and the Citizenship Laws;
- **Capacity Building.** Strengthen traditional and modern mediation capacity for dispute resolution particularly with regard to property, including NGO and civil society education and advocacy;
- **Integration-Reintegration.** Survey displaced in varying situations and provide targeted social and economic integration-reintegration assistance such as community-based and driven basic service delivery, livelihood and forest management; and
- **Public Information.** Launch a public information campaign to educate the displaced about the laws governing property rights and citizenship.
EASTERN DRC PEA SUMMARY

Context
There are an estimated 2.8 million displaced persons in the Great Lakes Region. The displaced include about 151,000 refugees from other countries within the DRC, 416,000 refugees from the DRC in neighboring countries, and 2.2 million IDPs within the DRC. The majority of the internally displaced reside in the eastern provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu and Province Orientale, where continued instability and violence has uprooted more than two million people. Some areas of Eastern Congo are relatively stable, while others tend towards increased instability. Displaced persons are both victims and drivers of conflict. In particular, they can become active factors of instability, as they are often prime candidates for recruitment into armed groups purporting to represent the interests of a particular ethnic group. They typically reside in areas already facing socio-economic struggles and weak governance, further straining the competition for high value resources. Yet these areas often possess opportunities for economic development and reintegration that could turn displaced people into a valuable resource.

The primary causes of displacement in North Kivu are conflicts over land, resources, and identity in both the DRC and Rwanda. Land access is highly politicized, and to a great extent militarized, with armed groups enforcing land access through parallel administrations and violence. The lack of state administration and rule of law enables non-traditional land processes, and largely precludes conflict resolution. Local military commanders often replace the traditional leaders trained to uphold customary law, leading to decisions that respect neither traditional restitution rights nor international law. Many of the displaced are in a protracted displacement situation without a permanent solution in sight.

Key Issues
IDPs face several key obstacles that result in endemic poverty:
- The lack of access to basic services;
- An absence of clear identity documents;
- Limited livelihood opportunities, and
- Insufficient access to land.

Policy and Operational Recommendations
The Bank could support knowledge building, policy and operational activities that mainstream IDPs and refugees into strategies and operations for the population as a whole but with a specific focus on their unique vulnerabilities, needs, and capacities. Such activities could include:
- Building knowledge with UN partners through surveys and profiles of the displaced focusing on: (i) population movements, (ii) demographics of the displaced, (iii) the likelihood of further displacement, (iv) durable solutions prospects, (v) needs and (vi) aspirations of the displaced (the latter two disaggregated by age and gender);
- Dual targeting of both IDPs and host communities with area-based assistance that benefits both the returnees and the non-displaced population;
- Integrating displacement challenges and opportunities into country and regional strategic analysis (e.g., CAS, Poverty Assessments, Great Lakes Sub-regional Strategy, etc.);
- Reviewing the Bank portfolio to assess how relevant ongoing and planned activities: (a) cover geographic areas with displaced people; (b) are designed to give the displaced access as beneficiaries; and/or (c) could include sub-activities directly addressing the unique challenges of the displaced. Such activities could include short-term labor intensive public works and longer-term employment generation.
- Promoting participation, empowerment and reconciliation, by including IDPs and refugees in community decision-making processes; and
- Providing targeted mediation and capacity building for customary land dispute resolution.
LIBERIA PEA SUMMARY

Context
From 1989-2003 armed struggle over political power and access to resources resulted in the displacement of over one million persons and the death of about 200,000 people. The Ivorian crises in 2002 led to large-scale flows of some 20,000 refugees into neighboring Liberia. The political violence that followed the 2010 election in Côte d'Ivoire led to a larger refugee flow of over 170,000 Ivorian into Liberia. Displacement in Liberia has therefore affected the majority of the population and has had long-term effects on social cohesion and access to decision-making and property rights. Short and long-term impacts on livelihoods have also been felt by the displaced and host communities.

