



## 1. Project Data

<b>Project ID</b> P130819	<b>Project Name</b> HN Safer Municipalities	
<b>Country</b> Honduras	<b>Practice Area(Lead)</b> Urban, Resilience and Land	
<b>L/C/TF Number(s)</b> IDA-51920	<b>Closing Date (Original)</b> 31-Aug-2018	<b>Total Project Cost (USD)</b> 9,745,123.21
<b>Bank Approval Date</b> 13-Dec-2012	<b>Closing Date (Actual)</b> 31-Dec-2018	
	<b>IBRD/IDA (USD)</b>	<b>Grants (USD)</b>
Original Commitment	15,000,000.00	0.00
Revised Commitment	12,700,000.00	0.00
Actual	9,774,638.22	0.00

<b>Prepared by</b> Cynthia Nunez-Ollero	<b>Reviewed by</b> Vibecke Dixon	<b>ICR Review Coordinator</b> Christopher David Nelson	<b>Group</b> IEGSD (Unit 4)
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## 2. Project Objectives and Components

### a. Objectives

According to both the Financing Agreement (FA, p.5) and the Project Appraisal Document (PAD, paragraph 12), the Project Development Objectives (PDOs) of this project were: (a) to improve the capacity of national and local authorities in violence prevention; (b) to address risk factors of crime and violence in selected municipalities; and (c) to improve its capacity to respond promptly and effectively to an eligible emergency. This review will assess the project's achievements against these objectives:

- to improve the capacity of national and local authorities in violence prevention;



- to address risk factors of crime and violence in selected municipalities; and
- to improve its capacity to respond promptly and effectively to an eligible emergency.

According to the PAD (paragraph 15), the following were the key PDO outcome indicators:

- Violence prevention components of Municipal Coexistence and Citizen Security Plans (MCCSPs) designed and implemented following a cross-sectoral and evidence-informed approach;
- National and municipal authorities collected, analyzed, and used data on crime and violence perpetration and victimization (disaggregated by age and gender) for evidence-based policy making and actions;
- Percentage of residents in targeted neighborhoods who report collective efficacy (social cohesion/trust, and willingness to act collectively to prevent violence);
- Percentage of people that are victims of school-based violence in targeted schools. School-based violence was part of the violence prevention components of the municipal plans in the three selected municipalities (PAD, footnote 13); and
- Time taken to disburse funds requested by the Government for an eligible emergency.

The MSCCPs are municipal initiatives funded by the Government's State and Peace Building Fund (SPF). The SPF provides TA grants to coordinate the violence prevention agenda across sectors through the National Citizen Security Council as well as mainstream violence prevention in the agenda of national government agencies and programs, support communications and capacity building strategy of the program, and promote south-south cooperation (PAD, footnote 14).

**b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?**

No

**c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?**

No

**d. Components**

1: **Strengthening of National Violence Prevention Institutions** (appraisal cost US\$2 million, actual cost US\$1.75 million). This component financed two subcomponents: the first one was to strengthen the capacity of the *Secretaria de Estado en el Despacho de Seguridad* (SEDS or Secretariat of Security) to guide, coordinate, and oversee violence prevention activities in selected communities. This financed (i) the systematization of good practices on violence preventions; (ii) assessment of violence prevention services available at the national level that may be offered in the selected municipalities; (iii) training SEDS staff to support selected municipalities in preparing and implementing Violence Prevention component of the respective Municipal Coexistence and Citizen Security Plans (MCCSPs); (iv) developing guidelines and protocols for preparing these plans; and (v) developing a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system for the implementation of these plans (PAD, paragraph 16). The second subcomponent strengthened the capacity of both SEDS and selected municipalities to collect and process violence data and use these as evidence to inform policy making. This capacity building financed (i) technical assistance and equipment to enhance the National Violence Observatory's capacity to validate crime and violence data; (ii) design and implement



victimization, attitude, and social cohesion surveys; and (iii) create and strengthen municipal crime and violence observatories in selected municipalities (PAD, paragraph 17).

**2: Investing in Integrated Crime and Violence Prevention at Municipal and Community Level** (appraisal cost US\$11 million, actual cost US\$7.22 million). This component financed three subcomponents.

