

**1. CAS Data**

<b>Country:</b> Tanzania	
<b>CAS Year:</b> FY2001	<b>CAS Period:</b> FY2001 – FY2003
<b>CASCR Review Period:</b> FY2001 – FY2006	<b>Date of this review:</b> March 21, 2007

**2. Executive Summary**

- i. This review examines the implementation of the FY01-03 CAS and evaluates the FY07 CASCR. The implementation of the FY01-03 CAS was extended *de facto* through FY06, and the review covers the period FY01-06.
- ii. The objective of the CAS was to help the Government reduce poverty through three priorities: (I) the promotion of higher growth and economic opportunities for the poor; (II) support for interventions that build the assets of the poor and reduce vulnerability; and (III) promotion of empowerment and accountability. The CAS objectives were fully aligned with the objectives of the Tanzania Assistance Strategy (TAS), an umbrella document prepared by the government in 2002 to provide a framework for organizing support from development partners around the priorities articulated in the 2000 PRSP. The CAS also incorporated lessons from the 2000 CAE on Tanzania. Over the (extended) CAS implementation period, the Bank program provided US\$2.3 billion to Tanzania (through 29 credits) and produced 61 analytic products. IFC invested in four projects worth US\$14.9 million and provided technical and advisory services for privatization and capacity-building in SMEs.
- iii. This review rates the outcome of the implementation of the FY01-06 CAS as *satisfactory*. Under priority (I), Bank support to the Government achieved its objectives of strengthening growth. Real GDP growth has averaged 6.9 percent since 2001, against a background of low and stable inflation. The overall fiscal balance was broadly consistent with the projections in the CAS and IMF programs (the PRGF1 and PRGF2). A cautionary note is warranted with respect to the large expansion of government expenditure and the sustainability of the resulting fiscal deficit (increasing from 5.6 percent of GDP in 2001 to 11.6 percent of GDP in 2005), although the expansion had been matched by donor support on favorable terms, which did not appear at risk. In addition, while poverty may be declining in Tanzania on account of high growth, in the rural areas, where the majority of Tanzanians live, the pace of growth in agriculture is lagging. Also, while doing business in Tanzania remained difficult, problems with administrative barriers and poor infrastructure are being addressed, although progress has been slower than anticipated. Given the significant progress on growth and inflation, this review rates the outcome of the Bank's interventions under priority (I) as *satisfactory*.
- iv. Under priority (II), the outcome of Bank interventions that sought to build the asset base of the poor and reduce vulnerability had generally favorable outcomes, albeit with important caveats. The CASCR considers benchmarks for Bank assistance to Tanzania in health and education to have been partially achieved (and this review agrees). In education, very substantial progress was made in primary enrollment, although the success in this area has also led to an increase in the pupil/teacher ratio, raising the risk that learning outcomes will not keep pace. In health and water supply, access and sustainability appears to have improved, although not as much as initially envisioned, especially in HIV/AIDS prevention. In light of the progress made in achieving the benchmarks in the CAS Results Matrix, this review rates the outcome of Bank interventions under priority (II) as *satisfactory*.

<b>CASCR Reviewed by:</b>	<b>Peer Reviewed by:</b>	<b>Group Manager</b>
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v. Under priority (III), the outcome of Bank interventions in support of greater empowerment and accountability is rated *moderately satisfactory* on account of the discernible progress, even though it was limited in several respects. Progress was made in achieving improved expenditure allocation through PERs, although the impact of service delivery efforts under Bank support for decentralization is unclear because of data deficiencies. The government has also made progress in addressing corruption and accountability, albeit more slowly than expected and with significant challenges remaining. Although their perceptions-based nature has clear limitations and only very broad inferences can legitimately be drawn from variations in them, the WBI Governance Indicators (GRICS) indicate that Tanzania improved in the area of “control of corruption”, but remained steady in the area of “voice and accountability” over the review period FY01-06.

vi. In terms of findings and lessons, the CASCR highlights the need to: (i) further strengthen the focus on outcomes; (ii) set realistic performance benchmarks; and (iii) selectively build on the Bank’s comparative advantage in analytic and advisory activities. IEG concurs with this analysis, while noting that to ensure that the outcomes of poverty reduction efforts can be monitored on a timely basis, a good M&E system is essential, and major efforts are still needed to establish one.

### 3. CASCR Summary

#### Overview of CAS Relevance:

1. The CAS was relevant because:

- It was fully aligned with the objectives of the Government’s development strategy (the PRSP), which had as priorities: (i) creating higher growth and economic opportunities for the poor; (ii) building capabilities; and (iii) increasing empowerment and improving accountability.
- It addressed the key development constraints facing Tanzania: the paucity of economic growth and income opportunities for the poor, especially in the rural areas; the still-limited role of the private sector as an engine of growth; the deterioration of social indicators and decline of life-expectancy on account of the HIV/AIDS epidemic; and the need to restore transparency and accountability in public service.
- The proposed lending and non-lending assistance was consistent with the strategy. The lending program (programmed and non-programmed) focused on infrastructure and private sector development, social infrastructure, rural development; and public sector reform and governance. The analytic and advisory activities (AAA) also focused on key issues related to poverty monitoring, rural development, governance and accountability, as well as fiscal decentralization. In its implementation, however, there was little apparent selectivity and a wide range of non-programmed activities were undertaken (see *Comments on Bank Performance*). IFC identified relevant areas in which it would seek investments, including the financial sector, mining, and tourism; as well as areas in which it would provide advisory services, such as the business environment, SME capacity-building, and privatization, particularly in the power sector and other utilities.

2. The CAS explicitly noted that the IEG (then OED) Country Assistance Evaluation had commented on the lack of an effective PSD strategy in Tanzania. Instead of a strategy for direct investment support for private sector development, a secondary strategy of improving the enabling environment for private sector development was adopted as more appropriate for dealing with the constraints facing the private sector. Working with the IFC, operations on the financial sector, SMEs and privatization were proposed, complemented by relevant AAA.

**Overview of CAS Implementation:**

3. Lending: The CASCR covered two periods: the original (FY01-03) and the extended (FY04-06). Actual commitments during FY01-03 amounted to US\$726.5 million compared to the target of US\$790 million for the base case (see Annex Table 1). The implementation of the program differed from the plan on account of delays in the preparation of operations and the addition of non-programmed operations. While the final composition was broadly consistent with the objectives of the CAS, the failure to deliver the original lending program as planned reflects limitations in preparedness at the inception of the CAS.

