GROUNDSWELL AFRICA INTERNAL CLIMATE MIGRATION IN WEST AFRICAN COUNTRIES EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Kanta Kumari Rigaud, Alex de Sherbinin, Bryan Jones, Susana Adamo, David Maleki, Nathalie E. Abu-Ata, Anna Taeko Casals Fernandez, Anmol Arora, Tricia Chai-Onn, and Briar Mills © 2021 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street NW  Washington DC 20433  Telephone: 202-473-1000 Internet: www.worldbank.org This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of the World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. All maps were cleared by the Cartography Unit of the World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information shown on these maps in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of the World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory, or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.   Rights and Permissions The material in this work is subject to copyright. Because the World Bank encourages dissemination of its knowledge, this work may be reproduced, in whole or in part, for noncommercial purposes as long as full attribution to this work is given. Please cite the work as follows: Rigaud, Kanta Kumari; de Sherbinin, Alex; Jones, Bryan; Adamo, Susana; Maleki, David; Abu-Ata, Nathalie E.; Casals Fernandez, Anna Taeko; Arora, Anmol; Chai-Onn, Tricia, and Mills, Briar. 2021. Groundswell Africa: Internal Climate Migration in West African Countries. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Any queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to World Bank Publications, The World Bank Group, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA; fax: 202-522-2625; e-mail: pubrights@worldbank.org.   Photo Credits (top to bottom, left to right): Vincent Tremeau, Andrea Borgarello 2 Groundswell Africa: Internal Climate Migration in West African Countries GROUNDSWELL AFRICA INTERNAL CLIMATE MIGRATION IN WEST AFRICAN COUNTRIES EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Kanta Kumari Rigaud, Alex de Sherbinin, Bryan Jones, Susana Adamo, David Maleki, Nathalie E. Abu-Ata, Anna Taeko Casals Fernandez, Anmol Arora, Tricia Chai-Onn, and Briar Mills Acknowledgments This report was developed by the World Bank’s Environment Global Practice as part of a knowledge activity on internal climate migration under the leadership and counsel of Mark R. Lundell, Regional Director, Sustainable Development, Eastern and Southern Africa, and Simeon K. Ehui, Regional Director, Sustainable Development, West and Central Africa. The work was led by Kanta Kumari Rigaud, Lead Environmental Specialist, and David Maleki, Environmental Specialist. Strategic guidance and support from Iain G. Shuker, Manager, was instrumental to the delivery of the report. Maria Sarraf, Ruxandra Maria Floroiu, and Sanjay Srivastava provided guidance at key stages. Benoit Bosquet provided guidance at the outset. This report was led by Kanta Kumari Rigaud and David Maleki (World Bank) with a core team comprised of Alex de Sherbinin, Susana Adamo, Tricia Chai-Onn, Briar Mills (Center for International Earth Science Information Network, CIESIN), Bryan Jones (City University of New York, CUNY), Nathalie E. Abu-Ata, Anna Taeko Casals Fernandez, and Anmol Arora (World Bank). Anne-Laure White (CIESIN), Analia Calcopietro, Charity Boafo-Portuphy, Ena Loureiro, Esther Bea, and Yesmeana N. Butler (World Bank) provided support throughout the project. The analysis that forms the basis of the report was the result of a unique collaboration between World Bank Group staff and researchers at the CIESIN of the Columbia University Climate School and its Earth Institute and the CUNY Institute for Demographic Research (CIDR). Continued inputs from the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impacts Research (PIK) were very much appreciated. The work has been funded by the World Bank with additional support provided by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), the Knowledge Pillar of the West Africa Coastal Areas (WACA) Platform, which receives funding from, among others, the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) and the Nordic Development Fund (NDF), and the Africa Climate Resilient Investment Facility (AFRI-RES) – a partnership of the World Bank, the African Union, and the United Nations Economic Commission of Africa, with funding from the NDF. ii Groundswell Africa: Internal Climate Migration in West African Countries The team is grateful to the authors of several background papers that informed the research. The Institut Africain de Développement Durable at Cheikh Anta Diop University in Dakar, Senegal, led by Ahmadou Aly Mbaye and comprising Aklesso Yao Grégoire Egbendewe, Fatou Gueye, Clément Sambou, Ndiaga Diop, Yusuf Abdul Malik Mohammed, Mamane Bello Garba Hima, and Fama Gueye provided country reports and a regional synthesis for West Africa to help identify patterns and drivers of migration based on a literature review. Francois Gemenne contributed a policy paper that provided an overview of frameworks and options to shape current and long-term policy responses in West and East Africa. Duygu Cicek worked with her colleagues in the World Bank’s Legal Department—Manush Hristov and Markus Pohlman—to provide a review of relevant legal frameworks and processes as inputs to the report. A portfolio review prepared by Kanta Kumari Rigaud, Silke Heuser, Nathalie E. Abu-Ata, and Anmol Arora provided insights on operational experiences and lessons learned from World Bank projects at the climate-migration-development nexus. The report benefited from regional consultations with stakeholders from civil society, government institutions, and academia, as well as international organizations and donors. Participants included representatives from Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, and Togo, as well as Agence Française de Développement (AFD), GIZ, the European Commission, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Institut de recherche pour le développement (IRD), NDF, the Platform on Disaster Displacement (PDD), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR, and the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS). Several colleagues provided timely advice during the review process of the overall knowledge activity and were indispensable in framing the report to ensure its practical value. For the World Bank, these colleagues included Alex Mulisa, Arame Tall, Caroline Bahnson, Corey Pattison, Denis Rugege, Diego Arias, El Hadj Adama Toure, Erwin de Nys, Farouk Mollah Banna, Jane A. N. Kibbassa, Jian Xie, Michael John Hammond, Pablo Cesar Benitez, Peter Kristensen, Ragini Praful, Varalakshmi Vemuru, Viviane Wei Chen Clement, and Sonia Plaza. External reviewers included Hind Aissaoui Bennani, Susan Martin (Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development, KNOMAD), Lisa Lim Ah Ken (International Organization for Migration, IOM), Atle Solberg (Platform on Disaster Displacement, PDD), and Alex Aleinikoff (Zolberg Institute on Migration and Mobility, The New School). The reports benefitted from a series of internal consultations within the World Bank with thematic specialists, Sector Leaders, and Country Managers. The report benefited from editing by Alex Behr and design by Owen Design Company LLC. The World Bank’s Cartography Unit supported in clearing the maps. Andrea Borgarello / World Bank Groundswell Africa: Internal Climate Migration in West African Countries iii GROUNDSWELL AFRICA WEST AFRICAN COUNTRIES Up to 32 million internal climate migrants in West African countries by 2050 in the absence of concrete climate and development action. 