- The first subcomponent financed (i) training and technical assistance to personnel of the selected municipalities and members of violence prevention committees to prepare Violence Prevention components of the MCCSPs, including municipal subprojects; (ii) the establishing of municipal level mechanisms to handle complaints; (iii) developing and implementing communication and outreach to promote community participation (PAD, paragraph 18). These activities improved the capacity of selected municipalities to plan and manage violence preventions activities.
- The second subcomponent financed the design and implementation of community participation activities such as those related to identifying, prioritizing, implementing and supervising municipal subprojects (PAD, paragraph 19). These activities promoted collective efficacy. This is defined as the extent to which neighborhood residents trust each other and were willing to act together to prevent crime in their community (PAD, footnote 15).
- The third subcomponent financed grants to selected municipalities to implement subprojects in at least three "hotspot" neighborhoods in each target municipality and other municipal-wide strategic initiatives. These subprojects, identified in response to the prevention component of municipal plans, included (i) training in social prevention interventions such as those that were family- and youth-oriented, gender, or school-based; (ii) training in situational prevention interventions that financed construction of small-scale community infrastructure to create safe community spaces such as parks, gardens, playgrounds, street lighting, street paving; and the construction or rehabilitation of similar space to deliver services; (iii) access to basic urban upgrading services such as small diameter water and sewer connections, drainage, electricity connections, and access roads; and (iv) training in alternative conflict resolution measures, such as training municipal mediators, strengthening case registration systems, and expanding networks of women and youth volunteer mediators.

**3: Project Administration and Monitoring and Evaluation** (appraisal cost US\$2 million, actual cost US\$2.38 million). This component financed training, workshops, and technical assistance to strengthen the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) as well as to carry out fiduciary obligations. This component also financed the establishing of systems for monitoring and evaluation of the project, as well as impact evaluations of at least two types of interventions (PAD, paragraph 22).

**4: Immediate Response Mechanism (IRM) Contingency Emergency Component** (appraisal cost US\$0, actual cost US\$0). This component would support a response to an eligible emergency. A specific IRM Operations Manual applied to this component.

**e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates**

**Project Cost:** The total planned project cost at appraisal reached US\$17 million, of these US\$15 million were IDA funds and US\$2 million was the Government contribution. This was revised to US\$12 million (see



Dates below). The project disbursed US\$11.35 million (ICR, Annex 3). The remainder was attributed to the undisbursed Borrower Contribution (see below).

**Financing:** The International Development Association (IDA) financed this project.

**Borrower Contribution:** The Government committed US\$2.0 in counterpart financing. No contributions were disbursed (ICR, paragraph 17).

**Dates:** The project was approved on December 13, 2012 and made effective March 15, 2013. The Mid Term Review (MTR) was completed on May 15, 2015. The project was scheduled to close on August 31, 2018 but was extended through a restructuring to close 4 months later on December 31, 2018, for a total of 20 month implementation period. There were 3 level 2 restructurings:

- On November 23, 2016 to cancel US\$2.3 million in financing, reallocate US\$0.45 million across components, amend the Results Framework, amend the institutional arrangements and the corresponding financial management (ICR, paragraph 17). The amendments to the Results Framework included the replacement of output indicators with more rigorous intermediate and outcome indicators that followed the ecological model method promoted by the World Health Organization (WHO, 2002). The epidemiological method identified risk factors for violence. These risk factors were conditions that cumulatively increased the probability for an individual or group to become victim and/or perpetrator of violence. The new RF captured the cumulative effects of the various interventions with target groups. PDO outcome indicators measured the increased perception of residents' safety, decrease in student absenteeism and drop out, improved self-esteem and increased participation in elaborating and monitoring community action plans for violence prevention.
- On June 14, 2018 to reallocate US\$1.6 million between disbursement categories to enable the Government to pay selected consultancies and salaries of local teams implementing the project.
- On August 31, 2018 to extend the loan closing date by 4 months to December 31, 2018 to complete the remaining 3 contracted subprojects (kindergarten building in Palermo and an integral center and ditches in Choloma).

### 3. Relevance of Objectives

#### Rationale

The PDO was highly relevant to the country's national development plan embodied in the *Vision de Pais 2010-- 2038 y Plan de Nacion* (Country Vision 2010-2030 and National Plan). Of the four objectives in that plan, Objective 2 aimed for a democratic Honduras, developed with safety and without violence. One of the five goals to achieve this objective focused on reducing the level of criminality to a level below the international average. The plan identified also identified the need to eliminate the social problems that present true risks to the population such as violence, access health and education, as well as political, social, and economic opportunities for the youth. This project directly contributes to achieving this objective. The PDO directly supported the Government's 2011-2022 National Citizen Security and Coexistence Policy (NCSP), which espoused crime control and violence prevention. According to the ICR (paragraph 7), the policy led to the creation of the Sub-Secretariat of Prevention (SSP) in the Secretariat of Security (SEDS) to



lead the violence prevention agenda while the National Citizen Security Council (NCSC) was tasked with coordinating efforts in criminal justice and violence prevention. This policy coincided with the PDO by recognizing that incidence and drivers of crime and violence differed across locations and required customized response.