4. The shortfall was made up during FY04-06 when total commitments amounted to US\$1557.3 million (or double the commitments of the previous period), of which US\$284 million were programmed in the original CAS and the rest non-programmed. Although the lending activities for this period were largely non-programmed, they reflected the areas of emphasis defined in the CAS: private sector and infrastructure; agriculture, environment and rural development, social infrastructure; and budget support and governance (see Annex Table 1).

5. The performance of the portfolio was rated low risk during FY2001-04, but deteriorated during FY2005-06 (see Annex Table 4), which raises concerns about the rapid scale-up in the second period. Of the 29 credits delivered, QAG rated quality at entry for three projects, of which one was highly satisfactory and the remaining two satisfactory. Of the 19 projects that exited the portfolio during the CAS period, 89.5 percent was rated satisfactory on outcome, compared to an average of 69 percent in the Africa Region and 77 percent Bank-wide. About 94 percent of the projects were also rated likely to be sustainable, compared to a 64 percent average for the Africa Region and 77 percent Bank-wide.

6. The program also increased the use of budget support (SWAPs and PRSCs). The SWAPs were advantageous in sectors such as health and education in which many donors provided assistance. For example, an ICR Review of the Primary Education Development Program that closed in October 2004 noted that budget support in the SWAP arrangement was effective in enabling Government to develop and take charge of the consultative process for ongoing policy-making, sectoral and administrative reforms, and planning and budgeting. It also helped to ensure that assistance was channeled to priorities within a coherent strategy for the sector and within the MTEF to ensure aid effectiveness. Four PRSCs were delivered, one each year during FY2003-06, to support the Government's PRSP, but also to respond to the "scale-up" objectives of meeting the MDGs. The design assured that actions cited were achieved prior to effectiveness. Most actions were, however, output or process-oriented, and until all four are evaluated, their overall impact may not be known. The outcome rating by IEG in the ICR Review of the first two PRSCs was satisfactory.

7. Non-Lending Services: Eleven of the fourteen ESWs proposed in the CAS for FY01-03 were completed along with 17 non-programmed ESWs (see Annex Table 2). Thirty-one ESWs (all except one were non-programmed) were completed during FY04-06. The large number of non-programmed ESWs, while reflective of the need to be flexible, did not appear to be aligned with the CAS's approach of being selective (see below on Bank performance). Despite the lack of selectivity, the quality of AAA was satisfactory. A 2004 review by QAG highlighted the Bank's strong engagement with Government, development partners and stakeholders at all stages of the ESW cycle. The overall rating for the AAA program was satisfactory and a highly satisfactory rating was given for strategic relevance.

8. IFC Activities: IFC activities focused on technical and advisory service (TAAS), with limited investment projects being realized over the period. Four investments were committed since FY00: one in tourism; one in the financial/SME sector; and two in the food and beverage sector. IFC's tourism investments have seen limited success in part due to a decline in the market between 2000-2004 owing to security issues. In the financial sector, an IFC investment along with firm-level TA contributed to the significant growth of a small SME-oriented bank. IFC was unable to realize any investments in the mining sector as mining companies initially self-financed their investments and subsequently used local currency loans from domestic banks. IFC also engaged in advisory services in privatization,

although several difficult private participation in infrastructure (PPI) experiences and continuing deficiencies in the business environment slowed the momentum toward PPI. During the CAS period, IFC's approach to supporting SMEs shifted from a single SME retail focus (under the Africa Project Development Facility for TA and the Africa Enterprise Fund for financing) to a wholesale approach under which TA through the Private Enterprise Partnership program targets the broader SME environment. Financing of SMEs is likewise through a wholesale approach through SME oriented banks (such as IFC's investment in Exim Bank). Several TA projects were also provided to help improve the business enabling environment. While good progress has been made in some areas, continuing obstacles to doing business (discussed in the section on Business Environment below) remain a constraint to greater private sector investments in general, and IFC investment in particular.

**Overview of Achievement by Objective:**

9. The Tanzania CASCR provides a detailed assessment of the achievements of the CAS by objective, by evaluating identified and verifiable performance benchmarks outlined in the CAS matrix. The outcomes of the CAS objectives are set forth in what follows:

**Priority I: Creating higher growth and economic opportunities for the poor**

10. A central theme of the CAS was to help Government sustain the growth and macroeconomic stability attained during 1996-2000 in order to facilitate efforts to create economic opportunities for the poor. The program focused on accelerating growth, improving budget and fiscal outcomes, enhancing rural development, and improving business environment.

- **Growth:** Real GDP growth has averaged 6.9 percent since 2001, against a background of low and stable inflation (see Annex Table 7). Growth in aggregate demand was largely driven by an expansion of consumption. On the supply side, agriculture, which contributed up to 46 percent of Tanzania's GDP and affected 81 percent of Tanzania's poor, grew at an estimated 5-6 percent per annum despite periods of drought. Other sectors, including mining and construction, have grown much more rapidly but have had modest contribution to growth because of their relatively small share of GDP. The main challenge for the Government was how to translate macroeconomic stability and higher growth into poverty reduction. Rural and agricultural reforms were key elements of policy (to be discussed below) that continue to warrant attention.
- **Fiscal Outcomes:** The overall fiscal balance was broadly consistent with the projections in the CAS and IMF programs (the PRGF1 and PRGF2). Despite a rapid rise in expenditures (in excess of those projected in the CAS), expenditure management improved substantially. Annual PERs were conducted to establish budget priorities within an expenditure ceiling. The composition of budget expenditures moved in favor of identified priority sectors (primary education, health and HIV/AIDS, agriculture research and extension, rural roads, water, and the judiciary). IMF sources indicate that poverty-reducing expenditures increased (as required in the CAS matrix) from the average of 31.9 percent of government revenues in 2000-1 to an average of 46.4 percent during 2002-05. But some expenditure commitments remained outside the purview of the PERs, which raises concerns about transparency and accountability (see Priority III: Empowerment and Accountability). Revenue mobilization improved on a path broadly consistent with PRGF arrangements during 2002-06, although revenues were below the country's revenue potential as determined by the IMF. With technical support from the Bank and other donors, significant reforms were undertaken, although at a relatively slow and unstructured pace, with a view to rationalizing the tax system and improving administration. Government expenditure increased sharply, from 17.6 percent of GDP in 2001/02 to 25.6 percent of GDP in 2005/06, and the fiscal deficit before grants rose from 5.6 percent of GDP to 11.6 percent of GDP between these years. Grants of about 6 percent of GDP contributed to its financing. Finally, one of the key goals of the CAS was for Tanzania to reach HIPC completion point by the end of fiscal year 2001; an achievement which resulted in Tanzania's NPV of debt-to-export ratio to decline from 160 percent in 2001 to 64 percent by 2006.