Key Issues

- Local governance and social cohesion have been greatly affected by displacement. Many displaced stayed in communities other than their own where they became “strangers”. The poor integration of the displaced considered as strangers deprives them of access to decision-making and productive assets. The system of community governance that divides people into citizens and strangers has made it difficult a stranger to adjust into a new role.

- The ambiguity of property rights, the history of multiple displacements, and current investor interest makes those who did not return to their communities of origin particularly vulnerable. As people moved from areas where they acquired land through ethnic related kin to areas dominated by other ethnic groups, different customary rules governed their access to land. Where large farms and mining companies are setting up, there is a great risk that returning displaced will lose access to land and livelihoods.

- Rapid urbanization due to displacement into Monrovia has considerably strained the administrative capacity for services. Monrovia, which had a population of 400,000 before the war, has grown to over a million inhabitants.

- Security risks are still felt in areas along the border with Côte d'Ivoire. Insecurity in Côte d’Ivoire has led to recruitment of Liberians (especially former fighters) and to increased levels of crime along the border.

Policy and Operational Recommendations

The security, property rights, livelihoods, citizenship, social cohesion and governance challenges make it necessary for development actors to customize policy and programs to Liberia’s historical displacement due to the internal crisis and that in Côte d'Ivoire.

- Provide technical assistance. Provide technical assistance to review the government's legal and policy framework and strategy for addressing displacement to ensure clear citizen and property rights. If land allocation is impossible, restitution and reparation may be needed.

- Strengthen service delivery capacity. To respond to the service delivery crisis particularly in the high growth urban area of Monrovia, local service institutions and NGOs might be strengthened and programs better targeted to the displaced, potentially reduces their vulnerability.

- Regulate property transactions of foreign investors. Ensure that property rights are clear when allocating land to foreign and domestic investors particularly in agro-industry and mining.

- Strengthen border control and immigration. Prevent contagion effects of conflict by supporting border controls and border development initiatives.
MINDANAO, PHILIPPINE PEA SUMMARY

Context
Historical land policies, inequality, marginalization, weak governance, and perpetual armed conflict have conspired to ensure underdevelopment and displacement among the Muslims and Lumads of Mindanao. The confluence of armed conflict, corrupt politics, and the destruction/confiscation of productive assets are at the very heart of the political economy of displacement in Mindanao. Forced displacement has been a means to control strategic territory (land and natural resources) by influencing the movement and loyalties of the local population ensuring their deepening dependence in evacuation centers, temporary relocation site (sometimes a formally declared closed old evacuation site), or simply an urban or peri-urban squatter settlement. The numbers of displaced have ranged from a high of nearly 1 million in 2000 to a fluctuating 100-250,000 in 2012-13.

Key Issues
There are multiple issues including land tenure-property rights, livelihood opportunity, governance, security, access to basic services, and degree of social support shaping the decision making processes of IDPs around the options. They are as follows:

- **Land tenure and livelihood opportunities.** Despite attempts at agrarian reform over the years, property rights linked to livelihoods remains at the heart of forced displacement;

- **Governance, state legitimacy, and market connectivity.** Destroyed and confiscated economic resources, compounded by weak state legitimacy and limited market access have resulted in contestation, displacement, and relative deprivation;

- **Security sector reform.** To the extent that officers bid for “lucrative” local commands, they become “incidental war profiteers” and enablers of displacement; and

- **Basic services and information.** There is a lack of access to basic services and information, be it labor market and employment opportunities, security arrangement, and or human rights-legal advice.

