GROWTH POLES PROGRAM

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOCIAL CAPITAL

Economic and Sector Work (ESW)

Poverty Reduction and Economic Management
(PREM AFTP3)

Competitive Industries Practice

Finance and Private Sector Development
(AFTFW)

World Bank
Africa Region

April 2014
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................................................. 3  
MAP OF SIERRA LEONE .................................................................................................................................. 4  
SIERRA LEONE BY REGION ............................................................................................................................ 5  
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................. 6  
ACRONYMS ................................................................................................................................................... 7  
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................... 10  
CHAPTER 1: DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES CHARACTERISTIC OF PROVINCIAL AREAS IN SIERRA LEONE .. 13  
CHAPTER 2: THE LOCAL IMPACT OF LARGE SCALE PRIVATE SECTOR INVESTMENT .................................. 22  
CHAPTER 3: GOVERNMENT (CENTRAL AND LOCAL) AGENCIES AND PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT .... 52  
CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................. 59  
ANNEX 1 QUESTIONNAIRE FOR MIGRANT WORKERS ................................................................................. 70  
ANNEX 2 TERMS OF REFERENCE ..................................................................................................................... 73  
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................................................ 79
SIERRA LEONE BY REGION
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Sierra Leone’s ambitions for middle income status by 2035 depend heavily upon its ability to attract and harness hitherto un-paralled levels of foreign direct investment in key areas of the economy (energy, transport and agriculture). These aspirations coupled with ongoing efforts to develop and expand the extractives sector, are the basis on which the Government plans to achieve broad based growth and tackle extreme poverty and income inequality in the next few years. The World Bank is the principal Development Partner in these efforts, principally through its proposed Growth Poles Approach, which will assist the Government in prioritizing private sector investment in parts of Sierra Leone, where it will both yield the greatest impact, but also support the planning and implementation of the public sector responsibilities (governance framework, development planning, service delivery) throughout the country.

The effective delivery of a growth poles approach, and indeed the successful implementation of private sector investment, will be enhanced by a more comprehensive understanding of local governance dynamics and in particular, the relationships between the political center and regional bodies/individuals/institution, and the execution of the development planning processes. Because the majority of the future proposed investments will most likely be centered in parts of the country that are both physically and administratively distant from Freetown, the roles and responsibilities of local government authorities and their relationships with communities, central government and investors, are a critical piece of the jigsaw in determining the trajectory and pace of future economic growth – and therefore need to be properly understood and recognized. This analytical report attempts to provide a “window” into the undercurrents and the nuances that affect and shape the characteristics of host communities into which investment takes place.

The report also highlights the various “input considerations” that need to be acknowledged (land, labor, community relations), the governance framework into which the future growth poles approach will fit – central, local and community – and finally concludes with a series of recommendations around key policy, institutional, cross linkages, and contextual challenges that the growth poles approach must consider as it attempts to underpin the Government’s “growth by foreign direct investment” agenda.

The Government of Sierra Leone will need to ensure that its approach to attracting and retaining private investment is managed and implemented in a manner so as to avoid the pitfall of enclave operations that ultimately do little or nothing for communities, or the wider population, or the economy at large. This analytical report attempts to act as an honest broker, in terms of offering insights into how the Government in the drive for economic growth, could be shaped and strengthened at all levels and reinforces the importance that all stakeholders play essential roles in determining the growth trajectory and future prosperity of the country.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>ACRONYMS</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
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<td>A4P</td>
<td>Agenda for Prosperity</td>
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<td>ABC</td>
<td>Agricultural Business Centers</td>
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<td>AGI</td>
<td>Africa Governance Initiative (Office of Tony Blair)</td>
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<td>ALA</td>
<td>African Lion Agriculture</td>
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<td>AML</td>
<td>African Minerals Limited</td>
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<td>All People’s Congress</td>
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<td>BKM</td>
<td>Bureh-Kasseh-Makonteh Chiefdom</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>Chief Administrator</td>
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<td>Community Development Agreement</td>
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<td>CLC</td>
<td>Chiefdom Land Committee</td>
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<td>CSR</td>
<td>Corporate Social Responsibility</td>
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<td>CTAP</td>
<td>Chiefdom and Traditional Administration Policy</td>
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<td>EPA</td>
<td>Environmental Protection Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESIA</td>
<td>Environmental and Social Impact Assessment</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
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<td>FBO</td>
<td>Farmer Based Organization</td>
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<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<td>FGD</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussions</td>
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<td>GoSL</td>
<td>Government of Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>GPP</td>
<td>Growth Poles Program</td>
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<td>HLC</td>
<td>High Level Committee</td>
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<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>INPSS</td>
<td>Integrated National Public Services Survey</td>
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<td>IRCBP</td>
<td>Institutional Reform and Capacity Building Program</td>
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<td>WDI</td>
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<td>World Food Program</td>
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INTRODUCTION

1. The Government of Sierra Leone and the World Bank have agreed upon the design and implementation of a Growth Poles Program in support of the Agenda for Prosperity (A4P), the GoSL’s Third Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSPIII). The A4P is a development agenda that aims to boost broad-based growth and reduce poverty and income inequality through a very heavy reliance on the prospective expansion of the natural resources sector and a focus on large scale infrastructure (primarily in the energy, agriculture and transport sectors). The growth pole strategy has been welcomed by Government as an important method by which it will prioritize investment in areas where it will yield the greatest impact.

2. With support from the European Union Competitive Industries and Innovation Practice Trust Fund, the WB has been undertaking a series of scoping and diagnostic analyses on the proposed Growth Poles Program (GPP) since early 2013, and to date this work has constituted the main part of the first phase of the approach (the initial diagnostic stage). This diagnostic work was completed in August 2013 and the diagnostic report confirmed that the growth pole approach could feasibly support and facilitate economic development in two geographical areas of the country. Agreement was subsequently reached between the Government and the World Bank (WB) to move ahead with the second phase of the work: the design phase of the GPP. The design phase of the work would now cover the detailed design of the project delivery system, undertake thorough analytical work on the social and political implications of the growth pole approach, identify the key sectorial development priorities and investigate the feasibility of information design. The Government request to proceed with the design of the GPP was formalized in February 2014.

3. Delivery of a successful growth poles program will depend on a detailed and comprehensive understanding of local governance dynamics and political and institutional relationships (social capital) in the development and investment planning process. In particular, most of the proposed investments are located in parts of Sierra Leone both physically and administratively distant from Freetown. In provincial areas, widespread poverty and limited access to education and employment training severely constrains the local population’s capacity to respond to enterprise opportunities. For example, the Sierra Leone Integrated Household Survey, carried out by Statistics Sierra Leone in 2011, reported that 70% of Sierra’s adult labor force was engaged in agriculture, mostly on smallholdings. Only 8% of rural households were operating a

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4 The two areas are 1) a North-Western pole based around the Freetown-Makeni Corridor and 2) a Southern pole based around the southern coastal areas.
non-farm enterprise (as compared to 35% of households in urban areas) and only 4% of the total workforce was in wage employment (as compared to a Sub-Saharan African average of 16%).

4. Leveraging local economic development from large-scale private sector investment in Sierra Leone faces several challenges that are specific to an environment of widespread agrarian poverty. First, the economic activities of the rural poor remain orientated towards survival, which tends to limit horizons of trust and engender a preference for moral economics above contractual relationships. External private sector investors tend, therefore, to come under intense pressure to deliver to host communities what the latter consider to be their ‘fair share’ of the profits from investments and thus to provide them with services that are, in fact, the primary responsibility of government (both national and local). Second, people who enjoy close links to both government and rural communities (e.g. Members of Parliament, local councilors and public sector employees working in rural areas) are in a privileged position both to identify and take advantage of local enterprise opportunities. Some serve as hard working patrons of their home communities, but the fundamental informality of patron-client relations also militates against improvements in laws and regulations (especially land laws) that should be protecting the rural poor from exploitation by the less scrupulous. Third, a gap needs to be bridged between the economic opportunities created by large-scale private sector investment (e.g. expansion of wage employment, vocational training, rents and local markets for goods and services), and mainstream rural development strategies (e.g. smallholder commercialization and micro-credit).

5. The responsibilities of local government authorities and their relationships with both communities and central government are a critical piece of the growth poles jigsaw. Sierra Leone’s National Decentralization Policy (2010) emphasizes the principle of subsidiarity and local government’s key role in the promotion of local economic development. The challenge here is to ensure that local government has both the power and resources to fulfil this prescribed role.

6. A diagnostic of local social capital and institutional capacity is therefore key to identifying strategies for overcoming the above-noted challenges and thus for sustainable economic growth and diversification in Sierra Leone (See Annex 2 – Terms of Reference). This paper undertakes this diagnostic and is divided into four sections. Section 1 examines the development challenges characteristic of rural and provincial areas in Sierra Leone and the constraints they place on leveraging local economic development from large-scale private sector investment. The aim here is to highlight historical and future inhibitors to sustainable private sector investment outside the capital and provincial urban centres. Section 2 reports on the current impact of large-scale private sector investment. Highlighted here are issues of labor migration to ‘growth poles’, land lease administration and company-community relations, all of which provide context and substance to investment ‘input considerations’. Section 3 assesses the capacity of Sierra Leone’s central and local government system to facilitate and regulate private sector-led

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development – a dynamic that needs to function at its most optimal in order to secure sustained economic growth and diversification. Finally the conclusions and recommendations (Section 4) bring the focus back onto the questions of a) how the growth poles approach can be best managed and implemented in Sierra Leone and b) how Government can best leverage economic growth and development from current and future private sector investment.

Potential Growth Pole Areas

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6 World Bank, ‘Sierra Leone Growth Poles Program – A Development Approach for the Agenda for Prosperity’, August 2013
CHAPTER 1: DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES CHARACTERISTIC OF PROVINCIAL AREAS IN SIERRA LEONE

1.1 Socio-Economic Characteristics of Host Communities

Research Areas

7. Field research was carried out in Port Loko, Kambia, Tonkolili, Bonthe and Moyamba Districts between October and December 2013. Interviews were held with communities, workers, local and central government functionaries, representatives of private companies, vocational training agencies, NGOs, commercial banks and farmers’ associations. Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were held with men and women farmers, traders’ associations, youth groups and migrant workers. Further interviews with ministerial, development agency and company staff were held in Freetown.

8. The two research areas have distinctive social and economic profiles. Port Loko district lies adjacent to Sierra Leone’s capital district (Western Area) and is the most populous district of the Northern Province (population 0.5 million in 2010). Together with Kambia district further north (population 0.3 million in 2010), it is an area long noted for intensive production of rice in tidal river valleys and inland valley swamps. Today, the two districts remain major sources of agricultural produce for nearby Freetown and neighboring areas of Guinea-Conakry. The recent refurbishment of the Freetown-Conakry highway will only serve to strengthen cross-border commerce, although local produce is still carried down to the coast in traditional fashion by riverboat. Port Loko district has seen a recent influx of external commercial investment in both agriculture (notably rice, oil palm, cassava and ginger) and mining (iron ore and bauxite). The shore-to-ship loading facilities of two major iron ore mining companies (London Mining and African Minerals Limited) are also located in the district.

9. Bonthe district, located on Sierra Leone’s Atlantic coast south-east of Freetown, is the least populous provincial district (population 0.14 million in 2012). Like Port Loko, Bonthe has a long history of commercial activity. Bonthe town grew into an international port as a result of the mid-19th century palm oil boom, although its economic fortunes declined considerably in the 20th century. Mature oil palm plantations remain widespread in the district, the largest being the government-owned Gambia-Mattru plantation in Jong chiefdom. Mechanical cultivation of rice on swamp grassland was also carried out in some parts of the district prior to the civil war. The district also has a long-established mining operation, which began the extraction of rutile from river gravels in the 1960s. Sierra Rutile, the current operator, has concession areas in five chiefdoms (three in Moyamba district and two in Bonthe district). Its latest operations are

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7 Government of Sierra Leone, Agricultural survey of the existing and potential rice lands in the swamp areas of the Little Scarcies, Great Scarcies, Port Loko and Rokel rivers, Freetown: Government Printer, 1931.
8 Traders interviewed in Freetown and Port Loko reported that foreign imports such as car parts, electrical goods and clothes tend to be cheaper in Guinea-Conakry, while agricultural produce tends to be cheaper in Sierra Leone.
concentrated in Imperri chiefdom in Bonthe district. In spite of its history of large-scale economic activity, Bonthe district is still more easily reached from Freetown by sea than by road.

10. The local populations of Port Loko and Bonthe districts are mainly engaged in smallholder farming and petty trading. According to the most recent national census (2004), 80% of the workforce in Port Loko district and 65% the workforce in Bonthe district were engaged in agriculture, hunting and, forestry. A further 11% of Port Loko’s workforce was engaged in trading, while a further 17% of Bonthe’s workforce was engaged in fishing. Only 6% of the workforce in Port Loko and 8% of the workforce in Bonthe were employed by governmental agencies, NGOs and private corporations. The Integrated National Public Services Survey (INPSS) for 2011 reported that 81% of surveyed households in Port Loko and 73% in Bonthe had undertaken agricultural activities in the previous year. Smallholders in Port Loko are major producers of agricultural commodities. The district ranked second equal among Sierra Leonean districts as a market producer of rice (12% of all reported sales) and first as a market producer of cassava (15% of all reported sales). Bonthe district ranked last in both categories.  

1.2 Agrarian poverty and indebtedness

Dynamics of smallholder farming

10. Weak institutional integration along the agricultural value chain tends to minimize smallholder farmers’ returns from produce sales. Smallholder farming in Sierra Leone typically combines low capital inputs (e.g. no fertilizer) with almost complete reliance on manual labor. As a result, the rural population still resides in small villages scattered across the landscape. Farmers in Port Loko and Kambia districts sell some of their produce in local towns and roadside periodic markets (lumas). However, few smallholders can afford to transport produce in bulk and many sell direct to traders. Buying agents for Guinean traders typically drive trucks from village to village when the rice harvest is underway, and competition to secure bulk purchases tends to keep prices stable despite the flood of produce onto the market. For example, the members of a women’s farming association in a village in southern Kambia district reported that local farmers can obtain up to 50,000 Leones for each bushel (approximately 25 kg) of rice sold at harvest time, as compared to a retail price of 80,000-100,000 Leones per bushel for locally grown rice in urban areas.

11. Like many smallholder farmers in Sierra Leone, these women are unable to grow enough rice to avoid an annual ‘hungry season’ (i.e. the 5-6 month period when rice stocks from the previous year’s harvest are exhausted but the current year’s crop is not yet ready for harvest). Access to labor is the main constraint upon the expansion of production to fill this gap. Farming households throughout Sierra Leone tend to pool labor to undertake the heavy work of clearing

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farm plots at the beginning of the season, but few households manage to avoid going into debt to buy food during the ‘hungry season’. The women of the above-mentioned association are at a double disadvantage here: many are widowed or divorced and even the married members are farming independently of their husbands. They cannot undertake the heavy work of clearing farm plots in swamp grassland by themselves, but don’t have access to the labor of adult male family members in sufficient quantities to avoid having to hire labor. The cost of hiring labor in the village is 10,000 Leones per worker per day plus meals, which makes considerable inroads into the women’s net income. Traders readily advance credit to farmers at the beginning of the farming year, accepting payment in kind at harvest time. According to the women, a bushel of newly harvested rice is sufficient to repay a loan of 30,000 Leones taken out six months earlier. By these means, traders not only garner indirect interest (for example, the interest on a 30,000 Leone loan, repaid in kind, is 66% when the wholesale price of rice at harvest time is 50,000 Leones per bushel) but also tend to ‘capture’ poor farmers in a cycle of indebtedness.

12. The need for poor farmers to pool resources in order to survive ensures that community cohesion is, for them, a recurrent concern and a key factor in deciding whether or not to enter into agribusiness. People rely on others’ willingness to share, to show them trust and to be trustworthy in return. But even at the family and village level, the distinction between collective and individual entitlements to scarce resources is a frequent source of contention. It is thus noteworthy that when the women farmers were asked to name the one thing that would ensure the long-term success of their association they all pinpointed moral improvements rather than financial or technical advances. *Honesty* one woman replied; *unity* said another; *determination and belief* said a third. As these comments indicate, horizons of trust among Sierra Leone’s agrarian poor tend to be extremely localized. These limitations make community membership hard to reconcile with conventional business entrepreneurship, but the other side of the coin is agrarian communities’ historically deep-seated interest in converting wealthy and well-connected external agents into ‘family’, i.e. patrons. Even today, politicians, bureaucrats and business people enjoying personal ties to rural areas often find these ties conducive to particular kinds of communitarian enterprise, notably development brokerage.

**Case Study – Women Farmers’ Association**

13. The coordinator of the above-noted women farmer’s association is a case in point. Educated to tertiary level in Freetown, she was working as a secondary school teacher in Makeni when civil war intervened and caused her to take refuge in her home village in Kambia district. Located just under an hour’s drive on dirt roads from the Freetown-Conakry highway, the village sits on a hill

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10 Research carried out in a village in rural Tonkolili district in 2007 found that approximately 20% of households could afford to hire labor and negotiate the ‘hungry season’ without going into debt, another 30% farmed successfully using family and pooled labor and only incurred debts during the ‘hungry season’, while the remainder were unable to begin farming each year without borrowing (in cash or kind) to obtain labor and seed rice. See R. Fanthorpe, ‘BRACE institutional survey’, Concern Worldwide, Freetown, June 2007.

11 See, for example, A. Howard and D. Skinner ‘Network building and political power in Northwestern Sierra Leone, 1800-1865’, *Africa* 54(2) 1984.
overlooking the fertile swamp grasslands of the Scarcies River valley. While the coordinator was born in this village, she is a descendant of a chiefly family in neighbouring Bureh-Kasseh-Makonteh (BKM) chiefdom in Port Loko district and her close relatives include senior officials in Government. When she returned home during the war, she was at a loss for income (she is long separated from her husband) and set about organizing local women to make a collective farm using pooled seed rice. Her great asset in this endeavour was that she had access to land her father had purchased in the village on his retirement from government service.

