Document of The World Bank Report No: ICR2564 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (TF-96268) ON A MULTI DONOR TRUST FUND – SOUTH SUDAN (MDTF-SS) GRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF US$40 MILLION TO THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN FOR A SOUTHERN SUDAN ROADS MAINTENANCE PROJECT February 15, 2013 Transport Unit Country DepartmentAFCE4 Africa Region CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective February 11, 2010) Currency Unit=Sudanese Pound (SDG) US$ 1.00 = 2.55 Sudanese Pound Fiscal Year July 1 – June 30 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS CIDA Canadian International Development Agency CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement DA Designated Account DfID Department for International Development DG Director General EAA External Audit Agent ERRP Emergency Road Repairs Program ESAF Environmental and Social Management Framework ESSAF Environmental and Social Screening and Assessment Framework ESIA Environmental and Social Impact Assessment ESMP Environmental and Social Management Plan ESMU Environmental and Social Monitoring Unit EU European Union FM Financial Management FMS Financial Management System FPP Final Project Paper FY Financial Year GLA Grant Letter Agreement GoS Government of Sudan GoSS Government of South Sudan HIV/AIDS Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome IA Implementing Agency ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development IFR Interim Financial Statement ISN Interim Strategy Note ISR Implementation Status Report JAM Joint Assessment Mission KM Kilometer M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MA Monitoring Agent MDTF Multi-Donor Trust Fund MDTF-SS Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Southern Sudan MOA Memorandum of Agreement MoFEP Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning MoT Ministry of Transport MRB Ministry of Roads and Bridges MTR Mid-Term Review OPRC Output and Performance Based Road Contracting PAD Project Appraisal Document PDO Project Development Objectives PFMU Project Financial Management Unit PIU Project Implementation Unit PMT Project Management Team QAG Quality Assurance Group RAPs Resettlement Action Plans RF Results Framework RRC Rapid Response Committee SDG Sudanese Pound SETIDP Sudan Emergency Transport and Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project SPLM Sudan People’s Liberation Movement SSRA Southern Sudan Roads Agency SSRMP Southern Sudan Roads Maintenance Project SSRRP South Sudan Rural Roads Project SSTTF South Sudan Transition Trust Fund TA Technical Assistance TF Trust Fund(s) UN United Nations USAID United States Agency for International Development USD United States Dollars VfM Value for Money WA Withdrawal Applications WB The World Bank WFP World Food Programme Vice President: Makhtar Diop Country Director: Bella Bird Country Manager: Laura Kullenberg Sector Director: Jamal Saghir Sector Manager: Supee Teravaninthorn Project Team Leader: Tesfamichael Nahusenay Mitiku ICR Team Leader: Muhammad Zulfiqar Ahmed ICR Primary Author: Muhammad Zulfiqar Ahmed/ Emmanuel Taban REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN Southern Sudan Roads Maintenance Project CONTENTS Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ............................................... 1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .............................................. 6 3. Assessment of Outcomes .......................................................................................... 13 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome......................................................... 18 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ..................................................... 19 6. Lessons Learned ....................................................................................................... 21 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners .......... 23 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................... 24 Annex 2. Outputs by Component ................................................................................. 26 Annex 3. Efficiency Related Analyses ......................................................................... 33 Annex 4. Grant Preparation and and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes 36 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ........................................................................... 37 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results................................................... 38 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ..................... 39 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ....................... 44 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ...................................................................... 45 MAP DATA SHEET A. Basic Information SOUTHERN SUDAN ROAD Country: South Sudan Project Name: MAINTENANCE PROJECT Project ID: P118579 L/C/TF Number(s): TF-96268 ICR Date: 02/18/2013 ICR Type: Core ICR GOVERNMENT OF Lending Instrument: ERL Grantee: SOUTHERN SUDAN (GOSS) Original Total USD 40.00M Disbursed Amount: USD 39.96M Commitment: Revised Amount: USD 39.96M Environmental Category: B Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Transport and Roads (now Ministry of Roads and Bridges) Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: None B. Key Dates Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 02/09/2010 Effectiveness: 03/01/2010 03/03/2010 06/06/2011 Appraisal: 10/06/2009 Restructuring(s): 06/25/2012 Approval: 02/16/2010 Mid-term Review: 10/31/2009 10/14/2010 Closing: 06/30/2011 08/31/2012 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Moderately Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Substantial Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Grantee Performance: Moderately Satisfactory C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Quality at Entry: Satisfactory Government: Moderately Satisfactory Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Implementing Satisfactory i Agency/Agencies: Overall Bank Overall Borrower Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Performance: Performance: C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments Indicators Rating Performance (if any) Potential Problem Project Quality at Entry No None at any time (Yes/No): (QEA): Problem Project at any Quality of No None time (Yes/No): Supervision (QSA): DO rating before Moderately Closing/Inactive status: Satisfactory D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Public administration- Transportation 4 4 Rural and Inter-Urban Roads and Highways 96 96 Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Infrastructure services for private sector development 3 3 Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise support 20 20 Other public sector governance 37 37 Rural services and infrastructure 40 40 E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Makhtar Diop Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Country Director: Bella Bird Kenichi Ohashi Sector Manager: Supee Teravaninthorn Sanjivi Rajasingham Project Team Leader: Tesfamichael Nahusenay Mitiku Negede Lewi ICR Team Leader: Muhammad Zulfiqar Ahmed Muhammad Zulfiqar Ahmed/ ICR Primary Author: Emmanuel Taban F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The development objective is to (i) improve access and quality of targeted roads in Southern Sudan, and (ii) strengthen the capacity for strategic and project planning, construction and ii maintenance of roads. The specific objectives are to support the road development and maintenance program of the Ministry of Transport and Roads now called the Ministry of Roads and Bridges (MRB) through the provision of funds for the: (i) routine and periodic maintenance and spot improvement works on about 1,700 km of trunk roads, (ii) capacity building of local contractors to carry out maintenance works, and (iii) institutional capacity building for road maintenance and management. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) The PDO was not revised iii (a) PDO Indicator(s) Original Target Formally Actual Value Values (from Revised Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value approval Target Completion or documents) Values Target Years Indicator 1 Increase in critical main roads restored to maintainable condition Value (quantitative 1,600 km 3,371 km 3,024 km or qualitative) Date achieved 10/06/2009 06/30/2011 08/31/2012 90% of the target has been achieved. The target value had been revised to Comments (incl. % 3,129 km during the Mid-Term Review (MTR) in October 2010 but not achievement) formally recorded through project restructuring. Indicator 2 Average travel time reduction on project roads (hrs.) Value (quantitative 4.0 2 2 or qualitative) Date achieved 10/06/2009 06/30/2011 08/31/2012 Reduction in travel time has been 100% achieved. The baseline value was Comments (incl. % revised to 4.5 hours during MTR but not formally recorded through project achievement) restructuring. Number of direct project beneficiaries (number), of which female Indicator 3 (percentage) Value (quantitative 0 None 395,283 (48) or qualitative) Date achieved 10/06/2009 06/30/2011 08/31/2012 This number was miscalculated in the last ISR of Aug 2012 as 666,800 (48%). The error in calculation was detected at the ICR stage and correctly Comments (incl. % estimated as reported in this table, i.e., 395,283 (48%) of the actual road achievement) length maintained (1,424 km). This number represents people living within 2 km distance from the roads maintained under the project. Number of indirect project beneficiaries (number), of which female Indicator 4 (percentage) Value (quantitative 0 None 1,270 or qualitative) Date achieved 10/06/2009 06/30/2011 08/31/2012 There is no information provided in the Project Document. It was to be determined from the implementation progress report. In October 2010, the current value is shown as 1,018. By the end of the project 1,000 transport Comments (incl. % operators gained sustainable employment/business. In addition 1,270 achievement) workers were employed during the maintenance period. The employment under maintenance work force is mainly men, in particular ex-combatants. Women are not yet engaged in transport operations. If we compare the actual end value achieved, it is still 25% more than the October 2010 figures. About 35 professional staff delegated the responsibility for planning, Indicator 5 supervision and management of construction and maintenance of roads by the Ministry of Transport and Roads. Value (quantitative 0 35 18 or qualitative) iv Date achieved 10/06/2009 06/30/2011 08/31/2012 Comments ( incl. % Due to freeze on hire of civil servants by the Government, only 51% of the achievement) target value could be achieved. v (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) Original Target Actual Value Formally Values (from Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value Revised approval Completion or Target Values documents) Target Years Indicator 1 Roads maintained under WFP – non rural Value Planned roads heavily (quantitative or 1,054 km 848 km deteriorated qualitative) Date achieved 10/06/2009 06/30/2011 08/31/2012 The target value was revised in October 2010 at the time of the mid-term review to reflect the actual contracted total length of the roads. (As this was an Comments emergency project and some of the project sites were inaccessible, the (incl. % information provided by the client, at the time of preparation, was not always achievement) accurate.) From the planned roads 109 km was maintained by the USAID and the Jonglei state administration. The actual target achieved is 92%. Indicator 2 Roads maintained under the Ministry of Transport and Roads/MRB – non rural Value Planned roads heavily (quantitative or 495 354 deteriorated qualitative) Date achieved 10/06/2009 06/30/2011 08/31/2012 The target value was revised in October 2010 at the time of the Mid-Term Comments Review to reflect the actual contracted total length of the roads. One of the roads (incl. % (Kajo Keji-Juba) was estimated at 260 km instead of the actual length of 150 km. achievement) The actual target value achieved is 92% Indicator 3 Roads maintained under labor based contracts – non rural Value Planned roads in poor (quantitative or 222 km 222 km condition qualitative) Date achieved 10/06/2009 06/30/2011 08/31/2012 Comments Achieved 100% of target value and all contracts were implemented by local (incl. % contractors in order to train and enhance their capacity in road maintenance. achievement) HIV/AIDS awareness campaign to project workers and communities nearby Indicator 4 contractors camp - (number) of which women (percentage) Value (quantitative or New N/A 63 qualitative) Date achieved 10/06/2009 06/30/2011 08/31/2012 Comments This was a new indicator introduced during mid-term review. No record on the (incl. % female percentage was kept. achievement) Local labor based contractors engaged under the project (Number), of which Indicator 5 female (percentage) Value (quantitative or New N/A 5 qualitative) vi Date achieved 10/06/2009 06/30/2011 08/31/2012 This indicator was introduced at the time of the mid-term review but no end Comments target was identified until April 2011. (incl. % Achieved 100% of target value with five contracts awarded to local labor based achievement) contractors. As indicated under PDO Indicator 4, women are not yet engaged in transport operations. Indicator 6 Maintenance planning, budgeting and management practices developed (Yes/No) Value (quantitative or Barely Yes Yes qualitative) Date achieved 10/06/2009 06/30/2011 08/31/2012 Comments (incl. % Target 100% achieved though maintenance budget is still a constraint achievement) Ministry of Transport and Roads professional staff specialized in maintenance, Indicator 7 procurement, Environment and Social management (Number) of which female staff (Number) Value (quantitative or 0 35 18(1) qualitative) Date achieved 10/06/2009 06/30/2011 08/31/2012 Comments Due to freeze on hire of civil servants by the government, target value achieved (incl. % is 51%. Therefore, MRB could not increase the number of staff initially planned. achievement) Technicians trained in carrying out road maintenance and construction Indicator 8 supervision, material testing, etc.