



## 1. Project Data

<b>Project ID</b> P150929	<b>Project Name</b> BI-Infrastructure Resilience Emergency	
<b>Country</b> Burundi	<b>Practice Area(Lead)</b> Transport	
<b>L/C/TF Number(s)</b> IDA-D0460	<b>Closing Date (Original)</b> 30-Jun-2019	<b>Total Project Cost (USD)</b> 24,433,596.83
<b>Bank Approval Date</b> 31-Mar-2015	<b>Closing Date (Actual)</b> 30-Jun-2019	
	<b>IBRD/IDA (USD)</b>	<b>Grants (USD)</b>
Original Commitment	25,000,000.00	0.00
Revised Commitment	25,000,000.00	0.00
Actual	24,433,596.83	0.00

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## 2. Project Objectives and Components

### a. Objectives

According to the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) (p. iii) and the Financing Agreement of April 7, 2016 (p. 5) the objective of the project was “to enhance the climate resilience of key transport and drainage infrastructure in Greater Bujumbura while strengthening the country’s capacity to manage and prevent natural disasters.”

### b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?



No

**c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?**

No

**d. Components**

The project included three components:

**Component A. Rehabilitation of Roads and Urban Infrastructure (appraisal estimate US\$21.6 million, actual cost US\$21.8 million):** This component consisted of two sub-components:

**Sub-component A.1: Transport Infrastructure Rehabilitation (appraisal estimate US\$12.6 million, actual cost US\$10.6 million):** This component was to finance the reconstruction or rehabilitation of structures on the Recipient's NR-1 route, including, installation of slope protection mechanisms, stabilization of embankments, rehabilitation of drainage systems, redirection of groundwater and rehabilitation and stabilization of related road pavements.

**Sub-component A.2. Urban Infrastructure Rehabilitation (appraisal estimate US\$9.0 million, actual cost US\$11.2 million):** This component was to finance the construction or rehabilitation of urban infrastructure in the PIA including: (a) reinforcement of channels of approximately 7.5km along the Recipient's Nyabagere and Kinyankonge rivers; (b) construction of a channel on the Recipient's Gasenyi river; (c) resizing of water outlets underneath the Recipient's NR-9 route; (d) construction of a lined canal in the Recipient's district of Carama; and (e) dredging of the canal, upstream of the Recipient's Buterere waste water treatment plant to improve downstream flow and fortification of the retention walls of said treatment plant.

**Component B. Capacity Strengthening in Disaster Risk Management (appraisal estimate US\$2.0 million, actual cost US\$1.2 million):** This component existed of two sub-components:

**Sub-component B.1. Capacity Strengthening in Disaster Risk Management (appraisal estimate US\$0.5 million, actual cost US\$0.7 million):** This component was to finance: (a) an evaluation and mapping of risks and underlying factors in the project area including their potential impacts on infrastructure; (b) a strategic information system to prioritize structural and non-structural risk mitigation activities, and take action regarding the location, orientation and design of infrastructure under the project; (c) the establishment of a prevention, early warning and response system in areas at risk of flooding and landslides to reduce losses to infrastructures and protect lives and livelihoods; and (d) the development of risk evaluation and extreme event monitoring tools to be owned by the communities and supported by the Red Cross volunteers, the local Committees for Civil Protection and the hydro-meteorological service (IGEBU).

**Sub-component B.2. Disaster Risk Recovery Contingency Funds (appraisal estimate US\$1.5 million, actual US\$0.5 million):** This component was to support emergency measures to reduce damage to infrastructure, ensure business continuity, and enable early rehabilitation. An Immediate Response Mechanism (IRM) coordinating unit and expenditure management procedures was to be defined during project implementation and reflected in an 'Immediate Response Mechanism Operational Manual', to be prepared separately and approved by IDA, in line with the flexibility provided under paragraph 12 of OP 10.00.



**Component C. Institutional Support, Project Management and Coordination** (appraisal estimate US\$1.4 million, actual US\$1.5 million): This component was to finance consultancy services, technical advisory services such as technical studies and assessments, training, media Information, Education and Communication (IEC), and financial audits This component was also to finance project management and coordination costs, including the Project Management Unit (PMU) operating costs.