- **Rural Development:** Support for rural development was achieved through the promotion of community-based agriculture, agricultural research and extension, improvements to rural infrastructure, and the establishment of a social safety net to assist the rural poor and the vulnerable. An initial safety net program was put in place, which financed sub-projects in some 581 communities, exceeding the envisaged target of 328 communities. Although there were clearly positive outcomes from the Bank's interventions, the overall impact on poverty is not known with any certainty. No data is available beyond 2000/01, which indicated that 38.6 percent of people in rural areas lived below the basic needs poverty line, compared to 17.6 percent in Dar es Salaam and 25.8 percent in other urban areas. In the absence of annual survey data since 2000/01, simulations in a Bank research working paper, completed in 2004, suggest that while poverty may be declining in Tanzania on account of the high growth, in the rural areas, where the large majority of Tanzanians live, the decline would not be sufficient to meet the MDG target. In addition, a recent Diagnostic Trade Integration Study by the Bank concluded that more than agriculture growth, it is the composition of such growth away from food crops and in favor of cash crops that bears on poverty reduction. Supporting a shift towards the production of cash crops and improved marketing structures, including improved rural infrastructure, are key elements which are still not fully in place.
- **Business Environment:** The CAS matrix defined measures to improve business environment, although they were essentially process benchmarks. These measures included the enactment of legislation in the areas of business licensing and registration, revisions to labor laws, and the establishment of enabling institutions. Despite the progress in the legal environment for doing business in Tanzania, doing business remains difficult. The World Economic Forum 2005 ranked Tanzania 82 out of 116 countries in the quality of the national business environment, and 71 out of 117 in the Growth Competitiveness Index. Problems with administrative barriers to doing business and poor infrastructure are being addressed, although progress has been slow in improving governance and reducing corruption, which potential investors underscored as important factors undermining investment in Tanzania (see Priority III: Empowerment and Accountability).

11. IEG rates the outcome for Priority I as satisfactory.

#### **Priority II: Building Capabilities**

12. This priority focused on improving the asset base of the poor in order to reduce their vulnerability to economic shocks. Support was provided through health, education, water and sanitation, and social fund projects. It is not possible to evaluate the outcome targets contained in the CAS matrix because of data deficiencies, but broad conclusions may be derived from the achievement of similar targets outlined by the MDGs (see Annex Table 8). In education, substantial progress has been made in primary enrolment, although the success in this area increased the pupil/teacher ratio, raising the risk that learning outcomes will not keep pace. Two independent surveys of satisfaction with policy and services (by REPOA in 2003 and 2005) found that most mainland Tanzanians, rural and urban, were increasingly satisfied with the government's handling of education needs. The on-going decentralization is increasing the involvement of parents in school management. The Bank has worked with other donors through SWAPs and analytic activities, especially on secondary and tertiary education. While substantial changes in sector indicators are not perceptible at this stage, the focus on primary and secondary education is likely to accelerate increases in literacy in the medium term. In health, the multi-donor programs are contributing in tackling basic health problems and expanding coverage. Bank support in planning and budgetary institutions, through the MTEF, has helped raise expenditures for the sector and improve efficiency. In water, decentralization of rural water delivery system is under way in many districts, although overall access does not appear to have improved substantially. As part of its capacity-building efforts, the Bank is phasing out project implementing units (PIUs) in the execution of its operations.

13. IEG rates the outcome of Priority II as satisfactory.

**Priority III: Empowerment and Accountability**

14. The objectives of the empowerment and accountability pillar were to: (i) help government improve service delivery through local government reform (decentralization and budget reform); and (ii) support government efforts at improving accountability and reduce corruption and governance. No outcome indicators were provided, except those for the public service reform program. Because of data deficiencies, it is not possible to evaluate service delivery outcomes of the local authorities associated with Bank interventions. However, the process benchmarks, such as strengthening the capacity of local government authorities, and the establishment of the capital development grant were attained.

15. Improving governance was identified as a challenge. Three approaches were employed to tackle the challenge: regular PERs to improve expenditure efficiency and transparency; civil service reform, to limit its role to priority areas and improve government administration; and direct efforts at anti-corruption. The PERs have assisted in achieving improved expenditure allocation towards the poor. With respect to the civil service, while progress had been slower than anticipated, reform of the government administrative structure has been achieved, although there is still concern about the appropriateness of the incentive structure in the civil service. An IMF report highlights the complex system of allowances (recorded outside the wage bill) which is a cause for concern. Despite the evident limitations of perception-based indicators and the caution needed in drawing inferences from the levels of such indicators and movement in them over time, it is noteworthy that Tanzania continues to rank low on corruption and accountability ratings. Although a National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan (NACSAP) had been in place since 1996, the low rating for Tanzania on corruption and democratic accountability by the Political Risk Services (PRS) Group remained constant. According to the WBI composite GRICS indicators, Tanzania did register improvements in the area of “control of corruption”, but remained steady in the area of “voice and accountability”.

16. IEG rates the outcome of Priority III as moderately satisfactory.

Achievement of CAS Objectives			
Objectives	CASCR Rating	IEG Rating	Explanation / Comments
Priority I: Creating higher growth and economic opportunities for the poor.	S	S	Macroeconomic stabilization was established and the economy grew rapidly, and inflation was kept low. Poverty has very probably declined, though the extent is uncertain. Government expenditure and the fiscal deficit grew, although foreign aid financed a large portion of it. There was limited progress on M&E, resulting in little information on poverty reduction.
Priority II: Building Capabilities	S	S	Improvements occurred in key social indicators, though results elsewhere were less clear because of data limitations. Institutional strengthening, particularly in health and education, are laying the foundation for sustained progress in the future.

<p><b>Priority III: Empowerment and Accountability</b></p>	<p>MS</p>	<p>MS</p>	<p>More work is still needed on the part of the implementing agencies for decentralization. The impact of service delivery efforts is not clear, and progress on tackling corruption and strengthening accountability though evident in process-related measures, is taking time to materialize in terms of an impact on concrete outcomes.</p>
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S: Satisfactory; MS: Moderately Satisfactory

**Comments on Bank Performance:**

17. Bank assistance to Tanzania helped address key development constraints identified jointly by Government and its development partners. The design of the lending program (FY01-03) recognized the need for selectivity and performance and proposed five operations per year under the base case scenario. But while actual lending reflected the priorities outlined in the CAS, lending volumes fell short of planned levels (in terms of the number of projects and value). Much of the short-fall was made up during FY04-06 period, and although not under the formal mandate of a CAS, expanded lending both in terms of numbers (18 operations as against 11 during FY01-03) and value (US\$1557.3 million as opposed to US\$726 million for FY2001-03). This period also saw the greater use of new modalities aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of Bank lending (PRSC and the SWAPs). Overall Bank performance for the implementation of the lending program is rated satisfactory. Although it is of concern that Bank intervention expanded in the absence of a CAS, IEG notes that the delay of the new CAS allowed greater government ownership of its poverty reduction strategy and led to a joint partnership program among development partners.

