80758 Governance Working paper series Access to Information Program Access to Public Information and Citizen Participation in Supreme Audit Institutions (Sai) Ezequiel Nino Working Paper Access to Public Information and Citizen Participation in Supreme Audit Institutions (Sai) Guide to Good Practices Ezequiel Nino 2010 Asociación Civil por la Igualdad y la Justicia (ACIJ) www.acij.org.ar This work was carried out with the support of the Access to Information, Program of the World Bank Institute (WBI), through the financial support of the Spanish Government Trust Fund. We are grateful to the International Budget Partnership (IBP), and especially Vivek Ramkumar, for their support. Part of the information in this document has been the result of the learning gathered at the International Seminar “Dialogue on Civil Society Engagement in Public Accountability” or- ganized jointly by IBP and UNDSEA (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs), in Manila, The Philippines, November 7-8, 2006. We also thank Aránzazu Guillán Montero, Jorge Romero León, William Reuben, Luis Fernando Velásquez Leal and Andre Herzog for their com- ments. The analysis presented in this document does not reflect the official opinion of the World Bank or the Government of Spain, and is the sole responsibility of the author. Contents Foreword....................................................................................................v 1. Introduction............................................................................................1 2. Strengthening the Public Oversight System................................................3 2.1 SAI Models......................................................................................................... 3 2.2 The Necessary Relationship between SAIs and CSOs.................................................4 3. Good Practices to Strengthen the External Oversight System.......................7 3.1 Improvement in the Information Related to External Oversight. ............................... 7 3.1.1 Dissemination of Audit Reports produced by SAIs . ............................................... 7 3.1.2 Disclosure of institutional information related to the external audit system.............. 8 3.1.3 Dissemination of information related to the Auditors’ selection process to citizens and opening the process to participation ................................................ 9 3.1.4 Citizen training on the External Audit System...................................................... 11 3.2 Opening Up the External Oversight of Public Administration to Citizen Participation ..........................................................................................12 3.2.1 The filing of citizen complaints. ............................................................................ 12 3.2.2 Participation in the selection of agencies or programs to be audited. ...................... 13 3.2.3 Coordinated Audits and Citizen Oversight Committees........................................ 15 3.2.4 Participation in the monitoring of compliance with audit recommendations ........ 15 4. Table: Summary of Good Practices.......................................................... 17 5. Final Observations................................................................................. 19 ............................................................................................ 21 6. References. Endnotes.................................................................................................. 23 iii Foreword For more than a decade, the Association for Civil America. Our interest in this subject goes back Rights (Asociación por los Derechos Civiles, ADC) several years. Since 2001, ADC has been actively has been working actively to strengthen a le- working on the promotion of reforms intended gal and institutional culture that guarantees the to increase both the transparency and the par- fundamental rights of individuals in accordance ticipation of civil society in the operation of the with Argentina’s National Constitution, inter- Judiciary. national human rights standards and democrat- To conduct the research related to the Su- ic values. Among other objectives, ADC aims to preme Audit Institutions and Congress, ADC in- monitor and support the reform of those insti- vited two expert organizations that are region- tutions of democracy of which an improved op- al leaders in these matters, Asociación Civil por eration enables a greater protection of citizen’s la Igualdad y la Justicia (ACIJ) (Civil Association rights, such as the Judiciary. for Equality and Justice)—from Argentina—and At the beginning of 2008, ADC began a Fundación Pro Acceso (Pro Access Foundation)— project to document various good practices from Chile.1 and experiences from different Latin Ameri- The result of this project is reflected in this can countries related to access to information series of three documents that are intended to (ATI) and transparency of the State. More pre- serve as a reference for NGOs in the region, cisely, innovative experiences in regards to the government officials, members of academia, and Judiciary, Congress and Supreme Audit Institu- public policy experts. The papers were written tions were identified. This was all done thanks by Álvaro Herrero and Gaspar López (ADC); to the valuable support of the Access to Infor- Ezequiel Nino (ACIJ); and Tomás Vial Solar mation Program of the World Bank Institute (Fundación Pro Acceso). (WBI). Lastly, we wish to thank the internal and In addition to acting as lead on the project external reviewers of the World Bank Institute on ATI and transparency of the State, ADC has for their valuable comments on the three doc- been responsible for the particular research on uments. Any errors and omissions, however, are good practices in the judicial systems of Latin the sole responsibility of the authors. v 1 Introduction External oversight agencies perform a funda- good practices in terms of access to public in- mental role in monitoring the exercise of pow- formation and citizen participation that de- er in democratic regimes, especially in countries serve to be publicized. Where there are expe- characterized by high corruption rates and in- riences that can be replicated they should be efficiency in public management. Despite their adapted to the needs of each jurisdiction. This importance, however, they do not usually have document highlights the importance of access strong links to society. Their reports do not re- to public information in these external over- ceive the public recognition they deserve and sight agencies and the consequent use of such the oversight agencies themselves are not usual- information in the promotion of participato- ly perceived by civil society as places for partic- ry mechanisms in the oversight work conduct- ipation. Nevertheless, in recent years, there have ed by Supreme Audit Institutions. As evidenced been increasing demands for these agencies to in this document, such practices can be gener- establish transparency, access to information, and ated from the audit institutions towards society citizen participation mechanisms in the work (top-down) as well as from society towards these they carry out. This is intended to strengthen agencies (bottom-up). their control functions, increase the demand for It should be noted that it is still too early to accountability from public administration and identify particularly successful practices, since in thus enhance the credibility of governmental most cases these are incipient experiences that policies and programs. are currently being implemented, and began Although we are still far from having over- only a short time ago. Consequently, future as- sight agencies that are close to the population sessment is needed. It is also worthwhile noting and exhibit a high degree of citizen participa- that the experiences compiled in this document tion in the monitoring work that they perform, come from various countries, with special em- there are—in various countries—examples of phasis in Latin America. 