0.3 – 2.2 million people living along the West African coast could be compelled to move out of the 5-kilometer coastal belt by 2050 due to sea level rise compounded by storm surges. Climate migration hotspots could emerge as early as 2030 and continue to intensify by 2050 across West African countries. The population migration model and analysis combine climate and nonclimate factors—expanding the Groundswell approach—to better inform policy dialogue and action. Water Crop Ecosystem Sea level rise availability productivity productivity and storm surge Conflict Sex Flood risk Median age iv Groundswell Africa: Internal Climate Migration in West African Countries Locality and context matter Internal climate migration is not uniform across countries. Some areas will be more adversely impacted by climate change than others. The optimistic scenario (inclusive development and low emissions) yields lower numbers of internal climate migrants than the pessimistic scenario (high emissions and unequal development). Internal climate migrants by 2050 Niger Nigeria Senegal Mali Benin Pessimistic Optimistic Burkina Faso 0 2 4 6 8 10 Million The study also included Cabo Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, and Togo. TAKING RESULTS TO ACTION Migration and Climate-Informed Solutions (MACS) Core Policy Climate-Smart Areas and Opportunities Action for Migration Domains with Proactive and Sustainable Solutions (COMPASS) Conduct spatio-temporal Adopt farsighted analytics on climate landscape and migration hotspots territorial approaches Improve Cut understanding greenhouse on migration gases Domesticate Harness climate policies and migration for jobs bridge legal gaps Pursue inclusive, Embed and economic climate-resilient, migration in transitions and green development development Nurture humanitarian- development-peace partnerships Groundswell Africa: Internal Climate Migration in West African Countries v Foreword According to a popular African proverb, “we do not inherit the earth from our ancestors, we borrow it from our children.” Global warming, with its causes and impacts, connects generations, and is a powerful example for how this holds true. West Africans have a long history of coping with challenging climatic conditions. Mobility has always been a key strategy for people in the region to manage risks and avail opportunities, be it nomads traveling the Sahel to feed their livestock, fishermen braving stormy seas, or merchants crossing the desert. However, as climate shocks and Ousmane Diagana stresses escalate in the coming decades, West Africans World Bank Vice President could face unprecedented challenges. Despite the region’s Africa Western and Central relatively small carbon footprint, it will be one of those most affected by the impacts of climate change. The study finds that without concrete climate and development action, up to 32 million people in West Africa could be compelled to move within their countries by 2050, in response to water scarcity, declines in crop and ecosystem productivity, and sea level rise, augmented by storm surge. By 2050, Niger alone could have up to 19.1 million internal climate migrants, which would account for up to 30.26 percent of the total population if no action is taken. Smaller coastal countries in West Africa like Benin could see climate migrants representing 45 percent of all internal migrants by 2050. Locality matters. Countries in West Africa could see the emergence of climate migration hotspots as early as 2030—reflecting both the changing ability of ecosystems to sustain livelihoods, and the risk from flooding in low lying coastal areas. Climate out-migration hotspots coincide in some cases with important growth centers, including coastal cities like Lagos and Dakar. At the same time, climate in-migration hotspots could arise in areas that already have high incidence of poverty, like northern Nigeria, as well as the Mali-Burkina Faso border. Importantly, these numbers are not predestined—and could be reduced at the regional level by about 60 percent. This study provides us with strong and compelling analysis, and a planning- and action- oriented framework to bring climate-induced migration into the policy dialogue and launch preventive action. It emphasizes that countries in West Africa must step up their efforts for inclusive and resilient development to successfully manage internal climate migration. At the same time, the global community must cut greenhouse gas emissions more rapidly and at scale, to avert or reduce the impacts that drive climate induced migration. The bottom line is that we cannot afford to ignore climate migration in the development context if we are to ensure stability, security and help countries to delivery their sustainable development goals. The World Bank Group is committed to supporting the required move towards green, resilient and inclusive development. This is a promise to our client countries and to future generations in West Africa and beyond. vi Groundswell Africa: Internal Climate Migration in West African Countries Andrea Borgarello / World Bank Groundswell Africa: Internal Climate Migration in West African Countries vii Andrea Borgarello / World Bank viii Groundswell Africa: Internal Climate Migration in West African Countries Executive Summary MESSAGE 1 West Africa, already a highly mobile region, will see an increase in the scale of internal migration due to the impacts of climate change. West Africa is one of the most mobile regions in the world, with a long history of trade, nomadic pastoralism, and migration for livelihood diversification. The internal migration pattern has been dominated by rural to urban movement. Nomadic pastoralism and seasonal migration from inland areas to the coast plays a crucial part in preserving livelihoods. In much of Africa, migration is part of events embedded in 20th-century colonial legacies and postindependence strategies, and entrenched in broader geographical and climate characteristics. Migration is driven by various economic, social, religious, political, environmental, and now, increasingly, climate “push and pull” factors. Senegal, for example, is simultaneously a country of origin, destination, and transit. For Nigeria, the Internal Migration Survey conducted by the National Population Commission (NPC) in 2010 revealed that 23 percent of the sampled population are migrants. Rural