Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No: ICR00004278 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA H514-RW, TF-097484, TF-097476, TF-016108, IDA 5432-RW, TF-A3913) ON A GRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 5.2 MILLION (US$8.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT) AND TRUST FUND GRANTS IN THE AMOUNT OF US$9.1 MILLION ADDITIONAL TRUST FUND GRANTS IN THE AMOUNT OF US$3.1 MILLION AND AN ADDITIONAL CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 5.8 MILLION (US$8.9 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA FOR THE SECOND EMERGENCY DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION PROJECT ( P112712 ) June 13, 2018 Social, Urban, Rural And Resilience Global Practice Africa Region CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective December 31, 2017) Currency Unit = Rwandan Franc (FRw) FRw 859 = US$ 1.00 US$ 1.00 = SDR 0.70 FISCAL YEAR July 1 - June 30 Regional Vice President: Makhtar Diop Country Director: Diarietou Gaye Senior Global Practice Director: Ede Jorge Ijjasz-Vasquez Practice Manager: Robin Mearns Task Team Leader(s): Natacha Caroline Lemasle ICR Main Contributor: Murat Onur ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AF Additional Financing AG Armed Group BNK Basic Needs Kit CAS Country Assistance Strategy CM Community Member CPS Country Partnership Strategy DRC Democratic Republic of Congo DDR Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration EDPRS Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy EDRP Emergency Demobilization Reinsertion and Reintegration Project EMP Environmental Management Plan ESMF Environmental and Social Management Framework FDLR Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda FM Financial Management HIV/AIDS Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross IEI Independent External Evaluation IGA Income-generating Activity IMAGES International Men and Gender Equality Survey ISM Implementation Support Mission ISR Implementation Status and Results Report IT Information Technology JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency KfW German Development Bank (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau) LOGiCA Learning on Gender and Conflict in Africa M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MDRP Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program MDTF Multi-Donor Trust Fund MIGEPROF Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion MINALOC Ministry of Local Government MINECOFIN Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning MINISANTE Ministry of Health MIS Management Information System MONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo MTR Midterm Review NCC National Commission for Children NCCR National Cooperatives Confederation of Rwanda NCPD National Council of Persons with Disabilities NET Narrative Exposure Therapy NGO Nongovernmental Organization NURC National Unity and Reconciliation Commission OAG Office of the Auditor General PDO Project Development Objective PDOP Pre-Discharge Orientation Program PTSD Post-traumatic stress disorder RCA Rwanda Cooperative Agency RDF Rwandan Defense Forces RDRC Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission RDRP Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program REMA Rwanda Environment Management Authority RG Reintegration Grant RICEM Rwanda Institute of Cooperatives, Entrepreneurship and Microfinance RSA Recognition-of-Service Allowance RWAMREC Rwandan Men’s Resource Center SEDRP Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project STEP Systematic Tracking of Exchanges in Procurement TDRP Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program TTL Task Team Leader UN United Nations VSW Vulnerability Support Window WDA Workforce Development Authority XC Ex-combatant The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) TABLE OF CONTENTS DATA SHEET ....................................................................... ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES ....................................................... 7 A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL .........................................................................................................7 B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION .............................................................. 11 II. OUTCOME .................................................................................................................... 13 A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs ............................................................................................................ 13 B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY) ...................................................................................... 13 C. EFFICIENCY ........................................................................................................................... 22 D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING .................................................................... 23 E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (IF ANY) ............................................................................ 23 III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME ................................ 25 A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION ................................................................................... 25 B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION ............................................................................. 26 IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME .. 28 A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E) ............................................................ 28 B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE ..................................................... 31 C. BANK PERFORMANCE ........................................................................................................... 33 D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME ....................................................................................... 34 V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................. 35 ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS ........................................................... 36 ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT ............................................... 62 ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT ........................................................................... 65 ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS ........................................................................................... 66 ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER COMMENTS ........................... 70 ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS .................................................................................. 72 ANNEX 7. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES................................................................... 76 ANNEX 8. ADDITIONAL LESSONS LEARNED ........................................................................... 79 ANNEX 9. LIST OF PEOPLE MET AND SUMMARY OF ICR CONSULTATIONS ............................. 81 ANNEX 10. MAP OF RWANDA .............................................................................................. 86 Page 1 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) DATA SHEET BASIC INFORMATION Product Information Project ID Project Name Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration P112712 Project Country Financing Instrument Rwanda Emergency Recovery Loan Original EA Category Revised EA Category Partial Assessment (B) Partial Assessment (B) Related Projects Relationship Project Approval Product Line Supplement P148116-Rwanda 21-Nov-2013 Recipient Executed Activities Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project Additional Financing P148706-Second 30-Apr-2014 IBRD/IDA Demobilization and Reintegration Project - Additional Financing Supplement P162274- Additional 01-Feb-2017 Recipient Executed Activities Financing Rwanda SEDRP Organizations Borrower Implementing Agency Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission Page 2 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) Project Development Objective (PDO) Original PDO The objective of the Project is to support the efforts o f the Recipient to: (i) demobilize members of armed groups o f Rwandan origin and members of the Rwandan Defense Force; and (ii)p rovide socioeconomic reintegration support to said members following demobilization, with a particular focus on the provision of such support to female, child, and disabled ex-combatants. FINANCING Original Amount (US$) Revised Amount (US$) Actual Disbursed (US$) World Bank Financing 8,000,000 8,000,000 8,029,816 IDA-H5140 4,500,000 4,499,947 4,499,947 TF-97484 4,592,734 4,592,734 4,592,734 TF-97476 2,348,382 2,348,377 2,348,377 TF-16108 8,970,000 8,970,000 8,130,347 IDA-54320 800,000 800,000 800,000 TF-A3913 Total 29,211,116 29,211,058 28,401,221 Non-World Bank Financing Borrower 2,000,000 0 2,000,000 Total 2,000,000 0 2,000,000 Total Project Cost 31,211,116 29,211,059 30,401,222 KEY DATES Approval Effectiveness MTR Review Original Closing Actual Closing 27-Aug-2009 09-Jun-2010 20-Jun-2011 31-Dec-2012 31-Dec-2017 21-Nov-2013 01-Feb-2017 Page 3 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING Date(s) Amount Disbursed (US$M) Key Revisions 07-Feb-2012 5.08 Other Change(s) 21-Dec-2012 6.89 Change in Loan Closing Date(s) 25-Nov-2013 8.03 Change in Loan Closing Date(s) Reallocation between Disbursement Categories 16-Dec-2013 8.03 Additional Financing 07-Apr-2014 8.03 Additional Financing 19-May-2014 8.03 Change in Loan Closing Date(s) 27-Jul-2015 11.33 Change in Loan Closing Date(s) 30-Jan-2017 15.12 Additional Financing 30-Jun-2017 15.94 Reallocation between Disbursement Categories 29-Sep-2017 16.16 Reallocation between Disbursement Categories KEY RATINGS Outcome Bank Performance M&E Quality Satisfactory Satisfactory Substantial RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs Actual No. Date ISR Archived DO Rating IP Rating Disbursements (US$M) 01 27-May-2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0 02 03-Dec-2010 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 1.85 03 15-Apr-2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 2.72 04 12-Nov-2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 5.08 05 03-Mar-2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 5.08 06 14-Oct-2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 6.89 07 24-Apr-2013 Satisfactory Satisfactory 6.90 08 18-Nov-2013 Satisfactory Satisfactory 7.78 09 06-Apr-2014 Satisfactory Satisfactory 8.03 10 11-Jun-2014 Satisfactory Satisfactory 8.03 Page 4 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) 11 06-Aug-2014 Satisfactory Satisfactory 8.03 12 19-Dec-2014 Satisfactory Satisfactory 8.03 13 19-May-2015 Satisfactory Satisfactory 10.38 14 21-Jul-2015 Satisfactory Satisfactory 11.33 15 22-Jan-2016 Satisfactory Satisfactory 12.43 16 17-Sep-2016 Satisfactory Satisfactory 14.37 17 03-Dec-2016 Satisfactory Satisfactory 14.82 18 13-Jun-2017 Satisfactory Satisfactory 15.71 19 09-Aug-2017 Satisfactory Satisfactory 16.16 SECTORS AND THEMES Sectors Major Sector/Sector (%) Social Protection 100 Social Protection 68 Public Administration - Social Protection 32 Themes Major Theme/ Theme (Level 2)/ Theme (Level 3) (%) Social Development and Protection 0 Social Inclusion 10 Participation and Civic Engagement 10 Fragility, Conflict and Violence 80 Conflict Prevention 40 Post-conflict reconstruction 40 Human Development and Gender 0 Gender 10 Private Sector Development 100 Jobs 100 Page 5 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) ADM STAFF Role At Approval At ICR Regional Vice President: Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Makhtar Diop Country Director: Johannes C.M. Zutt Diarietou Gaye Senior Global Practice Director: Inger Andersen Ede Jorge Ijjasz-Vasquez Practice Manager: Ian Bannon Robin Mearns Task Team Leader(s): Marcelo Jorge Fabre, Pia Peeters Natacha Caroline Lemasle ICR Contributing Author: Murat Fatin Onur Page 6 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL Context 1. Following the genocide in 1994, the Government of Rwanda (government) embarked on establishing a series of measures to address the social and economic impacts of the war. A key component of this process was disarmament and demobilization of armed groups (AGs) and national reconciliation. The government established the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC) and launched the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program (RDRP) in 1997 with the objective of helping ex-combatants (XCs) transition into civilian life and of reducing the size of the Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF). 2. Demobilization and reintegration efforts before the project. Supported by the United Nations Development Programme, the first phase of the RDRP was implemented from 1997 to 2001. In response to the continued presence of Rwandan AGs in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Government of Rwanda implemented a second phase of the RDRP in 2002. RDRP-II built on RDRP-I and learned from the lessons and challenges met particularly in the areas of project design, project outcomes, and understanding the constraints of the economic and social context within which the project was implemented. The government solicited financial and technical support from the World Bank, mainly through the International Development Agency (IDA) and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) of the World Bank- administered Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP). The World Bank support to the second phase of the RDRP was channeled through the Emergency Demobilization Reinsertion and Reintegration Project (EDRP), which was implemented from 2002 to 2008. 3. At the time of the EDRP’s closure, there were still an estimated 8,000 members of AGs of Rwandan origin, mostly belonging to the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), in the DRC. The FDLR was considered a major destabilizing factor in the region. In the context of the deteriorating security situation in the DRC, demobilization of AGs and efforts promoting regional security remained central to the Government of Rwanda’s Poverty Reduction Strategy and to the World Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for Rwanda at the time. Demobilization and reintegration activities were, therefore, considered as ways to consolidate development gains and continue to build national capacity and strengthen regional security. 4. Preparation of the project. Building on the successful implementation of the EDRP, in 2008, the government requested the assistance of the World Bank for a Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (SEDRP) to support the third phase of the RDRP. The SEDRP was financed by an IDA grant; the MDTF of the World Bank- administered Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program (TDRP); a second MDTF, co-funded by Sweden, the Netherlands, and Germany (German Development Bank [Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, KfW]); and a government contribution, to support the government to demobilize a final cohort of 4,000 RDF soldiers, the remaining AGs and to provide socioeconomic reintegration support to demobilized XCs, with a particular focus on female, child, and disabled XCs. The project also aimed at improving the capacity of project beneficiaries to advance their own socioeconomic reintegration and at increasing their access to national social protection programs. 5. The World Bank management warranted the application of World Bank Operational Policy on Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies (OP/BP 8.00) to better assist the government to maintain the RDRP and the capacity to respond to the demobilization and reintegration needs of an expected influx of remaining combatants into Rwanda. Page 7 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) While Rwanda was not considered a conflict-affected country at the time of project appraisal, at the end of the EDRP in 2008, the volatile nature of the situation in the eastern DRC made it difficult to predict when combatants would repatriate. There remained a considerable number of AG members in the eastern DRC, primarily belonging to the FDLR, which was considered a significant destabilizing factor by Rwanda and the international community. The application of emergency procedures was appropriate given the project’s contributions to regional peace and security, planned activities that target war-affected populations (XCs and dependents), and the added flexibility allowed for eligible areas of investment (for transitional safety net payments) and standard levels of retroactive financing. 6. Alignment with government and World Bank strategies. Having financed the EDRP and a number of demobilization and reintegration operations in Africa and other regions, the World Bank presented a clear comparative advantage to assist Rwanda with the third phase of the RDRP. The World Bank also had the convening power of bringing together donors, through the TDRP1 and the MDTF. The SEDRP was aligned with the World Bank’s poverty reduction and human development goals as indicated in the strategic and policy documents of the time. The project provided financial and technical assistance to one of Rwanda’s flagship programs, the RDRP, which continues to be has been an integral part of a series of multi-agency regional efforts contributing to peace and stability in the region. Both the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) 2008–2012 and the World Bank CAS for FY09–FY12 for Rwanda acknowledged the importance of activities financed by the project as part of wider efforts to consolidate peace and development. The EDPRS emphasized vocational and technical training, including the need for training to meet specific needs of vulnerable groups, as a key means to achieve the socioeconomic transformation as described in the government’s Vision 2020. Similarly, pillar two of the CAS for FY09–FY12, ‘Reduce Social Vulnerability’, presented objectives to support vulnerable Rwandans, including the promotion of peace and social cohesion through demobilization and reintegration. 7. The original project cost was US$19.1 million and included (a) an IDA grant (H514-RW), which became effective on June 9, 2010, for US$8 million; (b) an MDTF grant (TF097476), which became effective on January 5, 2011, for US$4.6 million; (c) a second MDTF grant (TF097484), which became effective on January 5, 2011, for US$4.5 million; and (d) a US$2 million counterpart contribution. Theory of Change (Results Chain) 8. Although not clearly described in the original project paper, the theory of change of the project was embedded in its core activities primarily in social and economic reintegration. The key objective of the project’s reintegration support was to help XCs reintegrate into society and be at par with the socioeconomic level of their peers in communities. With regard to long-term outcomes, it was expected to contribute to general peace in the eastern DRC by supporting the demobilization of the remaining AGs that have presented a general threat to the regional peace and stability. The project’s results chain is illustrated in Figure 1: 1 Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program DRP was the successor to the MDRP with a modified mandate. Page 8 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) Figure 1. Project Results Chain Project Development Objectives (PDOs) 9. The PDO was to support the efforts of the Recipient to: (i) demobilize members of Armed Groups of Rwandan origin and the Rwanda Defense Forces; and (ii) provide socioeconomic reintegration support to such members following demobilization, with a particular focus on female, child, and disabled Ex-combatants. Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators 10. The project had three key expected outcomes, as follows: • Increased number of beneficiaries settled in their chosen communities of destination • Improved capacity of beneficiaries to advance their own social and economic reintegration • Increased access of XCs to support services through central and local government service provision mechanisms (as opposed to through program services) 11. The following were the key performance indicators: • Demobilized RDF members (disaggregated by gender, ill/disabled) (number) • Demobilized AG members (disaggregated by gender, child, ill/disabled) (number) • Demand for demobilization service met (percentage) • Direct project beneficiaries (number) • Ex-combatants who are economically active (percentage) (disaggregated by gender, child, ill/disabled) • Ex-combatants who report social acceptance by their communities (percentage) (disaggregated by gender, child, ill/disabled) Page 9 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) Components 12. The original project paper presented five components: (a) Demobilization, (b) Reinsertion, (c) Reintegration, (d) Mainstreaming of Program Activities, and (e) Program Management. While there were no revisions in activities or components, key demobilization and reintegration activities were expanded with the provision of additional support with the additional financing (AF) (see revised components section below). 13. Demobilization. Demobilization is the process through which the individual combatant is formally discharged from the AGs or armed forces. The main activities were the following: verification and registration, collection of data on social, economic and health profile, pre-discharge orientation program (covering civic education, basic skills training, entrepreneurship, field tours, etc.), psycho-social and trauma counselling (including specialized services for survivors and witnesses of gender-based violence), and medical screening including for HIV/AIDs and voluntary counselling, support of basic needs, including food and shelter and basic health care and psycho-social support. 14. Reinsertion. This component provided support to individual XCs to meet their basic needs in the initial three- month period of adjustment to civilian life following the day of discharge from the demobilization center. It included a grant provided to beneficiaries to cover basic needs. For XCs of AGs, the project provided, on the day of discharge from a demobilization center, a Basic Needs Kit (BNK) to cover basic needs. For former members of the RDF, a Recognition-of- Service Allowance (RSA) was provided one month after demobilization. 15. Reintegration. This component covered activities designed to support the reintegration of XCs, through social and economic support, into the mainstream society, to the level of their peers. Economic reintegration activities included provision of a reintegration grant (RG) to the XCs for small subprojects. The XCs who remained among the most vulnerable, as identified through the application of a vulnerability criteria and thorough screening process, received additional support through the Vulnerability Support Window (VSW) in the form of vocational training, apprenticeship training, access to a maximum of two years of formal education, or small grants for income-generating activities (IGAs). Social reintegration activities included provision of specialized assistance to disabled XCs, including medical insurance, surgery, mobility devices, psycho-social support, and housing support for the most severely disabled XCs. This component also provided information, counselling, and referral support on HIV/AIDS, women’s rights, risks, prevention and mitigation of sexual and gender-based violence, resolving of family conflicts, and assisting families of deceased XCs. Further, this component provided job placement support to XCs and technical and advisory support to cooperatives of XCs. 16. Mainstreaming of Program Activities. This component was designed as a way to prepare the project’s exit strategy from its onset. It focused on a dual approach: (a) support advocacy and sensitization efforts to ensure that XCs who have resettled into communities of their choice are able to access national social protection support, as any other Rwandan citizen, and (b) capacity building and lessons sharing with relevant ministries and institutions that would be taking over some of the project activities when the project closed. 17. Program Management. This component financed project administration, internal management tasks, financial management (FM) and procurement, safeguards compliance, disbursements, and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of project activities. Page 10 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION Revised PDOs and Outcome Targets 18. The PDO and outcome targets were not revised. Revised PDO Indicators 19. An AF IDA credit (5432-RW) in the amount of US$8.9 million was approved in April 2014, at which time, changes were made to the project’s Results Framework.2 Changes to the PDO indicators included (a) revised target of PDO Indicator ‘percentage of ex-combatants who are economically active’ to align with economic activity levels of peers in host communities and clarified the criteria in defining economically active; and (b) revised data collection of PDO Indicator ‘percentage of ex-combatants who report social acceptance by their communities’ to exclude reporting of children due to child protection concerns. An AF grant (TFA3913) to the co-financing MDTF in the amount of US$0.8 million was approved in January 2017, at which time, the target for PDO indicator ‘percentage of ex-combatants who report social acceptance by their communities’ was revised from 80 percent to 65 percent, to better align the tar get for XCs with the situation of their peers in communities, according to relevant surveys that showed that on average, only 45 percent of community members (CMs) and 65 percent of XCs felt socially accepted by their communities.3 Revised Components 20. New demobilization and reintegration activities were added to project components with the AF of April 2014.4 These additions included (a) provision of orientation for dependents of AG XCs (demobilization component), (b) mental health screening, counseling, treatment, or referral for adult and children XCs (reintegration component), and (c) support to disabled XCs through Integrated Rehabilitation and Production Workshops (IRPWs) as part of reintegration component. The justification for additions to the reintegration component of support to disabled XCs was that this cohort of XCs ‘needed additional support to achieve economic reintegration’ and providing equipment to the government -funded IRPWs and offering cooperative trainings to the ex-combatants and their dependents at these workshops was using ‘an innovative additional entry point’ to support economic reintegration of disabled XCs.5 The justification to add these new activities was based on the lessons learned from the original project which were discussed extensively in the AF paper.6 Other Changes 21. Table-01 presents a summary of project restructurings, including three AFs, that were processed between February 2012 and September 2017. As discussed in the next section, the rationale for restructurings was primarily related to the nature of the program, which was essentially a demand-driven demobilization and reintegration initiative by nature, continuously affected by the evolving situation in the eastern DRC. Details of changes can be found in annex 7. 