1 2 Strengthening the Public Oversight System The consolidation of democracies in developing effort designed to strengthen the public control countries requires appropriate accountability systems that characterize democratic regimes. with regard to public resources. Corruption and inefficiency in the use of resources appear as a growing citizen concern. In the context of gov- 2.1 SAI Models ernance reforms that seek to strengthen trans- parency and accountability processes, there is a In this context, Supreme Audit Institutions need to have external oversight agencies more (SAIs) represent a key component in what are involved in producing concrete results that are generally complex public oversight systems. De- observable by citizens. In that sense, these agen- pending on the institutional placement of the cies should take on new roles, because they have oversight agencies, it is possible to distinguish been considered to be eminently technical and between two types of public control: external beyond the reach of society. and internal. External oversight entities are not This need is being recognized even by the part of the organization to be audited, while in- oversight agencies themselves—which, as com- ternal control entities are those established with- plex state agencies, usually display a more cau- in the various organizations that are the subject tious approach to these types of transparen- of control. Therefore, external control agencies cy and participatory processes. Thus, at the end tend to enjoy greater autonomy and, therefore, of 2007, the International Organization of Su- greater margin for collaboration with civil so- preme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI)1 indicated ciety. the need to “consider establishing working re- Using this distinction as a basis, this docu- lationships with civil society organizations that ment focuses on practices that make information participate in activities related to the develop- public (that is, the dissemination of, and grant- ment and use of key national indicators to ex- ing of access to, public information) and par- pand the exchange of information and promote ticularly on those that link SAIs and civil soci- the various functions that each supreme audit ety organizations (CSOs). Such practices around institution may perform in connection with the SAIs as external control agencies present both development and use of the indicators with the difficulties that are related to rules (for example, aim of fostering government transparency, ac- the lack of an adequate regulatory framework) countability and effectiveness.”2 Consequently, and others that are of an institutional nature it is an appropriate time to promote this type of (for example, the lack of institutional channels 3 4 Access to Public Information and Citizen Participation in Supreme Audit Institutions (Sai) to formalize the engagement between SAIs and Finally, in other cases, the SAI is autono- CSOs). For this reason, it is necessary to pro- mous. It is not a part of any government branch. mote and develop formal and informal instanc- es that make it possible to foster these practices. 2.2 The Necessary This document examines a series of good prac- tices with respect to access to public informa- Relationship between tion and citizen participation, that are intend- SAIs and CSOs ed to promote a more effective external control of public actions, thus contributing to inclusive Although the functions of SAIs and CSOs are governance. different in nature, the oversight actions they per- External audit agencies may be classified ac- form make it possible to establish spaces for co- cording to the branch of government to which operation. This section briefly presents some of they report.3 A first model is characterized by the specific characteristics of both types of actors the SAI reporting to the Legislative branch. In that can contribute to a complementary exercise this case, the SAI presents the findings regarding of control functions. This description is only in- its work to the Legislature (through specialized tended as an illustration, to show the possibilities legislative committees), which uses this infor- of interrelation around external auditing. mation to perform its functions of government SAIs have the duty of auditing budget ex- oversight. This model may assume two forms of ecution and expenditure efficiency. In other leadership: one headed by a single Auditor Gen- words, the concrete functions of these entities eral in charge of the SAI, and another led by sev- include: (a) ensuring that funds go to the areas eral auditors who are members of a multi-mem- to which they have been allocated and that they ber body (Board of Auditors).4 have been used in an adequate and legal manner In this model, at the end of each year the (legal and financial audits); and (b) that the agen- SAI’s reports are submitted for examination by cies being audited have complied with the ob- a legislative commission and, later, by the ple- jectives that they agreed upon at the start of the num of Congress, which issues recommenda- cycle under examination (management audit). tions on corrections to be made. The legislative CSOs, especially in developing countries committee, in turn, is responsible for monitor- with fragile public institutions, are gradual- ing compliance thereafter. While the single- ly acquiring an increasingly important role in person leadership model may favor a more ex- the institutional strengthening of their respec- peditious operation, the multi-member Board tive countries. One of the roles that they have of Auditors model is more deliberative and can been playing on a more frequent basis is that of accommodate different perspectives, although monitoring the state through the social auditing it runs the risk of resulting in a slower oper- of (or exercising social accountability over) gov- ation. ernment agencies. In a second model, the SAI reports to the Ju- It is evident that the respective roles of diciary. In that case, the SAI members are judg- SAIs and CSOs can be mutually complemen- es (members of the Judicial Branch), who deter- tary. While SAIs have the obligation of audit- mine the legality of the administrative activities ing, CSOs take it upon themselves as a volun- and may prosecute any officials who commit ir- tary action. regularities. This type of SAI does not usually Compared to CSOs, SAIs have a number of conduct management audits. specific characteristics that indicate that they are Strengthening the Public Oversight System 5 better placed for the performance of their audit- have the resources or the access to the valuable ing functions: information available to SAIs. This material, in- cluded in the reports that the latter develop, can • Access to information: Due to laws and oth- serve as a starting point from which CSOs may er regulations (along with offices in charge initiate the monitoring of public administration of promoting, disseminating and guaran- activities. Based on such information, CSOs can teeing it), access to public information by propose and demand changes, denounce pub- citizens is gradually advancing in various lic officials who may have committed corrupt states. However, SAIs have privileged access acts, disseminate among public opinion specific to government agencies and can require all issues that they detect in government and pro- the necessary information in an expeditious pose an informed and technical dialogue with manner; public officials. • Human and