to urban migration is the largest type of migration flow in Nigeria, in which around 60 percent of the internal migrants in 2010 lived in urban areas (IADD 2019). Climatic factors have long played an important and nuanced role in the region, as evidenced by the seasonal and longer-term migration between the semiarid Sahel region and the tropical coastal countries in the south. These movements have been an important livelihood strategy to cope with Sahel’s dry season. Studies show spikes in short-distance and seasonal movements in response to climate variations. Conversely, there is large-scale migration into coastal cities vulnerable to sea level rise and storm surge. Only a few areas, such as Saint-Louis (Senegal) and Cotonou (Benin), have seen out-migration because of climate factors. Ghana has seen a north-to-south movement influenced by rainfall levels and variability and land degradation in the north. There was large-scale migration from the rural areas to informal settlements in Nouakchott (Mauritania) as a result of droughts in the 1970s and 1980s. This West Africa study reaffirms the finding on the potency for climate change to drive internal migration (Rigaud et al. 2018; Clement et al. 2021). The results described in this study are based on the application of an enhanced version of the pioneering Groundswell model with a more granular analysis and additional features better placed to inform policy dialogue and action (box ES.1). Groundswell Africa: Internal Climate Migration in West African Countries 1 Collectively, West African countries1 could see as many as 32 million internal climate migrants by 2050 (4.06 percent of the 2050 projected population) under the pessimistic scenario (figure ES.1). These results represent an aggregation of country based analysis. Of the alternative scenarios modeled, the optimistic scenario projects the lowest number of internal climate migrants, reaching a mean of 7.4 million by 2050. People will migrate from areas with lower water availability, declining crop and ecosystem productivity, and from areas affected by sea-level rise compounded by storm surges. Hence, pursuing concrete climate and development action could yield a reduction in the average number of migrants by 11.9 million (61.7 percent) by 2050 (figure ES.1). No country in West Africa is immune to internal climate migration, but the scale in each country will depend on how the climate factors interact with demographic and socio-economic factors at the local level (figure ES.2). For example, Benin is projected to have up to 342,000 internal climate migrants by 2050 under the high end of the pessimistic scenario but could see a reduction of climate migrants by up to 72 percent, reaching a low of 97,000 at the low end of the optimistic scenario. Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal are projected to have the highest numbers of internal climate migrants by 2050: reaching a high of 19.1 million, 9.4 million, and 1.0 million, respectively, under the pessimistic scenario. 1. The study modeled the following West African countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. Andrea Borgarello / World Bank 2 Groundswell Africa: Internal Climate Migration in West African Countries Box ES.1: An Enhanced Groundswell Model The results described in this study are based on the application of an enhanced version of the pioneering Groundswell model (Rigaud et. al. 2018). The expanded model includes the optimistic scenario, and additional climate (net primary productivity, flood risk) and nonclimate factors as variables. The modeling results presented here are based on four plausible scenarios—reflecting different combinations of future climate change impacts and development pathways—to characterize the scale and spread of climate migration by 2050. Projecting Internal Climate Migration under Four Plausible Scenarios High More inclusive Pessimistic development reference (RCP8.5/SSP2) (RCP8.5/SSP4) Emissions Optimistic More climate-friendly (RCP2.6/SSP2) (RCP2.6/SSP4) Low Inclusive Inequitable Development Note: 1. The scenarios are based on combinations of two Shared Socioeconomic Pathways—SSP2 (moderate development) and SSP4 (unequal development)—and two Representative Concentration Pathways —RCP2.6 (low emissions) and RCP8.5 (high emissions). 2. Estimates of climate migrants are derived by comparing these plausible climate migration (RCP-SSP) scenarios with development only (SSP) or the “no climate impact” scenarios The expanded model provides a more granular analysis better placed to inform policy dialogue and action. To estimate the scale of internal climate migrants a population gravity model was used to isolate the portion of future changes in population distribution that can be attributed to climate change as a proxy for climate migration. To capture the effects of slow onset climate factors on internal migration, the methodology used state of the art simulations for crop, water, net primary productivity (NPP), flood risk models, and sea level rise with storm surge. Nonclimate factors were considered, including demographic variables (sex and median age) and conflict. This expanded model was also used to analyze internal climate migration in West African countries (Rigaud et al. 2021a). Groundswell Africa: Internal Climate Migration in West African Countries 3 Figure ES.1 Projected Total Internal Climate Migrants, West Africa, by 2050 35 -8.3 -4.5 30 25 20 Millions -11.9 15 10 5 0 Optimistic More Climate-Friendly More Inclusive Pessimistic Development Note: The whiskers represent the lowest and the highest number of internal climate migrants in that scenario. Figure ES.2 Projected Internal Climate Migrants in Select West African Countries under the Pessimistic Scenario by 2050* Figure ES.2: Projected Number of Internal Climate Migrants in West African Countries under the Pessimistic Scenario Niger Nigeria Senegal Mali Benin Burkina Faso 0 2 4 6 8 10 Millions Results for the rest of the West African countries are available in the full report (see Rigaud et al. 2021. Groundswell * Africa: Internal Climate Migration in West African Countries). 