**e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates**

**Project Cost:** The project was estimated to cost US\$25.0 million. Actual cost was US\$24.43 million.

**Financing:** The project was financed by a US\$25.0 million IDA grant of which US\$24.43 million disbursed.

**Borrower Contribution:** No contributions by the Borrower were planned.

**Dates:** The project was not restructured and closed on its original closing date on June 30, 2019.

### 3. Relevance of Objectives

#### Rationale

According to the PAD (p. 1) at the time of project appraisal, Burundi was among the ten poorest countries in the world, with a Human Development Index of 0.389 in 2013, which was well below Sub-Saharan Africa's (SSA) average, estimated at 0.502 for the same period. In 2015, more than 75 percent of Burundi's urban population lived in Greater Bujumbura, which had an estimated population of about 800,000. The area covered by the city had expanded rapidly over the last three decades, from about 37 square kilometers in 1983 to over 100 square kilometers in 2015. However, this rapid expansion was not accompanied by proper land use planning and watershed management, leading to uncontrolled urbanization and informal settlements and creating a complex hydrological situation. Also, insufficient public investments, especially in the peripheral districts of the capital, Bujumbura's, which concentrated more than 75 percent of the urban population, resulted in shortcomings in the provision of basic infrastructure and services. The under-served informal settlements were vulnerable to flooding due to the poor drainage infrastructure and the city's geographical location.

In February 2014, catastrophic rains caused extensive flooding and landslides in Greater Bujumbura resulting in casualties and damage of critical public infrastructure due to the rupture of an artificial dam on the Gasenyi River. On the request of the Government of Burundi, the Bank and other development partners conducted in joint rapid assessment in March 2014. The assessment identified the root cause of the disaster as: i) land degradation, related to inappropriate agricultural practices on steep slopes and deforestation upstream of rivers; ii) lack of expansion of water management services in coordination with urbanization; iii) inadequate sizing of the storm water collection system, particularly in the district of Carama; iv) building of houses and social infrastructure in flood-prone areas; and v) absence of a monitoring and early warning system. The project objective

The project's development objective was aligned with the country and the World Bank strategies. the objective of the project supported the government's Infrastructure Action Plan (2010-2015) with Road



Network Improvement Program to support the productive sectors of the economy. Also, the project's objective was in line with the country's National Policy on Climate Change and Nationally Determined Contributions adopted in 2013. Furthermore, the project's objective was in line with the Bank's most recent Country Partnership Framework (CPF) (FY19-FY23) which stresses under Focus Area 2 "strengthening foundations for economic and social resilience" the importance of resilient transportation infrastructure for economic and social resilience.

Based on the above discussion, the project development objective was relevant to the emergency infrastructure rehabilitation needs as well as developing longer-term capacity for managing climate resilience of infrastructure.

The relevance of the project's development objective is rated High.

## **Rating**

High

## **4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)**

### **OBJECTIVE 1**

#### **Objective**

To enhance the climate resilience of key transport and drainage infrastructure in Greater Bujumbura

#### **Rationale**

The project's theory of change linked outputs such as key transport and drainage structure, increasing drainage capacity in Carama and Buterere districts, discharging of storm water channeled to Lake Tanganyika would lead to reducing climate vulnerability to flooding, landslides, and rockslides on RN1, and thereby enhancing resilience of key transport and drainage infrastructure in the target area. According to the ICR (p. 11), the project assumed that emergency civil work activities were to prevent more damage on RN1 and mitigate future impacts of floods in neighborhoods located along the Gasenyi and Nyabagere rivers.

#### **Outputs:**

- 40 drainage structures/spots on RN1 were rehabilitated and reconstructed, surpassing the target of 17 drainage structures/spots.
- 10.37 kilometers of drainage network were newly constructed/rehabilitated, not achieving the target of 12.6 kilometers.
- 30 crossing structures over key transport infrastructures (RN1 or RN9) were rehabilitated, surpassing the target of three crossing structures.
- The transport strategy and road investment plans were completed, achieving the target.
- The Road Database was completed and tested for paved and unpaved roads, achieving the target.
- The Gasenyi upstream riverbanks along the RN1 were stabilized.



- The share of the road maintenance budget versus the annual maintenance budget increased from 68 percent in 2015 to 91.30 percent in 2019, surpassing the target of 85 percent. According to the Bank team (January 31, 2020) this indicator measured the delivery capacity (disbursement capacity) of the road maintenance fund.