financial resources: In general, SAIs, in turn, can benefit from coopera- SAIs have at their disposal highly qualified tion with CSOs, since it might not only im- personnel (accountants, lawyers, economists, prove the impact of the work the SAIs do, but etc.) to conduct the work with which they also the quality of institutional oversight. At are charged; and times, audit reports do not have sufficient im- • Technical tools: SAIs usually have a greater pact on the governmental agencies in which ir- technical capacity than CSOs to audit gov- regularities are detected. External oversight sys- ernment agencies, although several CSOs tems are complex: SAIs only represent one link are making progress in that direction. in a more extensive chain, of which legislative commissions, the National Legislature and vari- For their part, CSOs also have distinct char- ous offices of the Executive are also part. Exces- acteristics—different from those of SAIs—that sive bureaucracy and conflicting political inter- enable them to strengthen the execution of ex- ests usually conspire against the system working ternal oversight: on its own. For that reason, there is a need for the participation of other stakeholders (judg- • The possibility of using the information re- es, prosecutors, Ombudsmen, journalists and sulting from monitoring efforts for concrete CSOs.) Through interaction with CSOs, SAIs advocacy actions; could prevent their efforts from being thwarted. • Greater closeness to service delivery and, The irregularities they highlight in their reports hence, to the users; have better chances of being remedied if there • Sensitivity to the implementation of gov- is pressure coming from stakeholders external to ernment programs in practice; the public oversight system. • Capacity to go beyond the time and proce- The SAIs, as entities responsible for the ex- dural limits (predefined types of audit) that ternal auditing of public management, have pro- govern the work of SAIs; and gressively been entering the field of citizen par- • A lower degree of bureaucratization. ticipation and adjusting their institutional, legal and operational structures accordingly. Both types of actors, with different but com- In Colombia, in 1999, the Office of the plementary roles, can benefit from each other. Comptroller General of the Republic (Contral- Even more so, it may be asserted that they must oría General de la República, CGR) began a strat- interact. As previously indicated, CSOs do not egy called “Participatory Fiscal Control,” which 6 Access to Public Information and Citizen Participation in Supreme Audit Institutions (Sai) sought to promote citizen participation in fis- tect the confidential nature of certain stages in cal control. This strategy has continued to be the investigation process, and insulate them from developed since then, both at the national lev- social or political pressures that could affect the el (CGR), and at the level of the Departmental diagnosis.7 For that reason, it is necessary to have and Municipal Comptroller Offices, which are clear rules that determine stages and procedures accompanied by the CGR. for the granting of access to, or dissemination of, In the Latin America and the Caribbean information related to auditing activities, while region, the 4th General Assembly of the Latin at the same time protecting the integrity and American and Caribbean Organization of Su- objectivity of the oversight process. preme Audit Institutions (OLACEFS, by its ac- Within this logic, access to public informa- ronym in Spanish), held in 1994, reported on tion is fundamental in order to establish a frame- the first steps taken in this area by Colombia’s work in which greater participation exists. This Office of the Comptroller General of the Re- document aims to present a survey of practic- public. However, it was only one year later, at es and experiences in which either civil society the 5th General Assembly of OLACEFS, which organizations or SAIs have worked to improve took place in Lima in 1995, that the possibility the relationship between SAIs and social audit- opened up for citizen participation in fiscal con- ing agents. These agents may contribute to the trol “as a source of qualified and permanent in- efficiency of the external auditing system, and formation on the critical areas of public admin- consequently to an effective accountability on istration.”6 the part of public administration and improved In general terms, however, it may be stated governance. that SAIs and CSOs do not interact with each The main experience being examined is other enough. On the one hand, CSOs fear that that of Argentina, partially resulting from an the relations they may establish with SAI offi- ACIJ project on the national public administra- cials might be misconstrued. On the other hand, tion’s external auditing system. Initiatives imple- SAIs fear that the neutrality and objectivity that mented in other countries, mainly Latin Amer- is expected of their reports may be compro- ica nations, that adequately illustrate different mised if they maintain a collaborative relation practices that can be undertaken to improve the with the CSOs. For that reason, SAIs are not efficiency of external control are also included. usually open to the establishment of links out- What follows is a series of good practic- side government. In this respect, the sensitivi- es to strengthen SAIs (and the external auditing ty of SAIs control activities requires establish- system) through their interaction with CSOs. ing measures to guarantee their objectivity and These good practices ought to be systematically autonomy. It is important to have clear and well incorporated into the operation of SAIs. established procedures and timeframes that pro- 3 Good Practices to Strengthen the External Oversight System Both the dissemination of and access to public tions in Mexico City. Its Fifth Principle estab- information related to control functions, along lishes that SAIs have the right and the duty to with the establishment of mechanisms for cit- disseminate the results of their work and that izen participation, contribute to strengthening they should suffer no interferences in that re- the external oversight system. This section pres- gard. The Sixth Principle stipulates, among oth- ents a series of good practices in both areas, il- er things, that SAIs are free to publish and dis- lustrated by examples of concrete implementa- seminate their reports once they have formally tion experiences, presented in boxes. been delivered to the corresponding authorities. Broadly speaking, the dissemination and/ 3.1 Improvement in the or access to information regarding the work of SAIs face two challenges: i) the technical char- Information Related acter of audit reports; and ii) the lack of com- to External Oversight munication mechanisms with other social stake- holders. In the field of dissemination and access to public Generally, audit reports are of such a techni- information, four concrete practices are presented: cal nature that it makes it difficult for anybody who is not a subject matter expert to read them. 1. Dissemination of audit reports by SAIs; This obstacle could be understood as an indi- 2. Disclosure of institutional information re- rect violation of the right to access public in- lated to the external audit system; formation. As is the case in various public ar- 3. Dissemination to citizens of information eas, the technical nature of certain information about the process for selecting auditors, and should not prevent somehow making it acces- the opening of such processes to participation; sible to citizens. As in the case of the Judicia- 4. Training citizens with regard to the external ry, which is increasingly being asked to explain auditing system. their decisions in a clearer fashion (either by us- ing a less formal language; through activities to 3.1.1 Dissemination of Audit Reports explain them to the media and train the latter in produced by SAIs relation to such decisions, or, in general, by hav- ing greater contact with citizens)8 audit agencies In 2007, INTOSAI issued the Declaration on should also improve the accessibility of the in- the Independence of Supreme Audit Institu- formation they produce. 