LA)PS 3O -
POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER              3 08 1
The Anatomy of a Multiple Crisis
NWhy was Argentina Special
and What Can We Learn from It?
Guillermo Perry
Luis Serven
The World Bank
Latin America and the Cariblbean Region
Office of the Chief Economist
June 2003



I POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 3081
Abstract
The Argentine crisis has been variously blamed on fiscal    areas, neither of them was higher than those affecting
imbalances, real overvaluation, and self-fulfilling investor  other countries in the region, and thus there is not one
pessimism triggering a capital flow reversal. Perry and     obvious suspect. But the three reinforced each other in
Serv6n provide an encompassing assessment of the role       such a perverse way that taken jointly they led to a much
of these and other ingredients in the recent                larger vulnerability to adverse external shocks than in
macroeconomic collapse. They show that in the final         any other country in the region. Underlying these
years of convertibility, Argentina was not hit harder than  vulnerabilities was a deep structural problem of the
other emerging markets in Latin America and elsewhere       Argentine economy that led to harsh policy dilemmas
by global terms-of-trade and financial disturbances. So     before and after the crisis erupted. On the one hand, the
the crisis reflects primarily the high vulnerability to     Argentine trade structure made a peg to the dollar highly
disturbances built into Argentina's policy framework.       inconvenient from the point of view of the real economy.
Three key sources of vulnerability are examined: the        On the other hand, the strong preference of Argentinians
hard peg adopted against optimal currency area              for the dollar as a store of value-after the hyperinflation
considerations in a context of wage and price               and confiscation experiences of the 1980s-had led to a
inflexibility; the fragile fiscal position resulting from an  highly dollarized economy in which a hard peg or even
expansionary stance in the boom; and the pervasive          full dollarization seemed reasonable alternatives from a
mismatches in the portfolios of banks' borrowers. While     financial point of view.
there were important vulnerabilities in each of these
This paper-a product of the Office of the Chief Economist, Latin America and the Caribbean Region-is part of a larger
effort in the region to understand the causes of macroeconomic volatility. Copies of the paper are available free from the
World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Ruth Izquierdo, room 18-012, telephone 202-
4S8-4161, fax 202-522-7528, email address rizquierdo@worldbank.org. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted
on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at gperry@worldbank.org or
lserven@worldbank.org. June 2003. (57 pages)
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about
development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The
papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this
paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the
countries they represent.
Produced by Partnerships, Capacity Building, and Outreach



THE ANATOMY OF A MULTIPLE CRISIS:
WHY WAS ARGENTINA SPECIAL AND WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM IT*
Guillermo Perry
Luis Serven
The World Bank
JEL codes: E44, F31, F32, F41, G28, 054
This paper is the output of a collective effort led by the authors, and based on background work on (i)
fiscal issues, by Norbert Fiess, Rodrigo de Jesus Suescun and Guillermo Perry; (ii) exchange rate issues, by
Humberto Lopez and Luis Serven; (iii) financial sector issues, by Augusto de la Torre and Sergio
Schmukler and (iv) capital flows and spreads, by Norbert Fiess and Luis Serven. We are grateful to these
colleagues for their respective contributions. Though we borrow freely from them, the interpretations and
conclusions offered in this paper are our exclusive responsibility. We also thank Christian Broda for his
kind collaboration on exchange rate issues, Jose Luis Machinea for helpful discussions, and Myrna
Alexander, Jerry Caprio, Daniel Lederman, Paul Levy, Emesto May, Pedro Pou, Andrew Powell, David
Rosenblatt, Nick Stern, Adolfo Sturzenegger and Federico Sturzenegger for very useful comments. Ana
Maria Menendez and Patricia Macchi provided valuable assistance.






Table of Contents
I.  INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY ................................................................   1
II. ECONOMIC PERFO]RMANCE AND EXTERNAL SHOCKS IN THE 1990s: The
endogeneity of capital flow reversals .................................................................4
III. OVERVALUATION AND DEFLATIONARY ADJUSTMENT UNDER THE
HARD PEG: Why old lessons about optimal currency areas should not be forgotten ..... 16
A. Was there an overvaluation? Where did it come from?                  .      .        17
B. Persistence of misalignments and deflationary adjustment under hard pegs       ... 25
C. Summing up ................................................................         28
IV. FISCAL VULNERA]3ILITIES: Mismanagement in the boom and large fiscal
contingencies associated with adverse external shocks .................................................... 28
A. Fiscal policy during boom and bust ................................................................   29
B. Fiscal solvency assessments ................................................................  36
C. The role of Social Security reform            ............................................ 38
D. Public deficits, external debt and the current account .      ............................................ 40
V. THE BANKING SYSTEM: Vulnerabilities behind a strong facade ........................ 42
A. Strengths ................................................................          42
B. Vulnerabilities ................................................................    44
VI. POLICY OPTIONS BEFORE AND AFTER 1999 .................................................. 49
A. The Argentine via crucis: policy under the De la Rua Government and beyond. 49
B. Policy dilemmas and options ................................................................  50
REFERENCES ................................................................               56
Tables and Figures
Table 2.1. Real GDP Growth Rate .................................................................5
Figure 2.1. Poverty, Inequality, and Unemployment ..........................................................5
Figure 2.2 a. Terms of Trade .................................................................7
Figure 2.2 b. Terms of Trade Shocks .................................................................8
Table 2.2. Impact of the Global Slowdown 2001: The Income Effect via Trade Volume. 9
Figure 2.3. Sovereign Spreads ................................................................  10
Figure 2.4. Gross Capital Flows ................................................................  10
Figure 2.5 a Capital Account ................................................................  11
Figure 2.5 b. Current Account ................................................................  12
Table 2.3. Current Accounit Adjustment ................................................................   12
Figure 2.6. Sovereign Spreads: The Role of Global Factors ............................................ 14
a.   Contribution of First Principal Component to Overall Variation of Spreads ........... 14
b.   Contribution of First Principal Component to Variation in Individual Country
Spreads ................................................................             14
Figure 2.7. Capital Inflows to Argentina: Contribution of Local Factors ........................ 15
Table 3.1. Argentina's Trade Structure (2001) ................................................................ 17
Figure 3.1. Actual and Equilibrium REER ................................................................   18
Table 3.2. Average Annual Growth of Real Exports ........................................................ 19
Figure 3.2. Argentina: Real Overvaluation of the Peso .................................................... 21
Figure 3.3. Relative Productivity ................................................................  21
Figure 3.4. Net Foreign Assets ................................................................  22



Figure 3.5. Sources of cumulative peso overvaluation, 1997-2001 .................................. 24
Figure 3.6. GDP            Response to        a Terms of Trade Deterioration ........................................ 27
Figure     3.7. RER       Response to         a Terms of Trade Deterioration ......................................... 27
Table 4.1.        Debt Indicators in          Emerging        Markets ............................................................. 29
Figure 4.1. Overall Budget Balance excluding privatization revenues ............................ 30
Figure 4.2. Consolidated               Public Debt and           Service ........................................................... 30
Figure 4.3. GDP           and Potential GDP ..............................................................                            31
Figure 4.4. Current and Structural Primary Budget Balance of Federal Government ...... 32
Figure 4.5. Fiscal Impulse of Federal Governm                           ent .......................................................... 33
Figure 4.6. Blanchard's Indicator of Fiscal Impulse ......................................................... 33
Table 4.2.        Interest Payments on             Public Debt ..............................................................          34
Figure 4.7. Current and              Structural Overall Federal Budget Balance ................................ 35
Table 4.3. Indicators of Fiscal Sustainability ..............................................................                          36
Table 4.4. Fiscal Sustainability                 and the Exchange Rate ................................................... 37
Figure 4.8. The Social Security                  Deficit in      Perspective ..................................................... 39
Figure 4.9. Private and             Public Current Account Balances ................................................ 40
Table 4.5. Debt Stocks ..............................................................                                                 41
Table 5.1. Camelot Ratings for Banking                         System      Regulation ........................................... 42
Table 5.2. Selected            Banking       System      Indicators ..............................................................    43
Table 5.3. Consolidation and Internationalization of the Banking System ...................... 44
Figure 5.1. Anticipated devaluation implied by the 30-day NDF discount -- up to 3/15/01
................................................................................................................................... 45
Figure     5.2. Deposits in         Dollars and Interest Rate Differential ......................................... 46
Figure 5.3. Financial System: Exposure to Public Sector ................................................. 48
Annex       1. Argentina via crucis ...............................................................                                    54



I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
The severity of the Argentine crisis and its dire social cost have come as a
surprise to most observers, even to those that had been predicting it since the Brazilian
devaluation of 1999. There were very few that Iredicted it before 1999. Indeed, the
Argentine economy appeared to be in relatively good shape at least until before the
Russian crisis. Even then the attention of the markets and the International Financial
Institutions was focused on Brazil, which had more apparent macroeconomic imbalances
and had suffered severe speculative attacks in October 1997 and again after the Russian
crisis, leading to the demise of the exchange rate band and a sharp devaluation of the
Real in January 1999.
Argentina outperformed most other economies in the region until 1997 in terms of
growth per capita -- though income distribution did not improve and unemployment
stayed at high levels -- in a relatively benign external environment (terms of trade, capital
inflows and spreads, worlcl growth), in spite of a short-lived interruption in 1995 when it
suffered severe contagion from the Tequila crisis. But after the major slowdown in
growth in 1999 that affected the whole region, mainly due to capital flow retrenchment
after the Russian crisis, other countries in the region began a modest recovery, while
Argentina plunged into a protracted recession, reversing most of her previous gains at
poverty reduction We explore in Section II if this difference in performance can be
attributed to Argentina receiving more severe external shocks than other economies in the
region. We find that Argerntina was not hit harder than other Latin American countries by
the terms of trade decline after the Asian crisis, nor by the US and worldwide slowdown
in 2001, nor by the capital flows reversal and the rise in spreads after the Russian crisis.
As a consequence, the fact: that Argentina did worse than other countries after 1999 must
be attributed to her higher vulnerabilities to shocks, weaker policy responses or a
combination of both. Indeed, we find in Section II that the large capital flow reversal in
2001 was driven by Argentina-specific factors. We view this as evidence that "sudden
stops" of capital flows acted more as an amplifier than as a primary cause of the crisis. 1
Thus, the bulk of this paper is devoted to examine to which extent and why was
the Argentine economy more vulnerable to adverse external shocks than other Latin
American economies, and to what extent were policy mistakes (particularly during the De
la Rua Government) the main culprit, as has been often claimed.2 We examine the
vulnerabilities associated with deflationary adjustments to shocks under a hard peg in
Section III; those associated with a large public debt and a fragile fiscal position in
Section IV and those hidden under a facade of strength in the banking sector in Section
V. We conclude that although there were important vulnerabilities in each of these areas,
neither of them on its oWnI was larger than those affecting some other countries in the
region, and thus there is no one obvious suspect. However, we also find that they
1 This view is in contrast with the interpretation put forward in Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2002), though
in most other aspects our conclusions agree with those in that paper.
2 There is by now an extensive literature analyzing the causes of the Argentina crisis. See for example the
papers by Hausmann and Velasco (2002), Mussa (2002), Powell (2002) and Teijeiro (2001)
1



reinforced each other in such a perverse way that taken jointly they led to a much larger
vulnerability to adverse external shocks than in any other country in the region
In particular, the hard peg and inflexible domestic nominal wages and prices
imposed a protracted deflationary adjustment in response to the depreciation of the Euro
and the real, the terms of trade shocks and the capital market shock of 1998, leading to a
major overvaluation of the currency and a rapidly deteriorating net foreign asset position.
Such imbalances were aggravated by weak fiscal policies during the decade, especially
after 1995. In Section III we estimate that all these factors led since 1997 to an increasing
overvaluation of the currency that peaked in 2001 at over 50 percent. The need to address
the rising concern with solvency - given the large debt, the weak primary fiscal balance
and low growth - led to tax hikes and budget cuts in 2000 and 2001 that deepened the
economic contraction. The endogenous capital flow reversal and increased risk premium
in 2001 amplified these problems by requiring a large external current account
adjustment. To aggravate matters, such an adjustment under the hard peg had to take
place mostly through demand reduction and aggregate deflation - a lengthy, costly and
uncertain process.
The hard peg actually hid from public view the serious deterioration in fiscal
solvency and the mounting financial stress. Indeed, the protracted deflationary adjustment
required to realign the real exchange rate under the hard peg would have unavoidably
eroded the debt repayment capacity of the Government, households and finns in non
tradable sectors - the debtors whose incomes would be more adversely affected as a
direct result of the deflation. 3 The collapse of the peg in 2002 revealed in full force these
latent problems and made them much worse due to the exchange rate overshooting and
the disruption of ihe payments system derived from the deposit freeze (the so called
"corralito") -- which might have been partially avoided by better policy responses.
Financial stress was amplified by the large exposure of banks and Pension Funds to
increasing Government risk. Thus a vicious circle of economic contraction, fiscal
hardship and financial stress ensued.
The authorities and the Argentine polity were indeed faced with very harsh
dilemmas after 1998 (as discussed in Section VI). They were placed between a rock and
a hard place. One option was to accept a painful and protracted deflationary adjustment
while keeping the Currency Board - and attempting to retain market confidence in the
meantime. This would have entailed a severe test of the fragile Argentine political and
fiscal institutions.
An early adoption of full dollarization might have reduced somewhat the pains
and duration of the deflationary adjustment, and thus increased the likelihood of success
of such an option. But it would have left the Argentine economy exposed to a repetition
of these problems in the future.
3 While some debtors from the tradable sector might be affected by an economy -wide deflation as well, the
increase in the real value of the debt relative to real income due to the recession and price deflation would
have impacted most strongly on the nontradable sector. On this see also the discussion in Roubini (2001).
2