(Number) of which female staff (Number) Value (quantitative or 0 85 30 (5) qualitative) Date achieved 10/06/2009 06/30/2011 08/31/2012 Comments Due to civil servant hire freeze following the economic crises and reduction of (incl. % government revenue, only 35% of the targeted value could be achieved. achievement) Therefore, MRB could not increase the number of staff initially planned. The Environment and Social Monitoring Unit (ESMU) is functional and staffed Indicator 9 with appropriate expertise (Yes/No) Value ESMU not properly (quantitative or Yes Yes staffed and functional qualitative) Date achieved 10/06/2009 06/30/2011 08/31/2012 Comments (incl. % Target 100% achieved achievement) Indicator 10 ESSAF is adopted for the transport sector (Yes/No). Value (quantitative or Partial Yes Yes qualitative) Date achieved 10/06/2009 06/30/2011 08/31/2012 Comments Target 100% achieved and MRB has prepared an updated ESSAF as part of the vii (incl. % new South Sudan Rural Roads Project achievement) Ministry of Transport and Roads delegated the authority as a Procuring Entity, Indicator 11 with a Procurement Committee and a functional Procurement Unit (Yes/No). Value (quantitative or No Yes Yes qualitative) Date achieved 10/06/2009 06/30/2011 08/31/2012 Comments (incl. % Target 100% achieved and MRB has established a procurement committee. achievement) SSRA Bill accepted as basis for road asset management with Ministry of Indicator 12 Transport and Roads core units trained by project in place (Yes/No) Value (quantitative or Draft Legislative Bill Yes Yes qualitative) Date achieved 10/06/2009 06/30/2011 08/31/2012 Comments Target 100% achieved and the SSRA has been established by an Act of (incl. % Parliament. achievement) G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs Actual Date ISR No. DO IP Disbursements Archived (USD millions) 1 04/30/2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 11/14/2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 14.00 3 05/18/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 33.40 4 02/25/2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 38.91 5 08/29/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 39.87 viii H. Restructuring (if any) ISR Ratings at Amount Reason for Restructuring Disbursed at Restructuring Board Approved Restructuring & Restructuring Dates(s) PDO Change Key Changes DO IP in USD Made millions Closing date extended by one 06/06/2011 No Satisfactory Satisfactory 33.40 year to allow completion of activities Closing date extended by two 06/25/2012 No Satisfactory Satisfactory 39.87 months to allow completion of activities I. Disbursement Profile ix 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1. The US$40 million Southern Sudan Roads Maintenance Project (SSRMP) supported the government’s program of road sector development including maintenance of its core road network. It aimed at improving the condition of selected trunk roads of Southern Sudan and the management of road network in general, by: (i) carrying out routine and periodic maintenance as well as spot improvements, (ii) capacity building for sustained road maintenance works by small scale road contractors; and (iii) the provision of Technical Assistance (TA) for capacity building in the then Ministry of Transport and Roads, and supporting the establishment of a Southern Sudan Road Agency (SSRA). All roads treated under the project had lateritic1 gravel surface, and the same was maintained throughout the interventions. The Ministry of Transport and Roads is now known as the Ministry of Roads and Bridges (MRB) since Independence of South Sudan in July 2011. Accordingly, everywhere in this report, the Ministry of Transport and Roads at project approval is referred to by its current name “the MRB�. 2. This project was built on the work carried out under the Sudan Emergency Transport and Infrastructure Project (SETIDP) with financing by the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Southern Sudan (MDTF-SS). The MDTF-SS was established to help finance the reconstruction and development of Southern Sudan in a collaborative framework that brought together several of the key development partners and provided a one stop point of contact and information on the reconstruction and development effort. After approval of the Bank’s Rapid Response Committee (RRC), the project was submitted for final clearance by the Oversight Committee of MDTF-SS on February 16, 2010. 1.1 Context at Appraisal 3. South Sudan emerged from a 22 year long civil war which ended in January 2005 when the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), a rebel movement in the South of the country, signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on January 9, 2005 with the Government of Sudan (GoS). The signing of the CPA led to the establishment of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), a semi-autonomous government with the responsibility to run the Southern part of Sudan. 4. Due to the highly inadequate road network which had deteriorated during the long period of conflict, a Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) was formed as a strategy for meeting the development needs of South Sudan. The assessment was carried out jointly by the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank (the Bank) in the lead. The JAM report of March 2005 recognized that the main challenges in the road sector in Sudan were: (i) the lack of roads in the south and other war affected areas; (ii) inadequate institutional capacity to manage roads in the South Sudan; (iii) inadequate funds for road 1 Laterite gravel is a particular type of natural soil material located in tropical regions and is used as construction material for gravel road surfaces. Its color generally varies from reddish to yellowish 1 maintenance; and (iv) an inadequate enforcement of axle-load regulations. South Sudan, which has an area of about 650,000 sq. km had no asphaltic (paved) surface roads outside the towns of Juba, Malakal, and Wau. Following the JAM process, a number of donors pledged to provide funds for the reconstruction and development of post-conflict South Sudan which led to the establishment of the MDTF-SS. The Bank was selected to administer those funds as a Trust Fund Administrator. 5. The road network (estimated at that time to be over 12,500 km) needed to be restored to return communities to their livelihoods, run peacekeeping operations, distribute relief goods, and provide access for the urgent rehabilitation needs of different sectors. GoSS placed great emphasis on quickly opening up inaccessible areas in order to restore access and mobility to the otherwise isolated communities. This was done by implementing various projects to restore the gravel surfaced road network, including the Emergency Road Repair Program (ERRP) (that had started in 2003 supported by World Food Programme - WFP), and SETIDP (that started in December 2005 under MDTF-SS financing). One of the modes of implementation was to engage the WFP which was providing humanitarian assistance for food relief, transport and other services to open up roads into inaccessible areas. MRB signed a Memorandum of Agreement with WFP to arrange for emergency road infrastructure repairs and demining under the ERRP and the SETIDP. 6. At project appraisal in October 2009, with the combined efforts of GoSS, WFP, and SETIDP, access was opened to many key areas of the country, on primary road corridors, covering more than 3,300 km. Of this, 890 km were rehabilitated and maintained under the SETIDP with financing from the MDTF-SS. GoSS had already spent a total amount of one billion Sudanese pounds (SDG) (about US$530 million equivalent). The road restoration activities were all preceded by demining activities to ensure adequate security and safety. 7. The GoSS allocated about SDG 690 million of the annual budget for FY2009- 2010 for the road sector to provide access and maintain roads that had been repaired. However, as a result of the financial crisis, GoSS was unable to fully finance ongoing commitments in the road sector including those with WFP; while the roads that were repaired and maintained under the ERRP had deteriorated further owing to the continuous rainfall and rising traffic levels. Increased overloading of heavy cargo trucks further worsened the road conditions. 8. The MDTF-SS donors had agreed, as part of the Juba Compact (endorsed by Donors Partners and GoSS in June 2009), to support the government on different fronts, including the provision of rapid support to meet urgent budget and high priority needs. Donors therefore agreed to use MDTF-SS resources in the amount of US$25 million for the first year and possibly US$15 million for the second year to support road maintenance and emergency repairs utilizing rural labor wherever possible. In line with that agreement, the MRB submitted a proposal for a US$40 million project for an outstanding amount of US$26 million to the WFP to continue road maintenance works, and to use US$14 million to build capacity for managing and executing road maintenance on the 2 maintainable network. This was further discussed and firmed up during the project appraisal in October 2009. 9. The project provided comprehensive support to the road sector helping to realize the higher level objectives of the Interim Strategy Note (ISN) of March 2008. The ISN had highlighted inadequate infrastructure in South Sudan which was a challenge to economic development and in particular transport infrastructure including roads and bridges. SSRMP therefore contributed to the integration of Southern Sudan in order to function as an economic unit, improvement of access to markets, services and governance in the road sector, and reduction of the acute fiscal pressures. Being one of the largest international development institutions actively engaged in the transport sector, and in particular the prior involvement under the SETIDP, the Bank was well positioned to support this project. 10. The project further facilitated transition from emergency mode of operation to (i) keeping the roads in service, (ii) building the capacity of local labor based contractors, and (iii) creating institutional structures and capacity necessary for sustainable development and management of the road network. Since Southern Sudan was in post- conflict status, and in keeping the need for speed, flexibility and simplicity, the project was prepared to be implemented under OP/BP 8.00 directives using an Emergency Recovery Grant instrument. 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved) 11. The PDO as stated in the Grant Letter of Agreement (GLA) signed on March 03, 2010 was the following: “The objective of the Project is to preserve the road asset in Southern Sudan by maintaining priority roads, and strengthening the capacity for strategic and project planning, construction and sustainable maintenance of roads.� The original PDO stated in the Final Project Proposal (FPP) at the approval (February 16, 2010) differs in its formulation. The PDO at the time of approval as per the FPP was as follows; “to (i) improve access and quality of targeted roads in Southern Sudan, and (ii) strengthen the capacity for strategic and project planning, construction and maintenance of roads.� This difference in PDOs came about after the RRC meeting held on Feb 09, 2010. The RRC, while clearing the project, advised the team to refocus the PDO consistent with the design and emergency nature of the operation, and to revisit the Results Framework (RF) to include core indicators. The task team did not update the GLA submitted for the RRC meeting though the PDO was revised in the FPP, which was approved on February 16, 2010 by MDTF-SS Oversight Committee. 12. This document has used the PDO stated in the FPP in all subsequent sections. The specific objectives (as listed in the FPP) were “To support the road development and maintenance program of the Ministry of Transport and Roads (now MRB) through the provision of funds for the: (i) routine and periodic maintenance and spot improvement works on about 1,700 km of trunk roads, (ii) capacity building of local contractors to carry out maintenance works, and (iii) institutional capacity building for road 3 maintenance and management.� The key indicators at approval as presented in the FPP are summarized below:  Kilometers of road completed to maintainable condition (a) 1,054 km of roads executed under WFP managed contracts (b) 495 km of roads executed under Ministry of Transport and Roads (now MRB) managed contracts (c) 222 km of roads by local contractors.  Average travel time reduced on project roads (Indicator baseline shown as 4.0 hours in the FPP)  (a) Direct project beneficiaries (number), of which female (percentage) (b) Indirect project beneficiaries (number), of which female (percentage)  About 35 professional staff delegated the responsibility for planning, supervision and management of construction and maintenance of roads by the Ministry of Transport and Roads. 1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification 13. Neither the PDO nor the Key Indicators were changed during the project duration. At mid-term review (MTR), some adjustments were made to the target values of some of the indicators, and a few new Intermediate Outcome Indicators were added (as shown in the Data Sheet and Annex 2), but no restructuring of the project was done to formally reflect these changes. 