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Capital requirements, screening and interlinked share cropping and credit contracts (English)

This paper provides one more rationale for interlinking credit and tenancy contracts in the context of production loans. In an environment characterized by a heterogeneous labor pool and imperfect information, landlords will have an incentive to avail themselves of screening devices. By linking tenancy and credit contracts a screening device can be implemented. The equilibrium set of contracts is characterized by a variety of interest rates, some...
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Braverman,Avishay; Guasch, J. Luis.

Capital requirements, screening and interlinked share cropping and credit contracts (English). World Bank reprint series ; no. REP 326 Amsterdam : North-Holland. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/829511468344328416

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