The other option was to allow a nominal devaluation and adopt a float, in an
attempt to shortcut the protracted deflationary adjustment. However, this would have
precipitated a latent colporate, banking and fiscal crisis, given the open currency
exposures in the balance sheets of both the public and the private sectors and the large
degree of overvaluation of the currency. In order to avoid such scenario, financial
contracts would have to be pesified before floating. But this in turn posed the serious
danger of a deposit run, which would have forced a deposit freeze and/or some kind of
Bonex plan, fatally eroding the public's confidence in money as a store of value.
In the event, the authorities did not use well their limited margin of maneuver, by
engaging in too little and too late fiscal adjustment (which actually should have been
done in the boom years before 1999), by hesitating on the ultimate choice of exchange
rate regime, by postponing too long the needed public debt restructuring, and by
precipitating a major financial and payments crisis - first reducing the liquidity buffers of
the banking system and over-exposing it (along with the Pension Funds) to Government
risk, and later adopting an arbitrary asymmetric pesification of assets and liabilities and a
particularly disruptive deposit freeze, which was held for an excessively long period of
time without resolution Such actions and omissions deepened the crisis and created
additional unnecessary problems for the recovery.
These hard choices were a reflection of a deep structural problem. On the one
hand, the Argentine trade structure made a peg to the dollar highly inadequate -- from a
real economy point of view. On the other hand, the strong preference of Argentineans for
the dollar as a store of value (since the hyperinflation and confiscation experiences of the
1980s) had led to a higly dollarized economy in which a hard peg or even full
dollarization seemed a reasonable alternative from a financial point of view, not only to
avoid massive capital gains and losses resulting from exchange rate changes, but also as
an expeditious shortcut to nominal stability and monetary credibility. No wonder that
inforned analysts favored -and still do- opposite exchange regime choices depending on
the relative weight they assign to real economy or financial considerations.
With the benefit of hindsight, the boom years up to mid 1998 were a major lost
opportunity. Staying with the hard peg but ninimizing the risks associated with adverse
external shocks would have required four supporting ingredients: First and foremost,
significant fiscal strengthening, not just to protect solvency but with the broader objective
of providing some room for counter-cyclical fiscal policy. This contrasts with the
expansionary pro-cyclical stance actually followed during most of the decade, and
especially during the boom from end-1995 up to mid-1998 - once the implicit pension
debt (as well as other implicit liabilities) had been brought in the open by pension reform
(as documented in Section IV). Second, considerable flexibilization of labor and other
domestic markets (including utilities). Third, significant unilateral opening to trade. None
of this was done in the nineties. And fourth, even stricter prudential regulations for banks
than actually adopted (in spite of the significant progress achieved in this field), including
harder provisioning and/or capital requirements for loans to households and finns in non
tradable sectors, a "firewall" between banks and the Government and some form of
3



earmarking of liquidity to demand deposits in order to protect the payments system in the
event of a systemic deposit run (as discussed in Section V).
Alternatively, those years would have been the right time to engage in a more
orderly change of the exchange rate regime. But the exit, whether towards a successful
flexible exchange rate regime with a monetary anchor or to full dollarization, would have
also required significant structural reforms and institution building. Instead, this was a
period of inaction and laxity on many fronts.
Just too often in Latin America the seeds of crisis are planted in good times by
imprudent behavior or lack of precautionary action, whose consequences are only
revealed when bad times arrive. There are deep political economy factors that help to
explain such bad outcomes. A key lesson from Argentina is the need to adopt economic
and political institutions that align incentives to face hard choices and facilitate timely
reforms, and in particular that are less prone to amplifying economic cycles.
The analysis of the Argentine crisis yields many other useful lessons for other
Latin American economies. After all, the exchange rate system dilemma faced by a
highly dollarized economy that conducts only a fraction of its trade with the US, in a
world economy characterized by highly volatile currencies, is not exclusive to Argentina.
But even economies with less stringent structural dilemmas often face some form of
tension between the convenience of adopting and maintaining a flexible exchange rate
regime with a monetary anchor in order to achieve flexibility in responding to shocks,
and balance sheet vulnerabilities to major real exchange rate adjustments originated in
unhedged foreign-currency debt of firms in non-tradable sectors and of Governments
themselves.4 Even those could draw useful policy lessons from the Argentine debacle.
And so can we, in the International Financial Institutions, as we must admit that we were
slow in understanding some of the deep problems discussed here and in reacting to them.
II. ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND EXTERNAL SHOCKS IN THE 1990s:
The endogeneity of capital flow reversals
Over 1990-97, Argentina outperformed most other economies in the region in
terms of growth (Table 2.1). The external environment (terms of trade, capital inflows,
sovereign spreads and world growth) was relatively benign in those years, apart from a
short-lived but abrupt interruption in 1995 due to the Tequila crisis, from which
Argentina suffered a severe contagion. The growth performance remained fairly
satisfactory even in 1998. But after the region-wide growth slowdown of 1999 - largely a
consequence of capital flow retrenchment following the Russian crisis - other Latin
American countries began a modest recovery, while Argentina plunged into a protracted
recession.
4 What Calvo and Reinhart (2000) have described as "liability dollarization" that leads to "fear of floating"
and Hausmann et al. (2000) have attributed to the inability to issue long term debt in local currency.
4



Table 2.1. Real GDP Growth Rate
(Percent per year)
1981-90       1991-97        1998          1999        2000-01
Argentina                -1.3          6.7           3.9          -3.4          -2.6
Bolivia                 -0.4           4.3           5.0           0.4           1.8
Brazil                   2.3           3.1           0.1          0.8           3.0
Chile                    4.0           8.3           3.9          -1.1           3.6
Colombia                 3.4           4.0           0.6          -4.1           2.0
Costa Rica               2.4           4.8           8.4           8.2           1.6
Ecuador                  :2.1          3.2           0.4          -7.3           4.0
Mexico                   1.5           2.9           5.0           3.6           3.2
Peru                     0.0           5.3          -0.5           0.9           1.7
Venezuela                0.3           3.4           0.2          -6.1           3.0
Average                  1.4           4.6           2.7          -0.8           2.1
Source: World Development Indicators Database and the Unified Survey.
Figure 2.1. Poverty, Inequality, and Unemployment
45 - -      |          Poverty Headcount Ratio (left scale)                          42.04  0.5
41- .           -Gini coeficlent (right scale)                                    _
40 - . ¢-          ^-Unemployment (left scale)                                              0.49
35--
30.40                                30.0     .4   290                          0.48
30--
25  - -             24.10                                                                   0.47
21~~~   ~      ~~~ 21t8      21.607-
20                                                                   ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0.46
15-                                                                                   17.
15                14.1         ~~~~~~~~~~0.45
10-1211.
-dP  8.7                                                   ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0.44
1990   1991   1992    1993   1994   1995    1996   1997   1998    1999   2000   2001
Data for urban areas. Sources: Llnemployment from INDEC, Gini Coefficient and Poverty Head Count ratio from World
Bank Poverty Assessment Reporl (2000) except for the 1999-2002 ratios which are estimated using the trend observed for
the Greater Buenos Aires headcount ratios from INDEC.
Unemployment kept a slightly increasing trend up to the Tequila crisis, when it
jumped sharply (Figure 2.1). The fact that unemployment was rising even when the
economy was growing at full steam reflects a combination of rising participation rates
5



(likely stemming from an 'encouragement effect' due to the growth upturn), declining
labor-intensity of production techniques (encouraged by the real appreciation of the
peso), productive restructuring towards less labor-intensive activities, and probably also
the poor operation of the labor market.5 The unemployment rate declined in the boom
years 1996-1998, to resume an upward trend during the ensuing recession.
Poverty indicators display a similar trajectory (Figure 2.1). Poverty declined
sharply until 1994, but rose again with the Tequila crisis and then continued on an
upward trend during the recession of 1999-2001, so that by 2001 the gains at poverty
reduction achieved in the early part of the decade had been wiped out. Even more striking
is the trajectory of inequality, which appears to have risen without interruption from 1993
on, after an initial decline in 1990-92.
Was Argentina's poor growth performance from 1999 onward a reflection of
more adverse external shocks than those affecting other Latin American and Caribbean
(henc,eforth LAC) countries? To answer this question, we first consider real shocks
stemming from terms of trade changes and global growth and then look at capital flow
disturbances.
We begin by looking at terms of trade changes. Argentina's terms of trade
declined by over 10 percent in 1998/99, but recovered fairly quickly in 2000/01.
Moreover, the temporary drop followed a rise that had occurred in 1996/97. Relative to
other countries, Argentina's terms of trade decline in 1998/99 was less severe than that
suffered at first by oil exporting countries like Venezuela and Ecuador, which as a
consequence suffered a much deeper contraction in 1999 (Figure 2.2a). Likewise, the
cumulative terms of trade decline from 1997 through 2001 was less pronounced for
Argentina than for Chile, and much less than the one experienced by Peru.
In any case, the economic impact of these gyrations in the terms of trade was
much less significant for Argentina than for other countries. The reason is that Argentina
is a fairly closed economy, and thus terms of trade changes entail only modest changes in
real income. This is highlighted in Figure 2.2b, which portrays the terms of trade shocks
suffered by various LAC economies, calculated multiplying the changes in import and
export prices by the respective magnitudes of imports and exports relative to GDP. It is
immediately apparent that Argentina's terms of trade shocks over the second half of the
1990s were smaller in magnitude than those of any other country in the graphs, perhaps
with the only exception of Brazil (which is also fairly closed). Indeed, Argentina's real
income loss from the terms of trade fall in 1998-99 amounted to less than 0.5 percent of
GDP.
5 See Galiani (2001) for a recent assessment of the state of Argentina's labor market.
6



Figure 2.2 a. Terms of Trade
1992=100
160
' ^ Argentina         '-Chile
140     _       Ecuador           Mexico
*'Venezuela, RB
120
100
80
60 -
1995       1996      1997       1998      1999       2000       2001
140 -
0Argentina              Brazil
130  _        'Colombia           Peru
120
110
100
90                       ,
1995       1996      1997       1998      1999       2000       2001
Source: WDI 1995-00 and domestic sources 2001.



Figure 2.2 b. Terms of Trade Shocks
(Percent of GDP)
2.5 -
"ArgentUna           -Brazil
2.0 -      --,-Colombia         Peru
1.5-                                                 /
1.0 
0.5 -
0.0
-0.5-
-1.0
-1.5
10
OArgentina           --Chile
8 -         Ecuador           +Mexico
6 - _     - Venezuela, RB
4-
2-
-2-   1 9 > \ H \ ; < <    _   o   7    ~~~~~1999
-2
-4,
-6
-8  c
Source: World Development Indicators - World Bank.



The other source of adverse real shocks was the global growth slowdown that
started in 2000. Relative to that year, in 2001 real GDP growth declined by 3 percentage
points both in the U.S. and the industrialized world as a whole. Like with the terms of
trade decline, however, Argentina was much less affected than other countries in the
region, again because of its lower degree of openness. As a result, the growth
deceleration and the ensuing slowdown in export markets translated into a fairly modest
aggregate demand decline for Argentina - the smallest among the countries shown in
Table 2.2.6
Table 2.2. Impact of the Global Slowdown 2001:
The Inicome Effect via Trade Volume
Exports / GDP     Exports of     Exports of     Impact of the  Impact of the
(%)           goods to       goods to      decline in U.S.  decline in
US/Total      OECD/Total     growth (% of   OECD growth
Exoorts 1%)    ExDorts (%)       GDP)         (% of GDP)
(a)             (b)            (c)           21(c)[(ar(b)*  (d)-[(a)*(c)*
(a)  (b)             (c)        ~~~~~~~2.21*0.03  2.21*0.03
Argentina          10.81           10.90          33.09           -0.08          -0.24
Bolivia           17.55            13.86          25.27           -0.16          -0.29
Brazil            10.81            24.70          57.11           -0.18          -0.41
Chile              31.85           18.48          62.44           -0.39          -1.31
Colombia          21.34            43.45          60.22           -0.61          -0.85
Costa Rica        48.09            41.38          72.01           -1.31          -2.29
Dominican Rep.    29.93            86.47          94.37           -1.71          -1.86
Ecuador           42.43            38.55          67.05           -1.08          -1.88
Guatemala          19.93           56.40          70.80           -0.74          -0.93
Jamaica            42.94           30.86          85.80           -0.87          -2.43
Mexico             31.06           88.55          94.31           -1.82          -1.93
Peru               15.98           25.39          63.55           -0.27          -0.67
Venezuela, RB      28.45           53.81          64.14           -1.01          -1.20
Notes:
(a)Exports of Goods and Services and GDP of 2000, source: WDI.
(b) Exports of goods in 2001 source:lM F Direction of Trade.
(c) 2.2 is the U.S. expenditure elasticity (Clanda,1994), and 3% is the decline in the U.S. economic growth between 2000 and 2001(d) 3 %
Is the decline in the OECD economic growth between 2000 and 2001.
Next, we turn to the disturbances stemming from world financial markets.7
Following the Russian crisis, Latin American countries - like other emerging economies
- had to face a generalized increase in the cost of market borrowing. Figure 2.3, which
offers a comparative perspective on the sovereign spreads faced by different countries,
shows that Argentina did not fare worse than the rest of the region in this regard. As a
matter of fact, Brazil's spreads rose above Argentina's in 1997-99, with speculative
attacks on the real taking place in October 1997 and October 1998. It was only in late
2000 that the Argentine spread began to drift above Brazil's. And the same happened
with Venezuela and Ecuador, whose spreads (not shown to avoid cluttering the graph)
increased more than Argentina's in 1998 and remained higher until 2001.
6 The impact on export demand shown in the table is calculated using an income elasticity of 2.2 for both
U.S. and OECD imports.
7 The role of external financial shocks in the Argentine crisis has been underscored in particular by Calvo,
Izquierdo and Talvi (2002).
9



-Z0OOMMJ                                                    zo-des
-Wm"                 -ZOO~~~~~0ZIVL                                               zo-une
-ZOOZ/ZIV                                     zo~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-jew
400I/I/I                        ~O-des
=;;P-  ~ ~ ~  ~   t.0~~I                                                       o-unr.
W,-jew
I.00~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I~~~~~~fl~003                  (
000~~~IZI0L                                             .00-deS
m                      OOOZ~~~~~~00IZIL                                            00u,
C4                                                                       o~~~~~' 00/~t  o-jew
C%l     00OZIM                                                     ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~66-OgCa
2 >  ~ ~ ~  ~~          00I~l66-deS
4 2                                u  2 ~~~~~66&II0.66-unlr
Q IDW  ~ ~ ~ ~   ~   ~~--      *~66L~L66-IJVW
-666WIZ4                                                     6-V
--  ~~~~~                                                                                    96-~~~~96M/
-966U/ZiL                                                    96-unr~
_ _ _ _ _ _   - .   9 6 6  U~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~IL                   9~~~~6 -Je W
-966 IMIt                                                    L6-3Oa
966 I.I~~IIq                                             L6-deS
L66MI/0I      Pofl
L66LI~~~~~~IL        =L6-JeWl
-L66&IZIV                                                   96XO
C'Em  ~ ~ ~ ~  ~   ~~L6Ufl~96-d0OS
96-dflg  ID
-966WIILZ/96Je&
966&/LIVI                                                   96-OOC U
-  966I4liI.  8 
0                                          (4~~~~  e a a 
a  a   a     a~~~~t  a   Inn                              a     n    a    so    a



The comparative evolution of the current and capital accounts across LAC
countries tells the same story. Until late 2000, Argentina's capital account surplus (as
percentage of GDP) rerrmained above the regional average (Figure 2.5a). Its current
account deficit likewise exceeded the region's norm (Figure 2.5b). Indeed, the current
account adjustment that Argentina, like most Latin American countries, undertook in
1999 - a result of the capital flow decline that followed the Russian crisis - was fairly
modest by regional standards. Among the larger countries, it exceed only Mexico's, and
was dwarfed by the current account correction undertaken by Chile, Colombia and Peru -
not to mention the dramatic adjustments of oil-exporting Ecuador and Venezuela (Table
2.3).
Figure 2.5 a Capital Account
(Percentage of GDP)
16         - Argentina
12 -|LAC GDP Weighted Mean
4  oo  aO       ,w           N   3N 0     N 
8-
-12
In summary, while the global contraction in capital flows that occurred in 1999
reached virtually all Latin American economies, Argentina was not affected as severely
as (and certainly not more severely than) other countries in the region. Thus, Argentina
was able at first to continue running large current account deficits, as it had done in the
previous years. After 199>9, however, capital flows to most LAG countries recovered
somewhat, except for Airgentina (and Venezuela), where they continued to fall,
especially sharply in 2001. Thus, the tentative conclusion is that the deterioration of
capital flows to Argentina at the end of the decade reflected mostly Argentina-specific
factors rather1than2global factors.