14. During the early post-war period, the coordinator used her family house in Freetown as a base from which to canvass international development agencies for resources for her association. This canvassing bore initial fruit in the form of a large donation of seed rice from the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and further FAO support for the construction of a grain store and drying floor in the village. Her association went on to obtain further supplies of seed rice and groundnuts from another local NGO distributing food relief on behalf of FAO and World Food Program (WFP). A micro-credit project, supported by the INGO Trickle Up, was also added to the association’s portfolio. At one point, her association served as the coordinating hub for more than thirty local farmer’s associations spanning three chiefdoms. In recent years, the coordinator has served in a senior capacity on the National Association of Farmers of Sierra Leone (Kambia Branch), Kambia District Women’s Rights Advocacy Group, and the Women’s Wing of the All Peoples Congress (APC) Party for Kambia District. She also manages an Agricultural Business Centre (ABC) and is the proprietor of the village’s Junior Secondary School (housed in a community hall built with the support of NaCSA). She has also served a term as a councillor on Kambia District Council.

15. In spite of these successes, the recent history of the association illustrates the inherent limitations of this kind of development enterprise. While the association’s early involvement in post-war food relief distribution enabled it to accumulate 1,500 members at one point, its efforts to maintain its seed stocks by loaning seed rice to non-members was not successful. Even though the interest demanded was low (one and a half bushels to be returned for every bushel loaned), most recipients refused to repay at harvest time. Many argued that the rice distributed by the association came originally from an FAO donation and therefore belonged to the ‘community’. Chiefdom and local council authorities went on to demand, and receive, substantial gifts of rice from the association as tokens of ‘respect’ for their positions. Satellite associations based in outlying villages also began to split off as they gained access to, and control over, new development assets.

16. Today, the association has a little under fifty active members, most of them residing in the original village. Members still make a joint farm on the coordinator’s land (which she has

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12 The National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA) and Sierra Leone Roads Authority (SLRA).
13 The women’s leader attributes her initial success with the FAO to the fact she has a Higher Teaching Certificate in Islamic Studies and was able to converse in Arabic with the Egyptian-born FAO Emergency Relief Coordinator in Freetown.
14 A recent example is a farmer’s association that left the group in order to take over the management of a grain store and drying floor built in their village with the support of the World Bank’s Rural and Private Sector Development Project.
inherited from her late father (since no male members of her father’s family currently live in the village) and produce sales from this farm represent the associations’ main source of operating funds. The women also contribute small amounts of cash each week to a rotating credit scheme exclusive to association members. Most of the members are also growing rice, sweet potatoes, cassava and onions on small individual plots rented from local landowners. The women have made one elderly male landowner an honorary member of the association in recognition of his willingness to make land available to them at low rates of interest. Married members of the association have also prevailed upon their husbands to group together to clear vegetation on each of the women’s farm plots at the start of the farming season. Some of these men have also been granted honorary membership of the association although the women still complain that their payment demands are too high.

1.3 Development challenges of the smallholder sector

Commercializing the Smallholder Sector

17. Historically, there has been no shortage of schemes aimed at developing Sierra Leone’s smallholder economy. The latest initiative is the Government’s Smallholder Commercialization Program (SCP), launched in 2012. The core component of this nationwide program is the creation of Agricultural Business Centres (ABCs) to provide services to local farmers (e.g. bulk storage, marketing information and mechanized food processing) on a commercial basis. According to the program literature, each ABC will be managed by a local cluster of Farmer-Based Organizations (FBOs). These organizations are specifically identified in this literature as outputs of technical training and institutional capacity building work managed by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food Security (MAFFS). The long-term aim here is that ABCs will become fully-fledged commercial entities (e.g. limited liability companies or cooperatives) managing ‘evolved’ value chains of rice and other agricultural commodities. Other components of the SCP include small-scale irrigation development, feeder road rehabilitation and the creation of rural micro-credit institutions.

18. The program faced an early challenge in finding suitable sites for each ABC, specifically for the building containing the ABC office, storage space and processing equipment (e.g. rice mills and cassava graters). The fundamental problem here is that in the provinces, there is no usable land in the vicinity of settlements that is not already owned by local families. Village-based farmer’s associations usually have little difficulty in persuading local chiefs and landowners to make land available for crop storage and processing facilities since these tend to benefit all residents of the village. But it is a different matter when several associations operating in a wider area are

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15 Members repay 100,000 Leone loans after six months at 20% interest.
16 Interest on seasonally rented land in this village is typically 20% of the volume of the estimated harvest.
17 Government of Sierra Leone, ‘Summary of Smallholder Commercialization Program’, no date.
expected to use and manage such facilities jointly. Some ABCs have been deliberately sited on ‘neutral’ ground in an effort to avoid a situation in which their facilities are claimed as the exclusive property of the village in which they are situated. For example, an ABC visited on the outskirts of Port Loko town is sited on part of an old forest reserve that was decommissioned to facilitate the building of the Freetown-Conakry highway. The ABC’s location in a well-populated area a few metres from the new highway would appear to maximize its chances of attracting custom. However, the drawback of the site is that the ABC office is surrounded by heaped laterite subsoil from the road excavation, which restricts space for demonstration plots for new crop varieties and cultivation techniques. The leader of one of the FBOs managing the ABC expressed the hope, when interviewed on site, that the ‘big people’ (i.e. senior politicians and government officials) of Port Loko could be prevailed upon to assist his group in accessing earth-moving machinery to level the ground surrounding the main building.

19. According to the FBO leader, the ABC has been operational for a little under a year and has been struggling, so far, to ‘influence’ local farmers to use its facilities. One of the constraints he highlighted was that farmers tend to sell all of their surplus rice to traders to pay off ‘hungry season’ loans and therefore have no produce to take to the ABC for storage and ‘value added’ processing. An empty storeroom also means that traders are not coming to the centre to buy produce. He also claimed that local youths are not interested in small-scale agribusiness, only in getting salaried jobs with the big mining companies. This is a fundamental challenge to smallholder agribusiness development, as ‘easier’ money has more of a lure than ‘hard work’.

20. Interviews held in the MAFFS district offices in Port Loko revealed that all 15 of the ABCs established in the district are currently facing problems. A recent survey undertaken by local MAFFS staff had classified six of these centres as ‘fully functional’, six as ‘not fully functional’ and three as ‘not functional’. From the interviews it appears that the main issue militating against the success of ABCs is the way in which their component FBOs were originally established. Many of these FBOs, it was claimed, comprise of family members of current MAFFS staff (e.g. extension workers) and it was further claimed that ABCs are being targeted as ‘retirement benefits’ by these staff. It was also stated that local farmers don’t want to sell produce to a centre ‘controlled by one person’, especially as they can often get higher prices from traders when they are not paying off debts. Furthermore, farmers are reportedly reluctant to take produce to a central buying center where fellow community members can easily see how much they have to sell, and how much they can subsequently be pressurized to share. They much prefer to take surplus produce to local lumas (12 of these periodic markets currently operate in Port Loko district), where they can use the proceeds from sales to buy clothes and household goods on the spot and therefore make best use of their off-farm time and transport costs.

\[^{18}\] It will be interesting to discover whether the newly-created ABC managed by the above-noted women’s association coordinator will enable her to recapture her former network of client associations or whether it will become just another ‘village’ facility.
21. According to the MAFFS district office, one of the few ABCs in the district that is actually doing well is surrounded by a large ‘developed’ swamp capable of yielding up to three rice harvests each year. In the opinion of specialists interviewed in the district office, agricultural intensification and increased overall production has to take place before smallholder commercialization can succeed. These observations are supported by another report,\(^1\) which noted that the only area of Sierra Leone where ABCs have been consistently successful is in the southeast where high value cash crops (e.g. cocoa) are particularly attractive to buyers in processed form. In discussions with Development Partner specialists, it was noted that ABCs focussing on rice and cassava are unlikely add value to these commodities on a sufficient scale to achieve commercial viability.

\(\text{Low-Interest Credit}\)

22. Another strategy for the promotion of business development in rural areas has been to make low-interest credit available to the rural poor. Micro-finance schemes have a long history in the country and remain in high demand at the grassroots. In practice, these schemes seem to work better as instruments of poverty alleviation rather than as drivers of economic development in rural communities. For example, BRAC, an INGO specializing in micro-finance, reported that their organization targets disadvantaged women and that their Port Loko office currently disburses grants of up to 3 million Leones (US$666) per person to just under 1,000 clients. All of these clients live within a 4km radius of Port Loko town and almost all are petty traders. BRAC’s micro-finance model tends to favour this type of client since it only lends to individuals that are a) already managing a recognizable business, b) members of a bona fide business association or cooperative and c) able to nominate a personal guarantor known to BRAC. BRAC went on to claim that they do not usually lend to farmers because, in their view, ‘they don’t like to do hard work’ and don’t tend to qualify for loans.\(^2\) Nationally, BRAC has been piloting ‘enterprise start-up’ schemes for female school leavers and youths of both sexes, although only the first of these has reached Port Loko.

\(\text{Commercial Lending}\)

23. Commercial banks, which have returned to the provinces since the end of the civil war, also struggle to do business with poor farmers. According to the local branch manager of one of these banks in Port Loko town, commercial lenders often have difficulty convincing poor farmers that their money is safe with them. This branch currently manages 15-20 corporate accounts, which are mostly those of government bodies (including the district council) and NGOs. Members of the local business elite (i.e. wholesale produce traders, machinery importers, \(\text{\textsuperscript{19} P. Richards, ‘Performance of Agribusiness Centers in Sierra Leone’, Wageningen University, 2012.}\)

\(\text{\textsuperscript{20} A more sympathetic explanation would be that farmers’ obtain cash much more sporadically than petty traders and are harder to reach geographically.}\)
owners of retail stores and building contractors) tend to have personal accounts rather than company accounts. According to the branch manager, his bank encourages the less well-off to open ‘group’ accounts as members of interest-based associations (e.g. Okada motorcycle taxi operators), the idea being that members are accountable to each other, as well as the bank, in managing their financial affairs. Associations may qualify for loans if they can supply commercial lenders with copies of their constitutions and business registration certificates and photos of their account signatories.

24. However, bank lending to associations, as well as to individuals who don’t receive regular salary payments, is severely restricted by a dearth of client collateral. Almost all small businesses and interest-based associations in Sierra Leone’s provinces operate from premises on leased or community-donated land, which effectively rules out land as loan collateral. According to the branch manager, his bank tends to assess small business clients’ credit worthiness on the basis of their trading stock. Such assessments can be problematic because, as the branch manager noted, storekeepers often borrow stock from each other for the precise purpose of boosting their credit rating. Village-based farmer’s associations and (currently) ABCs have even greater difficulty in securing commercial loans precisely because they lack readily assessable stock.21

Informal Credit

25. Some small-scale traders prefer informal credit to banking credit. For example, members of the Port Loko branch of the Sierra Leone Traders’ Union reported in a FGD that their main business is buying goods in Freetown (e.g. fish, building materials, packaged foodstuffs, clothes, shoes and household goods) for sale in local shops and markets. Responding to advertisements, they decided to set up a group account in a newly established commercial bank branch in Port Loko town. The local union membership was re-enumerated and re-registered and each member contributed 50,000 Leones to the new account. However, the traders were disappointed to find that simply holding money in the account for a six-month probationary period did not automatically qualify them for a loan. The account has since been closed and the members have returned to self-organized rotating credit schemes. One such scheme, described in the discussion, requires participants to contribute 10,000 Leones each month to qualify for a loan of up to one million Leones. This loan is typically used to buy new stock and has to be repaid within six weeks at one per cent interest. The traders were keen to draw attention to the minimal interest charged through the scheme as compared to the bank’s lending rate of 21%. They also claimed that the recovery rate for these loans is 100%.

26. The inherent limitation of such schemes was nevertheless illustrated by the branch secretary’s reluctance to reveal, during the FGD, the exact number of people involved in this particular scheme. In a subsequent interview, he explained that members of three separate traders’

21 Both the women farmer’s association and ABC visited during fieldwork have savings accounts at local banks, but are unable to secure loans due to lack of collateral.
associations were present at the FGD, each affiliated to the national union in Port Loko town and each with its own chairman and rotating credit scheme. The largest scheme has 24 members; the others have 14 and 8 members respectively. These schemes rely on strong personal trust between participants, which limits their size and scope. Indeed, it is the extreme localization of trust in the rural economy generally that militates against the success of micro-finance as a driver of development. Even supporters of micro-finance as a developmental strategy in Sierra Leone acknowledge that poor loan recovery is a major constraint.22

Capacity for Wealth Generation

27. Historically, significant capacity for wealth generation in North-western Sierra Leone has largely been confined to two groups: a) wholesale produce traders with the means to operate on a trans-regional basis and b) a select group who are able to ‘straddle’ the social and geographical divide between rural communities and central government. For example, a 26,000-hectare oil palm plantation established by a former high-ranking Government official in his home area near Port Loko town in the 1970s remains intact today, although it is no longer managed as a corporate enterprise.23 Furthermore, the single largest produce-buying operation in present-day Port Loko District is managed by one of North-western Sierra Leone’s oldest political families.24 Another of the district’s leading commercial farmers began their career as a student protégé of former President Siaka Stevens and remains close to the inner social circle of the ruling party. This individual now manages a cassava processing plant near Lunsar, whose recent construction was supported by Netherlands-funded Cassava Value Chain Development Project. The processing plant buys most of its cassava from local smallholders, but its buildings are located on land purchased outright from a nearby community. This purchase was facilitated by the manager’s current partner, who is a descendant of that community.25

28. For the GoSL and development partners, the challenge of the growth poles approach is to ensure that the opportunities and benefits generated by new private sector investment and economic growth are shared by all Sierra Leoneans, not just the politically well connected. The next section of the report assesses the local impact, positive and negative, of recent corporate investment in the provinces.

23 Local farmers pay for access to small sections of the plantation to harvest the oil. This information was obtained from the Senior District Officer (SDO) in Port Loko, whose office still holds a copy of the original lease.
24 Information obtained from the Port Loko District Director of Agriculture.
25 Information obtained from a member of the plant manager’s extended family, interviewed on site.
CHAPTER 2: THE LOCAL IMPACT OF LARGE SCALE PRIVATE SECTOR INVESTMENT

2.1 Labour Migration to Growth Poles

29. Migrant labor is usually defined as either casual or unskilled workers who move from one region to another, in either a systematic or sporadic manner, in response to employment and livelihood opportunities. In Sierra Leone, it is not uncommon to find large numbers of individuals who have travelled on their own initiative in search of employment and a better life. Freetown, as a capital and as the historical center for Government, investment and industry, has seen its population since the end of the civil war, in large part due to migrants from all over the country seeking work opportunities and better living conditions. The Agenda for Prosperity envisions the country as being an inclusive, green, middle-income country by 2035 (driven by private sector led growth), but recognizes that there remain deep rooted and structural challenges to this vision. These include: a) the challenge of full time employment for young people, b) the need to align the education and vocational training systems to the emerging needs and future requirements of the job market, and c) the provision of an enabling environment for private sector investment (both foreign and national) to flourish and thrive. With the proposed growth poles approach seen as the key to unlocking investment opportunities and, ultimately, growth in key sectors and regions, and with private investment extending deeper into rural areas, it is vital to gain a clearer understanding of how labor supply, particularly migrant labor, interacts with investment activity. An understanding of the migrant labor force and its relationships with local communities facilitates better investment decisions, better balancing of the economic opportunities between migrants and local communities and stronger policy decisions, (including how to mitigate possible negative social effects of large scale private sector investment).

Methodology

30. Given the economic constraints that many young people face in Sierra Leone, the lure of possible employment (full or part time) in areas that are experiencing significant private sector investment (e.g. agriculture and mining) is often too great to resist. Migrant workers are found in significant numbers near current extractive industry operations. A questionnaire for migrant workers (see Appendix 1) was designed to capture information on their general characteristics as a group, mobility (location), current and previous employment status, present living conditions (and family issues), access to services, relations with host communities and interactions with mining companies. A total of 322 migrant workers (202 in the north of the country and 120 in the south) were interviewed. In the north, interviews took place around two mining sites: Lunsar, the site of London Mining PLC (97 interviews) and Bumbuna, the site of African Minerals Limited (105 interviews). In the south, the interviews took place in the Sierra Rutile area in Bonthe and Moyamba districts: Moriba Town (43 interviews), Mogbwemo (30 interviews), Matagelema (17 interviews), Kpetema (15 interviews) and Kpanguma (15 interviews).
31. In both Bumbuna and Lunsar, interviewees (migrant workers) were selected randomly and identified by location. It was difficult to obtain interviews during working hours on site, so they were organized to take place at workers’ homes after their shifts had ended. For the on-site interviews, the field workers received permission from the mining management to proceed, but many of the on-site workers preferred to talk when they were at home. Interviewees in the south, an area where migrant mining workers are longer established, were identified by the locations in which they lived.

32. Considerable efforts were made to gain the trust of interviewees. The field workers were instructed to explain clearly the purpose of the interview (e.g. understanding migrant labor as part of a wider study of private sector-led development). The interviewees (particularly the women and those who were employed by mining companies) were reassured that the responses were confidential and were not personally attributable. In some instances, the field workers had to supply proof (e.g. their contract from the WB) to interviewees that they were who they claimed to be.

33. All of the interview forms were then independently analyzed and their data entered into a spreadsheet. The analysis was verified in a debriefing discussion with the field workers. It should be borne in mind that the purpose of the interviews was to gain a quick insight into the characteristics of migrant workers and their relationship with companies and host. Further research, using a much larger interview sample, will be required to verify the analysis presented below.