18. The non-lending activities supported the lending program and advanced the policy dialogue, especially through the annual PERs, which helped deal with the weaknesses in public expenditure management. However, the Bank's support for M&E was not given the priority highlighted in the CAS and a concerted effort is only now underway. Arguably, the Bank could have pushed more forcefully for setting up a well-functioning M&E system, especially providing for data on poverty to be collected and analyzed more regularly. A substantive poverty monitoring analysis was conducted in FY2001 (at the start of the CAS), but it was only in 2006 that a new labor force survey got underway; and another Household Budget Survey is expected to be initiated in 2007. The weaknesses in the M&E system is also reflected in the CAS matrix in which many of the outcome indicators were not precise enough to facilitate evaluation, as noted by the CASCR, and this review agrees. Furthermore, although it reflected the Bank's flexible response to the needs of Government, the large number of non-programmed analytic studies (ESW) may have stretched the Government's capacity to sustain the policy dialogue across such a broad front or to make optimum use of the recommendations.

19. The Bank collaborated closely with other donors, notably in analytic and advisory activities (AAA). In the area of lending, collaboration with other donors, using SWAPs and "basket funds" facilitated aid effectiveness and efficiency, especially in the health, education and urban sectors where delivery mechanisms are decentralized and there are many operating donors. Budget support became increasingly important during the CAS period, with a large number of donors using this instrument. With respect to AAA, the Bank collaborated with the Fund and other donors in a wide range of analytic work and TA, with well-defined responsibilities for each partner.

20. Overall, the Bank's performance is rated satisfactory.

**4. Overall IEG Assessment**

<b>Outcome:</b>	<i>Satisfactory</i>
<b>Bank Performance:</b>	<i>Satisfactory</i>

21. The Bank's activities in Tanzania were successful in achieving the program objectives of strengthening macroeconomic management and accountability. The first priority objective is the most extensive. Grouping loans for support of priorities makes this the largest group of interventions, with \$1.2 billion, but half of the loans correspond to PRSCs which in turn cover sectors in priorities II and III—health, education, governance, etc. GDP growth during 2001-2005 was strong, with low inflation; the overall impact on poverty reduction, especially in rural areas, is less clear. Support for social infrastructure (health, education, and water supply) and on rural development (agriculture, social funds, etc) addressed the issue of stagnant social indicators, although the outcomes are mixed, and much still remains in developing a dependable poverty monitoring system. An overall outcome rating of satisfactory is warranted.

**5. Assessment of CAS Completion Report**

22. The CASCR provides a comprehensive and frank assessment of the implementation and outcomes of the Tanzania country program during FY2001-06. It suffered somewhat from the limitations of data availability (especially on poverty and social indicators) and the weaknesses of the CAS matrix in not identifying appropriate target benchmarks. Moreover, the section on IFC activities could have been strengthened by greater discussion of IFC's contribution to the achievement of CAS objectives, of constraints to greater IFC activity in the country, and of lessons learned during the period. A more comprehensive discussion of IFC's technical assistance and advisory services, including the use of TAAS Project Completion Report data would also have enhanced the report. Because of the detailed and frank effort to assess Bank assistance within a results framework, the CASCR is rated satisfactory.

**6. Findings and Lessons**

23. The CASCR identified a number of lessons and recommendations for the subsequent CAS design:

- **Focus on Outcomes.** Building a logical causal chain in the M&E framework that links country goals with outcomes and outputs facilitates the monitoring of progress at various stages in CAS implementation.
- **Set Realistic Benchmarks.** The setting of realistic benchmarks could facilitate what can be achieved in the relatively short CAS period.
- **Build on Bank's Comparative Advantage in Analytic Work.** Significant contributions to outcomes over the CAS period came from the Bank's analytic and advisory activities. Selectively, these activities can help ensure positive impact from Bank support.

24. IEG agrees with the findings and lessons identified in the CASCR. Additionally, to ensure the outcomes of poverty reduction interventions could be monitored more regularly, establishing a good M&E system, which outlines the frequency of key surveys and data sources to be tapped, is imperative. The statistical master plan identified under the MKUKUTA could form the basis of such poverty monitoring system.



**Annex Table 1: Planned and Actual Lending, FY01-06**

**Annex Table 2: Planned Non-Lending Program and Actual Deliveries, FY01-06**

**Annex Table 3: Project Ratings, Exit FY01-06**

**Annex Table 4: Portfolio Status Indicators, FY01-06**

**Annex Table 5: IBRD/IDA Net Disbursements and Charges, FY01-06**

**Annex Table 6: Total Net Disbursements of Official Development Assistance and Official Aid to Tanzania 2000-05**

**Annex Table 7: Economic and Social Indicators, 1998-2005**

**Annex Table 8: Millennium Development Goals**



**Annex Table 1: Tanzania - Planned and Actual Lending, FY01-06 (US\$ million)**

<b>Programmed Projects</b>	<b>Planned FY</b>	<b>Approval FY</b>	<b>Planned \$</b>	<b>Approved \$</b>
Primary Education Development	2001	2002	100.0	150.0
Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF)	2001	2001	50.0	60.0
Dar Water Supply and Sanitation	2001	2003	45.0	61.5
Rural Water Supply and Sanitation	2001	2002	5.0	26.0
Regional Trade Facilitation	2001	2001	10.0	15.0
Songo Songo Gas Development and Power Generation	2002	2001	170.0	183.0
Accountability and Governance/Accountability, Transparency and Integrity	2002	2006	40.0	40.0
Soil Fertility and Recapitalization	2002	Dropped	20.0	
Forest Conservation (and Management)	2002	2002	50.0	31.1
HIV/AIDS	2002	2004	20.0	70.0
Roads Rehabilitation/Central Transport Corridor	2003	2004	80.0	122.0
Education Rationalization	2003	Delayed to 2008	30.0	
Lake Victoria 2	2003	Delayed to 2007	30.0	
PSCAC 2	2003	Dropped	100.0	
Local Government Capacity/Local Government Support	2003	2005	40.0	52.0
PERC (high case scenario) (PRSC 1)	2003	2003	200.0	132.0
<b>Non Programmed Projects</b>		<b>Approval FY</b>	<b>Planned \$</b>	<b>Approved \$</b>
Lower Kihansi Environmental Management		2002		6.3
Lake Victoria Supplement		2002		5.0
Participatory Agricultural Development and Empowerment		2003		56.6
Emergency Power		2004		43.8
Health Sector Development 2		2004		65.0
Secondary Education Development		2004		150.0
PRSC 2		2005		150.0
Social Action Fund 2		2005		150.0
Lake Victoria Supplement 2		2005		3.5
Marine & Coastal Env Mgmt		2006		51.0
Private Sector/MSME Competitiveness		2006		95.0
Agriculture Sector Development		2006		90.0
PRSC 3		2006		150.0
PRSC 4		2006		200.0
Financial Sector Support		2006		15.0
Local Government Support Supplement		2006		98.0
Tax Modernization		2006		12.0
<b>Total FY 2001-2006</b>			<b>990.0</b>	<b>2,283.8</b>

Sources: Tanzania CAS 2000 and WB Business Warehouse as of March 15, 2007.