Policy and Operational Recommendations
There is a need for a variety of policy and operation actions as follows:

- **Comprehensive IDP survey** measuring a range of factors (e.g., government legitimacy; security; housing; social services access-education, health, family planning; livelihood opportunities-access to land, work, training and credit; and social capital or relations/support networks) shaping IDP decisions;

- **Property rights and land tenure study** linked to the design of a land adjudication and mediation program and a compensation and or reparation fund;

- **Labor market survey** and a linked information, counseling and referral service urban development project to enhance livelihood, employment and income prospects;

- **Strengthening of local institutional capacity and leadership** of Local Government, NGOs, and CSOs especially in the areas of planning, fiscal management, procurement, monitoring, and implementation; and

- **Sub-regional area integrated economic reconstruction and development** program to enable a transformative, “development surge” bringing together a critical mass of local capacity, donor assisted multi-sector technical skills and financial resources.
SOMALIA PEA SUMMARY

Context
More than 20 years of internal conflict combined with drought has resulted in very high levels of voluntary and forced migration. Many communities have suffered multiple displacements from the forcible acquisition of their land by armed clans, resulting in a loss of assets and livelihoods. This has been exacerbated by a cycle of environmental disasters. The major source of income for households in all three major regions is livestock. Climate change and changing conflict patterns have led Somali pastoralist and agriculturalist households to either migrate as a family or to send family members to urban areas to seek alternative livelihood opportunities. There are a reported 1,020,644 refugees in neighboring countries and over one million IDPs within Somalia: 129,400 in Puntland, 919,400 in South Central Somalia and 84,000 in Somaliland. 50-60 percent are especially vulnerable female-headed households.

Key Issues
- **Humanitarian response**: The response across Somalia remains primarily humanitarian, with limited efforts to move towards a more long-term solution for those remaining in urban areas;
- **Poor governance**: This is in part an effect of the economic advantages the ‘IDP-label’ brings for local gatekeepers, clan leaderships, and local authorities, in terms of poor governance and corruption in the form of ‘aid taxation’;
- **Networks**: Challenges faced by IDPs are not very different from those of urban poor, lacking networks, clan, or family affiliations in the city that would help to ease their circumstances;
- **Livelihoods, land, services**: Agricultural production is contingent on voluntary return rooted in the ability to: sustainably re-engage in agricultural and pastoralist livelihoods; obtain secure land tenure; access basic services; and ensure security. Past experiences with return have been mixed due to the limited attention to sustainable livelihoods. Instead, returnees have received a return package for the first three months, which has proven insufficient from a development perspective, resulting in migration back to urban areas for services, security, and livelihoods.

Policy and Operational Recommendations
- **Support the Somali government to mainstream IDP issues** in the current ‘New Deal’ process, the Somalia Compact and National Development Plan;
- **Assist in the reform of land legislation** to enable a more legitimate land restitution and registration process that will ensure security of tenure for returnees and IDPs. The process should consider female-headed IDP households and their particular needs;
- **Undertake further analysis on the economic dimensions of IDP development**, focusing on increased agricultural production, land reform, and a more skilled work force;
- **Assist in the preparation of livelihood development programs** especially targeting female-headed households;
- **Support urban planning** and implementation in Mogadishu and small and medium-size towns across South-Central Somalia to ensure access to services and markets for displaced returnees;
- **Engage in better service delivery and improved infrastructure development programs** that would enhance economic growth and mobility; and
- **Build the capacity of local NGO** to provide services for refugees and IDPs in their areas of origin, as well as in urban areas of return where local government capacity is insufficient.
SOUTH SUDAN PEA SUMMARY

Context
South Sudan became an independent state on 9 July 2011. However, 30 years of fighting with the north (the second Sudanese civil war for independence) and internal conflicts—arising from competition over resources manifesting in border disputes, violent cattle rustling and conflicts among pastoralists and between these and agriculturists—had left the country economically and socially devastated. More than half of the country's population was living under the poverty line at formation and the country had the highest maternal mortality rate in the world. Additionally, prolonged conflicts have caused forced displacement of more than 5 million of the country's 8.3 million population. Further, problems with reintegration and re-establishment of livelihoods — due to competition over land and resources and the lack of capacity within receiving communities and authorities — have led to situations of secondary displacement of at least 10% of the returnees. Return of displaced to locations other than their communities of origin, has in turn contributed to rapid and unregulated urbanization.

