

OED REVIEW OF REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON 1996 CAS COMPLETION REPORT

Introduction

1. Cameroon has seen its economic fortunes fluctuate widely over the past 25 years. During 1978–85, fueled by oil exports and improving terms of trade, the economy boomed. The country was seen as a star performer in Africa. Subsequently, during 1985–93, declining terms of trade, an overvalued exchange rate and economic mismanagement combined to lead the country into depression. In this period the Bank continued to lend to the country on IBRD terms even though Cameroon's creditworthiness was becoming highly questionable. By 1994 real per capita GDP had fallen to some 60 percent of its 1985 level. Cuts in civil service wages followed by the long overdue 1994 devaluation of the CFA franc led to a huge drop in civil servants' real income, eroding motivation and feeding corruption.

2. Following the devaluation, the donor community responded promptly. Cameroon became an IDA-only country. But the Government was slow in engineering a recovery, absent a strategy. Things changed in late 1996 when the President installed a new reform-minded economic management team. During 1996–02 real per capita income grew at close to 2 percent per year and is now some 20 percent above its level in 1994.

3. The CAS Completion Report (CCR) covers the period 1996–02. The January 1996 CAS was followed by Progress Reports in 1998 and 2000.¹ Over time the Bank's strategy did not change fundamentally. The most notable unplanned addition to the lending program was an HIV/AIDS project in FY01. In that same year Cameroon also received a HIPC grant for which it had qualified after a satisfactory three-year track record of policy performance. The CCR is a clear, logically constructed and transparent evaluation. First, the CAS objectives are evaluated within the context of the Government's long-term strategy. Second, for each major CAS objective, the report examines the relationship to Bank lending and non-lending instruments, compares plans with actuals, and reviews achievements and failures. This self-evaluation is constrained in some areas by numerous information gaps.

Government Objectives and CAS Objectives

4. Cameroon's decade-long depression had, by the mid-90s, not only impoverished the country but also made the external debt burden unsustainable. The Government's long-term goals, as established in 1996, were to achieve at least a doubling of per capita income in 20 years (per capita income growth of at least 3.5 percent p.a.) and food security (not to be interpreted as self-sufficiency, but rather as a proxy for poverty reduction in the sense that everyone ought to have enough to eat). In the short run, the creation of a viable macro-economic framework was essential to a sustained recovery. The strategy was two-fold, and relevant under the circumstances: (1) Fiscal adjustment to generate a primary surplus to keep current on external interest obligations; this, together with substantial

¹ The delay in preparing a full CAS was largely due to delays in preparing a full PRSP.

external assistance, would eventually lead to a manageable debt burden. (2) Financial sector reform, privatization and the creation of a better business environment to stimulate private investment and growth. Poverty alleviation was a secondary objective, expected to result from growth.

5. The Bank's CAS objectives were in line with these government objectives, except that the CAS included poverty alleviation as a primary goal. The three objectives were: (1) consolidation of the benefits of the 1994 devaluation through improved public resource management; (2) poverty alleviation; and (3) creation of a climate favorable for private sector development.

Bank Instruments and CAS Outcomes, by main objective

6. Each of the three main objectives of the CAS was broken down into several intermediary objectives, or actions which the Bank's program was designed to influence.

(1) Improved public resource management

- increase resource mobilization
- improve quality and management of public expenditure
- settle domestic arrears
- deepen civil service reform
- divest the state of productive activities

(2) Poverty alleviation

- promote sustainable and employment generating growth
- reallocate budget towards priority social sectors
- improve access to primary education and health
- promote employment generating programs, especially rural
- increase financial services for the poor
- promote food production, processing and marketing
- reduce interregional income disparities
- monitor evolution of poverty

(3) Favorable private sector environment

- improve incentive and regulatory framework
- improve judicial system
- reform financial sector
- maintain and develop basic infrastructure
- pursue privatization program

7. Actual Bank commitments in pursuit of these objectives are shown in Table 1, roughly grouped by main objective. Deviations between actual commitments and plans in the 1996 CAS and in the progress reports were relatively minor, except for delays and for dropped projects in the area of poverty alleviation. Details are provided in the CCR, Annex B. Formal ESW in support of the strategy has been lacking. As discussed below, much ESW was planned in the CAS and the Progress Reports, but subsequently dropped.