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26 There are specific areas in towns, known locally as ‘ghettos’, where migrant jobseekers who are not working tend to congregate.
Table 2.2.1  General Characteristics of Migrant Workers in North and South

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NORTHERN REGION</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>SOUTHERN REGION - “RUTILE AREA”</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Southern Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bumbuna</td>
<td>Lunsar</td>
<td>Moriba Town</td>
<td>Mogbwemo</td>
<td>Matagplema</td>
<td>Kpetema</td>
<td>Kpanguma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Interviews</td>
<td>Interviewees</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women %</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>29.52</td>
<td>41.24</td>
<td>35.38</td>
<td>9.30</td>
<td>16.67</td>
<td>17.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men %</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>70.48</td>
<td>58.76</td>
<td>64.62</td>
<td>90.70</td>
<td>83.33</td>
<td>82.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Age Women Years</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>26.17</td>
<td>24.85</td>
<td>25.51</td>
<td>30.25</td>
<td>25.60</td>
<td>28.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Age Men Years</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>32.68</td>
<td>33.61</td>
<td>33.15</td>
<td>34.21</td>
<td>35.00</td>
<td>35.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of Oldest Migrant</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>48 (M)</td>
<td>51(M)</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>65 (M)</td>
<td>53 (M)</td>
<td>45 (M)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of Youngest Migrant</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>16 (W)</td>
<td>18(W)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23 (M and W)</td>
<td>21 (W)</td>
<td>24 (M and W)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average No. Dependants Accompanying</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average No. Dependants Left Behind</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary Level/Graduate</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary School %</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary School - Left by 18 %</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary School - Left by 15 %</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Level</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Education</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No of Interviews with No Education that were women</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Catering</td>
<td>Petty Trading</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Other (Teaching)</td>
<td>Mechanical Eng.</td>
<td>Catering</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Building/Construction</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Building/Construction</td>
<td>IT Skills</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Petty Trading</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Age

35. There are a number of interesting regional differences (and similarities) between migrant workers found in mining areas. In the first instance (and perhaps unsurprisingly), the majority of those interviewed in both north and south were young men (64.6% and 81.9% of total interviewees respectively) with an average age of 33 years in the north and 37 years in the south. Female interviewees, averaged 25.5 years in the north and 23 years in the south, but some in the north were as young as 16 or 18 years of age. These figures again underline the pressure that Sierra Leone faces in terms of meeting employment aspirations of a young workforce. They also highlight the willingness of job seekers to actively seek out employment in an attempt to improve their lives. For the growth poles approach, it is an important reminder that youth unemployment remains a significant challenge to the development of the economy.

Marital Status/Dependents

36. In terms of marital status, 57% of the northern respondents were single (unmarried) as opposed to only 31% in the south. On average, respondents in the northern region had left behind at least 4 dependents in their areas of origin/hometowns and were accompanied on average by less than one dependent. In the south, interviewees were accompanied by one dependent on average, and had left behind only two dependents in their home areas. The high number of people ‘left behind’ to fend for themselves when the principal breadwinner has gone in search of employment is a potential challenge for future social cohesion and social protection programming. While migration does not preclude the sending back of remittances to dependents (no questions were asked in this regard, but it is a long-established practice among Sierra Leonean migrant workers), it seems unlikely that this is happening on significant scale in mining areas at present due to the employment challenges faced by migrants. When the northern respondents were asked why they had left their immediate family behind, they explained that they were unaccompanied because they were unsure of shelter, housing and the availability of local services (e.g. health and education) even if they did find jobs. When the future planning of investment opportunities is undertaken, the social consequences of attracting labor to a few places and the consequences of large numbers of family and dependents being left behind in agrarian poverty needs to be taken fully into account.

Educational Levels

37. Interviewees’ level of education was higher than the general population. Data from the 2004 National Census showed that 62.2% of Sierra Leoneans of all age groups (including 40% of 6-29 year olds) had never attended school, 24.6% had finished their education at primary level, 6.4% had finished their education at junior secondary level, 4.2% had finished their education at senior secondary level and 2.6% had finished their education at tertiary level (including 1.3% attaining vocational and commercial qualifications). Sierra Leone was still undergoing post-war recovery in 2004 and it is likely that enrollment at all levels of education has grown substantially
since then. However, it is noteworthy that in the current survey, 28% of interviewees in the north and 40% in the south had been educated to tertiary level. Furthermore, 48% of interviewees in the north\textsuperscript{27} and 52% in the south had attended secondary school. A large-scale study of labor migration in Sierra Leone in the 1970s found that those most likely to migrate in search of work were either the comparatively wealthy and well educated or the desperately poor.\textsuperscript{28} This pattern still appears to apply today.\textsuperscript{29} The basic educational challenge these figures highlight is that many migrant workers are \textit{inappropriately} qualified for the jobs they are applying for: they are either over-educated (e.g. qualified secondary school leavers applying to become security guards) or they are offering skills, in lieu of educational qualifications (e.g. driver/mechanic\textsuperscript{30}, building and construction, petty trading and catering), for which there is only limited demand among the mining companies. Mismatches between job applicants’ qualifications/skills and those required by employers can lead to social tensions as migrant arrivals compete with the local jobless for employment. Comments such as \textit{locals get the jobs before others and the local population tells us that the jobs are theirs...we (migrants) are discriminated against...} are commonplace.

38. For example, a group of migrant job seekers interviewed in Lunsar had been in the town for a few months and were living in the shanty town (‘ghetto’) that has grown up across the road from the petrol station where vehicles plying the Makeni-Freetown highway drop off passengers. This group were all ex-soldiers. Their ‘chairman’ claimed to be a friend of a senior employee of a civil engineering company working in the mining sector in Lunsar and is trying to use this contact to arrange jobs for the group as security guards. The ex-soldiers claim that they left the army due to poor pay and conditions and need the assistance of their ‘bra’ (Krio: ‘big brother’, i.e. patron) because they can’t afford to pay the private commissions demanded by company recruitment managers (see paragraph 48). According to them, an applicant needs to pay a commission of at least 300,000 Leones (70 USD) to stand any chance of gaining employment as a security guard. As they wait for salaried work, the ex-soldiers are managing to survive on what they call ‘half-half’ work, e.g. car maintenance, barbering, load carrying, refuse collection, vegetable growing and farm labouring in nearby villages. While they depend on the settled population of Lunsar for these work opportunities, they feel that the Lunsar resent their presence and want to reserve all the jobs and other benefits from large-scale mining for themselves. They vehemently oppose these perceived sentiments. ‘\textit{We are not foreigners}', they point out: ‘\textit{we are Sierra Leoneans}'.

39. An average of 37% of respondents without an education in the north were women, although there were significant intra-regional variations (for example, in Bumbuna 70% of interviewees

\textsuperscript{27} Note, however, that 64% of interviewees in Bumbuna had attended secondary school as compared to 33% in Lunsar.
\textsuperscript{29} Again, further research is needed to fully understand current patters of labor migration in Sierra Leone. The next national census, to undertaken in 2014, will help to provide a more complete picture.
\textsuperscript{30} Many interviewees were unable to demonstrate that they held valid driving licenses or were appropriately trained in construction related activities, so reported skills may simple be codes for ‘casual labor/willing to do anything'.

26
without an education were women, but the corresponding figure for Lunsar was 3%). These figures (coupled with the young ages of female migrant workers) continue to underline the obstacles facing women as they seek employment. But equally importantly, the field workers discovered that many of the younger girls had migrated to these mining areas to undertake commercial sex work with no consideration to securing formal employment. These findings have ramifications for social protection, crime prevention, and HIV/AIDS prevention and will need to be taken fully into account in the future planning and management of private sector investment.

40. Without appropriate and education and relevant skills, the Sierra Leonean workforce will find its employment opportunities limited, despite the best intentions of the Local Content Policy (see paragraph 49). There is, in turn, likely to be increasing frustration amongst the unemployed and underemployed. Continuing poverty and income inequality, coupled with unmet expectations (however unrealistic) of improved quality of living as a result of the extractives boom (and other investments), remains a potential driver of social unrest in post-civil war Sierra Leone. The World Bank’s own diagnostics have clearly identified this problem, noting that huge shortfalls in both literacy and youth employment pose a threat to the viability of the entire growth pole strategy.

Previous Location

41. A further finding of the survey (and one that establishes a defining characteristic of migrant labor in Sierra Leone) is the high percentage of respondents who were not residing in their areas of origin (i.e. their hometowns) prior to moving to their current locations. In the north, 41% of all respondents (but only 19% of Bumbuna respondents) stated that they were residing in their hometowns prior to their arrival. In the south, only 35% of respondents stated that they had come to the area from their hometowns. In all the fieldwork areas, individuals had arrived from all over Sierra Leone in search of employment. The respondents were clearly part of a mobile social stratum that actively looks for employment wherever it can found. This group is not confining its search for employment in urban areas (moving in the traditional way out of rural areas), but is also prepared to move back to rural areas if there are employment opportunities to be found there (Table 2.2.2). In the north, only 24.5% of interviewees claimed to have been employed prior to moving to either Bumbuna or Lunsar and their predominant explanation for coming to these areas was simply that I aspire to a job with the mining company. In the south, a higher percentage (66%) of those interviewed stated that they were employed full time before coming to the area.

Teachers

42. A slightly concerning aspect of the survey was the number of those who claimed to be former teachers and school students who had given up on the education sector in order to pursue employment opportunities with the mining companies. The teachers were looking for a better

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quality of employment (current conditions for teachers are very poor) and often expressed the hope that their previous experience and qualifications would provide them with an advantage in the job market. Field workers also heard claims from migrants that local community members had deliberately taken their children out of school and sent them to apply for positions with the companies. These two findings will require further investigation to determine if both are true and if so, what impact they are having on the education sector and its capacity to produce a workforce with skills required by the large-scale private sector.

**Length of Stay**

43. The survey found that there are significant local variations in respect of the length of time the interviewees had been living in the various locations (Table 2.2.3). In Bumbuna, the average elapsed time since arrival among migrant worker interviewees was 22 months. This is an indicator of their determination to find a job despite the relatively high cost of rental accommodation in the town (on average 53,000 Leones per room per month). While the majority of Bumbuna respondents stated that they were not happy with their unemployed predicament, they were prepared to remain in the town indefinitely. Part of this determination may have been due to family pressure (or personal shame) not to return home without securing employment. In Lunsar, the average time elapsed since arrival was 11 months. The jobless in Lunsar were more prepared than their counterparts in Bumbuna to consider leaving if they didn’t find employment quickly. The number of people sharing accommodation in Lunsar was twice as high as in Bumbuna (on average 8 people per room, compared to just under 4 people per room in Bumbuna), which illustrates just how crowded the township has become by the influx of people looking for work.

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33 This appeared not to be the case, as those with an educational background didn’t seem to be in any better position for gaining employment than those with a particular skill.

34 A positive aspect to the former teachers’ dilemma is that these individuals could be targeted for immediate short or medium term training in managerial, administrative and perhaps technical skills, given their already higher levels of education. A strategy to ‘take advantage’ of the availability of such individuals might be something future employers could consider, but there are clearly social implications for this type of approach (i.e. triggering a wave of teachers abandoning their positions in learning institutions for immediate higher wage employment, thereby resulting in a dearth of teaching staff and possibly declining national education standards).
### Table 2.2.2 Location and Skills/Employment History

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NORTHERN REGION</th>
<th>Northern Average</th>
<th>SOUTHERN REGION - &quot;RUTILE AREA&quot;</th>
<th>Southern Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bumbuna</td>
<td>Lunsar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residing in Hometown Before Coming Here</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>19.23</td>
<td>62.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed in Location Before Coming Here</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>11.00</td>
<td>38.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If Employed, Most Common Profession/Employment</td>
<td></td>
<td>Banking</td>
<td>Ex-Sierra Rutile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Security Guard</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Driver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NGO Worker</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If Unemployed, Most Common Coping Mechanism/Activity</td>
<td></td>
<td>Petty Trading</td>
<td>Petty Trading</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Prostitution</td>
<td>School/Dropped Out</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2.2.3 Length of Stay

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NORTHERN REGION</th>
<th>Northern Average</th>
<th>SOUTHERN REGION - &quot;RUTILE AREA&quot;</th>
<th>Southern Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bumbuna</td>
<td>Lunsar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Here</td>
<td>Months</td>
<td>22.83</td>
<td>11.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Years</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Number of People Sharing Accommodation</td>
<td>People</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>8.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Rent per Month/Single Room</td>
<td>Leones</td>
<td>53,010.75</td>
<td>53,311.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewees with Family Members Here</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>37.25</td>
<td>33.77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Family Support

44. Rutile mining has been in progress for many decades in the southern region, and here the average elapsed time since arrival among migrant workers was just under 4 years (44 months). Many of these workers had also built houses, married into local communities and expressed no intention of ever returning to their home areas. In fact, they considered their present locations more as ‘home’ than their areas of origin. Fifty-three per cent of the southern respondents indicated that they had family members in the locality, as compared to 32% of respondents in the north. During the survey, it became apparent that ‘family connections’ represented a critical support mechanism during times out of work, especially as source of accommodation and funds for paying medical or hospital bills. As the figures demonstrate below (Table 2.2.4), 54% of respondents in the north and 64% in the south claimed to have been sick recently.

45. The high incidence of reported sickness among migrant workers shows that significant investment into towns and rural areas must be accompanied by a corresponding increase in availability and quality of services from government authorities at both the central and (more importantly) local level. Clear leadership on devolution, and coordination between Ministries, Departments and Agencies over service delivery, will need to be coupled with the strengthening of local government capacities.
### Table 2.2.4 Health Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Northern Average</th>
<th>Moriba Town</th>
<th>Mogbwemo</th>
<th>Matagelema</th>
<th>Kpetema</th>
<th>Kpanguma</th>
<th>Southern Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Times Eat Per Day</td>
<td>Meals</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewees Recently Sick</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2.2.5 Employment Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NORTHERN REGION</th>
<th>Northern Average</th>
<th>SOUTHERN REGION - “RUTILE AREA”</th>
<th>Southern Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bumbuna</td>
<td>Lunsar</td>
<td>Moriba Town</td>
<td>Mogbwemo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full Time Employment</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>50.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Time to get Job</td>
<td>Months</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average No of Applications for Current Job</td>
<td>Applic</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Monthly Pay</td>
<td>Leones</td>
<td>1,448,792</td>
<td>2,733,089</td>
<td>2,090,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average length of Employment</td>
<td>Months</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Interviewees working</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewees Heard of Local Content Policy</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understand LCP</td>
<td>No. Protect landowners</td>
<td>Stop foreigners and expatriates taking our jobs</td>
<td>Promote qualified citizens/locals</td>
<td>Reduce expatriates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If not working: key survival strategies</td>
<td>Type:</td>
<td>Prostitution</td>
<td>Prostitution</td>
<td>Petty Trading</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If working, most common jobs</td>
<td>Type:</td>
<td>Operator for - plant, excavators, heavy machinery, ADT, dump trucks, general driver</td>
<td>Site Supervisor/ Safety Officer</td>
<td>Engineer - mechanical and electrical</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Currently Employed

46. Only 50.6% of the migrant laborers surveyed in the north were in full-time employment when the interviews were carried out and only 21.3% of the female migrants had a full-time job (Table 2.2.5). In the south, the average employment rate was slightly higher (56.6%), but with a lower percentage of female interviewees in work (10.1%). It appears to have taken longer for individuals in the south to secure employment as compared to the north (8.2 months as opposed to 5 months), but southern-based workers made fewer applications (1.2 applications on average as compared to 2.9 applications on average in the north).

Remuneration

47. Despite some northern intra-regional differences, the average monthly pay in the northern region for migrant workers in permanent jobs was just over 2 million Leones per month (2,090,940 Leones, which is approximately US$475), and in the south it was just under one million Leones per month (922,949 Leones, approximately US$209). The differences between the two regions are noteworthy given that the types of employment on offer are very similar (e.g. management and administration and technical, operating heavy machinery, security, driving and housekeeping). Indeed, some of the migrant workers interviewed in Lunsar had previously worked for Sierra Rutile and had travelled north specifically to obtain better-paid jobs with London Mining (salaries in some cases were 200-300% higher than previously). These differences are also noteworthy given that the United Mineworkers Union (UMU) signed a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with several mining companies in October 2013.\(^{35}\) In Bumbuna, some workers who had been working for AML sub-contractors complained that their wages were much lower than those of colleagues directly employed by AML in similar jobs. Effective implementation of the CBA is critical for future employment relations in Sierra Leone’s extractives sector, particularly given the status of the UMU as the only recognized negotiating representative of employees below supervisory level.\(^{36}\) The CBA needs to be widely distributed and communicated, especially to the labor force.

Facilitation Fees and Unfair Recruitment Practices

48. Some respondents who had been employed in both regions indicated that in addition to applying a number of times, they had been forced to pay upfront ‘fees’ (i.e. facilitation payments) in order to secure jobs. The average size of this fee was 10% of a monthly salary, and the most affected job seekers were the skilled and semi-skilled (e.g. drivers, cooks, supervisors and mechanics). In Bumbuna, respondents stated that it was to be easier to get a job when the mining startup operations were underway but now they felt that without paying, they had little chance of even being interviewed. They also felt that company employees were exploiting the

\(^{35}\) United Mineworkers Union, ‘A Collective Agreement between Mining Companies and the United Mine Worker’s Union of Sierra Leone (Terms and Conditions of Service for Mine Workers below Supervisory Level)’, October 2013. The CBA covers a number of issues relating to conditions of engagement, working hours, absence from work, leave, overtime salary structures dismissal an termination procedures

\(^{36}\) There is an ongoing discussion (and concern) around the dominance of the UMU as the sole union representing mineworkers and the desires and aspirations of mineworkers at other operations to set up and belong to other Unions of their own choice. See Human Rights Watch. ‘Whose Development: Human Rights Abuses in Sierra Leone’, February 2014.
overall lack of transparency in the recruitment process. Some migrant workers also complained about what they termed the ‘interference of the local authorities, i.e. chiefs in the recruitment process. The claim here was that chiefs were brokering employment for family and supporters who lacked the proper qualifications and experience for their positions. Some respondents also alluded to the existence of an informal ‘employment committee’ that promotes Bumbuna ‘indigenes’ over migrants from other areas. Other respondents expressed frustration with central government for not providing more skills training to make them employable to companies such as AML and with AML itself (and its subcontractors) for not being clear on conditions of employment and termination procedures. Complaints over the interference of chiefs in the company recruitment process were not raised in other parts of the northern region (Lunsar) or in the southern Rutile area, so it appears to be an issue specific to the Bumbuna area.