Figure 2.5 b. Current Account
(Percentage of GDP)
5
-C-Argentina
3
5  &LAC GDP Weighted Mean
0)                 0~~0)0               0         0
N 1 N      N            N
-3 
-5
-7
Source: Balance of Payments from domestic sources via HAVER. Latin America
average includes Arg, Bra, Chi, Col, Mex, and Pe.
Table 2.3. Current Account Adjustment
as share of GDP           as share of Imports
1998/99     2000/01         1998/99    2000/01
Argentina               0.77        1.29            7.16      14.51
Bolivia                 1.44        1.54            4.96       7.83
Brazil                  1.11       -0.55           13.83       -7.33
Chile                   5.56       -0.86           22.38       -3.64
Colombia                5.20       -3.14           34.37      -22.55
Costa Rica             -0.91       -0.34           -2.07       -0.83
Ecuador                15.84      -12.20           56.03      -41.16
Mexico                  0.37        0.31            1.13       0.92
Peru                    3.19        0.50           20.75       3.37
Venezuela, RB           7.24       -5.56           42.99     -41.67
Average                 3.98       -1.90           20.15       -9.06
Note:
Current Account adjustment is defined as the year on year difference in the
Current Account surplus as share of GDP or imports.
Sources: Imports (US$) from Direction of Trade (IMF); GDP and Current
Account Balance (US$) from WDI (World Bank).
12



We can assess more formally the relative role of global and countryspecific
factors in the observed pattern of capital flows to Argentina and other countries using a
suitable statistical decomposition separating the common component of sovereign
spreads from their country-specific component. Loosely speaking, the common
component reflects global conditions (both interdependence and 'contagion'), and hence
captures global risk, while the country-specific component reflects each country's
economic fundamentals (or, more precisely, investors' perceptions about them) and thus
provides a measure of its pure risk premium. 8
This procedure yields a synthetic "global factor", whose role in the observed
evolution of emerging-market spreads is depicted in the top panel of Figure 2.6. The
figure plots the degree of comovement of the spreads, as measured by the fraction of their
total variation (computed over moving 48-month windows) attributable to the global
factor. The graph shows that the global factor accounts for the vast majority of the
variation in spreads up to 1998. After that date, there is a steady decline in the degree of
co-movement of spreads., reversed only in part in September 2001.
The bottom panel of Figure 2.6 performs the same exercise for Argentina, Brazil
and Mexico. For each of these countries, the figure shows the fraction of the total
variation in its spread attributable to the global factor just described. In all three countries
analyzed, sovereign spreads reflect both global and country-specific risk. The roles of
these two factors are riot the same across countries and time periods, however. In
accordance with the previous figure, the global factor plays the main role up to 1998.
Indeed, in 1997-98 it accounts for the bulk of the variation in spreads in all three
countries. After the Russia crisis in 1998, however, the contribution of the global factor
declines for the three countries. Importantly, the extent of the decline differs aross
countries. In the case of Argentina, it is much more marked and accelerates noticeably in
the second half of 2000. In fact, after that moment global factors account for less than
half of the observed variation in Argentina's spreads. The conclusion is that such
variation increasingly reflects country-specific factors after 1998, and especially so from
2000 onward.
8The full details are spelled ouat in Fiess (2002). In a nutshell, we use principal component analysis to
construct an indicator of global comovement of spreads using end-of-the-month JP Morgan EMBI data for
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela and the non-Latin EMBI index over the period from January 1991 to
March 2002. The indicator is the percentage of the total variance of the (normalized) spreads explained by
their first principal component, constructed using a rolling window of 48 months. We smooth the resulting
series by averaging the values obtained for each data point over the 48 windows in which it appears. As a
robustness check, we redo the exercise using a broader set of countries - Argentina, Bulgaria, Brazil,
Ecuador, Mexico, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Poland, Russia and Venezuela. However, not all of them possess
observations over the entire sample period. We also construct altemative global indicators incorporating the
effects of US interest rates on country spreads. Finally, we redo these experiments with alternative window
lengths. All these specification changes have only minor effects on the qualitative results. See Fiess (2002)
for details.
13



Figure 2.6. Sovereign Spreads: The Role of Global Factors
a.    Contribution of First Principal Component to Overall Variation of
Spreads
(Percent)
100%
90%-
80% -
70% -
60% -
10  in  (0  (0  t~-  t~-  co  co  0)  a)  0)  0        C-  -  N
0   ,   .    .   .   .   .   .   .      9  9 . 9     9     9
b.    Contribution of First Principal Component to Variation in Individual
Country Spreads
(Percent)
100%
80%
60%
40%
] ~~~~ARGENTINA 
20%                            -,i&-*BRAZIL 
-'&MEXICO
0%
10 10 a0 (0 °  0, C,D CD  -  C0 $    0)P 0  9   9   0o  o  o
1=    >                               cmf n : o >  c  c  f  i
(U  0     aQ~         S   u                          .
7~ 7~ Z        U) IL  7 ..  a    0   i  <      7    Z      U )O
Source: Fiess (2002)
14



The above analysis of country spreads can be extended to capital flows with the
aid of a suitable econornetric model of their determinants, a task undertaken in Fiess
(2002). In brief, the model describes the simultaneous determination of flows and spreads
making use of the decomposition of the latter into their global and local components
shown above. Empirical implementation of this framework shows that capital flows are
negatively affected by both global and local risk. In turn, local risk rises with the total
volume of debt and the primary fiscal deficit, both expressed as ratios to GDP.
Using this framework, we can assess the roles of local and global factors in the
observed time path of capital flows to Argentina. This is done in Figure 2.7, which plots
the variation in flows to Argentina attributable to local factors, as a fraction of the total
variation explained by ithe model.9 The figure shows that Argentina-specific factors
played a negligible role until 1998, but became increasingly important following the
Russian crisis, and especially after October 2000. Indeed, from the latter date up to
September 2001, local factors account for two-thirds of the total variation in capital flows
to Argentina explained by the model.
Figure 2.7. Capital Inflows to Argentina: Contribution of Local Factors
(Percent of Total Variance Explained)
70%-
60% -
50%-
40%
30% -A                                        l
20% -
10% 
0% 
a0  40  ,0  _0  1=.  i...  4...  4..  40  40 2  4  40  a,  40  a0,  9  '   -  9   9
40 4  0  0 4  4  0 4 to  40  40  40  40  40   4 0  0  0   0  0    t0
C -s  ;  -C                       C         co C  L      C   -
X <  g nzt 7g n      n °W <1 7 °U <en g              <1 7) g
Source: Fiess (2002)
9 Like in the previous figures, we use a 48-month moving window for these exercises. Alternative window
lengths result in qualitatively similar results.
15



On the whole, these modelbased results reinforce the more informal evidence
shown earlier that Argentina was not affected as severely as other countries by the global
slowdown in capital flows from 1999 onwards. On the contrary, the econometric models
confirm that the sharp reversal of flows to Argentina in late 2000 and 2001 was mainly
driven by country-specific factors. This strongly suggests that the "sudden stop" of
capital flows in 2000/2001 acted as an amplifier of the effects of domestic factors, rather
than being the primary, exogenous cause behind the crisis.
We can summarize this section by noting that Argentina was not hit harder than
other LAC countries by the terms of trade decline after the Asian crisis, nor by the global
capital flow reversals and spread increases that followed the Russian crisis, mr by the
U.S. and worldwide slowdown that started in 2001. On the contrary, the sharp capital
flow reversal from 2000 onwards was primarily an Argentina-specific phenomenon
driven mostly by Argentina-specific factors.
Since external shocks were no worse in Argentina than in the rest of the region,
the fact that after 1998 Argentina's performance fell short from that of other LAC
countries must reflect either higher vulnerabilities or weaker policy responses, or both. It
is true that Argentina was particularly affected by other external events, such as the
appreciation of the dollar and the depreciation of major trading-partner currencies. But
such differential effects were a consequence of policy decisions - the peg to the dollar
under the Currency Board arrangement - and the handicaps that they created. Most
important among the latter were the significant balance sheet vulnerabilities to external
shocks that plagued the Argentine economy. We next turn to these issues.
III. OVERVALUATION AND DEFLATIONARYADJUSTMENT UNDER THE
HARD PEG: Why old lessons about optimal currency areas should not be forgotten
Our next task is to assess the role of the dollar peg in Argentina's malaise - how it
added to the economy's external vulnerability and how it hampered adjustment to real
shocks.
The pros and cons of irrevocable pegs, such as that adopted by Argentina under
Convertibility, have been traditionally assessed in the framework of Optimal Currency
Area (OCA) theory. In brief, the latter suggests that an irrevocable peg is more likely to
be beneficial for the client country if it trades a lot with the anchor, and if client and
anchor are not exposed to significant asymmetric shocks which would demand monetary
policy responses of different sign in the two countries. If the scope for asymmetric shocks
is substantial, the peg might still make sense if the client country can easily adjust to real
shocks through nominal price and wage flexibility, or through other mechanisms such as
a system of fiscal transfers and/or unrestricted labor mobility with the anchor.
Argentina did not meet any of these conditions for an OCA with the U.S. dollar.
The U.S. accounted for less that 15 percent of Argentina's total trade, equivalent to
16



under 3 percent of its GDP, leaving a very large scope for asymmetric shocks (Table
3.1).1° Wage and price flexibility were limited, making adjustment to real shocks
difficult.
Table 3.1. Argentina's Trade Structure (2001)
Geographical composition of
imports plus exports
(percentage of the total)
Brazil                                        25%
Main LAC w/o Brazil (*)                       17%
USA                                            14%
Europe (**)                                   20%
Rest of the world                              24%
Notes:
(*) Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Penr, Paraguay,
Uruguay, and Venezuela.
(**) Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Germany, Spain, Finland,
France, United Kingdom, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Sweden, and Switzerland.
Source: International Monetary Fund - Direction of Trade.
Indeed, the adoption of Convertibility was not guided by OCA arguments, but by
the credibility-enhancing effect that renouncing monetary discretion was expected to
have after many years of acute monetary instability, as well as by Argentinean investors'
stated preference for dollar-denominated assets. As we shall see below, however, this
purported shortcut to credibility left the economy highly exposed to disturbances.
A. WAS THERE AN OVERVALUATION? WHERE DID IT COME FROM?
Argentina's real effective (that is, trade weighted) exchange rate (henceforth
REER) experienced a considerable appreciation during the 1990s." Between 1990 and
2001, the REER rose12 by over 75 percent (Figure 3.1). The bulk of the appreciation
developed before 1994. In fact, the REER depreciated after that date and until 1996, but
then appreciated again to reach its peak in 2001.
10 In fact, on these grounds a peg to the Euro would have made more sense than a peg to the U.S. dollar.
See Alesina, Barro and Tenreyro (2002).
1 Trade weights are taken from the IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics and correspond to 1995. They refer
to goods trade (imports and exports).
12 Throughout this note we define the RER so that an increase represents a real appreciation.
17



Figure 3.1. Actual and Equilibrium REER
1.3
1.2-
1.1
1.0
0.8
/~~~~~~-0 Actual REER (1995=1)m
0.7                       -0- Equilibrium REER
.   .   .    b ~-* Avera,qe 1960 - 2001.    .     .
0.6
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001
Source: Alberola, L6pez and Serven (2003)
This evolution of the REER was duly reflected in Argentina's export
performance. While real exports did show positive growth over the decade, they grew
less than in comparable countries, and their rate of expansion was closely associated to
the evolution of the REER. During the initial real appreciation at the time when the
currency board was established, Argentina's exports stagnated. As the REER depreciated
after 1993, exports expanded vigorously, at rates sirnilar to, or higher than, those
experienced by other countries. When the REER started appreciating again in 1997,
export performance fell significantly behind that of comparable countries. (Table 3.2).
Real appreciation is not necessarily a symptom of imbalance in need of
correction. Indeed, during the 1990s - especially in the early part of the decade -- a
number of reasons were offered by different observers in order to explain the persistent
real appreciation of the peso as an equilibrium phenomenon. Most importantly, it was
argued that the efficiency-enhancing reforms of the early 1990s had led to a permanent
productivity increase in the tradable sector of the Argentine economy, which would have
justified a permanent REER appreciation. Nevertheless, over the final two or three years
of Convertibility an increasing number of independent observers and financial market
actors expressed the view that the peso was overvalued - although the precise extent of
the overvaluation was disputed, depending on the measure of the equilibrium REER used
as benchmark of comparison. 13
13 For example, Deutsche Bank perceived the peso to be some 20 percent overvalued in real terms in mid-
2000. See also Sachs (2002), Rodrik (2002) and Hausmann and Velasco (2002) for various assessments of
the degree of overvaluation of the peso.
18



Table 3.2. Average Annual Growth of Real Exports
(Goods and Non-Factor Services, Percentages)
1992-1993   1994-1997   1998-2001   1992-2001
Argentina                               1.8        14.4         3.6         7.6
7 major LAC countries w/o Argentina (*)  7.7       11.1         7.8         9.1
Upper middle-income LDC's (**)         7.8         11.9         8.9         9.8
World                                  3.8         8.4          6.6         6.8
Memo Item:
Argentina's REER growth
(appreciation +)                       10.4        -4.1         5.8         2.8
Notes:
(*) Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela.
(**} World Bank classification: American Samoa, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Barbados, Botswana,
Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Dominica, Estonia, Gabon, Grenada, Hungary, Isle
of Man, Latvia, Lebanon, Libya, Lithuania, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mayotte, Mexico, Oman, Palau,
Panama, Poland, Puerto RioD, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Slovak Republic, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia,
Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
Source: World Development Indicators - World Bank.
Such views were most often based on simple comparisons of the prevailing real
exchange rate with its historical value, under the view that the equilibrium REER is
constant - the so-called purchasing power parity (PPP) view. Figure 3.1 illustrates the
use of this approach to assess the misalignment of the Argentine REER over the 1990s,
taking as equilibrium value the REER average over the last four decades (1960-2001).
The latter is depicted by the horizontal line in the figure. Comparison with the actual
REER suggests that the peso was initially undervalued in 1990, but became increasingly
overvalued after the introduction of the Convertibility Law in 1991. The overvaluation
peaked initially in 1993, (leclined later through 1996, and rose again to nearly 50 percent
in 2001.
However, this approach neglects two important factors that may cause the
equilibrium REER to change over time The first one is the relative level of productivity
across countries. Other things equal, an increase in productivity in traded goods sectors
relative to nontraded goods sectors in a given country above that experienced by its
trading partners should lead to a REER appreciation -- precisely the argument advanced
by some observers to justify the rapid real appreciation of the Argentine peso in the early
1990s.14
The second ingredient is the adequacy of tlh current account to sustain
equilibrium capital flows. The real exchange rate must be consistent with a balance of
payments position that does not lead to explosive accumulation of external assets or
14 This is the so-called Balassa-Samuelson effect.
19



liabilities. In this framework, the equilibrium REER is that which allows the economy to
achieve a sustainable long-run net foreign asset position. 15
Our assessment of Argentina's equilibrium real exchange is based on an
analytical model encompassing these two ingredients. Thus, we take into account
simultaneously the internal (productivity) and external (asset position) equilibrium of the
economy to draw inferences about the overall equilibrium or disequilibrium position of
the real exchange rate. 16
Empirical application of this analytical framework to Argentina using data for
1960-2001 yields the estimated equilibrium REER shown in Figure 3.1. The figure
suggests that the trajectory of the equilibrium REER consists of two stages. First, an
initial real appreciation in 1991-93 - particularly sharp in the first two years. Second, a
steady depreciation from 1994 on, which by 2001 has brought the equilibrium REER
below its 1990 value.
The equilibrium and actual REER are compared in Figure 3.2, which presents the
percentage deviation of the actual REER from its equilibrium value, along with the 95
percent confidence bands derived from econometric estimation of the equilibrium real
exchange rate model. In the figure, a positive value indicates overvaluation, and a
negative one means undervaluation. The graph reveals two stages of real misalignment.
Between 1990 and 1996, the REER was undervalued, although after 1991 the degree of
undervaluation was fairly small. From 1997 on, however, the REER exceeded its
equilibrium counterpart by a widening margin, resulting in an increasing overvaluation.
By 2001, the REER exceeded its equilibrium value by 53 percent.17
Notice the contrast between the degree of misalignment derived from the
equilibrium model and that arising from the simple-minded PPP calculations mentioned
earlier. While by both yardsticks the peso was substantially overvalued by 2001, the PPP
calculations imply that the overvaluation of the peso developed basically between 1991
and 1993, with little change afterwards, while the latter suggests that the overvaluation
arose only in the last few years of Convertibility. What lies behind these contrasting
assessments ? As discussed earlier, the analytical model used here encompasses two key
determinants of the time path of the equilibrium REER: (i) the relative prodictivity
differential between Argentina and her trading partners, and (ii) Argentina's net foreign
asset position. It is useful to examine them in turn.
15 While this stock-based asset view of real exchange rate determination has become mainstream, an
alternative flow-based view assigns to exogenous capital flow fluctuations a dominant role in the
determination of the equilibrium REER. According to this approach, the equilibrium level of the real
exchange rate is that which makes the current account balance equal the (exogenously given) supply of net
foreign financing.
16 The details are spelled out in Alberola et al. (1999) and Alberola, L6pez and Serven (2003).
17 To be specific, this figure is the difference between the logarithms of the actual and equilibrium REER.
20



