



<b>1. Project Data:</b>		<b>Date Posted :</b> 06/10/2003	
<b>PROJ ID:</b> P070268		<b>Appraisal</b>	<b>Actual</b>
<b>Project Name:</b> Tp-emergency School Readiness Project	<b>Project Costs (US\$M)</b>	13.90	13.90
<b>Country:</b> Timor-Leste	<b>Loan/Credit (US\$M)</b>	13.90	13.90
<b>Sector(s):</b> Board: ED - Primary education (43%), Secondary education (43%), Central government administration (14%)	<b>Cofinancing (US\$M)</b>	0.0	0.0
<b>L/C Number:</b>			
	<b>Board Approval (FY)</b>		00
<b>Partners involved :</b>	<b>Closing Date</b>	06/30/2001	06/30/2002
<b>Prepared by :</b>	<b>Reviewed by :</b>	<b>Group Manager :</b>	<b>Group:</b>
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**2. Project Objectives and Components**

**a. Objectives**

The project supported the School System Revitalization Program. The objectives were to: (i) provide school-age children and youth with opportunities for education at a basic operational level, that is, having safe school buildings with basic furniture, textbooks and learning materials, and management support; (ii) promote social mobilization and community participation for the creation of a modern school system; (iii) build up the capacity of school system managers; and (iv) support policy development.

**b. Components**

The components were: (a) rebuilding school physical infrastructure with community participation (US\$8.75m, 63% of estimated total costs) for school rehabilitation, provision of basic furniture and construction of 4 prototype schools; (b) providing schools with teaching-learning materials (US\$3.2m, 23 % of total costs); (c) social mobilization and communications (US\$0.15 m, 1 % of total costs) for identification of audiences and media, production of communication materials; (d) policy development (US\$0.50m, 3.6 % of total costs) for school mapping and studies; and (e) implementation management support (US\$1.3m, 9.3% of total costs).

**c. Comments on Project Cost, Financing and Dates**

The project was estimated to cost US\$13.9m and was financed entirely by a grant, part of a Trust Fund for East Timor, administered by the World Bank. Rebuilding the school infrastructure amounted to 92% of estimated costs, because of lower than expected sub-contracting costs for rehabilitation. The savings from the rehabilitation sub-component were used to rehabilitate additional classrooms, procuring more furniture and construction of an additional prototype school. Project management costs amounted to US\$2.08m, 60% above estimated costs because the project was extended for one year.

**3. Achievement of Relevant Objectives:**

-The primary objective of providing basic educational opportunity for the estimated targets was satisfactorily achieved. By rehabilitating 2, 780 classrooms in 535 schools, and providing basic furniture (2,000 sets for teachers and 72, 484 sets for students) and teaching materials (2,063,517 books), more children had access to safe and equipped schools than prior to the emergency. The number of classrooms rehabilitated was 32% higher (3012 classrooms) than appraisal targets because of increased demand. However, an anticipated double shift failed, and only 52% of current enrollments can be accommodated in the rehabilitated schools. Due to a lack of space, enrollments were lower than expected.

-Communications for a range of stake holders included press releases, videotapes, messages for TV and radio and brochures in 4 different languages. There was some community participation in the project;

however, there were no specific activities aimed at enhancing the capacity of the school system managers. Nonetheless, the capacity to manage school physical infrastructure, select learning materials, and mobilize the community for furniture and learning materials distribution has been improved .  
 -Support to policy development was limited to school mapping; since the work was carried out during an unstable period, demographic data may now be obsolete. Nonetheless, the data can be used as the basis for building an information system. Other activities such as study tours, workshops were not implemented .

**4. Significant Outcomes/Impacts:**

The management capacity of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Youth and Sports, particularly district education offices was enhanced with respect to school infrastructure, selection and procurement of textbooks, distribution of furniture and learning materials .

The involvement of communities in the distribution and assembly of furniture & learning materials has led to a more collaborative relationship between schools and their communities, and revitalized parent-teacher associations.

Capacities of local engineers and architects in construction design, procurement, management and supervision of works, and local carpenters in production and business management have been strengthened.

**5. Significant Shortcomings (including non-compliance with safeguard policies):**

There were delays in implementing the social mobilization and communications interventions . School maintenance has been desultory. There were no activities aimed at organizing school rehabilitation committees as specified in the project documents . The impact of interventions was not assessed. Double shifting was not implemented as envisaged, thus reducing the total number of beneficiaries .

<b>6. Ratings:</b>	<b>ICR</b>	<b>OED Review</b>	<b>Reason for Disagreement /Comments</b>
<b>Outcome:</b>	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	[the ICR's 4-point scale does not allow for a "moderately sat." rating]. Even taking into account the unpredictability of the implementation environment, the fact remains that only 52% of current enrollments can be accommodated in the rehabilitated schools. The outcome is therefore not entirely satisfactory .
<b>Institutional Dev .:</b>	Modest	Modest	
<b>Sustainability:</b>	Likely	Likely	
<b>Bank Performance:</b>	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	
<b>Borrower Perf .:</b>	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	
<b>Quality of ICR:</b>		Satisfactory	

**NOTE:** ICR rating values flagged with '\*' don't comply with OP/BP 13.55, but are listed for completeness.

**7. Lessons of Broad Applicability:**

-The design of education projects, particularly in crisis situations, must take into account the uncertainties, fluidity and peculiar situations which prevail, and therefore maintain a high degree of flexibility, identify alternative mechanisms for delivery of inputs, and include monitoring indicators which reflect incremental stages of achievement. There would be need for special procedures to address both the immediate needs resulting from the crisis as well as the institutional and other developmental aspects . This would include guidelines for making prompt adjustments to the scope and interventions, and elaborating policies within an evolving context.

-Social mobilization and public communication are important for promoting empowerment, ownership, collaboration between schools and communities . These interventions need to be carefully planned, with clear objectives, target audiences and appropriate media identified, and should include monitoring and evaluation indicators.

-In post-conflict situations, involvement of local suppliers is likely to require technical assistance in order to strengthen capacity, and may not be cost-effective in the short -run; however, in the medium to long term, the opportunity for capacity enhancement is likely to result in improved efficiency and effectiveness .

-Particularly where schools are rehabilitated only to a basic minimum level, there is need for provision for continuous upgrading and maintenance to avoid loss of investments .

**8. Assessment Recommended?** ● Yes ○ No

**Why?** The Bank can derive important lessons from further analysis to enhance its capacity to design and implement post conflict social investment projects.

**9. Comments on Quality of ICR:**

The ICR provides an insightful analysis of the issues related to planning and implementing an education project in a post-conflict emergency situation. It highlights important lessons for policy analysis and development to meet these peculiar needs. There are discrepancies between the data on total project costs in Annex 2 which provides an erroneous figure of US\$41.70 m and the text, paragraph 5.4, which indicates the correct figure of US\$13.9 m.