1.4 Main Beneficiaries 14. The FPP classified the beneficiaries of the project as direct and indirect. The direct beneficiaries were the people living within 2 km distance from the roads that were maintained under the project. The indirect beneficiaries were the transport operators who gained sustainable employment or businesses, and workers employed during the maintenance period. Other indirect beneficiaries included staff of MRB through institutional capacity building, and local contractors through capacity building by carrying out labor based roads maintenance works. 1.5 Original Components (as approved) 15. The project consisted of three main components, namely: (i) road maintenance (US$36 million); (ii) local contractors’ capacity building (US$2.5 million); and (iii) institutional strengthening and capacity building (US$1.5 million). 4 16. Component 1-Road Maintenance (US$36 million). This component supported the routine and periodic maintenance and spot improvement works on selected trunk roads and consisted of the following subcomponents:  Subcomponent 1(a) - Road maintenance works implemented by WFP (US$26 million) - that comprised of the following seven (7) roads to be maintained; (i) Nadapal-Kapoeta 90 km; (ii) Kapoeta-Juba 273 km; (iii) Yei- Juba 160 km; (iv) Juba-Bor 190 km; (v) Rumbek-Tonj 125 km; (vi) Tonj- Wau 120 km; and (vii) Loming Junction-Imehejek 96 km.  Subcomponent 1(b) - Road Maintenance works implemented by MRB (US$10 million). This second part of the component involved funding for road maintenance works managed directly by MRB in order to enhance their capacity in procurement and contract management. The three (3) road contracts under this subcomponent were: (i) Kaya-Yei 85 km; (ii) Yei-Rasolo 150 km; and Kajo Keji-Juba 260 km. 17. Component 2- Local Contractors Capacity Building (US$2.5 million). This component provided support to train and enhance the capacity of local labor based contractors with the intention of building the capacity of the local construction industry in road maintenance. Five roads were as follows: (i) Kergelu-Morobo 77 km; (ii) Torit- Katire 45 km; (iii) Rumbek-Akot 40 km; (iv) Rasolo-Faraksika Mambe 25 km; and (v) Bor-Baidit 35 km. 18. Component 3- Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building (US$1.5 million). This component supported the creation of dedicated Units which would eventually form part of the envisioned Southern Sudan Road Agency (SSRA) to be established. It also provided for technical assistance (TA) and training in five main areas of activity. This component consisted of the following subcomponents:  Subcomponent 3(a). Creation of Road Maintenance, Procurement, Environment and Social Monitoring Unit (ESMU).  Subcomponent 3 (b). Institutional Strengthening TAs and Capacity Building training in: (i) contract Administration and Claims, (ii) financial management, (iii) procurement, (iv) environment and social management, and (v) road maintenance management. The trainings were provided mostly on the job and were a continuation of the training program of the MRB developed under the SETIDP. 1.6 Revised Components 19. There was no change made to the project components throughout the project duration. 5 1.7 Other significant changes 20. The project was restructured twice, on request of the GoSS. . The first restructuring was done to provide a one year no-cost time extension of project closing date from June 30, 2011 to June 30, 2012, which was approved on June 09, 2011. This was done in order to: (i) complete the maintenance contracts under the MRB and WFP that were slowed down during the referendum period in January 2011; (ii) continue with the provision of training and TA services to further strengthen the implementation capacity of MRB; and (iii) continue with the provision of technical support to the operationalization of the SSRA. 21. A second and final restructuring was carried out in June 2012 to permit completion of the remaining ongoing activities under Component 3 (Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building). A no-cost time extension of two months was approved on June 25, 2012, from June 30, 2012 to August 31, 2012, making the cumulative extension of 14-months. 22. During the MTR conducted in October 2010, the project implementation was assessed and the RF for the project was updated based on the findings of the MTR, with the baseline data as well as targets for the key indicators revised. The indicators that were revised during the MTR are: (i) target kilometers of roads distances executed under WFP and MRB managed contracts, and (ii) baseline average travel time on the project roads. These revisions were carried out without any formal restructuring to the project and are presented in Annex 2, Output by Components. However, no revisions were made during the two project restructurings mentioned above. 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry 23. Project Preparation. The project preparation considered situation arising out of the financial crisis in 2009 as the GoSS could not fully finance ongoing commitments in the road sector that included an outstanding amount of about US$25 million to WFP. In addition to fill the financing gap to ensure continuity of WFP activities, it was imperative to safeguard the benefits realized through prior investments under the ERRP. A lesson from the ERRP and the SETIDP road improvement programs was to move from emergency post-conflict interventions to sustainable road development where all weather road access was provided. Furthermore, the maintenance of critical roads was desirable as GoSS was committed on elections in 2010 and the referendum period in January 2011. 24. In recognizing the above lessons and considering the development plans of the GoSS and the work of development partners such as USAID (particularly in capacity building of the MRB) the project focused greatly on improving access on targeted roads in Southern Sudan while supporting the institutional capacity of MRB for strategic and project planning, construction and maintenance of roads. The project design also aimed to 6 facilitate implementation of other MDTF financed projects by opening up reliable all weather road access in targeted areas, thereby helping reduce overall transport costs. 25. The works implemented by the WFP were based on a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) for works up to a total value of US$55 million signed by MRB and WFP in May 2007. Under the SSRMP, an amended MOA was signed between MRB and WFP specific to project road works. The MRB was given opportunity to nominate counterpart engineers to work with WFP on road maintenance works in order to build their capacity in road maintenance works. This arrangement allowed WFP to closely work with the Director General (DG) for Roads and Bridges and enabled them to coordinate their activities with those of MRB. 26. Lessons learned from the previous SETIDP continued to inform the design of implementation arrangements in this project. The project was designed in such a way that both MRB and WFP were responsible for implementation of the different components. The Project Management Team (PMT) of the MRB headed by the DG of the Ministry was given the overall responsibility of managing the project, performance monitoring, and progress reporting of the project. All project components managed by MRB were implemented by the PMT under the leadership of the Deputy Director for Maintenance and Equipment. The PMT also had the responsibility to manage the capacity building of local contractors and institutional and capacity building component of the project. 27. Assessment of Project design. The project was simple in design, with components limited to maintenance works on selected trunk roads; capacity building of local contractors through labor-based maintenance works; institutional support for creating the SSRA; and TA to the MRB. The road works were spread across six out of ten states of South Sudan namely; Eastern Equatoria, Central Equatoria, Jonglei, Lakes, Warrap, and Western Bahr-el-Ghazal, The geographical spread was perceived a challenge that was mitigated by engaging WFP to manage the works on trunk roads. Government was fully committed to the project and participated in its preparation actively. The support to creating the SSRA was designed in line with the government’s vision to separate the functions of the ministry and road authority for which it was seeking parallel support from the USAID as well. The MRB had also developed a Transport Sector Policy in 2006 and a Strategic Plan for the Roads Sector. The policy and strategic plan included instituting policy and regulatory functions, roads maintenance management and implementation, revenue generation, and roads technical standards and specifications. All of this was taken into account at the design stage. 28. Risks and Mitigation. The risk assessment carried out indicated that the project would face a number of risks and classified the overall project risk as ‘Substantial’. This was due to the high fiduciary risks, a first-time new government (GoSS), and the macroeconomic framework inter alia. The assessment of risk surrounding the project was nevertheless sound. The fiduciary risks were addressed by putting in place a framework for mitigation of the high risks. These included monitoring actual expenditures by the MDTF Monitoring Agent (MA) to ensure utilization of funds for the intended purpose. 7 Project Financial Management Unit (PFMU) was given the responsibility to ensure that reliable and robust accounting system was in place, and the use of an External Audit Agent (EAA) to provide an independent assessment of the reliability of the project’s financial statements. 29. The project’s Quality-at-Entry was not reviewed by the Quality Assurance Group (QAG). 2.2 Implementation 30. The project was approved by the Bank on February 16, 2010 for a grant amount of US$40 million; the GLA was signed on March 3, 2010; and the project became effective immediately. Based on the MTR conducted in October 2010, the project implementation started quite well. Within the first seven months of effectiveness all WFP and MRB contracts were awarded and about 90 percent of the Grant was committed. The PMT and WFP worked closely, which resulted in satisfactory implementation of the project. Details of the roads and activities completed under the three components are provided in Annex 1. 31. Major Factors affecting Project Implementation. The first major challenge in the implementation of the project was the freezing of recruitment of new civil servants by the government due to the economic crisis in 2009. This greatly hindered the strengthening of the capacity of the MRB. 35 professional staffs were to be delegated responsibility for planning, supervision, and management of road construction and maintenance. However, only 18 staffs were engaged by the MRB as a result of the freeze. 32. There was also delay in the establishment of the SSRA and insufficient funds for roads maintenance due to government budgetary constraints which remained a key impediment in operationalizing the SSRA. The operationalization of the SSRA further slowed down due to protracted process for recruitment of the Senior Executive Officers, which was affected by the austerity budget in the country effected due to shut down of the oil transport through Sudan. Neither the project nor the MRB had control over the situation. Nonetheless, the capacity building support has helped to create a functional implementing entity. 33. There were other delays and disruption of works during the referendum period from December 2010 to January 2011. This led to the extension of the project closing date in order to allow sufficient time for completion of the maintenance contracts. 34. The operation and management of the project by MRB remained challenged due to staff with little or no exposure to project management and required a constant hand- holding effort by the Bank task team. Other factors that affected implementation included: (i) insecurity in some project areas, (ii) an ever increasing cost of construction and the scope of works, (iii) low construction industry capacity in Southern Sudan. This was coupled with limited financial and technical capacities of the contractors. 8 35. The project implementation has been rated as satisfactory throughout in the Implementation Status and Results Reports (ISRs). 36. The supervision of the project was not reviewed and evaluated by the QAG. 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization 37. M&E Design. At project approval a set of Outcome Indicators were identified to monitor the project outcomes. The key performance PDO level indicators and Intermediate Results Indicators at appraisal are presented in Annex 2. Adequate monitoring mechanisms and data collection instruments were identified and these are quarterly and annual progress reports with data to be collected from supervision reports, census data and project progress reports. In October 2010, during the MTR, the RF was revised but without formal restructuring to the project, with two Intermediate Results Indicator targets revised and two new Intermediate Results Indicators introduced. 38. M&E Implementation. At appraisal it was proposed that monitoring and evaluation would focus on outputs as well as measurement of results and project reporting, to be carried out by a Monitoring Agent (MA). The project design provided for the recruitment of a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) specialist to develop a framework of key input/output/outcome/impact indicators in consultation with the PMT and the Bank. Other roles of the M&E specialist included the review of implementation progress in the form of technical and social audit of roads maintained, capacity in the form of skills, and areas of training implemented covering physical and technical progress. It also covered for review of the capacity of MRB and the private sector for management and roads maintenance implementation. A detailed M&E arrangements to monitor the project’s results were prepared at appraisal. 