#### **Outcomes:**

- 66,151 people had access to improved drainage in the areas served by the project, not achieving the target of 77,000 people.
- 46 percent of the beneficiaries was female, close to the target of 50 percent.
- Unit transport costs along NR1 in project impact area were reduced by 4.81 percent, achieving the target of a 4 percent reduction. This indicator was to reflect the benefits of the road restoration and improvement on the passenger and goods transport price. The methodology of the calculation was based on road user recollection of the prices at three periods (before the 2014 flooding, during the RN1 detoured, and after the project).

While, some drainage works could not be completed and thus the target for the number of beneficiaries of improved drainage was slightly under-achieved, the project completed most of its planned works. Although, the ICR did not include a "quality" related indicator to measure climate resilience aspect of the PDO (e.g. more durable infrastructure, higher technical specifications to address climate change needs, etc.), the ICR mentioned that (page 16) climate-resilient standards were rolled out to ensure all-weather/ season accessibility with an adequate service for RN1. Thus, the achievement of this objective is rated Substantial.

#### **Rating**

Substantial

## **OBJECTIVE 2**

### **Objective**

To strengthen the country's capacity to manage and prevent natural disasters:

### **Rationale**

The project's theory of change linked outputs such as enhancing government capacity in disaster risks knowledge, management and reduction, increasing communities' awareness and preparedness, and setting up an emergency contingency recover fund with strengthening foundations for economic and social resilience with strengthening the country's capacity to manage and prevent natural disasters. According to the ICR (p. 11), the project assumed that technical assistance and awareness raising activities on DRM would improve the government's response to future floods. This assumption was reasonable.

### **Outputs:**

- A contingency funding mechanism was established and is ready to provide access to financial resources in case of an eligible crisis or emergency, achieving the target.
- Eight municipalities were supported for emergency information response and contingency planning, achieving the target of eight municipalities.



- Several workshops were held in April-June 2017 for the members of the National Platform for Disaster Risks Prevention and Reduction (NPDRPR) at the national and communal levels to build capacity in the following areas: risk assessment and mapping of potential impacts through the use of Geographic Information System (GIS) Global Positioning System; operational procedures for prevention, early warning, and emergency response to reduce losses; protection of people and their livelihoods; and updating of contingency plans and monitoring/warning tools for extreme events in vulnerable communities.
- A three-day workshop was organized to raise awareness to about 20 members of Parliament on Disaster Risk Management (DRM).
- Several key technical assistance activities were not completed due to the lack of consultants to perform the following activities: i) revision of Burundi's national emergency response plan; ii) study for an information system in the watershed of the project area (some of the equipment initially planned under the project to improve local capacity to respond to natural disasters were not procured before project closing); iii) provision of minimum equipment such as hydraulic pumps for five communes of the project was delayed to challenge with technical specifications; iv) procurement of equipment for setting up an early warning system at the national level.

**Outcomes:**

- 38,385 people were supported by participatory evaluation of disaster risks and operational early warning and response systems, almost achieving the target of 39,000 people. 46 percent of the beneficiaries were female, close to the target of 50 percent.

This objective was ambitious given the large number of activities. Some key activities were not completed. The outcome indicators were not adequate to measure this objective and thus, due to lack of achievement and evidence, the achievement of the objective is rated Modest.

**Rating**  
Modest

**OVERALL EFFICACY**

**Rationale**

The achievement of the first objective was Substantial but the second objective was Modest due to lack of achievement on the key capacity building activities, resulting in an overall Substantial rating with moderate shortcomings.

**Overall Efficacy Rating**

Substantial



## 5. Efficiency

### Economic Analysis:

The PAD (p. 15) stated that a comprehensive economic assessment for the proposed project could not be carried out due to the emergency nature of the operation and the limited availability of data needed to prepare a formal cost-benefit analysis. However, the PAD identified the broader benefits of the project such as improved access to markets, and facilitating transport services through reopening NR1 to heavy traffic and reducing the time travel and distance between the capital city and border points with Rwanda and Tanzania. Other benefits – such as reduction in externality costs from trans-boarding activities or traffic interruptions and reduction in fatality and/or serious injuries that would otherwise have resulted from damaged structures – were also identified.

The ICR did not include a traditional economic analysis either and stated (p. 26) that the road rehabilitation works were limited to spots improvements and restoration and not a complete rehabilitation of NR1 which indicated that classical benefits from reduction of travel time and vehicle operation costs could not have been significant. The ICR (p. 36) itself states that given the difficulty of a proper economic assessment to capture the climate resiliency valuation, a survey would have been useful to capture beneficiary satisfaction of the civil works implementation and DRM activities. Further, the ICR would have benefited from including a unit cost analysis for the infrastructure works (e.g. cost of activity; cost per km rehabilitated, drainage built, etc.) in comparison with similar emergency projects.