The PDO was also relevant to the World Bank's Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for FY16-FY20. This project contributed to the first pillar of Fostering Inclusion as part of meeting the objective to expand coverage of social programs. Areas with the highest rates of poverty, malnutrition, vulnerability, violence and high child migration would be prioritized for expansion (CPF, paragraph 60). The project supported Pillar 3, Reducing Vulnerabilities by contributing to Objective 7 to build crime and violence prevention capacity of local governments. The CPF noted that an important source of vulnerability derived from the high levels of crime and violence, affecting growth and opportunity and the country's social fabric (CPF, paragraph 103). To reduce the country's vulnerabilities, the objective was to build crime and violence prevention capacity of local governments (CPF, paragraph 104).

## Rating

High

## 4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

### OBJECTIVE 1

#### Objective

To improve the capacity of national and local authorities in violence prevention.

#### Rationale

**Theory of Change:** The PAD did not present a theory of change (ICR, paragraph 10). This PDO improved municipal (local) capacity to manage citizen security interventions through activities such as training, technical assistance, and collaboration with independent experts. These activities were to generate outputs that strengthened the capacity of the national authorities to guide and oversee violence prevention activities, improve the capacity of national and selected municipal authorities to collect and process data on violence. Strengthened national and municipal violence observatories would provide the outputs - data - to design outcomes that were evident in prevention components of municipal and citizen plans. These plans provided the framework for community investments and social prevention interventions funded by this project. The training and technical assistance led to outputs that supported the PDO. The logical chain is clear - that by improving capacity to identify risk factors for violence, and use data as evidence, national and local authorities could better understand how to combine interventions to mitigate risk actors in highly vulnerable communities. The underlying assumptions were that support for the project would not be affected by change in government, results at the community level would be appreciated at the higher levels of government, and that there will be investments to sustain the results.

#### OUTPUTS:



- According to the ICR (paragraph 42), SEDS and municipalities produced 10 certified municipal violence prevention plans using evidence, data, and participatory approaches (no baseline in the ICR, original target 13, target almost achieved)
- 100 percent of community leaders participated in updating the community action plans (baseline available but not reported in the ICR, original target 90 percent, target exceeded) as evidence of increased community empowerment. The ICR did not provide the number of community leaders. This indicator was expressed as a percentage following the introduction of the revised Results Framework during the November 2016 restructuring (see Dates above). This indicator followed the ecological model method promoted by the World Health Organization that captured cumulative effects of various interventions, such as this participation by community leaders in updating community plans. In addition, the Bank team noted that all data, baselines, and targets at closing were in the World Bank archives but not captured in this ICR (see Annex 1 Results Framework and Key Outputs Note at the beginning of the Table).

### **OUTCOMES:**

- Percent of residents satisfied with local authorities' capacity to implement violence prevention community plans using participatory methods increased from 93.3 to 97.3 percent (no baseline in the ICR, original target 93 percent, target exceeded). The fully populated results framework with targets at closing was in the World Bank's document archives and not reported in the project portal nor the ICR (see also Section (8)(b) Quality of Bank Supervision below).
- The number of beneficiaries was expressed in the following manner: 900 persons benefited from temporary employment (original target 911, target almost achieved); and 3,775 residents from targeted neighborhoods who participated in social prevention programs (original target 13,004, target not achieved).

**Rating**  
Modest

## **OBJECTIVE 2**

### **Objective**

To address risk factors of crime and violence in selected municipalities.

### **Rationale**

**Theory of Change:** The PAD did not present a theory of change (ICR, paragraph 10). This PDO would improve municipal capacity to manage citizen security interventions through training, technical assistance and collaboration with independent experts. These prevention components of municipal and citizen plans provided the framework for community investments and social prevention interventions funded by this project. Four activities supported the achievement of this PDO for an integrated crime and violence prevention at municipal and community levels. These were engaging residents of target neighborhoods in social prevention programs, providing safe public spaces using the Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED), building leadership and capacity for collective action, and developing and implementing instruments in target municipalities. Outputs generated by these activities led to an understanding of the risk factors associated



with crime and violence in selected municipalities. The CPTED used data on how lighting, barriers, and visual or physical access elements exacerbate or discourage anti-social or violent behavior when developing specifications for physical upgrading of built spaces (ICR, footnote 3). The outcome indicators do not appear to directly measure the achievement of the PDO because the PDO would merely "address" rather than "reduce" risk factors of crime and violence.

## OUTPUTS:

- Geo-referenced community violence maps were produced (baseline 0, target 9 from the PAD, no information in the ICR on achievement)
- 911 at-risk youth beneficiaries gained temporary employment (target 900, target achieved) paired with cognitive behavioral therapy programs. Annex 1 of the ICR reported this number at 300. Cognitive behavioral interventions paired with temporary employment created an entry point for working with young men who were overwhelmingly both perpetrators and victims of homicide. (ICR paragraph 41)
- 13,004 residents (half of them female) from the target neighborhoods participated in social prevention programs (original target 3,775, target exceeded). These programs included school- and family-based (*Mile de Manos, Familias Fuertes*), community leadership, conflict resolution, countering gender based violence, violence interruption, situational prevention, sports and recreation, community arts, and beautification.
- 68.42 percent of residents in target communities report willingness to help each other (target 62.20 percent, target exceeded). This provided evidence of greater collective action and social capital.
- 86.95 percent of mothers and fathers reported greater knowledge and attitude towards positive discipline and communication with children (baseline 60.70 percent, original target 84.98 percent, target exceeded). This indicator provided evidence of improved relations within the family.
- 15.40 percent of residents showed lower tolerance toward gender based violence (target 15 percent, target achieved). This provided evidence of positive change in attitude towards gender based violence.
- 100 percent of community leaders participated in updating the community action plans (original target 90 percent, target exceeded) as evidence of increased community empowerment.