Key Issues
Key issues for displaced in South Sudan include:

- **Social structures:** The study focused on the authority structures and land administration within communities of South Sudan and the impact of forced displacement on such dynamics. It found that development actors have a very weak understanding of these social structures in South Sudan often leading to mis-categorization of groups and actors. For instance, ethnic groups and tribes have generally been perceived as relatively fixed markers of belonging.

- **Parallel structures:** However, displaced populations complicate authority structures in society and force group dynamics to shift within communities. Authority structures continue to persist within displaced communities even where reintegration processes tried to “return” them to new communities. The study found such parallel structures continuing to function within the returnee/displaced populations, even after being ‘integrated’ into local communities.

- **Land tenure and livelihoods:** While social structures have implications on all aspects of displaced/returnee life, the most visible implications were on issues of land tenure/adjudication and on livelihoods—this included disputes involving double selling of land, illegal occupation, military land-grabs, unauthorized building, attempts to reclaim land without documentation etc.

- **Group identity:** The study found a connection between economic success of displaced/returnee populations and group identity, i.e. family, ecology, personal history, kinship, ethnic group, livelihood etc., and social networks. This underlined the important role that a shared displacement history seems to play in creating new trust networks and social capital.

Policy and Operational Recommendations

- **Map impacted communities:** Development actors should realize the absence of detailed empirical evidence on the social structures in South Sudan and their interplay with potential development objectives. Therefore, development programs should attempt to map impacted communities with regard to the specific objectives of a particular intervention.

- **Understand the local context:** In categorizing communities, development actors should be careful of the implications of markers in specific communities. For instance, when using language as a marker, one must understand which languages are considered locally to be spoken by ‘outsiders’.

- **Flexible community engagement:** Seeking community support for development poses the risk that development planning shapes community structures, rather than the other way round. Therefore, development programs need to be careful not to impose new structures by taking an ongoing, open and flexible approach to seeking community engagement.
ZIMBABWE SUMMARY PEA

Context
Historically, some 4,500 white commercial farmers have held 15.3 million hectares of agricultural land, or 40% of the total land area, while millions of Africans were overcrowded in communal lands covering 16.3 million hectares, or 42% of the total land. The mass exodus of Zimbabweans that began in 2000 is considered a series of overlapping crises. Terms such as reluctant migrants, humanitarian migrants, or forced migrants capture the element of forced displacement of migrants who left because of the crisis. The economic causes (e.g. hyperinflation, unemployment) of mass migration were at root political. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) almost halved between 1999 and 2008, life expectancy plummeted to the lowest in the world in 2006 (37 years for men; 34 years for women) and public services collapsed. Millions of households became food insecure. In each year from 2002 to 2009, the WFP provided food assistance to one-quarter to two-thirds of a population estimated at 12.5 million. Unprecedented numbers of Zimbabweans fled the country in search of security, educational opportunities, and livelihoods. Circular migration within southern Africa compounded the challenge of estimating the number of migrants. The 2012 UN Consolidated Appeal (CAP) estimated that 3 million Zimbabweans lived abroad, most in South Africa and Botswana.

Key Issues
- Unreliable displacement data;
- A lack of identity documents and asylum rights;
- Loss of farm workers’ land and contestation over housing, land and property rights;
- Lack of infrastructure and services for resettlement;
- Resettling diamond field evictees;
- Weak policy making capacity, coordination and funding especially for reintegration; and
- Insufficient political will as expressed in the failure to ratify the Kampala Convention.