4 Groundswell Africa: Internal Climate Migration in West African Countries MESSAGE 2 Internal climate migration will ramp up by 2050, with the share of climate migrants accelerating, unless we act early to pursue concerted climate and development action. The trajectory of internal climate migration in West Africa could increase between 2025 and 2050— with variations on the acceleration of increase between scenarios and countries (figure ES.3). There is a consistent upward trend across the scenarios, with the higher emissions scenarios (pessimistic and inclusive development) showing higher rates of acceleration of internal climate migration over the decades. The scale of internal climate migrants in the countries within the region could see anywhere from a 3.3-fold increase to a 5.0-fold increase between 2025 and 2050. Greatest gains are realized under the optimistic scenario, which combines low emissions with equitable development. These projections emphasize the value of early action on both climate and development fronts. Internal climate migration is not uniform across countries—and depends on demographic patterns and economic trends, but climate is increasingly a potent factor. Of the West African coastal countries, Nigeria is projected to have the highest mean number of internal climate migrants under the pessimistic scenario by 2050 (8.3 million) far ahead of Senegal (0.6 million) and Ghana (0.3). However, smaller countries, such as Benin, also exhibit high internal climate migration figures as a percentage of their total population—1.62 percent for Benin compared to 1.93 percent for Nigeria and with Senegal achieving the highest percentage at 1.98 percent. Internal climate-induced migration could emerge as an important type of internal migration in West African countries by 2050. The number of internal climate migrants compared to other internal migrants is projected to increase across scenarios, decades, and countries, particularly under the high emission scenarios, and significantly so in Benin, Senegal, and Nigeria. At the regional level, internal climate migrants could account for one third of all internal migrants as early as 2030 under the pessimistic scenario. Projected Number of Internal Climate Migrants in West African Figure ES.3 Projected Trajectory of Internal Climate Migrants, West African Countries Countries, under the High End of the Pessimistic Scenario by 2050 2025–50 20 Internal Climate migrants (millions) 15 10 5 0 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 Optimistic More Climate-Friendly More Inclusive Development Pessimistic Groundswell Africa: Internal Climate Migration in West African Countries 5 Timely and concrete climate and development action can modulate the scale of future climate-induced human mobility, but the window of opportunity for optimum gains is quickly closing. The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)’s Sixth Assessment Report (2021) highlights the growing nature of the climate crisis and the urgency for action. The latest science on warming and impacts could challenge the prospects of reducing the scale of climate migration under the optimistic scenario. More extensive and extreme climate impacts on water availability, crop and ecosystems productivity, and sea level rise will have significant ramifications for population movements. For example, the number of climate migrants in Senegal could drop from a mean value of 603,000 under the pessimistic scenario in 2050 to 92,000 in 2050 under the optimistic scenario. These projections underscore the need for both inclusive development and low emissions for modulating the scale of climate migration, but also the need to pursue highly resilient policies and shifts toward less climate-sensitive sectors at scale. MESSAGE 3 The emergence of internal climate in- and out-migration hotspots in West African countries as early as 2030 requires holistic and far sighted approaches to ensure sustainable and durable outcomes. Climate in- and out-migration hotspots in West African countries could emerge as early as 2030 and intensify and spread by 2050 (figure ES.4, panels a and b). These plausible hotspots, aggregated based on country analysis, represent areas where population movements are considered high certainty across the scenarios. Population movements are expected to shift in response to changes in the ability of ecosystem to support livelihoods, particularly in terms of changing water availability, crop productivity, and NPP, and habitability of coastal systems in a context of sea level rise compounded by storm surges. Climate out-migration hotspots reflect a dampening or increase in population growth in response to climatic factors and do not necessarily imply an absolute decline or growth of population numbers. The emergence, spread, and intensity of hotspots within countries in West Africa calls for contextualized understanding and early action to avert and reduce adverse consequences and harness opportunities. Climate in-migration hotspots are projected to emerge in the Sahel because of increases in water availability and pasturage. These results must be interpreted against the low baseline of water availability in the region. South-central Mauritania, southeastern Mali, and northern Nigeria will be large climate in-migration hotspots in the area. Climate out-migration could become prominent in the Dakar- Diourbel-Touba corridor by 2050. Countries with high populations, such as Nigeria and Niger, dominate the hotspots map, but with normalization for population, demographically smaller countries such as Benin, Sierra Leone, Senegal, and Mauritania show prominent climate in- and out-migration hotspots. Vincent Tremeau / World Bank 6 Groundswell Africa: Internal Climate Migration in West African Countries Figure ES.4 Projected Hotspots of Climate In- and Out-migration within West African Countries by 2030 and 2050 a. 2030 b. 2050 IN-MIGRATION OUT-MIGRATION High certainty in high levels of climate High certainty in high levels of climate in-migration out-migration Moderate certainty in high levels of climate Moderate certainty in high levels of climate in-migration out-migration Low certainty in high levels of climate Low certainty in high levels of climate in-migration out-migration Note: High, moderate and low certainty reflects agreement across all four, three, and two scenarios modeled respectively. In- and out-migration hotspots are thus areas in which at least two scenarios concur on density changes. Data is based on compilation of West African country results between the climate and no climate impact scenarios by country for the top and bottom 5th percentile differences in the density distribution for climate in- and out-migration respectively. Groundswell Africa: Internal Climate Migration in West African Countries 7 Unmanaged climate migration patterns will not just undermine poverty eradication but can also roll back development gains in cities and centers of growth. Many climate in-migration hotspots in West Africa face severe environmental challenges due to climate change, including landslides, flooding, droughts, and land degradation, on top of other development challenges, such as high poverty rates, informal human settlements, and weak services and infrastructure. Climate in-migration hotspots projected for the northern and northwestern Nigerian states of Kano, Katsina, and Sokoto, coincide with areas of high poverty incidence. In contrast, Dakar and the west-central part of Senegal, where poverty levels are lower, could emerge as climate out-migration hotspots. These trends, in many cases, run counter to the historical development-induced migration trajectory. Better management of environmental and water resources and the rural landscapes is an essential part of any strategy to counter adverse consequences of migration and displacement. Water stress, declining crop and NPP productivity, and sea