39. The MA provided support to the project and regularly conducted field visits and submitted quarterly monitoring reports with updated details of the quarterly progress of project implementation, including a set of key performance indicators. This enabled continued and consistent monitoring of the project inputs, outputs and outcomes. The MRB also hired an M&E specialist in December 2011 to assist in the development of a framework to monitor the key performance indicators of the project and review the progress of project implementation. 40. The overall physical targets of the project remained short of achievement considering the designed targets. The primary reason was that at the MTR in October 2010 many targets were revisited and revised in the RF but were not formally recorded through the project restructuring. And the subsequent monitoring was carried out based on the revisions to the RF. This led to a difference in the achievement of numbers as reported in Annex 2, Outputs by Components. 41. M&E Utilization. At Project completion, the M&E specialist, based on field visits, prepared and delivered a monitoring framework for the MRB to apply to the downstream road sector projects, and conducted PMT staff needs assessment as well as training in 9 monitoring of maintenance projects. This framework was however not applied to the project activities as it needed further developing, which is planned under a new Bank financed project currently under implementation. 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance 42. Environmental and Social Safeguards. The project was classified as Category B, which is applied if the potential impacts on the environment are typically site-specific, reversible in nature; less adverse than those of Category A projects and for which mitigation measures can be designed more readily. At appraisal, the activities that were identified and could generate significant environmental impacts included: (i) periodic and routine road maintenance, (ii) civil works associated with repair of bridges and cross culverts, and (iii) borrow pit management. However, the impacts that were expected from these activities were assessed to be minimal and localized in nature. Borrow pits that were created due to extraction of gravel during road construction were also reinstated and spillovers along the maintained roads were tidied up. However, on sites where communities requested to use the borrow pits as ponds, the contractors shaped the pits in such a way that animals could easily move in and out thus permitting safer use by the communities. 43. The project triggered no social safeguards policies. During project implementation, MRB conducted an Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) of the roads under the project, according to Bank Policies, as National Legislation was not enacted. It was confirmed that there was no displacement of people or businesses, since no land acquisition occurred. This was because existing camp sites and borrow pits were used, and maintenance activities were restricted within the existing road width. MRB also closely followed up on creating awareness about HIV/AIDS in the project areas as well as implementation of road safety measures. 44. The MRB also prepared (with support from the Bank) a draft Environmental and Social Screening and Assessment Framework (ESSAF) for the road transport sector under this project. This document now serves as guideline for conducting ESIA, and preparation of Resettlement Action Plans (RAPs) for roads projects in South Sudan. 45. An Environmental and Social Management Unit (ESMU) was established within the PMT. The unit was supported through TA by engaging Social Safeguards and Environmental Specialists in the project. The capacity of the unit was also built through workshops and trainings arranged in the project. The Bank also worked hand-in-hand with the unit by offering guidance. The unit effectively managed the implementation of environmental and social safeguards as mentioned above. However, the unit is understaffed and requires engaging more staff in order to perform strongly in carrying out ESIAs and monitor the implementation of mitigation measures. 46. Procurement. An assessment of the procurement capacity of MRB was carried out at appraisal and concluded that the overall risk to the project was “High�. Despite the presence of a procurement agent at the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 10 (MoFEP) for about three years, there was no satisfactory capacity building in procurement. The major contracts under the project were to be executed by WFP. The PMT established under MRB was responsible for the procurement of some small value works and services under one of the road maintenance subcomponent, and local contractors’ capacity building component. The Bank provided necessary hand holding support to the PMT in conducting those procurements. Flexibility and simplicity provided under OP/BP 8.00 was suitably applied in the procurement processes. The independent procurement reviews conducted by the MA did not indicate any major deficiency in the procurement processes. 47. The MOA between WFP and MRB provided for the application of WFP procurement policies and procedures, agreed with the Bank, taking into account procurement, fraud and corruption, as well as financial management issues. The Bank had the obligation to provide an oversight on the contracts that were procured and implemented by WFP. Most of the contracts had already been awarded by the time the project was approved, and the financing from SSRMP was transferred to the WFP for implementation under the MOA. 48. Financial Management. At appraisal a Financial Management assessment was carried out to determine: (i) the adequacy of the Financial Management (FM) arrangements of the Implementing Agencies (IAs); (ii) that there should be accurate, reliable and timely preparation of the financial reports of the project; and (iii) that assets of the project would be safe guarded. It was assessed that the project was characterized by an overall weak FM system and, hence, posed a “High� risk. To ensure mitigation of the high risk and reduce the FM risk to moderate, a fiduciary framework was put in place and included: (i) monitoring the actual expenditures by the MA to ensure funds were used for the intended purpose; (ii) the responsibility to ensure reliable and robust accounting systems was given to the Project Financial Management Unit (PFMU) established for the MDTF-SS, working under the MoFEP; and (iii) selection of an External Audit Agent (EAA) to provide independent assessment of the reliability of financial statements produced for the project. However, due to events that included the national elections in April 2010 and the Southern Sudan referendum in January 2011, the overall FM risk was rated substantial. 49. In addition to the PFMU, towards the end of the project, a dedicated Financial Management Specialist (FMS) was engaged by MRB to work at the PMT with the responsibility to carry out basic accounting tasks including operating bank reconciliations, registering fixed assets, and keeping petty cash among others, as well as liaising with PFMU for disbursements. The FMS was however not involved by the PFMU in the processing of Withdrawal Applications (WA) that limited the direct monitoring ability of the PMT and resulted at times in inconsistency in reporting of the numbers by PMT and the PFMU. All Interim Financial Reports (IFRs) and the audit report for the Financial Year 2010 and 2011were prepared and submitted on time during the project duration. However, the auditor issued a disclaimer statement because the WFP implemented component was not audited by them. According to the MOA between the WFP and the MRB, the WFP implemented contracts were managed under the procedures established 11 for WFP contract as a UN Agency, and were audited accordingly under WFP institutional guidelines. The WFP audit reports were provided to the MRB separately. 50. The project performance is “Satisfactory�, and the project is almost fully disbursed. As of project closure on August 31, 2012, an amount of US$39,437 remained undisbursed under Category 2 (Works under component 1(b) and 2 of the project, Goods, Consultants’ Services, Workshops, and Training and Operating Costs under components 1(b), 2, 3 of the project). However, as all awarded contracts and operating costs were completed, the remaining amount will be cancelled once the final audits for the MDTF- SS projects are finished prior to closing of the MDTF-SS on June 30, 2013. 2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase 51. The maintenance contracts, capacity building and TA services under the project have all been completed and the MDTF-SS is closing on June 30, 2013. A new project funded by the Bank under the South Sudan Transition Trust Fund (SSTTF), the South Sudan Rural Roads Project (SSRRP), for a grant amount of US$38 million was approved on April 18, 2012, and became effective on August 1, 2012. The new operation continues to build upon the achievements made under this project with an objective to enhance all season road connectivity to high agriculture productive areas of South Sudan. It aims at rehabilitating and maintaining selected roads and supporting the institutional development at the state and national levels. The institutional development achieved under this project will be further strengthened through this follow-on project by providing TA services in Environmental Social Management Plan (ESMP) and ESIA, FM, procurement and contract management, M&E, and studies on road fund among others. All these will strengthen the various units of the PMT that will eventually form the SSRA, once operational. The capacity gained in the project shall ensure that professional engineers and technicians are available in MRB with the skills to plan, supervise, manage and execute roads maintenance activities. The studies on road fund aims at the establishment of a stable maintenance funding which has been a challenge to this project. 52. Several development partners are expressing interest in supporting to rehabilitate and maintain rural roads in South Sudan. The European Union (EU) is financing (through WFP) feeder roads projects in the Greater Bahr-el-Ghazal region of South Sudan. Similarly the Department for International Development (DfID) of United Kingdom is also financing feeder roads project in Greater Bahr-el-Ghazal. Other donors that are financing feeder roads projects or have expressed interest include USAID, the Kingdom of Netherlands, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). All of the partners are working with the MRB as the lead ministry for roads working to improve and constantly enhance the institutional capacity built under this project and the SETIDP. 12 3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation 53. The project objectives, design and implementation were highly relevant to the development priorities of the GoSS. The project objectives were in line with the Transport Sector Policy developed by the Ministry of Transport and Roads (now MRB) in 2006 and a Strategic Plan for the road sector. The objectives of the policy and strategic plan were to facilitate the establishment of firm institutional arrangements for policy and regulatory functions, management and implementation of the development and maintenance of roads, revenue generation, provision and efficient management for roads maintenance financing, and setting technical standards and specifications for the various classes of road network. These development priorities have linkage with PDO, design and implementation of the project. The maintenance of the selected trunk roads, capacity building of the local contractors, and the institutional strengthening and capacity building of the MRB enabled to keep the roads in service, continued to foster local capacity among small sized contractors still in infancy, and created the institutional structures and capacity to develop and manage the road network. MRB is a new government institution with limited capacity in discharging its responsibilities and needed support to manage the road network. There was clear linkage between the project components and project development objectives. Component 1 of the project included the restoration and rehabilitation works on the critical main roads which is PDO indicator 1. The project provided support towards the formation of the SSRA which is aimed at ensuring a sustainable maintenance of the road network. The project also contributed to the higher level objectives of the ISN of March 2008 by improving access to markets, services, and governance in the road sector. 54. The project’s design included relevant global priorities such as road safety and combating HIV/AIDS. The road safety management is relevant to the UN Decade of Action for Road Safety Improvement. Combating HIV/AIDS through creating awareness and public campaigns are also indeed relevant to the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives 55. The project objectives were substantially achieved. For evaluation of the achievement of the PDO, the project uses the PDO stated in the FPP. 56. The project’s development objective of improving access and quality of targeted roads and strengthening the capacity for strategic and project planning, construction and maintenance of roads has been substantially achieved on basis of the following achievements. 57. The maintenance activities were fully completed and about 1,424 km of roads were maintained and are in use. 13 58. The travel time reduction was fully achieved and the average travel time on the improved roads upon completion was about 2.0 hours compared to 4.0 hours at the beginning of the interventions. 