Policy and Operational Recommendations
While the government has formulated draft migration policies, it has yet to establish policies to attract returnees. Recognition of displacement by the government would allow development actors to engage directly with displaced populations to promote durable solutions, addressing: (i) livelihoods; (ii) housing, land and property; (iii) inclusion in service delivery; and (iv) voice and participation. A range of policy and operational actions may be taken as follows:

- **Integration of displacement issues into national policies and strategies**;
- **Portfolio review of development programs**. Review how existing development programs (including health, water/sanitation, and education) can also benefit displaced populations;
- **Analysis of the dynamics of migration**. Examine opportunities for addressing the needs of individuals through greater understanding of the complexities of population movement;
- **Local reconciliation**. Study the traditional and modern approaches undertaken towards local reconciliation within return communities;
- **Human capacity**. Analysis of human development assets, including education, and health levels;
- **Land and property rights**. Contribute to the existing dialogue and knowledge on land issues with the objectives of both improving access and increasing tenure security in the short-term and in preparation for longer-term land reform;
- **Strengthen civil society advocacy** for the government to ratify the Kampala Convention, and sensitize stakeholders, chiefly local authorities on Internal Displacement;
- **Community-based planning and development programming** to bring together IDPs and host communities, strengthening social capital and social cohesion.
### Annex II: Comparisons of Actors, Factors, and Interests in Case Study PEs

#### Philippines (current estimated number of displacement 260,000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>unclear title to property</td>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>security and free fire zones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>uneven access to productive assets</td>
<td>MILF</td>
<td>retaining political power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cyclical conflict-driven displacement</td>
<td>Moro clan</td>
<td>accruing greater land resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Muslim tensions, with history Christian bias</td>
<td>Donors/NGOs</td>
<td>armed struggle &amp; self-determination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim-Muslim &quot;land grabbing&quot; Muslim oligarchs</td>
<td>GoP</td>
<td>land, labor, vote control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>poor access to justice: periodic martial law</td>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>access to state treasury funds (IRA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>poor market connectivity and high unemployment</td>
<td>Islamist militants</td>
<td>AFP militias provide employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>weak service delivery to IDP areas</td>
<td>IDP youth</td>
<td>sustained provision of relief/dev aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>electoral manipulation by local leaders</td>
<td></td>
<td>sectarian bias and distrust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>state periphery financial transfer manipulation</td>
<td></td>
<td>clan/gang control of trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>poor information flows</td>
<td></td>
<td>protect private corporate investment</td>
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<tr>
<td>under-resourced, narrowly focused dev interventions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>poor adjudication options for land disputes</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>youth disaffection contribute to conflict</td>
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#### Cote d'Ivoire (UNHCR: 126,668 IDPs with 40,000-80,000 newly displaced 2010-2011. 154,824 refugees originating from C'd'I)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>recurring conflict, often related to regional instability</td>
<td>allogene</td>
<td>profitable use of land resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shifts in power b/t (autochtone/allochtone/allogene)</td>
<td>autochtone</td>
<td>physical and livelihood security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>return impeded by physical insecurity, poor services</td>
<td>allochtone</td>
<td>predictable land tenure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on return, access to previous property often denied</td>
<td>elders</td>
<td>preserving large landowners interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>absence of coherent land tenure policies and laws</td>
<td>IDP youth</td>
<td>controlling access to land, assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>poor information on and understanding of current laws</td>
<td>GoDI</td>
<td>expanding secure access to land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>boundary/occupancy disputes, contested sales common</td>
<td>tuteurs</td>
<td>improved service delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vagueness of Ivorian citizenship identity</td>
<td>local government</td>
<td>predictable, enforceable adjudication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intra-group generational conflicts: youth disaffection</td>
<td>large land owners</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>land transfers or use agreements often verbal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>few methods to enforce dispute resolution agreements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>widespread lack of identity documents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>women can not inherit or sell land</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>poor extension of services into rural areas/forests</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>erosion of traditional authority to resolve land disputes</td>
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#### Zimbabwe (UNHCR: 80,000 - 1 million UNHCR - "circular migration" poses analytical problems; 2-4 million refugees IOM/UN CAP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>political &amp; economic outmigration (Bot/SA/Moz/Malawi)</td>
<td>war veterans</td>
<td>pol/econ change necc for return</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political roots of hyperinflation, unemployment</td>
<td>MDC-T</td>
<td>Only 50% wish near term return</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>patronage, war veterans, expropriation of farms remittances</td>
<td>ZAPU-PF</td>
<td>&quot;asylum&quot; in SA makes legality easier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>outmigration continues due to lack of change</td>
<td>diaspora</td>
<td>govt's curtailing arrivals from Zim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60% unemployment</td>
<td>police</td>
<td>xenophobia over lack of jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>declines in service delivery</td>
<td>military</td>
<td>COSATSU SA union org concerned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>election-related violence 2000 and 2008</td>
<td>black farm labor</td>
<td>Regional employers underpay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>internal displacement often due to govt punishment</td>
<td>white farm owner</td>
<td>Diaspora groups factionalized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>external FD tends to have economic origins</td>
<td>ZAPU supporters</td>
<td>IOM/UNHCR have limited influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 Mhambatsvina and Garika/Hani Kuhle</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>ARV available outside of Zim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ongoing harassment of opponents</td>
<td>regional hosts</td>
<td>MDC/ZANU not advocating for IDPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Displaced population is 40% female</td>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>GoZ does not recognize IDPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chidzwa diamond area evictions</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>circular migration changing to one way exit from Zim</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ease of &quot;asylum&quot; in SA opposed to in Bot/Moz/M/Zam</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulawayo poverty and unemployment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>return not encouraged by govt.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM and UNHCR underfunded</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>health care better outside of Zim for HIV</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Casamance, Senegal