2 World Bank. 2014. Project Paper on a Proposed Additional Credit for the SEDRP. Report No: 84424-RW. The Amended and Restated Financing Agreement for the IDA Credit was signed on June 13, 2014. 3 World Bank. 2017. Project Paper on a Proposed Additional Financing for the SEDRP . Report No: 112301-RW. 4 World Bank. 2017. Project Paper on a Proposed Additional Financing for the SEDRP . Report No: 112301-RW. 5 World Bank. 2014. Project Paper on a Proposed Additional Credit in the Amount of SDR 5.8 million (US$8.97 million equivalent) for the SEDRP, Report No: 84424-RW, p. 4. 6 World Bank. 2014. Project Paper on a Proposed Additional Credit in the Amount of SDR 5.8 million (US$8.97 million equivalent) for the SEDRP, Report No: 84424-RW, p. 25. Page 11 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) Table-01. Summary of Changes Date Type of Change Details February 2012 Restructuring Redistribution of allocations across sources of financing December 2012 Restructuring Extension of closing dates of original IDA grant (H514-RW) and two co-financing trust fund (TF) grants (TF097476 and TF097484) November 2013 Restructuring • Reallocation of proceeds for IDA grant (H514-RW) and co-financing TF grant (TF097476) • Extension of the closing date of the IDA grant December 2013 AF • Processing of AF TF grant (TF016108) • Revisions in units of measure of intermediate results indicators April 2014 AF • Processing of AF IDA credit (5432-RW) • Revisions in project’s Results Framework May 2014 Restructuring No-cost extension of closing date of AF TF grant (TF016108) July 2015 Restructuring No-cost extension of closing dates of AF IDA credit (5432-RW) and AF TF grant (TF016108) January 2017 AF Processing of AF TF grant (TF-A3913) June 2017 Restructuring Reallocation between categories of expenditure September 2017 Restructuring Reallocation between categories of expenditure Rationale for Changes and Their Implication on the Original Theory of Change 22. The PDO, project components, and the core demobilization and reintegration activities (including the new activities as recommended during the midterm review [MTR]), as well as the implementation structure and mechanisms remained unchanged throughout implementation. Minor modifications in the Results Framework were included in project restructurings mainly to ensure efficient reporting and adjust project targets. Since the inception of the RDRP, the government’s position remained that all Rwandan members of AGs (except those accused of crimes against humanity and genocide) and their dependents may return to Rwanda to receive assistance to reintegrate into society. However, the region has been affected by varying levels of unrest, which have influenced the number of XCs and dependents repatriating mainly from the eastern DRC and being supported by the project. The project attempted to respond to the resulting fluctuating and unpredictable demand for demobilization and reintegration of repatriating XCs and dependents. This warranted project restructurings (including those concerning AF), extension of closing dates, and reallocation between categories of expenditures throughout the project.7 Similarly, budgeting of the project was done based on high estimates of incoming XCs and dependents to ensure that the project had the financial and technical capacity to absorb a sudden high intake, recognizing that toward the end of the project, if this intake did not materialize, these funds would then be reallocated, thus warranting the restructurings for reallocation of categories of expenditures. In this context, the changes summarized in this section had no implications on the theory of change. 7 Except for the first restructuring, which was processed to redistribute prorated allocations across sources of financing to compensate for the erroneous inclusion of retroactive financing in the project budget (40 percent of the grant was disbursed retroactively) in the pooled resources. Page 12 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) II. OUTCOME A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs Rating: High Assessment of Relevance of PDOs and Rating 23. The objective of the project is highly relevant, timely, and appropriate to the current needs of the government in responding to the demobilization and reintegration challenges, primarily concerning XCs arriving from the eastern DRC. The project has also been consistent with Rwanda’s commitment to regional peace and security. At completion, the project was aligned with the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS2) and the objective of maintaining domestic and regional peace and stability through increasing the rule of law, unity and reconciliation, and ensuring stability in Rwanda’s development process. The project objectives remain consistent with the current Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) for FY14–FY18. At closing, the project contributed to achieving objectives under the second theme of the CPS, namely ‘improving the productivity and incomes of the poor through rural development and social protection’.8 Specifically, Demobilization and Reintegration Program is listed as one of the key social protection programs that supported the stabilization of livelihoods of vulnerable groups.9 The PDO was also relevant as demobilization and reintegration needs of XCs repatriating from the eastern DRC are mentioned as an issue across themes under regional aspects.10 The World Bank’s implementation support was highly responsive and remained relevant to the PDO, including achieving both the government goals and objectives of the World Bank CAS for FY08–FY12 and CPS for FY14–FY18. While the country circumstances did not change during implementation, the project was highly responsive to changing needs and challenges, stemming primarily from the complex context in the eastern DRC. B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY) Rating: Substantial 24. By design, project activities were relevant to project’s objective and the project presented a clear logical link between inputs and outcomes. The PDO statement does not convey the benefits (changes) expected to flow to the beneficiaries, but it expresses the goal of supporting the government with its demobilization and reintegration program. The PDO statement presented two objectives in support of the recipient to (i) demobilize members of AGs of Rwandan origin and members of the RDF, and (ii) provide socioeconomic reintegration support to said members following demobilization, with a particular focus on the provision of such support to female, child, and disabled XCs.11 Toward the PDO, the project paper presented three intended outcomes: (a) Increased number of beneficiaries settled in their chosen communities of destination (b) Improved capacity of beneficiaries to advance their own social and economic reintegration (c) Increased access of XCs to support services through central and local government service provision mechanisms (as opposed to through program services) 8 World Bank. 2014. Country Partnership Strategy for Rwanda FY2014-2018. p. 34. 9 World Bank. 2014. Country Partnership Strategy for Rwanda FY2014-2018. p. 34. 10 World Bank. 2014. Country Partnership Strategy for Rwanda FY2014-2018. p. 36. 11 The PDO remained the same through the AFs. Page 13 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) Assessment of Achievement of Each Objective/Outcome Objective 1: Demobilize members of AGs of Rwandan origin and members of the RDF 25. The project aimed to support 4,000 RDF soldiers and 5,500 Rwandan combatants from AGs in the DRC, including an estimated 500 child soldiers. While the RDF numbers were based on real-life figures because these were soldiers on government payroll, the target of 5,500 Rwandan combatants from AGs was an estimate. Therefore, from the beginning, demobilization support was designed as a demand-driven exercise targeting potential beneficiaries, most of them in the neighboring DRC, whose repatriation flows are dependent on factors outside of the World Bank or borrower control. At completion, the project demobilized all 4,000 RDF members, including 4 females and 110 disabled former soldiers, and 4,739 combatants from armed groups, including 43 female combatants and 147 disabled combatants. In addition, the project received a total of 293 child soldiers, all of whom were demobilized at completion. Table0-2. Status of Demobilization as of December 31, 2017 In-Process Discharged Total TOTAL 79 8,739 8,818 Total - 4,000 4,000 Of which Female - 4 4 RDF Of which Male - 3.996 3,996 Of which Disabled - 123 123 Total 79 4,739 4,818 Of which Female 2 43 45 AGs Of which Male 77 4,696 4,773 Of which Disabled - 147 147 Source: RDRC MIS. 26. Demobilization aimed at laying the foundation for social and economic reintegration. It consisted of a three- month program, called the Pre-Discharge Orientation Program (PDOP), which was designed to prepare beneficiaries for their reintegration. The PDOP included key information about life, society, and government in Rwanda, medical support, and psycho-social screening and counseling. With the AF in 2014, the project expanded its initial scope to include the dependents of XCs in this process, customizing a shorter PDOP targeting adult dependents of XCs. Beyond demobilization, dependents were also provided with a reinsertion kit and eligibility to receive VSW benefits through the deferral option (discussed later). The mini-PDOP was a condensed version of the PDOP targeting adult dependents of XCs for a period of two weeks, supporting spouses to stay for two weeks in Mutobo to benefit from medical and mental screening and support, and basic sensitization on benefits available through the project. Overall, more than 60 percent of adult dependents of XCs participated in mini-PDOP sessions at Mutobo Demobilization Center. 27. The comprehensive and well-tailored training syllabus at Mutobo Demobilization Center provided XCs a foundation for their reintegration. For example, instructors in Mutobo Demobilization Center specifically tailored instructions, such as agriculture methods, to the different locations and local conditions where XCs expected to resettle. Small-scale and often innovative activities (such as the introduction of micro-agriculture training, pre-vocational skilling and the mini-PDOP for dependents) were found to contribute to the effectiveness of the demobilization process, and thus the likelihood of successful reintegration results.12 This is broadly in line with the overall satisfaction with demobilization 12 Kash-Consult. 2017. Independent External Evaluation of the SEDRP (July 2014 to December 2015) . Page 14 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) services among beneficiaries according to RDRC reporting.13 Successive beneficiary surveys also confirm satisfaction regarding PDOP, particularly the orientation trainings among XCs.14 It must be noted that 100 percent of the demobilization demand being met with satisfactory results was partly attributable to availability of financing and flexible planning. 28. With 100 percent of the demobilization demand met15, the project successfully increased the number of beneficiaries settling in their chosen communities. At completion, the project exceeded its target of 95 percent with 100 percent of XCs reporting they freely choose their community of reintegration. Successive externally administered surveys verified this by highlighting positive social outcomes: a large majority of XCs felt that they were treated equally or better than their peers in communities when accessing medical care, and by local authorities, the judicial system, the police, and education system in their communities.16 29. Despite the demand-driven demobilization process, the project actively sought opportunities to encourage the repatriation of Rwandan XCs and their dependents from DRC. This was largely done via communications and sensitization activities in close collaboration with the World Bank communications team in Kigali. The project recruited a radio communications specialist who prepared a weekly radio show that included interviews with XCs leaders who repatriated to Rwanda through the RDRP. As part of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) initiated cross-border sensitization plan, the project organized Skype conferences linking Mutobo Demobilization Center and MONUSCO transit centers in the DRC, allowing families in Rwanda to speak with their relatives in the DRC. Similarly, the discharge ceremonies (conducted at the end of each demobilization phase at Mutobo Demobilization Center) were livestreamed through YouTube. According to RDRC reporting, there were 3,500 viewers per demobilization ceremony during live broadcasts. While communications and sensitization activities are widely seen effective by project stakeholders, it is not possible to assess the effectiveness and reach of these activities as internal and external surveys did not include questions on communications. Objective 2. Provide socioeconomic reintegration support to said members following demobilization, with a particular focus on the provision of such support to female, child, and disabled XCs. 30. The core objective of the project’s reintegration support was to help XCs reach a comparable level of social and economic life as their civilian peers. Therefore, the primary effort was to offer resources and economic incentives, namely pull factors, to XCs. Similarly, social reintegration support was to contribute to social cohesion and reconciliation among XCs and communities. Overall, the project demonstrably improved the capacity of its beneficiaries to advance their own reintegration with positive economic and social results. Successive surveys indicate strong sustainable reintegration across economic and social indicators, including disaggregated results by gender, disability, and status as a former child soldier. This is widely supported by project information and interviews during ICR consultations. 31. The project provided RGs to 4,000 former RDF members (including 4 females and 113 disabled), 4,668 XCs of AGs (including 42 females and 148 disabled),17 and 125 XCs, beneficiaries of the EDRP who did not receive their RGs at the 13 The externally-administered surveys found lower rates of satisfaction with services and information at Mutobo Demobilization Center in comparison to internal RDRC reporting. Further details about satisfaction ratings are provided in Annex 1. 14 RDRC. 2012. Payment Verification Survey of SEDRP (Data collected in October 2012); Nordic Consulting Group. 2015. 2014 Payment Verification Survey of SEDRP; and Kash-Consult. 2017. 2016 Payment Verification Survey. 15 The project demobilized 100% of the 4,00 ex-RDF members, 100% of the 4,739 ex-combatants of armed groups, and 100% of 293 former child soldiers. 16 Kash-Consult. 2017. Final Report of the 2016 Community Dynamics Study. 17 According to the project implementation manual, XCs received RGs within three months of discharge from the demobilization center. At completion, the project demobilized 4,739 XCs, of which 4,668 were provided with RGs. Page 15 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) time of its closing in 2008. The project provided 8,793 beneficiaries with RGs, representing 100 percent of the caseload (target was 9,500 including 4,000 RDF and an estimated 5,500 XCs). The review of project information indicates that grant payments were done systematically and the majority of XCs received their payments within the three months of discharge from the demobilization center as described in the project implementation manual. The RG was perceived positively among beneficiaries, indicating overall satisfaction with its use toward their economic wellbeing: more than 70 percent of XCs noted their satisfaction with the payment, while 15 percent indicated being neither dissatisfied nor satisfied.18 Similarly, more than 95 percent of XCs indicated there was sufficient communication from the RDRC on how to receive the payment.19 32. A key element of the RG was the emphasis on guidance and advice regarding this benefit. More than 90 percent of XCs noted their reintegration choice was an informed one, while 93 percent of XCs indicated that they received business development advice before using their grants and 83.4 percent indicated that they were satisfied with the advice.20 There is further evidence showing the overall positive impact of the grants and the project’s attention on its utilization: nearly all XCs (99 percent) that received the RG indicated they developed viable subprojects and more importantly, of the 91 percent of XCs who indicated receipt of development advice, only 1.7 percent indicated they were dissatisfied with that advice.21 33. At completion, 74.2 percent of XCs (target was 70 percent) were found to be economically active22 as opposed to 62.1 percent of CMs, signaling an overall positive economic performance and a causal relationship between the activities and achieved outcomes. When disaggregated by armed group/force affiliation, the disparity between former armed group combatants and former RDF members were not statistically important with 72.4 percent of armed group ex- combatants and 77.2 percent of former RDF were economically active.23 Table-3. Comparison of Ex-combatants and Community Members - Economically Active Ex-combatants (%) Community Members (%) Average 74.2 62.1 Women 82.7 53.2 Disabled 58.5 70.0 Children24 69.5 33.3 Source: IEI of the SEDRP (2017). 34. There is further supporting evidence on the overall positive impact of the project’s economic outcomes that are attributable to financed activities. More XCs than civilians had access to banking and credit institutions (73.9 percent versus 69.8 percent, respectively) and more XCs than civilians saved money after meeting household expenses (76.2 18 Kash-Consult. 2017. Final Report of the 2016 Payment Verification Survey. p. 13. 19 Kash-Consult. 2017. Independent External Evaluation of the SEDRP (July 2014 to December 2015) . 20 Kash-Consult. 2017. IEI of the SEDRP (July 2014 to December 2015). 21 Kash-Consult. 2017. IEI of the SEDRP (July 2014 to December 2015). 22 Economically active was measured through externally-administered tracer and community dynamics surveys, where respondents were asked to identify one occupation among 14 categories. Economically active corresponds to categories 2 to 14: 1 = Unemployed, 2 = Studying, 3 = Housewife / working in the home, 4 = Retired (but not economically active), 5 = Employed working for employer (agriculture), 6 = Employed working for employer (private sector), 7 = Employed working for employer (public sector), 8 = Self-employed (agriculture), 9 = Self-employed (service), 10 = Self-employed (retail), 11 = Self-employed (manufacture), 12 = Hustle / involved in or reliant on the informal economic (i.e. economically active in informal sector), 13 = Supplementing income through subsistence activities, and 14 = Other. 23 Kash-Consult. 2016. Dataset of the Community Dynamics Study. 24 Ex-combatants who entered the SEDRP as former child soldiers. Page 16 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) percent of XCs versus 61.4 percent, respectively) of CMs.25 Similarly, there was no major disparity between the dwellings of XCs and CMs: around 78 percent of XCs and 75 percent of CMs live in rural houses. 35. The project financed a broad range of social reintegration activities to promote reconciliation between XCs and civilians. Sports activities sponsored by the project are considered particularly important in terms of social reintegration by a wide range of stakeholders. For example, the project organized an annual football tournament, called the Peace Cup Tournament, which brought together ex-combatants and their peer from the communities. On each team, about half of the players were XCs and the rest community members. The XCs were either former military personnel or former combatants. The tournament was one of the most important tools of collective social action that helped counter the stigma of having taken part in combat. 36. With regard to social indicators, the review of project information and externally collected data indicates that there was little disparity between the social performance of XCs and their peers in communities: 78.5 percent of XCs (target was 65 percent) expressed they felt accepted in their communities compared to 84.1 of CMs. When disaggregated, the figures include 76.2 percent of female XCs, 69.8 percent of former child soldiers, and 71.7 percent disabled XCs. 26 When disaggregated by armed group/force affiliation, there was little disparity of social performance: 56.2 percent of armed group members and 68.3 percent of former RDF reported social acceptance.27 Table-4. Comparison of Ex-combatants and Community Members - Social Acceptance Ex-combatants (%) Community Members (%) Average 78.7 84.1 Women 76.2 87.8 Disabled 69.8 60.0 Children 71.7 83.9 Source: IEI of the SEDRP (2017). 37. There are strong indicators signaling the relationship between social reintegration activities and project results. There were visible signs of social cohesion and sense of understanding between XCs and CMs, reflecting sustainable reintegration outcomes.28 By the project closing, 69.6 percent of XCs, in comparison with 68.2 percent of CMs reported feeling belonging to their immediate community, while 69 percent of XCs in comparison with 69.3 percent of CMs reported feeling belonging to Rwandan society. Proportionally, XCs had higher literacy rates than CMs: 86.8 percent of XCs reported they could both ‘write and read’ compared to 75.7 percent of CMs. There is further evidence signaling a strong social reintegration performance of the project29 85.3 percent of XCs reported that they believe they are treated as regular Rwandan citizens in their communities, and 100 percent of the XCs reported that they are treated equally or better than CMs when accessing medical care, interacting with local authorities, the judicial system, the police, and the education system. Further, more XCs than CMs were found to be married (62.9 percent compared to 51.9 percent, respectively. Similarly, female XCs have higher literacy than female CMs (24 percent), as do disabled XCs when compared to disabled CMs (84.9 percent compared to 69.3 percent, respectively). 38. The project exceeded its targets concerning the additional support provided to XCs who were selected to benefit through the VSW scheme. At completion, more than 98 percent of XCs selected to receive VSW support and registered 25 Kash-Consult. 2017. Final Report of the 2016 Community Dynamics Study. 26 Kash-Consult. 2017. Independent External Evaluation of the SEDRP (July 2014 to December 2015) . 27 Kash-Consult. 2016. Dataset of the Community Dynamics Study. 28 Kash-Consult. 2017. Final Report of the 2016 Community Dynamics Study . 29 Kash-Consult. 2017. Final Report of the 2016 Community Dynamics Study. Page 17 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) to receive support had successfully completed their activities (98.52 percent in vocational training and apprenticeship, 98.17 percent in IGA support, and 91.52 percent in formal education). As noted earlier, the project expanded its VSW support to include dependents through the deferral option, allowing the primary beneficiary to transfer the VSW support to spouse or nominated dependent (at completion, around 5 percent of XCs chose to defer their benefits). 39. The project’s vocational training approach was particularly praised among different stakeholders. In cooperation with the national agencies such as the Workforce Development Authority (WDA) and international partners such as Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the RDRC offered XCs comprehensive, well-tailored, and nationally recognized vocational training. The trainings were delivered by existing centers, which were part of the overall national workforce and skill development framework. Upon completion, all trainees were given certificates of completion endorsed by the training institution, relevant ministries, and WDA. National recognition and certification assured vocational training graduates that their skills and knowledge would be recognized in the country and assured employers that such graduates would be sufficiently educated and skilled to perform the work they were hired to do. Being able to attain a national certificate adds assurance and thus builds confidence in the individual.30 The trainees were also provided with a start-up toolkit which helped them start their economic activity. Similarly, the project’s partnerships with international partners such as JICA, which supported the improvement of training centers to accommodate vocational training for disabled XCs, contributed to the success of training. The project managed to provide beneficiaries quality training, which helped them obtain technical and soft skills to reach the level of their peers in the communities. Vocational training not only contributed to overall positive economic outcomes, but also supported the reintegration process in the form of increased self-confidence and social skills, such as ability to work as part of a team and be involved in the community, life skills, and networking with others and employers.31 40. ICR interviews also revealed that many XCs used a combination of their vocational skills, soft skills such as civic education and entrepreneurship skills, and the start-up support provided to build their livelihoods. In fact, an important portion of XCs did not continue working in the vocation in which they received vocational training (see details in annex 1). Based on the overall positive economic performance of beneficiaries, it can be argued that, in addition to the formal trainings, the XCs benefited from the informal skills acquired during the project’s training activities. 41. In addition to RGs and provision of support through the VSW, the project implemented activities to form and capacitate economic cooperatives and to facilitate job placement. These activities contributed to successful reintegration outcomes. Cooperatives were supported with technical assistance, entrepreneurship training, experience and knowledge exchange tours, and awards offered to best-performing cooperative projects. An important aspect of this support was the fact that the RDRC worked with national agencies such as the Rwanda Agriculture Board, Rwanda Cooperative Agency (RCA), National Cooperatives Confederation of Rwanda (NCCR), and the Rwanda Institute of Cooperatives, Entrepreneurship and Microfinance (RICEM). Although there is no quantitative study that measured the impact of such support, ICR consultations with such stakeholders indicate that partnerships with specialist organizations helped cooperatives improve productivity and expand their activities. Mental Health Support 42. Combatants in the great lakes region usually have accumulated years of harsh combat exposure and are to a great extent mentally and/or physically affected. In Rwanda, the findings from a 2012 survey conducted at Mutobo Demobilization Center revealed the prevalence of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and other mental health issues 30 Finn, Baxter and Onur. 2014. Making Vocational Training Work: A Study in Vocational Training (Rwanda) . 