Local Content Policy

49. The Sierra Leone Local Content Policy (LCP)\textsuperscript{37} is very clear about the responsibility of investors to employ a given percentage of Sierra Leoneans at each level of its operations during start-up and the first years of activity.\textsuperscript{38} If properly implemented and respected by all stakeholders, the policy (and the eventual Local Content Bill), represents a real opportunity to build technical, managerial, and administrative capacities within the Sierra Leonean workforce. This will result in increased employment for Sierra Leoneans, better remuneration, improved disposable income, better quality of life, wider access to services and stronger citizen voice in demanding better services from Government. However, the successful implementation of the LCP depends on two critical factors.

50. The first factor is the existence of an adequately educated and technically proficient national workforce that can draw maximum benefit from the provisions of the policy. The second factor is thorough public understanding what ‘local content’ actually means. For example, interviewees in both the north and south regions were asked whether they had heard about the LCP and, if they had, what was their understanding of it. Only 12.9% of respondents in the North had heard of the LCP (1.8% of Bumbuna respondents and 24% of Lunsar respondents), as compared to 63.1% in the south. In the north, interviewees that had heard of the LCP thought that it was either: a) a policy which outlined a mining company’s corporate and social responsibilities in its area of operations, b) a policy specifically designed to protect landowners in Marampa Chiefdom (Lunsar), or c) a policy governing the allocation of profits from the mining companies to local communities. Yet many northern workers also expressed the view that a) Government should help the workforce to obtain employment in mining industries, b) that specific policies

\textsuperscript{37}Government of Sierra Leone, ‘Sierra Leone Local Content Policy’, May 2012.

\textsuperscript{38}Percentages are outlined in the Draft Bill, A Bill Entitled The Sierra Leonean Local Content Act 2013, as “for each of its operation...may retain a maximum of 80% of management positions as approved by the Commission (proposed Sierra Leonean Content Commission) as expatriate position...during the first five years of its establishment, after which it may retain a maximum of 40% of management positions as may be approved by the Commission as expatriate positions. ..... may retain a maximum of 50% of intermediate positions as approved by the Commission (proposed Sierra Leonean Content Commission) as expatriate positions during the first five years of its establishment, after which it may retain a maximum of 20% of intermediate positions as may be approved by the Commission as expatriate positions...
promoting local job creation were needed and c) that the authorities should provide training to empower the Sierra Leonean workforce to enable workers to obtain well-remunerated positions in mining companies. Among the southern interviewees, there was a much clearer understanding of the LCP. Here, it was described as a) a policy assisting citizens to get jobs, b) a policy promoting the employment of suitably qualified local applicants, and c) a policy supporting the development of the Sierra Leonean workforce. But there were also some troubling interpretations of the LCP, notably that it would stop foreign workers taking our jobs and stop Western expatriates from coming to Sierra Leone. This last observation came from Guinean migrant workers, a few of whom were interviewed in Lunsar and the Sierra Rutile area. The presence of Guineans in the local workforce, while not being pinpointed in the interviews as a cause of friction or concern, shows that skills are lacking within the Sierra Leonean workforce and that competition for employment in the country’s expanding mining sector extends to the West African sub-region.

51. It is clear from the survey that despite the importance of the LCP, there is very little public awareness of it and what it is supposed to achieve. Better communication of the policy is vital, and these efforts need to be aimed equally at the national workforce and incoming investors. Government has a key responsibility here. For any local content policy to make an impact, it must move beyond simply trying to secure set quotas of personnel in a mining company and focus instead on improving Sierra Leonean engagement in the overall supply and value chains (e.g. a Sierra Leonean steel industry?). It is critical, however, that the LCP does not intrude on the profitable and efficient management of private sector investment.

Survival/Coping Strategies

43. The final set of survey questions concerned the survival strategies of those who were not working. Virtually all of the female migrant workers included in the survey were engaged in sex work. From both the nature and tone of the responses, it seems almost certain that the vast majority of young female migrant workers (under 25 and with no education or additional skills) had moved to these areas specifically to undertake this work. There are clear health, personal safety and social cohesion implications for this type of population movement.

44. In both regions, the main coping strategies among men were petty trading, building and construction, dependence on friends and relatives and, in some cases, private teaching. As noted in the recent World Bank Labor Profile for Sierra Leone, self-employment continues to be a major source of livelihood throughout the country, particularly in urban areas. In Bumbuna, many of these petty traders identified themselves as former workers for AML subcontractors

39 Local skilled and semi-skilled youth are also faced with competition from more skilled and often better-certified workers coming across from Guinea. See M. McLaughin, A. Wai, T. Senesie and W. Kamara, ‘Market And Economic Survey and Mapping of Training Providers and Supportive Structures in Sierra Leone’, GOAL, IBIS and Save the Children, April 2013.
40 ‘Capturing Increased Value from the Mining Industry: is the local content policy (LCP) the answer for our iron ore industry?’, draft discussion note from a Sierra Leonean Policy Analyst, March 2014.
that had used their termination benefits to set up small trading enterprises to sustain themselves until such time as they were able to return to full time employment. In the south, agriculture was a key source of survival, particularly for those who had been there for a significant amount of time.

45. Understanding the dynamics of the migrant labor workforce as a stakeholder in areas of investment and employment growth is an imperative for the successful design and implementation of a ‘growth pole’ strategy. The following themes emerged very strongly in the interviews and represent a glimpse into the complexities of the labor migration process:

46. **The Desire to be Employed.** All of the migrant workers interviewed strongly expressed their aspiration to be employed or, if they were already working, to enjoy better conditions of service and opportunities for career advancement. It was clear from the frustrations voiced by the unemployed, by the distances that many had travelled, by the length of time people had been in situ, and by the numbers that had broken off from studies, that Sierra Leoneans of working age desperately want to work. Whilst on the whole, relations between local communities and migrant workers were cordial, frustrations over employment opportunities have boiled over on occasion. Migrants often feel that they are blamed unfairly for incidences of theft, disorderly behavior and other low-level misdemeanors in congested mining towns. Above all, they want clarity and fairness in the recruitment process.

47. **Sexual Harassment.** Many female respondents who were in jobs complained of sexual harassment in the workplace, perpetrated by expatriate as well Sierra Leonean colleagues. In one case, an employee claimed that in order for her to gain employment, she was forced to put aside her boyfriend and ‘set up’ with her expatriate boss. With the expatriate having left the country, she was hoping for reconciliation with her former boyfriend. While sexual harassment in the Sierra Leonean workplace is not uncommon, it remains under-reported. It is important for the Government to ensure that the ‘Sierra Leone is open for business’ mantra is accompanied by strict enforcement of foreign investors’ social and ethical responsibilities. This needs to be accompanied by a ‘zero tolerance’ attitude to sexual harassment in the workplace in order to ensure that women are treated as employable equals to men.

### 2.2 Land Leasing for Commercial Investment

**The Provinces Land Act**

48. The single most contentious issue surrounding large-scale commercial investment in Sierra Leone is the leasing of family and community-owned land. Host communities’ grievances over leasing agreements have been widely reported and common complaints are that a) chiefdom authorities have been signing away land without properly consulting the communities whose interests they are supposed to be representing and protecting, b) crop compensation and surface rent payments are insufficient to cover smallholders’ actual losses and are chaotically
managed, c) politicians and government officials have been putting pressure on communities to give up land, often promising new jobs and services that do not materialize, d) companies have also been promising jobs and development investment but are not delivering on them.  

49. Sierra Leone’s obsolete land laws have contributed significantly to these problems. The Provinces Land Act (Cap. 122 of the Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960), originally enacted in 1927, remains the primary instrument for regulating land leasing in the provinces. Cap 122 is founded on the principle, first stated in the Protectorate Ordinance of 1905, that land outside the Crown Colony of Sierra Leone (now the Western Area) belongs inalienably to the indigenous (‘native’) African population. This principle ensured that local land rights remained under the jurisdiction of customary law, which in turn helped to facilitate colonial ‘indirect rule’. The subtitle of Cap 122 is ‘an act to make provision relating to the tenure of land by non-natives in the provinces’. It was originally drafted in response to increasing European, Lebanese and Krio activity in the interior in the 1920s. This activity, which was mainly trading and missionary work, had outgrown customary arrangements whereby chiefs served as guarantors (for a fee) of the good conduct, personal safety and property of ‘strangers’ residing in their localities. However, the new law was mainly aimed at formalizing these old arrangements rather than replacing them. Almost all of the leases taken out under Cap 122 before 1980 referred to trading, manufacturing and missionary premises situated in towns.  

50. The Provinces Land Act was never designed for the administration of large-scale land acquisition for mining and agriculture. Leases covering areas greater than 1,000 acres were originally regulated by the Concessions Act (Cap. 121 of the Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960), which was first enacted in 1931. According to this Act, all applications for concessions over the 1,000-acre threshold must be vetted by a special Concessions Court. Concessions of more than 5,000 acres also require Parliamentary and Presidential approval. The Concessions Act fell into disuse before the recent expansion of large-scale land leasing. Why this happened is not clear. SLIEPA’s guidelines on agricultural land leasing state that the Concessions Court ‘was never set up’ and another source indicates that the Act is no longer used because ‘the procedure for the grant of a concession is very complicated and time consuming, and not cost-effective’. However, many of

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44 This principle has never precluded land sales between ‘indigenes’, although it has ensured that the state has never established regulatory authority over land markets in the provinces.  
48 Cap 121 was amended in 1976 to exclude mining concessions.  
49 SLIEPA, ‘Leasing agricultural land’, p.4  
50 A. Renner-Thomas, Land Tenure in Sierra Leone: the law, dualism and the making of a land policy, Milton Keynes, 2010, p. 241. This exact sentence also appears in the draft National Land Policy.
the current problems surrounding large-scale land leasing in the provinces might have been avoided if the Provinces Land Act was fit for purpose.

51. The main shortcoming of the Act is that it does not recognize the rights of land users and landholders. The preamble to Cap 122 states that ‘all land in the provinces is vested in the chiefdom councils who hold such land for and on behalf of the native communities concerned’. The precise meaning of this preamble has long been debated in Sierra Leone. A view shared by many legal experts is that it does not grant chiefdom councils legal title to all land in the provinces because a) this is not the stated purpose of the Act and b) there are no corresponding clauses in laws providing for the powers and responsibilities of chiefdom councils (notably the Chiefdom Councils Act, Cap 61 of the Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960). The expert view is that the preamble to Cap 122 serves only to facilitate land leasing and that the vesting of title to land in the provinces is still governed by customary law. Most experts also agree that communal tenure, in which title to land is vested in the community head (i.e. the chief), is an historical form that has been replaced in most areas of the provinces by family tenure, in which title is vested in the head of the family.

52. Another shortcoming of the Act is its out-dated provisions for government authorization of land leases. The Act states that leases should be authorized either by a District Officer or a Magistrate. Such authorizations were sufficient in an era when most lease applications were for shops, mission stations and trading company branch offices. But large-scale operations that impact on the environment, local livelihoods and the national economy clearly require central government authorization. Mineral rights licensing fulfils this function in the mining sector. Companies engaged in large-scale mining and agriculture also require environmental licences, but there is nothing in the unreformed Provinces Land Act to make these licences a condition for the award of land leases. Currently, Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIAs), carried out by the Environmental Protection Agency prior to the award of environmental licenses, tend to begin when company operations are already well advanced. Since commercial agricultural is not itself licenced, the key entry point for companies in this sector is the award of the land lease. In the absence of up-to-date regulations governing such awards, central government authorization of commercial agriculture is very ad hoc. Some companies have MOUs with the GoSL, ratified by Parliament, but others do not. Furthermore, some companies hold land leases brokered by MAFFS, while others hold leases brokered by the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD): the ministry that supervises district and chiefdom administration.

53 J. Baxter, ‘Understanding Land Investment Deals’. 
Compensation Payments to Landowners

53. A further shortcoming of the Provinces Land Act is that, unlike the Mining and Minerals Act, it makes no provision for compensating landowners for loss of crops, economic trees, buildings and other assets located on leased land. In recent years, companies leasing land in the provinces have tended to use compensation guidelines issued by MAFFS. However, these are not legally binding and not easily obtainable by the general public. A recurrent complaint among members of host communities is that compensation payments for economic trees in particular are grossly inadequate. For example, one recent study calculates that the compensation paid for a single wild (‘native’) oil palm tree in one concession in northern Sierra Leone was less than half the value (Le 83,300) of one year’s oil production from it. The compensation paid for an ‘improved’ palm tree was about one-quarter the value (Le 240,000) of a single year’s oil production from it.\(^{54}\)

54. The fundamental problem here is that the compensation companies are offering to landowners is based on MAFFS’ estimate of the replacement cost of each economic tree, not the income generated from it over its productive life. This formula is not necessarily unreasonable if the time taken for replacement trees to mature is taken into account and if poor farmers have access to land outside the lease area suitable for re-planting. But if these conditions are not met, farmers’ loss of income is indeed severe. Clearly, compensation agreements for landowners’ loss of economic trees should be a mandatory component of each lease agreement and take lessors’ overall land holdings into account.\(^{55}\)

Proposed Land Law Reforms

55. Sierra Leone’s new National Land Policy, currently in draft form, anticipates the repeal of the Provinces Land Act and the creation of new land laws. However, it does not dwell in detail on current problems in land lease administration, calling instead for the creation of a national ‘land bank’ to facilitate direct government control over the allocation of land to commercial investors. According to the policy, the GoSL will embark on ‘systematic acquisition’ of land in the provinces by means of voluntary sale and, if needed, the exercise of eminent domain (compulsory purchase). While the policy makes provision for strengthening landowners’ statutory rights to compensation from commercial investors for lost crops and other assets, it also stresses the importance of developing ‘alternative operational business/production models between the landowners and investors (such as contract farming schemes for small holder farmers, out-growers schemes, equity sharing schemes, use of leaseholds and joint ventures)’. However, the

\(^{54}\) ALLAT: Who is Benefitting? The social and economic impact of three large-scale land investments in Sierra Leone: a cost-benefit analysis’, July 2013, pp.41-2. This calculation is allegedly based on ‘rural prices’, but it is not stated whether these are wholesale or retail. For reasons discussed in Section 1.1 of this report, the price obtained by producers for agricultural commodities are likely to be substantially lower than the retail price.

\(^{55}\) During fieldwork a list was found entitled ‘Revised and current return per year per tree crop’, pinned to a noticeboard in the Agriculture Department Office in Port Loko. The list contains estimates of the income per acre per year of 12 different tree crops. At the bottom of the list is a note stating: ‘the calculation is based on prices for the producers. There is need to negotiate a cut off point (5-10 years)’. While the existence of this list indicates that MAFFS has recently updated its compensation formula for landowners, we were unable to discover whether or not it was actually in use.
draft policy does not address the question of how poor farmers will be able to make a living after their land has been acquired by a national land bank, or how they can be expected to attract corporate commercial partners without control over land.

56. The draft policy also proposes the creation of a National Land Commission (NLC), whose strategic goal is to harmonize the freehold tenure system of the Western Area with the customary tenure system of the provinces. The policy identifies land titling as the main means of achieving this goal. It also proposes that the NLC structure will include District Land Commissions and Chiefdom Land Committees. The district bodies are expected to have a core membership of all the land sector ministries and civil society, plus a majority of ordinary members elected by local voters. They are also expected to perform the land use planning and regulation functions that were scheduled for devolution to local councils by the local Government Act of 2004, but never released by the Ministry of Lands, Country Planning and the Environment (MLCPE). The rationale for creating new elected bodies in spaces already occupied by district councils is not explained in the draft policy.

57. The Chiefdom Land Committee (CLCs) will, according to the draft policy, be an elected body drawn primarily from local landowners and headed by the paramount chief. Radical title to communal lands will now vest in the CLC, which will, the draft policy states, ‘vet/approve all land transactions and perform all other functions relating to disposal of communal lands presently performed by the chiefdom councils’. Again, no explanation is given as to why chiefdom councils cannot perform these tasks. Furthermore, the draft policy notes that there are three forms of customary land tenure in the provinces (communal, family and customary tenancy acknowledging the reversionary rights of the original owners) and goes on to state that the CLC will be ‘an institution of the devolved administration and management system for all land in the chiefdoms held under any one of the three forms of tenure’. While it is not stated outright that the CLC will have ultimate control over the disposal of family-owned land, it is hard to see what other ‘administration and management’ function it is likely to exercise over it. Consequently, the titling process could easily become mired in conflict as chiefs and local people dispute whether local land is under communal or family tenure, i.e. under the control of chiefs or family heads. A far simpler solution in the short term would be to revise existing land law to ensure that a) all land concessions above a certain area require parliamentary approval; b) all land leases remain conditional on the lessee continuing to fulfil the terms of environmental licenses and c) no lease is valid without the signatures of all affected landowners.

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56 These planning functions are: land surveying, land registration and control of illegal sale of land, leasing government land, strategic local plans, issuance of building permits, sand dues, preparation of land use plans and education and sensitization on environmental issues. By mid-2012 only sand dues (i.e. a tax on sand mining) had been devolved.