8. Progress towards the objective of *Improved Public Resource Management* was significant. The primary performance indicator, an increase in the revenue to GDP ratio, was fully met, with the ratio rising from 13 percent in 1995 to 15.7 percent in 1999 and

Table 1. Cameroon: IDA Commitments (US\$ million) ^{a/}

		FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01	FY02	FY03
<u>Public resource</u>	Sector Adj. (SAC II)	150.0	25.2	18.1					
<u>Management</u>		30.3							
	Struct. Adj. (SAC III)			180	13.1	11.0	7.8	5.5	
	HIPC Grant						63.9		
<u>Poverty</u>	LIL (educ)			4.9					
	Ag. Ext. and Research				15.1				
	HIV/AIDS						50.0		
<u>Private sector</u>	Transport	60.7							
	Privatization TA	12.6							
	Oil Pipeline Loan ^{b/}					53.4			
	Env. – Oil					5.8			
	Pub/Priv Partnership					20.9			
	Railways								21.4
	Douala Infrastructure								56.3
		253.6	25.2	203.0	28.2	91.1	121.7	5.5	77.7

^{a/} Commitments for SAC II and SAC III, after the initial year, are from IDA reflows.

^{b/} IBRD loan.

estimated at over 20 percent in 2000. Stabilization was achieved and growth resumed (see Annex Table 1). The privatization process proceeded well. The Bank can take credit for having contributed substantially to these achievements through the Structural Adjustment Credits (SAC). The Bank supported an ambitious adjustment program in spite of widespread skepticism, both inside and outside Cameroon, about the Government's commitment to reform. In the end, the program was largely successful, though implemented with some delays, under the impetus of a reform-minded group in the Government and in spite of resistance from vested interest groups. At the same time, progress towards some of the objectives—settling domestic arrears, improving the management of public expenditure, civil service reform—was very limited. Bank AAA in support of the Public Resource Management objectives—a planned FY97 CEM, planned annual PERs and a planned Civil Service Study—never materialized. Scarce staff resources were diverted to other tasks such as a Country Procurement Assessment Review, a Country Financial Accountability Assessment, and assistance in the preparation of the PRSP. But the lack of basic economic work, such as a CEM, is unfortunate because it weakens the basis for strategy formulation.

9. Progress towards poverty alleviation was mixed. While the percent of people below the poverty line has declined from its peak level of 53 percent in 1996, following the decade-long depression, to 40 percent in 2001, this is only a return to the poverty level in 1984: it is the result of the economic recovery, to which the Bank contributed. At the same time, several social indicators (immunization levels, life expectancy, infant mortality) have deteriorated over the period (Annex Table 1).

10. However, with regard to the specific, intermediary, *Poverty Alleviation* objectives in the CAS, little was achieved. There were essentially two performance indicators: increases in the budgets for education and health of at least 3.5 percent per annum in nominal terms, and the creation of a mechanism to reach local communities. While spending was reallocated towards the social sectors, data were inadequate for monitoring the poverty incidence of spending; the second indicator was only vaguely linked to the objectives, and was in any case not achieved.

11. Amongst the other intermediary objectives, the only area of substantial progress was in poverty monitoring, through the 1996–97 Household Budget Survey and the 1998 Demographic and Health Survey. But, per capita income growth was not rapid enough to generate significant employment; no progress was made in the areas of job creation programs, of increasing financial services for the poor, or of reducing regional income disparities; agricultural progress (production and productivity growth) was limited.

12. Lending in support of the poverty objectives included a then ongoing (FY95) Health project, an Agricultural Extension and Research project to help increase the productivity of poor farmers (FY99) and an HIV/AIDS project (FY01) which was recently added to the program. The Health Project experienced difficulties from the start and its outcome was rated highly unsatisfactory by OED. It is too early to judge the impact of the Agricultural Extension and Research project: project status reports suggest that the project is proceeding well, but with substantial delays, as is the HIV/AIDS project. On the other hand, CAS plans included an Education Project for FY97 and a Social Development project for FY98, both meant to improve education and health service delivery for the poor: both were dropped, largely because the Government was not ready to implement these programs.

13. Non-lending activities planned in the CAS included Strategy Notes for the education, rural water supply, rural infrastructure and rural finance sectors. None of these activities were carried out: instead the Bank devoted its resources to help the Government prepare the Interim PRSP and the full PRSP in order to help convince the Government of the need for real reform in the priority areas for poverty reduction. By the time prospects for debt relief under the HIPC initiative became a reality, the Government's interest in poverty reduction initiatives grew: an Interim PRSP was finalized in September 2000 and a full PRSP in April 2003. The Interim PRSP also encouraged the development of a national HIV/AIDS strategy.