**Operational Efficiency.** The ICR (p. 26) states that technical design studies for road and urban infrastructure were expedited through two projects that were underway before IREP, which helped to speed up the bidding and contract approval process and complete it one month after the Financing Agreement became effective. Also, the project closed on its original closing date of June 30, 2019.

During implementation, the original scope of addressing road vulnerabilities on the 30 km Bujumbura–Bugarama road segment had to be expanded to spots located beyond Bugarama, about 110 km toward the border with Rwanda. New flooding in April 2018 caused fresh damages to the newly built drainage channels and existing drainage channels in the project area. Further, additional critical spots appeared on RN1 and required immediate attention to protect nearby residents from landslides. The activities related to damaged infrastructure encountered an overrun of 24 percent. The ICR (p. 26) states that while these events expanded the scope of civil works, it was financed without restructuring or additional financing, but with support from Recovery Contingency Funds that were activated by the Bank in July 2018.

The ICR (p. 27) states that the original design studies carried out by an international consultant of two lots including the retention basin of lot eight in Carama were of poor quality. The studies had to be redone by a local consultant with an overall increase in quantities and costs.

Considering all the above factors, on balance, efficiency is rated modest.

### Efficiency Rating

Modest



a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

	Rate Available?	Point value (%)	*Coverage/Scope (%)
Appraisal		0	0 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable
ICR Estimate		0	0 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable

\* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

## 6. Outcome

Relevance of objective was *high* given its alignment with the country's emergency needs, country priorities, and the Bank's most recent Country Partnership Framework (FY19-23). Efficacy was *substantial* for the first objective, and *modest* for the second, leading to an overall *substantial* rating *with moderate shortcomings*. Efficiency is rated *modest*. Based on these ratings, the project's outcome rating is rated moderately satisfactory.

- a. **Outcome Rating**  
Moderately Satisfactory

## 7. Risk to Development Outcome

The main risks to development outcome can be categorized under two broad categories as listed below. While the technical and institutional risks are likely to be mitigated through the activities of two other projects, economic risks will prevail in the medium run due to budget limitations for maintenance.

**Technical and Institutional Risks:** According to the ICR (p. 40) the project's improvements of the drainage system are being continued by the Bank's Landscape Restoration project (P160613) which supports the restoration of the catchment area upstream of the project's interventions. The new project is constructing terraces on degraded hillsides and augmenting vegetation cover at critical points in the landscape to prevent soil erosion, increase soil moisture, and reduce surface runoff. Also, a new Bank project in the transport sector that will focus on safe and resilient road investments on key corridors and improve institutional capacity to manage the road sector is currently being developed.

**Economic Risks:** However, project investments will face the challenge of lacking resources for maintenance. The ICR (p. 40) stated that even though the government recently established the Burundi Office of Housing and Construction (BOHC), which will receive its funding from a tax levied on real estate transactions, to provide technical and financial support to municipalities in the maintenance of urban infrastructure, financing is very limited. Furthermore, the National Road Fund (NRF) might face a similar financial issue for maintaining road investments. The NRF is being financed through fuel levy which the government capped in 2016. Therefore, only 50 percent of the collected revenues are being transferred to the NRF. While the



NRF's budget was US\$5.6 million in 2017, the maintenance funding needs for the classified road network were calculated at US\$18 million in 2019. Finally, Burundi might in the future face similar challenges as during project implementation including shortage of hard currency and the volatility of exchange rates on works, poor quality of technical studies and difficulties to mobilize experts in DRM for capacity building activities, and political crises resulting in suspension of activities by development partners.

## 8. Assessment of Bank Performance

### a. Quality-at-Entry

According to the ICR (p.31) the project took the recommendations for resilient rehabilitation and reconstruction which were identified during the 2014 Rapid Assessment, conducted by the Bank and other donors, into account. The assessment recommended activities grouped into three categories: i) emergency: activities to stop the progression of damage; ii) medium-term: activities that allow the rehabilitation of infrastructure; and iii) long-term: activities that allow to envisage resilient reconstruction. The project design was simple and centralized all decision making within the NRA to avoid conflict of interest and diverge views from different stakeholders.