59. The project facilitated in provision of reliable transport services for the population living within the influence area of the road corridors. Furthermore, the maintenance contracts created employment opportunities for about 1,270 people. It also contributed to the sustainable employment and business for about 1,000 vehicle operators. The cost of inputs for development undertakings was very high as a result of the road conditions. The support provided to the road maintenance activities under this intervention helped in the reduction of the transport costs. 60. The project has significantly contributed to the otherwise low institutional capacity building of the MRB. The MRB and PMT have acquired experience in the procurement, contract management and environmental and social management of maintenance contracts. During project preparation it was anticipated that 35 professional staff would be engaged and delegated responsibilities by MRB for planning, supervision and management of construction and maintenance of roads. However, due to economic crisis that affected the international oil prices, the government froze the recruitment of civil servants. Therefore, MRB could not hire additional staff due to budgetary restrictions beyond their control. This resulted in only 18 MRB staff to obtain on-the-job training as envisaged under the project. Despite this challenge, the support aimed at capacity building of the MRB was achieved. The project also contributed to the development of the local construction industry through the involvement of five local contractors in labor based maintenance contracts. 61. The bill for enacting the South Sudan Roads Authority (the new name for the SSRA) was passed by the national legislature in January 2011. The Board for the SSRA was inaugurated in August 2011 and the operationalization of the authority is still in progress. The Executive Director of the SSRA has been recruited, and the organization structure for the SSRA has been agreed. Recruitment of the senior officers is in progress though at a very slow pace due to above stated financial crises. The establishment of the SSRA will ensure that the development and maintenance of the road network in South Sudan will be effectively and sustainably managed. Nevertheless, it is recognized that the continuation provided by the project that built upon the SETIDP towards the creation of the procurement, contract management, finance management, environmental and social assessment, and maintenance management units will serve as foundational once the SSRA becomes functional. 3.3 Efficiency 62. There was no detailed economic analysis conducted for the project during preparation given the emergency nature of the operation. The project has been successful and efficiently implemented as a result of the achievement of the development objectives. The economic returns of gravel road maintenance projects are generally high. However, 14 the effect of the interventions, if not succeeded quickly by a new routine or periodic maintenance/improvement, would deteriorate faster thereby eroding those returns. 63. All the project activities were implemented and completed within budget. The key physical works were completed within a short period of time. Both the works and services delivered during the project have helped in achieving the purpose of improving key road corridors, strengthening the capacity of the MRB, and building the capacity of local contractors through labor based contracts. The process of creating procurement, contract management, finance management, environmental and social assessment, and maintenance management units that will eventually form part of the SSRA was completed under this project. The PMT acquired experience in procurement and contract management of maintenance contracts. 64. Value for Money Assessment. The Monitoring Agent (MA) for the MDTF-SS carried out a Value for Money (VfM) assessment in October 2012 to determine whether the Works and Consultants’ Services met the three dimensions of economy, efficiency and effectiveness. The contracts that were assessed are the labor-based road maintenance works of the Torit – Katire road and the consultancy services of the Environmental Management Specialist. A conclusion was then drawn from the analysis of these two contracts. The assessment was carried out on the following basis: (i) relevance of inputs to the project’s outputs; (ii) efficacy of financial management processes; (iii) appropriateness of inputs; (iv) value of procurement process; (v) pricing of inputs; (vi) how inputs were used; (vii) whether inputs contributed to tangible outputs; (viii) actual/potential attributable contribution of output(s) to project’s planned outcome(s); and (ix) the actual/potential attributable contribution of each output(s) to the project’s impact(s). The assessment confirmed that (i) the contracts were within the approved budget with payments being consistent as in contract provisions, and procurement processes were transparent and competitive; (ii) actual outputs of budgeted activities matched the expected outputs; and (iii) activities contributed to the achievement of the project objective. The assessment concluded that the overall VfM performance of the contracts was fully achieved. An example of the VfM is presented in Annex 3. 65. Unit Cost Comparative Analysis. The maintenance cost for all the works contracts including supervision services was estimated at about US$35.225 million at appraisal. This cost was to cover maintenance of 1,771 km of road length. At completion, the cost increased to US$35.953 million which covered a distance of 1,424 km. The rise in costs is about 2 percent despite the drop in road lengths maintained. This is mainly attributed to deterioration of the road network at the time of maintenance hence increased scope of works/quantities. However, the increase in cost was within the budget of the project, hence no cost overruns. 66. Under component 1 (WFP and MRB roads) of the project, the average appraisal unit cost per km for all the contracts was US$22,854. At completion, the actual unit cost per km increased to US$29,960. The increment in unit cost from appraisal to completion is therefore 31 percent. This is a significant increase and indicates that cost and/or quantity estimates at appraisal were underestimated. Similarly, under component 2 (labor 15 based roads), the average appraisal unit cost per km for all the contracts was US$11,330. The actual unit cost per km at completion was US$13,368 representing a rise of 18 percent. This increase can as well be attributed to underestimation of costs and/or quantities at appraisal. 67. For a comparative analysis in the absence of any other road maintenance cost data in South Sudan, the ICR team considered unit costs for similar completed works under the previous SETIDP. 575 km of road length was maintained under the SETIDP from October 2006 to December 2007 at a cost of US$6.409 million. The unit cost per km was therefore US$11,246. The comparative analysis with similar SSRMP interventions (component 1) clearly indicates that the actual comparative increment at completion of SSRMP was US$18,714 representing an increase of 166 percent over a period of 4.5 years from December 2007 to June 2012. 68. The above implies that the average unit cost increase in South Sudan per year over the period stated was about 37 percent. This is a very significant annual increment, and clearly indicates that between completion of the projects under the ERRP and the SETIDP till the time those were maintained again under the SSRMP, the roads condition had actually deteriorated to a great extent. As such the interventions under the SSRMP came very timely to ensure sustainability of the previous investments and the quality of access on targeted roads. The unit cost analysis table is presented in Annex 3. 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 69. The project objectives, design, implementation, and outcomes were highly relevant to South Sudan’s development priorities and country circumstances as defined in its ISN. The operation’s PDOs were broadly achieved, i.e. it improved the access and quality of targeted roads in Southern Sudan by restoring the critical main roads (1,424 km) to a maintainable condition, resulting in reduction of travel time to half, on project roads; and strengthened, to some extent, the capacity for strategic and project planning, construction and maintenance of roads through technical training, developing maintenance planning, budgeting and management practices (see also Section 3.2). Despite the substantial achievement of the targets for the improvement of the overall road network, the intermediate outcome targets for the road maintenance work financed under the project were not revised during the restructuring to reflect the reduction of the road lengths that were carried out by other partners, including the government. As such, the project was not able to meet the road maintenance targets as set at approval. The project was also not able to meet the target number of professional staff at MRB with delegated responsibilities for planning, supervision and management of roads construction and maintenance. This was due to the economic crisis in 2009 and the government freeze on recruitment of civil servants, making the Ministry unable to hire more staff. It is in this context that the rating is kept as “Moderately Satisfactory�. 16 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development 70. Poverty Impacts. The project other than enabling provision of reliable and cheaper transport services (reduced transportation time directly helps in reducing prices of commodities and increases trade activities) for the population living within the influence areas of the road corridors, enabled the maintenance contracts to create direct employment for about 1,270 people. Furthermore, the improvement of roads has contributed to sustainable employment and businesses for about 1,000 vehicle operators. This therefore can be directly attributed towards helping enhance the interconnectivity boosting local economy and supporting in overall poverty reduction. 71. Gender Aspects. The project had focus on capacity development of females to enhance their skills and efforts were directed towards improvement of the capacity of women in the implementing institution. Female technicians were trained in carrying out road maintenance and construction supervision, material testing inter alia. A female staff at MRB was also able to specialize in maintenance, procurement, environment and management. The capacity of the staff was built through trainings, workshops and TA services. Based on 2008 South Sudan Census findings, out of the population living in the influence area of the improved road corridors, the proportion of females are 48 percent. 72. Social Development. The Project enabled the provision of improved access to schools, administrative centers, health centers, and markets, as well as facilitated business activities along the improved road corridors for the main beneficiaries of the project. Since the maintenance activities were contained within the existing road widths and alignments, and existing borrow pits and camp sites were used, the project did not have negative impact on human settlements. This is because there was no land acquisition and no displacement of human settlement or removal of livelihood of the direct beneficiaries to the project. The use of borrow pits as ponds after completion of maintenance works enabled the direct beneficiaries to safely provide water for their cattle and other uses for the community. The creation of awareness about HIV/AIDS in the project areas also provided the main beneficiaries with knowledge on mitigation measures of the disease. Furthermore, road safety management plans were implemented during the project which benefited the beneficiaries from reduced accidents and injuries. (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening 73. The project has significantly contributed to the institutional capacity building of MRB and private local contractors which is critical for the long term sustainability of the road network in South Sudan. The institutional changes resulting from the project are as follows. 74. MRB Project Management Team. The PMT that was created under the first SETIDP has acquired notable experience in the procurement, contract management and environmental and social management of maintenance contracts. The engineers assigned by MRB to work with WFP were given the opportunity to gain knowledge and skills 17 infield implementation activities. Therefore, the capacity of the assigned staff (including those directly under the ministry) was built in areas such as road maintenance execution, contract management and administration, and resource allocation among others. The PMT is a precursor to the SSRA and all the trained staff would ultimately transition into the Road Authority. The project also contributed to the development of the local construction industry through the involvement of five local contractors in labor based maintenance contracts. 75. Dedicated Safeguards Unit. An ESMU was established within the PMT. The main objective of the ESMU was to ensure the application of environmental and social management guidelines and best road development and maintenance practices and to coordinate between MRB, WFP, Supervising Consultants and Contractors, and the governmental Environmental Agency on the effective implementation and monitoring of environmental and social safeguard measures for road sector projects. 