14. Significant progress was achieved towards the CAS-proposed actions intended to create a *favorable private sector environment*. Much was achieved in all but one of the five areas of focus; the exception was judicial reform, where little was accomplished. Several monitorable performance indicators had been laid out in the CAS: elimination of petroleum monopolies, liberalization of marine transport, phasing out of export taxes, privatization of large public enterprises and banks, restoration of liquidity in the banking sector, and maintenance of the road network. All of this was achieved, although with some delays in the privatization area.

15. Lending in support of the private sector development objective consisted primarily of the two adjustment loans (SAC II and SAC III) to underpin the policy dialogue, backed up by three technical assistance credits: in transport (FY95), privatization (FY96) and public/private partnership (FY00). A transport sector investment project (FY96) focused on privatization, rehabilitation and road maintenance issues, while a railways project, introduced in the FY98 Progress Report, focused on privatization. In cooperation with IFC the Bank also made an IBRD loan in FY00 to cover the Government's equity in the Chad/Cameroon oil pipeline project, further supported by a technical assistance credit to strengthen the Government's capacity to deal with environmental issues.

16. Non-lending activities to support improvements in the environment for private sector development were limited to an ongoing dialogue. The FY00 Progress Report did include preparation of a Judiciary Reform strategy, but this was not carried out.

17. In sum, progress towards the objective of *improved public resource management* was significant and the results are evident in the form of the economic recovery and increased government revenues, both of which contributed to making the country eligible for HIPC debt relief. Also, income poverty declined substantially. But improvements in the management of public spending and civil service reform are still lacking. Trends in social indicators and progress towards the MDGs present a mixed picture. The Human Development Index, after deteriorating between 1990 and 1995 has seen no improvement since. Unfortunately, little was achieved in terms of the specific CAS objectives on *poverty alleviation*, largely because the actions identified in the Bank's CAS were not on the Government's priority list. In the area of creating a *favorable private sector environment* the achievements in terms of intermediate CAS objectives were substantial, although these should be looked upon as necessary but not sufficient prerequisites: Cameroon has yet to become an attractive place to invest. What constitutes a healthy private sector environment is determined by a complex set of factors. In the case of Cameroon, some of the more obvious issues which will need to be addressed are the quality of the labor force, the quality of the judicial system, corruption and the rule of law.

18. Bank lending was well in tune with the main objectives of the CAS, although relatively little was lent in support of the poverty alleviation objectives in the CAS. On the other hand, supportive formal analytical work has been scarce (Table 3).

19. As mentioned earlier, one cross-cutting issue not included in the FY96 CAS was HIV/AIDS. It took the Bank time to convince the Government that this was more than just another disease. The issue was brought to the fore in the FY00 Progress Report and a project approved in FY01. Another such issue is governance, which was first raised in the FY98 Progress Report. A Governance Overview has since been carried out (FY01).

Overall Evaluation, Conclusion and Lessons

20. It is useful to evaluate the overall outcome of the 1996 CAS in perspective. The 1985–94 depression was a stressful experience. Faced with economic deterioration and a severely overvalued exchange rate, Cameroon could not unilaterally use the self-evident corrective measure—devaluation—because of the CFA arrangement, which kept the currency of 14 African countries pegged to the French franc.² In addition, during this period and up until FY93 the Bank kept lending to Cameroon on IBRD terms, even though the country was becoming increasingly non-creditworthy. As a result, and in spite of a substantial IDA program during the past decade, net transfers from the Bank Group (IDA and IBRD) were negative during FY95–03 at an average amount of \$25 million per year (Table 5). Furthermore, OED project outcome ratings show that of the 15 projects approved during FY85–94, 13 had unsatisfactory or highly unsatisfactory outcome ratings (Table 2). To some extent this was also a reflection of the economic conditions, more specifically the fiscal deterioration. It meant increased indebtedness without increases in economic capacity.

² The CFA franc is now pegged to the euro.

21. Against this background, the turnaround in Cameroon over the 1996 CAS period has been remarkable. OED project outcome ratings are available for only four projects approved since FY95. The outcome of one (the FY95 Health project) was rated highly unsatisfactory (para 12). But the outcomes of the three others were rated satisfactory (the FY95 transport sector TA, the FY96 SAC II) or moderately satisfactory (the FY95 privatization TA).

22. On balance, many of the CAS objectives were achieved, and especially the most urgent ones, i.e. a strengthened fiscal position and progress towards solving the external debt problem, a prerequisite for sustainability of the recovery. On this basis, the outcome of the CAS strategy is judged moderately satisfactory, although it must be added that quite a large number of the objectives were not achieved, including civil service and judicial reform or improved public expenditure management (some progress has been made in the latter area during the past couple of years, e.g. in the capacity to track poverty-oriented expenditure); and, above all, hardly any progress was made on the CAS's specific poverty alleviation objectives. All of this also suggests that the institutional development impact of the Bank's strategy was modest.