(An estimated 15,000 registered refugees in Guinea-Bissau and Gambia.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fighting for independent Casamance since 1982</td>
<td>MFDC</td>
<td>land rights reform/tenure/rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermittent ceasefires, new openings for peace in 2012</td>
<td>Senegal AF</td>
<td>security buffer areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FD direct result of armed conflict and land acquisition</td>
<td>farmers</td>
<td>displacement for strategic gain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no clear distinction b/t ref/FD with close border with GB</td>
<td>traders</td>
<td>control land for crop sale profits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long term, short term, return mixed in S Casamance</td>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>control access for lucrative smuggling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>refugee/displaced highly mobile in border region</td>
<td>INGOs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>much circular flight and return</td>
<td>donors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>customary and statutory land tenure systems conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>salinization/climate change impacting return</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lack of infrastructure to facilitate trading</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FD try to enter labor markets in cities like Ziguinchor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of educational / vocational op with FD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>presence of land mines/UOX</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### DRC-eastern

(Desk study) (416,000 from DRC in other countries, 151,000 from other countries in DRC. An estimated 2,185,000 IDPs in DRC)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>diverse displaced and refugee communities</td>
<td>militants</td>
<td>core business rivalries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>majority of IDPs/ref originate N/S Kivus &amp; Orientale</td>
<td>FARC</td>
<td>access/control of land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>critical services like ed/health based on ability to pay</td>
<td>GDRC</td>
<td>lucrative looting opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disp/non-displaced have poor access to identity docs.</td>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>local autonomy, political control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rate of secondary and tertiary displacement very high</td>
<td>regional govs</td>
<td>access to land is &quot;militarized&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs on the move while trying to stay close to home</td>
<td>INGOs</td>
<td>military supplanting trad leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Displacement protracted</td>
<td>donors</td>
<td>IC &quot;does not want to own&quot; Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>formal employment unrealistic in rural areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>physical insecurity driving displacement in most cases</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>displaced and non-displaced often endure similar cond.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regaining land after displacement is difficult</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>land adjudication mechanisms lacking</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>north Kivu conflict most politicized, complex, existential</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>most displ. in informal settlements/hosts, not camps</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hot conflict ongoing, DDR processes not effective</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>additional ongoing displacement expected</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>multiple combatants with competing interests</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>state failure acute in eastern Congo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ongoing violence precludes engagement and return</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FD is result of and cause of conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>community powerbrokering creates patchwork &quot;policy&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Somalia