76. Initiation of the SSRA. The SSRA was established in January 2011 through an Act of Parliament and the Board for the SSRA was inaugurated in August 2011 while the operationalization of the Authority remains in progress. The Executive Director of the SSRA has been recruited and the organization structure for the Authority has been agreed. Recruitment of the senior officers is slow as explained earlier due to the financial crises. The operationalization of the SSRA will be a breakthrough in having a lead institution that would help to ensure that the development and maintenance of the road network in South Sudan will be managed effectively and sustainably. (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts 77. The extraction of gravel during road construction resulted in the creation of borrow pits along the roads. On some sites, communities requested to use the borrow pits as ponds, and therefore contractors shaped the pits in such a way that animals could easily move in and out and as such permitted safer use by the communities. 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops 78. Not Applicable. 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Substantial 79. The project activities are all completed with a concerted support of the TAs and the Bank to the MRB, which managed well the implementation process, and the capacity risk is not as high as expected at approval. The capacity constraints of MRB were tackled by the capacity building activities, which require continuity. Sustainability of the project remains a challenge given the lack of budgetary allocation for road maintenance by the GoSS. The roads maintained under the project were deteriorating already in 2012 at the time of ICR preparation, as there was no government funding for follow-on regular routine maintenance since the project financed contracts were completed. The situation is 18 worsened by the current austerity measures due to the oil production shutdown in early 2012, following disagreement between South Sudan and Sudan. The country level risk is expected to remain “High� as the security situation destabilizes. This mainly comprises the conflict in the border areas with Sudan and conflicts between ethnic groups in some parts of the country. All of the above will contribute in hampering the expected outcome of the project vis-à-vis the road maintenance, sustaining the built capacity, and the operationalization of the SSRA. Hence, risk to the development outcome is rated “Substantial�. 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Satisfactory 80. The project design was highly relevant to the development priorities of the GoSS. Given that improvement of roads was among the top priorities of the GoSS, the maintenance of critical roads was desirable at the time of project preparation. The project design was further supported by the strategies proposed by JAM which included capacity building, training and project preparation by developing implementation structures that facilitate sufficient high financial and procurement standards, as well as enable execution of labor-based road works. 81. The project design adequately provided arrangements for ensuring fiduciary compliance of the project during implementation. Given the weak fiduciary systems in South Sudan, a fiduciary framework was put in place under the MDTF-SS for all its projects. That ensured that the project financial and procurement systems were adequate to manage the project funds and meeting the Bank guidelines. Furthermore, the project also provided for monitoring and evaluation arrangements to ensure focus on outputs and results. 82. The Bank carried out an efficient risk assessment and identified adequate mitigations measures at entry. A comprehensive risk mitigation plan for use during the project implementation was designed and discussed with the Borrower during project preparation. Given the project’s overall substantial risk at appraisal adequate mitigation measures were put in place at entry. This includes institutional development of the Borrower which was a continuation of the program carried out under SETIDP. (b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Satisfactory 83. The supervision of the project was done by a country-based Task Team with a well-balanced skills mix. The team provided hands-on support during project implementation to the PMT who had low capacity in executing activities of a road maintenance project. Implementation of the project started quite well with all works contracts awarded (except the labor-based) within the first seven months and about 90 19 percent of the Grant committed. The Bank task team provided significant support to the project on all the components including cross cutting issues such as HIV/AIDS awareness and implementation of Road Safety measures. There was intensive support from the Bank fiduciary specialists which resulted in satisfactory performance of the project in both Financial Management (FM) and Procurement. Supervision missions were promptly conducted and aide-memoires were prepared which provided highlights on key issues and follow-up actions to both the client and the Bank’s management. 84. The project was extended twice, first by one year from June 30, 2011 to June 30, 2012 and second for two months from June 30, 2012 to August 31, 2012. The first extension was to complete the implementation of the project activities and achieve its development objectives. During the time of first extension the procurement of most of the activities had been completed and the works activities largely completed. The second and final extension was carried out to permit completion of the ongoing capacity building activities. 85. The Bank task team though assessed the key targets at the MTR in October 2010, however, overlooked revising the RF formally to restructure the project. This omission was to reflect the reduction in length of roads implemented by other partners and the government. As such, all the targets remained the same throughout the period of implementation. The changes to targets should have been reported and revised through restructuring. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 86. Given the services and support provided by the Bank at both entry and supervision of the project, the overall performance rating for the Bank is assessed as ‘Moderately Satisfactory’. This is based on the shortfall in road distances completed and lesser number of government staff trained which were not formally revised through restructuring. 5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 87. The government was committed in implementing institutional changes in the roads sector by establishing the SSRA through the Act of Parliament in January 2011. This was the first major step taken by the government in recognizing the need for an agency solely responsible for roads. However, there has been a delay by the government in recruitment of senior officers affected lately by budget restrictions due to the austerity measures adopted in 2012. Therefore, the delay in setting up the SSRA and lack of sufficient budget for roads maintenance remains a major challenge for sustainably managing the roads network. 20 88. The freeze on the recruitment of civil servants greatly hampered the achievement of capacity building of staff at the MRB. This was again due to the financial crisis GoSS faced during the project. The MRB could not hire targeted staff as such. The government was also going through multiple country-level challenges that continued to distract its attention from the developmental needs of the Country. Those included the elections in April 2010, the Referendum for Independence in January 2011, and then declaration of the Independence of South Sudan from Sudan on July 9, 2011. 89. Based on the commitments, failure to setup and operationalize the SSRA, freezing of the recruitment of civil servants and lack of sufficient funds for roads maintenance, the government’s performance is rated as ‘Moderately Satisfactory’. The assessment of rating however recognizes that the government was committed to the project but was limited by the austerity budget. (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Satisfactory 90. The MRB (through the PMT) and WFP were the IAs for the project. Despite the limited capacity in terms of managerial and technical skills, MRB was focused on implementing the project activities. WFP had been repairing roads in South Sudan through the ERRP (prior to signing of the 2005 CPA) since 2003. The project implementation started quite well with no delays and all project components were successfully completed with no cost overruns. The Financial Management System (FMS) was adequate for the project activities and the FM responsibilities were managed by the PFMU hosted in the MoFEP with payments promptly made in all contracts. All financial reports were timely prepared. At project closure the MRB was able to improve the capacity of their staff through trainings, workshops and the TAs. Based on these achievements despite the challenges faced by the IAs, the performance rating for the MRB and WFP is rated as ‘Satisfactory’. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 91. The overall performance of the Borrower is rated as ‘Moderately Satisfactory’ due to government failure to provide sufficient funds for road maintenance and staff hiring. 6. Lessons Learned 92. The project has contributed to addressing the principal challenges of capacity limitation to deliver results in the post conflict and newly emerging country. On the positive count, the PMT of MRB has acquired experience in applying Bank procurement procedures, and managing contracts. The project was implemented in a record time of two years owing to the contribution of the overall capacity development efforts made under the MDTF-SS and other development partners’ supported projects. A number of lessons are to be learnt from this project, and those are as follows: 21 93. Fiscal Constraints, Road Financing and Institutions. The project continued to experience insufficient government financing in road sector to jump start its institutional development. Despite its commitment, due to budgetary constraints and other country- level challenges, the flow of funds for road maintenance (from the government during the project period) had to compete with emergency and security roads construction and had always been minimal compared to the needs. This calls for a major initiative by the GoSS in approaching various traditional and non-traditional donors currently within and outside of South Sudan around the Globe. The MRB has to prepare a vision and a road-map of the road sector development in South Sudan to support such an initiative that can lead to the establishment of a stable and sustainable road sector financing scheme. The MRB also needs to complete the operationalization of the SSRA to ensure sustainability of the investments in a methodical and institutionalized manner. 94. Balancing financial resource and physical targets. The roads in South Sudan are in poor condition and repairing a road and making it serviceable involves substantial cost. During implementation, the IAs had to improvise and reprioritize the bill of quantity items and revise bill of quantities several times to cover a given contract length within the original contract amount. Some contracts had to concentrate only on spot improvements at the worst sections, and perform light maintenance on the other sections or shorten the length or contracts before reaching the designated end lengths. This however resulted to lesser coverage of some road distances and implies that adequate funding is required to repair the road network and bring it to maintainable condition if physical targets are to be met. 95. Project Duration. The project effectiveness date was March 3, 2010 while the initial closing was June 30, 2011 which was later revised twice to finally close the project on August 31, 2012. The initial closing date as well as the two revisions was constrained due to the closing date of the MDTF-SS that was also extended twice during project implementation. The project duration is too short to enable all the capacity building and institutional strengthening activities to take its roots within such timeline and does not allow for a longer term planning of activities and support. 96. Deployment of UN Agencies for Emergency Road Works. The engagement of WFP was helpful in fast tracking the emergency repair and maintenance works and providing on-the-job training on supervision of works contracts. Going forward however, as the country moves out of the emergency phase into regular contracting environment, there is a need to support the development of local contracting industry to independently participate and execute projects under Bank financing as in other developing countries. 97. Use of Innovative Longer-term Contracting. Applying innovative and cost saving methods, including contracting road improvement works under Output and Performance-based Road Contracting (OPRC) and/or contracting maintenance works for multiple of years is an option that should be practiced in such fragile post-conflict country environments to ensure continued maintenance on the classified roads. This is 22 vital in situations where there are no appropriate measures put in place for road maintenance funding. 98. Balancing the role of the MRB vis-à-vis the Ministry of Transport (MOT). The new arrangement for the transport sector calls for close coordination between the two ministries – the MRB and the separate MOT, in order to promote integrated sector level policies and legislations, as well as, creating synergy between the functions of the two institutions. MOT shall be vested with the responsibility of developing and promoting integrated transport policy and maintaining synergy among the different modes, in particular between river transport and roads in the marshlands while MRB will be steering the development of the roads. It is also suggested that the two ministries establish a joint forum for consultations on cross transport sector issues and coordination of sector-wide policy development and implementation. MRB and SSRA may have overlapping responsibility and their roles and mandate have to be clearly defined. MRB is suggested to focus on policy, overall strategy and program formulation for the road sector development and oversee the development of the roads network, while SSRA primarily concentrates on maintenance planning and management of roads improvement projects. 