23. The sustainability of what has been achieved remains subject to many risks. This is partly illustrated by portfolio data, e.g. the high proportion of commitments at risk (Annex Table 4). More importantly, issues such as weak governance, corruption and the rule of law must be addressed by the Government as a matter of urgency so as to improve the private investment climate and strengthen the prospects for sustained growth.

24. An important lesson is that patience and persistence on the part of the Bank led to results. Although constrained by limited enthusiasm for reform within Cameroon, reluctance to even acknowledge some issues such as HIV/AIDS, and opposition from vested interests, the Bank identified and worked closely with a reform-minded group within the Government and successfully helped Cameroon reestablish its credibility with external creditors and initiate an arduous reform process. Government concern with issues such as HIV/AIDS, governance or corruption and poverty has been strengthened *pari passu*.

25. The Government has prepared a full PRSP (April 2003). In view of the slow pace of the reform process experienced in the past it might be tempting to recommend programmatic lending in support of government reforms as they proceed. However, many reforms will require deep and sustained Bank involvement which, in turn, requires solid ESW and investment lending. In addition, it will be most important to ensure that, once Cameroon reaches the HIPC completion point, the available funds are used well. Past failures of Bank project lending in agriculture should not discourage the Bank from re-engaging in this vital sector in the fight against poverty. Likewise, projects in health and education are of high priority in order to promote reform. A focus on improving social indicators is desirable.

26. Cameroon may not be able to reach all of the MDGs because some of the goals are unrealistically ambitious; it may even have difficulty in reaching its objective set in the mid-90s of at least doubling per capita income in 20 years as this would require 3.5 percent p.c.p.a. income growth. The prime objective should be that the economic recovery, which has been given new momentum by the PRSP, be sustained.