Figure 3.2. Argentina: Real Overvaluation of the Peso
70
60
so     =;iOvervaluation
e 20 -g,                                                  *
10                                          f
X,                                                 CDNH;   Y K X X e 
en   CD   a_    aO        o _  ew   0    c 
-10
-20
-30
Source: Alberola, L6pez ancl Serven (2003)
Figure 3.3. Relative Productivity
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5            /0\
0.0                       *
1990  199  1992  1993  1994  1995 \996  1997  1     1999  2000
-0.5
-1.0
-1.5
-zo2
Source: Alberola, L6pez and Serven (2003)
21



Figure 3.3 portrays the time path of a measure of the productivity differential,
based on the (log) ratio of nonitradable to tradable prices of Argentina relative to its
trading partners.   An increase represents an improvement in Argentina's productivity
differential, and calls for an appreciation of the equilibrium REER. The figure suggests a
clear rise in relative productivity in the early 1990s and hence, given other things, an
appreciation of the equilibrium REER between 1990 and 1993. Much of this gain in
productivity is likely to reflect efficiency gains derived from the end of hyperinflation
achieved in 1991. After 1993, however, there were no additional gains in relative
productivity, and in fact a partial reversal appears to have taken place after 1994. This
absence of further productivity gains appears consistent with the stalling of Argentina's
structural reform process in the second half of the decade.
If the initial productivity gains are largely responsible for the appreciation of the
equilibrium REER in the early 1990s, its depreciation in the late 1990s is driven by the
changes in Argentina's net foreign asset position, shown in Figure 3.4. In the figure, an
increase represents a rise in Argentina's NFA position (relative to GDP) and hence calls
for an appreciation of the equilibrium REER, given other things.
Figure 3.4. Net Foreign Assets
(Percent of GDP)
-10%
1990   1991   1992   1993   1994  1995   1996   1997   1998   1999   2000   2001
-15%
-20%
-25%
-30%
-35%
-40%
Source: Alberola, L6pez and Serv6n (2003)
18 See Alberola, L6pez and Serven (2003) for more details on the construction of this measure. An
alternative measure based on ratios of aggregate labor productivity yields broadly similar qualitative
results.
22



The figure displays an initial rise of NFA in 1991, followed by a steady decline
between 1993 and 2001, during which the NFA/GDP ratio falls by over 20 percentage
points. The decline proceeds at a particularly fast pace after 1997. In the face of a
stagnant productivity differential, as shown above, this deterioration in the NFA position
is the driving force behind the steady depreciation of the equilibrium REER in the late
1990s.
The falling NFA/GDP position is largely a reflection of the rising trend in
Argentina's foreign liabilities relative to GDP over the late 1990s, which resulted from
the combination of substantial current account deficits - particularly large in 1997-99 -
and, in the final years of the decade, a persistent growth deterioration. It is true that by
1999-2000 Argentina's current account imbalance, while large, was not far above the
region's norm -- at least if the wide surpluses of the oil importing countries are excluded
from the comparison. But Argentina's deficits were being incurred in the midst of a
severe recession with escalating unemployment. This suggests that the full-employment
current account deficit would have been much bigger than that actually observed. 19 In the
next section we examine how these persistent current account imbalances relate to the
fiscal gaps that developed over the decade.
Our empirical frarnework allows us to reassess the role of external shocks in the
misalignment of the Argentine peso. In particular, we can gauge the impact of changes in
the real exchange rates of third currencies. It has been argued that much of the
overvaluation of the peso can be attributed to the appreciation of the U.S. dollar in the
late 1990s relative to the currencies of major trading partners of Argentina - especially
the Euro --, and also to the Brazilian devaluation of 1999, which abruptly reduced
Argentina's competitiveness vis-a-vis its top trading partner.20 Arguably, these are not
'external shocks' in the s,trict sense of the tern, but self-inflicted ones resulting from
Argentina's choice of currency regime - they are a result of 'pegging to the wrong
currency'.
We can assess the contribution of these factors to the overvaluation of the peso by
decomposing the latter iinto three parts. The first one is due to the divergence in
fundamentals between Argentina and the U.S., which causes the equilibrium REERs of
the dollar and the peso to diverge. This reflects primarily tle pursuance of policies
inconsistent with the dollar peg, which must eventually lead to misalignment if the peg is
'right' for the Argentinean economy. In turn, the other two components reflect the
inadequacy of the dollar peg itself. One is just the overvaluation of the dollar, which is
translated to the peso through the dollar peg. The other results from changes in the real
exchange rates of third currencies whose weight in Argentina's total trade is different
from their weight in the UJ.S. total trade - clearly the case of the Brazilian real.21 Note
19 This point is underscored by Roubini (2001).
20 In contrast, adverse terms of trade shocks had presumably a very modest impact on the extent of
misalignment of the peso. As already discussed, in 1998-99 Argentina's terms of trade declined by some 11
percent. However, the shock was only temporary, and was reversed in 2000. In addition, the decline
followed a terms -of-trade windfaLlI in 1995-96.
21 See Alberola, L6pez and Serven (2003) for further details on this decomposition.
23



that, in the former case, misalignment results from pegging to a misaligned anchor
currency, while in the latter it results from asymmetries in the trade structure of the client
and anchor countries.
The decomposition is presented in Figure 3.5, which shows the contribution of
each of the three ingredients to the cumulative change in the misalignment of the peso
between 1997 and 2001. As shown earlier, these were the years during which the
overvaluation developed. Between those dates, peso overvaluation rose by 50 percent.22
The figure suggests that both the wrong choice of peg and inconsistent fundamentals
were behind the mounting overvaluation of the peso in the final years of Convertibility.
Indeed, the former accounts for 27 of the 50 percentage points of overvaluation
accumulated between 1997 and 2001, while the latter contributed the remaining 23
percentage points.
Figure 3.5. Sources of cumulative peso overvaluation, 1997-2001
(Percentages)
50% 
40% -       Inconsistent fundamentals
a3 Dollar overvaluation
30%  _  * Trade structure
20%
10%                                  ,
.10% B1999                                        2000            20 1
-10% -
Source: Alberola, L6pez and Serven (2003)
The graph also shows that most of the misalignment due to inadequacy of the peg
can be traced to the overvaluation of the U.S. dollar in the late 1990s. In contrast, trade
structure asymmetries worked against overvaluation prior to 1999, because the Brazilian
real was itself appreciating in those years. The figure clearly shows that Brazil's abrupt
devaluation in 1999 added significantly to the misalignment of the peso. In fact, Figure
3.2 above showed that the overvaluation of the peso increased by almost 20 percent in
22 As before, this figure and the ones that follow refer to logarithmic deviations.
24



1999. Numerical calculations suggest that the depreciation of the real was directly
responsible for about half of this amount (1l%).23
Finally, it is important to note that these calculations may understate the true
contribution of the dollar overvaluation and the depreciation of the real to the
misalignment of the peso. To the extent that the overvaluation due to these two factors
led to larger current account deficits over time, and hence declining net foreign assets and
a falling equilibrium REER, such factors would be indirectly responsible for additional
peso overvaluation. All in all, it is safe to conjecture that the choice of a 'wrong peg'
accounts for the majority of the observed overvaluation of the peso.
In summary, we conclude that the peso had become substantially overvalued after
1997, in the face of stagnant productivity and mounting net foreign liabilities relative to
GDP. We find that the appreciating U.S. dollar and the depreciating Brazilian real
accounted directly for over half of tir overvaluation. The rest can be attributed to the
divergence in fundamentals between Argentina and the U.S. Such divergence largely
reflects the external imbalances that Argentina incurred tbroughout the decade, which, as
we shall see later, were mainly the result of persistent public deficits.
Importantly, we reach these conclusions in a framework in which exogenous
capital flow fluctuations play no role in the determination of the equilibrium REER. This
is consistent with the analysis in the preceding section, which found that factors
governing global capital flows became relatively less important in explaining the
observed pattem of flows to Argentina in the late 1990s.
B. PERSISTENCE OF MISALI GNMENTS AND DEFLATIONARY ADJUSTMENT UNDER HARD PEGS
Real misalignments can and do occur under both fixed and flexible exchange rate
regimes. But the key difference is that under a floating regime a real misalignment can be
eliminated quickly through a nominal exchange rate adjustment. Thus, if a temporary
spending boom, say, causes the real exchange rate to appreciate above its equilibrium
value, as the spending boom unwinds the nominal exchange rate will typically depreciate,
helping eliminate the real overvaluation. 24
In a pegged regime, in contrast, the real exchange rate adjustment has to occur
through changes in the domestic price level vis-A-vis foreign prices. Disturbances
requiring a real depreciation - such as the Brazil devaluation or the U.S. dollar
appreciation just reviewed - call for a decline in the inflation differential vis-A-vis trading
partners in order to restore REER equilibrium. If trading partner inflation is low, this'.
means that domestic prices need to fall in absolute terms. Under nominal inertia - of
wages and other prices - deflation in turn requires a recession, making the adjustment
process slow and costly in terms of output and employment. This generates a second
23 See Alberola, L6pez and Serv6n (2003). This figure is in fact very similar to those reported at the time by
financial market analysts.
24 Because of this, large and persistent overvaluations are less frequently observed under floating than
under fixed regimes. See Goldfajn and Valdes (1999).
25



difference with floating regimes: in the presence of a large overvaluation, the fact that the
required adjustment process may entail large (and politically unpalatable) output losses
can in turn undermine confidence in the sustainability of the peg itself - especially when
fiscal institutions are weak, as was the case in Argentina (see Section IV below).
The cost of adjustment under a hard peg can be illustrated on the basis of
empirical evidence on the adjustment to real disturbances from a large sample of
industrial and developing countries under different exchange rate regimes. Figures 3.6
and 3.7 portray the adjustment of countries with floating regimes and hard pegs (such as
Argentina's currency board) to a trajectory of the terns of trade similar to that
experienced by Argentina in 1998-99 - a cumulative drop of 11 percent.25 The figures
show the time path of output and the real exchange rate, in percentage deviation from the
initial (pre-shock) level.
Figure 3.6 shows the adjustment of real GDP. In floating regimes the output loss
is small - it never exceeds 0.5 percent of initial GDP. In hard pegs, in contrast, the terms
of trade deterioration leads to a sizable output contraction in the short-run - up to 2.5
percent by the second year. The initial contraction is followed by a partial recovery of
GDP, which approaches the level of the floating regime by the fifth year.
The other side of the coin is shown in Figure 3.7, which presents the time path of
the real exchange rate, again distinguishing between floating regimes and hard pegs. In
floating regimes, the terms of trade loss causes an immediate real depreciation. The RER
depreciates by over 1.5 percent on impact, and continues to depreciate over the following
periods - by up to 5 percent by the third year. In contrast, under hard pegs the real
depreciation is gradual and of very modest magnitude - less than 2 percent after ten
periods - in spite of the sharp output contraction. Moreover, it is possible to show that
the adjustment patterns under both regimes are significantly different in the statistical
sense.
These empirical results conform with the experience of Argentina. As noted
earlier, Argentina's REER overvaluation was partly a reflection of specific disturbances
to which the currency board was vulnerable - such as the appreciation of the US dollar
and the Brazilian real devaluation. In the adjustment to these disturbances, prices did fall,
but by a very modest magnitude - a total around 3 percent over 1998-2001. This price
deflation was wholly insufficient to offset the impact of the shocks on the misalignment
of the REER -- even though nominal deflation was the only way to achieve REER
adjustment under the hard peg. However, a faster deflation would have been politically
very difficult, as it would have required an even deeper recession and higher
unemployment than actually witnessed in 1999-2001.
25 This is based on an extension of earlier work by Christian Broda (2001).
26



Figure 3.6. GDP Response to a Terms of Trade Deterioration
0.25
0.00                   I
o&      3     4     5     6     7     8     9    10
-0.25
-0.50     \'
-0.75
-1.00
-1.25
-1.50
Figure 3.7. R]ER Response to a Terms of Trade Deterioration
I
2     3.   4      5     6     7     8     9     10
-1
-2   E
-3       \
4
-5                     I_I
-6
0-FIoating Regime                -Hard Peg
27



C. SUMMING UP
To sum up, we can highlight four facts that emerge from the discussion. First,
taking into account developments in both ArWntina's relative productivity and its foreign
asset position, we find that the appreciation of the peso up to 1993 was to a large extent
an equilibrium phenomenon, reflective of efficiency improvements that took place at the
beginning of the 1990s. On the other hand, we also find that the peso had become grossly
overvalued by 1999-2001. We reach these conclusions in a framework in which
exogenous shifts in capital flows play no role.
Second, a considerable portion of the overvaluation of the peso by 2001 can be
traced to the U.S. dollar appreciation against the Euro, as well as the Brazilian real
depreciation. This shows the dangers of a hard peg adopted in violation of standard OCA
criteria, which in the case of Argentina pointed clearly against the U.S. dollar as anchor
currency - even though finance-based arguments may have pointed in the opposite
direction, as we shall discuss later.
Third, the experience of Argentina also provides a vivid illustration of the
rigidities imposed by a hard peg. The observed degree of downward price flexibility
proved wholly insufficient to absorb the adverse real shocks that impacted on the
economy in the late 1990s.26 While deflation provided the only mechanism for REER
adjustment under the peg, the deflation required to adjust to the shocks would have been
politically hard or impossible to achieve.27 In this regard, the hard peg offered the
mechanism for a persistent and large REER misalignment to go unchecked. As we shall
see below, it also hid from public view a rapidly mounting fiscal solvency problem.
Finally, a key ingredient behind the mounting overvaluation of the peso after
1996 was the persistent decline in Argentina's equilibrium NFA position. This in turn can
be traced to the large external imbalances that developed over the 1990s, which led to an
escalation in external liabilities relative to GDP - especially in the context of slow or
negative growth at the end of the decade. As we shall discuss below, public sector
imbalances were a major element in this process.
IV. FISCAL VULNERABILITIES: Mismanagement in the boom and large fiscal
contingencies associated with adverse external shocks
Many observers have blamed the Argentine crisis on the lack of fiscal discipline
which was essential to preserve the Currency Board.28 Others, in contrast, have argued
that even until mid-2001 conventional debt and fiscal indicators appeared no worse in
26 This is also in accordance with the international evidence reported by Goldfajn and Valdes (1999). They
show that once a real overvaluation exceeds some threshold (around 30%), it becomes very difficult to
reverse via nominal deflation., and a collapse of the nominal exchange rate is virtually assured to occur.
27 This view is also stated by Rodrik (2002) and Sachs (2002).
28 See in particular Teijeiro (2001) and Mussa (2002).
28