57 The GoSL’s Chiefdom and Traditional Administration Policy (CTAP), published in 2012, contains several provisions to make the chiefdom councils more effective as local units of administration and more democratic.
2.3 Relations between companies and host communities

‘One-Sided’ Leasing Agreements

58. Problems with land lease agreements can have a lasting effect on relations between large-scale commercial operators and host communities. A recent case in point is African Lion Agriculture (ALA) in Bonthe District. Sierra Rutile, ALA’s parent company, has a large community development portfolio, which includes a dedicated community development fund (the Sierra Rutile Foundation), a clinic for workers and community members and support to NGO-managed programs seeking to improve local technical and vocational education, HIV/AIDS prevention and access to clean drinking water. However, landowners and chiefdom authorities interviewed in townships surrounding the main plant continue to raise concerns about the size of surface rent (US$22 per hectare per annum), crop compensation payments and, most of all, the environmental damage caused by mining operations that remove extensive areas of topsoil and dredge watercourses. Sierra Rutile has already embarked on a land reclamation program, but it is expensive and progress is fairly slow. According to company literature, 282 hectares of mined-out land have been restored since 2011.58 When ALA was incorporated in 2012, it was perceived (and presented) locally as a program contributing to the rehabilitation of mined-out land for agriculture. However, Sierra Rutile’s annual report for 2012 makes it clear that ALA is, in the first instance, seeking to make commercial gains from land in its concession area that is not currently being mined:

> With over 55,000 hectares of land in our mining concessions, and given the region’s ample rainfall, fertile soil, and location near the equator, we believe that there is a compelling business case for an agribusiness that also provides substantial employment opportunities for the surrounding population.

59. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with this business objective, but the confusion it went on to generate at the local level highlights the pressing need for new approaches to the regulation of commercial land use in Sierra Leone. In November 2013, a delegation from MAFFS and the District Offices of Moyamba and Bonthe called local landowners and chiefdom authorities to a meeting at Sierra Rutile headquarters. According to ALA staff, the company had looked to MAFFS for guidance in preparing an MOU with the host community and the purpose of the meeting was to ‘present’ this document to the chiefs and landowners. One chief who attended this meeting complained that the process was entirely ‘one-sided’: the official delegates apparently expected the chiefs and landowners to sign the document on the spot and would not give them time to study it in detail or make changes to it. Given that government has a duty to protect the interests of citizens as well as promote private sector investment, the appropriateness of the delegates’ behavior on this occasion could be open to question. Notable for its absence here was a planning process that weighs up all the benefits and drawbacks of a

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proposed commercial investment and goes on to issue instructions to the investors to ensure that negative impacts on the local community are mitigated.

60. ALA staff went on to report that the MOU has a community development component but that significant funding is not likely to come on stream until the newly planted crops (which include oil palm, rubber, coffee and cacao) mature and begin to yield significant income. They also want to set up an out-grower scheme for pineapples at some point in the future. The company’s Sierra Leonean employees currently comprise of 4 management staff, 77 permanent lower-level staff and 196 casual workers. Most of the latter are local residents but communities that have lost farmland to the project are already reporting that cash income from casual labor, surface rent (US$22 per acre) and compensation payments for lost economic trees is failing to match the value of lost farm produce and lost resources from fallow land (e.g. firewood, building materials and wild food and medicinal plants). These communities also report that villagers living outside ALA’s operational area are no longer cooperating with requests to borrow land for farming because they allegedly resent what they see as these communities’ privileged access to wage employment with the company. A further source of social tension is ALA’s policy of recruiting casual labor through village chiefs and installing solar-powered lights beside chiefs’ private houses. Some community members now question whether the chiefs’ loyalty lies with the company or the people.

Unmet Promises

61. Another example is a 40,000-hectare lease in BKM chiefdom in northern Port Loko District, which was brokered by the local Member of Parliament (MP). The MP’s constituency secretary recalled in an interview that, when the civil war ended, the MP was keen to attract investors to rehabilitate the old Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board (SLPMB) palm plantation in the chiefdom. A new lease was taken out in 2003 but little activity took place until the current lessee took over in 2011.59 The current lessee now manages three large plantations of oil palm seedlings, one each in the three former chiefdoms that comprise the amalgamated BKM chiefdom.60

62. FGDs were held in two villages located next to these new plantations. It was reported in both villages that the MP, the party secretary, the paramount chief and the chiefdom speaker had all come to ask that land should be given to the project. These individuals had promised the communities that they would see benefits in the form of school scholarships for their children, a health centre and a multi-purpose community centre. Because of the status of these individuals (‘big men’), their promises had given the villagers confidence to give up their land. Nothing like this project had come to the area in their lifetimes so they had felt compelled to accept it. However, since there was little sign of the promised benefits in the first two years of company operations they became disillusioned. Lack of consultation on the part of the company during

59 The lease documents were not available for review so it was not possible to ascertain how many companies had held an interest in the lease from 2003 onwards.
60 ALLAT: ‘Who is benefitting’, p.22
the land clearance operations exacerbated this growing sense of grievance. For example, FGD participants complained that the land had been cleared with no consideration given to the destruction of economic trees (especially wild palms and mangoes), which meant that the location and ownership of these trees was not recorded and no compensation was offered. One of the villages had relocated many decades previously to be closer to the Port Loko-Gbinti motor road. The company had bulldozed a grove of trees marking the site of the old village and its graveyard without realizing, but did subsequently apologize and meet the cost of community rites of appeasement and de-consecration.

63. The size of surface rent payments was a further source of discontent for the villagers. The 2010 lease agreement states that surface rent is to be paid at a rate of US$5 per hectare (US$2 per acre). A farmer complained in one of the FGDs that this amount is a pittance given that he used to be able to harvest 24 bushels of rice per acre from land now planted with oil palms. How, he asked, can he make ends meet with just 20,000 Leones (i.e. US$5) when the retail price of 24 bushels of rice is 2.5 million Leones? Some FGD participants reported that they still have land, but others complained that they only have swamps left and that these do not produce enough rice to support their families. However, villagers are being paid surface rent on the whole lease, not just the land currently planted with oil palms. Surface rent distributions are overseen by the paramount chief and the money is divided, villagers reported, by ‘family name’. One participant stated that his personal share of the last surface rent distribution was 250,000 Leones (US$60). The company is planning to undertake a comprehensive survey of local land holdings to ensure that landowners receive their full share of surface rent. Interestingly, FGD participants in one of the villages insisted at the beginning of the meeting that land was owned collectively by the whole village, but later spoke of land as being owned by families and individuals. Such dissembling may reflect local concerns over the potential for conflict if, as a result of company land surveys, surface rent payments are re-allocated on the basis of land control (i.e. family headship) rather than land rights based on family and community membership.

64. Another complaint aired in the FGDs was that when the company had in fact delivered local development benefits (which to date include 600 jobs, a community hall, a primary school, Traditional Birth Attendant facilities and four groundnut gardens) these had not been targeted at villages that had given up the most land. The point being made here was that a) other communities have noted the problems encountered by communities that have given up land and are now resisting giving up their own land and b) the company has been targeting benefits at the latter communities as inducements to drop this resistance. Even so, the villagers left little room for doubt as to whom, in their view, bore the greatest responsibility for their predicament. We understood the message the big people brought to us, one villager remarked, but we don’t know what message they shared among themselves.

61 An example from the author’s earlier fieldwork in Bombali District illustrates the issue at stake here. Three farming brothers were living with their wives and children in the same village. The two senior brothers had divided their late father’s land between them. The junior brother farmed land borrowed seasonally from other families because none of his own family land was currently available to him and because he did not want to work under his brothers. The younger brother would have had a much better chance of being included in a benefit distribution organized on the basis of membership of a landowning family than one organized on the basis of *de facto* land control.
Another pointed out that it had been the ‘big-men’ of the community who had signed the lease agreement, not the villagers, and went on to argue that any new agreements must be signed by all local landowners. A third simply stated: they have fooled us.

The Company View

65. An interview with ALA’s operations manager brought a different perspective to bear on these issues. The operations manager made the unprompted comment that lots of things were promised when the lease was signed and that relations with the host community have suffered as a result of unrealistically elevated local expectations. The 2010 lease agreement contains non-binding clauses on company provision of basic services (education, health care and sanitation) to the families of its local workers and goes on to state that 5% of the company’s annual net profit will be allocated to a community development fund. However, the company is not expecting to make a profit from the plantation until the young palms are at least 13 years old. The operations manager further pointed out that this expectation depends on ‘everything being done correctly.’ Already, the company’s 600-strong local workforce is far less time-efficient in its maintenance tasks (e.g. weeding, fertilizer application and pest control) than the company’s business plan budgets for.

66. The company is keen to get the message across to its host community that the plantation is a long-term investment and is hoping to interest local farmers in out-growing schemes and in market gardening in carefully delimited strips between rows of young palms. However, little progress is being made at present because many landowners in the lease area are refusing to give up any more land to the project. The operations manager admitted that the company has indeed targeted development support (notably the community hall and primary school) to ‘uncooperative’ landowners and that villagers that have already complied with the terms of the lease are right to complain about it. The company had been hoping that its landholder survey would enable it to devise an employment quota system, in which the number of employees taken from each locality in the lease area becomes proportional to the amount of local land under the plantation. However, some villages are not currently allowing survey teams onto their land. Ironically, as the company begins to step up its efforts to engage with its host community and rebuild trust, it is receiving numerous offers of land from outside the lease area. The operations manager was unable to tell whether these offers are coming from landowners or brokers claiming to represent them.

Being Truthful and Realistic From the Start......

67. It is hard to escape the conclusion that many of these problems could have been avoided if communities in BKM chiefdom had, from the outset, been provided with an honest assessment of the local economic opportunities and benefits the plantation was likely to generate. These two examples are by no means unique: tensions between companies and host communities over the terms of land leases and the local benefits of commercial operations are now

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62 ALLAT, ‘Who is benefiting’, p. 48
widespread in Sierra Leone. An emerging inter-company market in land leases has tended to exacerbate these problems. For example, the above-noted operations manager observed that some investors attempt to secure lease agreements by promising landowners that they will deliver substantial local development investment, their intention being to make windfall gains by selling on lease-holding companies to new investors who are also left with the burden of fulfilling these promises.

68. Two historically deep-seated governance issues underlie tensions between companies and host communities. First, poor farmers long used cooperating with each other in order to survive tend to take an intensely moral view of private commercial investments that exploit community assets (i.e. land). They expect to receive a ‘fair share’ of the wealth generated by these investments, which for them means development out of poverty rather than a few benefits that merely prevent them from slipping deeper into it. No commercial enterprise is ever likely to meet such expectations in the short term, which means that local resentment towards large-scale investors becomes more or less inevitable.

69. Second, resource shortage and institutional weakness at the state level has long encouraged politicians and functionaries to embrace the demand for patrons at the local level. The central state often relies on such individuals to monitor events in their home areas, channel information back and forth and intervene personally in local matters where the government interest is at stake. Effectiveness in such political brokerage can make or break bureaucratic careers and determine whether or not politicians get re-elected. It is therefore in the interest of centre-local brokers that their communities look to them, rather than government generally, to access scarce state resources and development investment. The price they pay for cultivating such dependency is constant pressure from below to deliver development resources.

70. It is understandable that incoming investors tend to look to these centre-local brokers help them negotiate land lease agreements. Indeed, SLIEPA’s published guide for investors explicitly encourages ‘engage[ment] with an agent, facilitator, or joint venture partner, familiar with national and local-level stakeholders, to support the land acquisition process’. Yet it is precisely here that the above-noted problems begin to arise. Centre-local brokers whose primary aims are a) to obtain private commissions from investors, b) to be seen to be implementing government policy on private sector-led development, c) to show superiors that they really can get government business done in the communities they claim to lead and d) to obtain relief from the pressure of local development demands, are not predisposed to inquire about the long term impact of large-scale commercial land acquisition on local food security, or question meagre rates of surface rent and the absence of legally binding compensation packages. On the contrary, they are likely to favour a quick deal and leave it to the new investor to deliver the local development investment promised to landowners. It is only later that investors may


discover that fast-track land deals, by-passing allegedly ‘complicated and time consuming’ legislation originally designed to regulate them, are false economies.

........Or It Gets Complicated.

71. In a final case from fieldwork, the debate about community rights and entitlements in the context of large-scale private sector investment has become increasingly complex, divisive and political. The case in question is Lunsar, a town that grew considerably in middle of the 20th century due to its proximity to a large opencast iron ore mine. The original mining operations closed in the early 1980s, but there were sufficient tailings and in situ deposits to attract new investors when the recent upturn in world iron ore prices made further exploitation viable. The years 2010-12 were a boom time for western Port Loko district. One major investor (London Mining) was building a new processing facility on part of the old mining concession next to Lunsar, plus a haul road linking it to a river barge loading facility at Thofeyim. Another major investor (African Minerals), operating in Tonkolili district, was building a haul railway through Port Loko district to a ship loading facility at Pepel. These operations, to which were later added the start up operations of a third company (Cape Lambert) on the remaining part of the old concession area, made extensive use of local unskilled and semi-skilled labor. However, since the completion of these start-up operations, activity has concentrated on the Lunsar mining sites. The town has become a magnet for job seekers and traders of goods and services.

72. The high demand for jobs in Lunsar has generated considerable local debate about companies’ recruitment practices and whether some groups are, or should be, enjoying preferential access to jobs. For example, a male youth group in Port Loko town, all recent secondary school leavers, reported that casual work was fairly easy to come by when the haul road and railway were being built. But even then, they noted, some Sierra Leonean recruitment managers working for construction subcontractors (most of which have now moved on) tended to exploit the heavy demand for jobs by charging private commissions for processing applications to a successful conclusion. One youth claimed to have paid a 500,000 Leone (about US$115) commission for a job as a security guard in one company. When the application failed he threatened to expose the recruitment manager in court and was able to obtain a refund. The youths also reported that successful job applicants were often asked to sign ‘blind’ contracts, where only the space for a signature was made visible. Those that refused would lose the job, while those that did sign had no way of proving that the pay and benefits they actually received from the company payroll office matched those set out in the contract.

73. The youths went on to allege that local Lunsar people claim priority in access to jobs on the mining sites adjacent to their town. They argued that the mining companies are able to get away with inadequate Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) packages and damaging the environment because the Lunsar people want to remain in the companies’ favour. They also reported that on one occasion, a group of Lunsar residents led by a former local councillor and contestant for the chairmanship of the Marampa Landowners Association (see below), used the poro secret society
to impose a ritual curfew on the town in an attempt to force non-initiates to leave. Due to the historical influences of trans-regional trade and Islam, adherence to traditional Temne secret societies like *poro* is far less prevalent in western Port Loko and Kambia districts than in eastern Port Loko and Tonkolili districts. While the youths in the Port Loko FGD spoke the same Temne mother tongue as the inhabitants of Lunsar, they were afraid of this curfew. Such small, sub-regional differences gain currency when everyone is competing for access to the same limited resource.

74. Needless to say, a youth group interviewed in Lunsar took a different view on these matters. Concerns raised in the FGD included: a) the town is becoming so overcrowded with migrant job seekers that crime is rising and public health is suffering, b) local education is also suffering because schoolteachers are leaving their poorly paid jobs to find work with the mining companies, c) local girls are abandoning school to become sex workers, and even well-educated female job seekers find themselves pressurized by unscrupulous company recruitment managers to exchange sexual favours for employment contracts, d) the town becomes almost deserted at weekends as mining company workers go to Freetown or their provincial home areas to spend their money.

75. The youths had nothing positive to say about the mining companies. For example, they wanted to know why the Lunsar-based companies had not built hospitals for their workers and set up a bus service for local school children as the allegedly ‘Sierra Leonean’ company Sierra Rutile had done in the south. Flooding around Lunsar in recent rainy seasons was, they insisted, the result of local drainage system alterations for which mining companies are responsible. Renewed flooding had brought local anger about the lack of a school bus service to a head and local youths had had attempted to barricade the haul road in protest. The youths went on to allege that the companies only give school scholarships to landowners’ children. They also alleged that most mining company jobs are awarded by prior arrangement, that job advertisements are merely for show and that many jobs are being taken by foreigners (e.g. Guineans) who naturally seek to fill new vacancies with their foreign ‘brothers’. The companies don’t want to employ Lunsar people, one youth alleged, because ‘we know who to complain’. In other words, since the mining companies are operating right next to the town, Lunsar people are able to observe them at close quarters and quickly identify which of their employees are responsible for unjust or corrupt management decisions. This youth concluded by asserting that London Mining in particular is never going to help the Lunsar community because it is, as he put it, ‘an SLPP

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66 Sierra Rutile has a Sierra Leonean Chief Executive Officer and other Sierra Leonians on its senior management team, but is in fact owned by the Virgin Islands-registered Titanium Resources Group.
67 An investigation commissioned by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) found that the primary cause of the flooding was a collapsed culvert that had been installed during the original, pre-1980, development of the Marampa mine site. However, many people we spoke to in Lunsar insisted that, since companies currently working the site are still using water from the old reservoir system constructed during earlier mining activity, they are responsible for ensuring that the entire system, both within and outside their concession areas, is properly maintained.
68 Other local informants (and the national press) were reporting that the barricading of the haul road was in fact a protest against the main haulage contractor’s alleged failure to comply with the terms of the Local Content Policy and give better opportunities to Sierra Leonean sub-contractors.
company’. Port Loko district has become a stronghold of the governing APC party in recent years and here the youth was trying to draw inferences from the fact that this company’s original exploration licence was granted during the time of the previous SLPP government.

76. Lunsar traders are also contributing to the local debate about access to benefits from mining operations. A group of storekeepers interviewed in the town centre reported that the retail prices of foodstuffs, clothes, domestic goods and building materials in the town had all risen by between 50 and 100 per cent since the mining companies began operations. Unlike house owners in Lunsar, who are reportedly doing very well from rental incomes inflated by demand from both company workers and migrant job seekers, the traders claimed not to be benefitting greatly from the mining boom. Credit to buy stock is hard to come by and they are facing strong competition from traders from outside the area who tend to arrive in town on company paydays to sell goods out of the backs of trucks. Some of these traders sell goods on credit to wage workers and are therefore able to ‘capture’ the market. These traders, the storekeepers complained, do not pay income tax to the government or store licence fees (currently 100,000 Leones per annum) to the district council. The storekeepers reported that they don’t have much contact with the mining companies. Those that had done business with the companies complained that they had taken a too long settle accounts and that tax deductions (i.e. sales and withholding taxes) had eaten into their profits since they had agreed prices without taking these deductions into account.