31 Finn, Baxter and Onur. 2014. Making Vocational Training Work: A Study in Vocational Training (Rwanda) . Page 18 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) among combatants: one-third of all respondents scored high in indicators for severe mental health problems. 32 Particularly with the AF credit in 2014, the project attempted to address this challenge and improved its screening, treatment, and referrals for mental health issues for both XCs and their dependents. The availability of financing from TFs allowed the project to significantly improve the RDRC’s capacity (that is, recruiting additional mental health staff and contracting international experts for training), equipping the RDRC’s mental health staff with relevant tools and skills for diagnosis and treatment. The project recruited additional psychologists, and the review of project information indicates that, despite shortcomings due to capacity constraints, the RDRC obtained capacity to diagnose and address psycho- trauma spectrum pathologies, critical behaviors, and counterproductive social behavior. Further, the project referred more than 3,500 XCs for psychiatric treatment or psychotherapy to specialized institutions in Rwanda. While shortcomings in mental health support were noted during implementation (and validated by independent evaluations),33 the project’s mental health focus, particularly with the adaptation of innovative tools such as Narrative Exposure Therapy (NET), had an overall positive impact on socioeconomic reintegration.34 According to the RDRC data, the project exceeded its target of 75 percent, with 100 percent of adult XCs reported to have received mental health screening at completion.35 Support to Child Soldiers 43. A total of 293 former child soldiers were received by the project as of December 31, 2017, of which 263 were reunited with families or reintegrated in society outside of families. The project provided specialized support to children XCs including rehabilitation, family tracing, family reunification, self-reintegration support, and family visits. In addition, the project conducted regular sensitization workshops nationwide (targeting child XCs) to establish links between former child XCs and local authorities, CMs, and XC representatives, as well as sensitizing them on key economic and social activities and opportunities. The project collaborated closely with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on rehabilitation support in the center, family tracking and reintegration follow up. Table-5. Status of Child Ex-combatants as of December 31, 2017 Exited the Project (Ineligible Total Caseload Reintegrated At the Children Centre Follow-up Visits or Voluntarily) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Reintegrated in Society outside Repatriated to DRC (Congolese Reintegrated Who Received At Children Rehabilitation Center In Muhoza as of December 31, Received at Muhazi/Muhoza (in Addition to 48 Who Were Children Ineligible under the least One Follow-up Visit Present in the Center in Reunited with Families Left Center Voluntarily [(1) − (2 + 3 + 4 + 5)] Reintegrated (2 + 3) December 2008) of Families Project) 2017 Total 293 189 74 42 20 16 263 236 Male 292 189 74 42 19 16 263 236 32 Promundo. 2014. A Study of Gender, Masculinities and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Rwanda: Results from the International Men and Gender Equality Survey (IMAGES). World Bank/LOGiCA. 33 These include capacity limitations (World Bank Aide Memoire dated December 2015) and low rate of identification of new cases (World Bank aide memoires covering implementation support missions [ISMs] in 2017). IEIs were more critical and recommended remedial actions. 34 ICR interviews with the RDRC staff and other stakeholders. 35 Externally administered surveys in 2016 and 2017 indicate that 67.5 percent and 86.5 percent, respectively, of adult XCs reported that they were screened for mental health issues (Source: Kash-Consult, IEIs of the SEDRP 2016 and 2017). Page 19 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) Female 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 Source: RDRC MIS. 44. Reintegration of former child soldiers is considered a challenging process in any disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) context. Despite the noted achievements in social and economic reintegration, the SEDRP encountered obstacles and limitations when working with former child combatants.36 The ICR interviews with stakeholders validate challenges particularly with regard to tracking and extending additional support to this cohort. With close World Bank technical and implementation support, the project gradually improved its program for child XCs. At completion, a total of 284 child XCs were provided with targeted reintegration support (223 provided with vocational training, 41 with IGA support, and 20 with formal education)37. The project’s tailored support to this cohort had an overall positive impact on their socioeconomic return to society: at the close of the project when compared to their peers in the community, former child combatants were doing well in terms of social and economic reintegration. Table-6. Social and Economic Indicators for Former Child Ex-combatants and Civilian Youth Former Child Civilian Youth Social Acceptance and Economically Active (%) Ex-combatant (24 and Younger) Feeling Rejected 3.3 3.2 Social Acceptance Neither accepted nor rejected 25.0 12.9 Accepted 71.7 83.9 Economically inactive 30.5 66.7 Economically Active Economically active 69.5 33.3 Source: 2017 Community Dynamics Study. Support to Disabled and Chronically Ill XCs 45. The project addressed the needs of disabled and chronically ill XCs through a holistic approach. The additional support consisted of medical support and mental health screening, psychological counseling, therapy, and treatment, as well as referrals to specialized clinics. The introduction of categorization of disability to ensure that targeted support is available to XCs with different levels of needs was a success, and it informed the work of other institutions working in the health sector. Disabled XCs were provided with technical trainings and equipment by program partners such as JICA. The project also carried out regular voluntary testing and counseling for HIV/AIDS as well as nationwide surgery campaigns. The project paid particular attention to meet the needs of highly vulnerable XCs who required treatment or medication throughout implementation. 46. One of the most remarkable achievements in addressing the needs of disabled XCs was the construction of accessible housing. A total of 220 houses for severely disabled XCs were built with project financing. Drawing on lessons learned from preceding phases, the government decided to finance the construction of more than 600 houses for less severely disabled XCs.38 Further, with government financing, 10 IRPWs were built in different locations. The centers provide vocational and employment opportunities and house recreational facilities for the disabled XCs and communal areas. The project provided technical assistance and support for the design of the workshops, and with provision of equipment and trainings in these workshops, which contain a health post for the purposes of general consultation and 36 Kash-Consult. 2017. Independent External Evaluation of the SEDRP. p. 26; World Bank Aide Memoire covering the ISM conducted in June 2016 also noted the low number of follow-up visits. 37 Only former child ex-combatants who reached the age of vocational training and labor, received vocational training and IGA support through the project and pursued employment in different sectors. 38 The project financed the construction of houses defined as category I houses for the most severely disabled XCs. Building on the success of the project-financed houses, the government decided to construct houses for less severely disabled XCs (category II houses). Page 20 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) treatment, physiotherapy, and general health monitoring of the disabled beneficiaries. Through these workshops, the project reached more than 3,000 XCs with disabilities and enhanced their social and economic reintegration process. Table-7. Economic and Social Indicators Compared Economically Active (%) Social Acceptance (%) Disabled Ex- Disabled Community Disabled Ex- Disabled Community Year combatant Member combatant Member 2017 58.5 70.0 69.8 60.0 2016 65.5 60.5 66.7 63.2 2015 50.5 59.3 60.9 40.0 Source: 2015, 2016, 2017 Community Dynamics Studies. 47. The project supported more than 3,500 disabled XCs between 2009 and 2017. Economically, disabled XCs came close to parity with their peers in the communities (see annex 1 for detailed information). The low economic performance reported in externally-administered surveys in the last two years of implementation can be attributable to the fact that, particularly after the AF in 2014, the project started focusing on supporting the spouses/partners of disabled ex- combatants to be economically active as a means to contribute to the socio-economic reintegration of disabled ex- combatants. The surveys, however, did not involve the spouses of disabled ex-combatants in assessing economic performance. Overall, this group of XCs performed well socially in comparison, which signals the overall positive causal relationship between project activities and outcomes. Proportionally, disabled XCs had a much higher rate of marriage when compared to their CM counterparts (71.3 percent compared to 44.6 percent, respectively) and disabled XCs had higher literacy than disabled CMs (84.9 percent compared to 69.3 percent, respectively).39 Support to Female Ex-combatants 48. The number of female XCs was low throughout project implementation (the repatriation of female XCs was largely outside of the control of the project). The project provided specialized demobilization and reintegration support to 48 women, including four former RDF soldiers, 43 female XCs and one female child soldier. This was likely due to unwillingness of women ex-combatants to self-identify as ex-combatants, often preferring to repatriate either as dependent of an ex-combatant or as a civilian. A gender sensitive approach was applied throughout implementation to ensure differentiated needs of female ex-combatants are taken into account and reflected accordingly in services. The project made all female XCs automatically eligible to receive additional support through the VSW (male XCs were screened for vulnerability). Further, to address the fact that a number of women ex-combatants self-identified as dependents instead, the project expanded its support to the spouses and partners of XCs. This included mini-PDOP, option of deferral of training benefits to XC’s spouses, distribution of reinsertion kits to dependents, and the inclusion of spouses in economic reintegration activities. Therefore, the project successfully improved the situation of women despite the low number of female XCs. The project also drew on Government of Rwanda’s gender mainstreaming practices and worked with relevant public institutions in Rwanda. The project maintained a dedicated gender action plan as a cross-cutting program, which ensured focus on women-related issues (discussed in Gender section). Economically, female XCs performed considerably better in comparison to their peers in the communities: 82.7 percent of female ex-combatants were found to be economically active in comparison to 53.2 percent of their peers in the communities. 39 Kash-Consult. 2017. Final Report of the 2016 Community Dynamics Study. Page 21 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) Mainstreaming of Program Activities 49. The project’s mainstreaming activities had two main goals: (a) ensuring that XCs are included, along with all other Rwandans, into national social protection systems and (b) facilitating collaboration with and capacity building of Rwandan institutions that would potentially be in a position to provide support to XCs, alongside the general population, following when possible, best practices tested through the project. As such, the project’s mainstreaming component was designed as an exit strategy to ensure that by the time the project closed, XCs would be fully integrated in national social protection systems. The mainstreaming effort helped integrate XCs as beneficiaries of social protection programs including disability and mental health support, technical assistance to cooperatives, management of program data and information, and support to child XCs. A 2016 survey showed that 85.3 percent of XCs indicated that they have access to social services through central government or regional public offices (versus 91.5 percent of CMs).40 The project’s Results Framework presented two intermediate outcome indicators in relation to mainstreaming, including the support to disabled XCs and delivery of ID cards. The project did not meet its target of 95 percent of the beneficiary group with 84.79 percent (3,023 out of 3,565) disabled XCs receiving Mutuelles de Santé and 93.09 percent (3,319 out of 3,565) disabled former RDF members receiving the monthly allowance. The project met its target delivery of demobilization ID cards, with 100 percent of demobilized XCs having received their ID cards at the end of demobilization. 50. As supported by project data and independent evaluations, as well as by the ICR process, the project outcomes indicate increased prospects of beneficiaries in terms of social and economic reintegration through its holistic reintegration support. The project has contributed to a sustainable level of social and economic reintegration of XCs into Rwandan society. It must be noted, however, there were several external factors that contributed to the achievement of outcomes (discussed in Section III). Justification of Overall Efficacy Rating 51. The efficacy is rated Substantial. The project targets that were set in the Results Framework were almost fully achieved by project closure. The data have been validated by the RDRC and are also generally in line with the findings of the ICR review and independent evaluations at project closing. C. EFFICIENCY Rating: Substantial Assessment of Efficiency and Rating 52. Efficiency is rated Substantial. First, the project design had financial and procurement controls which helped maintain reasonable costs for key activities. These include; (i) technical support on FM by an independent international FM consultant, (ii) recruitment of an engineer to help manage contracts with construction firms and monitor the implementation (construction of houses), and (iii) recruitment of international experts in the design and improvement of specialized support. As noted earlier, the AFs and project extensions were primarily due to the demand-driven nature of the demobilization and reintegration program in Rwanda. There were no major delays in procurement and implementation of key activities. Second, based on the cost-effectiveness analysis, at completion, the project had a cost of US$2,366 per beneficiary, which is within the range of efficiency of demobilization and reintegration projects that have been financed by the World Bank in the region. The project’s cost per beneficiary falls within the range of the first phase project, Rwanda EDRRP (US$2,563) and Burundi Emergency Demobilization and Transitional Reintegration Project 40 Kash-Consult. 2017. Final Report of the 2016 Community Dynamics Study. Page 22 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) (US$2,132). Compared to recently approved Bank-financed reintegration projects, the cost per beneficiary of SEDRP is significantly lower despite the scope and reach of reintegration support (DRC Reinsertion and Reintegration Project with US$3,477, Mali Reinsertion Project with US$3,300, and CAR Reintegration Project with US$3,465). The average cost per beneficiary for additional specialized support for vulnerable ex-combatants (including specialized medical support and provision of accessible houses) of US$1,035 also falls within the range of the costs of Rwanda EDRRP with US$778 and the Burundi EDTRP with US$2,331 per beneficiary. For example, the average cost of houses for disabled ex-combatants built during SEDRP was US$252 per square meter, which compares favorably to Rwanda EDRRP (US$370 per square meter) and Burundi EDTRP (US$358 per square meter). In this context, the project falls within the expected efficiency range found in demobilization and reintegration operations, rendering the rating of Substantial. D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING 53. The relevance of project objectives was High because the project directly contributed to one of the key social protection programs of the government in addressing the social and economic impacts of Rwandan civil war. Project activities were straightforward with realistic assumptions and directly supported a clearly defined PDO. Efficacy was Substantial. The project results included (i) demobilization of all XCs of AGs and former RDF members and (ii) provision of key reintegration support to all eligible XCs. The project outcomes were also reached, including (i) increased number of beneficiaries settled in their chosen communities, (ii) increased capacity of XCs in terms of their social and economic reintegration, and finally (iii) increased access of XCs to support services through national and local social protection systems. At completion, the project almost fully reached its targets. Project efficiency is rated Substantial, due to the good results of economic efficiency and the performance of the RDRC. Therefore, the overall outcome rating is Satisfactory. E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (IF ANY) Gender 54. The project maintained a gender action plan to ensure that gender aspects and considerations related to male and female beneficiaries were fully included across the project activities. As discussed above, key interventions such as the mini-PDOP, deferral of VSW benefits to spouse or nominated dependent, distribution of reinsertion kits to dependents, and the inclusion of spouses in economic reintegration activities helped enhance the situation of women overall. By extending the support to dependents, the project expanded the coverage targeting women because spouses of XCs had access to support as described above. In terms of reintegration support, the project made all female XCs eligible to receive additional support through the VSW scheme (as opposed to male XCs who had to be screened for vulnerability). Further, the project involved both the XCs and their spouses in the orientation sessions of RGs, where they were encouraged to develop proposals together. The project implemented workshops and trainings targeting all XCs and their dependents to promote awareness on gender issues and gender-based violence. These involved partners such as the Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion (MIGEPROF) and Gender Monitoring Office. The project approached gender from both male and female perspectives. For example, based on the findings from a study that looked at gender and masculinities in Mutobo, the project introduced training modules on GBV, anger management and gender issues targeting male ex-combatants. At completion, the project successfully mainstreamed gender issues into all program activities. Institutional Strengthening 55. The project attained considerable results in relation to institutional strengthening. The primary institution that benefited from the project was the RDRC. The project was able to provide such support due to its financing flexibility and Page 23 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) with the availability of resources for World Bank-executed activities. The significant TF resources41 allowed for enhanced implementation support and World Bank-executed technical assistance. As such, the task team provided considerable institutional and technical capacity support in FM, procurement, M&E and data management, communications, and mental health and disability support. An important aspect of institutional strengthening was that the RDRC worked in close cooperation with expert agencies and institutions in Rwanda. As such, gradually, the project started to contribute to capacity building of other institutions. A few examples of the project’s overall impact on institutional strengthening include: • The project’s capacity-building assistance on mental health support involved staff from MINISANTE including district hospitals alongside the RDRC’s Medical Rehabilitation Unit. This approach not only improved coordination between the RDRC and relevant institutions, it also helped improve capacity in different institutions. In its final year of implementation, the project’s ongoing collaboration with MINISANTE resulted in the latter deciding to replicate the project’s mental health capacity building and targeted support;42 • The project shared its experiences and knowledge on the provision of comprehensive care to child XCs to the newly created Rwanda Children Rehabilitation Center;43 • With the capacity received through the project, the RDRC gradually became a regional knowledge hub for technical and advisory support on DDR. The RDRC hosted political, technical, and academic stakeholders from different countries and shared its knowledge and experience with different institutions and organizations; and • The project’s investments in construction of housing for disabled XCs and the implementation of safeguards compliance as part of this activity informed similar interventions financed by the government. The most obvious example was the government decision to construct houses for disabled XCs, based on the successes of the project-financed houses and applied similar safeguards procedures in constructing such houses. Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity 56. In terms of the project’s outcomes related to poverty reduction and shared prosperity, the project provided targeted economic reintegration support to XCs (and their dependents)—a highly vulnerable section of the population in the country. The project financed a holistic set of economic reintegration activities including vocational and soft skills training, psycho-social counseling, start-up tools and grants, technical and advisory support to cooperatives, and follow- up support to help XCs to be at par with their peers in the community. Of importance was the project’s e mphasis on advocacy, targeting public and private sector job opportunities for XCs. The RDRC used all available opportunities to advocate on behalf of XCs, targeting public institutions at local and national levels, private sector, and civil society. As indicated in the economic indicators, the project beneficiaries performed well in comparison to their peers in the communities, signaling overall positive impact on poverty reduction and shared prosperity. 41 Including World Bank-executed resources made available by the TDRP TF and the MDTF. 42 World Bank Aide Mémoire, June 2017. 43 World Bank Aide Mémoire, December 2017. Page 24 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION 57. The project was well prepared and benefited from a relatively conducive domestic and donor environment for preparing an operation targeting XCs, which is often a complex process. The project design was sound and reflected lessons learned in Rwanda and other countries. The PDO of the project was straightforward and presented direct support to a government program, namely the RDRP. The project indicators allowed the capturing of project benefits and achievement of the PDO although some of the indicators required small modifications during implementation. 58. The SEDRP constituted the third stage of the government’s demobilization and reintegration program, which has been an ongoing program with outcomes of varying success, implemented since early 2000s. The preparation of the SEDRP was primarily based on the previous, successful World Bank- and TF -financed EDRP and operated with systems and procedures that were deemed satisfactory to the World Bank at the time of preparation. A World Bank Aide Memoire at the time confirmed this: “given the generally acknowledged success of stage II, the strategies and implementation arrangements proposed by the government for stage II demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration of ex-combatants on the whole are considered sound and technically feasible.�44 59. Having operated since the previous project, the implementing agency, the RDRC, was in place and had sufficient capacity to start implementing a donor and World Bank-financed project. During preparation, there was no pressing need for institutional or government sensitization and awareness on demobilization and reintegration activities, which is often a challenge in preparing DDR operations. Partly due to the World Bank’s capacity-building efforts and to the strong government ownership, the RDRC was already a well-known public agency with strong working relations with a number of different stakeholders. ICR consultations with various stakeholders confirmed that the implementing agency, particularly its leadership and technical staff, was a factor contributing to the project performance. This environment was a catalyst during preparation and helped the government and the World Bank prepare the project relatively smoothly and allowed for speedy implementation following effectiveness. 60. The project benefited from the long-standing partnership between the government, donors, and the World Bank in the area of demobilization and reintegration as well as substantial involvement in the social protection sector. For example, JICA, although not a financier to the SEDRP, supported disabled XCs and former soldiers, which contributed to the overall impact of the socioeconomic reintegration support provided to beneficiaries with disabilities. Likewise, through its mainstreaming focus, the project received considerable support from specialist agencies within the government such as MIGEPROF. Overall, the convening power of the World Bank, bringing together donors toward common goals and building on the experiences from large-scale multi-donor initiatives (MDRP and later the TDRP), was a contributing factor to the overall success and secondary impacts of the project. 61. The project design was sound and reflected a best practice demobilization and reintegration approach that was informed by experiences of the government, the World Bank, and donors. Project objectives were clear and directly supported the government’s broader objectives through its RDRP, reflecting the government’s focus on demobilization and reintegration targeting the remaining XCs to foster social cohesion and socioeconomic development. Regarding monitoring of results, the project presented an appropriate plan for M&E of activities. While M&E arrangements seemed to be adequate at entry, there were shortcomings in the design and implementation (discussed later in the document). 