Argentina than in other emerging markets in Latin America and elsewhere (Table 4.1),
and view the fiscal deterioration mainly as a casualty of the recession. The contribution
of Social Security refomi to the fiscal imbalances of the 1990s has also attracted
attention. 29 In this section we assess those claims.
Table 4.1. Debt Indicators in Emerging Markets
PLiblic Debt        Public Debt Interest Payments
Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of
GDP            GDP       Tax Revenue        Debt
Argentina             62.2           5.4            30.8           8.7
Brazil                65.0           9.5            33.8          15.5
Colombia              50.8           5.0            25.3           9.8
Mexico                27.7           2.6            25.7           9.4
Venezuela             35.3            3.3           18.7           9.3
Poland                39.1            2.9           11.0           7.4
Russia                52.3           3.0            7.9            5.7
Turkey                85.1           23.7          133.1           27.8
Source: Goldman Sachs and IMF.
Note: Data are for 2000 except for Argentina (2001).
A. FISCAL POLICY DURING BOOM AND BUST
We begin our inquiry by examining how and when fiscal vulnerabilities
developed during the nineties. Most analysts have pointed to the deterioration of fiscal
balances (both at the Federal and provincial levels) and the corresponding increase in
debt indicators since 1995 and, especially, since 1999, which are shown in Figures 4.1
and 4.2 respectively. 30
29 See Teijeiro (2001) and Hausm,ann and Velasco (2002).
30 Argentina's fiscal balances during the first part of the nineties look better than they actually were, as they
include some privatization receipts above the line and hide important fiscal liabilities (in both Federal and
Provincial pension systems and other items) that were later partially recognized, especially from 1994
onwards. Public debt decreased up to 1993 thanks to large privatization receipts and the Brady deal, while
from 1994 onward the debt path reflects the recognition of some of the previously hidden liabilities (see
Teijeiro 2001). Also, from 1995 on the Federal Government absorbed cash flow deficits previously
included in the Provincial pension system. This latter change does not affect the consolidated (Federal +
Provinces) deficit but only its composition.
29



Figure 4.1. Overall Budget Balance excluding privatization irevenues
(Percentage of GDP)
2
I
I       #     9     1995               199_ 8  1999  2000  2001
.2
.3
-4
.5
-   0-Consolidated Public Sector 
-6
D 31Federal Govemment 
-7     lb Provincial Govemments
-8
Source: Ministerio de Economla de la RepOblica ArgenUna and World Bank.
Figure 4.2. Consolidated Public Debt and Service
(Percentages)
70-
60_
lo Consolidated Public Sector Debt / GDP
K11 Interest I Tax Revenue- 0_
oitiX~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001
Source: Intemnational Monetary Fund.
30



However, it is true that the observed deterioration in Argentina's fiscal balance in
the final years of the decade reflects in part the effects of declining growth on tax
collection and those of rising interest rates on debt service. To assess the fiscal stance
adopted by the authorities, we need to gauge the effects of these factors beyond their
immediate control.
Consider first the effects of cyclical variation in output on the fiscal balance.
Unfortunately, we do not have sufficient data to correct for this factor at the level of the
consolidated public sector., but only for the Federal government. Nevertheless, Figure 4.1
shows that the time profile of the Federal and consolidated deficits is roughly similar, so
the cyclically-adjusted fiscal stance should also be fairly similar for both government
definitions.
Figure 4.3. GDP and Potential GDP
(Hodrick-Prescott Trend and Linear Trend)
330000.
310000-
~-TREND GD)P(HPfllter) 
-   Linear trenid,'
290000       - Preferred Estimate
270000-
250000-        in n
230000 -
t  w0n      o DZD0b          rXe         000            0 _ 
w                             o        o L =  :0  0  0  0g_ 
a     z X   -) z X      z E      z  :     z X- z           z :E     z
Source: Ministerio de Economia de la Republica Argentina and Ministerio de Obras y Servicios Piblicos.
Construction of cyclically-adjusted fiscal figures typically requires estimates of
potential output, whose calculation near sample endpoints is subject to considerable
inaccuracy due to the difficulty in distinguishing between temporary output movements
and changes in trend at the beginning and end of the sample period.31  To partially
remedy this problem, we construct two potential output estimates - one through a
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, and another using linear extrapolation. Figure 4.3 shows that
the HP method appears to umderestimate potential output at the end of the period -- as it
projects zero or even negative potential growth -- while the linear extrapolation probably
31 See Orphanides and van Norden (2002) for a discussion.
31



overestimates it. Thus, we opt for a middle-of-the-way estimate (shown in the figure)
between these two.
Using this estimate, we can correct the Federal primary balance for cyclical
revenue effects.32 This yields the structural primary balance of the Federal government,
shown in Figure 4.4. It deteriorated markedly (by nearly 1.5 % of GDP) during the boom
period from the end of 1995 to mid 1998, and improved significantly hereafter. The
improvement was punctuated by brief periods of relaxation, mostly during the run up to
the election at the end of 1999.3
Figure 4.4. Current and Structural Primary Budget Balance of
Federal Government
(Percentage of potential output and pe rcentage deviation
from potential output)
3.0
2.5
2.0 -
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
*  *  0  0  0  0  0  *   0 ~~~m  o  ol Co
-0.5   -
-1.0
-1.5    -- Primary Balance
-2.0  -  - Primary Structural Balance
-*- Cyclical Component of GDP
-2.5 -
Source: Ministerio de Economfa de la Republica Argentina and Ministerio de Obras y Servicios Publicos.
Indeed, estimates of the fiscal impulse, defined as the change in the structural
primary deficit relative to GDP, also reveal a significant expansionary change in the
stance of the Federal government during the boom period, followed by progressive
adjustment after mid 1998 except for a few months in the run up to the 1999 election
(Figure 4.5).
32 To do this, we use a revenue elasticity to cyclical GDP of 1.14, which is obtained from a regression of
current revenues on trend and cyclical GDP.
33 Powell (2002) suggests that inclusion of the Provinces in the analysis would reveal an even larger
relaxation in that year.
32



Figure 41.5. Fiscal Impulse of Federal Government
(% change and deviation from potential output)
1.0
0.5
0.0
Fiscal Impulse\
-1.5   _   Cyclical Compornent of GDP
Figure 4.6. Blanchard's Indicator of Fiscal Impulse
(Percentage of GDP)
1.5
z --~                                 'z       'U                   
0.5
0.0
n i ~~~~0 0u ol a o  -5 C* 0               (a 0o Zod 
-0.5 -   Fis Impulse
-1.0
.1.5
Source: Our elaboration using data from Ministerio de Economia de la Republica Argentina.
33



The above analysis is based on the cyclically-adjusted primary deficit estimates
described earlier. To assess its robustness, we can examine an alternative measure of the
change in the fiscal stance, due to Blanchard (1993), which avoids taking a stand on the
nature of business fluctuations or on trend-cycle decomposition techniques. It compares
actual revenue and expenditure with those that would have happened if the previous
period's "economic environment" (as described by unemployment and trend output) had
prevailed. Such calculation is reported in Figure 4.6. The qualitative pattern is very
similar to that shown earlier in Figure 4.5: a major expansionary change in fiscal policy
from mid 1996 to 1998, reversed after that date (with brief interruptions in 2000 and
2001).
Table 4.2. Interest Payments on Public Debt
Interest      Change in           Contribution to
Payments        Interest              Change in
on Debt         Burden            Interest Burden
Percent of     Percent of        Debt        Interest
GDP            GDP           Volume         Rate
Effect       Effect
1991        2.8
1992        1.6            -1.1          -0.4          -0.8
1993        1.4            -0.2           0.1          -0.3
1994        1.6            0.1            0.1          0.0
1995        1.9            0.3            0.2          0.1
1996       2.1             0.2            0.1          0.1
1997        2.3            0.3            0.1          0.2
1998        2.6            0.3            0.2          0.1
1999        3.4            0.8            0.5          0.3
2000        4.1            0.7            0.3          0.4
2001        5.4            1.3            1.0          0.3
TOTAL
1991-2001                    2.6            2.2           0.5
1993-2001                    3.9            2.4           1.5
Source: Ministerio de Economia de la Republica Argentina and Intemational
Monetary Fund.
However, the adjustment in the structural primary balance after 1998 was not
enough to compensate for growing interest rate payments. Figure 4.7 shows how the
Federal government's structural overall balance, calculated as the structural primary
balance plus actual interest payments, was kept in negative territory (around 1% of GDP)
since the end of 1996. Indeed, interest payments rose from around 2% of GDP in 1995/96
34



to 4.1% in 2000 and 5.4% in 2001. As Table 4.2 shows, however, less than half of the
increase in the interest bill between 1995 and 2001 can be attributed to the rise in implicit
interest rates on public debt -- which accelerated after the Russian crisis and especially in
1999-2001 due to the perceived weakening of Argentine fundamentals. The rest of the
increase in the interest burden was due to the growth in the stock of outstanding debt. The
additional deterioration in the Federal government's overall balance, beyond that due to
changing fiscal stance and interest charges, can be attributed to the effects of the
slowdown, and is captured by the gap between the two deficit measures in Figure 4.7.
Figure 4.7. Current and Structural Overall Federal Budget Balance
(Percentage of potential GDP)
1.5 -
0.5
0.0
-0.5                  - I      I "a     Ra                                      o
-1.0 
-1.5-
.2.0         13Structural
-'&Cyclical component of GDP
-2.5-
-3.0-
Source: Ministerio de Economia de la Republica Argentina and Ministero de Obras y Servicios Publicos.
More often than not Latin American fiscal problems have originated in booms,
when weak fiscal institutions and policy complacency do not facilitate the achievement of
surpluses. As a consequence fiscal policy has to be pro-cyclical also in bad times,
contributing to a deepening of recessions and social tensions, and occasionally ending up
in a severe fiscal crisis. Argentina in the nineties was no exception to this unfortunate
Latin American policy tradition. 34
34 The procyclicality of fiscal policy in LAC has been examined in Gavin and Perotti (1996); Gavin, et al.
(1996) and Perry (2002)
35



B. FISCAL SOLVENCY ASSESSMENTS
We next explore debt sustainability. First, we attempt to mimic debt sustainability
exercises on the basis of growth expectations formed using the infonnation available in
each year. These exercises, reported in Table 4.3, reveal that declining future growth
projections (influenced by the deflationary adjustment under the hard peg) may have been
even more important than implicit public debt interest rate increases in shaping
perceptions about fiscal sustainability. Indeed, assuming that markets assessed long-term
growth potential based on a (3 and 5-year) moving average of past growth, the
simulations indicate that by the year 2000, and certainly by 2001, debt sustainability was
clearly open to question, in the sense that the required primary balance of the
consolidated government approached or even exceeded 4% of GDP, a figure that looked
unlikely given Argentine fiscal history and institutions. In practice, although fiscal
discipline had been a concern for years, it is fair to say that most analysts in investment
banks and elsewhere began to seriously question fiscal solvency in these years and not
before. It should be pointed out, however, that Argentine economists centered the debate
in the electoral year of 1999 on the need for further fiscal adjustment and that the Fiscal
Responsibility Law was enacted in mid 1999 as a means to guarantee fiscal solvency.
Non-compliance with its goals in the run up to the election and afterwards contributed to
undermine confidence in solvency.
Table 4.3. Indicators of Fiscal Sustainability
Average       Implicit   Consolidated      Sustainable        Sustainable
Growth     Interest Rate  Gov. Primary      Balance            Balance
Rate      on Gov. Debt    Balance            (a)                (b)
(three preceding                            (av. growth rate   (av. growth rate
year average)                               based on last 3    based on last 5
year observations)  year observations)
Percentage   Percentage   Percentage of    Percentage of       Percentage of
GDP              GDP                GDP
1991       0.7          8.6          -0.4              2.7                2.8
1992       5.7          6.2           1.4              0.1                1.4
1993       7.3          5.0           1.2             n.s.p.              0.5
1994       6.5          5.1          -0.1             n.s.p.             n.s.p.
1995       2.6          5.4          -1.0              0.8                0.1
1996       2.8          5.6          -1.3              0.9                0.4
1997       3.6          6.1           0.2              0.9                0.6
1998       5.8          6.4           0.6              0.2                0.9
1999       2.9          7.1           -1.6             1.7                2.0
2000      -0.1          8.0           0.3              3.9                2.5
2001      -2.9          8.7          -1.4              6.0                4.0
Note:
n.s.p. means no sustainability problem.
Source: Estimates based on IMF and Ministerio de Economia de la Repuiblica Argentina data.
The protracted deflationary adjustment to the external shocks imposed by the hard
peg to the dollar (as discussed above) had thus a major effect on debt sustainability
36



perceptions, through two channels. On the one hand, it reduced future growth
expectations, and on the other it made further fiscal adjustment more difficult and painful
as the ratio of revenues to GDP collapsed. In this context, further tax hikes (like the
"impuestazo" in 2000) or expenditure cuts (like those undertaken during the second half
of 2001) aggravated the recession and the ensuing social and political tensions.
Table 4.4. Fiscal Sustainability and the Exchange Rate
Debt Output   Debt Output   Consolidated   Sustainable   Sustainable
Ratio         Ratio      Gov. Primary     Balance       Balance
Adjusted       Balance    (av. growth rate  Adjusted
for RER                   based on last 3  for RER
Misalignment               year observations) Misalignment
Percentage of  Percentage of  Percentage of
GDP           GDP            GDP
1991       32.3%         28.0%          -0.4           2.7           2.1
1992       26.1%         23.9%          1.4            0.1           0.1
1993       28.7%         27.7%          1.2           n.s.p.        n.s.p.
1994       30.9%         29.1%          -0.1          n.s.p.        n.s.p.
1995       34.8%         31.6%          -1.0           0.8           0.8
1996       36.6%         34.9%          -1.3           0.9           0.9
1997       38.1%         39.4%           0.2           0.9           0.9
1998       40.9%         46.2%          0.6            0.2           0.2
1999       47.6%         63.2%          -1.6           1.7           1.9
2000       50.9%         70.6%           0.3           3.9           5.1
2001       62.2%         95.0%          -1.4           6.0           8.4
Note:
n.s.p. means no sustainability problem.
Even more, the observed adjustment in the structural primary balance was clearly
insufficient if we take irnto account both the direct and indirect effects of exchange rate
overvaluation since 1997 on the balance sheet of the government. The overvaluation
implied that measures of sustainability based on the observed ratio of public debt to GDP
understated by a considerable margin the public sector's difficulties, as most public debt
was denominated in dollars while government assets (in particular its capacity to tax)
were not. Thus, a real depreciation restoring real exchange rate equilibrium would have
raised public debt ratios by a large amount - up to 20-30 percentage points of GDP in
2000-2001, as shown in Table 4.4. It is important to note that this would have occurred
irrespective of whether the real depreciation was achieved under Convertibility through
nominal deflation or through a nominal devaluation and thus a collapse of the Currency
Board.3 In either case, the real depreciation would have eventually revealed the reduced
capacity of the government to pay back its debt. Table 4.4 shows that once this is factored
into the analysis, by 2001 government solvency would have required an additional
primary surplus of about 2% of GDP annually. The peg actually hid from public view the
increasing precariousness of the fiscal situation, and thus made it more difficult to elicit
political support for an adjustment while there was still time for an orderly correction.
35 This is underscored by Rotbini (2001).
37