The Bank team identified the following risks as Substantial: i) likelihood that political and governance factors could significantly impact the PDO, due to possible political tensions related to the June 2015 general elections; ii) investments on infrastructure may be negatively affected by spending pressure due to macroeconomic volatility; iii) adverse impact on the PDO stemming from inadequate sector strategies and policies; iv) negative impact on the PDO due to lack of institutional capacity; v) weak fiduciary oversight and control; v) heavy rains. The Bank mitigated these risks by conducting two full implementation review missions per annum and two limited implementation review missions. However, according to the ICR (p. 32) the project's implementation was negatively affected by the low capacity of the line ministry under which the Project Management Unit (PMU) was based. Also, the ICR (p. 33) stated that the shortage of hard currency and the volatility of exchange rates had a negative impact on the prices of material for construction with an impact on costs. Furthermore, the implementation of the Disaster Risk Management (DRM) component was negatively affected by the challenge to find experts for key capacity-building activities. Finally, the ICR (p. 27) stated that the initial poor quality of design studies of two lots including the retention basin of lot eight in Carama conducted by an international consultant resulted in the underestimation of the capacity of the basin. The design studies had to be conducted again by a local consultant resulting in a cost overrun of the drainage infrastructure costs. These were risks not identified during project preparation.

The ICR (p. 32) stated that the project was able to initiate or complete the procurement for most of the project's budget by the time of project approval.

However, the second objective was overly ambitious for an emergency project and resulted in the cancellation of some activities such as the development of long-term strategies such as the national emergency plan and establishing early warning systems. The project's Results Framework lacked PDO indicators to better measure the PDO, particularly for the second objective. (see section 4 and section 9a for more details).



## **Quality-at-Entry Rating**

Moderately Satisfactory

### **b. Quality of supervision**

According to the ICR (p. 39) the Bank conducted six field missions during project implementation. Also, the Bank provided timely “no objection” and proactively resolved implementation issues such as the delays in the implementation of the RAP. According to the Bank team (January 31, 2020) the Bank addressed the initial delay in the compensation of project affected people which in turn delayed project implementation by following closely up with all government stakeholders involved in the compensation (mainly Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Transport). Also, the Bank addressed the management of the severe accidents resulting in fatalities for workers and/or road users taken place (see section 10a for more details) by applying the Environmental and Social Incident Response Toolkit six-step approach which allowed the works to continue after clarifying responsibilities, deficiencies, and compensating the families of the victims.

The ICR (p. 39) stated that the Bank coordinated with other donors, especially during field missions. Also, according to the ICR (p. 38) the Bank provided several recommendations to improve construction and environmental and social compliance during the April 2018 mission.

However, the Bank team did not modify the Results Framework to include PDO indicators that would have allowed to better measure the PDO.

## **Quality of Supervision Rating**

Moderately Satisfactory

## **Overall Bank Performance Rating**

Moderately Satisfactory

## **9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization**

### **a. M&E Design**

The theory of change and how key activities and outputs were to lead to the intended outcomes was sound. However, it is not clear how some of the indicators included in the Results Framework were to measure the achievement of the first aspect of the PDO (“enhance the climate resilience of key transport and drainage infrastructure”) such as the PDO indicators “reduction in unit transport costs along RN1 in project impact area” and “number of direct project beneficiaries”. The project could have attempted to develop appropriate quality related indicators to measure relevant aspects of climate resilience. The second aspect of the PDO (“strengthen the country’s capacity to prevent and respond to natural disasters”) was also not measured adequately by any outcome indicator. All specified indicators included a target, but several indicators lacked a baseline.



According to the PAD (p. 11) for the project's Transport component, implementation, monitoring and evaluation was to be the responsibility of NRA. For the Urban and DRM components, implementation and monitoring and evaluation was to be the responsibility of BAPW in coordination with the central government.

## **b. M&E Implementation**

According to the ICR (p. 36) the project would have benefited from a beneficiary survey to assess the beneficiary satisfaction of the civil works and DRM activities. The Bank team stated (January 31, 2020) that some indicators were measured on a regular basis as the civil works were progressing and recorded in ISRs. Upon completion of all civil works, the final value of each indicator was included in the client's completion report. Other indicators (indicators measuring outputs such as the completion of the road investment plan) were measured just once either upon completion of the activity or at project closing. The PCU, which was responsible for M&E, ensured coordination with each executing agency to collect data and communicate it to the bank team at least during each supervision mission as shown by the ISRs. According to the Bank team (January 31, 2020) the data related to civil works was found to be of reliable and of good quality. The works done by the contractors were subjected to technical audits by an independent auditor throughout the duration of the project (four times during the project lifetime including at project closure) and the quality found to be satisfactory to all parties. The Transport strategy and road database have been reviewed by the Bank Team which testify completion and quality of these outputs that sustain the project outcomes. The study of Transport cost reduction along RN1 was performed by a consultant and based on road user interviews.