## OUTCOMES:

- Percent of students (Grades 4-9) reporting improved school climate in target schools increased from 42.5 (baseline) to 76.6 percent (original target 51 percent, target exceeded). This indicator referred to increased students' connectedness with the schools they attended.
- The percent of residents who perceived that safety in their communities improved were mixed (see Table below, replicated from Figure 2 of the ICR, target not achieved). Of the nine target communities, three communities showed an increase in their perception of safety in two, the decrease was slight but in four communities, residents showed that they significantly felt less safe (target not achieved). In those communities where residents perceived an increase in safety, there was evidence of a substantial reduction of various forms of crime and violence such as drug trafficking, homicide, theft, robbery, and rape in the target areas although causality or attribution could not be established at project closing because security concerns delayed the conduct of a project impact evaluation. The ICR provided additional data from surveys conducted at closing (July 2018) and post project (April 2019), which reflected on outcomes outside the PDO indicators (see ICR, paragraphs 26 and 27, and Annexes 6A and 6E).

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Response on Perceived Safety	(In Percent)	
	Baseline	Project End
Location - Community		
La Ceiba - Danto	48	64
La Ceiba - Melgar 1	62	64
La Ceiba - Melgar 2	60	45
El Progreso - Palermo	51	73
El Progreso - Policarpio	69	27
El Progreso - Fatima	76	73
Choloma - Ceden	87	82
Choloma - 11 de Abril	54	36
Choloma - Infon	83	73

- Participant at-risk youth reported improved self-esteem after receiving temporary jobs and psychosocial support in selected communities (ICR, Annex 1). According to the ICR (paragraphs 29-31), there was no end-of-project data available for this indicator because the final round of the impact evaluation surveys covering this indicator was not completed because of the fall out caused by the non-payment of stipends of the participating youth (target not achieved).

**Rating**

Modest

**OBJECTIVE 3**

**Objective**

To improve its capacity to respond promptly and effectively to an eligible emergency.

**Rationale**

**Theory of Change:** The PAD did not present a theory of change (ICR, paragraph 10). This particular objective was a standby immediate response mechanism to access financial resources in case of an eligible emergency. Approved rapid disbursement mechanisms needed to be in place and would be tested by its implementation by the number of weeks a disbursement would take.

**OUTPUT:** An Operations Manual for contingent emergency response was approved, meeting target. This Manual provided a mechanism for rapid disbursement if requested by the Government following an eligible emergency (ICR, paragraph 33).

**OUTCOMES:** The Government adopted the Operations Manual for the Immediate Response Mechanism that provided for rapid access to financial resources in case of an eligible emergency. The mechanism itself was not activated during the project because there was no emergency but the outcome target indicator (the time taken to disburse funds requested by Government of Honduras for an eligible emergency) was considered substantially achieved.



**Rating**

Substantial

**OVERALL EFFICACY**

**Rationale**

There were five PDO outcome indicators. Two were achieved at project closing, another showed mixed results, and the other had no available data to assess outcome at closing. While the fifth outcome was contingent on activating the rapid response mechanism, the outcome remained substantial because the Operations Manual governing the Immediate Response Mechanism in case of an eligible emergency was adopted and in place. Nevertheless, the efficacy is rated modest.

**Overall Efficacy Rating**

Modest

**Primary Reason**

Insufficient evidence

**5. Efficiency**

**Economic and Financial Efficiency:** At appraisal, a benefit cost analysis used a discounted rate of 12 percent over a 10 year period and reached a benefit cost ratio of 1.28. Benefits were derived from monetary values of losses averted by the interventions both at individual and community levels. These were reduced victimization rates (homicides, sexual violence, injuries and thefts) with savings from reduced health related treatment (emergency, out-patient, in-patient), police, judicial, and prison costs, value of lost property saved (because of averted thefts and crime-related injuries); reduced public school dropout rates (reduced losses in investments in human capital by increasing investments in national public education, reduced losses in future employment earnings by showing returns from one additional year of education), and reduced demand for goods and services associated with a reduced loss in future employment earnings (ICR, Annex 4, paragraph 2). Costs were the direct expenses and investments for the interventions. At closing, benefit cost ratio was at 1.59. This ratio was reached using the same methodology at appraisal (12 percent discount rate over a 10 year period) but limiting benefit estimates to the impact from reduced homicides. When the these benefit estimates were at combined with those from interventions addressing school dropouts, and only over a five year rather than a 10 year period, the benefit cost ratio registered at 1.05.