44 World Bank Aide Mémoire, April 2010. Page 25 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION 62. Overall, the project’s implementation progress and performance did not vary considerably during project implementation. The implementation progress rating was downgraded from Satisfactory to Moderately Satisfactory after the second ISM in November 2010 due to issues concerning program management and slow implementation of key activities.45 In October 2012, implementation progress was elevated to Satisfactory and remained stable for the remainder of the project. Key factors during implementation are described below. Country Context 63. This ICR identified two main factors concerning project context that affected implementation and outcomes, namely, (a) strong economic and social development performance of Rwanda and (b) persistent instability in the DRC. The political economy of Rwanda has reflected a stable macro-political environment and “remarkable development successes over the last decade which include high growth, rapid poverty reduction, and since 2005, reduced inequality.�46 Economically, Rwanda has performed well. The country has maintained a 6.9 percent economic growth rate and macroeconomic stability for the first three quarters of 2015,47 6 percent in 2016, and 4.2 percent in Q1 2017 but with expected recovery by the end of 2017.48 Rwanda’s economic growth and its progress in poverty reduction and social inclusion has been a strong pull factor that helped XCs find pathways to employment and toward the increasingly effective social protection mechanisms of the government. Overall positive context meant that economically, XCs were absorbed into the labor market and the positive social environment of reconciliation and peace building. 64. Another significant factor affecting the implementation and outcomes was the continued instability in the eastern DRC. The situation in the DRC had a direct effect on the number of combatants joining the program. Throughout implementation, the return of XCs, primarily from FDLR, was provided as the main justification to restructure or extend the project. Before completion of the project, the FDLR remained one of the largest foreign AGs in the DRC (between 700 and 1,200 combatants)49 and the security situation in the DRC was highly unstable and declining since 2016. Coupled with worsening socioeconomic conditions, resurgences in intercommunal violence and emergence of new conflict hotspots50 means that the DRC remains a highly unstable neighbor to Rwanda and home to a significant proportion of FDLR. While FDLR’s overall control of its combatants contributed to smaller numbers of re patriation (and thus demobilization), other factors within the DRC have played a role. For example, during 2016, independent evaluation qualitative interviews with recent returnees housed in Mutobo Demobilization Center indicated that despite the best efforts of the RDRC and its campaigns of sensitization within the DRC, in some cases, a lack of understanding of the Rwandan DDR process and difficulty making safe transit to Rwanda prevented willing FDLR members from disarming and returning to Rwanda. At the time of project closure, despite a positive trend observed during mid-2017 and despite the continuous sensitization efforts targeting combatants of Rwandan origin in the DRC, the return of FDRL members was still progressing at a slower pace than originally anticipated. 45 Respective Aide Mémoires present a detailed account of pressing issues: (a) staffing issues related to delays in hiring of key staff, (b) slow pace of reflecting changes in terms of program management since the previous project, and (c) limitations in the implementation of M&E activities. 46 http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/rwanda/overview. Accessed November 30, 2016. 47 Ishihara, Yoichiro, Tom Bundervoet, Apurva Sanghi, and Toru Nishiuchi. 2016. “Rwanda - Economic Update: Rwanda at Work .� Rwanda Economic Update (9). Washington, DC: World Bank Group. 48 World Bank. 2017. Rwanda Economic Update: Sustaining Growth by Building on Emerging Export Opportunities . 49 United Nations (UN) Security Council. 2017. Special Report of the Secretary-General on the Strategic Review of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 50 United Nations (UN) Security Council. 2017. Special Report of the Secretary-General on the Strategic Review of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Page 26 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) National Ownership 65. The project benefited from buy-in and commitment from the government. The government placed the project as part of its broader social protection objectives and was committed to the mainstreaming of project activities. The 2015 law on the RDRC’s responsibilities, organization, and functioning was an indication of the government’s ownership to maintain the program and the implementation structure beyond the project. The government’s commitment to the program activities was also noted as it provided financing support and worked with the World Bank through a financing arrangement that funded the institution of DDR in Rwanda, the RDRC, and to implement complementary activities such as constructing homes for less severely disabled XCs and IRPWs. Particularly, the integrated workshops and accessible houses for disabled XCs were key interventions contributing positively to social and economic reintegration outcomes. Institutional Capacity and Continuity of Key Staff 66. The RDRC demonstrated strong institutional capacity, which facilitated overall satisfactory implementation of the project. The project benefited from an overall low level of turnover of key positions in the technical secretariat such as the Chief Operations Officer, the Project Coordinator, the Social and Economic Reintegration Officer as well as Chief Finance Officer. This helped the project maintain institutional memory and implementation capacity, which was strengthened with considerable implementation support by the World Bank during the project. Implementation Support and Technical Assistance 67. While the project was allocated Bank Budget for regular implementation support, World Bank implementation support and technical assistance was achieved overwhelming through TF financing. Overall, the Bank’s implementation support was regularly undertaken, well planned, and well implemented. In addition to regular World Bank implementation support resources, the co-financing trust funds helped the project allocate approximately US$500,000 for consultants, US$400,000 for travel costs (including consultants and staff), and US$1,300,000 for staff time to provide technical assistance and day-to-day implementation support.51 It must be noted that the availability of trust fund resources for technical assistance and implementation support gave enormous flexibility to the task team. This must be noted as a major contributing factor not only toward the Bank’s implementation support performance but also toward the overall success of the project. 68. The project was led by two different Task Team Leaders (TTLs), and there were no issues during hand over that had an impact on implementation or outcomes. There was continuity in the core project task team members working in key technical areas such as FM, procurement, and social development. The project took appropriate measures in responding to changing conditions, and this is captured with timely restructurings that allowed it to sustain the capacity to respond to the demobilization and reintegration needs until closure at the end of 2017. The project was able to respond to the changing needs in terms of categories of expenditures. The project was restructured a number of times to reallocate resources between categories of expenditure to ensure that adequate resources were available where they were needed. 69. Although the ICR review did not identify any major issues that affected implementation and outcomes during project, the project task team was proactive in working with the RDRC in identifying and responding to emerging needs. For example, in response to concerns surrounding the management of project data and implementation of M&E, the 51The figures provided are estimates based on actual costs associated with staff costs (of relevant staff), consultant fees, and travel costs. Data is accessed from World Bank’s TF portal. Page 27 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) project task team worked with an information technology (IT) consultant who visited Rwanda to build MIS capacity in the RDRC. Similarly, the RDRC’s Medical Rehabilitation Unit received significant capacity-building support. Highly resource-intensive activities targeting physical disability and mental health needs were financed through TF resources. Regarding FM and procurement, international consultants were part of the project task team and enabled the RDRC to adequately carry out fiduciary tasks. The enhanced World Bank technical and implementation support was also helpful in addressing the accusations raised in the report of UN Group of Experts of the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee in 2012, where Rwanda and Uganda were accused of supporting the rebel groups in the DRC and re- recruiting demobilized XCs. The regular and enhanced technical and implementation support by the World Bank allowed for adequate attention and resources to be allocated to address this issue. Finally, resources made available by development partners through the TFs allowed the project to maintain financial capacity for continuous technical assistance and enhanced implementation support. This partnership facilitated donor alignment, harmonization, and constant support channeled toward key areas requiring technical support and advice during implementation. Mainstreaming and Alignment with Local and National Processes 70. An important contributing factor was that the project’s exit strategy was built into the project design through the mainstreaming component. The RDRC operated as part of a coherent and collaborative social protection sector, led by the Ministry of Local Government (MINALOC). As such, the project activities were closely aligned with overall social protection priorities of the government, which was a positive factor facilitating implementation and outcomes. The following is a list of mainstreaming activities that had overall positive effect on project implementation and outcomes: a) Mental health support. The project shared its experience in screening and treatment of mental health cases with MINISANTE and MIGEPROF to replicate such activities and facilitated the mainstreaming of such support through collaboration with MINISANTE. b) Reintegration support to former child XCs. The project enabled partnership with the National Commission for Children (NCC) through the District-level Gender and Family Promotion Officers who took part in family reunification activities and follow-up of children XCs. c) Support to XC cooperatives. Collaboration with the RCA and RICEM improved support provided to cooperatives. d) Information management. The RDRC’s data management activities were gradually transferred to the national integrated social protection MIS. The RDRC MIS staff received training, and at the time of completion, the project data were kept alongside other public agencies and the RDRC started using a national web-based interface to record data and information and generate reports accordingly. IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E) M&E Design 71. The M&E design was largely based on the previously developed and World Bank-endorsed mechanism that was implemented during the EDRP. This mechanism included a designated M&E Officer at the RDRC headquarters, specialized independent studies to collect data on indicators and implementation progress, and the RDRC’s existing MIS for data Page 28 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) management. The design of M&E was, therefore, drawn primarily from existing resources and tools because it was acknowledged that this approach used during the previous project worked satisfactorily. The MIS consisted of a central server, housed at the RDRC, and a web-based application to manage XC data. Based on the previous project design and the available types of data in the MIS, indicators were identified to monitor progress toward the PDO, with key indicators that measured social and economic reintegration outcomes. The project presented adequate and reliable indicators in its Results Framework, which would capture progress within the context of the project’s theory of change. While the project indicators were practical, a key flaw was related to the fact that the target indicators, concerning reintegration outcomes, were fixed. The Results Framework essentially attempted to measure social and economic reintegration performance (or social acceptance and employment levels of XCs) and set a target (based on a sample from the CMs) as the core objective was to help XCs reach the levels of their civilian peers. This was a logical but challenging way of measuring results because the social and economic situation evolves for everyone and is not a constant. Nevertheless, it must be noted that this is a general issue with Results Frameworks at World Bank-financed projects concerning social and economic performance of individual groups. The project team addressed this issue by revising the targets according to the results of annual studies and in line with recommendations from independent evaluations. In addition, while the PDO-level indicators provided disaggregated data for former armed groups and former RDF members in terms of general demobilization numbers, it lacked disaggregated data for other key indicators. It must be noted; however, all annual externally-administered surveys and studies were specifically requested to collect and present data and analyses disaggregated by armed group/force affiliation. M&E Implementation 72. Overall, the project M&E data was collected, analyzed, and reported in a sound manner. However, the project faced difficulties in ensuring quality and consistency of data. Despite the straightforward M&E design during preparation, there were shortcomings in implementation. The first issue was the inadequate quality of reporting during initial stages of implementation. The second issue was concerning the management of XC data, which was partly due to the consistent problems faced in the existing MIS. Regarding reporting, the review of project information revealed that there were shortcomings in the reporting of project progress stemming from internal reporting among different units and between headquarters and provincial offices in the first 18 months following effectiveness in 2009. The first set of quarterly progress reports were found to be of low quality;52 however, this was resolved during implementation. 73. Data collection consisted of four types of surveys, namely community dynamics studies looking at social and economic factors for both XCs and CMs throughout the country, payment verification surveys, tracer surveys, and IEIs. 53 While these studies provided considerable information and helped refine project activities during implementation, commissioning four different studies every year was a time-consuming and costly exercise, considering the amount of time spent in contracting, implementation and review of in-depth studies. The project could have benefitted from conducting a smaller, more condensed surveys every other year, rather than four in-depth studies annually. In addition, a number of external surveys, assessments, and studies were commissioned by the RDRC and the World Bank (through the TDRP and Learning on Gender and Conflict in Africa [LOGiCA]), looking at different aspects and activities of the project. For example, the 2012 LOGiCA survey among XCs in Mutobo Demobilization Center identified the prevalence of mental health issues, informing the introduction of a robust mental health component with the AF in 2014. Similarly, a 2013 study 52 World Bank Aide Mémoire, February 2011. 53 The final round of studies included payment verification survey and a community dynamics survey, which were integrated into the final IEI report. Page 29 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) commissioned by the TDRP looked into the successes of the project’s vocational training program and provided a number of lessons and considerations for future World Bank-financed projects.54 74. The main data-related challenge to externally administered surveys measuring project performance was the lack of accuracy in the project database. Throughout the lifetime of the project, the data were never fully up-to-date with basic XC contact details, thus causing challenges accessing an accurate sample of XCs. Therefore, throughout implementation, the XC database appeared to be difficult to manage and sub-functional. This, in turn, had an impact on the administration of quantitative and qualitative work as part of data collection and analysis. The technical issues with the MIS were noticed during implementation,55 and the World Bank responded with the provision of additional technical assistance by an expert IT consultant. Toward the end of implementation, the government embarked on a program to develop an integrated social protection MIS that would cover all public bodies working in the social protection sector. During the last quarter of implementation, the RDRC started using a new web-accessible interface as part of the integrated social protection MIS. The RDRC database was also migrated to the National Data Center, which is the government’s state of-the-art data hosting facility for public and private sector institutions that ensures data safety and protection. Nevertheless, although the MIS maintained considerable amount of data and information, it did not support the project’s M&E implementation as anticipated at the design stage. M&E Utilization 75. The project M&E was used to inform project management and decision making, particularly in the second half of implementation. Findings from evaluations and regular implementation monitoring were used to modify project targets. Based on project M&E, the project added new activities or modified existing activities (that is, introduction of mini-PDOP, mentorship for children XCs, modifications in mental health support, and so on). The project also benefited from restructurings and introduced modifications in its Results Framework according to the findings from annual evaluations and reports. For example, the target of the PDO indicator concerning social acceptance was revised down to better align the target for XCs with their peers in communities, according to the findings of the community dynamics studies conducted in 2015.56 54 Finn, Baxter and Onur. 2014. Making Vocational Training Work: A Study in Vocational Training (Rwanda) . 55 World Bank Aide Mémoire, September 2010. 56 Kash-Consult. 2017. Final Report of the 2016 Community Dynamics Study . Page 30 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) Justification of Overall Rating of Quality of M&E Rating: Substantial 76. There were shortcomings in the project’s M&E related to (a) management of XC data that had a limited negative impact on externally administered studies, (b) limited accurate data from independent studies in the first half of implementation, and (c) overall problems with the MIS. The project addressed these issues and the M&E system as it was designed and implemented was able to monitor and evaluate the project and inform project implementation, rendering an overall Quality of M&E rating of Substantial. B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE Safeguards Compliance 77. The project was assigned Environmental Assessment Category B because no large-scale or significant irreversible impacts were anticipated with two policies triggered, the Environmental Assessment OP/BP 4.01 and the Involuntary Resettlement OP/BP 4.12. An Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) was developed under the original project. It was revised and redisclosed in the InfoShop and in-country on December 11, 2013. The ESMF included detailed screening mechanisms and mitigation measures for subprojects. As recommended by the MTR, the RDRC signed a memorandum of understanding with the Rwanda Environment Management Authority (REMA), which contributed to safeguards compliance. In 2014, the project introduced a simplified checklist-type Environmental Management Plan (EMP) to be filled for subprojects and construction sites, which were mainstreamed at the district level for screening subprojects. The EMP, developed by the World Bank safeguards advisor in mid-2014, was mainstreamed at the district level for screening subprojects. The EMPs were attached to the contracts for houses57 and were implemented with close monitoring of the project staff. There were no cases of involuntary resettlement or displacement during implementation. With regard to social safeguards, the project implemented various activities aimed at fostering HIV/AIDS sensitization and national reconciliation (in partnership with the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission [NURC]). To prevent or mitigate potential negative social impacts, the PDOP provided at Mutobo Demobilization Center covered instruction about life in Rwanda (that is, civic education, taxes, health services, and so on) as well as trainings on managing conflicts and solving everyday tensions. The RDRC progressively improved its adherence to environmental and social safeguards requirements, and the project safeguards compliance ratings remained Satisfactory during implementation. The project’s safeguards measures were later replicated by other public agencies that were involved in similar construction projects. For example, the Ayabaraya settlement in Kigali City was identified among the model green villages by REMA with its emphasis on social and environmental best practices. Financial Management 78. The project’s FM performance generally remained satisfactory except early in implementation when the project’s FM rating was downgraded to Moderately Unsatisfactory primarily due to shortcomings in reporting (associated with technical challenges caused by the introduction of the new Smart FM System by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning [MINECOFIN]). A number of additional shortcomings were captured in FM supervision reports in the early stages of implementation.58 The review of project information reveals that the project continued to experience software-related problems and delays in recruiting key FM staff, which negatively affected reporting, rendering the project Moderately 57 Safeguards compliance only concerns category I houses that were financed by the project. 58 World Bank FM supervision reports dated December 2010, February 2011, and June 2011. Page 31 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) Satisfactory. The project’s FM performance improved over time, with significant World Bank technical and implementation support, and the FM rating was upgraded to Satisfactory in 2015 and remained so until project closure. The project was audited by the Office of the Auditor General (OAG). There were a number of shortcomings identified in the OAG report for the year ended in June 2013.59 The project managed to address these issues, and the recommendations of the OAG were implemented by the RDRC in due course. The review of audit reports indicates no major shortcomings and noncompliance issues regarding FM. For the fiscal year that ended in June 2017, the Auditor- General submitted a clean report both in terms of financial reporting and compliance. FM supervision was carried out throughout implementation, including regular meetings with the RDRC FM team and reviews in accordance with relevant policies. The ISMs, including reviews of FM functions, were conducted on a semiannual basis. Starting in 2011, the World Bank started providing considerable hands-on support provided by an international FM consultant. The World Bank technical assistance and the risk-based implementation support provided by the FM consultant to the RDRC FM team were essential in the improvement of the project’s FM performance. Except the shortcomings concerning reporting during early stages in implementation, the project submitted quarterly interim unaudited financial reports and annual audited financial statements on time. The interim unaudited financial report quality improved during implementation and was consistently acceptable to the World Bank. Procurement 79. The RDRC struggled to carry out its procurement responsibilities in accordance with IDA requirements, mainly due to staffing issues, during the first year of implementation because the position of Procurement Officer remained vacant until mid-2011. The World Bank task team provided close technical and implementation support and recommended the RDRC to fill the vacant procurement officer position during this time. Electronic records of all procurement processes of 2009 were lost due to data management issues. However, this was resolved because procurement records were also kept as hard copies and the RDRC converted the documents into electronic form during the same year. Despite the staffing issues at the onset of implementation, the procurement unit of the project was staffed in due course, and procurement affairs were mostly managed by three regular and one temporary staff. 80. In 2015, there were concerns raised by the World Bank regarding noncompliance issues pointed out in the report of the OAG.60 The OAG audit report revealed serious noncompliance issues with procurement procedures and guidelines. Major findings of the report were (a) significant delays in contract awards, (b) lack of preparation of realistic Procurement Plans, (c) poor contract management, which resulted in delays in contract execution, and (d) poor records keeping. The project managed to address these issues, and the recommendations of the OAG were implemented by the RDRC in due course. It is understood that the non-compliances pointed out by the OAG and the World Bank (during annual post- procurement reviews) were mainly due to the capacity of the procurement unit. It is important to note that the World Bank technical and implementation support were instrumental in maintaining Satisfactory procurement ratings. For example, the World Bank recommended the RDRC to carry out trainings, particularly for the head of the procurement unit who had not received such support by the Rwanda Public Procurement Authority. 81. Procurement Plans were prepared and updated on time during project implementation. Regarding the use of Systematic Tracking of Exchanges in Procurement (STEP), the RDRC made efforts to upload documents for completed contracts or post-review contracts under implementation in STEP. However, there have been irregularities in the use of the system, including double-planning a single contract, uploading wrong documents for the contracts, and indicating 59 OAG of State Finances. 2013. Audit Report for the Year Ended in June 2013. 