Table 1. Cameroon: Economic and Social Indicators, 1985-2001

Series Name	1985-1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Cameroon 1995-2001	Cote D'Ivoire 1995-2001	Zambia 1995-2001	Zimbabwe 1995-2001
GDP growth (annual %)	-0.1	-6.1	-3.8	-3.1	-3.2	-2.5	3.3	5.0	5.1	5.0	4.4	4.2	5.3	4.7	3.4	2.2	0.9
GDP per capita growth (annual %)	-2.9	-8.9	-6.5	-5.8	-5.8	-5.0	0.8	2.5	2.7	2.7	2.1	2.0	3.1	2.3	0.5	-0.1	-1.0
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US\$)	1004.0	960.0	900.0	910.0	890.0	730.0	660.0	610.0	620.0	610.0	610.0	580.0	580.0	610.0	707.1	337.1	561.4
GNI per capita, PPP (current international \$)	1614.0	1420.0	1360.0	1330.0	1280.0	1230.0	1280.0	1330.0	1360.0	1390.0	1450.0	1530.0	1580.0	1417.1	1414.3	701.4	2448.6
GDP per capita (constant 1995 US\$)	934.1	754.7	705.4	664.8	626.6	595.4	600.1	615.2	631.6	648.4	662.1	675.2	695.9	646.9	751.6	395.3	641.8
Gross domestic savings (% of GDP)	22.9	20.7	22.0	16.5	17.6	17.9	19.5	17.3	19.1	19.2	18.0	20.3	20.5	19.1	19.7	6.8	14.5
Gross foreign direct investment (% of GDP)	1.7	1.1	0.4	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	3.0	5.1	..
Gross capital formation (% of GDP)	22.6	17.8	16.7	14.3	16.5	15.3	14.5	15.4	16.2	17.5	18.3	16.4	17.8	16.6	12.4	16.6	15.7
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)	5.9	1.1	0.1	0.0	-3.2	35.1	9.1	3.9	4.8	3.2	1.5	-2.1	4.5	3.6	4.7	35.1	40.8
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)	23.9	24.6	24.8	27.3	27.9	39.6	40.2	41.1	42.1	41.2	42.3	42.6	42.7	41.7	24.5	20.6	19.0
Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP)	13.0	14.5	14.5	14.3	13.6	9.9	10.2	10.6	10.6	10.4	10.6	10.6	10.6	10.5	19.3	12.2	17.3
Services, etc., value added (% of GDP)	44.4	46.0	45.7	47.0	47.5	36.9	36.0	35.8	35.8	37.8	38.0	37.7	37.7	37.0	53.4	49.4	55.5
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)	21.2	20.2	20.0	20.5	17.1	22.1	25.7	22.5	25.3	26.5	23.8	30.7	31.8	26.6	40.4	27.8	36.5
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)	20.8	17.3	14.6	18.3	16.0	19.5	20.7	20.5	22.4	24.8	24.1	26.8	29.2	24.1	33.1	37.6	37.7
Current account balance (% of GDP)	-1.3	-1.8	-0.4	-1.9	-5.2	-4.1	-0.9	-4.1	-2.8	-2.7	-4.0	-1.7	-1.7	-2.6	-1.9	-12.7	..
Total debt service (% of exports of goods and services)	25.8	22.5	16.8	16.3	22.5	22.1	20.9	24.7	21.9	22.7	24.3	20.4	12.6	21.1	23.5	41.3	23.1
Total debt service (% of GNI)	5.8	4.9	3.7	3.7	4.2	5.3	5.8	6.0	6.0	6.4	6.1	6.7	4.3	5.9	11.0	16.7	9.3
Gross international reserves in months of imports	0.6	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.9	1.4	0.4	1.8	1.3	1.8
Current revenue, excluding grants (% of GDP)	19.6	15.4	16.2	15.5	14.2	11.3	13.0	16.5	15.7	15.0	18.6	..	27.1
Current revenue, including current grants (% of GDP)
Current expenditure, total (% of GDP)	13.2	14.7	16.3	14.5	14.0	12.8	11.4	12.7	13.3	12.5	16.4	..	32.9
Capital expenditure (% of GDP)	7.4	5.5	4.5	3.2	1.5	1.0	1.1	2.0	2.2	1.7	4.5	..	2.5
Interest payments (% of total expenditure)	4.2	5.4	6.0	6.8	11.5	22.2	23.5	21.6	19.3	21.5	21.3	..	25.2
Overall budget balance, excluding capital grants (% of GDP)	-0.8	-5.9	-5.2	-2.5	-1.7	-2.9	0.2	1.6	0.1	0.6	-1.6
Overall budget balance, including grants (% of GDP)	-0.8	-5.9	-5.2	-2.5	-1.7	-2.9	0.2	1.6	0.1	0.6	-1.0	..	-6.8
Fiscal balance, including grants (% of GDP)
Domestic financing, total (% of GDP)	-0.7	1.2	1.1	0.4	0.4	-0.4	-0.3	-0.4	-0.3	-0.3	-0.5	..	5.8
Financing from abroad (% of GDP)	1.5	5.2	4.2	3.3	1.9	3.5	0.3	-1.2	0.2	-0.2	1.5	..	1.0
Capital grants from abroad (% of GDP)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6
Proceeds from privatization (US\$)	..	0.0	41.1	..	72.0	20.0	44.4	112.3	202.4	51.3
Wages and salaries (% of total expenditure)	31.2	38.7	39.8	48.8	54.9	44.0	37.0	33.3	31.9	34.1	28.2	..	33.7
Illiteracy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above)	46.5	42.1	40.7	39.3	37.9	36.5	35.1	33.8	32.5	31.3	30.0	28.7	27.6	31.3	53.4	23.8	12.9
Immunization, DPT (% of children under 12 months)	44.4	48.0	42.0	37.0	37.0	37.0	46.0	46.0	48.0	48.0	48.0	..	43.0	46.5	57.4	85.7	83.5
Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access)	79.0	..	79.0	52.0	78.0	62.0
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)	52.8	54.2	..	54.8	53.6	..	52.9	..	50.9	50.0	49.2	51.3	46.4	40.5	42.7
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	93.0	85.0	..	87.8	92.0	..	93.2	95.0	96.0	94.0	101.6	112.0	68.5
Improved water source (% of population with access)	58.0	..	58.0	81.0	64.0	83.0
School enrollment, primary (% gross)	102.2	101.1	96.0	93.0	90.4	88.5	86.9	85.4	87.8	88.4	91.1	107.8	..	91.2	73.9	82.7	106.3
School enrollment, secondary (% gross)	22.8	28.0	28.9	28.3	27.7	26.9	25.6	25.2	..	19.6	23.5	22.9	25.3	46.4
Population, total (million)	10.6	11.6	12.0	12.3	12.6	13.0	13.3	13.6	13.9	14.2	14.6	14.9	15.2	14.2	15.2	9.7	12.2
Population growth (annual %)	2.9	2.9	2.8	2.7	2.6	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.3	2.9	2.4	1.9

Source: SIMA database as of 07-16-2003.