**Administrative and Operational Efficiency:** Slow disbursement and initial delays marked early implementation. A new Government took office in 2014, introduced reorganization, and reversed certain policies of the previous regime. The reorganization resulted in weakening project ownership by the Ministry of Security (*Secretaria de Estado en el Despacho de Seguridad* or SEDS). A policy was reversed that transferred from the municipalities to the central government the managing and collecting of the security tax, eliminating a source of municipal financing for crime and violence prevention (ICR, paragraph 17). Fiscal constraints required a lowering of disbursement targets (ICR, paragraph 48). An audit uncovered a long standing procurement practice that was not eligible under the Financing Agreement leading to a fiduciary process just as the project was winding down (see Section (9)(b) below). Corrective measures led to delays in implementation, including the payment of stipends to at-risk youth participating in temporary work programs and cognitive behavioral training (ICR, paragraph 57). Incomplete documentation of safeguards compliance at the sub-project level were noted



(see Section (8)(b) above). Implementation risks were not adequately assessed. Mitigating action to address risks that arose during implementation were not taken. Government commitment to provide counterpart financing was not met. However, one outcome of the project was the robust participation by the beneficiaries in the planning and implementation of interventions at the community level (ICR, paragraph 47). By 2016, communities confidently recalibrated interventions to suit their specific needs. In some communities, they also pursued accelerated disbursements to promote trust among beneficiaries.

## Efficiency Rating

Modest

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

	Rate Available?	Point value (%)	*Coverage/Scope (%)
Appraisal	✓	1.28	60.00 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable
ICR Estimate	✓	1.59	63.60 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable

\* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

## 6. Outcome

The relevance of objective is rated high. The efficacy of both objectives 1 and 2 are rated modest. The efficacy of objective 3 is rated substantial. Efficiency is rated modest. Following the guidelines, the project outcome is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory.

### a. Outcome Rating

Moderately Unsatisfactory

## 7. Risk to Development Outcome

The following, identified at appraisal and evident at closing, continue to pose risks to the sustainability of project outcomes:

- **Financial Viability Risk:** There was risk that project interventions would not be sustained unless funds were made available through regular fund transfers to the implementing entities at the local level. This risk was mitigated by the expectation that receipts from the security tax would continue to be funneled to the municipalities. The 2014 election of a new government reversed this policy. Funds from *tason de seguridad* were not transferred to the municipalities. This risk remained after project closing. However, in some cases, such as in the three communities in Choloma, residents built upon



the social cohesion introduced by the project by continuing to organize sports tournaments and festivals. These residents mobilized their own resources and tapped external support to complete the physical works that were unfinished by project closing.

- **Institutional Support and Government Commitment Risk:** There was a risk that staff from the Project Implementation Units who have been trained and who could be a resource to sustain efforts started under the project would not be retained. This risk was mitigated by the project design that called for the staff of the PIU to be absorbed by government institutions evidenced by adequate budget allocated for this purpose. The ICR reported that budgets were made available but only to cover the grace period after project closing and final disbursement. At the municipal level, those who have received training in conflict and violence prevention were also expected to be covered by municipal budgets. Without the fund transfers from the taxes noted above, this risk remained unaddressed. The ICR indicated that none of the experts were covered by the municipal budgets because of lack of funds.
- **Other Stakeholder Ownership Risk:** There was a risk that the planning for Operation and Maintenance (O&M) and the committees that support these at the sub-project levels may not remain after project closing. The ICR reported that all three communities - La Ceiba, El Progreso, and Choloma) have indeed put O&M plans in place and the committees remained functioning after project closing (ICR, Annex 6E). In addition, El Progreso hired the three SASA! staff (coordinator and two *promotors*) indicating continuing plans to continue the interventions introduced by the project in their three participating communities and roll out SASA! to the rest of the municipality. World Vision has also stepped up its support to participatory planning in El Progreso as part of the municipality's budgeting process.
- **Security Risk:** The security risk was noted during the stakeholder consultations following project closing, in April 2019. There was no further information in the ICR about this risk.
- **Economic Risk:** High unemployment and the resulting economic conditions this brings continue to challenge the communities that participated in this project even as they expressed interest in improving access to livelihoods and building skills using the community centers that were recovered or rehabilitated public space under the project. In the CEDEN neighborhood, in Choloma people conducted workshops to pass on the training they received in baking and haircutting to other residents. In La Ceiba, residents obtained USAID funding to continue to conduct livelihood workshops. Nevertheless, with a lack of stable employment residents continue to consider migration.