7 8 Access to Public Information and Citizen Participation in Supreme Audit Institutions (Sai) Box 1.  Argentina: a) Website to Disseminate Audit Reports b) Summaries provided by the National Auditor’s Office (Auditoría General de la Nación, AGN) a) The union of audit institutions’ personnel (APOC) created a website that is used to disseminate sum- marized versions of the reports generated by the various audits, which use plain language. The texts that serve as a basis for the summaries are the official AGN reports. That is, they are not “preliminary versions,” “drafts,” or any of the intermediate documents that are generated in an auditing process. Through this service, the population may access the site or request to daily receive news related to the reports developed by the national or provincial oversight agencies. The portal also contains academic papers on external auditing systems and assessments of their functioning. It is noteworthy that the union has undertaken this type of work; but it is also useful to understand that such an entity is another actor that has a concrete interest in strengthening the audit agencies. Typically those working within audit institutions are career professionals who have no ties to a specific administration, which makes clear the affinity they may have with initiatives seeking to enhance the independence and the impact of the SAIs work. b) Through its press department, the AGN sends journalists, Ombudsmen, CSOs and subscribers a bulletin explaining briefly and in a non technical language, the findings of the most important reports produced by the agency. This information contains a description of the objective of the corresponding audit, the period audited, the context in which it was carried out and the conclusions drawn from it. An example of such reports may be seen in www.agn.gov.ar/informes/informesPDF2008/Ficha_021_08. pdf. Asociación Civil por la Igualdad y la Justicia (ACIJ) promoted the dissemination of this bulletin and assisted the AGN in developing a wide database of contacts to disseminate the information. * www.elauditor.info Still, there is typically no formal infor- they produce. For that reason, the press, commu- mation channel between the SAIs, the media and nications and/or community relations offices of CSOs. Beyond the fact that, in general, SAIs do SAIs should more proactively seek to establish have press offices, they do not have institutional links with professional NGOs, community or- relations policies that consider other actors (be- ganizations, journalists (both from national and yond government branches to whom they must local media), Ombudsmen Offices, prosecutors report) as major audiences for the information and judges. Box 2.  South Korea: Civil Society Advocacy Actions for a Full Dissemination of Audit Reports Until not too long ago, the Board of Audit and Inspection (South Korea´s SAI) only publicly disclosed audit summaries . It held that audit reports were internal materials for the State, intended for corrective use. A group of politicians, CSOs and journalists formed a coalition to demand changing this practice. They asserted that the principle that should govern disclosure consisted of the fact that the state belongs to citizens in general, and therefore each individual constituting it has a legitimate interest in gaining access to the reports in which the performance of government offices is assessed. The coalition’s pressure led to a change in policy, and currently the complete texts are published, with the exception of the material including “state secrets” or such matters that “if disclosed, could affect national security.” * Pyun 2006. Good Practices to Strengthen the External Oversight System 9 Box 3.  Mexico: Agreement between the Supreme Audit Institution of the Federation (Auditoría Superior de la Federación, ASF) and the Federal Institute for Access to Public Information (Instituto Federal de Acceso a la Información Pública, IFAI) to promote transparency in oversight functions Both agencies report to different branches of government. While IFAI is a decentralized agency of the Federal Public Administration, ASF is an auxiliary agency of the Chamber of Deputies which enjoys technical autonomy. However, on April 2, 2006, they both signed an agreement intended to define joint activities in the field of transparency, access to public government information and superior oversight. The ultimate goal is to promote a culture of accountability. The press release issued by the two agencies recognizes that they both have a growing presence and influence in the country’s public life and that, therefore, an agreement between them to improve access to public information related to the functions entrusted to the ASF represents a major step forward in external control activities. The agreement is innovative because it subjects the ASF to commitments with the agency specializing in these matters. * See in this regard: www.ifai.org.mx/descargar.pho?r+pdf/sala_prensa/publicaciones/communicados/2006/&a=Co mmunicaoIFA1010406.pdf An example of improved availability and 3.1.2 Disclosure of institutional dissemination of information on the work of information related to the SAIs is provided by the Argentine National Au- external audit system ditor’s Office, through its website and the publi- cation of summaries of audit reports. Transparency regarding SAIs’ structures, activ- Next, the mobilization of segments of South ities, and employees is also required. They are Korea’s civil society illustrates another kind of public organizations and, as such, they should be experience, which has served to promote the held accountable for their actions, and dissem- availability of information on the work of the inate the information that they generate to the oversight system. public in the broadest and most easily under- Box 4.  Argentina: Court rulings to increase transparency in the work of the legislative commission that receives audit reports The Joint Accounts Review Commission (Comisión Mixta Revisora de Cuentas, CMRC), which reports to the National Chamber of Deputies and the National Senate, kept a policy of secrecy. It did not actively provide any type of information on its work. Furthermore, it refused the requests from CSOs for access to the minutes of its meetings, although that was provided for in the rules of Congress. At the same time, it also refused requests to access the Commission’s meetings. After having submitted two requests to access the minutes of meetings without receiving an answer from the CMRC, ACIJ filed a legal action of amparo (which demands the protection of a constitutional guarantee) to receive the minutes of the past and future meetings. The courts ruled in ACIJ’s favor and ordered CMRC to hand over the meeting minutes. After another filing by ACIJ, in 2006, the courts instructed the CMRC to hold their meetings publicly and to announce the date, time and place of the meetings on the Internet. After several requests for information made by ACIJ that received no answer, the CMRC published in the Senate’s website its regulations, its budget allocation and execution, and the details indicating the dates of each of the transactions associated with the Investment Account (execution of the budget).* *See in this regards www.senado.gov.ar/web/comisiones/evenComi.php?nro_comision=100. 