(PEA analysis incomplete)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>illegal land grabbing and occupation</td>
<td>clans</td>
<td>control over land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unclear jurisdiction of authorities</td>
<td>regional auth</td>
<td>stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>three legal systems: secular, customary (xeer), Sharia</td>
<td>local govs</td>
<td>improved services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>little legal capacity to adjudicate</td>
<td>Min of Agriculture</td>
<td>improved livelihood prospects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>livelihoods impacts/food security of fallow land</td>
<td>DMA</td>
<td>profitablility of private land holdings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>land restitution mechanisms weak</td>
<td>HADMA</td>
<td>improved governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lack of definition of urban/rural borders</td>
<td>MoRR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>land cadastre almost non-existent, and not updated</td>
<td>INGOs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs often forced to rent, pay tax, on use of priv land</td>
<td>donors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No IDP policy across three regions of Somalia</td>
<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>poor capacities of local governments</td>
<td>Diaspora Somalis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP settlements often on private land/w poor services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>extremely poor ed and health services, watsan poor remittances vital</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for many</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unemployment high at 70%, livelihoods rural and ag</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Columbia** (Colombia has over five million IDPs or an estimated 11 percent of the entire population.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>historical communist insurgencies/full civil war in 1970s</td>
<td>GoC</td>
<td>business or profit driven conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>multiple actors competing for resources and/or rents</td>
<td>AUC</td>
<td>access to and control over land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coca plantation cultivation &amp; ensuing illegal drug trade</td>
<td>FARC</td>
<td>security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUC-FARC-military control of territory</td>
<td>multiple militias</td>
<td>historical/kinship connections to the land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>armed non-state actors intimidation and direct threats</td>
<td>farmers</td>
<td>electoral control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conflict over land access b/t peasants &amp; landowners</td>
<td>corporations</td>
<td>livelihoods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>corporate cooptation of land for mining, biofuels, etc</td>
<td>agro-industry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>assertions of land rights by indigenous peoples</td>
<td>cartels/criminals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>failed reintegration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Philippines** (DSWD 430,000 IDPs) with 10M figures at 230,000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GoP/AFP COIN strategy</td>
<td>Moro oligarchs</td>
<td>controlling strategic territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cyclical displacement</td>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>electoral control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>clan-clan conflict</td>
<td>MILF</td>
<td>continuation of profitable transfer from central government (IRA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>breakdown of peace talks</td>
<td>DSWD</td>
<td>assertion of land tenure and property rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>weak governance</td>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>control of strategic resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>entrenched poverty</td>
<td>IDM</td>
<td>security, livelihoods and improved standard of living</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stigmatization/discrimination/economic marginalization</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palliative/small development interventions</td>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**South Sudan** (413,000 IDPs and 75,000 refugees having fled the country as of April 2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>conflicts over cattle</td>
<td>SPLA</td>
<td>ethno-religious dominance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conflicts between pastoralists and agriculturalists</td>
<td>SPLM</td>
<td>political marginalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conflicts over use/control of natural resources</td>
<td>SSRA</td>
<td>control over land and natural resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conflicts over communal boundaries</td>
<td>SSLC</td>
<td>control of strategic territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political exclusion along ethnic lines</td>
<td>WAAFG</td>
<td>control over livelihoods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>corruption, nepotism, exclusion from jobs</td>
<td>COTALs</td>
<td>regional stability and elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>land tenure disputes</td>
<td>RoSS</td>
<td>access to beneficiary populations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>massacres of civilians</td>
<td>SAF</td>
<td>consolidation of political power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special needs grp clans/tribes</td>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>personal security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>federaionary structures</td>
<td></td>
<td>competing political visions for the state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age-sets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>local communities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>language groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>local chiefs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>local CSOs</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>foreign gov'ts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>arms suppliers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>donor nations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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World Bank (2013), Social Development Department, “What is forced displacement?” at