60 OAG. 2015. Audit Report for the Year Ended in June 2015. Page 32 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) incorrect contract status. The project’s procurement rating was Moderately Satisfactory until 2012 when it was upgraded to Satisfactory and remained the same until project closing. C. BANK PERFORMANCE Quality at Entry 82. The project was responsive to the government’s strategic objectives at the time of project effectiveness. It was aligned with the priorities of the EDPRS, particularly the social protection aspects. Retroactive financing was appropriate to launch project activities; however, due to an oversight error, the amount of retroactive financing was included in the project budget and the project had to be restructured. While this was an oversight concerning quality at entry, it had no effect on the implementation or outcomes of the project. The issue was identified by the World Bank and addressed in a rapid, transparent, and efficient manner (see annex 7). 83. The analytical basis and lessons learned to inform project design were sound. The project design was built on the previous experiences in demobilization and reintegration and the generally successful implementation of the EDRP. In other words, there was a solid foundation that the project at entry could build on and replicate with modifications and additional activities. Implementation arrangements were clear and straightforward, building on the previous project and existing implementation structure. At the onset of implementation, there were shortcomings due to the delays in the recruitment of key staff of the technical secretariat, confusion around roles and responsibilities among different staff, and the quality of reporting. 84. The preparation identified the risks and incorporated activities and features to mitigate them and included the relevant technical specialists to support project implementation. Project preparation adequately assessed risks, including (a) the situation in the eastern DRC, which has a direct impact on the repatriation of members of AGs from the DRC, (b) likelihood of a financing gap between the time of the closure of the EDRP (December 2008) and expected effectiveness of the SEDRP (September–October 2009) that could undermine project objectives, and (c) reputational risk to the World Bank in financing a project that was closely tied to political and security context. The project identified appropriate mitigation measures including (a) introducing enhanced communications and outreach activities targeting Rwandan combatants on foreign soil, (b) using retroactive financing from IDA to prevent a potential financing gap, and (c) ensuring that the program remained a key government priority. In addition, the World Bank identified (a) harmonization with other members of the international community supporting regional peace efforts and the sector and (b) clear analysis of options and exit strategies if conditions deteriorate or the implementation of any component becomes impossible. 85. At entry, the RDRC’s existing M&E structure was understood by the World Bank as sufficient and the arrangements implemented during the EDRP were maintained. While by design the M&E was adequate, there were shortcomings in the implementation of M&E, particularly concerning measuring project impact and in the management of data, which was also an issue of the project MIS. The shortcomings did not significantly affect project implementation and outcomes. Quality of Supervision 86. ISMs were undertaken regularly, taking place two to three times per year. The World Bank task team prepared thorough aide memoires, in which progress toward each activity was presented in detail in the narrative and in table forms. Given the complex nature of demobilization and reintegration operations, the approach taken by the World Bank project team in preparing detailed data tables covering project activities was helpful and helped the World Bank Page 33 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) proactively identify and resolve potential issues. The project’s supervision was carried in close coordination with donor partners, which helped close coordination and management of reputational risks. As noted earlier, the World Bank team’s speedy and substantial response to the allegations raised in the 2011 UN Panel of Experts report was an indication of the quality of World Bank supervision. The presence of a full-time World Bank staff based in the Country Office significantly improved the quality of the World Bank implementation support and technical assistance. It also contributed to coordination between the World Bank and the RDRC and MONUSCO. The implementation support was efficient and responsive in the sense that attention was given to areas where support was needed (FM, information management, and so on). The implementation support was also instrumental in developing innovative interventions introduced in partnership with the RDRC such as the IRPWs, cross-border sensitization, and mental health support. During ISMs, the World Bank staff regularly visited key project sites, including Mutobo Demobilization Center and Muhoza Children Rehabilitation Center located in the Eastern Province, and the country office staff had regular contact with the project and access to the project’s field activities. The World Bank team provided technical assistance in the identification of additional activities such as the mini-PDOP, mentorship for children XCs, and information management. With regard to fiduciary and safeguards supervision, the ISMs included World Bank fiduciary staff, who provided detailed reports on procurement and FM performance, and Social Development Specialists and consultants who provided implementation support on safeguards compliance. During the last year of implementation, two country office-based staff covering environmental and social safeguards were recruited by the World Bank and provided additional support on safeguards. The ISMs were also inclusive of key donor partners and the task team members regularly briefed donor representatives during ISMs. Justification of Overall Rating of Bank Performance Rating: Satisfactory 87. The overall rating of World Bank performance is based on the assessments for quality at entry and during supervision, considering the overall satisfactory outcome rating. Despite difficulties faced at the onset of the project, the World Bank’s support ensured quality at entry and supported effective implementation through enhanced supervision, partly due to the availability of resources made available by TFs, particularly toward ensuring longevity of project interventions and continuity of the program activities beyond closing. D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME 88. While government commitment to demobilization and reintegration came out strongly both during ICR review of project information and anecdotally during ICR consultations, there are risks associated with addressing long-term needs. Certain activities financed by the project require provision of long-term, dedicated, and considerable human and capital resources (particularly concerning mental health and vulnerability aspects of disabled and children XCs). The RDRC’s role and importance to support a highly vulnerable group, namely XCs and their dependents, seem to be well understood by the different stakeholders. ICR consultations and findings from annual evaluations indicate that there is sufficient national buy-in that will maintain the RDRC’s position in the country as having played a critical role toward national reconciliation, peace, and development.61 With regard to risks that may arise outside of the project, the main unknown is related to the political and security situation in neighboring countries that may affect the repatriation and return of AG elements to Rwanda. e 61 RDRC, Final Reports of the IEIs of the SEDRP in 2015, 2016, and 2017. Page 34 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 89. Demobilization and reintegration programs should be designed as a holistic set of interventions. Achievement of project objectives and successful outcomes of complex interventions such as demobilization and reintegration rely on the extent to which activities are holistically designed and implemented. For example, including families and dependents in the reintegration process as co-owners of the process can significantly enhance the outcomes and impacts of social and economic reintegration. Similarly, vocational training, supplemented by life skills, follow-up support, counselling, and advocacy, can have long-term impacts on the livelihoods of beneficiaries. 90. Use of cooperatives enhances the impact of reintegration support on both economic and social outcomes. Participation of ex-combatants in cooperatives and associations should be promoted as they increase the potential for economic and social prospects. Participation in such structures have the potential for increasing economic activity and income while contributing to social cohesion and reintegration. In addition, cooperatives/associations can be supported by other development programs and initiatives beyond the DDR programs. 91. Reintegration should have sufficient resources to address disability and mental health issues. Detecting and identifying disability and mental health issues is a challenging process, particularly in contexts where reintegration programs are introduced. To the extent possible, reintegration programs should develop a well-resourced, staffed, and planned support mechanism to work with disability and mental health issues. While this is often difficult in countries with limited capacity in the health sector, innovative approaches can be tailored and implemented. The introduction of IPRWs and the use of NET to address trauma were two innovative approaches that contributed to the overall positive outcomes in Rwanda case. 92. Involving the family of ex-combatants contributes to positive economic reintegration outcomes. The project’s focus on the family of ex-combatants was an important contributing factor to overall positive social and economic reintegration outcomes. By involving the families, the project ensured that the spouses or dependents of primary beneficiaries had access to the benefits. This not only improved the efficiency of the project, but also supported positive socio-economic outcomes, particularly for vulnerable XCs. 93. The MIS should be considered as an integral part of M&E due to the sensitive nature of data collected and the complex nature of demobilization and reintegration programs. The design and development of the MIS should be done in alignment with the overall M&E approach. Adequate resources must be allocated at the onset, starting with a detailed analysis of existing IT systems and architecture of the public sector and identification of technical requirements. Based on the project M&E and reporting requirements, the appraisal should identify system requirements, analyze existing systems, and develop an MIS that best suits the objectives. 94. World Bank-financed demobilization and reintegration projects must seek donor support whether in the form of co-financing of operations through TFs or technical and implementation assistance. DDR programs are politically, financially, and technically challenging endeavors. Establishing close partnerships with donor community in fragile and post-conflict contexts is, therefore, crucial for a holistic response. As shown in the Rwanda experience, working with donor partners can significantly improve project implementation and outcomes, while helping manage reputational risks. . Page 35 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS A. RESULTS INDICATORS A.1 PDO Indicators Objective/Outcome: Demobilize members of armed groups of Rwandan origin and members of the Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF) Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Demobilized RDF members Number 22675.00 26675.00 0.00 26675.00 13-Aug-2009 13-Aug-2009 31-Dec-2017 Women Number 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 13-Aug-2009 13-Aug-2009 31-Dec-2017 Ill/disabled Number 0.00 0.00 0.00 123.00 13-Aug-2009 13-Aug-2009 31-Dec-2017 Comments (achievements against targets): The project demobilized 4,000 ex-RDF members as indicated in the original results framework. In total, 26,675 former members of the Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) were demobilized, including 22,675 demobilized in the previous project and 4,000 demobilized in this project. Source: RDRC Management Information System. Page 36 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Demobilized AG Number 7091.00 12591.00 0.00 11830.00 13-Aug-2009 13-Aug-2009 31-Dec-2017 Women Number 0.00 0.00 0.00 43.00 13-Aug-2009 13-Aug-2009 31-Dec-2017 Children Number 0.00 0.00 0.00 293.00 13-Aug-2009 13-Aug-2009 31-Dec-2017 Ill/disbaled Number 0.00 0.00 0.00 147.00 13-Aug-2009 13-Aug-2009 31-Dec-2017 Comments (achievements against targets): The project demobilized 4,739 armed group ex-combatants and 293 former child soldiers (including 1 female). In total, the actual achieved at completion is therefore 11,830 including 4,739 adult armed group ex-combatants demobilized and 7,091 demobilized armed group ex-combatants from the previous project. Source: RDRC Management Information System. Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Demand for demobilization Percentage 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 services met 13-Aug-2009 13-Aug-2009 31-Dec-2017 Page 37 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) Comments (achievements against targets): 100% of demand for demobilization services was met at completion. All 4,739 ex-combatants received by the project was provided with demobilization support. Source: RDRC Management Information System. Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Direct project beneficiaries Number 0.00 0.00 0.00 17438.00 13-Aug-2009 13-Aug-2009 31-Dec-2017 Comments (achievements against targets): The number of direct project beneficiaries at completion was 17,437. This includes 4,000 demobilized RDF members (of which 4 female); 4,739 demobilized armed group ex-combatants demobilized (of which 43 female); 293 demobilized former child soldiers (of which 1 female); and 8,406 dependents who received reinsertion kits. Source: RDRC Management Information System. Objective/Outcome: Provide socioeconomic reintegration support to said members following demobilization, with a particular focus on the provision of such support to female, child, and disabled ex-combatants Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Ex-combatants who are Percentage 73.00 75.00 70.00 77.70 economically active 13-Aug-2009 13-Aug-2009 07-Apr-2014 31-Dec-2017 Comments (achievements against targets): The target was revised with Additional Financing IDA Credit in April 2014. Actual achieved at completion was 77.7% of ex-combatants, as opposed to 75.3% of community members, were economically active (Women: 82.7%; Children: 69.5%; Disabled Ex- combatants: 70%). Source: Independent External Evaluation of SEDRP, January 2018. Page 38 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Ex-combatants who report Percentage 72.00 80.00 65.00 78.70 social acceptance by their communities 13-Aug-2009 13-Aug-2009 30-Jan-2017 31-Dec-2017 Comments (achievements against targets): The target was revised with Additional Financing Trust Fund Grant in January 2017. 78.7% of ex-combatants, as opposed to 84.1% of community members, report feeling socially accepted in their communities (Women: 76.2%; Children: 71.7; Disabled Ex- combatants: 69.8%). Source: Independent External Evaluation of SEDRP, January 2018. A.2 Intermediate Results Indicators Component: Component 1: Demobilization Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Demobilized persons who Percentage 80.00 80.00 94.14 are satisfied with the services and information provided in 13-Aug-2009 13-Aug-2009 31-Dec-2017 the demobilization centers (Comp 1) Comments (achievements against targets): The project exceeded the target of 80% with 94.14 of ex-combatants were satisfied with the services and information provided in the demobilization center at completion (cumulative, between March 2009 and December 2017). Source: RDRC Management Information System. Page 39 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) Component: Component 2: Reinsertion Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Ex-combatants who have Percentage 90.00 95.00 100.00 received reinsertion benefits (BNK, RSA) (comp 1) 13-Aug-2009 13-Aug-2009 31-Dec-2017 Comments (achievements against targets): The project exceeded the target of 95% with 100% of ex-combatants received their reinsertion benefits (BNK, RSA) at completion. Source: RDRC Management Information System. Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Resettlement kits delivered Number 3511.00 13511.00 11917.00 to dependents of ex-AG members (Comp 2) 13-Aug-2009 13-Aug-2009 31-Dec-2017 Comments (achievements against targets): 8,406 dependents (estimated target was 10,000) received resettlement kits (100% of demand met). As such, actual achieved at completion was 11,917. Original estimated target was 13,511 including 3,511 kits delivered during the previous project and the target of 10,000. Source: RDRC Management Information System. Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Ex-combatants who settle Percentage 95.00 95.00 100.00 Page 40 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) down in their community of 13-Aug-2009 13-Aug-2009 31-Dec-2017 choice (with access to shelter and food security) (Comp 2) Comments (achievements against targets): The project exceeded that target of 95% with 100% of ex-combatants resettled in their community of chose at completion. Source: RDRC Management Information System. Component: Component 3: Reintegration Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Ex-combatants who receive Number 29766.00 39266.00 38559.00 reintegration benefits (RG) in time and in accordance with 13-Aug-2009 13-Aug-2009 31-Dec-2017 the implementation manual (Comp 3) Comments (achievements against targets): The original target was 39,266 ex-combatants, including 29,766 ex-combatants from previous project and an estimated 9,500 ex-combatants, which was the target in this project. At completion, a total of 38,559 ex-combatants received reintegration benefits, including (i) 4,000 ex-RDF members, (ii) 4,668 ex-combatants of armed groups (including 42 female ex-combatants and 148 disabled ex-combatants), and (iii) 125 ex-combatants from the previous project who did not receive their reintegration grant by the time of previous project's completion. Therefore, the total number of ex-combatants who received their reintegration benefits (Reintegration Grant) was 38,559: previous project 29,766 and current project 8,793. Source: RDRC Management Information System. Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Page 41 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) Ex-combatants selected to Percentage 67.00 90.00 98.40 receive VSW support and registered to receive training 13-Aug-2009 07-Apr-2014 31-Dec-2017 have successfully completed training/education/IGA (comp 3) Comments (achievements against targets): The project exceeded the target of 90% with 98.40% completed VSW support (98.52% in vocational training and apprenticeship; 98.18% in IGA support; and 91.52% in formal education. Source: RDRC Management Information System. Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Incoming ex-combatants Percentage 0.00 75.00 100.00 who are screened for mental health issues (comp 3) 07-Apr-2014 07-Apr-2014 31-Dec-2017 Adults Percentage 0.00 75.00 100.00 07-Apr-2014 07-Apr-2014 31-Dec-2017 Children Percentage 0.00 75.00 100.00 07-Apr-2014 07-Apr-2014 31-Dec-2017 Comments (achievements against targets): This intermediate results indicator was added to the results framework with the Additional Financing IDA Credit on April 7, 2014. Therefore, no baseline was available. The project exceeded the target of 75% with 100% of ex-combatants received mental health screening. Source: RDRC Management Information System and Medical Rehabilitation Unit. Page 42 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) Component: Component 4: Mainstreaming of Program Activities Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Categorized disabled ex- Percentage 0.00 100.00 95.00 93.09 combatants who receive Mutuelles de Santé and 13-Aug-2009 13-Aug-2009 07-Apr-2014 31-Dec-2017 monthly allowance as per current legislation, within 9 months after demobilization (comp 4) Comments (achievements against targets): At completion, 84.79% of disabled ex-combatants (3,023 out of 3,565) was reported to receive Mutuelles de Sante and 93.09% of disabled ex-combatants (3,319 out of 3,565) Monthly Allowance. The project did not reach its target of 95% with, on average, 88.94% of disabled ex-combatants had access to Mutuelle de Sante and Monthly Allowance at completion. Source: RDRC Management Information System. Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Ex-combatants provided with Percentage 0.00 90.00 90.00 100.00 a national ID number before they leave the 07-Apr-2014 13-Aug-2009 07-Apr-2014 31-Dec-2017 demobilization center (comp 4) Comments (achievements against targets): The project exceeded its target of 90% with 100% of demobilized ex-combatants received their national ID card before they departed Mutobo Demobilization Center. Page 43 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) Source: RDRC Management Information System. Page 44 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) B. KEY OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT Objective 1: Demobilize members of armed groups of Rwandan origin and members of the Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF) 1. Number of demobilized RDF members (disaggregated by gender, ill-disabled) 2. Number of demobilized AG members (disaggregated by gender, children/adults, ill-disabled) Outcome Indicators 3. Percentage of demand for demobilization services met 4. Number of direct project beneficiaries (disaggregate by gender) • Percentage of demobilized persons who are satisfied with the services and information provided in the demobilization centers Intermediate Results • Percentage of ex-combatants who have received reinsertion benefits (BNK, RSA) Indicators • Number of resettlement kits delivered to dependents of ex-AG members • Percentage of ex-combatants who settle down in their community of choice (with access to shelter and food) Key Outputs by The project’s direct beneficiaries were former RDF soldiers, XCs from AGs, dependents of XCs, and a group of demobilized Component beneficiaries who did not receive their full benefits at the time of closing of the previous project. The project reached a total (linked to the of 17,437 direct beneficiaries, including 4,000 ex-RDF, 4,739 XCs, 293 former child soldiers, and 8,406 dependents who achievement of the received resettlement/reinsertion kits. Objective 1) Component 1: Demobilization The project demobilized 4,000 RDF soldiers, including 4 female soldiers and 123 disabled soldiers. This represents 100 percent of the target. With regard to demobilization of XCs from AGs, the project demobilized 4,739 combatants, including 43 female XCs and 147 disabled XCs. In addition, the project demobilized 293 former child soldiers. As a demand-driven demobilization program, the project successfully demobilized 100 percent of the demobilization demand; therefore, all XCs who were found to be eligible for the program were demobilized. There were 79 XCs who were undergoing the demobilization activities as of December 31, 2017 (this group of XCs was discharged from Mutobo Demobilization Center in February 2018). Page 45 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) Demobilization activities for XCs from AGs were carried out at Mutobo Demobilization Center. There, the XCs were provided with a comprehensive training program called the PDOP. All eligible XCs participated in the PDOP. Later during implementation, a hands-on practical training on agriculture techniques was added to the list of activities in Mutobo Demobilization Center. Dependents of XCs were offered a shorter and tailored version of the PDOP, namely the mini-PDOP, designed to improve the impact of demobilization for the individual XCs and their dependents. All dependents, not only spouses, were explicitly invited to the mini-PDOP. Rwandan specialist nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) Rwandan Men’s Resource Center (RWAMREC) and Uyisenga N’Manzi facilitated mini-PDOP sessions, including a tailored support to children dependents. In total, 211 out of 332 adult dependents of XCs participated in the mini-PDOP, representing 64 percent. Figure 2: Comprehensive List of PDOP Topics According to RDRC reporting, 94.14 percent of XCs reported that they were satisfied with the services and information provided in Mutobo Demobilization Center: Page 46 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) Table 1.1. Satisfaction with the Services and Information Provided in Mutobo Demobilization Center Satisfaction with Services and Demobilization Phase Information in Mutobo (%) Phase 49 (March 2014) 92.0 Phase 50 (June 2014) 90.0 Phase 51 (September 2014) 90.0 Phase 52 (December 2014) 94.0 Phase 53 (March 2015) 92.0 Phase 54 (August 2015) 96.0 Phase 55 (December 2015) 95.5 Phase 56 (March 2016) 91.5 Phase 57 (July 2016) 92.5 Phase 58 (November 2016) 96.0 Phase 59 (March 2017) 98.0 Phase 60 (July 2017) 96.0 Phase 61 (October 2017) 97.0 Source: RDRC M&E Department. It must be noted that there is a discrepancy between the satisfaction rates reported by RDRC and the rates reported in externally-administered survey, which found that, at the time of closing, satisfaction was 59.2 percent: Table 1.2. Satisfaction with the Services and Information Provided in Mutobo Demobilization Center All Female Disabled Children Dissatisfied 17.7 27.3 9.1 28.6 2017 Neither dissatisfied nor satisfied 23.1 9.1 9.1 14.3 Satisfied 59.2 63.6 81.8 57.1 Dissatisfied 8.5% 0.0% 12.5% 4.3% 2016 Neither dissatisfied nor satisfied 16.9% 25.0% 12.5% 8.7% Satisfied 74.6% 75.0% 75.0% 87.0% Source: IEIs of the SEDRP (2016 and 2017). The discrepancy is understood to be due to the fact that externally-administered surveys utilized three-scale for responses, Page 47 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) including a neutral response, to all questions on services in Mutobo Center, namely satisfied, neither satisfied nor dissatisfied and dissatisfied. The use of the middle group response corresponds to methodological consideration that inclusion of mid- points improves the reliability and validity of ratings. Therefore, the independent evaluations considered respondents who choose ‘neither satisfied nor dissatisfied’ as neither negative nor positive responses. According to the final independent evaluation of the project, the driver of the reported dissatisfaction among ex-combatants appears to be related to medical and mental services in Mutobo Demobilization Center: Table 1.3. Suggested improvement in services provided at Mutobo Demobilization Center What services at the demobilization center do you XC XC Female XC Disabled suggest can be improved? Medical care 33.0 23.1 15.4 Psychological counselling 18.0 7.7 15.4 Career guidance 12.2 15.4 0.0 Reproductive or sexual health care services 14.3 7.7 0.0 Socio-economic profiling 11.1 7.7 0.0 Identification of where you will resettle relocate 12.2 7.7 0.0 Issuing