In the same vein, even if the Currency Board had not collapsed, households and
firms in non tradable sectors would have suffered severe financial stress through the
required real exchange rate adjustment, as their capacity to repay dollar and peso debts
would have been eroded through the deflationary process. This would have had a major
impact on the quality of bank portfolios, and the government would have been faced with
significant fiscal contingencies -- though probably not as large as those that arose in fact
after the nominal devaluation. This is further discussed in Section V below.
C. THE ROLE OF SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM
It has been noted that much of the observed deterioration in Argentina's fiscal
accounts reflects the widening deficit of the Social Security system following its reform
in 1994. As a consequence of the reform, workers' Social Security contributions were
diverted from the public sector towards the new private pension funds.36 Figure 4.8 plots
the Social Security surplus along with the primary and overall balances of the
consolidated public sector. It is apparent from the figure that from 1995 on (and
especially in 1997-98) the deficit of the Social Security accounted for a large portion of
the overall public sector deficit. Further, comparison of the public sector primary deficit
with the deficit of the Social Security system reveals that from 1993 on the non-Social
Security component of the public sector ran a primary surplus every year except 1995.
However, not all of the observed deterioration in the Social Security balance is
attributable to the reform. Specifically, between 1994 and 2000-2001 the Social Security
deficit increased by roughly 2 percent of GDP. About half of this total (i.e., around 1
percent of GDP) was due to the reform. The rest resulted from a reduction in employers'
contributions and other factors. 37 Such figure of 1 percent of GDP is small relative to the
extent of the fiscal correction that would have been required to address the fiscal
sustainability problem identified in the previous tables. Thus, the fact that public finances
were headed for insolvency after 1999 is not just a consequence of the reforme-induced
increase in the Social Security deficit.
Nevertheless, it is true that such deficit increase added to the conventionally-
measured fiscal imbalance in the post-reform years. In this cgard, it is important to
emphasize that the reform aimed at improving the long term structural fiscal position of
the country in the first place. Pension reform just revealed a hidden public sector debt
(just like nominal devaluation in 2002 revealed the true volume of explicit public debt),
which had been kept out of sight by the former Pay as You Go System (Oust like the hard
peg did after 1997 with conventional debt).38 The implication is that the Argentine fiscal
situation up to 1994 had been worse than shown by the published figures.39 In this sense,
36 See Hausmann and Velasco (2002). The economic, as opposed to accounting, merit of this view is
disputed by Teijeiro (2001).
37 In spite of the reform, some hidden liabilities still remain in the system. See Teijeiro (2001).
38 As mentioned before, in Argentina the hidden liabilities also refer to Provincial pension systems, which
were absorbed after 1995 by the Federal Government.
39 Strictly speaking, the same is true for any other country with unfunded pension liabilities.
38



it must be concluded that fiscal imbalances (both explicit and implicit) were prevalent
during the whole decade.
Yet the fact that thle reform led to a higher measured fiscal deficit still carries a
lesson. From the economic, as opposed to accounting, perspective, the higher deficit had
existed all along, and the ' lifting of the veil' just put it in the open. But the conversion of
the implicit into explicit debt did impact on two dimensions, however. First, public sector
financing needs were raised by the amortization of the newly-recognized debt -- as
measured by the benefits that the public sector had to keep on paying -- and this entailed
additional demands on domestic and/or foreign financial markets. Second, perceptions of
Argentina's fiscal position may have been affected as well, to the extent that markets did
not see fully through the veil separating explicit from implicit government debt.
The lesson is that extra care is needed regarding the consequences for financial
markets of revealing and floating hidden pension liabilities. Even if doing so improves
the long term fiscal position, it must be accompanied by further fiscal adjustment in the
short term (to absorb at least part of the increased medium term cash deficit) and
appropriate long-term dormestic debt instruments. With the benefit of hindsight, the boom
years from the end of 199:5 to mid 1998 were a major lost opportunity to tackle the fiscal
imbalances revealed by the pension reform.
Figure 4.8. The Social Security Deficit in Perspective
(Percentage of GDP)
0~                            ~~ _
2-
19          ~~~~~1995  1996  1997    1998     1999    2000    2001
-1 
-2
-3
.4                                                   \A
-*--Consolidated Public Sector Primary Balance
0-Soclal Security Elalance
-7 -*     Consolidated Public Sector Overall Balance
Source: Ministero de Economia de la Republica Argentina and Intemational Monetary Fund.
39



D. PUBLIC DEFICITS, EXTERNAL DEBT AND THE CURRENT ACCOUNT
Finally, we explore to what extent fiscal imbalances contributed to the persistent
current account deficits of the nineties. The latter posed two risks: they increased
vulnerability to capital flow reversals, and also added to the overvaluation of the currency
- since, as we found above, much of the peso overvaluation can be traced to a steady
deterioration of the net foreign asset position of the country.
What were the contributions of the private and public sectors to Argentina's
external imbalance? Figure 4.9 depicts the overall fiscal balance of the consolidated
government (exclusive of privatization revenues) and the private sector overall surplus -
with the latter defined as the difference between the current account and the fiscal
balance; thus, the sum of the private and public deficits equals the current account deficit
by construction.
The figure reveals a contrast between the private and public sectors. While the
public sector exhibited a deficit every year since 1993, the private sector alternated
between deficit and surplus. In particular, after 1994 the private sector exhibited a current
account deficit only in the boom years of 1997-98. By 1999 it had moved to a position of
surplus, while the public sector continued to show large deficits.
Figure 4.9. Private and Public Current Account Balances
(Percentage of GDP)
4
2
0
-4                                  .
-.... Private Sector Balance
410-vera11 Public Sector Balance (excluding privatization revenues)
*8
Source: Ministerlo de Economla de la Rep(iblica Argentina and World Bank.
40



Likewise, we can also examine the roles of the private and public sectors in
Argentina's foreign debt build-up process. Table 4.5 shows that the economy's total
external debt increased from 27.7% to 52.5% of GDP between 1993 and 2001. About
half of this change reflects higher public indebtedness, while fie other half seemingly
reflects aggressive private sector borrowing abroad. Indeed, private external debt
increased from 5.6% of GDP to 17% during the period. One could view this as evidence
that the private sector, as much as the public sector, was behind the accumulation of
foreign liabilities.
However, Table 4.5 also shows that at the same time the public sector was
borrowing massively fromn the private sector in the domestic capital market. Indeed,
between 1993 and 2001 domestic public borrowing rose by over 20 percentage points of
GDP. This effectively means that the private sector was borrowing abroad on behalf of
the government.
In summary, Argentina's large external imbalances and its deteriorating net
foreign asset position reflected the action of both the private and public sectors at
different times. During the boom of 1997-98, the private sector was the one showing the
larger imbalance. However, the public sector failed to put its finances on firm footing in
those years (especially after part of the hidden liabilities in the pension system had
become explicit as a consequence of pension reform). In turn, after 1998 the expanding
saving-investment gap of the public sector was the main force at work behind the rising
foreign liabilities of the Argentine economy.
Table 4.5. Debt Stocks
(Percentage of GDP)
Total        Consolidated Government Debt   Nonfinancial Private External
External      Total         of which:         Private and  Debt Net of Gov.
Debt                  Extemal    Domestic    Financial  Bond Holdings
External Debt
1993    27.7        213.7      22.1       6.6          5.6          -1.0
1994    29.6        30.9       23.5       7.4          6.2          -1.3
1995    39.0        34.8       26.8       7.9          12.2          4.2
1996    41.8        363.6      27.4       9.3          14.4          5.1
1997    44.8        38.1       28.2       9.9          16.6          6.7
1998    48.6        40.9       30.2       10.6         18.3          7.7
1999    52.6        47.6       33.4       14.3         19.2          5.0
2000    52.7        50.9       33.8       17.1         18.9          1.8
2001    52.5        62.2       35.4       26.8         17.0         -9.7
Source: World Developmenit Indicators World Bank.
41



V. THE BANKING SYSTEM: Vulnerabilities behind a strong faqade 40
A. STRENGTHS
Hyperinflation and deposit confiscation at the end of the eighties41 wiped out
confidence in the peso and domestic financial intermediation. After Convertibility was
enacted, a major effort was launched to recreate a solid financial sector mostly based in
dollar-denominated deposits and loans. In 1995 Tequila contagion led to a run on 18% of
total deposits and to systemic illiquidity which, in the absence of a domestic lender of last
resort, required prompt support from the IFIs to avoid a collapse of the banking and
payments systems. The authorities responded by "building" a large liquidity buffer and
through otler ambitious reforms in order to consolidate a highly resilient financial
system. Results were impressive. By 1998 Argentina ranked second (after Singapore,
tied with Hong Kong, and ahead of Chile) in terms of the quality of its regulatory
environment, according to the CAMELOT rating system developed by the World Bank42
(Table 5.1).
Table 5.1. Camelot Ratings for Banking System Regulation
Country                               Total Score*
Singapore                                 16
Argentina                                 21
Hong Kong                                 21
Chile                                     25
Brazil                                    30
Peru                                      35
Malasya                                   41
Colombia                                  44
Korea                                     45
Philippines                               47
Thailand                                  52
Indonesia                                 52
Note:
*Lower numbers indicate better ranking.
Source: World Bank. Argentina Financial Sector
Review (1998).
40 This section, and part of the next, is based on a technical note prepared for the first version of this paper
by Augusto de la Torre and Sergio Schmukler, which later on evolved into a full-fledged paper (De la
Toffe, Levy Yeyati and Schmukler 2003) in which the summary analysis presented here is developed in
much more detail.
41 The so-called Bonex plan instituted in 1989.
42 The CAMELOT index combined separate rankings for capital requirements (C); loan loss provisioning
requirements and definition of past-due loans (A); management (M), defined by the extent of high-quality
foreign bank presence; liquidity requirements (L); operating environment (0) as measured by rankings with
respect to property rights, creditor rights, and enforcement; and transparency (T), as measured by whether
banks are rated by international risk rating agencies and by an index on corruption. Argentina ranked I for
C (tied with Singapore), 4 for A, 3 for M, 4 for L, 7 for 0, and 2 for T. For further discussion see World
Bank (1998).
42



The banking systern was apparently in a very solid position not only by 1998,
before the Brazilian devaluation of January 1999, but also afterwards and through the end
of 2000, despite the post-1998 continued economic contraction. In effect, through the
year 2000 conventional indicators of financial health depicted a well-capitalized, strongly
provisioned, and highly licluid banking system, although it was expenencing losses and
increasingly burdened by bad loans after 1998 (Table 5.2).43    The banking system's
prudential buffers were sufficient to enable it to withstand sizeable liquidity and solvency
shocks-including a flight of more than one-third of the system's deposits as well as a
sudden and complete deifault in up to 10 percent of the loan portfolio-without
endangering the convertibility system.44 The important presence of reputable foreign
banks in the domestic system (they accounted for over 70 percent of total banking assets
in 2000) was broadly perceived to implicitly augment these liquidity and solvency
cushions (Table 5.3). These banks were expected to stand behind the capital and liquidity
of their affiliates in Argentina, at least in the context of bad states of the world associated
with bad luck (few were thinking then of bad states of the world caused directly by
confiscatory government policy).
Table 5.2. Selected Banking System Indicators
(Percentages at end-year)
1997        1998        1999         2000
Net Worth/Assets                        12.11       11.44       10.72       10.52
Capital / Risk Weighted Assets          18.13       17.64       18.56       21.18
Non Performing Loans/Total Loans (a)    8.23        5.98         7.14       10.21
Provisions/Total Loans                  7.70        7.10         7.82        8.65
Provisions/Non Performing Loans (a)    108.64      140.40       122.25      77.13
Systemic Core Liquidity (b)            42.98        39.58       40.89       38.69
Return on Equity before Provisions     22.59        10.61        8.43        7.76
Retum on Equity after Provisions        7.41        -2.24       -6.71        -9.42
Return on Assets after Provisions       1.04        -0.27       -0.77        -1.01
Leverage Ratio (not in precent)         6.11        7.26         7.74        8.33
Notes:
(a) Non performing loans is defined as the sum of loans with problems (category 3), loans with high risk
(category 4) and non-recoverable loans (categories 5 and 6).
(b) Defined as the ratio of international reserves of the Central Bank in foreign currency and other liquidity
requirements held abroad, and total deposits.
Source: Central Bank of Argentina.
43 Profits had turned negative already in 1998, and became deeply negative during 1999-2000 mainly
because of the need to constitute provisions in the face of rising bad loans. NPLs spiked to 10.2 percent of
total loans in 2000, from 7.1 percent the year earlier, and the increase in provisions started to lag behind
(Table 5.3).
44 Table 5.3 puts systemic core li(quidity (disposable international reserves of the central bank plus foreign
exchange in cash or near-cash held abroad by banks) at above 35 percent of banking system deposits.
However, there was a significant variance in the distribution of such liquidity across banks. This may
explain why the "corralito" was imposed at the end of 2001 before deposits had fallen by 30 percent.
43



Table 5.3. Consolidation and Internationalization of the Banking System
Dec.1994   Dec. 1998 Dec. 2000
Number of total banks                      166         104         89
Foreign banks
Number of banks                         31         39          39
Number of branches                     391       1,535      1,863
Share of total assets (%)               15          55         73
Number of public banks                       32         16         15
Source: Central Bank of Argentina.
B. VULNERABILITIES
As the policy intent was to reinforce the viability of convertibility, it made no
sense for the authorities to issue prudential norms that would dissuade the use of the
dollar in financial contracts per se. To be sure, the markets did not take the permanence
of the Currency Board completely to heart-the peso problem continued throughout the
1990s, as evidenced by the always positive "currency risk" implicit in forward contracts,
which showed spikes during turbulent times (Figure 5.1). But the authorities could not
signal the possibility of a nominal devaluation through prudential norms without
undermining their own quest to raise the credibility of Convertibility above all doubts.
The hard peg and prudential regulation thus contributed to the high and increasing share
of dollar deposits and dollar loans in the domestic financial system (Figure 5.2). The
share of dollar deposits increased after the Russian crisis and the Brazilian devaluation,
and especially after mid 2001 when expectations of devaluation soared.
It was thus no secret that a disorderly breakdown of the rule of one-peso-one-
dollar would wreck the banking system, and this was the main reason why many
Argentine economists and external analysts preferred an exit from the Currency Board
towards full dollarization over an exit towards a flexible exchange rate regime and a
monetary anchor - and some still hold this view.
44



Figure 5.1. Anticipated devaluation implied by the 30-day NDF discount -- up
to 3/15/01
(at different perceived probabilities, percentage)
80
70
60
45
30-
45 ~ ~  ~   ~   ~   5