_Marampa Landowners Association_

77. In the case of the Marampa Landowners Association (MLA), grievances again the mining companies (notably London Mining) have become a modus operandi. The bulk of the MLA membership comes from the nine villages that own land on the part of the old Marampa mine site currently being worked by London Mining. Their current chairman is a shipping broker by profession, born in the Lunsar area. Their coordinator, also born locally but not in the old Marampa concession area, is the owner of a construction and transport business. The FGD with MLA members took place in the coordinator’s house. Flooding of farms and houses was again a major topic. Speaker after speaker reported that a) their swamp farms and vegetable gardens had been destroyed by flooding or polluted by materials washed down from mine spoil heaps, b) there were no longer any local sources of safe drinking water, c) their children were encountering extreme difficulties in getting to school due to the flooding and d) the loss of income from flooded farms and gardens meant that they could no longer afford to educate their children even if they could get to school. While the company had promised to help them, speakers argued that it had a) angered them by not them paying adequate compensation for lost economic trees, b) insulted them by not employing more than a handful of their children and c) frustrated them by not supplying food, school scholarships, water wells, water pumps and new bridges and culverts in sufficient quantity, sufficiently quickly or free from delays and cancellations. The MLA members were particularly aggrieved that the company has consistently denied responsibility for the flooding and that the government (via the EPA) is supporting this
denial. One participant alleged that whenever the landowners make a complaint to the company, at least one of their children gets sacked from their job at the mine, to be replaced by someone from outside Lunsar.

78. The MLA members were also critical of the paramount chief, whose long-established mining machinery import company supplies spare parts to London Mining. One FGD participant claimed that the chief, ‘advocates for himself’ rather than the Lunsar community and ‘keeps quiet’ when problems arise because he does not want to jeopardize his contract. Another participant, a section chief, was keen to stress that in today’s complex world, no paramount chief can cope with the demands of administering a chiefdom as large and populous as Marampa. The current paramount chief will, he observed, promise to take action when a problem is brought before him but then other issues will capture his attention and nothing will get done.

79. Towards the end of the FGD, a villager stood up to proclaim that it is better they [i.e. the mining companies] leave us how we were than how we are now, i.e. it would have been better for the local community if the mining companies had never come back to Lunsar. This statement met with the loud applause from the other MLA members present. While there is no doubting the strength of local feeling over the flooding problem, there is also a political dimension to the MLA’s dissatisfaction with the company. This was particularly apparent in the MLA coordinator’s contribution to the discussion. The coordinator recalled that he had been in charge of the on-site care and maintenance team for the Marampa mine after the last of the old investors pulled out in the 1980s. When the civil war ended, his boss at the Ministry of Mines in Freetown had told him that new investors were interested in the mine. He therefore set about organizing the local landowners to meet these investors, which included the original directors of London Mining. The London Mining group had faced strong competition from the group that would become African Minerals Limited for a licence to explore the old mine site but the landowners had strongly supported London Mining and their preference had prevailed. London Mining, the coordinator went on, is as indebted to the MLA for helping it to secure its exploration licence as it is accountable to the MLA as an organization representing local landowners. His fundamental point was that the MLA has a right to bring complaints to the London Mining management and to stage public protests if it does not obtain a satisfactory response. Like one of the participants in the above-noted Lunsar youth FGD, the MLA coordinator was also keen to emphasize that London Mining had obtained its original licence when the SLPP was in office. Again, the inference was that the company is currently operating under a less favourable and supportive environment with the current APC administration. Whether this is actually true or not, the insistence of brining political parties into the discussion highlights the divisive nature of politics in Sierra Leone and the impact it has on both investors and communities.

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69 One FGD participant commented, only half-jokingly, that the landowners had been attracted to London Mining because they had hoped that an investor with such a name would bring the wealth and prestige of the United Kingdom’s capital to Lunsar.
80. The Lunsar case demonstrates clearly that no private investor currently operating in Sierra Leonean’s provinces can hope satisfy local demand for jobs and development investment in the short term. London Mining has nearly three times the number of Sierra Leonean employees compared to the above-noted palm plantation in BKM chiefdom and contracting companies supplying it with engineering, transport and catering services employ several hundred more. Yet wage employment and other benefits from large-scale private sector investment are so highly prized, and so widely sought after, that failure to access them tends to be perceived as an injustice rather than a problem of not having the required skills and qualifications. Rent-seeking behaviour by some of those influencing or controlling the award of job contracts only magnifies this sense of injustice. Consequently, the job market fuels an intense debate over rights and entitlements, which tends to divide a) landowners from local residents, b) local residents from other Sierra Leoneans and c) Sierra Leoneans from foreigners. Locally, grievance becomes the predominant modality of interaction between communities and large-scale investors. Grievance, however genuine its origins, also has an instrumental value. For example, the MLA in particular makes no secret of the fact that it is seeking every opportunity to pressurize London Mining into delivering the jobs and benefits to which its members feel entitled. Whatever material benefits MLA leaders may accrue personally from such strategies, they are also seeking to consolidate their centrality in company-community interactions and to create opportunities for further involvement in centre-local political brokerage.\(^70\)

Re-thinking CSR

81. Such a political whirlpool makes it extremely difficult for large-scale private investors to optimize their recruitment and employee training programmes and CSR investments. For example, London Mining, like all mining companies, is obliged under the terms of the Mines and Mineral Act of 2009 to enter into a development agreement with its primary host community and to fund this agreement with at least 0.01% of its annual profits. The company decided to add an extra 0.99% to that amount and went on to document a community investment strategy.\(^71\) This strategy has four pillars (education, health, water and sanitation and livelihoods) and is guided by a steering committee whose members include the Senior District Officer (SDO), the Paramount Chief, local MPs and district councillors, a Ministry of Mines representative, religious leaders and representatives of landowners, women and youths. This steering committee has overseen the implementation of a school scholarship programme and an internship scheme for young graduates. It has also overseen the rehabilitation of the health centre, town hall, and police quarters and the SDO’s office and quarters in Port Loko town. Interviews with company managers revealed that these last two investments were congruent with the company’s desire to strengthen formal institutions of government in its local area, the

\(^70\) The MLA coordinator concluded his contribution to the FGD with the unprompted admission that he had been a member of the SLPP when London Mining obtained its original exploration license. He later switched to the APC because, he claimed, his landowner group had asked him to carry on leading them in their dealings with the company and the new government. Today, he is a prominent player in the affairs and politics of the local APC constituency association.

\(^71\) London Mining, ‘Community investment strategy policy’, September 2012.
strategic aim being to normalize company-community relations and enhance the security of mining operations.

82. Recently, the company has begun to re-think aspects of its approach to CSR in the light of both its dealings with the MLA and efforts by central government and development partners to develop a ‘model’ community development agreement (CDA) for the mining sector. The ‘model’ agreement, currently in draft form, calls for the creation of a Community Development Committee (CDC) to manage community development funds. The proposed committee is similar in overall composition to London Mining’s current steering committee, although District Officers have no seat on it. The mining company and the nearest district council are expected to provide unpaid technical support to the CDC, which can decide to implement projects that are not included in District Development Plans. Like the above-noted District Lands Commission, the proposed CDC seems designed to operate in an administrative space already occupied by elected local councils. London Mining managers are not comfortable with the proposed model, arguing that simply handing over money to a CDC a) reduces the company to the status of a ‘passenger’ in community development management and b) makes community development investment overly reliant on the company’s long-term profit-making capacity, which is subject to the vagaries of world iron ore prices. The company is now advocating a ‘strategic shift in thinking’, in which its role changes from that of a ‘patron’ to that of a ‘co-facilitator, co-initiator and supporter’ of development plans and initiatives. To that end, the company is seeking to build development partnerships with other agencies and institutions. The early fruits of this strategy have included a partnership with GIZ and St Joseph’s Vocational Institute to modernize and upgrade vocational training in Lunsar town and a partnership with a local NGO (Cotton Tree Foundation) to a) increase youth smallholder farmers’ production of cash crops and b) establish village savings and loans schemes.

83. ATS, London Mining’s catering contractor, is now seeking to build on this last initiative by supporting tunnel growing of high-quality vegetables in villages surrounding Lunsar. Intensive pig and poultry husbandry is integral to this scheme, serving both as a source of fertilizer and a means of re-cycling plant waste. This scheme could be a source of valuable lessons for development planning in rural Sierra Leone, since it enables smallholder producers to sell direct to consumers (i.e. ATS) without surrendering profits to middlemen. The scheme may also point to ways in which smallholders can cope in, even benefit from, a future in which agricultural land becomes an increasingly scarce resource.

84. Taking a long-term view of large-scale private sector investment in provincial Sierra Leone, it is possible that what is being seen now is the very beginning of a process that will eventually lead to wage employment becoming the norm rather than the exception in the country, and rights-claims based on citizenship replace rights-claims based on community membership. Managing change of such magnitude while minimizing the risk of hardship and conflict will require

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72 London Mining, 'Framework for action on sustainable development (Marampa-Sierra Leone)', no date.
effective government planning, monitoring and regulation, particularly at the local level. The next section reports on the challenges the governmental system in Sierra Leone will have to overcome if it is going to achieve such aims.
CHAPTER 3: GOVERNMENT (CENTRAL AND LOCAL) AGENCIES AND PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT

85. The issues discussed so far make a clear case for better understanding of the development constraints facing the smallholder sector, the introduction of a modernized and better regulated land leasing system, and stronger mechanisms for arbitrating disputes between companies and host communities. But above all, it makes the case for co-ordinating and planning bodies capable of a) accurately monitoring trends in agricultural and mining land use, b) ensuring that communities are not relocated without adequate compensation, c) ensuring that centres of economic growth and in-migration are provided with adequate services, d) identifying and supporting opportunities for business partnerships between large-scale commercial operators and smallholders (e.g. out-grower schemes), e) up-scaling lessons learned from these partnerships, f) identifying the skills requirements of private sector employers and reflecting these in national education policy and local education development plans, and g) designing institutions and infrastructure specifically to meet these combined needs.

86. The Government has fully embraced the growth poles approach as being ‘relevant to its development agenda.’ With this endorsement also comes realization that there several governance and institutional challenges in Sierra Leone that could, if not addressed or managed, have a constraining or undermining effect upon the success of a growth poles approach. These challenges could be summed up simply as the need to find a balanced dialogue and delivery mechanism between the significant numbers of stakeholders involved in the growth poles approach - central government MDAs, external investors, development partners, financiers, local authorities, and communities/wider population - and to ensure that there is the capacity (managerial, political and technical) within the appropriate state institutions to deliver a growth agenda predicated upon foreign direct investment.

Central Government

87. Based on the understanding that institutional capacity constraints exist, the WB commissioned analytical work to identify the optimal institutional and co-ordinating arrangements for the growth poles approach. The first phase of this analysis, undertaken between November 2013 and January 2014, was established on the basis that, given the proposed multi-sector approach of the GPP, any management and delivery system would have to be fully integrated into existing governmental structures. Here, the key factors that need to be considered are a) delivery systems, b) cross government co-ordination, c) the ability to prioritize, d) being able to ensure appropriate allocation of financial resources, e) the ability to co-ordinate and lead development partners and f) the ability to enter into dialogue with civil society.

88. The review examined a number of existing co-ordination arrangements (inter-ministerial coordination, development agenda prioritization, PRSP implementation and DP coordination) and compared these to the advantages and disadvantages of institutional arrangements in other countries where a similar growth poles program was active (e.g. the Madagascar Growth Poles Project, the Burkina Faso Bagre Pole and the Tanzania Mtwara Development Corridor). The initial recommendations of the report highlighted the need for continued high-level political coordination of the national economic growth agenda by the Office of the Chief of Staff (OCoS, located in the Office of the President). Further discussions on this issue have also identified the need for a small High Level Committee (HLC), which would include key line ministries and provide oversight and direction for the GPP. Overall co-ordination of the GPP would be led by a small task team within the OCoS, which would serve as a secretariat to the HLC and facilitate monitoring and oversight of the project.

89. The HLC will need to ensure that the MDAs represented on it align their internal decision-making and resource to the overall GP process. The OCoS will need to demonstrate to both internal and external stakeholders that that co-ordination and management of the growth poles strategy is being conducted in an apolitical, balanced and transparent manner, that quality investors are being encouraged, that investments are properly and legally protected and that the population of Sierra Leone as a whole sees the benefits.

90. Finally, while there is no question that central government has overall responsibility for development planning and administration, there is also a clear need here for local governmental agencies that are close to the investments that are being monitored and regulated, able to gather information at source, respond quickly to issues as they arise, exercise decision-making powers on the principle of subsidiarity and provide sound advice to central planners, policy makers and investors. However, interviews with local council staff, District Officers and chiefdom authorities, as well as knowledge of current capacity constraints for local councils, give little grounds for optimism that local government agencies are currently ready to fulfil this critical role.

Local Councils

91. The guiding principles of Sierra Leone’s National Decentralisation Policy, published in 2010, include the transfer of power, authority and resources from the centre to democratically elected councils... and bringing political, administrative and fiscal control and responsibility over services closer to the people where they are actually delivered. The objectives set out in the policy also

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74 Institutions that would be represented on this HLC include: Office of the Chief of Staff, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Ministry of Transport and Aviation, Ministry of Lands, Environment and County Planning and the Private-Public Partnerships Unit. Additional members might also include (where appropriate) Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food Security. The HLC would be chaired by the Chief of Staff.

75 It is accepted that despite the examples of sub-optimal local council capacity as outlined in this report, there are significant differences in terms of both technical (human resources and capability for example) and operational capacity (governance of local revenues for example) between the various councils – and not all councils will demonstrate the same failings (or successes) when it comes to interacting with external investment.
include to build local ownership of and operational efficiency of the decentralisation process through effective development planning [...] to provide an effective link between national development priorities and local level development initiatives and to devolve the required functions and resources to enable local councils to explore all opportunities to promote equitable local economic growth and service delivery through mobilisation of local resources in tandem with the private sector and civil society. The policy establishes a local council as the highest development and service delivery authority in the locality and specifically requires NGOs to ensure integration of their activities within the council’s development plan.

92. Interviews with Port Loko District Council (PLDC) administrators and councillors revealed that this particular council is currently unable to fulfil these policy provisions. For example, PLDC administrators reported that the council’s development coordination umbrella is currently confined to the NGOs, CBOs and small businesses (e.g. builders and storekeepers) that register with it. The PLDC planning office currently does not collect or process information on the larger companies operating in the district, although some administrators claim to ‘know about’ these companies because the council receives a) a share of surface rent on their land leases and b) property rates from some of them. Commenting on this situation, one administrator pointed out that large-scale private sector investment is authorized and monitored ‘above our level’ (i.e. by central government). Another observed that local councils need clearance from ‘head office’ in Freetown before investigating the local activities of corporate investors and have to be ‘very careful’ not to over-step their authority. External investment, he went on, is welcome in the district and local councils do not want to over-burden companies with regulations and taxes.

93. A similar picture emerged in interviews with senior district council staff in Bonthe. Local councils, they argued, should be responsible for overseeing negotiations of land lease agreements to ensure that local communities benefit for sustainable development and that investors respect the customs and traditional livelihoods of the people. However, they complained, the councils do not have the necessary support in legislation to monitor the large-scale private sector. As a result, companies only tend to deal with central government agencies. The 7,000-hectare Gambia Mattru oil palm estate is a particular source of concern in this context. Established in the 1960s with support from the African Development Bank, it has suffered from long neglect but remains a government-owned asset overseen by a MAFFS unit in Freetown via a local management committee chaired by the Paramount Chief. Neither the district council nor the local district office holds copies of the original land lease and both have been reduced to the role of bystanders while piecemeal efforts at rehabilitating the estate are channeled through MAFFS. One such investment, originating from the Malaysian Government, saw the replanting of part of the estate but this area has now reportedly become overgrown again. A private investor paid local residents to rehabilitate another part of the estate with a view to buying up the annual palm fruit harvest, but local landowners are embroiled in a dispute with the management committee over surface rents (currently only 1,500 Leones, i.e. US$0.35, per acre per annum)

76 Council registration certificates are useful to small businesses as proof of identity for opening bank accounts and securing loans.
and over the committee’s alleged allocation of the best-quality harvestable trees to non-landowners. There has never been any formal community development agreement between the estate management and local landowners. It was in reference to this last problem that the local councilor for the Gambia area commented scathingly about central government functionaries who, he claimed, adhere dogmatically to the notion that all external investment is in the interest of national development but don’t seem to notice when such investment does nothing to raise local people out of abject poverty.

94. However, the internal administrations of some local councils also suffer from weak capacity and lack of transparency. For example, the PLDC Chief Administrator (CA) has been a signatory to recent land lease agreements in the district, but claimed when interviewed that the council does not keep copies of these agreements.\(^{77}\) He went on to display several receipts for the council’s share of surface rent. These were kept loosely in his desk drawer and were written by hand on plain notepaper. It was not clear why the CA was (or appeared to be) managing the council’s surface rent income in what could be described as a ‘personal manner’, when there are procedures in place for booking and receipting payments. However, a group of councillors subsequently reported that the administration of PLDC’s own-source revenue (i.e. revenue distinct from tied grants from central government for administration and devolved functions) was the prerogative of the council’s ‘top-level management’ and they were not always privy to their deliberations.\(^{78}\)

95. Local councillors representing wards directly affected by London Mining operations (i.e. the main concession area, the haul road and Thofeyim port) were keen to emphasize that, apart from the construction of a new village for resettled residents at Thofeyim and a few short-term employment schemes, very little of the company’s community development funding directly benefits communities most affected by the mining operations. While it is wholly understandable that these communities should feel entitled to a substantial share of CSR funding, it does not make economic sense to locate major amenities and services in small villages. The broader point here is that overall responsibility for ensuring that a) local communities are properly compensated for losses incurred as a result of large scale private sector investment and b) services and amenities benefit the widest possible public, lies with government rather than private companies and ad hoc community development committees.

