The Mexican Government’s M&E System

Gloria M. Rubio

Fifteen years ago, Mexico, like most countries, had conducted a few scattered evaluations, but had not implemented systematic performance measurement. Political changes in the late 1990s generated an increased demand for transparency and accountability. These changes led to new legislation and institutions aimed at strengthening independent government oversight through several channels, including external evaluations, public access to information, and the creation of a supreme audit institution (figure 1). Also in the late 1990s, Mexico implemented Oportunidades, an innovative conditional cash transfer program with a rigorous impact evaluation built into its operational design. The program’s evaluation component became a role model within the Mexican public administration.

The development of a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system in Mexico can be divided into two stages. The first phase, from 2000 to 2006, was characterized by good intentions, but a limited vision on the institutional capacity building required for the new evaluation efforts. The budget law compelled federal programs involving subsidies, cash or in-kind transfers, and some infrastructure, health, and education services to carry out annual external evaluations. This requirement provided the necessary push to start systematic evaluation in Mexico. However, it also implied that ministries with incipient experience in this area had to prepare terms of reference, identify institutions capable of conducting evaluations, and supervise their work. At the time, evaluation guidelines did not distinguish between different types of evaluations. Nonetheless, annual external evaluations were expected to address questions ranging from compliance with operation rules to program impact, to program cost-benefit. This was an overwhelming task given the nascent institutional capacity on both the demand (ministries) and the supply (universities and research institutions) sides.

Despite the overall implementation shortcomings in this period, some ministries made substantial progress in developing sectoral M&E systems. For example, key champions at the Ministry of Social Development (Secretaría de Desarrollo Social [SEDESOL]) embraced the M&E agenda. SEDESOL reorganized to create a deputy minister office in charge of planning, analysis and evaluation, and invested in setting up an adequately staffed and resourced evaluation unit. Following the Oportunidades example and encouraged by the growing evidence-based approach of many professionals in the field, key champions in SEDESOL promoted the use of impact evaluation methodologies in a number of social development programs. They also supported the implementation of various innovations, including the use of logical frameworks and an evaluation feedback mechanism.

Furthermore, the key champions participated in pushing legislation institutionalizing evaluation and creating the National Evaluation Council (Consejo Nacional de Evaluación [CONEVAL]), an autonomous institution in charge of social program evaluation and poverty measurement.

M&E during the first phase lacked the incentives and institutional arrangements to ensure the use of the findings. More than 500 external evaluations were conducted in this period, but very little of that information was effectively used...
Since the driving force behind M&E was transparency and accountability, there was little attention to the role that evaluation could play in improving government programs. Congress, the Ministry of Finance (Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público [SHCP]), and the Ministry of Public Management (Secretaría de la Función Pública [SFP]) were the main recipients of the evaluation reports.

The 2006 Federal Budget and Fiscal Responsibility Law established a governmentwide performance evaluation system. This legislation, coupled with a change in administration, provided a new impetus to implement the M&E system. Fiscal concerns increased SHCP interest in promoting public expenditure efficiency and effectiveness. In addition, international experiences from Chile and other Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, along with policy dialogue with multilateral institutions, motivated SHCP to renew efforts to incorporate the performance dimension in the budgeting process.

A key factor leading to the second phase of the M&E system implementation (2007 to present) has been the strategic partnership between SHCP and CONEVAL. The former had the mandate to implement a performance-based budget, but its experience in M&E was limited, while the latter had substantial M&E technical expertise, but no “stick” to ensure that ministries outside the social sector participated in the system. The combination of forces has led to a federal governmentwide M&E system with much better chances of sustained utilization.

In 2007, CONEVAL, SHCP, and SFP jointly issued a revised set of evaluation guidelines that introduced technical criteria for regulating M&E activities and allow a more selective and strategic approach. Moreover, the guidelines established mechanisms to ensure evaluation quality and utilization, such as standardized terms of reference, uniform procedures to select performance indicators, creation of evaluation counterparts in line ministries, and a systematic feedback mechanism.
Mexico’s Performance Evaluation System

M&E in Mexico has gradually evolved into the Performance Evaluation System (Sistema de Evaluación del Desempeño [SED]). SED’s main purpose is to assess progress in meeting policy and program objectives to inform the performance-based budgeting decision-making process. It also aims at strengthening transparency and accountability. The scope of the system covers federal government spending of executive branch agencies and federally funded programs administered at the local level. This limits the influence of the government performance focus, since the legislature, judiciary and autonomous agencies, as well as state and municipal-level spending, are not required to participate.