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Grantee/Implementing Agencies/Donors (a) Grantee/Implementing agencies None (b) Cofinanciers/Donors None (c) Other partners and stakeholders None 23 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing (a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent) Actual/Latest Appraisal Estimate Percentage of Components Estimate (USD (USD millions) Appraisal millions) Component1(a) - Road 26.00 26.00 100% Maintenance by WFP Component 1(b) - Road Maintenance by the Ministry of 10.00 9.82 98.2% Transport and Roads (now MRB) Component 2 - Labor Based Contractors Capacity 2.50 2.97 118.8% building Component 3-Institutional Strengthening and 1.30 1.17* 90% Capacity Building Total Baseline Cost 39.80 39.96 Physical Contingencies 0.00 0.00 Price Contingencies 0.20 0.00 Total Project Costs 40.00 39.96 Project Preparation Costs 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Total Financing Required 40.00 39.96 99.90% Notes: 1. An undisbursed amount of US$39,437.65 was cancelled in January 2013. 2. [*] Bank charges on Designated Account (DA), about US$ 20,000, added here considered part of operational costs. (b) Financing Appraisal Actual/Latest Type of Estimate Estimate Percentage of Source of Funds Cofinancing (USD (USD Appraisal millions) millions) Trust Funds 0.00 0.00 Multi-donor Trust Fund for South 40.00 39.96 99.90% Sudan 24 SOUTHERN SUDAN ROADS MAINTENANCE PROJECT Detailed Breakdown of Project Cost by Activities Original Contract Revised Contract Final Account COMPONENT Budget item description Value Variation/Adendum Value Start Date Completion Date Valuation US $ US $ US$ US $ Component 1- Road Maintenance Part 1 (a) WFP Implemented inclding Mgt fee 26,000,000.00 CONTRACTORS Nadapal - Kapoeta, 90 km, GTZ-IS 1,722,397.50 1,722,397.50 5/3/2010 1/3/2011 1,722,397.50 Kapoeta - Torit, 140 km, GTZ-IS 2,486,408.10 200,000.00 2,686,408.10 5/3/2010 7/15/2011 2,686,408.00 Torit - Nesitu, 110 km, GTZ-IS 2,108,115.60 200,000.00 2,308,115.60 10/15/2010 6/15/2011 2,308,115.60 Yei - Juba (1), 80 km, Civicon 2,891,949.90 2,891,949.90 3/31/2010 11/3/2010 2,886,626.00 Yei - Juba (2), 33 km, Civicon 1,003,595.40 1,003,595.40 10/15/2010 4/28/2011 1,003,211.02 Yei River Bridge 378,847.00 378,847.00 1/17/2011 4/17/2011 365,000.00 Juba - Bor (1), 158 km, GTZ-IS 3,055,680.00 300,000.00 3,355,680.00 6/25/2010 6/9/2011 3,355,642.72 Juba - Bor (2), 35 km, Civicon 678,794.70 678,794.70 10/15/2010 3/15/2012 678,794.70 Rumbek - Wau, 225 km, Civicon 4,589,400.24 220,000.00 4,809,400.24 7/20/2010 10/31/2011 4,809,400.24 Loming Junction - Imehejek, 65 km, GTZ-IS 1,383,201.60 1,383,201.60 10/15/2010 7/31/2011 1,383,201.60 SUPERVISION Nadapal - Kapoeta, WFP/MTR 291,656.00 291,656.00 291,656.00 Kapoeta - Torit, WFP/MTR 322,356.63 322,356.63 322,356.63 Torit - Nesitu, WFP/MTR 305,390.84 305,390.84 305,390.84 Yei-Juba (1), Norken Ltd 206,475.00 206,475.00 3/31/2010 12/31/2010 206,475.00 Yei-Juba (2), WFP/MTR 214,904.67 214,904.67 214,904.67 Juba - Bor (1), CODA 276,950.00 276,950.00 4/19/2010 3/18/2011 276,950.00 Juba - Bor (2), WFP/MTR 214,904.67 214,904.67 214,904.67 Rumbek - Wau, Katahira 363,697.30 363,697.30 7/20/2010 7/20/2011 363,697.30 Loming Junction - Imehejek, WFP/MTR 276,306.00 276,306.00 276,306.00 WFP overhead costs and fees 2,363,000.00 2,363,000.00 2,363,000.00 WFP own-incured expenses (NOT PART OF PROJECT FUNDS) (34,438.49) Sub-total WFP 25,134,031.15 920,000.00 26,054,031.15 26,000,000.00 Part 1 (b) MTR Implemented 10,000,000.00 CONTRACTORS Payii Roads and Bridges Co. Ltd - Kajo Keji - Juba Road, 150 km 3,100,356.80 (14,636.80) 3,085,720.00 9/8/2010 4/30/2012 2,891,173.14 Kirinyaga Construction (K) Ltd - Kaya - Yei Road, 85 km 3,680,938.64 (1,144,110.24) 2,536,828.40 9/7/2010 9/20/2011 2,715,594.70 Kirinyaga Construction (K) Ltd - Yei - Rasolo Road, 150 km 2,529,384.64 950,949.76 3,480,334.40 9/8/2010 9/20/2011 3,360,244.51 SUPERVISION Comptran Engineering Co. Ltd 516,750.00 334,200.00 850,950.00 10/7/2010 4/30/2012 850,950.00 Sub-total MTR 9,827,430.08 126,402.72 9,953,832.80 9,817,962.35 Sub-total Maintenance 34,961,461.23 1,046,402.72 36,007,863.95 35,817,962.35 Component 2- Local Contractors Capacity Building 2,500,000.00 Rhino Stars Suppliers & Construction Co. Ltd Bor - Baidit Road 363,086.32 300,457.92 663,544.24 3/31/2011 667,188.15 Ms Community Agency for Research & Development Ras Olo - Farak Sika Mambe Road 241,010.00 196,655.97 437,665.97 3/31/2011 432,741.50 Ms Eco Builders Ltd Katire - Torit Road 421,216.26 165,322.58 586,538.84 3/31/2011 583,925.12 Ladu & Brothers Co. Ltd Kergulu - Morobo Road 749,032.26 180,789.35 929,821.61 3/31/2011 890,171.01 Pashong for Investment Company Ltd - Rumbek - Akot Raod 403,974.79 (192,485.28) 211,489.51 3/31/2011 180,532.26 Majuch Akech Anyar Ayom - Supervision of Bor - Baidit Road 17,543.88 17,543.88 3/31/2011 10,210.53 Inyani Anjelous Lagu Kenyi - Supervision of Torit - Katire Road 28,333.33 28,333.33 3/31/2011 11,666.66 Lomoro Joseph Bakhit - Supervision of Kergulu - Morobo Road 40,000.00 40,000.00 3/31/2011 40,874.02 Victor Tom Ofere - Supervision of Road 23,000.02 23,000.02 3/31/2011 16,333.34 Luke Thomas Oluhuya - Supervision work 5,333.33 5,333.33 3/31/2011 5,333.33 Leru Moses Muyang - Data collection & Supervision work 4,098.36 4,098.36 8,196.72 8,250.65 Bosco Leru D.Wani - Data collection & Supervision work 4,098.36 4,098.36 8,196.72 8,250.65 Flora P. Lohitei - Data collection & Supervision work 4,098.36 4,098.36 8,196.72 8,370.85 Aduot Madit Ansiem Ijuong - Data collection & Supervision work 4,666.67 4,666.67 4,645.16 Christina Luba Jomo Mike 16,071.43 16,071.43 11,430.90 COWI Ltd 71,587.50 71,587.50 62,927.86 Docks Investment Supplies Co. Ltd 26,800.00 26,800.00 26,800.00 Sub-total 2,423,950.87 3,086,986.49 2,969,651.99 Component 3- Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building 1,500,000.00 Workshop and Training and Operation Costs 133,702.25 133,702.25 417,538.08 Hisham Taher M. Al-Labadi (Training Consultant) 22,000.00 22,000.00 21,747.00 Rita Ohene Sarfoh 115,500.00 115,500.00 115,496.00 Dr. Koojo Charles Amooti 5,883.00 5,883.00 5,883.00 Ibanda Henry Emmanuel 71,955.00 20,469.00 92,424.00 91,023.71 Luke Obiri Okemwa 74,250.00 23,537.00 97,787.00 96,386.75 Kamanga Crispus Gachara 81,200.00 81,200.00 79,231.57 Ayisa Investment Co. Ltd (Supply of office & I.T Equipment) 66,250.00 66,250.00 66,250.00 Intersat - Internet Connection 23,445.00 23,445.00 30,945.00 East African Motor Mart 133,725.00 133,725.00 133,725.00 Tumu Consulting 87,750.00 87,750.00 87,750.00 Sub-total 815,660.25 859,666.25 1,145,976.11 Grand Total 38,201,072.35 39,954,516.69 39,933,590.45 25 Annex 2. Outputs by Component Baseline Target Project At Appraisal Revised at At Appraisal Revised at Project Outcome Actual Development 10/06/2009 MTR but not 10/06/2009 MTR but not ICR Remarks Indicators Output Objective Restructured Restructured 10/15/2010 10/15/2010 (i) improve 1. Increase in 1,600 km in 1,600 km 3,371 km of 3,129 km 3,024 km The baseline target was to access and critical main roads maintainable roads in of roads maintain 1,771 km of road length. quality of restored to condition maintainable maintained The lengths of the maintained targeted roads maintainable condition roads were;(i) overestimated by in Southern condition 133 km; (ii) another 105 km could Sudan, not be repaired due to funds shortage; and,(iii) about 109 km were taken up for maintenance by other partners. Therefore, the actual length of roads contracted was 1,529 km of which actual maintained was 1,424 km. 2. Average Travel 4.0 4.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 The travel time has been time reduction on continuously reducing on project roads (hrs.) completed project roads. 3. Direct project 0 0 No target Not revised 395,283 This number was miscalculated in beneficiaries figure in FPP. (48%) the last ISR of Aug 2012 as (number), of 455,810 is the 666,800 (48%). The error in which female estimated calculation was detected at the (percentage) population ICR stage and correctly estimated based on the as reported in this table, i.e., appraisal 395,283 (48%) of the actual road length of 1,771 length maintained (1,424 km). km This number represents people 26 living within 2 km distance from the roads maintained under the project 4. Indirect project 0 0 No target Not Revised 1,270 These are the transport operators beneficiaries figure in FPP who gained sustainable (number), of employment or businesses and which female workers employed during the (percentage) maintenance period (ii) Strengthen About 35 New New 35 Not Revised 18 MRB was not able to increase the the capacity professional staff number of staff as initially for strategic delegated the planned due to freeze on hire of and project responsibility for civil servants by the government planning, planning, following the economic crisis. construction supervision and and management of maintenance construction and of roads. maintenance of roads by the Ministry of Transport and Roads; 27 Component 1: Road Maintenance Baseline Target Intermediate Revised at Revised at Intermediate At Results At Appraisal MTR but not MTR but not Actual Output ICR Remarks Results Appraisal Indicators 10/06/2009 Restructured Restructured 10/06/2009 10/15/2010 10/15/2010 Road 1. Roads Planned Not Revised 1,054 km 922 km 848 km of roads were The RF targets were maintenance maintained under roads heavily of roads maintained by WFP. revised to 922 km at on selected WFP contract-non deteriorated maintained Maintenance of Nadapal MTR in October 2010 trunk roads rural (km) – Kapoeta 90 km but were not formally completed in January recorded through 2011, Kapoeta – Torit project restructuring. In 108 km completed in July the end, only 848 km 2011, Torit – Nesitu out of the planned (Juba) 110 km completed 1,054 km was achieved. in June 2011, Yei – Juba As such, keeping the 113 km completed in original plan, about 206 April 2011, Juba – Bor km of road length could 151 km completed in not be done due to March 2012, Rumbek – inadequate funds; Tonj – Wau 233 km Overestimated road completed in October length of about 97 km; 2011, and Loming 109 km implemented Junction – Imehejek 43 by other partners km completed in July 2011. 2. Roads Planned Not revised 495 km 385 km 354 km of roads have 354 km out of the maintained under roads heavily been maintained. planned 495 km was the Ministry of deteriorated Maintenance of Kaya – achieved. 141 km of Transport and Yei 85 km completed in road length could not Roads contract- September 2011, Yei – be completed due to non rural (km) Rasolo 140 km completed inadequate funds in September 2011, and 28 Kajo Keji – Juba 129 km completed in April 2012. 3. Roads Planned Not revised 222 km Not revised 222 km of feeder roads All contracts were maintained under roads in poor have been maintained implemented by local labor based condition through labor based contractors in order to contracts – non contracts. Maintenance of train and enhance their rural (km) Kegulu-Morobo 77 km capacity in road completed in March maintenance. 2012, Torit-Katire 45 km completed in June 2012, Rumbek Akot 40 km completed in March 2012, Rasolo-Faraksika Mambe 25 km completed in June 2011, and Bor- Baidit 35 km completed in June 2011. 4. HIV/AIDS - New Indicator - 63 (48%) 63 (48%) At MTR of October awareness 2010, this new campaign to indicator was project workers introduced and the and communities baseline number of 63 nearby contractors existing at that time camp - (number) was adopted for M&E. of which women This number remained (percentage) unchanged at completion. 29 Component 2: Local Contractors Capacity Building Intermediate Intermediate Results Baseline Target Actual ICR Remarks Results Indicators At Appraisal Revised at At Appraisal Revised at Output 10/06/2009 MTR but not 10/06/2009 MTR but restructured not 10/15/2010 restructured 10/15/2010 Capacity building 5. Local labor based - New Indicator N/A 5 Five (5) contracts of local contractors (Number), of were awarded to local contractors which female contractors labor based (percentage) contractors and works are completed totaling to 222 km of roads. Component 3: Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building Intermediate Results Intermediate Results Baseline Target Actual ICR Remarks Indicators Output At Revised at At Appraisal Revised at Appraisal MTR but 10/06/2009 MTR but 10/06/2009 not not restructured restructured 10/15/2010 10/15/2010 Technical Assistance to the 6. Maintenance Very low New Fully Yes Yes Maintenance Ministry of Transport and planning, budgeting (Yes) budget is still a Roads and support for the and management constraint establishment of the SSRA practices in place (Yes/No) 30 7. Ministry of 0 New 35 Not revised 18(1) MRB was not able Transport and Roads to increase the professional staff number of staff as specialized in initially planned maintenance, due to freeze on procurement, hire of civil Environment and servants by the Social management government (Number) of which following the female staff (Number) economic crisis. 8. Technicians 0 New 85 Not revised 30(5) MRB was not able Trained in carrying to increase the out road maintenance number of staff as and construction initially planned supervision, material due to freeze on testing, etc.(Number) hire of civil of which female staff servants by the (Number) government following the economic crisis. 