RDRP ID card 16.4 15.4 0.0 Medical Screening 14.9 15.4 15.4 Mental Health Services 11.6 7.7 15.4 Discharge ceremony 5.8 0.0 7.7 Travel to location for resettlement 9.5 7.7 0.0 Source: Final IEI of the SEDRP (2017). Component 2: Reinsertion The project offered reinsertion support to help XCs meet their basic needs in the initial period of adjustment to civilian life following demobilization and before they start receiving reintegration benefits. Reinsertion included the (a) distribution of BNK and RSA for regular military personnel, (b) provision of a reinsertion kit to dependents of XCs of AGs, and (c) provision of basic support and rehabilitation services. The project provided 100 percent of all eligible beneficiaries with reinsertions support, therefore of the eligible XCs, 100 percent received their reinsertion benefits against the target of 95 percent. At completion, 8,406 dependents were also provided with resettlement kits, representing the full caseload. All eligible dependents of XCs (8,406 beneficiaries) were provided with their reinsertion kits and 100 percent of XCs settled in their Page 48 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) chosen communities. The reinsertion kits typically contained basic consumables; food, shelter, and sanitary items; and small cash for transportation. Table 1.4. Progress of Reinsertion as of December 31, 2017 Caseload Ongoing Completed (Completed & on-going) Total 8,818 79 8,739 Total 4,000 - 4,000 Female 4 - 4 Former RDF Male 3,996 - 3,996 Disabled 123 - 123 Total 4,818 79 4,739 Female 45 2 43 AGs Male 4,773 77 4,696 Disabled 147 - 147 Source: RDRC MIS. Objective 2: Provide socioeconomic reintegration support to said members following demobilization, with a particular focus on the provision of such support to female, child, and disabled ex-combatants Outcome Indicators 1. Percentage of ex-combatants who are economically active (disaggregated by gender, children/adults, ill-disabled) 2. Percentage of ex-combatants who report social acceptance by their communities (disaggregated by gender, child, ill- disabled) Intermediate Results • Number of ex-combatants who receive reintegration benefits (RG) in time and in accordance with the implementation Indicators manual • Percentage of ex-combatants selected to receive VSW support and registered to receive training have successfully completed training/education/IGA • Percentage of incoming ex-combatants who are screened for mental health issues (disaggregated by adult/children) • Percentage of categorized disabled ex-combatants who receive Mutuelles de Santé and monthly allowance as per current legislation, within 9 months after demobilization • Percentage of ex-combatants provided within a national ID number before they leave the demobilization center Page 49 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) Component 3: Reintegration This component included both social and economic reintegration activities. To ensure that quantitate and qualitative information on key outputs that were realized under both aspect is fully captured, this presents social and economic reintegration separately. Economic Reintegration The project provided RGs to 4,000 ex-RDF (including 4 females and 113 disabled), 4,668 XCs of AGs (including 42 females and 148 disabled), and 125 XCs, beneficiaries of the EDRP who did not receive their RGs at the time of its closing in 2008. In total, the project provided 8,793 beneficiaries with RGs, representing 100 percent of the caseload. Within this group, 4,328 opted for subprojects for IGAs, 336 pursued formal education, 2,167 pursued vocational training, 1,804 pursued agricultural Key Outputs by training and accompanying support, and 158 received employment support. An interesting finding regarding vocational Component training was that a majority of XCs were working in sectors that were not related to their vocational training. (linked to the achievement of the Table 1.5. Current occupation vs vocational training during SEDRP Objective 2) XC XC Male XC Female XC Disabled Working in vocation in which 29.6 30.3 22.2 20.0 training received Not working in vocation in which 70.4 69.7 77.8 80.0 training received Source: Payment Verification Survey (2017). The project supported cooperatives as a means to foster social and economic reintegration of XCs. In total, the project provided support to 226 cooperatives of XCs. Some of the XCs’ cooperatives were formed and conducted their operations at rehabilitation and production workshops (financed by government funds, technically supported by the project). Every year, the project organized a competition among cooperatives and awarded the best-performing cooperatives to encourage others to improve their capacities and performance. Page 50 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) Table 1.6. Support to Cooperatives as of December 31, 2017 Entrepreneurship Resource Number of Learning Tours Technical Assistance Training Mobilization Training Cooperatives Completed Ongoing Completed Ongoing Completed Ongoing Completed Ongoing 226 73 0 51 25 226 32 146 0 Source: RDRC Operations Department. The RDRC maintained a strong advocacy effort to secure employment for XCs and effectively placed hundreds of XCs in short- term and long-term jobs in various sectors. These are covered in project Aide Memoires. Table 1.7. Economically Active Compared CM CM Youth Survey Year XC CM XC Male CM Male XC Female XC Disabled CM Disabled Former Child Soldier Female (24 and Younger) 2017 74.2 62.1 71.9 69.5 82.7 53.2 58.5 70.0 69.5 33.3 2016 75.1 73.3 75.2 77.6 73.8 67.6 65.5 60.5 75.5 67.1 2015 75.5 77.4 75.3 82.0 100.0 68.6 50.5 59.3 69.4 62.8 2012 53.1 52.0 54.2 53.2 18.2 49.4 55.1 45.8 66.7 37.4 Note: The data for 2012 were taken from the Tracer survey. All other data are from the successive Community Dynamics Studies for 2012, 2015, 2016, and 2017. Successive externally-administered community and ex-combatant surveys indicate outcomes that hint overall positive impact of reintegration support. For example, ex-combatants had more access to banking and credit institutions compared to their civilian peers: Table 1.8. Access to banking and credit institutions CM youth XC CM XC CM Child XC CM (24 and Female Female Disabled Disabled Soldier younger) 2017 73.9 69.8 92.6 68.8 88.7 60.0 42.4 44.4 2016 62.5 47.3 73.8 40.4 72.4 44.7 36.7 30.4 2015 65.1 61.1 80.0 47.4 79.1 56.5 41.5 53.5 Source: Community Dynamics Studies (2015, 2016, 2017). Interestingly, the ex-combatants were found to do worse than their peers in the communities when asked about capacity to meet their household expenses: Page 51 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) Table 1.90. Capacity to meet household expenses CM youth XC CM XC CM Former child (24 and XC CM Female Female Disabled Disabled combatant younger) 2017 To a small extent 61.5 35.4 54.3 44.8 76.5 75.0 59.3 33.3 Neither small nor great extent 37.9 59.9 45.7 52.2 23.5 25.0 38.9 41.7 To a great extent 0.5 4.8 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 25.0 2016 To a small extent 58.9 35.8 56.7 45.3 62.8 50.7 37.2 32.7 Neither small nor great extent 38.8 56.3 43.3 46.5 37.2 42.0 58.1 65.3 To a great extent 2.3 7.8 0.0 8.2 0.0 7.2 4.7 2.0 2015 To a small extent 66.5 49.3 100.0 61.4 78.0 82.6 67.9 68.8 Neither small nor great extent 32.0 43.1 0.0 33.9 20.7 8.7 32.1 25.0 To a great extent 1.5 7.6 0.0 4.7 1.2 8.7 0.0 6.2 Source: Community Dynamics Studies (2015, 2016, 2017). Social Reintegration Given the broad scope of social activities, the project reached hundreds of XC beneficiaries through social reintegration. Social reintegration activities included the following: • Vulnerability assessments. The project conducted regular assessments looking at social vulnerability issues covering vulnerable XCs nationwide. These assessments helped identify those vulnerable XCs who required additional support through the government’s social protection programs, aiming at contributing to their socioeconomic reintegration process. • Sensitization workshop for dependents. Sensitization workshops targeting dependents of demobilized XCs were conducted regularly. These workshops included local authorities and NGOs, covering topics such as community perceptions, sexual and gender-based violence, family planning, HIV/AIDS awareness and voluntary testing and counseling, psycho-social counseling, and coping with drug and substance abuse. The RDRC partnered with local NGO Uyisenga n’manzi to deliver modules of relationship and trust building between XCs, their spouses, and their children. The workshops served as platforms where local authorities inform the participants about available services (that is, small loans, agriculture programs, and health services). • Sports and recreational activities. The RDRC organized an annual sports event called the Peace Cup Tournament (football) involving both XCs (each team is required to have at least six XCs) and CMs. Likewise, basketball Page 52 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) tournaments of disabled XCs and CMs and football and volleyball tournaments involving former child soldiers and their peers from the communities were organized. • Other activities. The RDRC collaborated closely with local authorities to provide social support to XCs, including resolving family conflicts, providing counseling, referring severe cases of medical and mental health assistance to health facilities, assisting families of deceased XCs, and sensitizing XCs on Mutuelles de Santé. The project’s overall successful reintegration outcomes are captured in externally-administered surveys. While the community members reported slightly higher levels of acceptance when compared to ex-combatants, independent studies indicate that a sustainable level of social reintegration was reached at completion: Table 1.10. Social Acceptance Compared Social Acceptance To what extent do you feel that Former CM Youth CM XC CM you are accepted or rejected as XC CM XC Male CM Male XC Female Child (24 and Female Disabled Disabled part of the community where you Soldier Younger) live? Feeling Rejected 1.9 1.1 1.1 2.0 1.2 1.2 0.0 0.0 3.3 3.2 Neither accepted nor 2017 19.4 14.8 18.1 18.6 22.5 11.0 30.2 40.0 25.0 12.9 rejected Accepted 78.7 84.1 80.9 79.4 76.2 87.8 69.8 60.0 71.7 83.9 Feeling Rejected 3.3 2.2 1.2 3.3 3.3 3.5 4.6 1.3 8.2 2.9 Neither accepted nor 2016 33.8 33.3 32.6 33.4 37.7 34.3 28.7 35.5 51.0 43.5 rejected Accepted 62.9 64.5 66.1 63.3 59.0 62.2 66.7 63.2 40.8 53.6 Feeling Rejected 6.5 1.8 0.4 6.5 0.0 4.5 8.7 4.0 4.1 4.8 Neither accepted nor 2015 29.3 54.0 53.6 29.6 0.0 54.9 30.4 56.0 35.1 59.5 rejected Accepted 64.2 44.1 46.0 63.9 100.0 40.6 60.9 40.0 60.8 35.7 Feeling Rejected 1.9 0.4 0.6 2.0 0.0 0.0 30.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 Neither accepted nor 2012 19.2 12.0 13.7 19.5 9.1 8.4 17.4 14.6 0.0 8.8 rejected Accepted 78.9 87.6 85.8 78.5 90.9 91.6 79.1 85.4 100 91.2 Note: The data for 2012 were taken from the Tracer survey. All other data are from the successive Community Dynamics Surveys for 2012, 2015, 2016, and 2017. Page 53 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) Similarly, there was little disparity between the XCs and community members in terms of belonging to immediate community and belonging to Rwandan society: Table 1.11. Belonging to immediate community CM Former Youth XC CM XC CM Child (24 and XC CM Female Female Disabled Disabled Soldier younger) 2017 To a small extent 2.6 0.6 3.8 0.0 5.7 0.0 0.0 3.2 Neither small nor great extent 27.8 31.2 33.8 30.5 39.6 30.0 34.4 32.3 To a great extent 69.6 68.2 62.5 69.5 54.7 70.0 65.6 64.5 2016 To a small extent 5.7 3.7 1.7 2.9 6.9 2.7 8.2 1.4 Neither small nor great extent 39.9 29.9 33.3 31.2 40.2 18.9 59.2 37.7 To a great extent 54.3 66.4 65.0 65.9 52.9 78.4 32.7 60.9 2015 To a small extent 10.8 1.5 20.0 2.9 11.2 0.0 11.3 0.0 Neither small nor great extent 46.0 44.1 40.0 42.6 48.3 66.7 53.6 60.5 To a great extent 43.2 54.4 40.0 54.4 40.4 33.3 35.1 39.5 Source: Community Dynamics Studies (2015, 2016, 2017). Table 1.12. Belonging to Rwandan society CM Former Youth XC CM CM Child (24 and XC CM Female Female XC Disabled Disabled soldier younger) 2017 To a small extent 1.9 1.1 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0 Neither small nor great extent 29.1 29.5 26.2 34.1 37.7 50.0 32.8 38.7 To a great extent 69.0 69.3 72.5 65.9 62.3 50.0 65.6 61.3 2016 To a small extent 2.6 2.7 1.7 1.2 1.1 0.0 2.0 2.9 Neither small nor great extent 38.3 27.9 30.0 29.6 33.3 16.4 59.2 34.8 To a great extent 59.1 69.4 68.3 69.2 65.5 83.6 38.8 62.3 2015 To a small extent 7.3 1.5 0.0 2.2 6.7 0.0 4.1 0.0 Neither small nor great extent 45.8 39.9 60.0 43.8 50.0 51.9 57.7 51.2 To a great extent 46.8 58.5 40.0 54.0 43.3 48.1 38.1 48.8 Source: Community Dynamics Studies (2015, 2016, 2017). Page 54 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) Reintegration Support to Vulnerable Groups The project provided additional support to those XCs who are identified as being still vulnerable, after having received their initial demobilization and reintegration benefits. All female XCs were automatically made eligible to receive support through the VSW scheme, while the rest of the XCs were subject to vulnerability criteria to receive additional benefits. The vulnerability of individual XCs was determined on the basis of the challenges they faced to establish a sustainable livelihood, including access to shelter and land, health status, employment situation, and household characteristics (number of dependents as well as child-headed household). The VSW support was offered in the form of small grants for subprojects for IGAs, vocational and apprenticeship skills training, employment support, and access to formal education for two years. The project provided additional support to 6,787 XCs who were identified as eligible for the support through the VSW. Table 1.13. VSW Provided between January 2009 and December 2017 W-6 W-7 W-8 W-9 W-10 W-11 W-12 W-13 W-14 W-15 Total Completed 1,005 692 2,649 1,244 639 315 123 63 57 0 6,787 Ongoing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 72 73 Source: RDRC MIS. The project was able to ensure that the majority of eligible beneficiaries completed their VSW support. At completion, 98.40 percent of XCs who were selected to receive and register for the VSW support successfully completed their activities. Table 1.14. Rate of Successful Completion of VSW as of December 31, 2017 Registered to Receive VSW Support Completed VSW Support Vocational Vocational Training Formal Formal Completed (%) Total Training and IGA Total and IGA Education Education Apprenticeship Apprenticeship 6,894 6,453 382 59 6,787 6,358 375 54 98.4 Source: RDRC MIS and Operations Department. The project provided tailored support to disabled XCs through the VSW mechanism and IRPWs. In total, the project provided support to 328 disabled XCs through the VSW scheme, of which 185 received support for IGAs, 142 received support in the form of vocational training and apprenticeship, and 1 completed formal education. Support to Children XCs Page 55 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) The project received a total of 293 children at the Children Rehabilitation Center in Musanze District. At the time of project closing in December 31, 2017, 16 children were undertaking activities at the center. The project provided 284 children XCs with targeted reintegration supporting, including 41 in IGA grants, 20 in formal education support, and 223 in skills training support. In addition, the project implemented the following activities: • Family tracing and unification. The project traced families of child XCs and conducted unification activities in collaboration with local authorities. As part of reunification with facilities, children were provided with a certificate, an ID card, and a take-home kit. • Follow-up visits to children. Following family reunification and self-reintegration, the project conducted follow-up visits in collaboration with the National Council for Children and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Despite the small number of this cohort, follow-up visits were found to be challenging and not regular. • Workshop for former child soldiers. The project conducted nationwide sensitization workshops for former children XCs to enhance the links between former children XCs and local authorities, CMs, and XC representatives, as well as sensitizing them on key economic and social activities. • Mentorship program. The mentorship program was introduced to boost the potential of vulnerable former child XCs whose families could not be traced, and who reintegrated into society after leaving the rehabilitation center around 18 years old. The objective was to support life skills and integration into communities, through the guidance of mentors in cooperatives. This activity was piloted, but found to not be adapted to the demand and needs of young adults who were more eager to seek income-generating opportunities or applicable skills training rather than spending time in cooperatives. • Referrals to national employment program. With the introduction of the national employment program in 2016, the RDRC began advocacy on behalf of former children XCs who were eligible to go through the national program, which offered trainings and paid internships. Mental Health Support The project supported the capacity of the RDRC in addressing and responding to the needs of XCs who suffered from mental health issues. The first step was to train 2,146 Health Animators (“Animateurs de Santé�) and 394 Social affairs representatives at cell levels. An intensive sensitization campaign accompanied this effort. The project, through the support of the BETF, later contracted international experts to carry out a needs assessment of the RDRC mental health team and key national and local partners and design and deliver trainings on mental health support. As part of this exercise, key staff at Page 56 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) the RDRC and MINISANTE received training covering areas such as assessment and counselling skills, management of challenging behaviors, and psycho-therapy for survivors of war and combat focusing on the treatment of PTSD and trauma- related disorders including heightened levels of aggression and Substance Use Disorders. In 2013, the RDRC trained 2,146 Health Animators (Animateurs de Sante) and 394 Social Affairs Representatives at cell level. An intensive sensitization campaign in print and air accompanied this effort. With capacity building and technical support, the RDRC medical team was provided with tools and training on the effective application of the (a) Narrative Exposure Therapy (NET), one of the frontline techniques for the treatment of PTSD, and NET for survivors of combat; (b) FORNET, NET for Forensic Offender Rehabilitation; (c) KIDNET, a specific modification of NET for children; (d) Interpersonal Therapy for Depression; (e) Introduction to the Alcohol, Smoking and Substance Involvement Screening; and (f) Self-care as a trauma counselor and psycho-hygiene. Screening for mental health issues was done at Mutobo Demobilization Center, both with arriving XCs and their dependents. Similarly, children at the Children Rehabilitation Center were also screened for mental health issues at Muhoza child rehabilitation center. Project beneficiaries who required psychiatric care were referred to the most specialized institution in the country, namely Ndera Psychiatric Hospital located in Kigali. In addition, beneficiaries with addiction were referred to the Icyizere Center in Kigali, specialized in addiction problems. Table 1.15. Psychiatric Treatment Provided in Ndera Hospital as of December 31, 2017 Male Female Total Total 3,668 182 3,850 Source: RDRC Medical Rehabilitation Unit. Table 1.16. Psychotherapy Provided in Icyizere Center and Huye Rehabilitation Center as of December 31, 2017 Male Female Total Total 213 27 240 Source: RDRC Medical Rehabilitation Unit. The project conducted regular follow-up visits to XCs with mental health issues. The RDRC medical team maintained a file for each individual XC, and records were updated after every visit. Between 2015 and 2017, the project conducted more than 2,600 follow-up visits on mental health issues. Reintegration and Medical Support to Disabled XCs Page 57 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) At completion, the project was providing support to a total of 3,565 disabled and chronically ill XCs including 3,023, who were enrolled with the Mutuelles de Santé, and 3,319 who received a monthly allowance. In total, from different sources and donations, the RDRC provided 3,554 crutches, 1,444 prosthetics, and 316 wheelchairs to disabled XCs. Based on screening and medical categorization, the project provided targeted support to address the different needs of beneficiaries. Table 1.17. Cumulative Summary of Assistance to Disabled and Chronically Ill (December 31, 2017) Type of Treatment Physio- Chronic Mental Prosthetics Surgery Optometrists Others therapy Diseases Cases Category I 766 300 1197 91 3288 2093 1700 Category II 568 917 837 47 2164 1649 1133 Category III 404 712 718 49 803 912 1894 Category IV 557 504 323 389 686 951 1066 Non-cat 62 13 163 36 380 180 360 Total 2357 2446 3238 612 7321 5785 6153 Source: RDRC Medical Rehabilitation Unit. Voluntary HIV/AIDS testing and counselling activities were conducted regularly during sensitization workshops. The review of project Aide Memoires indicates that on average, the majority of participants to workshops undertook voluntary testing. The project financed the construction of handicap-friendly houses for severely disabled XCs. The project financed the construction of 220 houses for severely disabled XCs. Drawing on lessons learned from the project, the government has been funding houses for less severely disabled XCs, out of government budget, building 640 houses for less severely disabled XCs. The project provided targeted support to disabled XCs in their areas of resettlement in the form of access to medical support, mental health support, and training, through the IRPWs. The center concept was developed during the SEDRP as a vehicle for providing a durable solution to the health and livelihood challenges faced by XCs with severe disabilities. The RDRC constructed 10 such workshops, funded by the government and the project, in all five provinces of Rwanda and reached more than 3,000 XCs with disabilities, and enhanced their social and economic reintegration process. The structures contain medical rehabilitation facilities (clinics) for general consultation and treatment, physiotherapy, and general health monitoring of the disabled beneficiaries. The centers also provide vocational and employment opportunities and house recreational facilities for the severely disabled XCs and communal television. Page 58 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) Component 4: Mainstreaming Since its inception, the project’s mainstreaming component was designed as a built-in exit strategy, to ensure that by the time the project closes, XCs are integrated in national social protection systems and that capacity is built in Rwanda outside of the RDRC, to support and continue project activities. The scope of mainstreaming was to ensure the project beneficiaries have access to social protection services, particularly those beneficiaries who are disabled or chronically ill, who require psycho-social and psychiatric assistance, as well as services that target child soldiers. To do so, the RDRC actively sought to form partnerships with different institutions and agencies. At completion, the project successfully mainstreamed support to XC beneficiaries and allowed for their integration into national social protection systems. Table 1.18. Access to Health Insurance and Mainstream Services (December 31, 2017) XC XC CM Former Child CM Youth (24 XC CM Female CM Female Disabled Disabled Soldier and younger) Access to Mutuelle De Santé (health 86.4 94.9 92.4 93.9 88.7 100.0 75.9 96.8 insurance) Access to Mainstream Services 88.5 95.5 86.2 92.7 88.7 80.0 91.4 93.5 Source: Community Dynamics Study (2017). The project actively carried out advocacy and formed partnerships to encourage participation of key public agencies in the reintegration of XCs by linking them to problem solving and economic opportunities available within communities and a diversity of institutions. Key outputs of mainstreaming activities include: • Sharing information with National Council of Persons with Disabilities (NCPD) and shared information on the categorization of persons with disabilities; • Working with the NCC through field visits for child XCs associated with armed forces and in the reunification with their families; • Sharing knowledge and lessons learned on its work providing comprehensive care to child XCs, to the newly created National Rehabilitation Center. This institution, created in August 2017, will provide support to persons including street children and children suffering from drug addiction; • Partnering with Rwanda Agriculture Board for provision of technical trainings to the XCs’ cooperatives engaged in agriculture; Page 59 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) • Partnering with Rwanda Development Board for the provision of training of disabled XCs on National Employment Program; • Partnering with local authorities for the operation and management of the clinics within the production workshops; and • Partnering with Ministry of Trade and Industry to mainstream XCs into cooperatives, by securing technical support of RICEM and the NCCR. • The project’s capacity-building support on mental health helped increase the capacity of national mental health systems by including key mental health partners from national institutions who participated in the yearlong mental health training provided by Vivo International through a series of modules. Communications and Cross-border Sensitization The project attempted to encourage the repatriation of the remaining AG combatants from the DRC through innovative cross-border sensitization and communications activities. A variety of sensitization and communications activities were tested and implemented, particularly after the AF in 2014. The project recruited a radio communications specialist who prepared and hosted a weekly radio show on Radio Rwanda that included interviews with XCs and local leaders. The radio program ‘Isange mu Banyu’ was considered an effective communication and sensitization tool for the project, as noted by XCs and project stakeholders. In addition, the RDRC developed a joint sensitization action plan that was jointly implemented by the RDRC and MONUSCO. In collaboration with MONUSCO, the project helped organize cross-border Skype conferences, linking the RDRC and MONUSCO transit centers in the DRC. More than 10 Skype conferences were held, linking communities in different locations in Rwanda with the transit centers in the DRC and allowing families in Rwanda to speak with their relatives in the DRC. Similarly, the discharge ceremonies (conducted at the end of each demobilization phase at Mutobo Demobilization Center) were livestreamed through YouTube, and Skype conferences were held between the Mutobo Demobilization Center and the transit centers in the DRC. In general, the project carried out the following sensitization and