SED has three main components: performance indicator monitoring, evaluation, and a feedback mechanism.

Performance indicator monitoring
Performance indicator monitoring has been part of the M&E system since the late 1990s. However, it was initially a challenging exercise. There were multiple overlaps of indicator reporting demands from different actors including SHCP, SFP, and the Presidency. The focus of these indicators on outcomes was limited. There was no clear understanding of the difference between process, output, and outcome indicators. Moreover, data quality standards were absent, resulting in different values for the same indicator. Finally, although it had some application for accountability purposes, indicator monitoring was not relevant for decision making.

Since 2007, SED has required programs to identify performance indicators through a logical framework methodology (matrix of indicators for results [MIR]). MIRs are reported regularly through the SED informatics platform. This information is an input for annual performance evaluations. Moreover, a subset of MIR is submitted to Congress as part of the budget request. This subset is reported to Congress quarterly during the fiscal year and included in the federal government final accounts and Government Activities Report.

The logical framework methodology was adopted to provide a unified framework for program planning, monitoring, and evaluation to standardize results measurement. Also, it was expected that the process of building the framework would help improve consistency and quality in program design. In practice, however, SHCP and line ministry budget officials are struggling to take full advantage of the fairly comprehensive performance measurement provided by the framework, given the need to report quarterly a manageable number of indicators. Thus, programs are often discouraged from registering a broader set of indicators with SED that may take longer—one year or more—to be measured, even if they are necessary to fully account for program outcomes. Another difficulty with SED is setting meaningful targets for indicators resulting from strategic planning exercises. According to the 2008 specific performance evaluation, around 20 percent of indicators achieved levels that were 20 percent higher than the established target value. This raises questions about the merit of the target setting process.

Evaluation
Evaluation has struggled to balance the demand for accountability for all programs and the need to selectively and strategically apply different analytical tools to respond to specific policy questions. After an ambitious start in which evaluations were expected to assess program operation, impact, cost-benefit, and client satisfaction every year, the revised evaluation guidelines introduced an Annual Evaluation Program (Programa Anual de Evaluación [PAE]) and a menu of evaluation tools. Each year PAE specifies which evaluation tools will be applied to which programs. Evaluation tools are selected from a comprehensive menu addressing a broad range of policy questions including program design, operation, impact, and overall performance (box 1). The menu of evaluation tools includes various alternatives in terms of purpose, audience, and duration. For example, specific performance evaluations provide rapid feedback for annual program assessment. Impact evaluations require a longer implementation period but respond to more strategic policy questions. The menu also includes the possibility of analyzing strategies, policies, and institutions.

The selection of programs and evaluation tools is made jointly by CONEVAL, SHCP, and SFP, considering programs’ relevance, particular policy interest, and previous evaluation results. Ministries can also propose additional evaluations to support policy or management decisions or to get specific program performance information.

Despite the progress made in promoting a more sensible application of evaluation, legislation
still requires annual external evaluations of all social programs. This entails a number of challenges: first, development of a low-cost evaluation tool that provides rapid feedback, yet is informative; second, identification of objective and technically sound evaluators to conduct over 100 evaluations every year; third, an organizational structure capable of planning and implementing such a large number of evaluations; and last but not least, a formal process to ensure that evaluation results feed back into policy making.

Feedback mechanism
SED established a feedback mechanism in 2008. Following the completion of annual evaluations, program managers, along with planning, evaluation, and budget units within ministries, are required to prepare an evaluation response document. The document should identify issues for program improvement based on evaluation recommendations and classify them according to the actors involved in their solution (program operation unit, ministry, several ministries, and different government levels) and their relevance in achieving program objectives. In addition, each ministry should develop a two-level (program and institution) implementation plan to deal with evaluation recommendations that can be addressed at the program operation unit and at the ministry level. These plans should outline the improvement actions, the officials responsible for them, and their timeline. They should be published on the ministry’s Web site with the evaluation reports.

Undoubtedly, this mechanism has helped evaluations get the attention of program managers as well as other key actors. Moreover, by requiring an institutional plan, it forces ministries to consider sectorwide issues that cannot be addressed at the program level.