Figure 5.2. Deposits in Dollars and Interest Rate Differential
25 -                                                                    75
- 20                                                                     -70
'U                                                       C~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~A
15-                                                                     65 
0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
*~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-                ~~~~~~~~~Share of Deposits In US Dollars             i
oCO 10 -                 S|
°5-        /^                                                           55
Currency Premium
0                                                                      50
co  co    0    0)   0    0    0    CD  a0    a,   a         ,
0       0    0    0   0    0         a    a    a    o    a    a
-=   X    o    E    -=   0    o    E    -n   X    o    E    n    to
Source: Deposits from Ministeno de Economia (http/www.mecon.org); 30 day deposit interest rates in pesos and dollars from
Bloomberg. Currency premia is defined as the difference of domestic interest rates in pesos and US dollars.
However, with the benefit of hindsight we can now identify at least three crucial
vulnerabilities in the financial sector and weaknesses in the regulatory framnework, even
in the hypothesis that the Currency Board was to be permanent. The shortcomnings relate
to:
*  the link between debtor capacity to pay and the required deflationary adjustment
to a more depreciated equilibrium real exchange rate;
*  the growing exposure of the banking system to government default; and
*  the insufficient realization that general liquidity buffers, even if high, do not
adequately protect the payments system from a run.
The first vulnerability had to do with credit risk-the latent non-performing loans
(NPLs) in the context of an overvaluation of the real exchange rate (RER) relative to its
equilibrium level. As mentioned, it is estimated that, by the year 2001, the Argentine
RER was overvalued by more than 50 percent. Under convertibility, the adjustment of
the RER towards. equilibrium was bound to imply a protracted and painful deflation and
recession which would have certairly eroded the capacity to pay of debtors whose
earnings came from the non tradable sector.45 Hence, the first prudential shortcoming
was the failure to recognize the special risk of loans to debtors in the non tradable
sector-a credit risk that would materialize in the event of significant adverse shocks that
45 By contrast, in a country with a flexible exchange rate (i.e., where a fixed parity is not part of the social
contract) and without a liability dollarization problem, the adjustment to a more depreciated equilibrium
RER would come through a nominal depreciation, which would be associated with an improvement
(through debt dilution) in the capacity to pay of debtors in the nontradable sector.
46



led to a deflationary a(ljustment.46  Taking the one-peso-one-dollar rule as a given, it
would have been advisable for the authorities to require tougher loan classification
criteria (higher loan- loss provisions and/or a higher weight for the purposes of measuring
capital requirements) in the case of loans to the non tradable sector, regardless of whether
the loans were peso or dollar-denominated.47
The second vulnerability and prudential shortcoming also had to do with credit
risk, but derived from exposure to Government risk. It consisted in the failure to isolate
the solvency of the barking system from the solvency of the government. In countries
with recurrent fiscal problems, like Argentina, it appears worthwhile to endeavor to de-
link financial system solvency from fiscal solvency, through the use of prudential norms.
The authorities moved in this direction belatedly, in 2000, when they introduced mark-to-
market requirements for government bond holdings and established a positive weight for
loans to the government for the purposes of determining capital requirements. It would
have been advisable to complement this prudential approach by not allowing government
securities to count as part of the assets eligible to meet liquidity requirements. In this
manner, the stability of the banking system and the viability of convertibility would have
been better insulated from the vagaries of the fiscal process, including an event of
government debt default. Direct exposure of banks to Government risk was not high
until 2000 - less than 20% of total assets. However, in 2001 the Government began to
fund itself using available liquidity in the banking system in response to increasing
external borrowing constraints (see Figure 5.3 and Section VI). Other components of the
financial system, most notably private pension funds, had even higher exposure to
Government risk.
The third vulnerability and prudential regulation shortcoming relates to the
insufficient realization that general liquidity safeguards, even if high, do not adequately
protect the payments system from a run. To be sure, high liquidity requirements, like
those in effect in Argentina during the second-half of the 1 990s, enhance the resiliency of
the banking system-they cushion the system vis-a-vis liquidity shocks and deter runs,
thereby reducing the scope for multiple equilibria. Thanks to its liquidity requirements,
the Argentine banking system withstood a prolonged and severe process of deposit
withdrawal during 2001. At the same time, however, the Argentine experience illustrates
that once a run is under way, relaxing liquid reserve requirements can have adverse
signaling effects that exacerbate th run on the peso (instead of spurring credit growth as
Minister Cavallo had wrongly hoped48), further weakening confidence.
46 In a private communication to the authors, Andrew Powell noted the use of an "interest rate factor" in
determining the required capital weight for individual loans, as an indirect way to take into account, among
other things, such currency risks. However, as De la Torre et al (2003) argue such factor failed to capture
the specific risk of loans to thie non tradable sector associated with eventual RER depreciations, and might
have even encouraged further dollarization (as peso loans carried higher interest rates than dollar loans).
47 These suggestions apply also to fully dollarized economies such as Ecuador. The same prescription
should apply, but only to dollar loans to households and firms in the non tradable sectors, in countries with
a high degree of domestic financial dollarization but that keep flexible exchange rate systems, such as
Uruguay, Bolivia and Peru amnong others. See De la Torre et al (2003)
48 Many analysts actually cautioned about the potential negative effects of this move, and the extent of the
reduction was a major cause of dispute between the Central Bank and the Government.
47



Figure 5.3. Financial System: Exposure to Public Sector
Total Assets                                                 164,100
(Millions of Dollars)                       146,417   153,252
1576 130,929      ;1     ||l       ;1     125,069
91,534
82,5289'3 l 1.,
1994      1995     1996     1997      1998      1999     2000      2001
|  * Claims on the public sector  LUquid assets and claims on the private sector
Source: Central Bank of Argentina.
Moreover, Argentina illustrates that, as confidence collapses, a general liquidity
requirement (available to all deposits) fails in its most basic intended function-it does
not protect the payments system. The lesson is sobering. In the absence of a credible
lender of last resort, the payments system is vulnerable and can collapse under a run even
where liquidity is high, but still a fraction of deposits, and equally available to finance
any deposit withdrawal. It thus would appear that, under a currency board and formal
dollarization, the protection of the payments system from bank runs may actually require
a structure where there is either full liquidity backing for transactions balances - a sort of
narrow banking for demand deposits -- or at least liquidity is earmarked for those
balances under specified conditions, to allow the payments system to continue
functioning (without deposit freezes and payments interruptions) even in the extreme
scenario where banks are unable to honor withdrawals of time deposits 4
49 De la Torre et al (2003)
48



VI. POLICY OPTIONS BEFORE AND AFTER 1999
A. THE ARGENTINE VIA CRUCIS: POLICY UNDER THE DE LA RuA GOVERNMENT AND
BEYOND.
Right from the beginning, the De la Rua administration (which assumed power in
December 1999) was caught in a trap of low growth, high and increasing debt rollover
requirements, and an overvalued and inflexible exchange rate. The government's strategy
to break free from this trap focused on reviving growth while reducing fiscal imbalances,
although the means to achieve this objective changed dramatically after April 2001, when
Mr. Cavallo took the post of Minister of Economy (See Annex 1). During 2000, growth
resumption was sought indirectly-trying to regain investor confidence through fiscal
adjustment. It was hoped that improved confidence would eventually lead to lower
interest rates, more capital inflows and growth, making the debt and current account
sustainable. To be sure., the authorities also tried to address the problem of currency
overvaluation directly, through the flexibilization of labor markets. But the passage of
labor reform through Congress was linked to a bribery scandal that led to the resignation
of the Vice President, further exacerbating confidence problems and weakening
governance. In addition, as confidence was not restored and growth failed to pick up, the
authorities shifted their attention towards calming fears of a possible debt default. The
December 2000 IMF package (US$40 billion) was negotiated with this latter objective
prominently in mind. However, none of these actions achieved the expected results and
hopes of reviving growth faded away.
Minister Cavallo brought his prestige to attempt the rescue. He also focused on
rekindling growth, but this time more directly, through heterodox measures (in addition
to enacting a revenue enhancing financial transactions tax). These included imposing a
tax on imports and subsidizing exports (a fiscal devaluation for trade flows), lowering
reserve requirements, and announcing the eventual peg of the peso to the dollar and the
euro (with equal weights), once these two currencies reached parity. With hindsight, it is
clear that this growth-focused strategy, particularly in Cavallo's heterodox version, was
naive. Not only did it fail to yield growth, it also increased uncertainty about the two
other components of the trap, namely the debt rollover and the currency arrangement.
The trap thus tightened.
Doubts about convertibility soared-the one-peso-to-one dollar rule had already
been broken through the back door for trade transactions and could be easily broken also
for financial transactions. Perhaps more importantly, the government procrastinated in
taking a decision on the debt front. Instead of recognizing that debt restructuring was
becoming a necessity following the failed attempts to restore confidence and growth, the
government averted debt service arrears by draining the financial system's liquidity, as
shown in Figure 5.3 above. This increased the financial system's exposure to a
government default and heightened concerns about a potential abandonment of the
currency board -- as choices to finance the deficit through debt rapidly shrank, the specter
of money printing loomecl larger.
49



In the process, the fates of public finances, the banking system, and the dollar peg
became tightly linked. This link foreshadowed the catastrophe-a disorderly
abandonment of the one-peso-one-dollar rule in an economy with widespread balance
sheet vulnerabilities (i.e., dollar debts of non-dollar earners) both in the public and the
private sector. As a result, the little confidence that remained was splintered, and the
crisis exploded as investors and depositors ran for the exit, forcing a deposit freeze (the
"corralito"50) and a change in government.51
B. POLICY DILEMMAS AND OPTIONS
We now return to the discussion of the harsh policy dilemmas that Argentine
authorities confronted after 1998. Keeping the hard peg, that had served so well until
then, required a protracted deflationary adjustment to bring back the REER to
equilibrium, given the large degree of overvaluation that had developed as a consequence
of adverse real shocks and insufficient price flexibility, as well as the deterioration of the
economy's net foreign asset position. This deflationary adjustment would have reduced
the debt repayment capacity of households and firms - especially those in the non
tradable sectors -- and, together with the long recession, deteriorated the loan portfolio of
banks. It would have also reduced the debt repayment capacity of the Government,
increasingly raising the doubts about debt sustainability and requiring large expenditure
cuts, faced with declining revenues. The harsh fiscal adjustment that had to be
unavoidably imposed to restore solvency would also add to the recession, further
complicating the adjustment for households, firms, banks and the Government. Argentine
fragile institutions -both economic and political were to be put to a major test.
Accelerating the required REER depreciation, in order to shortcut such a
protracted and painful deflationary adjustment, would have required a large nominal
devaluation. This, however, would have brought immediately to bankruptcy a large
number of households and firms in the non tradable sector with dollar denominated debts,
suddenly deteriorating bank portfolios. The ratio of public debt to GDP would have
ballooned and the Government might have found itself suddenly cut off from credit.
Although all these effects would have happened gradually anyhow under the hard peg,
the abruptness of the balance sheet effects might have precipitated an even larger wave of
bankruptcies than in the alternative scenario and, as a consequence, the insolvency of the
banking system and a major deposit flight. A plain devaluation in an economy with such
50 The fact that the crisis had been widely anticipated for several months made it worse because depositors
(mostly large and informed ones) had time to withdraw around 18 percent of total deposits, leaving only
small depositors in the system.
51 It has been argued that actions taken during Cavallo's tenure were instrumental in raising doubts about
the permanence of the Currency Board and hence perceptions of fiscal unsustainability (given the large
contingencies associated with a nominal devaluation), thus precipitating the final collapse. Careful
inspection of the time path of currency and country premia shows that some of those actions - the
announcement of changes in the peg, adoption of the 'Convergence factor', the ousting of the Central Bank
president, the changes in banks' liquidity requirements - did provoke rises in currency risk, followed by
increases in country risk. However, these effects were only transitory: both currency and country premia
returned to their previous levels after a while. Irreversible effects began to appear only by July 2001,
although it is difficult to identify any single event as the trigger.
50



large balance sheet misrnatches in both the public and private sector would in all
probability have led to an immediate banking and fiscal crisis -as many analysts,
including ourselves, predicted at the time.
What were the alternatives? The authorities might have attempted an earlier
forced pesification of all domestic contracts before devaluing, in order to limit adverse
balance sheet effects of the devaluation to firms in non tradable sectors with foreign debts
and to the Government foreign debt, thus largely protecting the financial sector
However, forcefully breaking dollar deposit contracts would in all probability have led to
a major deposit flight and would have required a deposit freeze in order to protect the
payments system. In addition, this option would have demanded significant efforts to
restore confidence in the peso as a store of value and achieve credibility in the new
monetary authorities, as well as the creation of an alternative anchor to the hard peg. The
disorderly way in which this process was actually conducted, the increased financial
sector exposure to Government debt, the widespread violation of property rights through
arbitrary asymmetric pesification and discriminatory practices, the maintenance of a
deposit freeze for a long period of time with changing rules and high uncertainty about
the actual possibility of recovery, the almost unlimited lender-of- last-resort support to the
weakest banks (instead of confronting the need for their resolution through equity
injections or liquidation), all contributed to magnify these -to some extent unavoidable-
adverse effects.
The authorities mnight have accepted the need of a protracted deflationary
adjustment and gone the opposite route, establishing full dollarization, in order to
eliminate currency risk anid hopefully achieve a reduction in interest rates, thus limiting
somewhat the duration of the recession and alleviating the required fiscal adjustment.
This might have been the option with lower short term costs if it had succeeded in
avoiding a deposit run 53 - and if it had been politically viable. However, debtors would
have had to cope eventually with the adverse, although delayed, impact of the deflation
on their repayment capacity and, most importantly, Argentina would have remained
liable to similar episodes in the future, in which large adverse external shocks would have
required slow and painful deflationary adjustments. To minimize these potential future
costs, the authorities would have had to engage in significant fiscal strengthening (not
just to protect solvency, but more broadly also to provide some room for counter cyclical
fiscal policies), stricter prudential regulations (harder provisioning or capital
requirements to lend to households and firms in non tradable sectors, a "firewall"
between banks and the GCovernment, and liquidity earmarking to protect the payments
system in the event of a systemic run) and considerable flexibilization of labor and other
domestic markets (includLing the pricing of utilities). Those actions would have had
salutary effects also under an eventual foating exchange rate regime, but were sorely
needed under a hard peg or dollarized system.
52 This was publicly proposed by Ricardo Hausmann, at the LACEA Conference in 2002.
53 Such an outcome, of course, was far from assured, as De la Torre et al (2003) recognize.
51