level rise will become increasingly potent drivers of internal climate migration in West African countries over the next decades. Generally, areas that see positive deviations in water, crop and ecosystem productivity experience more in-migration, as reflected through spatial population distribution shifts. The coefficient for water availability in rural areas is around 2.7 times higher than that of crop production and 2.8 times that of NPP. Senegal, for example, is projected to become drier in the western and coastal areas. Under some models, the whole country could become drier, in some cases significantly. Ghana could see modest wetting in the north and drying across several models in the south. Drying could be high: up to 50 percent to 70 percent reductions in water availability projected in the Accra metropolitan area. In the south of Mauritania, crop production declines under most model runs by 2050. Across the region, the climate signal will become far stronger toward the end of the 21st century. In the West Africa study, the addition of nonclimate factors (median age, sex, and conflict) applied to individual countries provides a more complete representation of how climate-induced migration trends could manifest within countries. For example, higher median age, associated with the migrant-attracting urban areas in West Africa, dampens the effects of water stress, which would otherwise drive climate out-migration. This was observed in the coastal areas from Côte d’Ivoire to Nigeria. Conflict hotspots tend to be associated with slow or declining rural population growth and slightly more rapid urban population decline, because when civil conflicts break out it may be easier to shelter in place in rural areas than in urban areas. The climate migration hotspots are not predestined, but the agreement across the scenarios on climate in- and out-migration underscores the need for farsighted and anticipatory approaches to address the adverse consequences of climate-induced migration (box ES.2). For example, in the climate out-migration hotspot in Lomme Commune in Togo, the number of climate out-migrants would be reduced almost threefold in the optimistic scenario compared to the pessimistic scenario. These approaches may require adapt-in-place measures to protect communities and assets and provision of basic services and job opportunities. Managed retreat will need to be facilitated in areas that pose high levels of climate risks. Box ES.2 summarizes the results of a workshop in Accra in September 2019 and a virtual consultation in March 2021. Table ES.1 summarizes the regional results, aggregated based on country level data and analysis. 8 Groundswell Africa: Internal Climate Migration in West African Countries Table ES.1 Summary of Results Aggregated for the West African Countries Factors Regional Results Population Increases from 430.1 million to 676.1 million (in SSP2) or 447.4 million to in 2025 789.1 (in SSP4) and 2050 Total population at 306.9 million baseline (2010) Primary drivers Water availability, followed by crop productivity and changes in NPP, which will affect livestock herding Number of internal Highest in pessimistic (reference) scenario, with average projection of 19.3 climate migrants by million (2.44% of projected population) and a high end of 32.0 million climate 2050 migrants (4.06%). Trajectory Relatively persistent increase in the number of climate migrants: roughly 2.5 to 2050 million additional climate migrants per decade from 2025 to 2050 under the pessimistic scenario. There is a slight upward inflection after 2040 under the high emissions scenario (pessimistic and inclusive development scenarios). Internal climate in- In the Sahel: relatively large, spatially contiguous climate in-migration migration hotspots hotspots (south-central Mauritania, southeastern Mali, and northern Nigeria) because of projected increases in water availability and pasturage. These increases are consistent with climate model projections that show wetting in the eastern portions of West Africa, but there are uncertainties not fully captured in the two climate models used in this report. In coastal countries: coastal urban areas could still grow due to their job opportunities and amenities, but climate impacts are likely to shift populations slightly inland. Internal climate out- In the Sahel: large climate out-migration hotspots are projected in southern migration hotspots Niger and on the border between Mali and Mauritania. In coastal countries: climate out-migration hotspots are associated with major urban areas, which generally entail large numbers of migrants, despite the small areas, because they attract migrants searching for employment, etc. Coastal dynamics The coastal zone (defined as the 5-kilometer band along the coast) is projected to see an average of out-migration of 1.8 million people (and a high of 2.2 million people) in 2050 under the high emissions scenario. Under the low emissions scenario this could be between 300,000 and 800,000 people. Major climate out-migration hotspots are projected in coastal Senegal and along the entire coastline of the Gulf of Guinea (from Abidjan to Lagos). Monrovia, Liberia, and Conakry, Guinea, could emerge climate in-migration hotspots. Climate migrants The projected number of internal climate migrants by 2050 is 19.3 compared to other million and that of other internal climate migrants is 36.4 million, in the migrants by 2050 pessimistic scenario. Note: Based on aggregated individual country data. SSP2 represents a moderate development pathway, and SSP4, an unequal development pathway. NPP = net primary productivity; SSP = Shared Socioeconomic Pathway. Groundswell Africa: Internal Climate Migration in West African Countries 9 Box ES.2 Regional Consultation on Internal Climate Migration The report benefited from a regional consultation on internal climate migration with participants from civil society, government institutions, academia, and international bilateral and multilateral organizations (World Bank, unpublished). There was consensus among participants on key results areas: on the growing importance of the factors related to water stress, drops in crop productivity and sea level rise, and the overall potency for climate factors to drive migration and displacement. Participants also found the scenarios and climate in- and out-migration hotspots in this report plausible and highlighted the importance of preparedness and resiliency. The consultation stressed the need to assess additional factors affecting the vulnerability of certain sectors and demographic groups, such as the link between migration, conflict, and instability, and the need for an early, integrated and holistic approach to climate-induced migration. MESSAGE 4 Global responsibility for swift action to cut greenhouse gas emissions is critical to reducing the scale of internal climate migration. Global commitments to cut greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are off-track to meet the Paris targets. The