Box 1. Menu of Evaluations

**Design evaluation** is conducted on programs that are in their first year of implementation. The evaluation assesses if a program makes a clear contribution to the solution of a particular policy problem and if the objectives of the program are clearly defined and aligned with the strategic objectives of its ministry. Moreover, it analyzes to what extent there is a sound and evidence-based results chain behind program design. This evaluation only uses secondary information and involves no original data collection. It is mandatory for all new programs and is targeted to inform program managers, budget officials, and other ministry staff. The assessment goal is to identify early on any potential problems or flaws in program design, thereby increasing the effectiveness of interventions. This assessment is also expected to clarify how a new program will add to existing policies, thereby reducing the likelihood of duplication.

**Process evaluation** appraises the efficiency and efficacy of program operational processes and provides feedback for improvement. It allows program managers to identify bottlenecks in the program’s service delivery mechanisms and leads to improvements in the program’s operation, which then benefit the target population. As such, it should play an important role in providing explanations for low performance. The process evaluation is implemented on a case-by-case basis and is targeted for use by program managers, budget officials, and other ministry staff.

**Program consistency and results evaluation** is a rapid assessment used to obtain a general and comparative perspective of a program’s design; strategic planning; coverage and targeting mechanisms; operation; beneficiary perception; and results. It is used to highlight specific strengths and weaknesses and to motivate decision makers to consider which of these should be evaluated in a more rigorous way, using the other methods. This type of evaluation only uses secondary information and involves no original data collection. It is targeted at a broad range of users, including program managers, high-level decision makers, and the general public.

**Impact evaluation** seeks to measure changes in the conditions of well-being of the target population that are attributable to a specific program. This type of evaluation provides the most technically robust evidence about whether a program is working or not. As such, its purpose is to inform high-level officials on whether a program should be continued or not, or if any potential modifications are needed. This kind of evaluation is implemented on a case-by-case basis and is targeted toward more executive levels of government, although it does provide useful information to program managers and all kinds of government officials.

**Specific performance evaluation** is a rapid assessment of program progress in meeting objectives and annual goals. This type of evaluation analyzes program coverage, MIR monitoring data entered in the SED, as well as progress on implementing previous evaluations recommendations. It is implemented annually for all federal programs and is mainly for the review of Congress, executive levels of government, budget officials, and the general public.

*Source: Updated from Castro et al. (2009)*
the program level. However, program managers or ministries often commit to address the easier-to-solve problems only. They tend to dismiss evaluation findings involving major changes as invalid or unfeasible. Furthermore, although annual performance evaluations should assess the progress in carrying out improvements, this is only a mild incentive to follow up the implementation plan.

**Institutional Setup**

SED institutional arrangements result from the parallel efforts to promote M&E. In practice, SED is coordinated by SHCP with technical advice from CONEVAL, and some participation by SFP (figure 2). Institution-specific roles and responsibilities have been shaped ad hoc by their broader mandate and technical capacities. Hence, CONEVAL autonomy and academic expertise lend to providing technical leadership in defining the scope, methodologies, and processes of SED evaluation and feedback activities (box 2). Moreover, CONEVAL is responsible for evaluating social sector programs and ensuring that results feed back into policy making. The SHCP is in charge of the performance-based budgeting initiative. It coordinates performance monitoring activities and, in principle, ensures that this information is used for the budgetary decision-making process. SFP participation is less well-defined: although it has the mandate to coordinate the internal government M&E system, in fact its main focus on oversight has narrowed its perspective on the best way to contribute to SED.

SED institutional arrangements pose some challenges. The fragmented institutional responsibility for different sectors and activities is a potential source of coordination problems (OECD 2009). SHCP’s coordinating role is critical in linking M&E with planning and budgeting. However, SFP participation in SED coordination has yet to be thought out. Moreover, the fact that CONEVAL responsibility is limited to the social sector hinders the even progress of SED implementation across the public administration. Although SED has benefited from CONEVAL’s technical guidance, evaluation implementation outside the social sector still lags.

Other key players are the SED counterparts in the line ministries. Traditionally, SHCP’s liaison with line ministries is the Budget Office, which is responsible for implementing the performance-based budgeting process. In addition, administrative units in charge of coordinating the contracting, implementation, supervision, and feedback of evaluations within line ministries were introduced in 2007. These units are separate from program operation and their purpose is to ensure that evaluation work within each ministry is conducted independently and with the necessary human and financial resources. Finally, program operating units have the duty of reporting performance information, providing data needed for evaluation, and implementing evaluation recommendations.