Note: The CASCR covers FY01-03, where CASCR Review is extended through FY06.



**Annex Table 2: Tanzania – Planned Non-Lending Program and Actual Deliveries, FY01-06**

<b>Programmed</b>	<b>Planned FY</b>	<b>Delivered FY</b>
PRSP Activities	2001	2001
Public Expenditure Review	2001	2001
Financial Sector Assessment	2001	2002
Private Sector Profile (see Tanzania at the Turn of the Century)	2001	2001
Integration in regional and global markets (see Tanzania at the Turn of the Century)	2001	2001
Poverty monitoring and analysis	2001	2001
Consultative Group	2001	2001
Rural Development Strategy	2002	2002
Accountability/Transparency	2002	Dropped
Public Expenditure Review	2002	2002
Consultative Group	2002	2002
Fiscal Decentralization	2002	Dropped
Sustaining and Sharing Economic Growth: County Economic Memorandum/Poverty Assessment	2002	2006
Country Portfolio Performance Review	2003	2003
Public Expenditure Review	2003	2003
Consultative Group	2003	2003
<b>Actual (not included in the CAS)</b>		
Tanzania Airport Privatization Strategy		2001
Decentralization Assessment		2001
Country Financial Accountability Assessment (with DFID)		2001
Tanzania at the Turn of the Century: Country Study		2001
Tanzania Civil Air Navigation System		2002
Impact of Adult Mortality on Primary Education		2002
PRSP Progress Report: Joint Staff Assessment		2002
Presidential Investors Round Table		2002
Global Market		2003
Macro Modeling		2003
Policy Analysis		2003
Zanzibar Public Expenditure Review		2003
Country Procurement Assessment Report		2003
Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP)		2003
Microfinance Background		2003
Relevance, Efficiency, and Effectiveness of the Tert. and Higher Education		2003
Presidential Investors Round Table		2003
Analysis of Labor Market Linkage and external Efficiency of post-primary Education and Training		2004
Strategic Country Gender Assessment		2004
Financial Sector Review		2004
Crop Boards and the Future Prospects for Agricultural Exports of Tanzania		2004
Investment Climate Assessment		2004
Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) Assessment		2004
Public Expenditure Review		2004
FSAP Follow-up		2004
Presidential Investors Round Table		2004
Private Sector Development Report		2005
Marine and Coastal Resources Management		2005

**Annex Table 2: Actual (not included in the CAS) (continued)**

Tanzania Health Status Report on Health and Poverty	2005
Agribusiness Supply Chain Analysis	2005
Harmonization Policy Note	2005
Mineral Sector Strategy Note	2005
Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes Accounting and Auditing Assessment (ROSC)	2005
Local Government Taxation Reform in Tanzania: A Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA)	2005
A Case Study in Compr. and Programmatic Approaches to Cap. Building (Africa Capacity Dev. Task Force)	2005
Growth, inequality, and simulated poverty paths for Tanzania, 1992-2002	2005
Reducing child malnutrition in Tanzania - combined effects of income growth and program interventions	2005
Comparative review of microfinance regulatory framework issues in Benin, Ghana, and Tanzania	2005
Presidential Investors Round Table	2005
Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Review	2006
TASAF Impact Evaluation (FY07-ongoing)	2006
Integrated CFAA Country Financial Accountability Assessment (FY07-ongoing)	2006
CEM and Poverty Assessment	2006
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and Joint Staff Advisory Note	2006
Tanzania Rural Investment Climate	2006
Diagnostic Trade Integration Study	2006
Country Water Resource Assistance Strategy	2006
Presidential Investors Round Table	2006

Sources: Tanzania CAS 2000, WB Business Warehouse, IRIS, and Integrated Controller's Systems, as of March 15, 2007.

**Annex Table 3a: Tanzania - Project Ratings, Exit FY01-06**

Exit FY	Approval FY		IEG Outcome	IEG Sustainability	IEG ID Impact	Net Commitments
2001	1993	POWER VI	UNSATISFACTORY	UNLIKELY	MODEST	195.6
	1993	TELECOM III	SATISFACTORY	LIKELY	SUBSTANTIAL	73.9
	1991	PETROLEUM SEC. REHAB. PROJ.	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	LIKELY	MODEST	45.0
	1993	PRIV. PUB. SECT. MGT	SATISFACTORY	LIKELY	SUBSTANTIAL	34.7
	1994	ASMP	SATISFACTORY	LIKELY	SUBSTANTIAL	20.4
2002	1995	MINERAL SECTOR DEV.	SATISFACTORY	LIKELY	SUBSTANTIAL	11.1
2003	1991	RAILWAYS RESTRUCTURING <sup>1/</sup>	UNSATISFACTORY	NON EVALUABLE	SUBSTANTIAL	64.6
2004	1997	Nat Ext Phase 2 SIL (FY97)	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	LIKELY	SUBSTANTIAL	28.2
	1998	Agricultural Research SIL (FY98)	SATISFACTORY	LIKELY	SUBSTANTIAL	21.4
	2000	PSAC I	SATISFACTORY	LIKELY	SUBSTANTIAL	195.3
	1997	Riv Basin Mgmt & Smll Hldr Irr (FY97)	SATISFACTORY	LIKELY	SUBSTANTIAL	23.9
	2000	Health Sect. Dev. Program	SATISFACTORY	LIKELY	SUBSTANTIAL	20.8
2005	1996	Urban Sector Rehabilitation	HIGHLY SATISFACTORY	LIKELY	SUBSTANTIAL	96.6
	2000	RURAL& MICRO FIN SVC	SATISFACTORY	LIKELY	SUBSTANTIAL	1.5
	2001	Soc Action Fund SIL (FY01)	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	NON EVALUABLE	MODEST	62.6
	2002	Primary Educ. Dev. Program	SATISFACTORY	LIKELY	SUBSTANTIAL	165.4
	2005	PRSC2	SATISFACTORY	LIKELY	SUBSTANTIAL	150.5
2006	1998	Human Res Dev 1 (FY98)	SATISFACTORY	LIKELY	SUBSTANTIAL	19.4
	2003	PRSC1	SATISFACTORY	LIKELY	SUBSTANTIAL	132.7