Table 2. Cameroon: OED Project Ratings by Approval Date

<i>Proj ID</i>	<i>Project Names</i>	<i>Outcome</i>	<i>Sustainability</i>	<i>ID</i>	<i>Approval FY</i>	<i>Exit FY</i>	<i>Net Commitments</i>
P000354	Forestry	Unsatisfactory	Unlikely	Negligible	1982	FY90	6.7
P000357	Port III	Unsatisfactory	Unlikely	Negligible	1983	FY91	20.7
P000359	Western Province RDP	Unsatisfactory	Unlikely	Modest	1984	FY93	21.5
P000360	FSAR II	Moderately Satisfactory	Uncertain	Modest	1985	FY94	21
P000361	Hevecam Rubber	Unsatisfactory	Uncertain	Modest	1985	FY91	8.3
P000365	Roads VI	Highly Unsatisfactory	Unlikely	Negligible	1985	FY94	144.4
P000364	Educ. & Voc. Train.	Unsatisfactory	Unlikely	Negligible	1986	FY95	8.8
P000362	Agric. Research	Unsatisfactory	Uncertain	Modest	1987	FY93	17.8
P000394	Cocoa Rehab	Unsatisfactory	Unlikely	Negligible	1988	FY96	42.6
P000380	Livestock Sector Dev	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Uncertain	Modest	1989	FY97	14.1
P000396	SAL I	Highly Unsatisfactory	Uncertain	Negligible	1989	FY94	100
P000378	Urban II	Unsatisfactory	Unlikely	Negligible	1989	FY94	91
P000376	Agric. Ext. Training	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Unlikely	Modest	1990	FY99	21
P000403	Economic Management	Unsatisfactory	Unlikely	Modest	1990	FY94	8.8
P000405	SDA/Human Resources	Unsatisfactory	Unlikely	Negligible	1990	FY94	3.9
P000400	Food Security	Unsatisfactory	Uncertain	Modest	1992	FY99	12.3
P035481	ERC	Moderately Satisfactory	Uncertain	Negligible	1994	FY95	112
P035989	SAC I	Highly Unsatisfactory	Uncertain	Negligible	1994	FY94	103.4
P000411	Health, Fertility & Nutrition Project	Highly Unsatisfactory	Highly Unlikely	Negligible	1995	FY01	16
P035599	Transpt Sector T.A.	Satisfactory	Likely	Substantial	1995	FY99	8.8
P041553	PE/TA	Moderately Satisfactory	Likely	Modest	1996	FY01	10.3
P039856	SAC II	Satisfactory	Likely	Substantial	1996	FY98	210.5

Table 3. Cameroon ESW, 1980-2003

<i>Document name</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Report number</i>
CAS		
Cameroon - Country assistance strategy Vol. 1	01/17/96	15275
Cameroon - Country assistance strategy progress report Vol. 1	02/18/98	22662
Cameroon - Country assistance strategy progress report Vol. 1	11/21/00	21072
Central Africa - Regional Integration Assistance Strategy Vol. 1	01/10/03	25328
Economic Report		
Cameroon - Economic memorandum Vol. 1	04/30/80	2877
Cameroon - Country economic memorandum Vol. 1	02/19/87	6395
Cameroon - Diversity, growth, and poverty reduction Vol. 1 (English)	04/04/95	13167
Sector Report		
Cameroon - Financial sector report Vol. 1 (English)	06/02/86	6028
Cameroon - Agricultural sector review Vol. 1	11/30/89	7486
Cameroon - Agricultural sector review Vol. 2	11/30/89	7486
Cameroon - The challenge : harnessing unrealized potential - a private sector assessment Vol. 1 (English)	06/28/96	13955
Africa Gas Initiative	02/28/01	ESM240

Source: Imagebank as of 07-16-2003.