## 8. Assessment of Bank Performance

### a. Quality-at-Entry

The project components were designed to achieve the project objective. These components included capacity building at both the national and local levels in creating the violence and crime prevention framework; the grants directed at municipalities to implement a menu of social interventions at the community level, engaging recipients through participatory methods, and ensuring that data inform planning and decision making in customizing an approach to reduce crime and violence in the target neighborhoods. Coming from implementing the *Barrio Ciudad* project, the assessed capacity of the implementing entity rested on previous staff continuing into the project. Government committed counterpart resources based on an existing policy that receipts from taxes on security would reach the



municipality. Project design rested on five lessons from the Bank financed *Barrio Ciudad* project as well as global good practice on violence prevention. These five lessons (ICR, paragraph 45) were:

- (i) municipalities were in a position to lead customized crime and prevention efforts that respond to local conditions;
- (ii) social capital and cohesion were strengthened by engaging the community;
- (iii) sustainability of efforts rested on the availability of a national policy framework and support to quality control of local processes;
- (iv) Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)-led infrastructure interventions provide credible entry points in target neighborhoods;
- (v) crucial types of violence in disadvantaged communities involved families, schools, and the community.

New features were added to project design built on these lessons. These were (ICR, paragraph 9):

- (i) strengthening the capacity of the national government to coordinate violence prevention activities across ministries and local governments;
- (ii) enhancing the capacity of local governments by using geo-referenced data to prepare violence prevention components in their respective Municipal Coexistence and Citizen Security Plans;
- (iii) adding social interventions to strengthen the menu of subprojects eligible for financing. As a result, implementation shifted to the communities, accompanied by intensified support from the project teams.

However, implementation risks were insufficiently assessed (ICR, paragraph 46). For example, the fiduciary staff from the *Barrio Ciudad* project who were expected to join this project did not do so. Staff profile of the project staff assigned to coordinate and provide technical quality control for civil works, social intervention, and policy coherence did not reflect the complexity of the services to be provided. Accountability mechanisms in procurement was flagged as a weakness at appraisal. This weakness would be mitigated by guidance from the project's operations manual. The overall risk rating did not include the possibility of a difference in approach to address controversy such as policy reversal, or a possible decline in the Bank's role in donor coordination or leading a policy dialogue (ICR, bullet 3, paragraph 46) (see Bank Supervision below). There were shortcomings in the M&E design (see Section (9)(a) below) as evident from a lack of a governing Theory of Change.

### **Quality-at-Entry Rating**

Moderately Satisfactory

### **b. Quality of supervision**

According to the ICR, the Bank team did not adequately provide safeguard and fiduciary supervision. Documentation of Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIAs), Environmental and Social Management Plans (ESMPs), and consultation processes at the sub-project level (ICR, paragraph 55) were lacking. Supervision inputs and processes were marked by semi annual missions and acknowledged to have provided robust technical support to specific violence prevention interventions. However, consistency in approach may have been adversely affected by having four different task team leaders



manage the project over the five year implementation period. The focus on development impact also appeared to be insufficient. Risks were not updated as was established as good practice when implementing projects in Fragility, Conflict, and Violence (FCV) settings. The risks posed by the following events during implementation - (i) fiscal constraints reduced the project's disbursement target; (ii) a newly elected Government after the project was made effective reversed a policy decision to share with municipalities revenues from the security tax, a main source of funds for the violence prevention components of municipal plans; and (iii) complementary investments were reallocated (such as the integrated justice centers that was funded by the Inter American Development Bank and Switzerland's Agency for Development and Cooperation or COSUDE) or unsuccessfully implemented (the State and Peace Building Fund or SPF grant) - did not trigger a need to update mitigation mechanisms of risks that were not identified during preparation. Inadequate attention was paid to compliance with procurement mechanisms as evident of the continued practice of procuring goods by "shopping method" that was going on for years and only indirectly detected by an audit review and triggered extensive fiduciary review in 2018, as the project was winding down (ICR, paragraphs 46 and 48). According to the ICR, there were significant shortcomings in engagement during the last year of implementation.

### **Quality of Supervision Rating**

Moderately Unsatisfactory

### **Overall Bank Performance Rating**

Moderately Unsatisfactory

## **9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization**

### **a. M&E Design**

The *Fondo Hondureño de Inversión Social* (FHIS or Honduran Social Investment Fund) was the project implementing agency. At appraisal, M&E was designed with a rigorous impact evaluation developed in partnership with the World Bank's Development Impact Evaluation Initiative (DIME) together with the *Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras* (UNAH or the National Autonomous University of Honduras) (PAD, paragraph 33). FHIS, IUDPAS and UNAH would collect quantitative and qualitative data from project reports, community perception and victimization surveys. Data would be disaggregated by gender to the extent possible. Progress reports would be prepared for management use. Aside from capturing the outputs and changes in processes that accompanied the strengthening of institutional capacity, the M&E system also outlined a plan for impact evaluations - for the overall project and for specific interventions. The results framework was not accompanied by an explicit Theory of Change. The original outcome indicators were unclear and did not encompass all outcomes of the PDO. Intermediate results indicators inadequately captured its contributions to the PDO outcome indicators. These shortcomings were corrected during the 2016 restructuring, except for the second PDO wording regarding "addressing" rather than "reducing" risks.