SED implementation is complemented by Congressional budget oversight through the Federal Supreme Audit (Auditoría Superior de la Federación [ASF]). ASF conducts performance audits to assess program progress in meeting objectives and goals and generate recommendations to improve government results. It also reviews performance indicators included in the budget.

**Extent of SED Utilization**

SED’s implementation progress is to a large extent the result of the combination of the M&E legal framework and the public administration’s strong legalistic tradition that provides the incentives to comply with SED requirements. However, sustained SED use depends on shifting to a performance management and evidence-based policy-making culture throughout government. This cultural shift is still in the making, but at least a great deal of attention has been placed on identifying relevant outlets for SED information and formalizing feedback mechanisms. Established procedures feed M&E information back into decision-making processes in four areas. A pending task in SED implementation is to systematically monitor and publish budget and program or policy decisions informed by M&E information. 1. At the program level, the feedback mechanism described earlier provides the connection between evaluation recommendations and program design and operation. At the end of the 2009 evaluation exercise, CONEVAL reported that 78 percent of programs had clearly defined areas for improvement based on evaluation recommendations and a plan to address them. Programs identified on average six subjects for improvement. Most of them are design or operational issues that can
Box 2. The National Evaluation Council for Social Development Policy—CONEVAL

CONEVAL is the lynchpin of the social sector M&E system in Mexico. CONEVAL coordinates evaluation activities, sets standards and methodologies for the evaluation of social programs, develops evaluation terms of reference, provides technical assistance to ministries and agencies, and undertakes or manages some specific evaluations. It also coordinates with development organizations to plan and undertake evaluation work and to advise national entities and subnational governments in the implementation of their M&E systems, as well as on how to conduct quality program evaluations.

In addition, CONEVAL prepares and consolidates evaluation reports and disseminates the evaluation findings among Congress, government agencies, and civil society. To accomplish these tasks, CONEVAL has a staff of 73 professionals, including administrative personnel, and for 2011 has an annual budget of about Mex$155 million (US$12.4 million).

One particular feature that deserves attention is the mixed nature of CONEVAL, which is a relatively independent government agency with a unique governance structure. Although it is located within the executive branch and its executive director is appointed by the federal government, leadership of CONEVAL relies on an independent collegiate body made up of six academic advisors chosen from certified academic institutions. They are democratically elected for a period of four years by members of the National Social Development Commission, which includes 32 state government officials responsible for social development, the presidents of the Senate and the House of Representatives Social Development Committees, representatives of the national municipal governments associations, and the heads of federal government ministries responsible for social development, education, health, agriculture, labor, and environment. The councilors are involved in all of the agency’s decisions and the definition and review of evaluation projects. They also provide general guidance on the administrative direction of the institution and play an important role in the methodologies for poverty measurement.

Source: Updated from Castro et al. (2009).
be addressed at the program level, and more than half were considered a high priority for achieving program objectives. Upcoming results from the 2010 evaluation should reveal to what extent programs followed the improvement plans.

2. In the budgeting process, the use of evaluation findings is fostered by SHCP through the implementation of performance-based budgeting. With the incumbent administration, the Office of the Presidency has also played a key role in supporting this process by considering performance information when signaling budget priorities and agreeing on total ministry budget ceilings. In preparation for the 2009 budget and building on the logical framework exercise, SHCP analysts discussed with their counterparts in line ministries the progress made in the previous year’s performance indicators and proposed indicators and targets for the following year. This information was combined with the ministries’ self-assessment and a traffic light system developed by CONEVAL, using the 2007 Consistency and Results Evaluation, to create a summary picture of the performance of programs and ministries. SHCP top political officials met with the Presidency to discuss budget ceilings for each ministry considering fiscal priorities and performance summaries. Anecdotal evidence suggests that a few programs received additional resources for performing well (OECD 2009). In addition, there are some examples of program improvements informed by evaluation findings (table 1).