10 Access to Public Information and Citizen Participation in Supreme Audit Institutions (Sai) stood fashion. The fact that they are oversight On the other hand, in Argentina, a greater agencies does not exempt them from this re- transparency of the bodies to which the Nation- quirement and, as the impact of their auditing al Auditor’s Office reports has also been pro- work increases, there is a growing need for these moted through court resolutions. entities to be transparent and independent from political power. This means that those who ex- 3.1.3 Dissemination of information ert oversight (agents who monitor) should also related to the Auditors’ be monitored and, to that end, they need to pro- selection process to citizens mote good governance measures. In this regard, and opening the process to CSOs can also play a fundamental role, promot- participation ing the transparency of such oversight agencies and subjecting those who exercise public con- Just as in the case of the Judiciary, where trans- trol to scrutiny. parency and participation mechanisms are be- On the one hand, audit institutions should ing adopted for the appointment of judges and be included in the legislation on access to pub- officials,9 it is also necessary for these trans- lic information. Thus, at the request of any in- parency and participation mechanisms to exist terested party, an SAI should provide appropri- in SAIs. To that end, the process should be as ate, timely, truthful, and complete information, broadly disseminated as possible at all its stag- except for internal notes or data that could af- es. As suggested in the ADC document refer- fect a person’s privacy. An SAI should provide, enced above, the dissemination of information among other pieces of information, data on its about the call for applications, the list of appli- organization, staff, compensation of employ- cants, their background, tax situation, income ees and officials, audit plans and status, deci- and assets declarations, and so forth should sions adopted by the auditor or board of audi- de done through all possible means (Inter- tors, and minutes of the meetings of the board net, official gazette, local and national news- of auditors. papers, specialized journals). Thereafter, citi- In the oversight systems in which an entity zens should be provided with a time period different from the SAI is responsible for approv- in which to challenge candidacies, and pres- ing the reports it has produced, ordering mea- ent comments, observations and endorsements sures or filing complaints on the basis of the in- with regard to each. Prior to each appoint- formation contained in them, and supervising ment, a public hearing should be convened so compliance with the orders that are issued, it is that the body responsible for it may pose que- vital for such institutional information to also ries relative to any concern that might exist. At be disseminated. In general, the focus is usually this hearing, time should be reserved for citi- placed on the agency that produces the reports zens to ask questions. These types of practices and not on the body that makes recommenda- involve important elements regarding the dis- tions and has to verify compliance. For that rea- semination of information about procedures son, it is fundamental for both instances to be and candidates, as well as elements of social equally transparent and accessible. participation in the processes related to the se- In Mexico, increased cooperation between lection of SAI’s authorities. public agencies has contributed to strengthen- The experience of the Accounts Chamber ing the transparency of the external oversight in the Dominican Republic exemplifies the rel- system. evance of this practice. Good Practices to Strengthen the External Oversight System 11 Box 5.  Dominican Republic: Civil Society’s Proposal on the Appointment of Members of the Accounts Chamber In July 2008, the Senate of the Dominican Republic removed one of the members of the Accounts Cham- ber. The rest of the members resigned in view of the possibility of suffering a similar fate. As a result, numerous Dominican CSOs urged that, given the seriousness of the events that gave rise to the removal and the resignations (claims of irregularities, corruption, and unjustified pay raises), it was necessary to design a transparent and participatory mechanism to appoint their replacements. The process should consider making the CVs of the candidates and their income and assets declarations publicly available. The CSOs also called on citizens, in general, to actively collaborate in the process to prevent a repetition of the events that had lead to the replacement of the members of the Accounts Chamber. Source: Daily Hoy 2008 3.1.4 Citizen training on the External company greater opportunities for participa- Audit System tion. As mechanisms for public information and It is fundamental to expand public knowledge participation are incorporated, various aware- of the work of SAIs.Without it, access to public ness-raising actions should be implemented to information and citizen participation will only expand the target audience. There are differ- involve the organizations that are professional- ent ways to conduct this sort of actions. The ly devoted to monitoring government activities. first step would consist in using general surveys Although it is true that in times of little partic- about CSOs, which in general are already avail- ipation it is hard to attract attention to these able.This will make it possible to identify a con- types of institutions, the experiences described siderable number of thematic organizations that in the following section show that, when spac- could take advantage of the information and es become available to make concrete contribu- participation arrangements in the context of tions, multiple interested parties emerge. How- SAIs. It is likewise useful to contact academic ever, in addition to opening up these spaces for centers that conduct studies, research and field information and participation, it is necessary to work with CSOs,10 foundations dedicated to actively conduct training efforts regarding the promoting CSO networks,11 and the informa- subject matter. Such training should always ac- tion networks CSOs may have set up to com- Box 6.  Honduras: Training Activities Conducted by the Supreme Accounts Tribunal (Tribunal Superior de Cuentas, TSC) In the context of a project that was supported by the World Bank, the TSC implemented actions to improve its interaction with citizens. Thus, it organized informational meetings, participatory training workshops and conferences. The TSC created a Citizen Participation Directorate that is currently offering training modules on: the organization of the State, citizen participation and social auditing, access to information legislation, and participation in the Accounts Tribunal. They also initiated programs to engage citizens and civic organizations in institutional control. Around 1,200 citizens attended the public presentation of the results of the audits in each of the agencies that were audited.* *Tribunal Superior de Cuentas de la República de Honduras 2007/2008. 