One variant54 that could have reaped the short term benefits of full dollarization
while avoiding its long run inflexibility costs, would have been to follow the full
dollarization of financial stocks with "pesification at the margin" through the introduction
of a new domestic currency, initially circumscribed to transactions purposes.55 Although
this could have been in principle the best exit option at the time the crisis erupted,56 it
must be recognized that forging the necessary consensus and implementing it smoothly
would have been no easy matter under the circumstances.
Obviously, implementation of any of these alternative courses would have been
easier (political economy considerations aside) and less costly before solvency doubts
had arisen. The boom years of 1996/97 were the "best" period for an orderly exit into
eitherpesification and floating or full dollarization. Any of these courses of action should
have been accompanied by fiscal tightening, instead of the fiscal expansionary policy at
the time, and by considerable institutional strengthening, to permit a credible monetary
policy under the options of pesification (whether in full or at the margin, as just
explained), and to reduce the deflationary consequences of future adverse external shocks
under the option of full dollarization. However, this was precisely the time when
everything was going fine, nobody was asking for a change and it might have been
difficult to get political support for a major shift of policy and institution building. This is
by no means a new finding: we have always known that the exit from an exchange rate
regime should be undertaken in good times, precisely when nobody sees the need for it.
Still, it would have been convenient at least to strengthen the fiscal position - instead of
the structural weakening that was taking place, even after the pension reform and the
recognition of other hidden liabilities had revealed the true extent of the fiscal problems -
- as well as to adopt even stricter prudential regulations in the boom period.
As mentioned in the Introduction, these hard choices were just a reflection of a
deep structural problem. On the one hand, the Argentine trade structure made a peg to the
dollar highly inconvenient -- from a real economy point of view. On the other, the strong
preference of Argentineans for the dollar as a store of value since the hyperinflation and
confiscation experiences in the eighties had led to a highly dollarized economy in which a
hard peg or even full dollarization seemed reasonable alternatives - from a financial point
of view.
Facing such a dilemma, either the authorities succeed in restoring confidence in
the peso as a store of value - so that a floating exchange rate regime and a monetary
anchor have a fair chance of success -- or they will have to opt for full dollarization,
achieve enough market flexibility and adopt an especially strong fiscal stance and strict
prudential regulation, allowing the economy to adjust in less painful ways to adverse
external shocks in the future. In either case, they will have to build stronger and more
resilient institutions. After the recent confiscation of deposits and forced breach of
54 This option was first proposed by Levy Yeyati and Schmukler (2001), and its adoption was indeed
announced by president Rodriguez Saa during its short tenure.
55 In fact, the new currency could have channeled the disorderly issuance of quasi-monies by cash-strapped
provinces and the Federal Government.
56 This option is discussed in detail by De la Torre et al (2003).
52



contracts, restoring confidence in institutions, in the peso and the financial system -
under whatever exchange rate regime and monetary arrangements emerge -- will be a
major challenge. Most likely Argentina will have to move forward for a while with a
domestic banking system basically limited to current transactions - a situation which will
give an extra premium to the development of a sound capital market and to restoring
prompt access to external credit. Deep crises, however, offer the opportunity for bold
changes and we can only hope that the Argentine society grabs the chance to construct
stronger institutions than those of the past and a more resilient economy, free of the major
vulnerabilities and harsh dilemmas that characterized the one that has just collapsed.
53



Annex 1. Argentina via crucis
- President De la Ruia assumes power in December 1999 when the country is already in
recession and public debt has reached high levels.
- The government tries to gain confidence, and thus restore growth, through fiscal
adjustment.
- The "impuestazo" is implemented in January 2000. The new tax scheme includes,
among other things, an increase in the taxation on consumer goods, an extension of VAT
to health insurance and transportation, and an expansion of the income tax base.
- The fiscal adjustment does not bring growth. Rather, the recession deepens and doubts
about debt sustainability increase dramatically.
- The political weakness of the De la Rua's administration becomes evident when vice
president Carlos Alvarez resigns in October 2000.
- In December 2000, Minister Machinea negotiates a US$40 billion package with
international financial institutions and domestic financial institutions to extend the public
debt maturity and try to ease fears of default. The deal implied a much lower amount of
fresh funds, around US$12 billion.
- The government's bet is that once these fears were eased, growth would resume, but
growth does not pick up and Mr. Machinea resigns in March 2001.
- The newly appointed economy minister Lopez Murphy resigns after two weeks in
office, upon strong opposition to the new fiscal austerity package he sent to Congress on
March 16.
- Mr. Cavallo becomes economy minister once more. He is empowered by Congress
with special powers and tries different, more direct, measures to revive growth. On April
16, 2001, he proposes to congress an amendment to the convertibility law, according to
which the peso would be pegged to a basket consisting of US dollars and euros with
equal weights, when the dollar-euro rate reaches 1:1. Congress approves the amendment
in mid-June 2001. This change aims at better aligning the peso more with Argentina's
trading partners.
- On April 25, 2001, the president of the central bank, Mr. Pedro Pou, resigns amid
disagreements with Mr. Cavallo and other members of the government. Mr. Roque
Maccarone replaces Mr. Pou.
- On July 10, 2001, the government, after being forced to pay 1,410 basis points over US
Treasuries to place a short-term bond, announces a "zero deficit" rule. It thus becomes
obvious that the government cannot tap capital markets without the debt exploding. To
implement the zero deficit rule, the government pushes hard for an IMF-supported
program. But to obtain it, an agreement with the provinces on tax revenue sharing is
needed.
- Mr. John Taylor, US Treasury under secretary, declares that there will not be any
external help for Argentina until it can comply with its objective of a zero deficit.
- On October 26, 2001, negotiations toward an agreement with the provinces on the
distribution of tax revenues fail (again).
- On October 28, 2001, minister Cavallo starts negotiations to obtain resources from the
IMF and the US Treasury to purchase collateral for new bonds to be issued in an
exchange for the nearly US$100 billion of local and external debt.
54



- On October 29, 2001, Mr. Cavallo defines the debt exchange operation as voluntary.
The old debt is to be exchanged for bonds paying 7% per year and guaranteed by taxes
revenues. However, the IMF and US Treasury ask for compliance with the zero deficit
and an agreement with the provinces on the tax revenue sharing before any kind of
financial support is given. The negotiations last for more than a month.
- On November 19, 2001, the IMF announces that it would not make any new
disbursements to Argentina without being satisfied that the country has secured the goals
previously defined.
- On December 2, 2001, the government announces measures restricting deposit
withdrawals (the corralito). Withdrawals are limited to 250 pesos (dollars) per week per
account.
- On December 19, 2001, Mr. Cavallo and all other ministers resigned.
- On December 20, 2001, President De la Rua resigns and Mr. Ramon Puerta becomes
interim president.
- On December 23, 2001, Mr. Rodriguez Saa, governor of one of the provinces, becomes
the new interim president. His period is supposed to last 60 days, until elections are
called on March 3, 2002. He declares the suspension of external debt payments for at
least 60 days.
- On December 24, 2001, the government announces that a new flat currency (i.e.,
without foreign-currency backing) would be created, the "argentino."
- On December 30, 2001, Mr. Rodriguez Saa resigns and the legislative assembly chooses
Mr. Eduardo Duhalde as new president. He assumes power on January 2, 2002, and
officially ends the currency board and announces the floating of the peso.
55



REFERENCES
Alberola, E., S. Cervero, H. L6pez and A. Ubide (1999): "Global Equilibrium
Exchange Rates - Euro, Dollar, "Ins," "Outs," and Other Major Currencies in a Panel
Cointegration Framework," IMF working paper n. 99/175.
Alberola E. , H. L6pez and L. Serven (2003): "Tango with the Gringo: The Hard
Peg and Real Misaligniment in Argentina," The World Bank, mimeo.
Alesina, A., R. Barro and S. Tenreyro (2002): "Optimal Currency Areas,"
Discussion paper n. 1958, Harvard University Institute of Economic Research.
Blanchard, 0. (1993): "Suggestions for a New Set of Fiscal Indicators," in The
Political Economy of Government Debt, Amsterdam: North Holland.
Broda, C. (2001): "Coping with Terms-of-Trade Shocks: Pegs versus Floats,"
American Economic Review, v. 91 n. 2, p. 76-80.
Calvo, G. and C. Reinhart (2000): "Fear of Floating," University of Maryland,
mimeo.
Calvo, G., A. Izquierdo and E. Talvi (2002): "Sudden Stops, the Exchange Rate
and Fiscal Sustainability: Argentina's Lessons," IADB, mimeo.
De la Torre, A., Levy Yeyati E. and S. L. Schmukler (2003): "Living and Dying
with Hard Pegs: The Rise and Fall of Argentina's Currency Board," The World Bank,
mimeo.
Galiani, S. (2001): "Labor Market Reform in Argentina: Where Do We Stand?,"
Stanford University, mimeo.
Garvin, M. and R. Perotti (1996): "Fiscal Policy in Latin America: Volatility,
Ciclicality and Modes of Adjustment," unpublished manuscript.
Garvin, M., R Haussman, R. Perotti and E. Talvi (1996): "Managing Fiscal Policy
in Latin America and the Caribbean: Volatility, Prociclicality, and Limited
Creditworthiness," IADB Working Paper n. 326.
Fiess, N. (2002): "Capital Flows, Country Risk and Contagion," The World Bank,
mimeo.
Goldfajn, I. and R. Valdes (1999): "The Aftermath of Appreciations," The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, v. 114 n. l, p. 229-262.
Hausmann, R., U. Panizza and E. Stein (2000): "Why Do Countries Float the Way
they Float?," IADB working paper n. 418.
56



Hausmann R. and A. Velasco (2002): "The Argentine Collapse: Hard Money's
Soft Underbelly," Kennedy School of Government - Harvard University, mimeo.
Levy Yeyati, E. and S. Schmukler (2001): "Dollarization and Floating of a New
Currency: A Way Out oi the Currency Board", unpublished manuscript.
Mussa, M. (2002): "Argentina and the Fund: From Triumph to Tragedy," Institute
for International Economics, mimeo.
Perri G. (2002): "Can Fiscal Rules Help Reduce Macroeconomic Volatility in
LAC?," The World Bank, mimeo.
Powell A. (2002): "Argentina's Avoidable Crisis: Band Luck, Bad Economist,
Bad Politics, Bad Advice," Paper Prepared for Brookings Trade Conference, Washington
DC.
Orphanides, A. and S. van Norden (2002): "The Unreliability of Output Gap
Estimates in Real Time," Review of Economics and Statistics, v. 84 n. 4, p. 569-83.
Rodrik, D. (2002): "Argentina: Globalization Gone Too Far or not Far Enough,"
Kennedy School of Government - Harvard University, mnimeo.
Rodrk, D. (2002): "Trade Rout," Kennedy School of Government - Harvard
University, mimeo.
Roubini, N. (2001): "Should Argentina Dollarize or Float? The Pros and Cons of
Alternative Exchange Rate Regimes and their Implications for Domestic and Foreign
Debt Restructuring/Reduction," Stem School of Business, New York University, mimeo.
Sachs, J. (2002): "Understanding and Responding to Argentina's Economic
Crisis," Center for International Development - Harvard University, mimeo.
Schmukler, S. and L. Serven (2002): "Pricing Currency Risk under Currency
Boards," Journal of Development Economics, n. 69, p. 367-91.
Teijeiro, M. (2001): "Una Vez Mas, La Politica Fiscal ... ," Centro de Estudios
Puiblicos, mimeo.
World Bank (1998): Argentina: Financial Sector Review, Report n. 17864-AR,
September, p. 39-61, and Appendix A.
57












Policy Research Working Paper Series
Contect
Title                            Author                 Date             for paper
WPS3056 Avoiding the Pitfalls in Taxing   Patrick Honohan        May 2003          A. Yaptenco
Financial Intermediation                                                  31823
WPS3057 Teaching Adults to Read Better and  Helen Abadzi         May 2003          H. Abadzi
Faster: Results from an E xperiment                                       80375
in Burkina Faso
WPS3058 Working for God? Evaluating Service Ritva Reinikka       May 2003          H. Sladovich
Delivery of Religious Not-for-Profit  Jakob Svensson                      3769U3
Health Care Providers in Uganda
WPS3059 Do Capital Flows Respond to Risk  Cesar Calder6n         May 2003          T. Tourougui
and Return?                     Norman Loayza                             87431
Luis Serven
WPS3060 World Market Integration through the  Rui Albuquerque    May 2003          1. ToLluougui
Lens of Foreign Direct Investors  Norman Loayza                           87431
Luis Serven
WPS3061 Reciprocity in Free Trade         Caroline Freund        May 2003          P. Flewitt
Agreements                                                                32724
WPS3062 Labor Effects of Adult Mortality in  Kathleen Beegle     May 2003          F. de Castro
Tanzanian Households                                                      8912-1
WPS3063 Trade Liberalization, Firrn       Paolo Epifani          May 2003          P. Flewitt
Performance, and Labor Market                                             32724
Outcomes in the Developing World:
What Can We Learn frorn Micro-Level
Data?
WPS3064 Trade Policy, Trade Volumes, and  Ana M. Fernandes       May 2003          A. Fernandes
Plant-Level Productivity in Colombian                                     33983
Manufacturing Industries
WPS3065 Ghost Doctors: Absenteeism in     Nazmul Chaudhury       May 2003          H. Sladovich
Bangladeshi Health Facilities   Jeffrey S. Hammer                         37698
WPS3066 The Potential Demand for and      Shreelata Rao Seshadri  May 2003         H. Sladovich
Strategic Use of an HIV-1 Vaccine  P. Subramaniyam                        37698
in Southern India               Prabhat Jha
WPS3067 The Mini-integrated Macroeconomic  Pierre-Richard Agenor  May 2003         M. Gosiengfiao
Model for Poverty Analysis: A Framework                                   33363
for Analyzing the Unemployment and
Poverty Effects of Fiscal and Labor
Market Reforms
WPS3068 Poverty and Economic Growth in    Heba El-laithy         June 2003         P. Sader
Egypt, 1995-2000                Michael Lokshin                           33902
Arup Banerji
WPS3069 International Migration, Remittances, Richard H. Adams, Jr.  June 2003     N. Obias
and the Brain Drain: A Study of 24                                        31986
Labor-Exporting Countries
WPS3070 Are You Satisfied? Citizen Feedback  Uwe Deichmann       June 2003         Y. D'Souza
and Delivery of Urban Services  Somik V. Lall                             31449



Policy Research Working Paper Series
Contact
Title                           Author                  Date             for paper
WPS3071 Survey Techniques to Measure and  Ritva Reinikka         June 2003         H. Sladovich
Explain Corruption              Jakob Svensson                            37698
WPS3072 Diversity Matters: The Economic   Somik V. Lall          June 2003         V. Soukhanov
Geography of Industry Location in  Jun Koo                                35721
India                           Sanjoy Chakravorty
WPS3073 Metropolitan Industrial Clusters:  Sanjoy Chakravorty    June 2003         V. Soukanov
Patterns and Processes          Jun Koo                                   35721
Somik V. Lall
WPS3074 The Gender Impact of Pension      Estelle James          June 2003          M. Ponglumjeak
Reform: A Cross-Country Analysis  Alejandra Cox Edwards                   31060
Rebeca Wong
WPS3075 Child Labor, Income Shocks, and   Kathleen Beegle        June 2003          E. de Castro
Access to Credit                 Rajeev H. Dehejia                        89121
Roberta Gatti
WPS3076 Trade Reform in Vietnam:          Philippe Auffret       June 2003          K. Tomlinson
Opportunities with Emerging Challenges                                    39763
WPS3077 Do More Transparent Governments   Roumeen Islam          June 2003          R. Islam
Govern Better?                                                            32628
WPS3078 Regional Integration in East Asia:  Eisuke Sakakibara    June 2003          S. Yusuf
Challenges and Opportunities-   Sharon Yamakawa                           82339
Part l: History and Institutions
WPS3079 Regional Integration in East Asia:  Eisuke Sakakibara    June 2003          S. Yusuf
Challenges and Opportunities-   Sharon Yamakawa                           82339
Part II: Trade, Finance, and Integration
WPS3080 Can Fiscal Rules Help Reduce      Guillermo Perry        June 2003          R. lzquierdo
Macroeconomic Volatility in the Latin                                     84161
America and Caribbean Region?