District Offices

96. District Office staff echoed this last point during a subsequent interviews. The District Offices were created in the colonial era to oversee governance in the chiefdoms and to serve as local hubs for the field offices of central government departments (notably agriculture, health and public works). The post of District Officer (Senior District Officer in larger districts) was

\(^{77}\) The CA explained that only three copies of each lease are made: one copy goes to landowners, another to central government and the third to the lawyers who drew up the lease.

\(^{78}\) The councillors recalled being summoned to meeting by the CA and the PLDC Chairman to be informed that a new school scholarship scheme would be part-funded from own-source revenue.
discontinued when the local council system was established in 2004 but reinstated in 2010 in order to strengthen the central government presence in provincial districts.

97. The Senior District Officer (SDO) in Port Loko reported that his general role is to monitor government programmes and disseminate government policy, while the Assistant District Officer in Bonthe provided a detailed list of his functions and duties. The SDO in Port Loko went on to claim that the monitoring of large-scale private sector investment is part of his brief, since the district councils are only responsible for local services. His office, he went on, keeps ‘master copies’ of all land leases taken out in Port Loko District and is ready to intervene in the event of any disputes over their contents. However, he went on to express frustration at the manner in which large-scale private investments are currently being managed. Companies, he observed, often make promises of delivering local benefits when seeking signatories for lease agreements but fulfilling them is always a problem because their business models are never geared towards a) the employment of unskilled labour and b) supporting smallholder enterprise. Local people, he went on, tend to compound this problem by expecting too much from investors. They demand jobs when they don’t have the skills companies need and forget that it is the responsibility of government, not the companies, to deliver services. The problem is further compounded, he added, by the fact that new investors often arrive in the company of senior politicians from Freetown. If a local official like himself attempts to question the contents of a lease agreement or a CSR investment plan, the politician will claim that he is holding up much needed local development in search of a bribe. Local people will turn against him if he persists with these questions, only to experience the very problems he was talking about and trying to avoid, at a later date. This situation benefits nobody, least of all the local communities.

Chiefdom Authorities

98. The current de-formalized state of chiefdom governance lends extra urgency to capacity building at the local government level. While the chiefdoms are often spoken of in Sierra Leone as ‘traditional’ institutions, their governance structures are creations of colonial ‘indirect rule’. Efforts to graft local government functions onto chiefdom councils (e.g. tax collection and byelaw making) began in the 1930s. Originally, the colonial government allowed paramount chiefs to nominate their own sub-chiefs (i.e. speaker and section chiefs). However, a government decree issued in 1956 stated that each chiefdom council should comprise of the paramount chief, sub-chiefs, (i.e. speakers and section chiefs) and one additional member for each local residential cluster of twenty taxpayers (adult males). As a result of this decree, some of the larger chiefdoms ended up with more than 1,000 chiefdom councilors. An amendment to the Chiefdom Councils Act, enacted in 1964, transferred many of the executive functions of chiefdom councils to a

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79 These reported functions are: a) supervision of the local government activities for central government, b) mediating conflicts between local councils and line ministries; c) monitoring service delivery by local councils and NGOs throughout the district; d) mediating between local councils and chiefdoms; e) serving as the ‘single symbol of authority within the district’ i.e., the direct representative of central government; f) supervising local councils to ensure that they implement programs appropriately and report back to Central Government; g) regulate the activities of Paramount Chiefs; h) investigate and resolve local disputes or refer unresolved issues to the Provincial Secretary’s Office.

smaller chiefdom committee, comprising of the paramount chief, speaker, two members representing each district council ward in the chiefdom and a literate member. In practice, ward representation was usually supplied by section chiefs (until recently, ward boundaries were based on chiefdom section boundaries). Further amendments to the Chiefdom Councils Act in the late 1970s allowed for Members of Parliament (MPs) and government ministers to become *ex officio* members of chiefdom councils in their home localities. Many MPs went on to serve as the ‘literate members’ of chiefdom committees.

99. Today, the chiefdom council’s only real function is to serve as an electoral college for paramount chieftaincy elections; decision-making at the chiefdom level has effectively devolved back to paramount chiefs and their personally selected advisors. There is no statutory instrument to ensure that a) paramount chiefs take the wishes of landowners (i.e. controllers of family land) into account when approving land leases and b) that landowners can obtain redress if they are dissatisfied with chiefs’ decision-making on these matters.\(^{81}\) As a result of these uncertainties, new commercial investment has increasingly become a focus of conflict between chiefs and landowners in some areas. Furthermore, in some of the cases cited above, chiefs appear to be reprising their colonial role as center-local brokers and labor contractors for external investors. But in other cases, they are virtual bystanders in investment deals brokered by central government functionaries. In 2012, the GoSL published a new Chiefdom and Traditional Administration Policy, which recognizes that the old chiefdom council is an electoral college and nothing more. It also provides for the creation of a new chiefdom council, which is modeled on the old chiefdom committee (not mentioned in the policy) but allows for wider representation of civil society, women and youths. This new body could take on the functions and responsibilities that some in central government are currently keen to reserve for Chiefdom Land Committees (CLC) and Community Development Committees (CDC). As of now, a clear and coherent government strategy for institutional capacity building at the chiefdom level is urgently needed.

100. Existing governmental agencies in the provinces are not in a position to regulate highly capitalized private sector investment because a) the requisite planning authority has never been devolved to local councils, b) local councils were designed during a time when the main vehicle for delivering goods and services in the provinces was the development project, managed by an NGO or a project implementation unit embedded in a line ministry c) district officers are staffed by middle-ranking civil servants who are well down the hierarchy of governmental decision-making, d) chiefdom authorities’ primary function, both according to the statute and in practice, is not any kind of formal administration but the maintenance of social order. Making Sierra Leone’s local government system fully fit for purpose is unlikely to happen until central agencies overcome their reluctance to devolve functions and decision-making powers to it. But there may come a point when the sheer weight of social, economic and security issues generated by large-

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81 The original Chiefdom Councils Act does provide for the institution of lawsuits against chiefdom councils, but Sierra Leone’s judiciary has long been reluctant to rule on matters it considers as belonging to the realm of ‘tradition’. Historically, regulation of chiefdom governance in Sierra Leone has been the prerogative of the Executive. This means that for people dissatisfied with a chief’s governance the only way of obtaining redress is to present a petition, which government has no legal obligation to respond to.
scale private sector activity in the provinces makes enhanced and sustained efforts at capacity building at the local government level an imperative, and the challenge for central government will be to demonstrate that it can capacitate and empower local authorities (especially local councils) in a coherent manner so as to harness the benefits of external investment in a sustainable way.
CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

101. The rapid expansion in the extractives sector in Sierra Leone, has given much cause for optimism that the significant amounts of FDI can be leveraged in a manner that underpins continuing economic growth. Despite the fact that improvements in extractives governance are required,\(^2\) there is little doubt that large-scale foreign investment has the potential to drive development throughout the country and ultimately bring greater prosperity for all Sierra Leoneans. The analytical work undertaken during the diagnostic phase of the GPP has also identified agriculture and tourism as two further factors in growth pole development. The Sierra Leonean growth pole strategy appears to be well placed to follow the classic developmental approach of dialogue (with Government and public/private stakeholders), institutions (clear objectives and integrated approach), analysis (prioritization and subsequent sequencing of investments) and financing (identification and combining financing resources).

102. While a growth pole strategy has been successfully implemented in other countries, the unique characteristics of Sierra Leone will play a huge role in determining the success (or otherwise) of the project. The historical gulf in wealth, power and administrative capacity between Freetown and the provinces, the disconnect between central authority and local government and the changing relationship between traditional authorities and the local populations, will all add to the technical challenges of leveraging local economic development from external private sector investment. The success of the Sierra Leone GPP, will to a large degree, depend on devising strategies for overcoming country-specific challenges in the design process. In the GPP design, it is expected that the institutions, risks and mitigation sections of the Project Appraisal Document (PAD), especially the Operational Risk Assessment Framework (ORAF), will draw heavily upon this section of the report.

103. The conclusions and recommendations are therefore presented under three main headings: a) policy Issues, b) programmatic issues and c) understanding the local context.

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4.1 Key Policy Issues

Land

104. The single most important policy issue that needs to be addressed is land. Without clarity in land titling and ownership, there will continue to be significant uncertainty for any private sector investor (especially large scale commercial agricultural investors) and a disincentive to invest or to plan for the long term.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue: LAND</th>
<th>Category: POLICY</th>
<th>Importance to Growth Poles Approach: CRITICAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Challenge:** There remains a significant lack of transparency around the administration of land leases and the awarding of land to private sector investors. Meeting private investors’ needs for access to land to develop should not preclude the provision of adequate compensation to existing landowners and land users. The Growth Poles Strategy needs unambiguous clarity on this issue in both land policy and law.83

**Recommendation**

There is no simple solution to the land issue, aside from a complete revision of the National Lands Policy (followed by a revised land law) that addresses, as a core issue, the leasing of land for private sector investment. The revisions need to be very clear on compensation to landowners/land users for loss of income, the means of establishing title to land, Parliamentary ratification of land concessions above a specified area, the environmental and social responsibilities of lease holders and, most of all, the roles, responsibilities and authority of chiefs in the land tenure management.

**RESPONSIBILITY:** This is the responsibility of the Government of Sierra Leone, through a ‘whole of Government approach’84. While some work has already begun in this area, notably a revised draft National Lands Policy from the Ministry of Lands, County Planning and Environment (MLCPE),

**OTHER STAKEHOLDERS:** There are a number of stakeholders that would need to be involved in this

**TIMELINE:** Overdue and would need to be undertaken quickly in order to re-

**IF UNRESOLVED:** Continued opacity in the land management

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83 The forthcoming World Bank analytical work on Land Governance in Sierra Leone, available at the end of 2014, will contribute to the GP work in this area.

84 A whole of Government approach signifies a more co-ordinated and coherent manner in addressing policy to operational issues, whereby there is clear alignment between political, legislative bureaucratic and technical activities. Historically, this has been a challenge in Sierra Leone. The GP approach is also considered to operate in a similar manner.
supported by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), it is not clear how much and to what extent other key ministries, departments and agencies have been consulted or played a role in the drafting and subsequent rollout of the policy.

| supported by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), it is not clear how much and to what extent other key ministries, departments and agencies have been consulted or played a role in the drafting and subsequent rollout of the policy. | process, not least communities, the private sector and development partners. | assure current and future investors. | system will lead to conflict, undermine investment and impede development. |
Matching Education and Skills to Employment

105. The single biggest factor that constrains Sierra Leoneans in their search for employment is the quality and/or appropriateness of their education and skills in relation to the requirements of employers and commercial investors. The short-term and medium-term solution lies in providing targeted skills training for the existing workforce. The longer-term solution lies in improving adult literacy and greatly increasing capacity for technical and vocational education.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue: MATCHING EDUCATION AND SKILLS TO EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES</th>
<th>Category: POLICY</th>
<th>Importance to Growth Poles Approach: CRITICAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Challenge:</strong> Shortfalls in education and skills training within Sierra Leone’s workforce are a major concern for commercial investors. Frustrations among job seekers (migrant or local) when they are unable to access long-term wage employment can also lead to social unrest. The key challenge is to make the Sierra Leonean workforce educationally fit for purpose.</td>
<td><strong>Recommendation</strong></td>
<td>The LCP is not a magic formula for improving the quality of the Sierra Leonean workforce, but it is an important initiative. Clear communication on the precise meaning of ‘local content’ will be needed from the outset. Effective implementation of the policy (and the ensuing local content law) will require close coordination between government agencies and commercial investors engaged in start-up operations. Consideration should be given to the creation (through public/private partnership) of an employment training/skills facility (similar to the one in Gulu, Northern Uganda), where training courses are funded directly by commercial investors and graduates guaranteed employment after completion of their training courses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RESPONSIBILITY:</strong> Whilst this is clearly a Government responsibility, there is also a need for the private sector to support employment and skills training, both in the short and long term. The bigger issue here is the need for a concerted Government effort to improve the staggeringly</td>
<td><strong>OTHER STAKEHOLDERS:</strong> The private sector and development partners have a significant role to play in supporting</td>
<td><strong>TIMELINE:</strong> Solutions to the skills gap can be addressed in the short and medium term,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IF UNRESOLVED:</strong> Sierra Leone’s workforce is one of its potential assets. But if education and skills training</td>
<td></td>
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http://www.btvet-uganda.org/training-provider/homepages/st-joseph-technical-school-gulu
low levels of education in Sierra Leone and to redress the unacceptably low levels of adult male and female literacy (as low as 55% male literacy and 33% female literacy).\(^8\)

improvements in education and skills training.

but Government has to prioritize spending on education and skills training if long-term growth is to be sustained.

remains unresponsive to investor demands, a growth pole strategy simply will not work. The *2013 Doing Business Report for Sierra Leone*, reported that an inadequately educated workforce was the fourth most problematic factor for doing business in the country.

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\(^8\) UNESCO Institute of Statistics, 2011 – Adult (15+ male: 55%, female 33%). Youth (15-24 71% male, 52% female). The Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey undertaken by UNICEF in 2010, had a figure of 48% female literacy for the age group 15 to 24.
4.2 Programmatic Issues

Institutional Relationships

For the GPP to be successful, the institutional relationships and structures at three different levels (central, local and community) need to be clear, aligned and integrated. Sound governance principles and co-ordination/dialogue mechanisms need to be established (and proven to work) to provide assurance to investors that Sierra Leone is open for business and that it represents a safe and reliable investment opportunity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue:</th>
<th>PROGRAMMATIC</th>
<th>Category:</th>
<th>INSTITUTIONAL</th>
<th>Importance to Growth Poles Approach:</th>
<th>CRITICAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Challenge:**

A ‘whole of Government approach’ will be required to ensure an effective management, coordination and delivery mechanism for the GPP, which is itself a strategy for simultaneous coordinated investments. There are a number of competing interests that could provide disincentives to commercial investors. Key areas that need careful monitoring include:

a) The possibility that multi-

**Recommendation**

The siting of the GPP in the OCoS is a statement that the FDI agenda (and the growth poles approach) is a political priority. To ensure that political aspirations are matched by technical and bureaucratic willingness, there must be clear regulation and enforcement of the processes by which private investment is encouraged, supported and assisted. The ‘facilitation’ activities of brokers must be curtailed, whether they are politicians, local government functionaries or chiefdom authorities. Corruption and government accountability remains a key concern for business investors, as identified by the 2013 Doing Business Report for Sierra Leone. Here, corruption was identified as the third most problematic factor for doing business in the country.

**RESPONSIBILITY:** The proposed HLC needs to address all of these concerns, but the Task Team, as a technical body, will have limited political leverage to counteract competing advice and activities, especially at the local level. Strong political leadership will be required to coordinate and regulate the efforts of central and

**OTHER STAKEHOLDERS:**

A ‘whole of Government approach’ is just that: the whole of Government. The

**TIMELINE:** Immediate: a coordinating mechanism and guidelines for the GPP must be

**IF UNRESOLVED:** Private sector investment will continue to be of low quality and quantity and employment and
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency delivery responsibilities generate ‘turf wars’ and competitive rent seeking.</th>
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<tr>
<td>b) A continuing disconnect between centralized policy-making and local experience, coupled with continuing shortfalls in support to local authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Resource capture by local authorities and center-local brokers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, in particular, needs to be brought into the process in a manner that is more integrated than has been the case to date. It should be represented on the HLC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic opportunities will remain at low levels. The GPP will be unable to leverage investments, projects or programs that will trigger local economic development. The entire Agenda for Prosperity could fail.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue: PROGRAMMATIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Challenge:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) When looking at the role of agricultural investments in the growth poles approach, it is apparent that industrial centers can act as potential markets for expanded agricultural produce. The challenge here is establishing how best farmers can move beyond survival economies and indebtedness to middlemen to produce in bulk for emerging markets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) How best to organize sustainable and productive business relationships between large agribusiness investors and farmers – in a manner that clearly has beneficial implications for both parties – remains an issue. Smallholder farmers’ lack of formal business experience and increasing land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recommendation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>While the current organizational framework for smallholder farmers in the country is the ABC model, there is a need rectify the design weakness of this model. The GP framework can support this process by promoting a revised operational ABC model with a stronger focus on value chain integration and market development (i.e. not just production and processing). Restructuring the value chain would help to attract capital to where it is most needed and negate the perception of smallholder farmers as high-risk investments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RESPONSIBILITY:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearly MAFFS must have the central role in any re-modeling of the ABC’s. But there is a need to build relationships between smallholders and agribusiness investment in a manner that will have a dual benefit: smallholders will gain skills, business operating practices and management techniques while agribusiness investment will secure produce (volume and quality) from labor and land sourced from the smallholders. Local level management of this relationship is fundamental for it to work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OTHER STAKEHOLDERS:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Government, Private Investors, Ministry of Trade and Industry. There is a bigger issue here around building mechanisms for engaging the private sector in the overall GP program. Space needs to be created by Government to allow organizations like Chambers of Commerce to play.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IF UNRESOLVED:</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


4.3 Understanding the Local Context

107. There are a number of attitudinal and operational consequences that have been identified as being important to consider in the context of the proposed GPP. These range from the perceptions and behavior of the communities directly affected by private sector investment to the unintended social consequences of the desperate search for employment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue: CONTEXT</th>
<th>Category: UNDERSTANDING THE LOCAL CONTEXT</th>
<th>Importance to Growth Poles Approach: CRITICAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Challenge:</td>
<td>Recommendation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Community perceptions of the benefits attached to large-scale private sector investment need to be re-adjusted to create better understanding of their actual scale, location and timing.</td>
<td>A significantly improved policy on communicating the private sector-led growth agenda to rural populations is urgently required. This policy has to take into account the low levels of literacy in rural areas and the fact that, in the absence of any sustained Government support to improve their lives, the rural poor are looking for a way out of poverty in return for giving up their land.</td>
<td>A deeper understanding of the social consequences of the proposed growth pole approach is also required. Work on social and environmental protection and health hazard awareness needs to be factored in to strategies and guidelines for project investment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
b) Constructive engagement between external investors and communities needs to begin during the negotiation of land leases, not when problems and misunderstandings are exposed by operations.