12 Access to Public Information and Citizen Participation in Supreme Audit Institutions (Sai) municate among themselves.12 In turn, it is nec- comments; citizen oversight committees; partic- essary to adjust the language to the needs of the ipation in audit supervision; and actions to dis- various types of organizations. seminate auditing activities. In Honduras, the Supreme Accounts Tribu- At the same time, it is necessary to remain nal has promoted actions to make its procedures aware of the potential risks associated with the public and the training of citizens in the work- participation of CSOs in oversight activities. It ings of the oversight system. is important, for example, for the selection of the audits to be carried out in compliance with objective priorities and relevant criteria, to pre- 3.2 Opening Up the vent an inappropriate influence of individual in- External Oversight of terests. Public Administration This section presents good practices related to: i) the filing of citizen complaints to the SAIs; to Citizen ii) social participation in the definition of SAI Participation audits; iii) the establishment of coordinated au- dits and of citizen oversight committees; and iv) As mentioned in the introduction, access to the supervision of compliance with the recom- public information and transparency in SAIs are mendations made by the SAIs. a sine qua non condition to ensure the participa- tion of various non-state actors in the external 3.2.1 The filing of citizen complaints oversight system. But, at the same time, the par- ticipation in these public spheres contributes to It is commonplace for citizens to make the as- the justification of access to information. They sumption that in any government there are cer- are two sides of the same coin, through which tain areas where irregularities and corrupt ac- non-governmental stakeholders are able to exer- tions repeatedly take place. Such perception is cise oversight over public administration.There- damaging for the democratic system. If the as- fore, as transparency and access to information sumptions are true, it means that there are agen- are broadened, public participation mechanisms cies in which public resources are being inade- should be promoted. In other words, informa- quately invested. Even worse, such assumptions tion is a necessary but not sufficient condition help foster an image of public officials as those for effective control. For that reason, it is neces- who have no regard for the public good. Addi- sary to move forward with the design of appro- tionally, false assumptions contribute to unfair- priate methodologies for citizen participation in ly creating an inaccurate image of public offi- fiscal control, defining the principles, roles and cials without the possibility of demonstrating scope of such participation, and introducing the otherwise. It should be noted here that crim- necessary institutional adjustments, including inal courts only act upon concrete reports of innovations in the auditing techniques that are crime, which is not the case if there are on- employed. ly general assumptions of irregularities or in- There are different ways of channeling such efficiency. participation: creating channels to receive com- For these reasons, giving citizens the oppor- plaints; participatory processes for the selection tunity to file complaints,individually or through of the agencies or programs to be audited; open- CSOs, and to request audits of areas over which ing up the audits to suggestions, proposals and suspicions are harbored represents an innovative Good Practices to Strengthen the External Oversight System 13 Box 7.  South Korea: Citizen Complaints Regarding Areas About Which They Harbor Suspicions South Korea’s Superior Audit Office recently incorporated a system whereby citizens may request the conduction of certain audits in areas suspected of irregularities or corrupt actions. The system has been broadly disseminated in Korean society and has been receiving a growing number of requests. At the same time, a committee has been established to assess the quality of proposals brought forward by CSOs or citizens. Initially it was formed by four Auditor Generals and three civil society experts. Furthermore, the ratio of representation was later reversed (four members appointed at the proposal of citizens and three Auditor Generals), with the aim of making the system more open.* *Pyun 2006. way of strengthening democracy. Citizen com- Likewise, in Peru, a mechanism to present plaints serve to channel social audit efforts that complaints to that country’s Comptroller Gen- lack defined institutional channels, taking ad- eral of the Republic has been established. vantage of proximity to society, thereby enhanc- ing the effectiveness of the control and oversight 3.2.2 Participation in the selection functions implicit in the SAI’s mandate. SAIs of agencies or programs to be —which as an indispensable prerequisite need audited to maintain full autonomy vis-à-vis the Execu- tive Branch, as indicated in the Declaration of In a manner similar to that indicated above, it Mexico City on SAIs’ Independence by INTO- is desirable for the selection of audits not to SAI—will have to take into account some of take place behind closed doors, but rather by these complaints and proceed to examine mat- taking into account citizen concerns, gener- ters that would otherwise simply remain in the ally based on recommendations made by in- realm of public perceptions. termediary organizations. CSOs have valuable In this respect, South Korea has established information derived from the work they carry a system whereby citizens may request that spe- out. As these organizations progressively devel- cific audits be conducted in areas about which op, they become diversified and specialized in they harbor suspicions. thematic areas. Thus, with increasing frequen- Box 8.  Peru: Complaints Reception Service at the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic In 2003 the SAI passed a resolution establishing a mechanism that can be used by citizens (individually or through organizations),officials, and servants to exercise the right to file complaints before the Office of the Comptroller General. Pursuant to the agency’s resolution, the target of the complaints can be actions or operations that are suspected as a result of acts or omission related to the undue, illegal, or inefficient management and/or use of State assets or resources. The agency is banned from disclosing data or information that could endanger the complainant. Once the admissibility of the complaint has been determined, the agency is obliged to process it and verify the facts. The Comptroller is required to communicate to the complainant the results of the process. As per the resolution itself indicates, as a result of this mechanism, the Comptroller will benefit from the participation of civil society.* *Resolution of Peru’s Office of the Comptroller General No. 443/2003, December 31, 2003 14 Access to Public Information and Citizen Participation in Supreme Audit Institutions (Sai) Box 9.  Argentina: Participatory Process to Select Agencies or Programs to be Included in the Annual Audit Plan In 2005, the President of the National Audit Office (Auditoría General de la Nación, AGN) informally implemented an initiative through which the CSOs that had maintained some kind of relationship with the agency were called to become part of a process whereby they could petition for the inclusion of programs or agencies in the annual audit plan. The first meeting included a presentation of the initiative and an official of the institution gave an introduction to the external oversight system and the type of audits that were carried out, and detailed the type of proposals that could be presented by the CSOs. At the same time, he made himself available to respond to any concerns that might emerge on the part of the organizations between that time and the second meeting, when the organizations could submit their proposals. At the second meeting, the representatives of the CSOs presented the proposals they had prepared. The AGN officials made an assessment of each and explained whether, based on technical reasons, the initiative was feasible, whether it was already included in the plan for the following year, whether the agency had already been audited in the immediately preceding years, or if the proposal needed to be redrafted. After these