## **b. M&E Implementation**

The project did not finance any impact evaluations (ICR, paragraph 16). Financing for impact evaluation was not in place before Board approval. Subsequently, the timing and scope of the impact evaluation was reduced in ambition. The only impact evaluation conducted financed separately, focused on one intervention (at-risk youth). An overall project impact evaluation was not completed as planned. During the 2016 restructuring, the Results Framework was revised to show a clear theory of change aligned with the global best practice Ecological Model for violence prevention. The World Health Organization established this model in 2002. The Government adopted this model as its organizing framework (ICR, paragraph 19). The revised PDO outcome indicators included the increased perception of residents' safety in target communities, decrease in student absenteeism and drop out rates, improved self-esteem for at-risk youth beneficiaries, and increased satisfaction with the implementation of community action plans for violence prevention (ICR, Annex 6A).

The institutional relationships among FHIS, IUDPAS, and SEDS were not codified early resulting in a lack of shared timetable, causing data lags at key points of the project implementation. The weak quality of available firms that would conduct the type of survey work needed for the various elements of the M&E system contributed to the baselines not being completed early enough. Baselines were available for two of the four PDO indicators while one indicator's baseline was conducted during implementation to represent a mid-line rather than a baseline (ICR, paragraph 32). The Bank team also did not sufficiently engage with the PIU to capture methodological errors early on that would have averted the slow down in data collection and usage when other implementation disruptions competed for attention. These disruptions caused a ripple effect that made some communities inaccessible for surveys resulting in late or no end-of-project data (ICR, paragraph 50).

A significant shortcoming in M&E implementation was the Bank team's failure, even after three restructuring and accompanying clearances, to update the internal Bank system with the PDO outcome indicator targets and intermediate results indicators that the implementing agency diligently monitored and reported on (ICR, paragraph 51).

## **c. M&E Utilization**

M&E findings were communicated to the various stakeholders. The PIU used the M&E system as well as community engagement and social mobilization processes to generate information about project implementation. The project M&E system created capacity in municipal violence observatories, strengthened SEDS collaboration with IUDPAS, trained and supported community members and leaders to generate local violence maps. As a result, beneficiaries absorbed the capacity to use the evidence from the data on crime and violence the communities generated. The participatory nature of designing and implementing interventions in the target neighborhoods positively affected the shift in implementation. The ICR noted that the communities did not wait for restructuring to make changes to adapt interventions that suited local needs. Disbursements were even accelerated as communities became satisfied with initial investments as credible efforts to engage with them (ICR, paragraph 47). M&E data provided evidence of achievement of outcomes.

The significant weaknesses in the design (unclear indicators) and implementation of the M&E system (lack of government counterpart to finance the impact evaluations), the lack of baseline surveys, made it difficult to assess the achievement of the stated objectives and test the links in the results chain.



## M&E Quality Rating

Modest

## 10. Other Issues

### a. Safeguards

**Environmental and Social Safeguards:** At appraisal, the project was assigned an Environmental Category B for the purposes of OP/BP4.01, which required a partial environmental assessment. At appraisal, the target communities and neighborhoods had not yet been identified. The project triggered two safeguard policies - OP/BP 4.10 Indigenous Peoples and OP/BP 4.12 Involuntary Resettlement. The Social Assessment found the presence of traditional Garifuna communities in La Ceiba. An Indigenous and Afro Descendant Peoples Planning Framework was prepared. Community works may require potential acquisition of empty plots. A Resettlement Policy Framework was prepared. At appraisal, there were no resettlement of households, businesses, or persons, nor restriction of access to natural resources. A strong community participation led to a successful grievance redress mechanism (GRM). At project closing, there was one outstanding complaint in the GRM system related to unpaid stipends for youth participants in the temporary employment activities. The ICR reported that the complaint was resolved by May 17, 2019 with the full payment of outstanding stipends. Compliance with environmental and social safeguards was rated satisfactory (ICR, paragraph 55).

Two resettlements occurred during the construction of the El Mirador Recreational Plaza (in which community) - (i) a family of a water valve operator who was living in a water control station within the project site; and (ii) a structure used by a local church for its activities was lost. An abbreviated resettlement plan was prepared and caused implementation delays.