**Annex Table 3b: Tanzania - Portfolio Ratings, Exit FY01-06**

	Total Evaluated (\$M)	Total Evaluated (No)	Outcome % Sat (\$)	Outcome % Sat (No)	Inst Dev Impact % Subst (\$)	Inst Dev Impact % Subst (No)	Sustai- nability % Likely (\$)	Sustai- nability % Likely (No)
Tanzania	1,363.6	19	80.9	89.5	78	84.2	84.2	94.1
AFR	14,855.1	380	73.1	68.6	43	44.1	69.1	63.9
Bank Wide	108,230.1	1,548	81.7	77.3	56	52.3	83.1	77.3

1/ PPAR rating.

Source: WB Business Warehouse tables 4a.5 and 4a.6 as of March 15, 2007.



**Annex Table 4: Tanzania - Portfolio Status Indicators, FY01-06**

(US\$ million)

Country	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
<b>Tanzania</b>						
# Proj	18	22	24	23	21	26
Net Comm Amt	907.0	1,233.0	1,418.7	1,444.5	1,333.0	1,894.5
# Proj At Risk	1	2	2	0	4	4
% At Risk	5.6	9.1	8.3	0.0	19.0	15.4
Comm At Risk	41.2	71.1	17.0	0.0	133.4	425.6
% Commit at Risk	4.5	5.8	1.2	0.0	10.0	22.5
<b>Kenya</b>						
# Proj	14	13	12	11	12	12
Net Comm Amt	804.3	701.0	762.7	629.7	619.7	594.7
# Proj At Risk	3	5	5	5	2	4
% At Risk	21.4	38.5	41.7	45.5	16.7	33.3
Comm At Risk	187.8	421.5	342.8	290.0	90.0	92.7
% Commit at Risk	23.4	60.1	44.9	46.1	14.5	15.6
<b>Malawi</b>						
# Proj	11	9	11	11	12	10
Net Comm Amt	399.3	287.7	412.2	371.8	369.0	316.8
# Proj At Risk	2	3	1	1	4	3
% At Risk	18.2	33.3	9.1	9.1	33.3	30.0
Comm At Risk	60.6	44.3	15.0	48.2	132.6	82.9
% Commit at Risk	15.2	15.4	3.6	13.0	35.9	26.2
<b>Mozambique</b>						
# Proj	14	15	16	16	17	18
Net Comm Amt	756.9	943.7	931.4	810.0	920.0	867.5
# Proj At Risk	1	3	2	1	5	3
% At Risk	7.1	20.0	12.5	6.3	29.4	16.7
Comm At Risk	71.0	151.6	80.6	55.0	161.8	100.9
% Commit at Risk	9.4	16.1	8.7	6.8	17.6	11.6
<b>Uganda</b>						
# Proj	24	23	21	19	20	21
Net Comm Amt	1,209.6	864.5	961.2	886.9	1,030.5	1,113.9
# Proj At Risk	1	2	1	6	7	1
% At Risk	4.2	8.7	4.8	31.6	35.0	4.8
Comm At Risk	158.0	95.0	20.0	260.6	336.1	91.0
% Commit at Risk	13.1	11.0	2.1	29.4	32.6	8.2

**Annex Table 4: Tanzania - Portfolio Status Indicators, FY01-06 (continued)**

<b>Zambia</b>						
# Proj	16	12	14	14	12	9
Net Comm Amt	779.5	463.2	567.7	604.9	498.1	287.4
# Proj At Risk	5	9	2	1	6	1
% At Risk	31.3	75.0	14.3	7.1	50.0	11.1
Comm At Risk	241.6	341.2	27.8	25.0	255.9	28.2
% Commit at Risk	31.0	73.7	4.9	4.1	51.4	9.8
<b>AFR</b>						
# Proj	359	355	343	334	334	351
Net Comm Amt	14,408.9	15,182.1	15,793.2	16,387.7	16,364.8	18,310.4
# Proj At Risk	53	93	65	76	97	77
% At Risk	14.8	26.2	19.0	22.8	29.0	21.9
Comm At Risk	2,429.8	4,088.2	2,937.3	3,174.5	4,300.9	3,241.0
% Commit at Risk	16.9	26.9	18.6	19.4	26.3	17.7
<b>Bank wide</b>						
# Proj	1,457	1,428	1,395	1,346	1,332	1,345
Net Comm Amt	106,640.7	102,601.3	94,772.5	92,554.3	93,211.7	92,888.8
# Proj At Risk	184	272	218	228	224	188
% At Risk	12.6	19.0	15.6	16.9	16.8	14.0
Comm At Risk	12,539.2	17,385.4	14,141.5	14,742.1	12,552.7	10,849.8
% Commit at Risk	11.8	16.9	14.9	15.9	13.5	11.7

Source: WB Business Warehouse Table 3a.4 as of March 15, 2007.

**Annex Table 5: Tanzania - IBRD/IDA Net Disbursements and Charges, FY01-06  
(US\$ millions)**

FY	Disb. Amt.	Repay Amt.	Net Amt.	Charges	Fees	Net Transfer
2001	115.3	40.2	75.0	20.3	0.0	54.7
2002	169.9	43.8	126.2	20.0	0.0	106.2
2003	255.9	49.7	206.2	21.9	0.0	184.3
2004	336.9	60.3	276.6	25.4	1.6	249.6
2005	461.8	63.7	398.1	27.7	2.8	367.7
2006	339.6	61.6	278.0	28.2	2.5	247.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>1679.4</b>	<b>319.2</b>	<b>1360.1</b>	<b>143.4</b>	<b>6.9</b>	<b>1209.8</b>

Source: Client Connection as of March 15, 2007



**Annex Table 6: Total Net Disbursements of Official Development Assistance and Official Aid to Tanzania 2000-05, (US\$ Million)**