observations, the proposals were presented to the Board of Auditors, who decided on their inclusion in the future plan. One of the most visible results of the process consisted in the introduction of an analysis of accessibility for people with physical disabilities to the buildings of each of the agencies to be audited. This proposal was presented by a CSO devoted to promoting the rights of people with disabilities. It should be noted that the AGN had promised the attendants that it would provide written feedback related to the assessment of each proposal, but failed to comply with this commitment. Such a document would be recommendable in the context of these types of experiences, because it represents a response to the petitions filed and a justification regarding those that were turned down. cy, in regard to each public issue being debat- reasons, it is valuable to incorporate CSOs in ed, the specialized opinion of a CSO devoted the mechanisms related to the selection of au- to the issue of reference is sought. This is not dits to be undertaken. It is a way of opening only the case with the mass and community the process to society, taking into account the media, but it is also frequent in the case of leg- concerns arising and improving the channels of islative committees, academic events and even participatory democracy. in the courts through the institution known as This type of practice may be illustrated with amicus curiae (friends of the court). For the same the following example of the AGN in Argentina. Box 10.  Honduras: Citizen Collaboration with the Work of the Superior Accounts Tribunal According to the Superior Accounts Tribunal itself, the experience of engaging citizens and civil organiza- tions in the agency’s audits between August 2007 and March 2008 had very satisfactory results. A recent quantitative assessment indicated that such participation made it possible to detect 186 internal control deficiencies and make 199 management and 23 legality recommendations. Furthermore, 41 findings generated 155 civil liabilities for over US$1.6 million; representing 64 percent of the total detected by the Superior Accounts Tribunal. According to the Tribunal, “the establishment of effective and dynamic relations between institutional oversight and citizens implies, on the part of the auditor, adopting an attitude sensitive to dialogue, as well as a broad disposition towards an understanding of the social issues underlying the services delivered by the agencies that are audited”* *See www.tsc.gob.hn/PDFS/PARTICIPACION%20CIUD/proyecto_balance%20pdf.pdf Good Practices to Strengthen the External Oversight System 15 3.2.3 Coordinated Audits and Citizen Likewise, in Colombia, citizen oversight Oversight Committees committees allow the exercise of an autono- mous oversight of public management. This is a mechanism whereby groups of cit- izens become actively involved in audit pro- 3.2.4 Participation in the monitoring cesses. For example, a CSO may propose that of compliance with audit a multi-member body, made up of renowned recommendations experts in the subject-matter to be addressed, jointly participate along with the auditors that The Seventh Principle of the Declaration of the will conduct the investigations within a certain City of Mexico on SAIs’ Independence (issued agency or program. In this way, a valuable inter- by INTOSAI in November 2007) establish- action takes place between public servants and es that there should be effective mechanisms in qualified professionals coming from non-gov- place to monitor the recommendations from the ernmental sectors, also achieving an improved audits. In addition to the requirement for them control of the audited agencies and the strength- to send their reports to the body responsible for ening of the SAIs. their examination (Congress or the Judiciary, Citizen participation in Honduras has con- in accordance with the SAI models previous- tributed to strengthen the auditing efforts con- ly described), the Declaration notes that SAIs ducted by the Superior Accounts Tribunal should have an internal mechanism to monitor through coordinated audits. compliance with the recommendations includ- Box 11. Colombia: Citizen Oversight Committees in the Office if the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República, CGR) Article 270 of the National Constitution establishes that the “The Law will organize the ways and systems for citizen participation to take place in a manner that allows for oversight of public management at the various administrative levels and regarding its outcomes.” Two laws (passed in 1994 and 2003)* regulated the concept of ‘citizen oversight committees,’ which are democratic forms of representation that allow citizens and various community organizations to exercise oversight on public management processes involving administrative, political, judicial, electoral, and legislative authorities. To be eligible, a committee must have members with the technical skills required to undertake particular projects (lawyers to examine contracts, engineers to evaluate constructions, and so forth). From 1999 (the year when the Citizen Participation in Fiscal Control Program was launched by the CGR) to 2003, the CGR promoted the Citizen Oversight Committees (Comités de Vigilancia Ciudadana, CVC), as a form of citizen audit.§ Later, with the passing of Law 850 in 2003, the possibility opened up for Citizen Oversight Committees to apply to the CGR, through an exceptional way of control (control exercised over territorial resources), for conducting audits of departmental or municipal agencies that manage national resources. Currently, the Citizen Oversight Committees contribute to the audits processes performed by the CGR through the filing of complaints.† * Law 134 of 1994 and Law 850 of 2003. § Velásquez Leal 2002. † Participatory Fiscal Control is constituted by five components: Information, Training, Organization, Coordinated Audits and Complaints Reception System (www.contraloriagen.gov.co) 16 Access to Public Information and Citizen Participation in Supreme Audit Institutions (Sai) ed in their audit reports. It is, evidently, an ap- that civil society can play in following up on the propriate measure, given the failures detected in implementation of the recommendations is fun- the diagnosis that are undertaken regarding the damental.14 external audit systems.13 In this sense, the role 4 Table: Summary of Good Practices Practices Experience 1 Experience 2 Dissemination of the audit Website developed by Digital Bulletin of the reports produced by SAIs the union of audit agen- National Audit Office cies (www.elauditor.info), (Argentina) (Argentina) Disclosure of institutional infor- Agreement between the Transparency in the work mation related to the external Superior Audit Office of of the legislative commis- audit system the Federation and the sion that examines audit Federal Institute for Ac- reports (Argentina) Improvement in cess to Public Information the information to promote transparency related to the in the oversight function external over- (Mexico) sight system Dissemination of informa- Civil society’s proposal tion related to the Auditors’ on the appointment of selection process to citizens members of the Accounts (and opening the process to Chamber (Dominican participation) Republic) Citizen training on the external Training activities con- audit system ducted by the Superior Accounts Tribunal (Hon- duras) (continued on next page) 17 18 Access to Public Information and Citizen Participation in Supreme Audit Institutions (Sai) Practices Experience 1 Experience 2 Opening up to the filing of citi- Citizen complaints re- Complaints Reception zen complaints before the SAI garding areas over which Service of the Office of they harbor suspicions the Comptroller General (South Korea) of the Republic (Peru) Participation in the selection Annual participatory pro- of agencies or programs to be cess for the selection of audited. agencies or programs to be audited (Argentina) Opening Up to citizen participa- Coordinated audits and Citizen Citizen Oversight Com- Citizen participation in tion in the exter- Oversight Committees mittees in the Office of the auditing efforts of nal oversight of the Comptroller General the Accounts Tribunal public adminis- of the Republic (Colom- (Honduras) tration bia) Participation in monitoring compliance with audits’ recom- mendations. Source: Author. 