communications activities: • General sensitization of the public on RDRP and the achievements of the RDRC; • Sensitization on demobilization in DRC and on the border via radio programs and print media with an emphasis on the successes of demobilized XCs; • Skype conferences between demobilized XCs and/or family of XCs and XCs in DRC; Page 60 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) • Mobile phone calls between demobilized XCS and/or family of XCs and XCs in DRC; • Utilizing various social media channels including YouTube featuring demobilization/discharge ceremonies and promoting return (RDRC estimate 3500 viewers per demobilization during live broadcasts). Page 61 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION A. TASK TEAM MEMBERS Name Role Preparation Marcelo Fabre Senior Social Development Specialist, TTL Sean Bradley TF Coordinator Toni Ntaganda Kayonga Operations Officer Otieno Ayany FM Specialist Sameena Dost Senior Counsel Aissatou Diallo Finance Officer Matin Fodor Senior Environmental Specialist Mary Bitekerezo Senior Social Development Specialist Pia Peeters Senior Social Development Specialist Diego Garrido Martin M&E Specialist Chantal Kajangwe Procurement Specialist Rogers Kayihura Communications Officer Fanny Robert Operations Analyst Pamela Beecroft Operations Analyst Caroline Guazzo Language Program Assistant Aline Dukuze Team Assistant Supervision/ICR Natacha Caroline Lemasle Senior Social Development Specialist, TTL Mulugeta Dinka Senior Procurement Specialist Enagnon Ernest Eric Adda Senior Financial Management Specialist Rogers Kayihura Communications Officer Belinda Mutesi Program Assistant Fernando Martins Gonçalves Financial Management Kaori Oshima Social Development Specialist Murat Onur Social Development Specialist George Bob Nkulanga Social Safeguards Specialist Emmanuel Muligirwa Environmental Safeguards Specialist Harald Hugo Hinkel Social Development Antoinette Kamanzi Procurement Assistant Leonie Willenbrink Social Development Bettina Ruzima Program Assistant Stavros Stavrou Senior Social Development Specialist Benjamin Burckhart Senior Social Development Specialist Pia Peeters Senior Social Development Specialist Marcelo Fabre Senior Social Development Specialist Anton Baare Social Development Otieno Ayany Financial Management Chantal Kajangwe Procurement Berthe Rwagitare Ndayambaje Team Assistant Emilie Rees Smith Gender, Reintegration of child soldiers Page 62 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) Mamadou Sevede Procurement Paul Welton Lead Financial Management Specialist Richard Coppinger Engineer, architect Davide Naggi Disability expert Qyniu (Sabrina) Cao Gender, Reintegration of child soldiers Joseph Ellong Operations Analyst Lillian Brenda Namutebi Financial Management Pascal Tegwa Senior Procurement Specialist Joseph Byamugisha Financial Management Daksha Shakya Operations Officer Wolfhart Pohl Lead Environmental Specialist B. STAFF TIME AND COST Staff Time and Cost Stage of Project Cycle No. of staff weeks US$ (including travel and consultant costs) Preparation FY09 8.940 61,011.25 FY10 6.200 34,745.20 FY15 10.176 120,947.26 FY16 3.737 289,665.03 FY17 29.865 248,715.16 FY18 17.622 213,118.91 Total 76.54 968,202.81 Supervision/ICR FY10 41.707 88,038.53 FY11 50.950 129,809.63 FY12 38.095 208,087.27 FY13 28.882 229,148.04 FY14 23.441 196,460.47 FY15 42.892 217,651.56 FY16 37.020 169,248.02 FY17 25.651 113,894.18 Page 63 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) FY18 23.375 141,370.73 Total 312.01 1,493,708.43 Page 64 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT Actual at Project Amount at Approval Percentage of Approval Components Closing (US$, (US$, millions) (US$, millions) millions) Demobilization 2.52 5.53 219 Reinsertion 3.52 0.59 17 Reintegration 8.24 14.36 174 Mainstreaming of program 0.00 0.29 0 activities Program management 4.25 7.64 179 Unallocated 0.56 — — Total 19.09 28.40 148 Page 65 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS 1. This efficiency analysis is based on the information and data available thus cannot provide a comprehensive analysis. Limitations are related to comparability, including types of activities, service standards, and context of other demobilization and reintegration operations. In this context, bank- financed demobilization and reintegration projects that are comparable to the SEDRP include: • P075129: Rwanda Emergency Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration Project (EDRRP), closed in 2008. • P081964: Burundi Emergency Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration Project (EDRRP), closed in 2008. • P078658: DRC Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (EDRP), closed in 2011. • P113506: Burundi Emergency Demobilization and Transitional Reintegration Project (EDTRP), closed in 2014. 2. At the time of this ICR, there were three active reintegration projects that were partly comparable to SEDRP: • P152903: DRC Reinsertion and Reintegration Project, closing in 2019. • P157233: Mali Reinsertion of Ex-combatants Project, closing in 2020. • P160272: Central African Republic Reintegration of Ex-combatants Project, closing in 2020. 3. Although demobilization and reintegration projects have common objectives, the activities financed vary in scope and reach, thus representing limitations to efficiency analysis. These limitations include: (i) operating costs vary significantly from one operating environment to the other. For instance, quality of roads, distances, and accessibility are very different in CAR and Rwanda; (ii) in above-mentioned projects, not all beneficiaries receive all types of benefits. For instance, in several cases pending caseloads from previous projects receive only pending benefits, which could artificially lower the cost per unit; and (iii) the range and scope of benefits provided varies from one project to the other. 4. In this context, the following efficiency analysis method62 was utilized: (i) costs per unit is calculated without operating costs, (ii) analysis was done by first establishing the cost per beneficiary per type of benefit (demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration), and presenting the average cost per unit for one beneficiary receiving all types of benefits, and (iii) presenting cost per unit for comparable benefits only. In doing so, the different types of activities under each project were grouped to the extent possible to reach comparative analyses. 62This method was developed and used for the 2014 ICR for the Burundi Emergency Demobilization and Transitional Reintegration Project, rated successful by IEG. Page 66 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) 5. The DRC Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P078658) and Burundi Emergency Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration Project (P081964) included components to support vulnerable groups which covered basic activities. When compared, these activities correspond to support covered under demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration components of Burundi Emergency Demobilization and Transitional Reintegration Project (P113506) and Rwanda Emergency Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration Project (P075129). In these two projects, the vulnerable groups component covered additional advanced support, including medical and psycho-social support and construction of specialized housing for disabled ex-combatants. In the SEDRP, such advanced support to vulnerable groups were provided through demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration components, therefore there was no separate component for vulnerable groups. 6. It is assumed that support provided under demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration components in Burundi EDTRP and the Rwanda EDRRP projects cover similar activities as under all four components under the DRC EDRP and Burundi EDRRP (including components on vulnerable groups). Rwanda EDRRP and Burundi EDTRP provided advanced medical and housing support to vulnerable ex- combatants through separate vulnerable groups component, while the SEDRP provided such advanced support across demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration components, therefore efficiency for these particular services are assessed separately. Table 4.1 Comparative costs per beneficiary of demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration benefits, in US$ Burundi Rwanda DRC EDRP65 Burundi Rwanda SEDRP 63 64 EDRRP EDRRP EDTRP66 Unit cost 2,495 1,786 1,817 2,132 2,366 7. The project appears to be in the general range of unit costs for demobilization and reintegration projects with US$2,366 per beneficiary. It must be noted that the SEDRP provided advanced support, including construction of houses and provision of medical and psycho-social support to vulnerable ex- combatants across different components that were not available in other projects like in DRC. Furthermore, lower cost per beneficiary in DRC in comparison to Rwanda and the two Burundi projects, can partially be explained by the large caseload and related economies of scale as this project demobilized more than 140,000 combatants. Table 4.2 Comparative costs per beneficiary of demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration benefits of recently approved projects, in US$ DRC Reinsertion and Mali Reinsertion CAR Reintegration Rwanda SEDRP Reintegration Project67 Project68 Project69 Unit cost 3,447 3,300 3,388 2,366 8. When compared to the estimated costs per beneficiary of recently approved demobilization and 63 World Bank, ICR Report of Burundi Emergency Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration Project, 2009, p.25-26 64 World Bank, ICR Report of Rwanda Emergency Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration Project, 2009, p.32-45 65 World Bank, ICR Report of DRC Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project, 2012, p. 28 66 World Bank, ICR Report of the Burundi Emergency Demobilization and Transitional Reintegration Project, 2014, p. 13 67 World Bank, Project Appraisal Document of DRC Reinsertion and Reintegration Project, 2015, p. 4-11 68 World Bank, Project Appraisal Document of Mali Reinsertion of Ex-combatants Project, 2017, p. 4-10 69 World Bank, Project Appraisal Document of Central African Republic Reintegration of Ex-combatants Project, 2017 p. 13-19 Page 67 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) reintegration projects, the project’s costs of US$2,366 per beneficiary indicate overall efficiency. Table 4.3. Comparative costs per beneficiary per project component (projects with advanced support to vulnerable groups), in US$ Burundi EDTRP Rwanda EDRRP Rwanda SEDRP Demobilization 357 117 632 Reinsertion 461 591 68 Reintegration 1,314 1,078 1,666 Vulnerable Groups 1,065 778 n/a70 Total 3,197 2,563 2,366 Table 4.4. Detailed comparison of Rwanda EDRRP and SEDRP cost per beneficiary per demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration components, in US$ Rwanda EDRRP Rwanda SEDRP71 Cost per Cost per Number of Number of Total cost beneficiary per Total cost beneficiary per beneficiaries beneficiaries Project Component component component Demobilization 5,300,000 45353 117 5,525,696 8739 632 Reinsertion 17,200,000 29092 591 590,355 8739 68 Reintegration 24,434,725 22675 1,078 14,355,496 8793 1,666 Vulnerable Groups 8,528,311 10968 778 - - - Total 2,563 2,366 9. When compared to the previous project (EDRRP), the SEDRP costs signals an overall improvement in terms of efficiency with a reduction around US$200. The project did not include a separate component on vulnerable groups and provided advanced services to vulnerable groups across components. Table 4.5. Cost per beneficiary for additional advanced support to disabled ex-combatants (specialized medical support and provision of accessible houses) Rwanda EDRRP Burundi EDTRP Rwanda SEDRP Total cost (US$ million) 8.5 4.7 3.7 Total number of eligible beneficiaries 10968 4375 3,565 Cost per disabled (US$) 778 1,065 1,035 10. Additional support to vulnerable groups include specialized medical support and construction of accessible houses for eligible disabled ex-combatants. In terms of additional support, the cost per beneficiary is US$1,035 in the SEDRP compared to Rwanda EDRRP and Burundi EDTRP, signaling that the project’s specialized support was within the range of efficiency in Rwanda SEDRP. Table 4.6. Comparison of percentage of beneficiaries receiving houses and surgeries Rwanda EDRRP Burundi EDTRP Rwanda SEDRP Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage 70 Advanced support to vulnerable groups was provided in a cross-cutting manner, covering activities during demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration. 71 By design and implementation, activities financed by the Mainstreaming Component of SEDRP supported the project’s reintegration outcomes. As such, the costs of mainstreaming activities are included in the costs of reintegration component when the cost per beneficiary is calculated. Page 68 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) Total disabled caseload 3538 n/a 8400 n/a 3565 n/a House 150 4.3 176 2.1 220 6.1 Surgery 2043 57.7 704 8.4 3317 93 Table 4.7. Comparison of cost per square meter of comparable specialized disabled housing (US$ equivalent) Rwanda EDRRP Burundi EDTRP Rwanda SEDRP Average Unit cost (US$ equivalent) 25,887 25,513 17,607 Surface (m2) 70 71.2 70 Cost per m2 370 358 252 11. Data on cost of specialized houses shows that the SEDRP reached a higher efficiency rate compared to the previous demobilization and reintegration project in Rwanda and the EDTRP in Burundi. With regards to number of surgeries conducted through the project, the SEDRP reached more than 90 percent of eligible group of beneficiaries. Based on the above information, the SEDRRP is assessed to be within the range of efficiency of D&R projects, while admittedly being overall on the higher end of the spectrum. Page 69 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER COMMENTS 1. The draft ICR was shared with the borrower and the representatives of the donors to the MDTF (Germany/KfW, the Netherlands, and Sweden). The borrower indicated that it agreed with the document and had two minor comments on the document. First, the borrower indicated that the environment in Rwanda was fully conducive for a successful demobilization and reintegration program. Second, the borrower noted that the fact that there were shortcomings in the database of ex-combatant beneficiaries is mainly related to the fact that the individuals – once they leave the project – tend to move around the country in search of economic opportunities and family reasons. No comments were received from Germany/KfW and the Netherlands. The comments received from Sweden are provided below. 2. The overall response of Sweden toward the project is positive. Regarding the number of project beneficiaries, the donor raised the question of whether the estimated number of beneficiaries (AGs) at appraisal assumed the possibility of future re-recruitment. With regard to communications and sensitization activities, the donor appreciated the innovative ways of broadcasting social reintegration activities to the DRC, such as the annual peace cup football tournaments and other ceremonies, as a way of convincing combatants to come back to Rwanda. The donor inquired whether it was possible to find out the geographical location of the viewers, i.e. whether people viewed the livestreamed activities from the DRC (via YouTube). 3. The donor highlighted the importance of including a gender focus in the project, commenting on the specific gender training as an important part of the well-tailored training syllabus at Mutobo Demobilization Center, as well as the fact that childcare was available, which enabled female dependents to participate. The donor noted that the ICR mainly referred to gender in the stand-alone gender section and raised the question whether gender could be mainstreamed into other sections of the document. The donor also suggested to add the gender policy as an annex to the report and raised the question whether there are any lessons learned regarding gender mainstreaming that could be included in the ICR. Regarding the government’s gender mainstreaming practices, the donor mentioned that it would be useful to know the relevant public institutions in Rwanda that the project worked with. 4. The donor inquired about the comparison of economic performance of XCs and CMs and whether there were targeted information and sensitization activities conducted to mitigate potential issues. Regarding social outcomes, the donor inquired whether further research could be done into understanding the reasons behind the cohort of XCs who did not feel accepted in their communities, suggesting that the answer(s) could be used as a lesson learned. The donor commented on the project result that 100 percent of the XCs reported that they are treated equally or better than CMs when accessing medical care, interacting with local authorities, the judicial system, the police, and the education system. On mainstreaming of program activities, the donor inquired why the access of XCs to Mutuelles de Santé and monthly allowance donor was not 100 percent at completion. 5. Regarding the Justification of Overall Outcome Ratings, the donor asked whether the project results indicator ‘demobilization of all XCs of AGs and former RDF members’ refers to all XCs returning to Rwanda. The donor also suggested including in the report the estimated number of FDLR members currently remaining in the DRC. Finally, the donor emphasized the importance and success of national Page 70 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) ownership in ensuring sustainability of the project, noting that the entire budget of the RDRC has been taken over by the government at the end of the project, which signals strong ownership of the project. Page 71 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS World Bank Documents • All Implementation Status and Results Reports (ISRs) of the SEDRP. • Emergency Project Paper on a Proposed Emergency Recovery Grant in the amount of SDR 5.2 million (US$8 million equivalent) to the Republic of Rwanda for a Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project. Report No. 47964-RW, August 13, 2009. • Financing Agreement for IDA Grant H514-RW Conformed, February 8, 2011. • Implementation Completion and Results Report of Burundi Emergency Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration Project. Report No. ICR00001152, June 23, 2009. • Implementation Completion and Results Report of Rwanda Emergency Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration Project. Report No. ICR00001169, August 30, 2009. • Implementation Completion and Results Report of DRC Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project. Report No. ICR2168, March 30, 2012. • Implementation Completion and Results Report of Burundi Emergency Demobilization and Transitional Reintegration Project. Report No. ICR00003344, December 08, 2014. • Office Memorandum, RVP Approval of the MDTF co-financing the Rwanda Second Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712), July 29, 2015. • Office Memorandum, Rwanda Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project Restructuring Memo: Request for no-cost extension of the end disbursement date of Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) TF071228 (Trustee Level) and of closing date for TF016108 (Grant Level), May 2014. • Project Paper on a Proposed Additional Credit in the Amount of SDR 5.8 million (US$8.97 million equivalent) to the Republic of Rwanda for the Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project. Report No. 112301-RW, April 7, 2014. • Project Paper on a Proposed Additional Financing in the Amount of US$0.8 million from the Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project Multi-Donor Trust Fund (TF071228) to the Republic of Rwanda for the Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project. Report No. 112301-RW, January 30, 2017. • Project Paper on a Proposed Additional Grant from the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) in the Amount of US$2.3 million to the Republic of Rwanda for the Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project. Report No. 82708-RW, December 16, 2013. Page 72 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) • Project Paper on a Proposed Grant in the Amount of SDR 11.2 million (US$15 million equivalent) to the Republic of Mali for the Reinsertion of Ex-combatants Project. Report No. PAD1810, February 6, 2017. • Project Paper on a Proposed Grant in the Amount of SDR 22.2 million (US$30 million equivalent) to the Central African Republic for the Reintegration of Ex-combatants Project. Report No. PAD2158, March 31, 2017. • Restructuring Papers on Proposed Project Restructuring of Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project: 986190-RW (July 2015), RES28978 (June 2017), RES29672 (September 2017), 66678 v1 (February 2012), and RES11513 (November 2013). • SEDRP Aide Memoires: January 2009, September 2010, February 2011, June 2011, October 2011, March 2012, June 2012, November 2012, March 2013, September 2013, December 2013, March 2014, June 2014, October 2014, March 2015, June 2015, December 2014, June 2016, October 2016, June 2017, and December 2017. • Trust Fund Grant Agreement for Grant Number TF097476, January 5, 2011. • Trust Fund Grant Agreement for Grant Number TF097484, January 5, 2011. • Amended and Restated Financing Agreement for IDA Credit Number 5432-RW and Grant Number H514-RW, June 13, 2014. • Amended and Restated Grant Agreement for Grant Number TF016108 and Grant Number TF097476, December 30, 2013. • Letter Agreement Multi-Donor Trust Fund for the co-financing of the Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project for Grant No. TF0A3913, February 23, 2017. • Country Assistance Strategy for the Republic of Rwanda for the Period FY09–FY12. Report No. 44938- RW, August 7, 2008. • Country Partnership Strategy for the Republic of Rwanda FY2014–18. Report No. 88941, June 2014. RDRC Documents • All annual reports of the RDRC: Available at: http://demobrwanda.gov.rw/. • All quarterly progress reports of the SEDRP. Available at: http://demobrwanda.gov.rw/. • Assessment Report for Ex-combatant Cooperatives Which Participated into Project Competition 2017. • Environmental and Social Management Framework of the Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project, June 2010. Available at: Page 73 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) http://demobrwanda.gov.rw/fileadmin/templates/demoba/Coo/Special_Documents/ESMF_report .pdf. • Impact Assessment of Health Insurance, Housing, Monthly Allowances and Other Entitlements for Disabled Ex-combatants. Kigali, Rwanda: June 2012. Available at: http://demobrwanda.gov.rw/fileadmin/templates/templates_new/reports/DISABLED_FINAL_REP ORT_JULY_2012.pdf. • Project Implementation Manual, Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project. January 2015. Available at: http://demobrwanda.gov.rw/fileadmin/templates/demoba/Coo/Special_Documents/final_PIM_SE DRP.pdf. Project Studies and Evaluations • African Consultants Team. First Annual Independent Evaluation and Mainstreaming Study of the SEDRP, 2009–2011. Kigali, Rwanda: September 2012. • Finn, et al. Making Vocational Training Work: A Study in Vocational Training (Rwanda). World Bank/TDRP: January 2014. • Finn, Anthony. Things Come Together, Things Fall Apart: The Family During the Absence, Return and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants. World Bank/LOGiCA: 2015. • Karengera, Stephen. Baseline Survey to Establish the Extent to which Integrated Rehabilitation and Production Workshops could Improve the Livelihoods of Ex-combatants with Disabilities. Kigali, Rwanda: December 2013. • Kash-Consult. Independent External Evaluation July 2014 - December 2015. Kigali, Rwanda: January 24, 2017. • Kash-Consult. SEDRP Community Dynamics Study 2016. Kigali, Rwanda: January 24, 2017. • Kash-Consult. SEDRP Payment Verification Study, 2016. Kigali, Rwanda: January 24, 2017. • Kash-Consult. SEDRP Tracer Survey 2016. Kigali, Rwanda: January 24, 2017. • Nordic Consulting Group. Rwanda Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project 2014 Payment Verification Survey. Kigali, Rwanda: October 30, 2015. • Nordic Consulting Group. Rwanda Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project 2014 Community Dynamics Survey. Kigali, Rwanda: October 30, 2015. • Nordic Consulting Group. Rwanda Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project 2014 Tracer Survey. Kigali, Rwanda: October 30, 2015. Page 74 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) • RDRC. Comparative Report: Ex-combatant and Community Study on the Socio-economic Reintegration. January 2012. • RDRC. Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project 2011 Payment Verification Study. January 2012. • RDRC. Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project 2012 Tracer and Community Dynamics Survey. • RDRC. Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project 2012 Payment Verification Survey. • Universalia. Second External Annual Independent Evaluation of the Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project. 2014. Other Documents • All audit reports of the OAG of the State Finances (Rwanda). • Republic of Rwanda Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN). Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy II (2013-2018), Kigali, Rwanda: May 2013. • JICA. Project Report: The Skills Training and Job Obtainment Support for Social Participation of the Ex-Combatants and Other People with Disabilities. • Promundo. A Study of Gender, Masculinities and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Rwanda: Results from the International Men and Gender Equality Survey (IMAGES). World Bank/LOGiCA: August 2014. • Rwanda WDA. Technical Report of the Field Visit and Assessment of the Convenient of Prevailing Infrastructure for the Proposed Basic Skills Training Program of Ex-combatants at Mutobo Demobilization Center, Rwanda: June 2017. Page 75 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) ANNEX 7. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES 1. The project was restructured in February 2012 to redistribute allocations across sources of financing. The project had a pooled designated account to receive IDA and TF resources through a joint financing arrangement. This arrangement allowed for the simplification of FM and auditing while operating on the assumption of simultaneous availability of all sources of financing. By project MTR, it was discovered that there was a design error with regard to the inclusion of retroactive financing in calculations of the original cost distributions of the IDA grant (H514-RW). The error stemmed from the fact that IDA resources were considered at their full value (US$8 million equivalent) during the calculation of allocations among different sources of financing (IDA and TF) and did not account for retroactive financing, 72 which was to be covered 100 percent by IDA resources. In other words, the retroactive financing should have been subtracted from the full value of IDA resources before pooling them with other sources of financing to calculate the respective joint financing percentages of the project. As such, the expectation that IDA would finance about 40 percent of costs was an incorrect assumption because 40 percent of the IDA grant (H514-RW) was already disbursed through retroactive financing and, therefore, was not available for pooling later. Based on this error, there were necessary changes that affected the availability of TF resources and the project encountered delays in the processing of the TF grants (signed in February 2011). This series of issues meant that the project faced (a) a possible overrun of IDA resources because the percentage of joint financing from IDA did not take into consideration that 40 percent of the IDA grant (H514-RW) had already been disbursed retroactively and (b) an underrun of TF resources, because both TF grants became effective later than the IDA grant, particularly considering that the TFs did not allow for retroactive financing due to donor requirements, and therefore, the costs incurred during this period could not be recovered from the MDTFs. In this context, the project was restructured and Grant Agreements were amended to resolve the issues by redistributing the prorated allocation across sources of financing. The Restructuring Paper also noted that an extension of the closing date was advisable due to an expected remaining group of XCs in the eastern DRC who would require demobilization and reintegration support. 2. The project was restructured in December 2012 to extend the closing dates of the original IDA grant (H514-RW) and the two co-financing TF grants (TF097476 and TF097484). The closing date of the original IDA Grant (H514-RW) was extended from December 2012 to December 2013. In parallel, the closing date of the co-financing TF grant (TF97476) was extended from December 2012 until December 2013 and the other closing date of co-financing TF grant (TF97484) was extended from December 2012 to June 2013. The justification of the extensions was to assist the government in responding to the demobilization and reintegration of a remaining caseload of XCs in the eastern DRC at that time. 3. The project was restructured in November 2013 to (a) reallocate the proceeds for IDA grant (H514-RW) and co- financing TF (TF097476) to cover increased expenses in Category 2 of Expenditures (consultancies, goods, and services) and Category 3 of Expenditures (operating costs) and (b) extend the closing date of the IDA grant from December 2013 to June 2014. The increase in Category 2 and Category 3 expenditures was due to the first no-cost extension of the project from December 2012 to December 2013. The extension was processed to align the closing date of the original IDA grant (H514- RW) with the AF to the co-financing TF that was being prepared with a closing date of June 2014. 4. An AF grant (TF016108) to the co-financing MDTF in the amount of US$2.3 million was approved in December 2013. With this AF, the units of measure of five intermediate results indicators 8, 12, 13, 14, and 15 (reinsertion, reintegration, and mainstreaming components) were revised from number to percentage and vice versa (Restructuring Paper on Proposed Project Restructuring of Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project, Report No: RES11513, November 25, 2013). The AF, which was provided using the balance in the parent TF, was to support the demobilization and reintegration 72 Up to US$3.2 million equivalent retroactive financing allowed for under OP/BP 8.00 procedures. Page 76 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) of an estimated 1,200 remaining XCs and their dependents who were still in the eastern DRC at that time. The closing date of this AF at the time of approval was June 2014. 5. An AF IDA credit (5432-RW) for US$8.9 million was approved in April 2014. The AF was requested by the government to finance the costs associated with scaling up the original project through extending demobilization and reintegration services for incoming XCs from the eastern DRC at the time. The project’s Results Framework was revised with this AF. The revisions included the following: (a) The target of the PDO-level indicator ‘Percentage of ex-combatants who are economically active’ was revised from 75 percent to 70 percent. (b) The reporting of children was excluded due to child protection concerns from the PDO-level indicator ‘Percentage of ex-combatants who report social acceptance by their communities’. (c) A number of revisions were made in intermediate outcome indicators, including the following: (i) The target of ‘Percentage of demobilized persons who are satisfied with the services and information provided in the demobilization centers’ was revised to reflect the increased quality of services and increased beneficiary satisfaction. (ii) ‘Percentage of ex-combatants that have competed the supported income generating activity as planned’ was deleted due to the small number of XCs opting to receive IGA support and they do so through the VSW scheme. (iii) ‘Percentage of ex-combatants that have successfully completed the agreed training/education plan’ was revised to ‘Percentage of ex-combatants selected to receive VSW support and registered to receive training who have successfully completed training/education’. (iv) ‘Percentage of ex-combatants who have received psychosocial assistance’ was revised to ‘Percentage of incoming ex-combatants who are screened for mental health issues’. (v) ‘Percentage of severely disabled ex-combatants who receive benefits as per current legislation within 9 months after demobilization’ was revised to ‘Percentage of categorized disabled ex-combatants who receive Mutuelles de Santé and monthly allowance as per current legislation, within 9 months after demobilization’. (vi) ‘Chronically ill ex-combatants mainstreamed into socio-medical services within 9 months of demobilization’ was deleted. (vii) ‘Percentage of ex-combatants having an ID card with medical insurance within 6 months after being demobilized’ was revised to ‘Percentage of ex-combatants provided with national ID registration before they leave the demobilization center’. 6. The closing date of this AF at the time of approval was June 2016. Page 77 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) 7. The project was restructured in May 2014 to process a no-cost extension of the closing date of the AF TF grant (TF016108) for two years from June 2014 to December 2016. The rationale was to align the closing date of the co-financing TF with the AF IDA credit (5432-RW). 8. The project was restructured in July 2015 to process an 18-month no-cost extension to the IDA and TF resources. These included (a) an extension of the closing date of the AF IDA credit (5432-RW) from June 2016 to December 2017 and (b) an extension of the closing date of the co-financing TF grant (TF016108) from June 2016 to December 2017 (with an end disbursement date of the MDTF at the trustee level from December 2016 to June 2018), with a view of extending the World Bank-executed TF (TF019261) from December 2016 to June 2018 and the processing of an AF to the co-financing TF with a closing date of December 2017 (explained below). 9. A second AF grant (TF-A3913) to the co-financing MDTF in the amount of US$0.8 million was approved in January 2017 to fill a financing gap that emerged due to detrimental fluctuations of the exchange rate between the Special Drawing Right and the U.S. dollar of the first AF to the MDTF. The closing date of this AF at the time of approval was December 2017. With this AF, the target for PDO-level indicator ‘percentage of ex-combatants who report social acceptance by their communities’ was revised from 80 percent to 65 percent, to better align the target for XCs with the situation of their peers in communities, according to recent surveys showing that on average, only 45 percent of CMs and 65 percent of XCs felt socially accepted by their communities. 10. The project was restructured in June 2017 to reallocate categories of expenditure, from Category 1 and Category 2 to Category 3, of the co-financing TF (TF-A3913). The reallocation was warranted based on the following factors: (a) The no-cost extension (approved in July 2015) resulted in an increase in Category 3 of Expenditures (operating costs). (b) The strengthening of the project’s mental health activities necessitated the recruitment of additional psychologists and psychiatrists, also increasing operating costs. (c) Expenses were lower for Category 1 of Expenditures (beneficiary services and grants) due to the smaller-than-expected repatriation of combatants of Rwandan origin from the DRC due to the security situation in the eastern DRC. 11. The project was restructured in September 2017 to reallocate between categories of expenditure. The rationale was due to two factors: (a) there was lower-than-expected repatriation of XCs from the eastern DRC, and thus lower-than- budgeted costs associated with Category 1 and Category 3 of Expenditure (demobilization and reintegration), and (b) there were increasing needs for housing of severely disabled XCs, according to the aging population of such groups, which required additional resources in Category 2 of Expenditure. Page 78 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) ANNEX 8. ADDITIONAL LESSONS LEARNED 1. Political will and national ownership are key factors for success. In the absence of political will and national ownership, investments on demobilization and reintegration operations run considerable risks to implementation and development outcomes. The Rwandan program benefited significantly from the national direction and the broad national buy-in, thus allowing the creation of pathways to sustainable social and economic reintegration. 2. Establishing meaningful partnerships with clear roles and responsibilities. Establishing partnerships with public and private sectors as well as international specialist organizations contributes to implementation and outcomes. Partnerships should be meaningful with clear responsibilities and roles to help the client improve implementation, learn from expert organizations, enhance the reach and scope of activities, and so on. 3. Implementation support requires adequate staff and financing resources. Projects such as demobilization and reintegration operations are often implemented in contexts where the existing knowledge, capacity, and skills in designing and managing such programs is nonexistent or very limited. Therefore, technical and implementation support requires much more resources than what is generally allocated to activities in complex contexts. This project benefited from continuous and close support by a broad team of World Bank staff and consultants, mostly financed by TF resources, on critical areas. As such, it is recommended that complex projects are allocated sufficient resources for continuous implementation support and technical assistance. 4. Embedding a clear exit plan in advance of program completion. Mainstreaming and alignment of sub- activities with local and national processes can contribute to long-term cost-savings and promote longevity of interventions, and support ex-combatants access to other social protection and development programs as they exit the DDR program. 5. Demobilization and reintegration projects should be flexible and responsive to adjust to changes and respond to challenges. Flexibility is linked to the extent to which the project will implement meaningful M&E. Due attention must be paid to messages coming out of independent audits and evaluations as well as regular monitoring to adjust program activities. Beyond regular M&E, as the Rwanda experience showed, there needs to be willingness within the implementing agency to identify problems and shortcomings and implement preemptive course corrections and, where possible, solutions. 6. Project design should be flexible to allow testing of innovative activities. The SEDRP tested a number of innovative activities that were scaled up successfully: a. Cross-border interactive sensitization through video-conferencing via Skype to encourage repatriation of remaining armed group ex-combatants b. Field visits for ex-combatants to cooperatives and other economic activities of reintegrated ex- combatants during PDOP c. Hands-on training including demonstration agriculture and animal husbandry during PDOP d. Introduction of mini-PDOP for dependents of ex-combatants e. Deferral option for transfer of vocational training benefit to the spouse or designated dependent by the primary beneficiary f. Mentorship program that placed former child ex-combatants in cooperatives to gain hands-on skills in business life after vocational training Page 79 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) g. Skills training at the IRPWs and inclusion of spouses of the disabled ex-combatants in trainings and cooperatives h. Annual peace tournaments where competing teams comprise of both ex-combatants and community members, sports activities for the disabled ex-combatants Page 80 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) ANNEX 9. LIST OF PEOPLE MET AND SUMMARY OF ICR CONSULTATIONS A. List of People Met Table 8.1. Institutions and Positions of the People Met Name Organization Position Alphonse Kalinganire NURC Former Unity and National Identity, Diaspora Coordinator Annalyse Umunyana KfW Senior Project Manager Anthony Fin Consultant Consultant Breckmans Bahizi RICEM — Charles Balisa RDRC Center Manager, Children Rehabilitation Center Chaste Uwihoreye Uyisenga N’Manzi Country Officer Emmnauel Muera NCPD Disability Research and Mainstreaming Officer Eugene Ruzindana Kavumu Training Center Director Felicien Rimenyande RDRC MIS Officer Francis Musoni RDRC Secretary-General Hanna Doller Embassy of Sweden 2nd Secretary, Program Management on Peace and Security Ian McDonals ICRC Deputy Head of the Delegation Jackson Kwikiriza RCA — Jane Karera RDRC Project Coordinator Jean Claude Butera RWAMREC Project Officer Jeanette Kabanda RDRC Chief Operations Officer Kash Davis Kash Consultants Head Consultant Markus Bär KfW Country Representative Ndayisaba Emmanuel NCPD Executive Secretary Pascal Cuttat ICRC Head of the Delegation Priscilla Mukakarara WDA Specialist Shuhei Saikawa JICA Program Advisor Tomonori Nagasa JICA Senior Representative B. Summary of ICR Consultations 1. This annex provides a summary of the main findings and discussions with key stakeholders from the ICR mission, which was conducted as part of the final ISM of the project in December 2017. 2. The project has remained highly relevant to the country priorities and the World Bank’s CPS since its inception in 2009. Preliminary analysis indicates that the project is expected to achieve, and in some cases exceed, all its outcome targets as outlined in the Results Framework. The project might not reach the estimate of demobilizing 5,500 XCs belonging to AGs because from the beginning, demobilization support was designed as a demand-driven exercise targeting potential beneficiaries in the neighboring DRC whose repatriation flows have been heavily dependent on factors outside of the World Bank or Borrower control. Preliminary analysis indicate that project efficiency was high in terms of costs and achievements. 3. ICR consultations noted a number of key achievements of the project: • The project went beyond achieving its targets and informed broader development objectives of Rwanda in several areas, including categorization of disability, housing for disabled XCs, and mental health support. Page 81 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) • The RDRC offered XCs a comprehensive, well-tailored, and nationally recognized vocational training. ICR consultations revealed that many XCs used a combination of their vocational skills, soft skills such as civic education and entrepreneurship skills, and the start-up support provided to build their livelihoods. This is generally in line with the findings from annual independent studies. • Advocacy and follow-up work by the RDRC was a key driver for successful social and economic reintegration outcomes. Provincial Reintegration Officers played an instrumental advocacy role to link XC beneficiaries with employment opportunities in different sectors in all provinces of Rwanda. The provincial officers also worked closely with local authorities and institutions to assist XCs access social services under social protection programs. • The project offered tailored support to disabled XCs, including vocational skills trainings, tools and equipment to help with their disability, housing, and formation of cooperatives. These activities were instrumental in facilitating successful economic and social reintegration of outcomes for disabled XCs. 4. A major achievement in terms of reintegration was the construction of handicap-accessible homes for severely disabled XC beneficiaries. The project continued the implementation of the housing scheme that was developed in the previous project and constructed more than 800 houses (220 of which were financed directly by the SEDRP). The successful outcomes from housing support were adapted by the government, which embarked on a process of funding houses for less severely disabled XCs. 5. The project successfully mainstreamed gender issues. Female and child XCs were specifically identified as part of vulnerable groups requiring additional targeted assistance. For example, female XCs were automatically made eligible to receive additional support through the VSW. 6. The project achieved significant positive outcomes with regard to institutional strengthening. The RDRC and its implementation departments received extensive capacity support and technical and implementation support (by the World Bank). For example, frequent FM support provided by a World Bank consultant helped the RDRC develop and maintain a well-functioning FM structure that was instrumental in processing contracts and payments, as well as overall FM of the project. 7. In terms of outcomes related to poverty reduction and shared prosperity, the project primarily supported XCs and their dependents—a highly vulnerable portion of the population in Rwanda. The project implemented a holistic set of activities covering technical and soft skills; psycho-social, medical, and mental support; and technical auxiliary support to help them be at par with their peers in the community. Additionally, the RDRC engaged in intensive advocacy and lobbying to increase job placements of XCs in cooperatives, the public sector, and the private sector. The holistic set of activities implemented by the project, therefore, contributed directly to poverty reduction and shared prosperity. 8. Anecdotally, the ICR consultations identified the following key factors that affected implementation and outcomes: • Strong national ownership was instrumental for successful implementation and outcomes. The government remained highly committed to the demobilization and reintegration program. This is recognized with the commitment of national and local authorities to mainstream services to XCs (through social protection services, including housing, disability, and mental health services) and Page 82 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) by replicating or expanding activities initiated by the project, such as the housing support, among other aspects. • Solid partnerships with national stakeholders was a key driver, affecting overall quality and ensuring delivery of standardized services to XCs. The RDRC closely cooperated with key ministries in providing demobilization and reintegration support, that is, it worked with MINISANTE on psychosocial and HIV/AIDS issues, MIGEPROF on gender and child protection issues, and MINALOC to mainstream support interventions to XCs. Likewise, the RDRC worked with the NURC, which is in charge of guiding the national reconciliation agenda in Rwanda, as part of the social reintegration and reconciliation activities. The RDRC has established partnerships with a number of expert NGOs that had a positive influence on the quality and impact of the work delivered. For example, the NGO ‘UYISENGA N’MANZI’ provided psycho-social support to XCs and dependents. The RWAMREC provided sessions on gender-based violence, gender norms, and family life. Further, the RDRC cooperated with various national-level institutions to provide support to cooperatives and to promote job placements of XCs in cooperatives. These institutions include the Agriculture Board, the RCA, the NCCR, and RICEM. The project carried out its reintegration support activities for child XCs in close coordination with the ICRC and the NCC with regard to data sharing on family tracing, reunification, and follow-up visits of children. Lastly, the project collaborated with MONUSCO in linking eligible XCs in camps in the DRC and their family members in Rwanda through live Skype link to encourage their repatriation. • The RDRC demonstrated strong institutional capacity, which facilitated overall satisfactory implementation of the project. The project benefited from an overall low level of turnover of key positions in the technical secretariat such as the Chief Operations Officer, the Project Coordinator, and the Social and Economic Reintegration Officer. This helped the project maintain implementation capacity, which was strengthened with considerable implementation support by the World Bank during the project. • Enhanced technical and implementation support by the World Bank task team throughout the project was an instrumental factor. The World Bank task team carried out regular supervision missions, which were well staffed. The ICR consultations noted a clear consensus among people involved in implementation that the World Bank implementation and technical support was highly relevant and was a factor contributing to the overall successful implementation and outcomes. • The overall conducive and stable context in Rwanda facilitated project implementation and achievement of objectives. Rwanda’s positive economic and political development was a major contributing factor affecting implementation and outcomes. Additionally, the progressive rolling out of demobilization and reintegration in Rwanda (within a 17-year period) enabled the RDRC and partners to develop significant capacity and expertise on demobilization and reintegration. • The situation in the eastern DRC affected the implementation of the project. The volatile situation in the DRC was a key factor throughout implementation. The changing security dynamics in the region had a direct impact on repatriation of XCs and made it difficult to predict and plan. • World Bank performance is generally considered as satisfactory among stakeholders. The World Bank provided close support on key areas such as FM, procurement, MIS, and M&E, as well as the Page 83 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) overall program management. Communications between the task team and the RDRC remained close throughout implementation. Likewise, communications and coordination between the RDRC and the donors and between the donors and the World Bank were maintained adequately throughout implementation. 9. Risks to development outcomes. Despite a reduction of poverty and advancements in social inclusion in Rwanda, poverty remains a challenge for reintegration outcomes. There are risks associated with the longevity and sustainability of key interventions such as mental health support and reintegration of children. Stakeholders unanimously agree that more can be done on these key aspects and that these key interventions are fundamental to mitigate the risks to development outcomes achieved by the project. 10. Some of the key lessons learned are summarized as follows: • Political will and national ownership are key factors for success. Stakeholders broadly agree that government ownership of the project and political will to achieve successful results were key factors. In the absence of political will and national ownership, investments on demobilization and reintegration operations run considerable risks to implementation and development outcomes. • Demobilization and reintegration programs should be designed as a holistic set of interventions. Achievement of project objectives and successful outcomes of complex interventions such as demobilization and reintegration rely on the extent to which activities are designed and implemented holistically. For example, including families and dependents in the reintegration process as co-owners of the process can significantly enhance the outcomes and impacts of social and economic reintegration. Similarly, vocational training, supplemented by follow-up support, counselling, and advocacy, can have long-term impacts on the livelihoods of beneficiaries. • Reintegration should include sufficient resources and capacity to address the needs of special target groups. These include XCs who are disabled and/or who are suffering from mental health issues, children XCs, and female XCs. Detecting and identifying psychosocial challenges faced by XCs and then identifying cases adequately is a challenging process. It is, therefore, crucial to develop a well-resourced, staffed, and planned support mechanism to work with such groups from the onset. • Demobilization and reintegration projects should be flexible and responsive to adjust to changes and challenges. Flexibility is essentially linked to the extent to which the project will implement meaningful M&E. Due attention must be paid to messages/alerts coming out of annual evaluations and regular monitoring to adjust program activities. Beyond regular M&E, as the Rwanda experience showed, there needs to be sufficient willingness to identify problems and shortcomings. • Technical and implementation support provided by the World Bank requires adequate planning and staff and financing resources. Demobilization and reintegration projects are often implemented in contexts where the existing knowledge, capacity, and skills in designing and managing such programs is nonexistent or very limited. Therefore, sufficient staff and financial Page 84 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) resources must be allocated from the onset to ensure the World Bank can provide enhanced technical and implementation support. • Establishing meaningful partnerships with clear roles and responsibilities. Establishing partnerships with public and private sectors and international organizations can help improve implementation and outcomes. The partnership should be meaningful with clear responsibilities and roles to help the client improve implementation, learn from expert agencies/organizations, enhance the reach and scope of activities, and so on. • The MIS should be considered as an integral part of M&E due to the complex nature of demobilization and reintegration programs. The design and development of the MIS should be done in alignment with the overall M&E approach and structure. Adequate resources must be allocated at the onset, starting with a detailed analysis of existing IT systems and architecture of the public sector. Based on the project M&E and reporting requirements, the appraisal should identify system requirements, analyze existing systems, and develop an MIS that best suits the objectives. Page 85 of 86 The World Bank Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (P112712) ANNEX 10. MAP OF RWANDA Page 86 of 86