9. The Environment Partial (Yes) ESMU not Fully Yes Fully and Social Monitoring properly achieved Unit (ESMU) is staffed and functional and staffed functional with appropriate expertise (Yes/No) 10. ESAF is Partial (Yes) New Fully Yes Yes MRB has prepared adopted for the an updated ESSAF transport sector. as part of the new (Yes/No) South Sudan Rural Roads Project 31 11. MRB delegated PMT New Ministry of Yes Yes MRB has the authority as a responsible Transport and established a Procuring Entity, with for Roads/MRB as Procurement a Procurement processing Procuring Committee Committee and a Entity with functional Procurement Procurement Unit. Committee (Yes/No) Yes 12. SSRA Bill Draft Draft Bill Ministry of Yes SSRA SSRA established accepted as basis for Legislative under review Transport and established by act of road asset Bill Roads/MRB parliament. MRB management with Core Units core project Ministry of Transport implementation functioning and Roads core units units functioning as as PMT trained by project in place (Yes/No) functioning under SSRA Yes 32 Annex 3. Efficiency Related Analyses Table 1: Value for Money Performance of Sampled project Activities Sampled Activity: Torit – Katire Road Type of Budgeted amount Contract Payments Work delivered so far Payment % activity (USD) amount as a made so far (description) as a multiple % of (USD) of work budgeted delivered % amount Works 450,000 130% 583,925 Works completed. 100% / 100% =1 Name of Contract amount Payments so Work delivered % contractor (USD) far as a % of contract amount Eco 583,925 100% 100% Builders Sampled Activity: Environmental Management Specialist Type of Budgeted Contract Payments Work Payment % as a activity amount amount as a % made so far delivered so far multiple of work (USD) of budgeted (USD) (description) delivered % amount Consultants' 120,000 60% 62,927.86 The consultant 80% / 90% = 0.53x services had completed the draft report. Name of Contract Payments so Work contractor amount far as a % of delivered % (USD) contract amount Nelson Omagor 71,587.50 88% (of amount 90% (COWI Ltd) (62,250 plus including 9,337.50 contingencies) contingency) Note: All amounts in above tables have been stated in USD based on the data provided in the last Interim Financial Report of the project. 33 Value for Money Performance Rating Activity VfM Assessment finding VfM performance assessment rating parameter Torit-Katire Economy The contract was within the approved 1.0 road budgeted amount and payments made were consistent with contract provisions. Procurement process was transparent and competitive. Efficiency Activity budgeted for, included in the 1.0 procurement plan, actual outputs matched expected outputs. Effectiveness Activity contributed to achievement of 1.0 project objective and realisation of benefits to beneficiaries. Overall VfM performance 1.0 Environmental Economy The contract was below the approved 1.0 Management budgeted amount, and payments consistent Specialist with contract provisions. Procurement process was transparent and competitive. Efficiency Activity budgeted for, included in the 2.0 procurement plan, actual outputs matched expected outputs. But limited contract period of consultant affected his impact on the project. Effectiveness Activity contributed to achievement of 1.0 project objective; activity outputs used for intended purpose. Overall VfM performance 1.3 1=full achievement, 2=partial achievement, 3=non-achievement 34 Table 2: South Sudan Roads Maintenance Project (SSRMP), Unit Cost Comparative Analysis Project Comparator: SETIDP, Unit Cost per km at US$ 11,246 Road/Road Section Name Length (Km) Maintenance Cost (USD) Unit Cost per km (USD) Variation (%) At At At appraisal At completion At appraisal At completion Unit Cost Appraisal Completion WFP Roads Nadapal – Nesitu (split in 3- 363 308 7,760,000.00 7,636,324.57 21,377.41 24,793.26 16% contracts) Yei – Juba (Bungu) (split in 160 113 4,250,000.00 4,311,216.69 26,562.50 38,152.36 44% 2-contracts) Juba – Bor (km 151) (split in 190 151 4,050,000.00 4,526,328.09 21,315.79 29,975.68 41% 2-contracts) Rumbek - Wau (split in 2- 245 233 5,400,000.00 5,173,097.54 22,040.82 22,202.14 1% contracts) Loming Junction - Imehejek 96 43 2,170,000.00 1,659,507.60 22,604.17 38,593.20 71% MRB Roads Kaya - Yei 85 85 3,155,000.00 3,010,154.32 37,117.65 35,413.58 -5% Yei - Rasolo 150 140 3,180,000.00 3,654,804.13 21,200.00 26,105.74 23% Kajo Keji - Juba 260 129 2,760,000.00 3,153,003.90 10,615.38 24,441.89 130% Sub-total WFP & MRB 1549 1202 32,725,000.00 33,124,436.84 182,833.71 239,677.85 31% Average WFP & MRB 22,854.21 29,959.73 31% Labour based roads Kegulu - Morobo 77 77 850,000.00 931,045.03 11,038.96 12,091.49 10% Torit – Katire 45 45 510,000.00 595,591.78 11,333.33 13,235.37 17% Rumbek - Akot 40 40 450,000.00 196,865.59 11,250.00 4,921.64 -56% Rasolo – Faraksika Mambe 25 25 290,000.00 438,074.83 11,600.00 17,522.99 51% Bor - Baidit 35 35 400,000.00 667,398.68 11,428.57 19,068.53 67% Sub-total labour based 2,500,000.00 2,828,975.91 56,650.87 66,840.03 18% Average labour based 11,330.17 13,368.01 18% Grand Total 1,771 1,424 35,225,000.00 35,953,412.75 239,485 306,518 28% Overall Average 18,421.89 23,578.30 28% 35 Annex 4. Grant Preparation and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team members Responsibility/ Names Title Unit Specialty Lending/Grant Preparation Supervision/ICR Task Team Leader at Tesfamichael Mitiku Nahusenay Sr. Transport Engineer AFTTR closing ICR Team Muhammad Zulfiqar Ahmed Sr. Transport Engineer AFTTR Leader/Author Emmanuel Taban Extended Term Consultant AFTTR ICR co-Author Suzan Poni Piwang Team Assistant AFMJB Task Team Leader at NegedeLewi Sr. Highway Engineer AFTTR Approval John D. Riverson Consultant IEGPS Esther A. Riverson HRSGM David Stephen Rudge Consultant ECSTR Evarist F. Baimu Senior Counsel LEGAM Frederick Yankey Sr. Financial Management Specialist AFTMW Financial Management Prosper Nindorera Sr. Procurement Specialist LCSPT Procurement Nina M. Jones Program Assistant AFTTR Yasmin Tayyab Sr. Social Development Specialist AFTCS Safeguard Helen Mbao Chilupe Sr. Operations Officer AFMJB Operations AdenikeSherifatOyeyiola Sr. Financial Management Specialist AFTME Financial Management Petrus Benjamin Gericke Lead Transport Specialist AFTTR Anjani Kumar Sr. Procurement Specialist AFTPE Financial Management Environmental Bedilu Amare Rita Environmental Specialist AFTEN Management Ntombie Z. Siwale Sr. Program Assistant AFTTR (b) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle USD Thousands (including No. of staff weeks travel and consultant costs) Lending Total: 0.00 Supervision/ICR Total: 0.00 Note: All staff time was charged to the MDTF-SS and not to BB 36 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results (if any) N/A 37 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results (if any) N/A 38 Annex 7. Summary of Grantee's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR Borrower’s Comments on the ICR for the Southern Sudan Roads Maintenance Project (TF-96268) 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisal We agreed with the contents as at the appraisal. In October 2009, access to many key areas of the country had been opened including both the primary and secondary roads within Southern Sudan, covering more than 5,000 km, of which 890 km were rehabilitated and maintained under the SETIDP with financing from the MDTF-SS. 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved) The PDO as at the appraisal was to (i) improve access and quality of targeted roads in Southern Sudan, and (ii) strengthen the capacity for strategic and project planning, construction and maintenance of roads. However, these differs in GA letter from the appraised content to the following, which is ‘to preserve the road asset in Southern Sudan by maintaining priority roads, and strengthening the capacity for strategic and project planning, construction and sustainable maintenance of roads.’ 1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification The PDO was not changed during the project. We are in agreement with this section 1.4 Main Beneficiaries, Agreed 1.5 Original Components (as approved) Agreed 1.6 Revised Components This project has never been restructured since its effectiveness, but rather extended twice. The first extension was by one year from June 30, 2011 to June 30, 2012 and second for two months from June 30, 2012 to August 31, 2012. 39 The first extension was to complete the implementation of the project activities including: (i) completion of the maintenance contracts under the MRB and WFP that were slowed down during the referendum period in January 2011; (ii) continue with the provision of training and TA services to further strengthen the implementation capacity of MRB; and (iii) continue with the provision of technical support to the operationalization of the SSRA. The second and final extension was carried out to permit completion of the ongoing capacity building activities. These were necessary for the achievement of the project development objectives. 1.7 Other significant changes The project was never restructured. Refer to section 1.6. 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry Agreed 2.2 Implementation Agreed Major Factors that Affected Project Implementation Agreed Refer to section 1.6 of this ICR for the major factors that affected the implementation of this project as well as the Bank procurement bureaucracy which equally caused a lot of delay in the implementation of the project at the early stages of the project implementation. 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization Agreed 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance Environmental and Social Safeguards Agreed Procurement Agreed However, the Bank procurement bureaucracy caused a lot of delay in implementation of the project. 40 Financial Management Agreed Though, the knowledge transfer as a result of the set arrangement was limited to the staff of Ministry of Finance and Economic Development leaving out the implementing Agency (IA). 2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase Agreed Though the implementation arrangement put in place by these development partners is not a sustainable strategy since the central Ministry of Roads and Bridges is left to act as a spectator in the development and implementation of these projects. 3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation Agreed There was clear linkage between the project components and project development objectives, as such; it has improved the performance of the road transport sector in South Sudan. 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives Agreed The South Sudan Roads Authority (SSRA) Act 2011 established the Board of directors for the SSRA in August 2011 and the operation of the authority though delayed as a result of the cash flow instability in the government, is partially functional. The Executive Director of the SSRA has been recruited, as well as the recruitment of the senior officers has been in progress. 3.3 Efficiency Agreed The project has been successful and efficiently implemented due to the achievement of the development objectives, as well as the completion of all activities under the project. 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 41 Agreed 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development Agreed (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening Agreed (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) Not Applicable. 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops Not Applicable. 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Substantial Agreed Sustainability of the project remains a challenge given the lack of budgetary allocation for maintenance. The roads maintained under the project are deteriorating as there is no funding for follow-on regular maintenance due to the current austerity measures put in place by the Government mostly after the oil production shutdown in early 2012 following disagreement between South Sudan and Sudan 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Satisfactory Agreed The project design put in place adequate mitigation measures in place at entry to meet substantial risk at appraisal. The capacity of MRB built under SETIDP laid a foundation and supported the quality at entry for implementation of the project. (b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Satisfactory 42 Agreed, (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory Agreed Given the services and support provided by the Bank at both entry and supervision of the project, the overall performance rating for the Bank is assessed as Moderately Satisfactory. 5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory Agreed (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Satisfactory Agreed (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory Agreed 6. Lessons Learned Agreed The engagement of WFP was helpful in fast tracking the emergency repair and maintenance works and providing on-the-job training on supervision of works contracts. However, use of the UN agencies for downstream regular contracting environment is not a sustainable option for South Sudan given that it restricts the development of local contracting industry to independently participate and execute projects. 43 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders N/A 44 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents 1. Final Project Proposal (FPP) Southern Sudan Roads Maintenance Project, February16, 2010. 2. Grant Letter Agreement and Disbursement Letter, March 03, 2010. 3. Implementation Status and Results Report: April 30, 2010; November 14, 2010; May 18, 2011; February25, 2012; August 29, 2012. 4. Mid-Term Review October 7 to 15, 2010. 5. Aide Memoire - March 14-18, 2011. 6. Aide Memoire - June 23-July 1, 2011. 7. Aide Memoire - June 4-8, 2012. 8. Aide Memoire - October 1-6, 2012. 10. World Bank MDTF-SS. Value for Money (VFM) Assessment Report October 2012. 45 MAP 1