5 Final Observations The practices and experiences regarding access tion. Undoubtedly, a strong international move- to information and citizen participation that ment is a critical resource that citizens have to are reviewed in this document reflect a certain promote positive changes in local contexts that progress towards strengthening the control sys- lack adequate incentives. tem, something that is indispensable for inclu- Consensus is increasingly growing within sive governance. However, the survey also in- the global community on the relevance of SAIs, dicates that states have not taken concrete steps, their transparency and the need to be open to but rather isolated measures that only form a pic- citizen participation. Some of the good prac- ture—even if incomplete—when seen in com- tices mentioned in this document are, precisely, bination with the measures that have been taken the result of the work of different CSOs and in- by others. Experience also shows that political ternational institutions. Undoubtedly, this is the powers have no incentive to produce compre- road to be traveled, only at a faster pace. hensive reforms. The worst-intentioned officials This document presents a series of good fear becoming the target of scrutiny, and those practices designed to strengthen external au- that are well-intentioned are concerned about a dit systems. As indicated in the introduction, the greater bureaucratization of public management. collaboration between SAIs and CSOs is an ar- As a consequence, measures toward openness ea of development that is only beginning to re- and transparency are usually only taken when ceive the attention it merits. In this sense, there serious effects emerge as a result of poor prac- are a series of issues that would benefit from fur- tices and, consequently, cause a public outcry for ther research and analysis. Among those that de- change. For example, the latest political crises in mand a more complete understanding, the fol- Latin American countries have shown to be fa- lowing can be listed: vorable opportunities for the adoption of trans- parency and participation rules. • Evaluating the impact of the various prac- The international community may provide tices and collaboration mechanisms be- an adequate context to achieve greater prog- tween SAIs and CSOs that were examined. ress. In that framework, international organiza- • Analyzing the relationship between trans- tions such as INTOSAI—and the respective re- parency and participation in the external gional organizations—are fundamental players audit system. to continue promoting changes. The same ap- • Examining whether any of the external au- plies to the international treaties against corrup- dit models (legislative, judicial, autonomous) 19 20 Access to Public Information and Citizen Participation in Supreme Audit Institutions (Sai) is more effective in creating channels for ac- • Investigating the conditions that facilitate cess to public information and civil society transparency and social participation in SAIs. participation in regards to SAIs. • Examining the impact of access to pub- lic information laws on the opening of the SAIs in practice. 6 References Asociación Civil por la Igualdad y la Justicia vista de Reflexión y Análisis Político, Nº 7, (ACIJ). 2005. En busca del control perdido, Vol. Buenos Aires, Argentina, May. 1 a 4, Buenos Aires, Argentina. OLACEFS. 2004. “Control Ciudadano: Expe- Daily Hoy. 2008. Santo Domingo, Dominican riencias de las Entidades Fiscalizadoras Su- Republic. 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Endnotes 1  The original version of this document was published, in ty and CEDES, at www.utdt.edu/ver_contenido.php?id_ Spanish, in 2009. contenido=181&id_item_menu=823. 2  11  For more information, see the organization’s website at See, for example, the work of the Avina Foundation, at www.intosai.org. www.avina.net. 3  12  INTOSAI 2007. In Argentina, see Red Infocívica, at www.infocivica. 4  Ramkumar 2007b. org.ar. 5  13  González de Rebella 2005. See, for example, ACIJ 2005. 6  14  OLACEFS 2004. As indicated in Box 6, the Superior Accounts Tribu- 7  There is a real tension between the secrecy required to nal (Tribunal Superior de Cuentas, TSC) of Honduras de- conduct certain stages of oversight activities and the im- signed a methodology to involve citizens and civil soci- portance of social participation in them. There should be ety organizations in monitoring the recommendations for mechanisms to establish clear rules to increase transparen- improvement as a result of a pilot project which included cy in oversight activities without raising questions about eight audits involving citizen participation in the educa- the objectivity of the process.The handling of sensitive and tion, health, municipalities and infrastructure sectors. This confidential information should be submitted to known methodology was adopted through a formal signing (in a and predictable rules. public event) by citizens, the audited agency and the TSC. 8  Herrero and López 2008. Currently, citizens and their organizations and the TSC, 9  Herrero and López 2008. through the Directorate of Supervision and Monitoring, 10  See, for example, in Argentina, the postgraduate monitor the implementation of the recommendations that course in civil society organizations organized by the are formulated as part of this exercise. University of San Andrés, Torcuato Di Tella Universi- 23 About the World Bank Institute’s Governance Practice Governance is one of seven priority themes in the World Bank Institute’s recently launched renewal strat- egy—a strategy that responds to client demand for peer-to-peer learning by grounding WBI’s work in the distillation and dissemination of practitioner experiences. The Institute is committed to building knowledge and capacity on the “how to” of governance reforms, with emphasis on supporting and sustaining multi- stakeholder engagement in bringing about such reforms. WBI’s Governance Practice works with partners, including networks of country and regional institutions, to develop and replicate customized learning programs. Its programmatic approach aims at building multi- stakeholder coalitions and in creating collaborative platforms and peer networks for knowledge exchange. The Practice focuses on three thematic areas: governance of extractive industries, procurement reform, and access to information. A fourth program supports anti-corruption programs for Parliamentarians, the Judiciary and the Private Sector. A Mobilizing Stakeholders for Reform group links stakeholder groups in support of these priority areas, documents and codifies knowledge, and builds capacity in cross-cutting areas. And lastly—but importantly—a Leadership Development Program focuses on strengthening the ca- pacity of potential leaders to harness the energies of stakeholder groups and to and channel these efforts toward reform. For further information: WBI The World Bank 1818 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20433 Fax: 202-522-1492 Visit us on the web at: http://wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/topics/governance Photo Credits: (Front cover) istockphotos.com.