The project's Results Framework was not revised during project implementation to allow for a better alignment of the first two PDO indicators with the infrastructure resilience aspect of the PDO.

The Bank team stated (January 31, 2020) that the M&E functions and processes are likely to be sustained through the capacity developed in the PCU, which is embedded as a permanent unit in the National Road Agency.

## **c. M&E Utilization**

According to the ICR (p. 36) given the short time frame of project implementation, M&E data was only available during the last year of the project. Therefore, it did not significantly feed into decision making.

### **M&E Quality Rating**

Modest

## **10. Other Issues**

### **a. Safeguards**

The project was classified as category B and triggered the Bank's safeguard policies OP/BP 4.01 (Environmental Assessment), OP/BP 4.11 (Physical Cultural Resources), and OP/BP 4.12 (Involuntary



Resettlement). According to the ICR (p. 37) the project prepared Environmental and Social Management Plans and Resettlement Action Plans for the RN1 works and urban development works. In May 2015 a major conflict between the contenders of the presidential election broke out which resulted in the stalling of project effectiveness by delaying the preparation, approval and disclosure of safeguard documents such as the resettlement plans for the road works. Throughout the first Implementation Status Reports (ISRs) the environmental and social risks remained Substantial, however, in the sixth ISR the risk was increased to High due to two road incidents. The ICR (p. 37) stated that in 2017 and in 2018 two accidents, one on the RN1 and one on the river downstream canal, resulted in the death of eight people. The first accident was reported to the Bank five months late, resulting in the breach of the contractor and PMU's requirements. After the second accident, the Bank suspended the project for several months until investigations took place and the affected families were compensated.

According to the ICR (p. 38) the Bank provided several recommendations to improve construction and environmental and social compliance during the April 2018 mission. These recommendations included the installation of a safety retention tank, storage tank of fuel for the company's life base, improvement of ports and equipment for personnel protection, and strengthening of traffic signaling in the work areas. The project implemented these recommendations, hired a full-time environmental and social specialist. The environmental and social risk was decreased from High to Substantial in the seventh ISR and remained Substantial until project closing.

## **b. Fiduciary Compliance**

### **Procurement:**

The ICR (p. 32) stated that procurement for most of the project was being implemented or completed by the time of project approval. According to the ICR (p. 36) when the project closed, an external auditor assessed the entire procurement process and concluded that the project's procurement complied with the Bank's procedures and provisions of the Financing Agreement.

### **Financial Management:**

According to the ICR (p. 37) none of the audits identified any accountability issues in the project's financial management. The Bank team stated (January 31, 2020) that the external auditor's opinion was unqualified and submitted in a timely manner.

## **c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)**

NA

## **d. Other**

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### 11. Ratings

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	
Bank Performance	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Shortcomings in M&E which were not addressed during implementation
Quality of M&E	Modest	Modest	
Quality of ICR	---	Substantial	

### 12. Lessons

The ICR (p. 41-42) provided useful lessons learned which were adapted by IEG:

- **Embedding a maintenance program in the design of a climate-resilient infrastructure project is critical for ensuring the sustainability of past and future investments.** This project did not include a maintenance program and among the risks to its development outcomes are the lack of financing for the maintenance of urban infrastructure and roads.
- **Building capacity for climate-resilient road asset management at the national and local level allows to move away from a reactive decision-making process to a risk-based approach.** In this project, an investment program was combined with road asset and DRM activities to build local capacity.
- **Using the local market for labor-intensive works ensures to build local capacity and community ownership.** This project procured certain activities such as spots improvement and drainage structure construction from the local market which allowed for the hiring of local women and youth.

### 13. Assessment Recommended?

No

### 14. Comments on Quality of ICR

The project provided a good overview of project preparation and implementation. The ICR was internally consistent and sufficiently candid. The identified lessons learned were useful. The ICR did not provide sufficient evidence to conclude the outcomes. In addition, the ICR did not provide any detailed information on the project’s Financial Management, procurement and M&E implementation. Finally, the ICR would have benefited from including a unit cost analysis for the infrastructure works and compare it with similar emergency projects.



**a. Quality of ICR Rating**  
Substantial