Table 4. Cameroon and Comparators: Portfolio Status Indicators by Year

Country	Fiscal year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Cameroon	# Proj	14	12	13	11	6	6	8	7	8	6	9	8	8	9
	Comm Amt	756	725	748	709	287	235	385	376	355	329	420	423	428	504
	Net Comm Amt	756	684	707	667	245	180	372	365	345	329	400	423	428	504
	# Proj At Risk	5	8	8	11	5	5	5	7	5	4	1	2	5	3
	% At Risk	36	67	62	100	83	83	63	100	63	67	11	25	63	33
	Comm At Risk	335	446	446	667	170	170	288	365	150	121	23	27	355	247
	% Commit at Risk	44	65	63	100	69	94	78	100	43	37	6	6	83	49
Cote d'Ivoire	# Proj	18	13	14	14	12	11	13	14	15	15	16	12	12	10
	Comm Amt	1,043	507	863	832	735	307	669	764	804	609	622	573	768	712
	Net Comm Amt	1,035	507	863	832	585	307	669	764	804	609	622	563	758	703
	# Proj At Risk	7	10	9	11	2	3	2	2	2	5	2	6	5	7
	% At Risk	39	77	64	79	17	27	15	14	13	33	13	50	42	70
	Comm At Risk	224	451	386	793	88	45	43	80	80	109	60	462	344	684
	% Commit at Risk	22	89	45	95	15	15	6	10	10	18	10	82	45	97
Zambia	# Proj	10	10	10	13	14	16	17	17	14	14	14	16	12	13
	Comm Amt	185	385	582	529	712	659	670	682	516	676	715	785	463	555
	Net Comm Amt	185	385	582	518	712	659	670	682	516	676	715	780	463	555
	# Proj At Risk	10	7	6	7	8	3	4	4	3	5	2	5	1	1
	% At Risk	100	70	60	54	57	19	24	24	21	36	14	31	8	8
	Comm At Risk	185	115	105	194	244	217	116	156	123	239	131	242	13	15
	% Commit at Risk	100	30	18	37	34	33	17	23	24	35	18	31	3	3
Zimbabwe	# Proj	9	11	12	14	10	8	9	10	10	8	6	5	1	0
	Comm Amt	284	347	659	849	657	474	544	556	512	448	271	206	60	0
	Net Comm Amt	284	347	659	849	657	474	544	556	512	448	271	206	60	0
	# Proj At Risk	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	0	4	2	5	1	0
	% At Risk	11	18	17	7	10	13	11	20	0	50	33	100	100	
	Comm At Risk	44	80	124	80	150	125	125	161	0	287	71	206	60	0
	% Commit at Risk	16	23	19	9	23	26	23	29	0	64	26	100	100	
AFR	# Proj	524	528	528	530	495	462	443	425	396	373	367	359	355	342
	Comm Amt	17,838	18,506	19,654	20,488	19,126	17,024	16,842	15,672	15,054	14,180	13,644	14,521	15,376	15,926
	Net Comm Amt	17,741	18,354	19,517	20,182	18,513	16,326	16,516	15,473	14,787	13,976	13,526	14,409	15,182	15,780
	# Proj At Risk	270	290	261	250	238	205	154	168	122	102	51	53	82	64
	% At Risk	52	55	49	47	48	44	35	40	31	27	14	15	23	19
	Comm At Risk	8,859	10,500	9,993	10,111	9,211	7,640	7,431	6,562	4,370	3,148	1,619	2,430	3,598	2,924
	% Commit at Risk	50	57	51	50	50	47	45	42	30	23	12	17	24	19
Bank overall	# Proj	1,504	1,522	1,523	1,535	1,496	1,496	1,525	1,532	1,540	1,544	1,505	1,456	1,427	1,394
	Comm Amt	111,304	119,699	125,425	128,651	127,611	129,385	130,088	126,536	125,350	128,935	121,662	109,814	104,746	99,119
	Net Comm Amt	108,551	116,860	121,462	123,933	123,653	125,079	125,691	121,394	120,768	123,799	116,164	104,365	100,326	94,760
	# Proj At Risk	599	624	586	569	575	510	437	405	384	297	231	184	230	217
	% At Risk	40	41	38	37	38	34	29	26	25	19	15	13	16	16
	Comm At Risk	36,577	39,127	40,217	40,168	44,023	38,309	38,554	28,585	25,509	25,797	18,863	12,539	14,520	14,129
	% Commit at Risk	34	33	33	32	36	31	31	24	21	21	16	12	14	15

Source: Business Warehouse as of 7-23-2003.

Table 5. Cameroon: World Bank Net Disbursements and Charges FY95-03

<i>FY Year</i>	<i>Disbursement</i>	<i>Repayments</i>	<i>Net</i>	<i>Interest</i>	<i>Net Transfer</i>
1995	126.8	93.7	33.1	59.7	- 26.6
1996	88.2	88.6	- .4	54.6	- 55.0
1997	9.9	82.3	- 72.4	44.7	- 117.1
1998	143.8	80.6	63.2	37.0	26.2
1999	112.4	74.4	38.0	32.2	5.8
2000	49.0	63.1	- 14.1	29.3	- 43.4
2001	30.2	59.2	- 29.0	25.1	- 54.1
2002	29.3	55.7	- 26.4	21.3	- 47.7
2003	152.6 ^{a/}	44.2	108.4	17.7	90.7

^{a/} Includes \$64 million from HIPC grant.