latest IPCC report (2021) finds that the global average temperature increase will exceed 1.5°C during the 21st century unless there is a deep reduction in greenhouse gas emissions in the upcoming decades. Without immediate, rapid, and large-scale reductions in GHG emissions, limiting warming to 2°C will be beyond reach. Beyond the threshold temperatures, extreme events will rise and climate-related risks for natural and human systems become higher, with disproportionate impacts on the poorest and most vulnerable (IPCC 2021; UNEP 2020). Some impacts are already locked-in. Increased warming and climate impacts will have consequences for the changing viability of ecosystems and associated livelihoods, and on low-lying cities and coastlines vulnerable to sea, fueling increased levels of migration. Without aggressive global emission reductions to meet the Paris targets, the opportunity to reduce the scale of internal climate migration as set out under the low emission scenarios will be hard to achieve. The far-reaching consequences of internal climate migration means that the international community cannot relinquish its efforts. The responsibility for solving the challenges of internal climate migration cannot be delegated solely to the very communities that may have to move in response to increasing intensity and frequency of climate impacts. Strong, inclusive, and resilient development may be the first line of defense in the face of stalling action on GHG emissions, but will not suffice by itself. Managing environmental and land degradation, vulnerable coastal systems, and pastoral livelihoods is particularly challenging, and countries must pursue green, resilient, and inclusive development that cuts across spatial and timescales. Major GHG emission countries must find direct and indirect ways to complement countries’ efforts on climate- induced migration through support of technologies, capacity, and financing. 10 Groundswell Africa: Internal Climate Migration in West African Countries MESSAGE 5 Coastal hazards will accelerate on the West African coast to become a major driver of internal climate migration, projecting a reversal in the conventional migration trend towards coastal cities. West Africa’s coastline is particularly vulnerable to erosion, sea level rise, increasing temperatures, and flooding. The capitals and other large cities of Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Togo are all located on the coast. Despite risks, coastal cities such as Dakar, Abidjan, Accra, and Lagos continue to grow and provide economic opportunities to migrants from economically depressed areas. More than 6 million Nigerians live in the low elevation coastal zone, followed by Senegal (1 million), Mauritania and Benin (0.8 million each), Côte d’Ivoire (0.7 million), Ghana (0.6 million), and Togo (83,000)(CIESIN and CIDR 2021). A special focus on the 5-kilometer coastal zone of West Africa reveals that between 0.3 million and 2.2 million people could be compelled to move within their countries by 2050. Mauritania is projected to face the highest relative sea level rise over the course of this century because of coastal subsidence, and parts of Nouakchott already prone to flooding seawater intrusion and rising groundwater will likely see climate out-migration as early as 2030. Major climate out-migration hotspots are projected in coastal Senegal and along the entire coastline of the Gulf of Guinea. In Nigeria, climate out-migration is projected in the south and southeast and coastal states, including Lagos, Ogun, Rives, Ondo, Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers, and Akwa. By 2050, Senegal could have up to 443,000 coastal climate out-migrants under the high end of the pessimistic scenario (5.58 percent of the coastal population), while Benin could have up to 154,000 (4.97 percent). Nigeria could have the highest number of coastal climate out-migrants, with close to 1 million by 2050 under the high end of the distribution for the pessimistic scenario. By contrast, Côte d’Ivoire is projected to have up to 26,000 climate out-migrants (1 percent). The exposure and vulnerability of West Africa’s coastal activities and infrastructure to climate change risks will increase the probability of secondary reverse migration. Sea level rise, storm surge, and declining water availability will likely reduce the growth of coastal urban areas in certain countries (notably Senegal and Ghana). Large cities such as Dakar, Abidjan, Accra, and Lagos will continue to grow because they provide economic opportunities to those from more economically depressed areas, but the population growth at the hotspots will be dampened as a consequence of climate factors. Early, farsighted, and inclusive action to reinforce these coastal areas with green and gray infrastructure, where appropriate, and comprehensive coastal zone planning are essential. MESSAGE 6 Internal climate migration cannot be divorced from development, and as the human face of climate change must be addressed in a holistic, end-to-end manner. Internal climate migration in West Africa is a reality that can be nurtured into a positive force through a focus on a core set of policy areas and domains of action. The Migration and Climate-informed Solutions (MACS) framework (figure ES.5) brings together domains of action, buttressed by core policy areas, to reduce the scale of climate-induced migration across time and space, usher in social and economic transformation, and reduce vulnerabilities. This anticipatory approach will ensure that the countries’ economies are braced not just for the challenges but have the readiness to harness the opportunities of internal climate migration. Groundswell Africa: Internal Climate Migration in West African Countries 11 The core policy areas, as advocated by the first Groundswell report, remain critically important: • Cut GHGs now. • Pursue inclusive, climate-resilient, and green development. • Embed migration in development planning. • Invest in an improved understanding of migration. The diverse context of West African countries where internal climate migration will play out calls for focused attention and solidarity. It can be guided by these five action domains to avert migration driven by adverse impacts of climate change: • Conduct spatio-temporal analytics to understand the emergence of climate migration hotspots. • Adopt farsighted landscape and territorial approaches. • Harness climate migration for jobs and economic transitions. • Nurture humanitarian-development-peace partnerships. • Domesticate policies and bridge legal gaps. Action must be pursued through dedicated local and national action and regional cooperation, as appropriate. Unfortunately, a certain amount of warming is already locked-in due to historical GHG emissions, so pursuing inclusive and climate-resilient development policies must be a priority. Policies must focus on the full migration life cycle, including creating measures that can help communities to adapt in place where local