### b. Fiduciary Compliance

**Financial Management:** Financial management concerns with regard to partial and poor audit delivery were raised by the time of the Mid Term Review in May 2015. In addition, the Bank found US\$0.63 million ineligible for financing under the project because fiduciary processes did not comply with the Bank's Procurement and Consultant's Guidelines specified in the Financing Agreement. This resulted in delayed payments of stipends and project implementation (ICR, paragraph 57).

**Procurement:** Appraisal noted a weakness in the lack of accountability mechanisms for procurement in the *Fondo Hondureno de Inversion Social* (FHIS or the Honduran Social Investment Fund). The project team planned mitigating measures to be included in the project's Operations Manual. Staff in FHIS and the municipalities involved in procurement would be guided by this manual. There was no mention of training since at appraisal, the FHIS extensive experience with Bank policies from implementing Barrio Ciudad were expected to transfer to this project. Appraisal noted the strategy to ring fence the PIU from the rest of FHIS to facilitate project implementation. However, the official Procurement Plan did not include the "shopping" mechanism used by a unit of FHIS that went on undetected until an audit review. US\$0.63



million was found ineligible under the project because it did not use the Bank's Procurement and Consultant Guidelines specified under the Financing Agreement. Corrective measures were then implemented through a fiduciary process begun in 2018, as the project was closing.

**c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)**

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**d. Other**

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**11. Ratings**

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	
Bank Performance	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	
Quality of M&E	Modest	Modest	
Quality of ICR	---	Substantial	

**12. Lessons**

The ICR presented nine lessons to consider at design stage that could help strengthen future similar project interventions in Fragility, Conflict, and Violence settings. IEG added one more cited elsewhere in the ICR but equally important (ICR, paragraph 31). Some of these lessons are presented below:

- A robust Theory of Change may strengthen risk assessment.** This project did not have an initial Theory of Change at design stage. One was established at restructuring. A robust Theory of Change would have provided a means to assess shocks during implementation such as the ones encountered in this project. For example, the reversal of policy regarding the source of municipal financing of its localized violence prevention interventions, loss of leadership in the country policy dialogue, and fiduciary issues may have triggered corrective measures or strategies to avoid slowing down implementation since these points were methodically monitored as part of Implementation Status Reporting. There could be early warning signals incorporated into the results framework that address compliance with Bank policies at the sub-project level (e.g., safeguards, procurement) to avoid disrupting the trust momentum established among project beneficiaries. In this project, the expenses associated with the ineligible procurement method resulted in a fiduciary process that delayed the release of stipends to at-risk youth who were participating in interventions designed to foster their return to the community. Beneficiaries were not mollified by promises to quickly resolve



this issue. Grievance Resolution Mechanisms could also be used to provide frequent feedback for better communication on how issues were being resolved.

- **Periodic review of the country context in fragile, conflict, and violence settings may provide an opportunity to redouble efforts to achieve the PDO.** This was the first World Bank funded standalone violence prevention project. The challenges it faced during implementation compounded its achieving the PDO. For example, a change in government would have triggered a lookout for any policy or incentive changes, or movements among alliances who have a stake in the outcome of the project to alert on possible implementation hiccups. Appropriate strategies could be adopted in a timely fashion to ensure the project achieved its intended results. In addition, periodic review could point to adding resources for staff support in communications and partnerships particularly when the project requires a multi-sector coordination.
- **Limiting a menu of different kinds of interventions to balance cost effectiveness with community demand may lend to measurable impact on violence prevention.** For example, to recover public space, options that use CPTED methodology could be limited to a few that directly provide causal relations with reduced violence in a target neighborhoods. Adding longer term elements to assisting at risk youth (e.g., credit, apprenticeships, internships) may provide greater impact. A social sense of belonging and agency are also important considerations in assisting at risk youth (ICR, paragraph 31).

### 13. Assessment Recommended?

No

### 14. Comments on Quality of ICR

The ICR was concise and followed OPCS Guidelines. Analysis was based on available data. Evidence were from credible surveys conducted at closing. Outcomes of these surveys were adequately presented in the Annex (ICR, Annex 6). Reasons provided on the shortcomings of the M&E design and its implementation were candid. The incomplete data in Annex 1 was sufficiently explained. There was internal consistency in the report, pointing to the shortcomings in M&E design and implementation in places such as the Significant Changes During Implementation, as well as the M&E section of the report and the section on Bank Quality at Entry and Supervision. Lessons were derived mostly from the shortcomings in monitoring and evaluating the project outcomes - from the lack of baselines, to establishing targets, to collecting data - as well as the experience from implementation, including the continued use of stipends for at-risk youth as part of their reengagement in the community. There was a general story line a reader could follow. The gaps to better understand the overall impact of the project because of the sensitivity accompanying the fiduciary investigations, and the lack of baselines were supplanted by the surveys conducted. These provided qualitative impact of project outcomes in strengthening the social sense of belonging and agency (having a level of control) from the target beneficiaries.

#### a. Quality of ICR Rating Substantial