c) Labor migration is affecting the wellbeing of the dependents left behind. The increasing number of women and girls being drawn into commercial sex work in areas of large-scale investment poses health and social risks for the country’s population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESPONSIBILITY:</th>
<th>OTHER STAKEHOLDERS:</th>
<th>TIMELINE:</th>
<th>IF UNRESOLVED:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government needs to ensure that its social obligations to its citizens are not diluted in the drive for economic growth. Investment brings employment, employment brings prosperity and prosperity brings an improved quality of life. But there will always be a section of the population that does not benefit from (or is negatively impacted by) the growth agenda, and whose welfare remains the primary responsibility of the Government. The balance between the drive for economic growth and the risk of social conflict (particularly around extractives) must be carefully monitored and managed.</td>
<td>Development Partners and private sector investors have a critical role to play in ameliorating the negative (unintended) effects of a push for growth.</td>
<td>This is a current and ongoing issue.</td>
<td>Continued community grievance and unrest will undermine investor confidence. The GPP needs to support improvements in public access to information about investments, mechanisms for resolving conflicts over land and job opportunities and CSR systems and processes. The GPP (especially from the WB viewpoint) also needs to consider the unintended social consequences of private sector-led</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As the design work for the GPP begins, it is incumbent upon all stakeholders to appreciate the challenges facing the drive for private sector-led growth in Sierra Leone. New employment opportunities and improved standards of living are benefits that all Sierra Leoneans should enjoy. The GPP must therefore aim not only to promote external investment as a driver of economic growth and strengthen central government capacity to manage and oversee this investment. It must also improve coordination between central and local government and strive to ensure that economic development both engages and reaches the entire population.
ANNEX 1 QUESTIONNAIRE FOR MIGRANT WORKERS

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR MIGRANT WORKERS

QUESTIONNAIRE NO:

LOCATION OF INTERVIEW:

INTERVIEWER NAME:

Section 1. General Information

Name of Interviewee:   Age:
Gender:     Place of Origin:
Married/Single:    Wife/Wives:
Children:    Other Dependents (No/Type):
Here with you:    Left Behind:
Level of Education:   Any further Training/Skills (If so what):

Section 2. Previous Location

Where were you living before you came here? 
Was it your hometown? Yes/No
If yes, do you own land in your hometown? 
Did you make a farm or do business in your hometown?
Did you have a job before you came here? Yes/No
If Yes:
What was the job?
Why did you leave?
If No:
What were you doing?
How were you finding food, shelter and clothing?
How did you travel here?
Did you travel by yourself or with others?
How much did it cost you to get here?
Section 3. Current Location

How long have you been here?

Where are you living?

Are you living with other people?

If so, how many?

Are you paying rent?

If so, how much?

Do you have any family members or relations here?

How did you find the place where you are living?

Is this the first place that you have lived in this area?

If not, where were you before and why did you leave the place?

Are you happy that you are here – if not why not?

Section 4 Employment Status

Are you working? Yes/No

If working:

What is your job?

How long have you been working here?

How long did it take you to get the job?

Is this your first job here? Yes/No

If No, what else did you do before?

How many times did you apply for the job?

How much are you paid?

Are you paid on time?

Did you have to pay someone to get the job? Yes/No

If yes, how much did you pay?

If not working:

What are you doing?

How are you surviving?
How long will you stay here if you have no job?

Have you heard of the local content policy?

Do you know what it is supposed to do?

Do you agree with it?

Section 5. Social and well being

How often do you eat?

Have you been sick recently?

Have you had to visit a health facility? Yes/No

If yes, who paid the bill?

How are your relations with the local community?

Do you live with people from your hometown or with others?

Have you been in trouble with the authorities? Yes/No

If Yes Why?

How was the issue resolved?

Do you have access to facilities (health, schools, etc) in this place? Yes/No

If Yes, which ones?

If No, why not?

Do you ever plan to return to your hometown? Yes/No

If Yes, when?

If No, why not?

Section 6. Other

What are your hopes and aspirations?

Is there anything else related to your employment status that you would like to say
ANNEX 2  TERMS OF REFERENCE

GROWTH POLES PROGRAM

POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL CAPITAL

Context

The World Bank is currently undertaking a diagnostic exercise to identify opportunities for the Government of Sierra Leone to adopt a “growth-poles approach” for economic development driven by key sectors (e.g. minerals, agriculture and tourism). The growth poles approach aim to unlock the growth potential of various industries near a specific resource, asset or special geographic feature. Activities are often concentrated in a single hub of economic activity, or are integrated along a natural-resource corridor.

There is an urgent need to expand economic and employment opportunities outside of Freetown and regional capitals, and equally importantly outside and around the specific mining operation locations. Currently these mining operations function in an enclave manner – with infrastructure, power and services all specifically developed and targeted at the extractive operation, to the almost total exclusion of the surrounding communities and populations. The “growth pole concept”, essentially a spatial approach aimed at fostering private-public dialogue, with the aim of creating employment and investment opportunities through economic diversification (agriculture, tourism, mining etc.) requires targeted investment and coherent and robust investment policies. The proposed growth pole approach will provide the Government with an opportunity to match some of the expectations of its citizens by demonstrating its ability to utilize mining revenues for development projects and through sound investment principles and polies, deliver on economic growth and employment opportunities. Leveraging investments that have already been made by mining companies (such as work on Pepel Port, Marampa/Manna Point rail/port construction infrastructure) where possible, noting that the investments made by the mining companies mean that they have first priority on these investments for their own operations, will hopefully provide new investors with more confidence to come and develop operations.

Initial discussions and engagement with the key Government stakeholders led by the Office of the Chief of Staff, have already taken place over the past few months. The immediate activities under this work currently allow for a rapid assessment within a timeframe of less than a year, to i) identify options and constraints to leverage private sector investment in infrastructure and commercial operations, ii) to review and agree the institutional arrangements for taking forward and providing the political leadership and responsibility for the initiatives and iii) identifying the key implementational modalities. To date the conclusions from several in country missions, center the growth pole approach on four main tenets:

- The identification and establishment of an appropriate delivery mechanism (institutions and responsibilities) with activities such as capacity building, information systems management and planning skills transferred to local Government;

- Clarity and guidelines around deal/transaction planning to allow for and identify ways of, tapping into opportunities around shared infrastructure with the mobilization of project development financing for PPPs that maximize public, private and social returns;

- Establishment of a catalytic fund to remove value chain constraints (skills, innovation business development capabilities) and to undertake targeted feasibility studies. It will encourage the development
of domestic enterprises through matching grants and challenge funds, and possibly small public goods infrastructure investments; and

- Development of the local institutional and entrepreneurial capacity (social capital) to underpin a growth poles approach, engaging local stakeholders (especially the rural poor) that would otherwise not benefit from growth pole development. Particular groups will be targeted such as communities in mining areas, subsistence small holder farmers in the vicinity of large commercial farms and vulnerable persons such as women and unemployed youth. Addressing aspects of decentralization and environmental issues will contribute in building institutional capacity.

Delivery of a successful growth pole approach will be enhanced by more detailed and comprehensive understanding of local governance dynamics and political and institutional relationships in the development planning processes. In particular, as much of the proposed investments are centered in parts of Sierra Leone both physically and administratively distant from Freetown, the role and responsibilities of local government and authorities, and their relationships with communities and central government in terms of how they all support economic growth, are a critical piece of the jigsaw.

Furthermore, the evidence to date both historically and in present day, shows that external private sector investments in rural Sierra Leone often come under pressure from local populations to provide services that are the primary responsibility of government (both national and local). A diagnostic of institutional capacity therefore needs to be undertaken in order for the investment strategies and recommended solutions to have a distinctive and sustainable impact upon the economic growth of Sierra Leone.

Scope and Objective

The objective of this study is ultimately to improve the development and implementation of the growth pole approach in Sierra Leone, in a manner that will allow policies and the strategies for leveraged economic growth outside of Freetown, to be undertaken in the optimal manner.

The outcome of the assignment is a political economy analysis of local institutional and entrepreneurial capacity with a view to understanding the roles and responsibilities of the key stakeholders, recognizing the dynamics between these stakeholders and identifying major opportunities and challenges to the proposed growth poles approach. In the context of this program, institutional and entrepreneurial capacity specially refers to the interactions between central and local government in the promotion of local economic development, the relationship and responsibilities between wealth generating/service providing agencies (both formal and informal) and their publics and how the expected developmental benefits from a growth poles approach will impact upon these relationships. In order to better facilitate and support economic growth and development in Sierra Leone, outside of Freetown and enclave mining operations, there is a need to understand the building blocks and enablers of growth and how these impact upon the key institutional relationships and characteristics of central government, local government and grassroots organizations. In summary, this analytical piece will contribute to directly improving the quality and appropriateness of future World Bank understanding, engagement, policy dialogue and operations in the growth pole approach.

There will be three main outputs. It is recognized that given the nature of the work some degree of dovetailing in the sets of activities might be required to produce each output. However, the sequencing of each output provides both a platform for the next stage as well as ensuring a comprehensive approach and diagnostic.
Output 1: A detailed review of the roles and responsibilities between central and local government with regard to development planning and promotion of local economic development

Two related policy issues here are a) the division of planning functions/authority between central and local government and b) land tenure administration. In the first case, seven of the original eight planning functions scheduled for devolution to local councils in 2004 have not yet been devolved. Some councils (e.g. Bo City) are already using GIS data to delimit planning zones and others (e.g. Bo District) have compiled computerized amenities databases. However, local councils have insufficient authority, currently, to make or enforce planning decisions based on these data. The recent re-activation of District Offices further fragments local planning authority.

In the second case, a new National Lands Policy has been drafted. This document contains several progressive measures, notably a) the creation of a national land cadaster; b) giving communities an opportunity to refuse to lease their land whatever the type investment being proposed; c) ensuring that a larger share of lease rent goes to the principal owner of the land and d) creating democratically elected Community Land Committees to manage land under customary ownership and facilitate the recording and issuance of land titles. However, the draft policy also calls for the creation of a National Lands Commission (NLC), comprising of a central secretariat and district offices, with responsibility for local-level land use planning, tenure adjudication, surveying and mapping, issuance of titles and land valuations. The policy document states that the land use planning functions of local authorities at the provincial level shall be ‘reviewed’ to conform to the new policy. These provisions contradict the Local Government Act of 2004 (Third Schedule). Furthermore, there is no consideration in the draft policy as to whether the allocation of land use planning functions to one authority (the NLC) and development investment and service delivery functions to another (elected local government councils) is conducive to effective and coherent governmental decision-making.

The proposed analysis therefore needs to explore the political and institutional issues that are creating this policy contradiction (including a possible lack of coordination between development partners) and how they might be resolved.

Output 2: Recommendations for how best to build, enhance, and sustain capacity for community level development initiatives and participation, through a block grant distribution process/system, and performance monitoring mechanism for communities.

A great deal of work has been done in Sierra Leone in the last decade to improve rural livelihoods and build social capital and human rights awareness in rural communities. There have also been many efforts, mostly led by international agencies, to connect these initiatives to the decentralization process so as to create an integrated framework for development governance (e.g. council-NGO-CBO ‘learning alliances’, Ward Development Committee monitoring of development projects, district budget oversight committees and district youth committees).

The sustainability of this framework is by no means a given. A key research task is to discover which among a range of possible mechanisms for promoting local economic enterprise work best in Sierra Leone, whether generally or in

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88 District Officers were responsible, historically, for approving and recording land leases taken out by ‘non-natives’ and for adjudicating chiefdom land disputes.
particular locations e.g. challenge funds for community managed development, improving cooperatives and small businesses’ access to credit, subsidizing the purchase of locally managed equipment and machinery (e.g. rice mills), investing in infrastructure (e.g. feeder roads) or creating peri-urban ‘enterprise zones.’ What are the views of the GoSL, local councils and communities here? What lessons can be learned from previous experience?\footnote{For example the World Bank Rural and Private Sector Development Project.}

If the focus is on ‘quick wins’, the key question is how this framework can identify and capture local economic opportunities currently being generated by large-scale investments in infrastructure, agriculture, and mining. For example, capital-intensive mining and farming operations have no great interest in local labor, but their geographically concentrated workforces do represent a potential market for rural produce (especially fruit and vegetables). This potential is currently being constrained by lack of peasant access to credit. One mining large-scale company visited in March 2013 does not source food for its workers locally (via its catering contractor) because local farmers cannot accept monthly payments in arrears. A small business credit scheme, managed by local councils or commercial banks, could easily rectify this problem.

Output 3: \textit{An understanding of how a growth pole program will affect the local delivery of goods and services, rural livelihoods, gender relations and the environment.}

Recent large-scale mining and commercial agriculture enterprises in Sierra Leone have caused controversy on several counts\footnote{ALAT: Who is Benefitting? The social and economic impact of three large scale land investments in Sierra Leone: a cost-benefit analysis. July 2013.}. In particular, communities complain that they have not been properly consulted over land leasing arrangements and are being denied fair rents and compensation for lost assets. They also complain that jobs offered to them by companies are generally low paid, short-term and insufficient to sustain livelihoods outside farming. Concerns have also been raised in the literature that Sierra Leone Import Export Promotion Agency (SLIEPA) has been seeking to attract investors with the claim that 85% of Sierra Leone’s arable land is ‘unused’ and therefore available to investors. This claim, it is argued, is based on an outdated survey that did not full account of the fact that shifting cultivation in Sierra Leone (an historic adaption to low soil fertility) requires long fallow periods. The WB and other development partners have come under criticism for allegedly supporting external private investment in Sierra Leone with insufficient consideration of these issues.

Some commercial agriculture projects may not be environmentally sustainable. For example, one mechanized swamp rice enterprise in central Sierra Leone has leased a large tract of land from local communities. The company sub-lets plots to foreign investors at considerable profit, promising them a return on the twice-yearly harvest. However, the company is already ploughing seashells into the swamps in an effort to combat soil acidity. Local communities receive substantial donations of rice each harvest, but this is essentially charity rather than development assistance. History has shown that communities in Sierra Leone are perfectly capable of managing mechanized swamp rice schemes on their own given the right management model. \footnote{C. Jedrej, ‘The growth and decline of a mechanical agriculture scheme in West Africa’, \textit{African Affairs} 83:329 (1985), pp.541-58}

The prudent option here would be consult first with CSOs that have been engaging with these issues (e.g. Green Scenery) to discover what, if any, ideas are in circulation about making commercial investment in Sierra Leone more responsive to the needs and interests of the poor.

\textbf{Methodology and Approach}

The work will proceed as follows:
• Start-up Team discussions and consultations to develop a detailed plan for conducting the case study described above;

• Desk research and documentation review;

• At the outset of the task, organize a half-day session with the Sierra Leone Country Operations Team (and in necessary other parts of the CMU) to present the approach to the Sierra Leone case study and receive comments and feedback on the proposed comparative diagnostic methodology and to be appraised of any recent developments in the sector;

• Consultant to travel to Sierra Leone for one 10 day mission (to be concluded, at the latest, by the middle of October 2013) to carry out initial in country discussions, interviews with key stakeholders and to flesh out the proposed visit schedule (areas proposed for growth poles approach) for up country work.

• Consultant to return to Sierra Leone for final 20 day mission (to be concluded, at the latest by the middle of November 2013) and write the case study as described above, and refine it in consultation with the Bank management task team.

• The Team will combine desk and field work (in a manner to be defined and agreed in the detailed plan for conducting the study) to complete the task.

**Length of Task, Timing, Deliverables**

The work will be completed within 65 person-days. The Terms of Reference are for consultancy support from 3 consultants (one international and two national), (including two field missions), and one overall written report to be carried out within the period from September 2013 to December 2013. Specific WB personnel with relevant experience responsible for working on this assignment with the consultants are detailed in the section on Team Composition.

The deliverables are: i) 5 (maximum) page aide-memoire after the first field mission and ii) a final draft of a case study (30-40 pages, single-spaced) on the political economy of the social capital in the growth poles approach in Sierra Leone presented along the lines of the methodology described above.

**Timing of deliverables:**

*Aide-memoire:* (maximum 5 pages) this should: (i) outline key mission findings based on the methodology above and (ii) provide an outline of the final report. To be delivered no later than one week after the conclusion of the first field mission and no later than middle of October 2013;

*Draft Case Study Report:* to be submitted no later than two weeks month after the second field mission and no later than end November 2013; and

*Final Case Study Report:* incorporating task team feedback and suggestions, to be submitted no later than mid-December 2013.

**Target Audience**

The target audience for the study will be the Client (Government of Sierra Leone), in view of the fact that the whole growth pole approach is a tool for the GoSL to prioritize actions and investment policies/strategies, that underpin its development agenda (Agenda for Prosperity). The secondary target audience is the World Bank, that
will provide policy advice, operational resources and technical advice to the implementation of the Agenda for Prosperity.

**Team Composition and Resources**

The study task team includes senior consultants and Bank individuals with significant experience and exposure to political economy analysis, local government and decentralization and community development issues within Sierra Leone.
ALLAT, Who is Benefitting? The social and economic impact of three large-scale land investments in Sierra Leone: a cost-benefit analysis’, July 2013.


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Government of Sierra Leone, ‘Sierra Leone Local Content Policy’, May 2012.


London Mining, ‘Framework for action on sustainable development (Marampa-Sierra Leone)’, no date.


Sierra Rutile Limited, ‘Presentation to TZMI Congress’, November 201.


United Mineworkers Union, ‘A Collective Agreement between Mining Companies and the United Mine Worker’s Union of Sierra Leone (Terms and Conditions of Service for Mine Workers below Supervisory Level)’, October 2013.

S. Williams, ‘Land and pro-poor change in Sierra Leone: scoping study’, DFID/EU, July 2006;


80