	Calendar years					
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Australia	2.0	1.9	1.0	0.5	1.2	1.0
Austria	5.7	4.8	30.3	1.7	3.2	2.4
Belgium	7.4	16.1	70.6	8.8	17.6	6.3
Canada	11.6	8.4	8.3	34.3	32.7	33.0
Czech Republic	-	-	-	0.0	0.0	0.2
Denmark	68.8	66.6	69.9	85.5	93.9	84.7
Finland	12.4	12.9	12.6	13.2	14.8	17.2
France	15.8	13.1	16.0	1.6	120.0	4.5
Germany	34.8	48.2	23.2	98.5	56.4	49.9
Greece	-	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.1
Hungary	-	-	-	-	-	9.6
Ireland	15.9	16.4	24.8	26.5	32.2	35.1
Italy	0.7	1.5	132.3	1.3	5.1	4.7
Japan	217.1	260.4	58.2	74.5	52.5	36.1
Korea	0.3	0.3	0.6	0.8	1.2	2.4
Luxembourg	-	0.2	0.5	0.1	0.2	0.2
Netherlands	97.3	75.1	138.3	95.8	117.6	90.2
New Zealand	0.3	1.0	0.6	1.1	1.0	1.2
Norway	35.2	34.9	46.7	67.4	59.6	60.3
Poland	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
Spain	0.3	1.9	0.3	2.5	5.8	4.1
Sweden	63.5	47.3	61.4	66.2	83.6	91.8
Switzerland	12.7	17.0	19.3	25.6	26.0	23.6
Turkey	-	-	-	-	-	0.0
United Kingdom	152.7	290.1	103.2	285.5	215.6	215.9
United States	24.5	25.9	85.4	75.2	89.5	108.9
AfDF (African Dev.Fund)	26.4	9.7	17.1	44.6	55.7	114.7
EC	32.4	96.7	70.2	185.1	161.9	155.8
Arab Agencies	-11.9	-2.3	1.3	17.6	13.9	11.5
Arab Countries	-3.0	-5.9	-4.3	-0.2	1.4	-
GEF	-	3.3	0.7	0.0	0.2	0.5
Global Fund (GFATM)	-	-	-	2.8	16.6	68.6
IDA	109.4	119.9	146.3	424.9	474.2	275.2
IFAD	5.5	6.5	5.6	7.0	8.3	8.2
Nordic Dev. Fund	3.5	0.4	2.2	2.9	2.4	1.3
SAF+ESAF+PRGF(IMF)	27.4	37.1	29.3	0.6	-32.5	-48.3
UNDP	8.7	5.2	5.6	6.8	7.2	7.8
UNFPA	2.4	4.1	7.5	4.5	5.9	5.1
UNHCR	22.4	25.1	27.0	22.1	-	1.5
UNICEF	11.5	5.9	6.9	8.0	10.0	10.9
UNTA	3.0	2.2	3.4	3.9	2.6	3.5
WFP	2.5	16.5	7.7	7.3	3.5	5.7
Other Bilateral Donors	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.1

**Annex Table 6: Total Net Disbursements of Official Development Assistance and Official Aid to Tanzania 2000-05, (US\$ Million) (continued)**

	Calendar years					
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
DAC Countries, Total	778.7	943.8	902.8	965.6	1,028.7	871.0
Multilateral, Total	243.3	330.2	330.6	738.1	729.8	621.8
DAC EU Members, Total	475.2	594.2	683.4	687.2	766.2	607.0
Non-DAC Bilateral Donors, Total	-2.6	-5.5	-3.5	0.7	2.8	12.3
G7, Total	457.3	647.6	426.5	570.9	571.8	453.0
<b>All Donors, Total</b>	<b>1,019.4</b>	<b>1,268.5</b>	<b>1,229.8</b>	<b>1,704.4</b>	<b>1,761.3</b>	<b>1,505.1</b>

Source: OECD DAC Online database, Table 2a. Destination of Official Development Assistance and Official Aid Disbursements as of March 15, 2007

**Annex Table 7: Tanzania - Economic and Social Indicators, 1998-2005**

	Tanzania							Mozambique 1998-2005 average					Low Income		
	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	Tanzania	Kenya	Malawi	Uganda		Zambia	SSA
<b>Growth and Inflation</b>															
GDP growth (annual %)	3.7	3.5	5.1	6.2	7.2	7.1	6.7	7.0	5.8	2.6	2.8	5.7	3.5	3.7	5.6
GDP per capita growth (annual %)	1.4	1.3	2.9	4.1	5.1	5.1	4.7	5.0	3.7	0.3	0.3	2.3	1.5	1.3	3.6
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US\$)	230.0	250.0	260.0	270.0	290.0	300.0	320.0	340.0	282.5	446.3	160.0	256.3	345.0	539.4	430.2
GNI per capita, PPP (current international \$)	480.0	490.0	520.0	550.0	590.0	630.0	670.0	730.0	582.5	1,061.3	585.0	1,297.5	802.5	1,715.9	1,991.5
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) <sup>iv</sup>	13.2	9.0	6.2	5.1	4.6	4.4	4.1	4.4	6.4	7.8	23.3	4.1	22.4	..	..
<b>Composition of GDP</b>															
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)	44.8	45.1	45.0	44.7	44.7	45.0	46.2	44.5	45.0	29.6	38.0	35.4	21.8	18.4	25.3
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	15.4	15.5	15.7	15.9	16.2	16.6	16.7	17.8	16.2	17.0	17.5	20.4	26.3	30.3	26.6
Services, etc., value added (% of GDP)	39.8	39.4	39.2	39.4	39.2	38.4	37.1	37.7	38.8	53.4	44.5	44.2	52.0	51.3	48.2
<b>External Accounts</b>															
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)	13.7	13.5	14.4	16.3	17.1	18.3	17.8	17.1	16.0	23.1	27.4	12.2	22.2	31.4	19.2
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)	28.3	26.2	22.7	24.7	24.6	27.4	27.7	26.3	26.0	29.0	44.5	25.0	31.4	32.0	21.9
Current account balance (% of GDP)	-9.0	-9.7	-5.5	-4.8	-2.2	-3.8	-3.9	..	-5.6	-1.6	-5.4	-17.2	-15.7	..	..
Total debt service (% of GNI)	2.9	2.7	1.9	1.6	1.1	0.9	1.1	..	1.7	4.1	3.3	1.5	7.3	3.9	3.0
External debt (% of GNI)	88.3	89.6	77.4	66.8	70.4	68.2	72.2	..	76.1	46.8	161.7	66.0	182.3	63.4	43.1
Total reserves in months of imports	2.9	4.0	5.2	5.7	8.0	8.4	8.3	..	6.1	3.1	3.7	6.1	1.0	7.4	6.8
Gross domestic savings (% of GDP)	-0.8	2.8	9.3	8.6	11.6	9.5	8.5	9.7	7.4	12.4	-3.3	7.4	12.5	17.9	20.7
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP)	13.7	15.4	17.4	16.8	19.0	18.5	18.3	18.8	17.2	17.5	12.4	19.6	20.3	18.1	22.2