3. In social policy decision making, CONEVAL presents summary reports of cross-cutting issues revealed by evaluations to the Interministerial and the National Social Development Commissions. These commissions are in charge of coordinating social policy within the federal government and the national level, respectively. For example, some of the 2009 recommendations include implementing at the local level a maintenance scheme of social infrastructure financed by federal programs; simplifying and harmonizing administrative processes across ministries to speed up project approval; and clarifying the role of state and municipal governments in cofinancing and operating federal programs.

4. In Congressional budget oversight, ASF revises program performance indicators and issues an official report on their consistency, with binding recommendations for the programs. Unfortunately, the ASF annual report does not summarize the nature of performance audit recommendations or their follow up. In addition, national media regularly use evaluation and poverty measurement results

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<td>- Need to improve program planning</td>
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<td>3. Training support</td>
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Source: Adapted from Castro et al. (2009).
published by CONEVAL. There are also some examples of civil society organizations beginning to use evaluation findings as a way to exert public influence.

The Sustainability of the M&E System

Efforts to introduce M&E activities have been continuous since the late 1990s. The first attempts to conduct performance M&E started more than a decade ago and continue today. However, the comprehensiveness and suitability as well as the institutional arrangements of the M&E initiatives have varied considerably across the three different administrations governing the country during this period. Although there is still a long way to go in building a successful M&E system, so far the trend has been positive. One explanation for this favorable evolution is the combination of local demand for transparency and accountability and the existing capacity and external technical assistance available from a global trend on performance management.

Nonetheless, the jury is still out on M&E system sustainability, particularly in the case of a change in the governing party. Enabling elements for continuity in building an M&E system include a fairly solid legal framework. Moreover, demand from civil society and Congress for accountability and performance measurement does not seem to be fading away, and the economic and political economy factors that contributed to this demand remain valid and are likely to persist. Furthermore, to the extent that the civil service continues to operate adequately, some public servants who have experienced the change in the way government business is conducted could contribute to sustaining the new evaluation culture. Finally, an encouraging sign is the growing development of M&E initiatives at the state level. A number of states, regardless of their governing party, have created M&E institutions and systems resembling CONEVAL and SED.

A number of risk factors threaten the continuity of the positive trend in building and sustaining the M&E system beyond 2012. First, although some degree of M&E institutionalization has been achieved, progress to date has relied heavily on key champions in the Presidency, CONEVAL, line ministries, and SHCP. Many of them are unlikely to remain in office another term. Second, Congress has not fully come to grips with the need of the executive branch to have a strong M&E system that supports its management decisions. Congress tends to favor the view of M&E as an accountability tool that should be in the hands of control and oversight entities such as ASF or SFP. This is a potential threat to SED credibility and its institutional set up. Finally, it is inevitable that new administrations will want to make their mark in policy making. In some cases, changes may be merely cosmetic or even improve the system. However, there are also OECD examples of well-functioning M&E activities or systems that have suffered changes compromising effectiveness when a new administration takes over. Hence, the challenge will be to adapt the system to the new administration’s vision while retaining the soundness of the critical elements.

Lessons Learned and Challenges Ahead

SED is the result of a confluence of several factors over time that have led to a federal M&E system. Political economy changes since the late 1990s have increased the local demand for accountability and transparency, thus producing a legal framework promoting M&E. During the early stages, the political and technical leadership of key champions helped pilot M&E activities and created crucial institutions such as CONEVAL. Sectoral experience served as an example to design and implement a national M&E system to support a renewed performance-based budgeting initiative. Performance-based budgeting was motivated by fiscal concerns and OECD country experiences. Here again, key champions in SHCP, the Presidency, and CONEVAL promoted the application of sound M&E tools and the use of results in budget and policy decisions.

Policy dialogue and external technical assistance from different institutions, including the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the OECD and the World Bank, have played a key role in strengthening institutional M&E capacity. In particular, external support has been critical in generating momentum for reforms, ensuring continuous training, learning from other country experiences, and getting access to top-notch technical advice. For example, the World Bank supported SEDESOL through
an Institutional Development Fund (IDF) grant
to design and implement a sectoral results-based
M&E system. ECLAC technical assistance helped
introduce the use of the logical framework meth-
odology, first in the ministry and then across
government as part of SED. SHCP benefited from
technical assistance and a grant from IDB.