World Bank (2013), “Fragility, Conflict and Violence”,

Endnotes

11 These case studies were commissioned by the World Bank's Global Program on Forced Displacement (GPFD). Seven cases were funded by the Bank-Netherlands Partnership Program (BNPP). See Annex II for summaries.
13 Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), “Global Overview 2012”, April 2013
15 Where statistics exist, there is evidence that displaced persons are more likely to be poor and more likely to be in the bottom 40% than the non-displaced. In Azerbaijan for example, poverty rates amongst displaced persons are 25% compared to 20% among the non-displaced and employment rates among the displaced are 40% compared to 57% among the non-displaced. See World Bank (2011), “Building Assets and Promoting Self-Reliance: the Livelihoods of Internally Displaced Persons”, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/2794/AAA640ESW0P1180ort0complete0highres.pdf?sequence=1
16 See DFID/World Bank/ OECD DAC definitions of “political economy. This definition is drawn from DFID's July 2009 “Political Economy Practice” note.
While the humanitarian agencies remain committed to the IDP agenda, development agencies often refrain from engaging with IDPs, as the ‘label’ is associated with humanitarian assistance. To further exacerbate this situation, donors allocate funding to IDP activities through the humanitarian budget, which is focused on relief organizations and usually confined to one-year funding cycles, thereby challenging more long-term development efforts.


See, for example, Christensen & Harild 2009, “Forced Displacement – The Development Challenge”, World Bank


Numbers of internally displaced and refugees varying greatly by source and should be treated with caution. See UNHCR, UNCAP, IOM, IDMC, Human Rights Watch & Norwegian Refugee Council figures for estimates.

Economic figures from World Bank data and figures, July 2012; Life expectancy data are drawn from the World Health Organization, see BBC News, “Zimbabweans have ‘shortest lives’, 8 April 2006.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/afrika/4890508.stm


See, for example, Awa Dabo, “In the Presence of Absence. Truth-Telling and Displacement in Liberia,” *Case Studies on Transitional Justice and Displacement*, ICTJ/Brookings, 2012, p.4


40 This table merges various aims of this paper, namely: guidance on how to conduct and how to write PEAs, and what are the political economy considerations of doing PEAs. The basis for this table is the conclusions of the authors of the individual PEAs.

41 CLIP Analysis is an adaptable technique and software tool for examining how Collaboration, Conflict, Legitimacy, Interests, and Power (CLIP) factors shape a stakeholder structure and corresponding power relations in a given situation. CLIP can be scaled up to macro level (national) as well as down to participatory community level inquiries. For more information see Chevalier J.M. and Buckles D.J. (2008) *SAS2: A Guide to Collaborative Inquiry and Social Engagement*.

42 See reference above


47 Durable solutions entail either return to homes or countries of origin, local integration of the displaced in host communities, or resettlement to areas agreeing to accept the forcibly displaced.

48 A good place to start for figures on internal displacement is the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center at www.internal-displacement.org and the Joint IDP Profiling Service (JIPS) at www.jips.org.


51 See “A Strategy to Support Economic Development and Promote Peace and Stability in the Great Lakes Region.” Draft mimeo. March 2013. The World Bank: Washington, D.C. The section covering the need to address regional dimensions of population displacement calls for analytical work to assess population displacement dynamics in a regional context including current needs and prospects, challenges and obstacles related to return, as well as requirements for ensuring durable social and economic reintegration in communities of return. It recommends contused dialogue with governments and donor partners on mainstreaming displacement issues into development operations at both national and regional levels; a review of ongoing and planned Bank operations to include a focus on displacement, and the design of cross-border integrated area economic development programs.