adaptation options are viable and sensible; or enable mobility or movement for people facing unavoidable climate risks when the limits of local adaptation and ecosystems are reached. Critically, after migration, policy measures and other support must ensure that sending and receiving areas, and their people, are well-connected and adequately prepared to accommodate both outflows and inflows of people for the medium and longer term. Box ES.3 MACS Framework The MACS framework is the outcome of the World Bank’s efforts through the Groundswell reports and subsequently deeper dives through Groundswell Africa to better understand the implications of climate-induced migration and mainstream this phenomenon into development plans, programs, and policies. It stems from the result of the abovementioned modeling exercise, contextualized against current and historical mobility patterns, peer-reviewed literature, and multistakeholder consultations. A portfolio review of the design features of 165 World Bank projects operating at the climate-migration-development nexus further informs this framework (Rigaud et al. 2021b). MACS is flexible and adaptive, based on the premise that climate migration is linked to broader development challenges across spatial scales. It can guide policy makers and practitioners by offering critical information and insights related to development and policy implications of climate-induced internal migration.  This reflects the call for anticipatory approaches over larger time and spatial scales to avert and minimize the adverse consequences of climate-induced migration and harness opportunities brought forth by migration. 12 Groundswell Africa: Internal Climate Migration in West African Countries Climate-Smart Opportunities for Migration with Proactive and Sustainable Solutions (COMPASS) Figure ES.5 Migration and Climate-informed Solutions (MACS) Framework Conduct spatio-temporal Adopt farsighted analytics on climate landscape and migration hotspots territorial approaches Improve Cut understanding greenhouse on migration gases Domesticate Harness climate policies and migration for jobs bridge legal gaps Pursue inclusive, Embed and economic climate-resilient, migration in transitions and green development development Nurture humanitarian- development-peace partnerships Core Policy Actions Action Domains The scale, trajectory, and geographical spread of internal climate migration in West African countries calls for focused attention and urgent policy action. Addressing long-standing environmental challenges is a time-sensitive imperative in West Africa, where lives, livelihoods, and the economy are integrally linked with climate-sensitive livelihoods. Attention to environment degradation, pressures on pastoral livelihoods, water stress, declines in crop productivity and sea level rise must be addressed as part of landscape and territorial approaches. Unattended, these adverse consequences will lead to climate-induced migration, deepen existing vulnerabilities, and increased poverty, fragility, conflict, and violence. Underpinned by the MACS framework and in support of a country’s development vision and plans, the right set of climate and development policies measures taken today can help avert adverse outcomes and harness opportunities of climate-induced migration in West Africa. For example, Nigeria’s Economic and Recovery Growth Plan aims to achieve agriculture and food security and create jobs for youth skilled in information and communications technology (ICT) hardware. These goals have much in common with the priorities in the MACS framework. Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) recognize climate-induced migration as an adaptation strategy and a way to counter the adverse consequences of climate impacts. The Country Partnership Frameworks (CPFs) through which the World Bank supports its client countries could include polices and investments that can take a longer-term view to addressing climate migration, such as job diversification, land and landscape management, climate change resilience, environmental risk management, and provision of basic rural and urban services. The Country Climate Development Report (CCDR), a new World Bank diagnostic, provides a further opportunity to understand and address climate-induced migration as a crucial part of supporting countries to identify low-carbon and resilient pathways and deliver the sustainable development goals. The development community is not starting from zero. For example, the World Bank carried out a portfolio review (Rigaud et al. 2021b) to draw actionable insights from 165 World Bank projects operating at the climate-migration-development nexus, with commitments reaching US$197.5 billion (from 2006 to 2019). The learnings show that a more systematic and anticipatory approach in designing projects geared toward addressing climate migration is possible. Increasingly, projects not only address migrants’ direct needs but support for enabling interventions (early warning systems and social safety nets) and address underlying causes of mobility. There is a need to step up such integrative approaches with great vigor and urgency—acting in partnership and engagement with those directly affected. Groundswell Africa: Internal Climate Migration in West African Countries 13 MESSAGE 7 Climate migration, as a cross-cutting issue, has to be addressed through policy-informed actions that are farsighted in their approach and execution. The five action domains outlined in the MACS framework can bolster the delivery of the core policies to reduce, avert, and minimize distress-driven internal climate migration. The call for action on internal climate migration is clear and compelling. Conceiving effective responses by investing in iterative scenario modeling, grounded in new data and development progress, will be crucial to support decision-making. While the report does not focus exclusively on cross-border migration, the modeling identifies numerous migration hotspots in areas close to national borders. Climate change can be an inhibitor or a driver of cross-border migration, depending on a range of factors that propel individuals to decide to move or stay. Such investments should try to facilitate long-term planning, such as in adaptive capacity, to secure climate resilience. This will require cooperation not only at the international level but also at the local levels. One example is through the Regional Sahel Pastoralism Support project, which seeks to improve access to essential productive assets, services, and markets for pastoralists and agropastoralists in selected transborder areas and along transhumance axes across six Sahel countries (Plante 2019). Conduct spatio-temporal analytics to gauge the emergence of climate migration hotspots in coastal areas, particularly cities as engines of growth (Dakar, Lagos, Cotonou, Accra, Nouakchott, São Tomé, and Lomé) and areas of high poverty incidence (Kano in Nigeria, Korhogo in Côte d’Ivoire, and near Matam in Senegal) to set