Mexico’s well-trained public service has facili-
tated SED implementation. In addition, sustained
capacity building through constant training has
helped overcome limited experience with some
M&E methodologies. Continuous training also
contributed to maintaining institutional capac-
ity despite staff turnover during the change in
administration. The introduction of the logical
framework has been accompanied by widespread
instruction of government officials and evaluators.
There is also regular training and guidance for
line ministries counterparts to implement SED
activities, particularly performance indicator
monitoring and annual performance evaluations.

Despite its progress, the M&E system in Mexi-
co faces a number of challenges. First and foremost
is sustaining use of the M&E system in budget
decisions and policy making. The incentives to
move toward evidence-based policy making and
performance budgeting are weak or vulnerable
to the leadership of key actors. Higher utilization
depends on the full engagement of four players:
Congress, SHCP officials, line ministries, and civil
society. As OECD (2009) pointed out, the role
of Congress in using performance information
is yet to be fully realized. Congress’ role is critical
in holding government agencies accountable for
their performance and ensuring the use of M&E
information to inform budget decisions and policy
making. M&E information should be seen as a
means for improving public policy effectiveness
and government performance rather than as an
instrument for controlling the executive.

Budget officials in SHCP and line ministries
are critical players for using M&E in performance
budgeting. Hence, it is necessary to change their
mindset from detailed line item costing and
regulation compliance to policy effectiveness
and government performance. Their recruitment
and training should emphasize more policy and
analytical skills, including evaluation. Internal
discussions as well as external negotiations with
line ministries and Congress will benefit from an
enhanced policy and performance focus.

Internal use of performance information
is heterogeneous across ministries, as is their
institutional capacity to implement evaluations.
Social ministries tend to be at the forefront, in
part due to CONEVAL guidance, while the rest
lag behind. It is important to level the capacity
across ministries and provide incentives for per-
formance management at the program level, for
example, through benchmarking and showcasing
good practices. Executive training for top and
middle-level management, particularly program
managers, should include performance manage-
ment principles and practice.

Finally, it is necessary to generate broader
demand for the use of performance information
outside the government. The media, academia,
and civil society organizations can use publicly
available M&E information to hold Congress ac-
countable for its decisions, as well as government
officials for their performance. The media are
already regular users of evaluations, but they need
to focus more on discussing policy issues rather
than attacking the government. Academia and
civil society organizations could strengthen their
role in monitoring SED implementation, as well as
the use of performance information by Congress
and the government.

A second challenge of M&E system implemen-
tation is the fragmented institutional arrange-
ments and ad hoc coordination mechanisms. The
strategic alliance between SHCP and CONEVAL
is highly beneficial for the system, but it is vulner-
able to changes in leadership and does not take
full advantage of each institution’s potential.
SED coordination should remain in SHCP, but
CONEVAL voice and vote in SED design and
implementation should be institutionalized. Ide-
ally, CONEVAL’s mandate should be expanded to
all sectors, making the necessary adjustments to
its organizational structure. However, Congress
has rejected this proposal in the past. SFP’s role
in SED should be reexamined to profit from its
comparative advantage and avoid unnecessary
cumbersome arrangements. Care should be
taken not to replicate the pitfalls of institutional
arrangements at the central level among planning,
budgeting, and evaluation units within the line
ministries.

Last but not least is the challenge of producing
quality performance information. Specifically, a
long-term effort involving other partners such as
the National Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional
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**Notes**

1. PROGRESA (Education, Health, and Nutrition Program) was launched in 1997 and it was renamed Oportunidades in 2001.
2. A new administration from the same ruling party came into office at the end of 2006.
3. A constitutional reform in 2008 led the way to introducing evaluation at the state and municipal level, so the process of building sub-national M&E systems is just starting.
4. SED includes two components. The first is related to M&E, and the second one is the Medium-Term Program (Programa de Mediano Plazo—PMP) to increase public spending efficiency and reduce administrative costs; which PMP has not been fully implemented yet. This note focuses only on the first component.
5. Since 2004, ministries are required to publish all external evaluations in their Web sites.
6. Although it is not formally a part of SED, the National Institute for Women (INMUJERES) participates in some M&E activities such as revising the gender focus of the MIR.
7. SFP is supposed to spearhead the Program for Improving Public Management (PMG), in which one of the inputs is recommendations from evaluations. However, this initiative has not gotten off the ground.
8. According to PMG plans, the chief administrator is the SFP liaison within line ministries in charge of coordinating PMG activities with the collaboration of the Internal Control Office.

**References**


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