**Annex Table 7: Tanzania - Economic and Social Indicators, 1998-2005 (continued)**

	Tanzania					Mozambique					LOW Income				
	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	Tanzania	Kenya		Malawi	Uganda	Zambia	SSA
						1998-2005 average									
<b>Fiscal Accounts, per FY <sup>2/</sup></b>				01/02	02/03	03/04	04/05	05/06							
Total Revenue, before grants (% of GDP)				12.1	12.1	12.7	13.3	14.1							
Total Expenditure (incl. adj. to cash, % of GDP)				17.6	19.8	22.0	24.4	25.6							
Overall Budget Balance, before grants (% of GDP)				-5.6	-7.8	-9.3	-11.1	-11.6							
Overall Budget Balance, after grants (% of GDP)				-1.1	-1.6	-3.2	-3.4	-5.5							
<b>Social Indicators <sup>3/</sup></b>															
<b>Health</b>															
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)			46.8		46.0	46.1	46.2		46.3	47.9	40.1	42.0	37.8	46.1	
Immunization, DPT (% of children ages 12-23 months)	79.0	76.0	79.0	85.0	89.0	95.0	95.0		85.4	74.4	82.7	69.1	79.9	53.7	
Impr. water source (% of population with access)							62.0		62.0	61.0	73.0	43.0	58.0	56.2	
Impr. sanitation facilities, rural (% of rural pop. with access)							43.0		43.0	41.0	61.0	19.0	52.0	28.1	
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)			88.0				78.4		83.2	77.8	113.4	113.2	102.0	101.9	
<b>Education</b>									26.4	47.7			2.2	15.1	
School enrollment, preprimary (% gross)						25.3	25.3	28.7	81.9	100.1	136.9	77.8	126.7	87.1	
School enrollment, primary (% gross)	63.4	64.4	66.1	72.4	87.4	94.6	100.9	106.0	5.7	41.6	32.2	7.5	15.4	29.2	
School enrollment, secondary (% gross)	5.6	5.9													
<b>Population</b>									2.0	2.2	2.5	2.1	3.3	2.4	
Population growth (annual %)	2.3	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.9	35.8	31.7	11.9	18.5	25.7	686.5	
Population, total (million)	33.3	34.0	34.7	35.5	36.2	36.9	37.6	38.3	22.9	20.0	15.8	31.8	12.3	35.0	
Urban population (% of total)	21.6	21.9	22.3	22.7	23.1	23.4	23.8	24.2							

1/ IMF World Economic Outlook, Sept. 2006.

2/ IMF Staff Reports.

3/ Some of these indicators are not available on an annual basis, so some averages are based on fewer observations.

Note: Some data for recent years are still estimates.

Source: WB World Development Indicators (September 2006 update) for all indicators excluding those noted.



**Annex Table 8: Tanzania - Millennium Development Goals**

	1990	1995	1998	2001	2004
<b>Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger</b>					
Income share held by lowest 20%	..	..	..	7	..
Malnutrition prevalence, weight for age (% of children under 5)	..	31	29	..	..
Poverty gap at \$1 a day (PPP) (%)	24	..	..	21	..
Poverty headcount ratio at \$1 a day (PPP) (% of population)	49	..	..	58	..
Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line (% of population)	39	..	..	36	..
Prevalence of undernourishment (% of population)	..	..	50	..	44
<b>Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education</b>					
Literacy rate, youth total (% of people ages 15-24)	83	..	..	..	78
Persistence to grade 5, total (% of cohort)	81	..	81	99	76
Primary completion rate, total (% of relevant age group)	46.4	56.6	46.2	52.5	56.5
School enrollment, primary (% net)	49	..	47	56	86
<b>Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women</b>					
Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament (%)	..	..	18	22	21
Ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary education (%)	96.7	..	98.3	..	..
Ratio of young literate females to males (% ages 15-24)	86.5	..	..	..	94.2
Share of women employed in the nonagricultural sector (% of total nonagricultural employment)	29	..	..	..	..
<b>Goal 4: Reduce child mortality</b>					
Immunization, measles (% of children ages 12-23 months)	80	78	78	83	94
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	102	100	..	88	78
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000)	161	159	..	141	126
<b>Goal 5: Improve maternal health</b>					
Births attended by skilled health staff (% of total)	..	38.2	35.8	..	46
Maternal mortality ratio (modeled estimate, per 100,000 live births)	..	..	..	1500	..
<b>Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases</b>					
Children orphaned by HIV/AIDS	..	..	..	..	1100000
Contraceptive prevalence (% of women ages 15-49)	10	18	25	..	26
Incidence of tuberculosis (per 100,000 people)	178.9	..	..	..	347.1
Prevalence of HIV, female (% ages 15-24)	..	..	..	..	4
Prevalence of HIV, total (% of population ages 15-49)	..	..	..	..	7
Tuberculosis cases detected under DOTS (%)	..	56.1	52.9	46.8	46.6
<b>Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability</b>					
CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita)	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	..
Forest area (% of land area)	47	..	..	42	40
GDP per unit of energy use (constant 2000 PPP \$ per kg of oil equivalent)	1	1	1	1	1
Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access)	47	..	..	..	47
Improved water source (% of population with access)	46	..	..	..	62
Nationally protected areas (% of total land area)	..	..	..	..	29.8
<b>Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development</b>					
Aid per capita (current US\$)	44.7	28.4	30	35.8	46.4
Debt service (PPG and IMF only, % of exports of G&S, excl. workers' remittances)	31	17	21	7	6

**Annex Table 8: Tanzania - Millennium Development Goals (continued)**

Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 people)	2.8	3	4.8	16.2	32.2
Internet users (per 1,000 people)	0	0	0.1	1.7	8.9
Personal computers (per 1,000 people)	..	..	1.7	3.4	7.4
Total debt service (% of exports of goods, services and income)	33	18	20	10	5
Unemployment, youth female (% of female labor force ages 15-24)	..	..	..	..	..
Unemployment, youth male (% of male labor force ages 15-24)	..	..	..	..	..
Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15-24)	..	..	..	..	..
<b>Other</b>					
Fertility rate, total (births per woman)	6.1	5.6	5.5	5	4.8
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US\$)	190	160	230	270	320
GNI, Atlas method (current US\$) (billions)	4.8	4.9	7.5	9.4	11.7
Gross capital formation (% of GDP)	26.1	19.8	13.8	17	18.4
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)	53.5	49.9	48.1	46	46.2
Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above)	62.9	..	..	..	69.4
Population, total (millions)	26.2	30.9	33.3	35.5	37.6
Trade (% of GDP)	50.1	59.3	42	41	45.6

Note: Figures in italics refer to periods other than those specified.

Source: World Development Indicators database, September 2006