out for the challenges and opportunities. More investment is needed to better contextualize and understand climate migration, particularly at scales ranging from regional to local, where climate impacts may deviate from the broader global trends. Building country-level capacity to collect and monitor relevant data can increase understanding of the interactions among climate impacts, ecosystems, livelihoods, and mobility, and help countries tailor policy, planning, and investment decisions. Embrace landscape and territorial approaches to enable early planning and action across spatial and time scales to devise strategies that straddle hotspots (Accra and lower Volta River Basin in Ghana; San Pedro and Yamoussoukro in Cote d’Ivoire) in response to the dynamics of climate in- and out-migration localities. The coastal erosion rates are high in Togo and expected to exacerbate under sea level rise especially in low-lying areas of Lomé. Nouakchott, the capital of Mauritania, faces severe risks from sea level rise and coastal erosion. Its rapidly growing urban areas extend into low-lying portions, putting more inhabitants at risk. The agriculture- and livestock-dependent households in northeast Senegal (the Sahelian zone) are sensitive to land degradation and desertification. However, in Senegal’s Saint-Louis, coastal erosion has become an existential threat and planned relocation has taken place. Site-based and locally driven practices for forest and water management, integrated community programs, and land use plans, including for coastal areas, can be part of the landscape approaches for emerging hotspots in high-poverty regions. Harness climate-induced migration for jobs and economic transitions to leverage growth and development opportunities based on West African countries’ youth bulge, structural transformations in climate sensitive sectors (e.g. agriculture, rainfed crops), and investment in human capital for green growth, including through skills development and education. For instance, Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, has high social vulnerability with low levels of maternal education. Mauritania could see a relatively large level of climate migration out of the coastal zone: up to 300,000 under the pessimistic scenario. The main impacted area is 14 Groundswell Africa: Internal Climate Migration in West African Countries the surrounding and to the north of Nouakchott. Supporting climate-smart urban transitions with energy efficient, green, and resilient urban infrastructure and services, and embracing secondary cities or peri-urban areas as new growth poles, will offer ways to make migration a force for positive transformation. Nurture development-humanitarian-peace partnerships to capitalize on comparative advantages to support the needs of migrants and host communities. Stepped-up action by development, humanitarian, security, and disaster communities across the mobility continuum will help overcome barriers around funding sources, coordination mechanisms, and project timelines. Ultimately, this commitment will help countries pursue durable and holistic solutions. In Nigeria, conflicts between pastoralists and farmers in the northern states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa, in a context of terrorism and insecurity linked to Boko Haram, call for a new look at farmer-herder conflicts and the integration of humanitarian-development-peace efforts. Domesticate policies and bridge legal gaps in response to existing legal frameworks, agreements, and processes, and mobilize action, for example through the Kampala Convention. Climate-induced migration lies at the intersection of human rights, climate change, sustainable development, disaster risk reduction, and countries’ sectoral frameworks pertaining to the environment and management of natural resources. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment (1979) and the adoption of the ECOWAS Transhumance Protocol (1998) and Regulation (2003) are major achievements to facilitate human and livestock mobility. The legally binding African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (also known as the Kampala Convention) is a key regional framework for protecting internally displaced persons. The Convention, which has been either signed or ratified by several countries in West Africa, addresses internal displacement caused not only by armed conflicts but also by natural or humanmade disasters and focuses on the root causes of internal displacement to provide durable solutions. These collaborative and legal efforts should be applauded, but they remain insufficient to address the wide range of factors driving people to move internally and across borders. Domestication of regional (such as the Kampala Convention) and global frameworks and agreements (such as the Global Compact for Migration), and the operationalization of regional protocols (ECOWAS) into national practices, including to protect affected communities, can foster meaningful consultation about temporary migration and relocation, and secure people’s tenure at their new location and ability to move with dignity. World Bank financing instruments support climate and mobility, and further support could focus on developing opportunities and policies for the safe movement of people and on providing viable options for in situ adaptation. Climate-induced migration will be a reality in West Africa, and action cannot be postponed—the stakes are too high. The countries in the region can embark on a green, resilient, and inclusive path for development by exploiting new economic opportunities, recognizing that structural transformations must be informed by and responsive to climate change. Climate actions and plans should consider climate-induced migration and displacement. Spatial dimension and emergence of hotspots are critical to resilience-building efforts. Anticipatory and transformative action across the migration cycle will help to ease people out of vulnerability. The global community must do its part to contain GHG emissions as a critical part of reducing climate-induced migration. Climate migration is a reality, and acting now will lead to sustainable outcomes for all concerned. This latest World Bank report on climate migration in West Africa is also a call for collective action to reduce GHG emissions and for the development, humanitarian, disaster, and security communities to come together. Responding today will help secure the foundations of a peaceful, stable, and secure region for the people of West Africa, the continent of Africa, and the global community. Groundswell Africa: Internal Climate Migration in West African Countries 15 REFERENCES CIESIN (Center for International Earth Science Information Network) and CIDR (CUNY Institute for Demographic Research). 2021. “Low Elevation Coastal Zone (LECZ) Urban-Rural Population and Land Area Estimates, Version 3.” NASA Socioeconomic Data and ApplicaSons Center (SEDAC). Palisades, NY. 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