Table 6. Cameroon: Millennium Development Goals

	1990	1995	2000	2001
1 Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger	<i>2015 target = halve 1990 \$1 a day poverty and malnutrition rates</i>			
Population below \$1 a day (%)	..	33.4
Poverty gap at \$1 a day (%)	..	11.8
Percentage share of income or consumption held by poorest 20%	..	4.6
Prevalence of child malnutrition (% of children under 5)	15.1	..	22.2	..
Population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption (%)	32	..	25	..
2 Achieve universal primary education	<i>2015 target = net enrollment to 100</i>			
Net primary enrollment ratio (% of relevant age group)
Percentage of cohort reaching grade 5 (%)	80.7	..
Youth literacy rate (% ages 15-24)	81.1	86.2	90	90.5
3 Promote gender equality	<i>2005 target = education ratio to 100</i>			
Ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary education (%)	82.2	..	81.5	..
Ratio of young literate females to males (% ages 15-24)	87.9	92.5	95.7	96.1
Share of women employed in the nonagricultural sector (%)
Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament (%)	14	12	6	6
4 Reduce child mortality	<i>2015 target = reduce 1990 under 5 mortality by two-thirds</i>			
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000)	139	150	154	155
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)	85	92	95	96
Immunization, measles (% of children under 12 months)	56	46	62	62
5 Improve maternal health	<i>2015 target = reduce 1990 maternal mortality by three-fourths</i>			
Maternal mortality ratio (modeled estimate, per 100,000 live births)	..	720
Births attended by skilled health staff (% of total)	58	..	56.1	..
6 Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases	<i>2015 target = halt, and begin to reverse, AIDS, etc.</i>			
Prevalence of HIV, female (% ages 15-24)	7.8	12.7
Contraceptive prevalence rate (% of women ages 15-49)	16	..	19.3	..
Number of children orphaned by HIV/AIDS (in thousands)	270	210
Incidence of tuberculosis (per 100,000 people)	340.7	..
Tuberculosis cases detected under DOTS (%)	..	2	16	..
7 Ensure environmental sustainability	<i>2015 target = various (see notes)</i>			
Forest area (% of total land area)	56	..	51.3	..
Nationally protected areas (% of total land area)	..	4.5	4.5	..
GDP per unit of energy use (PPP \$ per kg oil equivalent)	3.4	3.3	3.8	..
CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita)	0.1	0.2	0.3	..
Access to an improved water source (% of population)	51	..	58	..
Access to improved sanitation (% of population)	77	..	79	..
Access to secure tenure (% of population)
8 Develop a Global Partnership for Development	<i>2015 target = various (see notes)</i>			
Youth unemployment rate (% of total labor force ages 15-24)
Fixed line and mobile telephones (per 1,000 people)	..	5.1	16.1	27.1
Personal computers (per 1,000 people)	..	1.5	3.3	3.9
General indicators				
Population (in million)	11.6	13.3	14.9	15.2
Gross national income (in billion US\$)	11.1	8.7	8.7	8.7
GNI per capita (\$)	960	660	580	580
Adult literacy rate (% of people ages 15 and over)	57.9	64.9	71.3	72.4
Total fertility rate (births per woman)	6	5.2	4.8	4.7
Life expectancy at birth (years)	54.2	53.6	50	49.2
Aid (% of GNI)	4.2	6	4.6	5
External debt (% of GNI)	62.5	126.2	111.9	104.1
Investment (% of GDP)	17.8	14.5	16.4	17.8
Trade (% of GDP)	37.5	46.3	57.6	61

Source: World Development Indicators database, April 2002.

Note: In some cases the data are for earlier or later years than those stated.

Goal 1 targets: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than one dollar a day. Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger.

Goal 2 target: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling.

Goal 3 target: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 2005 and to all levels of education no later than 2015.

Goal 4 target: Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate.

Goal 5 target: Reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio.

Goal 6 targets: Have halted by 2015, and begun to reverse, the spread of HIV/AIDS. Have halted by 2015, and begun to reverse, the incidence of malaria and other major diseases.

Goal 7 targets: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programs and reverse the loss of environmental resources. Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water. By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers.

Goal 8 targets: Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system. Address the Special Needs of the Least Developed Countries. Address the Special Needs of landlocked countries and small island developing states. Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term. In cooperation with developing countries, develop and implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth. In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable, essential drugs in developing countries. In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications.